Personnel Politics: Elections, ClientelisticCompetition, and Teacher Hiring in
Indonesia
Jan H. Pierskalla∗ and Audrey Sacks†
∗Department of Political Science, The Ohio State University†GPSURR, World Bank
June 25, 2018
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Motivation
Source: Jakarta Post
Pierskalla and Sacks Personnel Politics 2 / 21
Motivation
12.5
15.0
17.5
20.0
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010Year
Rea
lized
Exp
% o
f Tot
al
Source: World Bank 2013
Pierskalla and Sacks Personnel Politics 3 / 21
Motivation
39%
75%
2%
−0.7%
60%
8%
13%
25%
Contract PNS
0
250000
500000
750000
1000000
TK
SD
SM
P
SM
A
TK
SD
SM
P
SM
A
School Type
Num
ber Year
2006
2008
2010
Source: World Bank Teacher Census
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Motivation
United StatesMalaysia
High incomeThailand
IndonesiaChina
SingaporeJapan
United KingdomVietnam
Korea, Rep.Lower middle incomeLow & middle income
WorldMiddle income
MyanmarMongolia
Lao PDPhilippinesCambodia
0 10 20 30 40 50Student−Teacher Ratio, Primary School
JapanIndonesia
High incomeMalaysia
United KingdomSingapore
United StatesChina
Korea, Rep.MongoliaVietnamThailand
WorldLao PD
Middle incomeLow & middle incomeLower middle income
CambodiaMyanmar
Philippines
0 10 20 30
Student−Teacher Ratio, Secondary School
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Motivation
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Motivation
Failures in the Education Sector
- Weak student learning outcomes (e.g., PISA scores)
- Inefficient spending, especially on teachers (salaries and certification)
- Teacher absenteeism (10-19%)
- Rampant cheating in national exams
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Motivation
Failures in the Education Sector
- Weak student learning outcomes (e.g., PISA scores)
- Inefficient spending, especially on teachers (salaries and certification)
- Teacher absenteeism (10-19%)
- Rampant cheating in national exams
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Motivation
(Small) Research Question
What is the effect of electoral competition on teacher hiring in Indonesia?
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Motivation
(Bigger) Research Questions
1 What is the effect of democratization on public goods provision?2 What role does electoral competition play for bureaucratic quality?3 What happens to clientelism when competition between elites
intensifies?
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Argument
Elections and the Bureaucracy
The positive story:
- Voters demand the delivery of high quality public goods and services
- Elections discipline politicians in charge of the civil service
- Meritocracy in the civil service is essential for effective service delivery
→ Elections ought to improve governance of the civil service
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Argument
Elections and the Bureaucracy
The positive story:- Voters demand the delivery of high quality public goods and services
- Elections discipline politicians in charge of the civil service
- Meritocracy in the civil service is essential for effective service delivery
→ Elections ought to improve governance of the civil service
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Argument
Budget Cycles and Clientelism
...but:
- Elections in a post authoritarian, developing country setting are oftendifferent
• Autocratic elites• Low information environment• Weak rule of law• Low credibility of partisan platforms
→ Clientelism is prevalent (Hanusch & Keefer 2013, 2014)→ Elections lead to competition between clientelistic elites
- Bureaucrats are essential cogs in the clientelistic machine• Direct vote and turnout buying via targeted exchange• Colonizing the civil service to gain control over discretionary resources• Control over the election process
- Form of Geddes’ Politician’s Dilemma
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Argument
Budget Cycles and Clientelism
...but:- Elections in a post authoritarian, developing country setting are often
different• Autocratic elites• Low information environment• Weak rule of law• Low credibility of partisan platforms
→ Clientelism is prevalent (Hanusch & Keefer 2013, 2014)→ Elections lead to competition between clientelistic elites
- Bureaucrats are essential cogs in the clientelistic machine• Direct vote and turnout buying via targeted exchange• Colonizing the civil service to gain control over discretionary resources• Control over the election process
- Form of Geddes’ Politician’s Dilemma
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Argument
Observable Implications
- Patronage jobs are an important currency in clientelistic exchangesH1: An increase in electoral competitiveness will increase hiringin the civil service.
- Patronage hiring will be particularly pronounced in election years(Hanusch & Keefer 2013, 2014)
H2: There will be an increase in civil service hiring and financialrewards in election years.
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Empirical Analysis
Empirical Strategy
- An analysis of direct district elections in Indonesia- Why?
1 Relevant case more
2 (Plausibly) exogenous and staggered phasing-in of elections in 2005 →Causal identification more Balance
3 Detailed census data for the education sector (2+ million teachers,2006, 2008, 2010):
- Hiring in the education sector- Certification rates for teachers
- Panel data analysis with parallel trends assumption more
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Empirical Analysis
Direct Election Effect, Hiring
Direct
Indirect
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
Number of Contract Teachers
Ele
ctio
n Ty
pe
Direct
Indirect
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
Number of PNS TeachersE
lect
ion
Type
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Empirical Analysis
Election Year Effect, Hiring
Election
Non−Election
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
Number of Contract Teachers
Type
of Y
ear
Election
Non−Election
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
Number of PNS TeachersTy
pe o
f Yea
r
More Results
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Empirical Analysis
Election Year Effect, Certification
●
●
●
●
Direct Election
Post−Election Year
Election Year
Pre−Election Year
−3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8Regression Coefficient
District Level
●
●
●
●
Direct Election
Post−Election Year
Election Year
Pre−Election Year
−0.07−0.04−0.01 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.11 0.14Regression Coefficient
Individual−Level
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Empirical Analysis
Distortions?
- No aggregate improvement in student learning- Contract teachers in election years have lower levels of educational
attainment• 3.35 vs. 3.41 out of 7, difference of 0.057 significant below the 0.01%
level• No difference for civil servant teachers
- We know that contract teachers have higher absenteeism rates- Contract teachers often pressure for conversion to PNS status →
huge fiscal implications- Randomized evaluation finds no effect of certification (de Ree et al.
2016)
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Empirical Analysis
Distortions
- RCT designed to estimate the effects of the teacher certificationprogram collected student-level test score data in math, sciences,Indonesian and English language skills for over 80,000 students in 20districts in 2011 and 2012.
- We match these individual-level learning data to our data estimateand find:
1 Districts with more contract teachers score worse on math, sciences,and English language scores (2011 data only)
2 Election years have no average effect but out of 36 district-subjectareas with elections, 10 had a statistically significant and negativeeffect on student learning, while only five had positive effects and theremaining recorded non-significant effects (2011-12 data with studentfixed effects).
- This suggests that elections and contract teacher hiring is notbeneficial and potentially disruptive.
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Empirical Analysis
Heterogeneous Effects
●
●
Election Year, Golkar
Election Year, Non−Golkar
−1.0 −0.8 −0.6 −0.4 −0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0Effect Size
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Conclusion
Conclusion
- Clear presence of election-related distortions in the education sector- Hiring follows a political logic- Effect varies with context factors- This matters for service delivery, democratic accountability,
democratic consolidation- Clientelism is not only about vote buying, but also building machines
inside the bureaucracy- Competitive elections might not lead to the selection of leaders that
push for a meritocratic civil service.
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Conclusion
Open Questions
1 Other context factors that matter?2 Do parties matter?3 Does this extend to other parts of the bureaucracy?
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Appendix
Why the Indonesian Education Sector?
- General context fits:• Before democratization, centralized form of clientelism• After democratization competition between clientelistic elites intensifies• District governments gain control over staff and expenditures
- Clientelist practices are commonplace in the education sector:• District governments manage schools and teachers• Teaching positions are used as political rewards• Teachers are used as vote canvassers, man polling stations• Teachers themselves are an important voting bloc• Teachers are centrally embedded in social networks• Teachers are rent generators via school fees• → they act as organizational brokers (Holland & Palmer-Rubin 2015)
Back to Research Design
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Appendix
The Election Schedule
- 1999-2004 indirect → Candidates only need narrow elite support
- 2005- direct (plurality and 30%) → Candidates also need to win(some) mass support
- (Plausibly) exogenous and staggered phasing-in of elections (Skoufiaset al. 2014)
- Districts with and without elections are balanced on covariates
→ provides good counterfactuals
Back to Research Design
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Appendix
Balance Statistics
Table: Balance Statistics for Elections 2005
Variable Mean Treatment Mean Control T-test p-value KS Bootstrap p-valueGolkar Share 0.24 0.25 0.57 0.60PDI-P Share 0.19 0.19 0.86 0.29
Services Provision 0.23 0.03 0.04 0.06Natural Resource Revenue pc 52383 113022 0.15 0.008
Inequality 25.6 25.6 0.91 0.62Total Revenue pc 789360 937316 0.09 0.32
log Population 13 12.85 0.19 0.15Poverty Share 0.18 0.17 0.64 0.44
log GDP pc 1.58 1.59 0.94 0.54ELF 0.43 0.41 0.42 0.348
Back to Research Design
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Appendix
Model Specification
yit = αi + γt + τ ·Dit−1 + δt−1 · Eit−1 + δ · Eit + δt+1 · Eit+1 + β′xit−1 + εit
- yit our outcome measures (teacher data for 2006, 2008, and 2010)- αi and γt are fixed effects- τ is the effect for the introduction of direct elections- δ’s capture election cycles- Controls: incumbency, Golkar and PDI-P vote shares, quality of
public services, total revenue pc, nat resource rev pc, Gini index,poverty, GDP pc, population size
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Appendix
Election Year Effect, Hiring, Civil Servant Share
●
●
●
●
Direct Election
Post−Election Year
Election Year
Pre−Election Year
−0.20 −0.15 −0.10 −0.05 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15Regression Coefficient
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