MEXICALI BLUES: COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS AMONG THE BAJA CALIFORNIA
CHINESE
Michael Jenkins
A Thesis Submitted to the
University of North Carolina Wilmington in Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts
Department of History
University of North Carolina at Wilmington
2011
Approved by
Advisory Committee
Eva Mehl Michael Huner
Yixin Chen
Chair
Accepted by
______________________________
Dean, Graduate School
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract .............................................................................................................................. iii
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................ iv
Dedication ............................................................................................................................v
Introduction ..........................................................................................................................1
Chapter 1: Mexicali Blues ...................................................................................................7
Chapter 2: Home on the Range: The Chinese in Mexicali Life ........................................26
Chapter 3: Border Wars .....................................................................................................43
Conclusions and Goodbyes ................................................................................................57
Community Organizations and Integration ............................................................59
A Theory for Mexicali ...........................................................................................61
Bibliography ......................................................................................................................73
iii
Abstract
The Chinese began immigrating to Mexico before the establishment of the modern
Mexican state. Spanish trading galleons, bound for the Philippines, linked Mexico to the East
Asia, and brought the initial wave of Chinese immigration. In 1635, a group of Spanish barbers
in Mexico City complained about competition from their Chinese counterparts. Initially a
trickle, Chinese immigration increased in the 19th
century, as economic modernization and
expansion into the frontier created a demand for labor and investment opportunity. This brought
Chinese workers from their homeland, and Chinese investors from the United States. After
1882, The Chinese Exclusion Act prevented Chinese immigrants from entering the US directly.
Due to its proximity to the US and its economic opportunities, Northern Mexico, became an
attractive alternative.
This research will focus on a particular community in the Northwest: Mexicali, Baja
California. In many respects, the Chinese community in Mexicali proves exceptional. Their role
in the foundation of the city and its economic development, and the efforts of the various
Chinese community organizations which shaped civic life placed the Mexicali Chinese into a
unique position, unlike most other communities in the Diaspora. Using the aforementioned
community organizations as an entry point, this thesis will explore the history of the Mexicali
Chinese, and the factors that made them unique.
iv
Acknowledgements
My most profound thanks go out to Dr. Paul Gillingham, whose enthusiasm for Mexico
got me started down this path. This work, such as it is, would have been impossible without his
friendship and guidance.
I would like to offer further thanks to my committee, whose boundless patience and
enthusiasm were vital to the completion of this work. Likewise, thanks go to Dr. David La Vere
and Dr. Lisa Pollard, without whom our graduate experience would not have been as rewarding.
The Department of History of the University of North Carolina at Wilmington is blessed a
remarkable faculty, and I am grateful for the opportunities they offered. Special recognition goes
to Dr. Michael Seidman, Dr. Glenn Harris, and Dr. Taylor Fain, who contributed so much to my
graduate studies, in ways great and small.
The wonderful folks on the staff of Randall Library were an invaluable resource
throughout this research, and I owe them more than I can say.
Amanda Gendreau’s enduring friendship was often the only thing that kept me hanging
on, and I can only offer my eternal gratitude in return. Similar thanks must go out to the Port
City Low Lifes—you know who you are—whose companionship offered the occasional and
much needed respite from academic life.
And, as always, my parents deserve all due credit and respect for showing me that it
could, in fact, be done.
v
Dedication
My research would have been incomplete without the unique perspective and guidance of
Dr. Andrew Clark, whose presence was sorely missed as my thesis moved toward completion.
As such, it is dedicated it to his memory.
Introduction
This thesis grew from an unlikely inspiration: a short article in a culinary magazine. The
author offered a short piece of travelogue form the US/Mexico border, outlining the number and
variety of Chinese restaurants in Mexicali, Baja California, the region’s unique fusion of Chinese
and Mexican cuisine, and—briefly—the history of the Chinese in Mexicali. Their story seemed
exceptional; a cursory review of the literature on the Chinese Diaspora failed to reveal a
comparable community anywhere. This had not escaped scholarly attention. From the 1930s
until the present, a considerable body of secondary literature has emerged both the city and its
Chinese community. Exceptional in its history, geography, and economic development, Mexicali
offers many points of entry for academic inquiry.
Herein, I will attempt an original contribution to the historiography of the Chinese in
Mexico. Structured as a case study, this thesis has an elusively simple goal: an exploration and
elucidation of the factors which shaped Mexicali into a sui generis community for the Chinese in
the Americas. This is necessarily a complex endeavor, requiring both a comprehensive review of
the secondary literature and the use of primary sources, chiefly in Spanish. An accident of
historical timing made the latter much easier. Settled in the early years of the 20th
century,
Mexicali developed something resembling modern urban life fairly quickly, including detailed
maps, government records, and newspapers. These sources provide insight into the size and
shape of the Mexicali Chinese community, and its role in political and economic life at the local
and state level. They also help connect the Mexicali Chinese with the broader context of political
and social events in Mexico and the US.
The first chapter of this thesis presents the history of both Mexicali and, briefly, the
Chinese in Mexico. The former is a relatively recent development, as the city was formally
2
founded on March 14th
, 1903. The latter has a much longer history than is commonly
understood, as Chinese settlement in Mexico dates back to the 16th
century, and the two nations
share a colonial history due to the galleon trade to the Philippines. In comparing the two, the
unique nature of Mexicali becomes apparent immediately. The Chinese settler who founded
Mexicali took a very different path to the city than their counterparts across the rest of Mexico.
Present from the beginning, they arrived in the Colorado River Valley due to a complex series of
political and economic events, ranging from US immigration policy to international water rights
and the agricultural development of Mexico’s last frontier. This portrait immediately situations
the Mexicali Chinese as both a trans-national and a trans-border community, whose economic
and social ties reached out to China and the United States as much as the rest of Mexico. It also
establishes the way in which the Chinese were able to integrate relatively seamlessly with the
non-Chinese in Mexicali. Their founding role in the community, economic position, and gender
demographics led them to form a different set of relationships with both the native Mexicans and
other immigrants. Finally, this chapter will also explore the theoretical frame which shapes this
thesis and its approach to the material. Broadly this will entail a critique of the bodies of theory
normally used to approach diaspora communities. In describing why the conventional theory is
inappropriate for this research, we seek to understand both the limits of theory and shed further
light on the nature of Mexicali.
The second chapter focuses on a set of social mechanisms which enabled the Chinese to
thrive in Mexicali. Community organizations among the Mexicali Chinese were key in the
development of the community’s unique character and identity. Community organizations were
responsible for bringing new immigrants to town, helping them to establish themselves upon
arrival. These organizations moderated business practices and local politics, served as a point of
3
contact and a means of outreach between the Chinese and Mexican populations, and helped to
shield the Mexicali Chinese from the anti-immigrant sentiment which arose all too often. One
must note the variety of distinct community groups which filled these roles. While the most
prevalent among them, the Asociación China or Chinese Association, emerged early and persists
to this day, there were dozens of smaller groups filling various roles. These ranged from
traditional Chinese organizations, based around a common surname or native place, to more
contemporary groups brought together by business interests. In addition to addressing local
interests and issue, these groups were able to reach across borders, maintaining and developing
contact and relationships with their counterparts in the US and China. They were also a strong
source of political advocacy and protection, able to successfully lobby for the Mexicali Chinese
at both the state and national level. This becomes of special importance during the Chinese
expulsions of the early 1930s, as their actions had a measurable impact on the way events in Baja
California played out.
While several scholars have explained the unique development of the Chinese
community in Baja California in economic or demographic terms, a peculiar gap in the
historiography exists around the role of community organizations in the social development and
integration of the Chinese. James Curtis devotes a bit of attention to it in his articles on
Mexicali’s Chinatown, in which he discusses briefly the nature and role of Chinese benevolent
societies and the Asociación China in community life.1 Evelyn Hu-Dehart devotes very little
space to the role such organizations played in protecting the Baja California Chinese from
persecution. These omissions are odd in light of the prominent role that benevolent societies and
the Asociación China in Mexicali life. The Asociación China served as a point of contact
between the Chinese and Mexicans, and engaged in public works for the benefit of the
1 Curtis, James R. “Mexicali’s Chinatown”. Geographical Review. 85:3 (July 1995) p. 342.
4
community as a whole. The benevolent associations had accrued considerable economic and
political influence, as Hu-Dehart notes, and provided support and protection for their members.2
Such community organizations, both Chinese and those of other groups, held a central place in
community life, facilitated economic and social interactions, and held political sway. On a
broader level, Chinese community organizations functioned as transnational entities, linking Baja
California to far reaching social and economic web which spanned North America while
maintaining its roots in China. A detailed examination of their role in the history of Mexicali
will provide deeper insight into the unique nature of this border community.
The role of the Chinese in Mexico was never entirely secure. The rough-and-ready
nature of any frontier setting presented problems for all newcomers, regardless of race, but the
often rocky reception of the Chinese by the local Mexican communities in which they tried to
settle presented other, unique issues. Virulent xenophobia was common, with many ugly
incidents during the late 19th
and early 20th
centuries. These culminated most famously in the
Chinese expulsions of the 1930s, during which large number of Chinese settlers were forced to
leave the Mexican border states under threat of violence. While the Chinese expulsions are, in
general, very well-researched and understood, the secondary literature on the anti-Chinese
movement in Baja California is strangely lacking. There seems to be a broadly-held notion that
anti-Chinese violence didn’t make it that far, and that the Mexican population of the state was
largely uninterested in taking part in such a thing. This is often attributed to the strength of the
Chinese communities in Mexicali and Enseñada, both as founders of the community and as
2 Hu-Dehart, Evelyn. "The Chinese of Baja California Norte, 1910-1934," Baja California and the North Mexican
Frontier, Proceedings of the Pacific Coast Council on Latin American Studies, vol. 12, 1985-86 (San Diego State
University Press).
Hu-Dehart, Evelyn. "Immigrants to a Developing Society. The Chinese in Northern Mexico, 1975-1932." Journal
of Arizona History, 21 (autumn 1980): pp. 49-85.
5
political entities. While it is true that anti-Chinese violence in Baja California never reached the
levels found in Sonora or Chihuahua, there is more to the story. A closer look at US diplomatic
records, however, reveals that the situation was far more complex than generally believed. US
and Chinese diplomats were greatly concerned about the threat of violence in the region, and
worked closely with both Mexican authorities and local Chinese leaders in an effort to prevent
such events from taking place. This must not be mistaken for altruism on the part of the US;
rather, diplomatic records repeatedly mention concerns about illegal immigration and a flood of
unwanted migrants crossing the border.
The final chapter deals, in part, with a darker side of the history of Mexicali. The
beneficial, community oriented actions of the community groups discussed above found a
counterbalance in a new kind of organization as various modes of organized crime emerged in
Mexicali. . Due to the political situation in the US and Mexico, Mexicali became a locus point
for trans-border crime during the Prohibition era. Additional violence arrived as the frontier
town became more closely tied to other communities on either side of the border, and the politics
of broader world introduced political rivalries that often resulted in bloodshed. Mexicali’s social
unique position geographically and socially is responsible for these events. Its border location
and trans-national identity served to bring together the collection of people, organizations, and
issues that led regrettably to crime and violence. Traditional Chinese criminal organizations, the
infamous Tongs of southern China, infiltrated the Mexicali community in order to take
advantage of its unique potential for criminal profit. This chapter takes on a depressing degree
of relevance to the contemporary situation in the Mexican border states, as the crime and
violence that filled Mexicali in the 20s and 30s, centered around illegal recreational substances
and immigration, provides a prologue for the current cartel wars.
6
As mentioned before, this thesis is a case study. While that term has taken on a loaded
connotation in academic discourse—no one wants to be accused of ‘only writing a case study’—
they remain of fundamental importance. A close examination of one community and its history
reveals both its uniqueness and expands our understanding of the broader issues. In this case the
history and character set Mexicali apart from the rest of the diaspora. Due to its character and
makeup, it defies both easy comparison and the conventional theoretical approaches which have
been applied to immigrant communities for the last century and a half. This exception proves the
rule, in the sense that it tests our understanding and approach to the material and may force us to
reconsider them.
7
Chapter 1: Mexicali Blues3
Introduction
This chapter will introduce the “faces and places” which comprise this thesis, and will
attempt to establish, in part the sui generis nature of Mexicali and its Chinese residents. Mexico
has a long and often complex history of Chinese immigration, which forms the basis of the
narrative into which we inquire. This chapter will introduce that history, beginning with the first
connections between China and Mexico, the boom in Chinese immigration as a result of the
changes brought by the 19th
century, and the social and political responses by Mexicans and their
government. The focus will then shift to the story of Mexicali itself, the way in which it was
founded, and the roles played by American business interests, the Mexican authorities, and
Chinese investors and laborers. Particular attention will be paid to the development of
community life in Mexicali and the ways in which Chinese immigrants and their Mexican
neighbors interacted. This chapter will close with a discussion of the theoretical approaches used
in the study of overseas Chinese communities, and the reasons they fail to fully describe or
explain the Mexicali Chinese, whose historical circumstances led to the creation of a unique
diaspora community.
A Chinese Frontier
As a result of the galleon trade with the Phillipines, Mexico’s connections with China
began early. Mexico’s vast mineral wealth was exchanged, via Pacific trade routes, for the
luxury goods of the Far East. This economic interaction soon lead to migration and settlement.
In 1635 a group of Spanish barbers in Mexico City complained about competition from their
Chinese counterparts. They successfully petitioned the viceroy to restrict Chinese business
3 “Mexicali Blues” is the title of a song by the iconic group The Grateful Dead. A story oof crime, punishment, and
alienation, in many ways it resonates with the themes of this thesis.
8
activity to special quarters on the edges of town, allowing Spanish business to proceed
unhindered by the chinos de Manila.4 This ghettoization was an early example of the place the
Chinese would occupy in Mexican society. The multi-ethnic social order of Colonial Mexico
had space for white, black, and Indian, along with any possible permutation thereof. The term
chino assumed derogatory overtones, referring not only to Chinese immigrants but to the racially
mixed offspring of a mulatto and an Indian woman—an especially undesirable combination,
ranking toward the bottom of the Mexican racial hierarchy.
An independent Mexico would find a use for Chinese immigrants, however. The rapidly-
implemented modernizing programs of the Porfirian period necessitated increased immigrant
labor, particularly on the northwestern frontier. Unlike their cousins in the US, these Chinese
immigrants to Mexico in general did not seek employment as laborers, but rather engaged in a
variety of entrepreneurial pursuits either independently or in conjunction with US business
interests. This partnership proved especially successful in the border states. Chinese merchants
wisely avoided older, established communities with entrenched European and Mexican
competition. Instead, they focused on the newer settlements growing like weeds around railroad
and mining sites. They were often the first commercial ventures in these new communities,
catering to the needs of the workers and the relatively large and rapid influx of new capital from
abroad.
One should note that the overwhelming majority of Chinese immigrants to Mexico, from
the 1880s onward, were male. Immigration quotas ensured that relatively few Chinese women
were allowed to follow their male counterparts to the new world. This policy in Mexico was
inspired by a similar one in the United States, designed to prevent the establishment of a
4 Pan, Lynn (Ed.). The Encyclopedia of the Chinese Overseas. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1999, p.
256
9
permanent Chinese community and to stave off the possibility that a growing Chinese population
could eventually become a regional or state-level majority. However bigoted or wrong headed,
these restrictions would shape the future of the Chinese community in Mexico, in particular that
of Baja California.5
The number of Chinese in Mexico grew rapidly. By 1910, there were more than 3,000
resident Chinese in the northwest. By 1927, there were nearly 30,000.6 In some states, such as
Sonora, the became a dominant commercial force. They controlled the sale of groceries, dry
good, and hardware. Chinese businesses dominated the artisan and small-scale manufacturing
trades, producing the shoes, clothing, household goods, and the all-important masa. These
businesses both supported and relied on new Chinese immigrants, employing and housing
newcomers until they could establish themselves. Chinese trade markets in much of northern
Mexico were also divided along ethnic lines, selling to the community at large but keeping the
purchasing, producing and trade in-house. In the early 20th
century, only a few isolated regions
of Sonora had no Chinese presence, and as as Pan et al point out, those communities probably
had no stores or shops at all.7 Chinese dominance of commercial life in the region was actually
accelerated by the Revolution, which hampered the creation of new Mexican business ventures
and frightened away Euro-American investment. The Chinese filled the resulting void.8
The social and political role occupied by the majority of Mexico’s Chinese shaped the
response to their presence. The Mexican government, having carefully reviewed the situation in
the US, was initially cautiously optimistic about Chinese immigration and the careful uses
5 Hu-Dehart, Evelyn. “La Comunidad China del Distrito Norte de Baja California”, La Comunidad China del
Distrito Norte de Baja California (1910-1934), Mexicali: Instituto de Investagaciones Historicas del Estado Baja
California, 1992. p 20-23.
Pan, et al 1999, p. 258 6 Pan et al 1999, p. 257
7 Ibid
8 Raymond B. Craib, “Chinese Immigrants in Porfirian Mexico: A Preliminary Study of Settlement, Economic
Activity and Anti-Chinese Sentiment,” The Latin America Institute Research Paper Series (Albuquerque, 1996),
10
thereof . As a Mexican diplomatic official, Matías Romero, wrote while discussing the issue in
1875:
It seems to me that the only colonists who could establish themselves or work on
our coasts are Asians, coming from climates similar to ours, primarily China. The
great population of that vast empire, the fact that many of them are agriculturists,
the relatively low wages they earn, and the proximity of our coast to Asia, means
that Chinese immigration would be the easiest and most convenient to both our
coasts. This is not an idle dream. Chinese immigration has been going on for
years, and wherever it has occurred prudently, the results have been
favorable.9
The Chinese could be a useful tool for both the expansion of industry and the settlement of the
frontier. Certainly the large Mexican capitalists who controlled the heavy industry and national
business were either indifferent to the Chinese or supportive of their presence as a source of
labor. However, the average Mexican, living the world of the village square and the fields
beyond, saw things differently. For those with commercial aspirations, the dream of small
business ownership was often hampered by the apparently insurmountable force of Chinese
competition. As Chinese interests and success expanded, so did this resentment on the part of
working and middle-class Mexicans. An anti-Chinese movement began to grow in north
Mexico, with active anti-Chinese campaigns in 1922 and again in 1924-25. The worst would
come in 1929, when a series of massive and violent demonstrations in Sonora resulting in the
Chinese being expelled form that state by 1931.
9 As quoted in Lim, Julian. “Chinos and Paisanos: Chinese Mexican Relations in the Borderlands” Pacific
Historical Review, Vol. 79, No. 1 p. 59
11
The displaced Chinese headed in many directions: to the US, back to China. Many,
however, stayed in Mexico and tried their luck in Baja California Norte. Baja California was
Mexico’s last frontier, offering the kind of emerging opportunities historically sought by
Mexican Chinese. In addition, the state was far more tolerant than much of the rest of the
country, and after the horrible experience of the Chinese in Sonora must have appeared far more
promising. The early development of Baja California relied on a partnership familiar to most
Mexican Chinese. Yankee investment, in the form of the Colorado River Land Company,
acquired the rights to the agrarian development of the region. The CRLC was owned by
southern Californian investor (and publisher of the Los Angeles Times) Harrison Otis.10
Working
in partnership with his son in law, Harry Chandler, Otis began an investment program in the
extensive development of the Mexicali Valley for cotton production. Due to their business
experiances in California, particularly Los Angeles and the San Francisco Bay area, the two
Americans made the bold choice of partnering with not Mexican or American investors but
Chinese entrepreneurs from California and Northern Mexico.11
10
A large part of the primary source research for this thesis relies on media accounts from the period. As such, this
connection between the CRLC and the LA Times should be noted. 11
Hu-DeHart, Evelyn. “The Chinese of Baja California Norte, 1910–1934,” Proceedings of the Pacific Coast
Council on Latin American Studies, 12 (1985–1986), p. 9
Pan et al 1999, p. 258
12
Images 1 and 2: The relative location of the Mexicali Valley and the Colorado River Land
Company’s holdings in Mexico and Baja California12
12
Images from Curtis, James R. “Mexicali’s Chinatown”. Geographical Review. 85:3 (July 1995)
13
Rather than planting the land themselves, Otis and Chandler invested in the building of
infrastructure and irrigation, and then in turn leased parcels of land to other investors, most of
whom were Chinese. The CRLC supported a synthesis of Chinese and American investment.
Wealthy California Chinese arranged for the importation of labor and leased the land from the
CRLC. American ownership of the infrastructure profited from Chinese efforts, including the
American owned cotton gin, which processed raw, Chinese-grown cotton in return for a share of
the profits. By 1920, the majority of the agrarian output of the Mexicali Valley was a result of
Chinese efforts. They relied heavily on the traditional ethnic networks, well known to Chinese
immigrants in North America and dreaded by their competitors. Importing coolie labor from
China, the CRLC and its Chinese partners also welcomed Chinese refugees from Sonora, many
of whom brought business experience and occasionally capitol with them. Further Chinese
settlements sprang up in other parts of Baja California. The most notable of these was in
14
Ensenada. Rather than agriculture, the Ensenada Chinese recreated their success in the
commercial and retail sectors of the economy. The Chinese community in Mexicali, on the other
hand, proceeded in a unique direction, forging a new city and an unique experience for the
Chinese in Mexico.
Home on the Range
…es una ciudad enteramente china. Las calles, transitadas nada más por chinos,
los restaurants, atestados de chinos, los campos de trabajo, absolumamente
dominados por los chinos. Todo, todo es absolutamente chino en Mexicali.
Excelsior Newspaper, February 3, 192113
The city of Mexicali was formally founded on March 14, 1902, and the Chinese began to
trickle in shortly thereafter. The number of immigrants increased gradually, and by 1919 there
were an estimated 5,000 to 11,000 Chinese residents in the area.14
These new arrivals came form
three predominant source areas: California, Northwestern Mexico, and directly from China.
Socially they fell into two classes. The majority of the Chinese consisted of coolie laborers in
search of work, or imported by the Colorado River Land Company.15
However, due to the
CRLC’s practice of leasing large land parcels to private individuals for development, the
Mexicali valley attracted a number of wealthy Chinese, from San Francisco and Los Angeles,
armed with access to cheap labor and Chinese trade networks. As has been noted previously, the
Colorado River Land Company aggressively and exclusively courted Chinese investors and
contract labor suppliers as partners in developing the region.16
Their inspiration was the success
of many agricultural and railway building projects within the United States, during which the
13
Cardiel Marin, Rosario. “Los Chinos en Baja California Norte: El Caso de Mexicali”, La Comunidad China del
Distrito Norte de Baja California (1910-1934), Mexicali: Instituto de Investagaciones Historicas del Estado Baja
California, 1992. pp 76-77. 14
Curtis, James R. “Mexicali’s Chinatown”. Geographical Review. 85:3 (July 1995) p. 338. 15
Auyon Gerardo, Eduardo. El Dragon en el Desierto: Los Pioneros Chinos en Mexicali. Mexicali: Instituta de
Cultura de Baja California, 1991, pp 44-45. 16
Hu-DeHart, Evelyn. “The Chinese of Baja California Norte, 1910–1934,” Proceedings of the Pacific Coast
Council on Latin American Studies, 12 (1985–1986), p. 9
Pan et al 1999, p. 257
15
“judicious” use of imported coolie labor proved very successful.17
The demand for Chinese
labor also responded to labor movement between Mexico and the US. As many Mexicans
moved north seeking better-paying jobs and temporary employment in the US, Chinese coolie
labor—willing to accept poorer wages and often ugly frontier conditions—moved in to fill the
void. As an alternate approach, poorer Chinese immigrants would pool their resources, sublease
land from their wealthier paisanos, and form a profit-sharing cooperative. Reminiscent of the
U.S. frontier, many Chinese found employment building the new railroad network. These
enterprises were for the most part successful. In 1913 there were 27 Chinese-owned businesses
operating in Mexicali, with a declared value of just over 200,000 pesos.18
By 1919 there were an
estimated 50 Chinese-owned ranchos in the valley, occupying 75,000 acres and producing about
80% of the annual cotton crop.19
A newspaper article dated September 14 1930 indicates that one
local Chinese merchant had become wealthy enough to purchase a private airplane and arrange
for flying lessons from a Mexican Army pilot.20
Relationships between Chinese immigrants and their Mexican neighbors were complex
and dynamic. Many of the typical problems, tensions and biases existed. Mexican workers and
business owners feared Chinese competition. The Chinese themselves had all the fears and
concerns that immigrants bring with them to a new land, as well as those stemming from the
various anti-Chinese movements that would develop in Mexico. However, the unique blending
of Chinese and Mexican that created Mexicali allowed for a much more open and congenial
17
O’Brien, David and Fujita, Stephen “Middleman Minority Concept: Its Explanatory Value in the Case of the
Japanese in California Agriculture” The Pacific Sociological Review, April 1982 Vol. 25 No. 2 pp. 189-190
Lim, Julian. “Chinos and Paisanos: Chinese Mexican Relations in the Borderlands” Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 79, No. 1, pp 58-60 18
Approximately USD $100,000, and a considerable sum at the time.
Hu-Dehart, Evelyn. “La Comunidad China del Distrito Norte de Baja California”, La Comunidad China del
Distrito Norte de Baja California (1910-1934), Mexicali: Instituto de Investagaciones Historicas del Estado Baja
California, 1992. p 24. 19
Curtis, James R. “Mexicali’s Chinatown”. Geographical Review. 85:3 (July 1995) p. 338. 20
Mexican Army Flier Dies in Crash, New York Times, September 14 1930, p. 2.
16
atmosphere than had greeted the Chinese in the rest of the country. Manuel Lee Mancilla, the
son of a Chinese man and a Mexican woman, recalls that there were many Mexican families who
were on good terms with the Chinese, and that friendly personal relationships were not
uncommon.21
This is in part due to the economic ties between the Chinese and Mexican
communities, which fostered mutual interests and eventually personal ties. It is also the result of
the proactive role Chinese community organizations played in civic life, a subject which will be
further explored in the second chapter of this thesis.
Intermarriage, however, remained a contentious issue. The connections forged by labor
and business extended not only into friendship, but also into the romantic realm. Lee Mancilla
recalls that his parents met while working on in the cotton fields and married despite the
opposition of her parents.22
Such marriages were not uncommon. Few Chinese women made it
to Mexico, as a result of immigration quotas. In the years between 1911 and 1928, only 307
Chiense women were recorded as entering Mexico legally—a direct contrast to the number of
Chinese male immigrants, who were counted in the thousands.23
Those who did more often than
not travelled with their husbands. Likewise, most Chinese men arrived in Mexico alone. Many
had wives and families in China, but began to explore other options when return ceased to be
possible or desirable.24
The number of intermarriages grew, despite attempts at anti-
miscegenation legislation and the social bias against “mixed-race” couples, which often resulted
21
Lee Mancilla, Manuel. Viaje al corazón de la península: Testimonio de Manuel Lee Mancilla ed. Maricela
González Félix (Mexicali, Mex., 2000) pp 22, 61-62. 22
Ibid, p 21-22 23
Lim, 2010, footnote p 72-73. As both Lim and common sense suggest, there is a discrepency between the
recorded number of Chinese female immigrants and the actual growth of that population. However, There were
both male and female illegal migrants, and thus the offical number does give one a sense of proportion.
See also Romero, pp. 119-120 24
Hu-DeHart, Evelyn. “The Chinese of Baja California Norte, 1910–1934,” Proceedings of the Pacific Coast
Council on Latin American Studies, 12 (1985–1986),
Lim, Julian. “Chinos and Paisanos: Chinese Mexican Relations in the Borderlands” Pacific Historical Review,
Vol. 79, No. 1 2010, p. 73
17
in active harassment.25
By 1941, the vast majority of Chinese men in Mexico were coupled with
Mexican women.26
As the number of intermarriages, and the resulting children, increased, so did
the integration of the Mexicali Chinese with their Mexican neighbors. Many saw these unions as
concrete evidence that the Chinese were neither isolationist nor elitist, but rather a full part of the
community who desired equal and open relationships with their neighbors.27
As the Mexicali Chinese flourished, they gained international recognition. Due to the
large number of Chinese habitants, the Republican Chinese government formally established a
consulate in Mexicali in 1925. With the approval of President Calles, Chan Yee-Yat became the
first Vice-Consul. The consulate remained active during the Second World War, but closed in
1949 as a result of political changes in China. After the Republic of China established itself on
the island of Taiwan, the Republican government reopened the consulate in 1959. It remained
active in Mexicali until Mexico broke relations with Taiwan in 1970, after which the consulate
relocated to an office in Calexico, California, just over two miles from its original location.28
Political and social factors also contributed to the growth of Mexicali as a center of
Chinese Mexican life. In 1882, the Congress of the United States passed the Chinese Exclusion
Act, which forbade Chinese immigrants from entering the United States, either directly or via
another country. The Exclusion Act also made it difficult for Chinese immigrants to return to the
US after leaving the country. This disrupted many Chinese businesses on the US side of the
border, in particular traders who had been operating on both sides of la frontera, and Chinese
25
Hu-Dehart, Evelyn. “La Comunidad China del Distrito Norte de Baja California”, La Comunidad China del
Distrito Norte de Baja California (1910-1934), Mexicali: Instituto de Investagaciones Historicas del Estado Baja
California, 1992. p 20-23.
Lee Mancilla, 2010, p 41-42, 60-61 26
Lim, 2010, p. 74 27
Lee Mancilla, 2010, p. 41
Lim 2010, p. 73 28
Auyon Gerardo, Eduardo. El Dragon en el Desierto: Los Pioneros Chinos en Mexicali. Mexicali: Instituta de
Cultura de Baja California, 1991, pp 25-27.
18
fisherman from California ports used to harvesting Abalone in Mexican waters.29
The Exclusion
Act drove many of these entrepreneurs to relocate to Baja California. Mexican policy toward
China contributed the yin to their northern Neighbor’s yang. An 1899 treated between the two
nations actively courted Chinese immigration, promising “free and voluntary” movement
between the two nations and offering a guarantee on paper that Chinese immigrants would have
the same legal rights as Mexican citizens.30
As the Chinese community in the state grew,
Mexicali became a logical point of concentration. So much of Mexicali’s character is a result of
being a border town. Many Chinese, finding themselves barred from entry to the US, saw
Mexicali as a point of access to US markets and trade and as a possible “back door” into the
country.
The reception that the Chinese received from the host country also pushed many
immigrants to Mexicali. The reaction to Chinese immigration in Northern Mexico follows a
broader pattern, seen in 19th
century California and Australia. The Chinese were initially
welcomed as a source of cheap labor in an under populated region. However, their numbers
increased and they began to branch out economically, from manual labor to entrepreneurship,
both agricultural and mercantile. As the northern Mexico Chinese became more successful, local
resentment mounted gradually. The situation became more volatile in May 1911, when over 300
Chinese immigrants were massacred in Torreon, Coahuila.31
Similar incidents, though smaller in
scale, began in Sonora in 1916.32
The excuses for these attacks ran the usual gamut: the Chinese
sold tainted food, sold illegal goods, underpriced their services to compete with local businesses,
29
Abalone are a highly prized delicacy in Cantonese cuisine, and the harvesting and cultivation of abalone formed a
important component of trade in the Chinese Diaspora. 30
Romero, Robert Chao, “The Dragon in Big Lusong: Chinese Immigration and Settlement in Mexico, 1882–1940
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, 2003) pp. 91-97 31
Curtis, James R. “Mexicali’s Chinatown”. Geographical Review. 85:3 (July 1995) p. 339. 32
ibid
19
and catered to all manner of vice. Rumors also abounded that the Chinese were engaged in
opium production, for addicts on both sides of the border. The Sinaloan representative in Mexico
City called for the deportation of Chinese due to the large number of intermarriages in his state.33
While not attempting to excuse the abuse of Chinese immigrants, there may be truth behind some
of these allegations. Diaspora Chinese business typically relied on mutually supporting Chinese
trade networks, and labor was kept in family—practices designed to lower overhead costs. The
advantage this gave Chinese business over their Mexican counterparts is the root cause of this
anger. As Curtis says: “…the general reaction of the host society was that the Chinese were
depriving Mexican citizens of jobs and economic opportunities in both agriculture and
commerce.”34
Anti-Chinese political movements sprang up across northern Mexico, and reached
Mexicali by the early 1930s. However, this xenophobia never took root as it had in Sonora. An
anti-Chinese demonstration in Tijuana on March 4 1934 had to be cancelled for lack of an
audience. Similar scheduled public demonstrations in Mexicali also failed to materialize. There
are a few reasons why the Anti-Chinese movement was unsuccessful in northern Baja California.
The initially low population density of the region helped disperse the tension. As some of the
earliest pioneers to settle the Mexicali Valley, the Chinese were socially and economically
entrenched in the community. While it is difficult to verify Governor Olachea’s claim that the
33
“Asks Mexico to Ban Chinese”, Special Cable to the New York Times, New York Times, November 19 1930, p.
10.
As has been noted, there were very few women among the Chinese in Mexico, leading to a large number of
marriages between Chinese men and Mexican women. Generally, the children of these marriages were considered
Chinese. This led to concerns that the Chinese would eventually “breed out” the Mexican nationals or do irreperable
damage to the nation’s genetic stock. See Hu-Dehart, Evelyn. “La Comunidad China del Distrito Norte de Baja
California”, La Comunidad China del Distrito Norte de Baja California (1910-1934), Mexicali: Instituto de
Investagaciones Historicas del Estado Baja California, 1992. p 20-23, and Lim, Julian. “Chinos and Paisanos:
Chinese Mexican Relations in the Borderlands” Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 79, No. 1 2010, p. 70-76 34
It should be noted that contemporary Mexican scholars are not unaware of the irony in this, vis-à-vis the current
issues in the U.S. regarding Mexican immigration. Curtis, James R. “Mexicali’s Chinatown”. Geographical
Review. 85:3 (July 1995) p 341
20
Chinese had paid off politicians in the capital, it must be noted that in Mexico City on February
24 1932, Deputy Jose Maria Davila, representing the northern district of Baja California publicly
called for an end to the Anti-Chinese campaigns—ostensibly in support of the Republic of China
then under attack by Japan.35
Demographically, The Chinese were the majority in Mexicali until
the end of the 1920s, and as late as the waning years of the 1930s constituted up to a third of the
population.36
As the well-organized majority, they exerted considerable social and economic
influence.
On Theory; and the Limits Thereof
The study of immigration and immigrant communities has spawned a large body of
theoretical approaches. An exploration of these, and their limitations, provides further insights
into the history of the Mexicali Chinese community and the historical process and characteristics
which make it unique.
Originally applied to European Jews—and often used in discussion of overseas Chinese
communities--Weber’s Pariah Capitalism is an obvious starting point. The conventional
understanding is that as “the other”, Diaspora Chinese economic success is based on in-group
solidarity, mutual and reciprocal support, and ethnic social and economic networks. As James
Curtis points out, in many respects this applies perfectly to the Mexicali Chinese community.
The Chinese in Mexicali utilized Chinese labor almost exclusively, drawing on ethnic loyalty to
supply jobs for new arrivals as well as utilizing cheap labor to keep overhead low. The Chinese
also integrated vertically into the economy, creating a self-supporting trade network. Informal
lending institutions, or hui, provided startup capital for new arrivals. These patterns of
development are consistent with Weber’s theory and support traditional views of the Diaspora
35
“Mexican Champions China”. Special Cable to the New York Times. New York Times, Feb 25, 1932, p. 8. 36
Arreola, Daniel D and Curtis, James R. The Mexican Border Cities: Landscape, Anatomy and Place Personality
Tucson, 1993, pp. 21-22
21
Chinese as a transnational entity.37
An initial examination of the role of the various Chinese
organizations supports this. The native place and surname organizations supplied many services
for new arrivals ranging from housing and employment to transportation in and out of the
country. The Asociación China’s business, legal and mediation services also helped to insulate
and support the community. An illicit version of this emerges with Tongs’ illegal activities.
Human smuggling, bootlegging, and the drug trade, carried out quite literally underground on
both sides of the border situated the Chinese Tongs as groups of permanent outsiders, engaged in
black market pariah capitalism. The Tong violence that plagued Mexicali in the 1920s also
situates that community as part of a broader, transnational wave of violence brought about in part
by disputes far beyond the local level.
However, many of the economic and social activities in which the Mexicali Chinese took
part undercut a clean adoption of the Weber’s approach. In Diaspora Chinese communities
around the world, Chinese small-business ventures tend to focus on things like shop keeping,
tailoring, and the archetypal Laundromat. Much of the Mexicali Chinese economy focuses on
these activities. However, the Mexicali Chinese also made durable, long term investments in
agriculture and the civic infrastructure of the city. It is difficult to liquidate an office building
quickly, and impossible to transport a cotton plantation. The social and political activities of the
community further undermine the use of Weber’s idea. For reasons discussed previously,
Chinese men in Mexicali intermarried freely with Mexican women. The local Chinese were also
extremely active in civic life, via local politics, charitable work, and community organizations.
These activities situation them firmly outside the sphere of Weber’s pariahs, despite the ethnic
difference which sometimes strained the community.
37
Curtis, James R. “Mexicali’s Chinatown”. Geographical Review. 85:3 (July 1995) p. 342.
22
Work has been done along this line of inquiry since Weber, much of it a house built on
his foundation. Originally advanced by Blalock in 1967, the idea of the “middleman minority” is
the theoretical approach most commonly applied to Chinese communities in the Diaspora.38
Its
continued appeal is, in part, due to its flattery of the post-modern world view. The middleman
minority thesis supposes that some minority groups occupy a special niche in a community, of
social and economic mediation. This position is defined by a series of structural constraints
which bars the middleman group from mainstream economic pursuits, while allowing them to
exploit their own “adaptive capacities” for economic gain. It further suggests that, while the
middleman groups face continued and often violent discrimination, that their social position is
not marked by sustained and extreme subordinate status.
The criteria used to qualify a group for middleman status are often ill-defined.39
A
survey of the core literature on the subject reveals that four general ideas appear most often,
though the degree of explication and emphasis may vary:
1) A “Middle Position” in the social strata of the community. Middleman
minorities either occupy the middle ranks of a rigid class or racial system, or act
as economic and social intermediaries for groups divided by such a system.40
2) A “Sojourner Orientation”. As the label suggests, middleman minorities do no
seek permanent settlement in the host country or region.41
3) A distinctive cultural and social identity. Middleman minority groups
maintain a separate series of cultural traits and identity and cohesive, mutually
supportive communities.42
38
Blalock, H. M. Toward a Theory of Minority-Group Relations. New York: John Wiley. 1967 39
O’Brien, David and Fujita, Stephen “Middleman Minority Concept: Its Explanatory Value in the Case of the
Japanese in California Agriculture” The Pacific Sociological Review, April 1982 Vol. 25 No. 2, p. 187 40
Blalock, 1967 41
Bonacich, Edna "A Theory of Middleman Minorities." American. Sociological Review. 38: 583-594. 1973
23
4) A distinctive economic identity. Due to their “outsider” social position,
middleman minority groups concentrate their business efforts on
entrepreneurship, tending to keep capital liquid and making use of kinship and
community for labor and collective economic effort. 43
Again, the middleman minority thesis is the theoretical approach applied most often to the
Overseas Chinese—and indeed, many Asian minority groups resident in the Americas.44
It is a
useful tool in understanding the Chinese experience in Mexico and much of the rest of Latin
America. However, it fails to offer much satisfaction when applied to the situation in Mexicali.
It is important to remember that the Chinese were the founding population of Mexicali,
and that as their financial ventures evolved over the following decades they took on a lasting,
rooted nature. Furthermore, in a community which was creating itself almost out of whole cloth,
it is difficult to determine which status gap they filled. As previously discussed, the Mexicali
Chinese where a large, if not majority, part of that community during the opening years of its
history, making it difficult to define them as a minority. While other minority groups—chiefly
Japanese and “Hindu”—were in presence, they were much smaller and no evidence exists that
they relied on the Chinese to mediate between them and the Mexican community. Likewise, nor
does the “Sojourner” qualification fully explain the Mexicali Chinese. While many Chinese
settlers initially cherished the dream of a return home, social and economic circumstances
conspired to transform that desire. The Colorado River Land Company is directly responsible
for the presence of the Chinese in Mexicali, as a result of their aggressive pursuit of business
42
Turner, J. H. and E. Bonacich. "Toward a Composite Theory of Middleman Minorities." Ethnicity 7: 144-158,
1980 43
Ibid 44
See Kitano, H.H.L. 1974 "Japanese Americans: the development of a middleman minority." Pacific Historical
Review 43: 500-520. 1976; Fujita, M. 1929 "The Japanese Associations in America." Sociology and Social
Research 13: 211-228 and O’Brien, David and Fujita, Stephen “Middleman Minority Concept: Its Explanatory
Value in the Case of the Japanese in California Agriculture” The Pacific Sociological Review, April 1982 Vol. 25
No. 2
24
partnerships with the established Chinese in Los Angeles and San Francisco. The “big money”
investment opportunities were not in the mercantile sector, as with many Chinese communities.
Rather, they were in the grounded, rooted world of real estate: ranches, farms, and urban
development. As the community grew, coolie labor became a growing middle class, who
pursued similar opportunities.45
This made relocation difficult, economically, and increased the
social investment in Mexicali by the Chinese population. Intermarriage and economic
investment led the Chinese to seek a place in this brave new world, and they responded by
creating institutions and investments that both kept them grounded and allowed them to integrate
at least in part with their Mexican neighbors. They built bridges, rather than cutting ties.
It is not the intent of this thesis to critique, disparage or disprove the Middleman Minority
thesis, which has proven to be a valuable theoretical approach when applied appropriately.
However, by demonstrating the inapplicability of a popular and frequently useful approach, we
can again establish the unique and localized nature of the Mexicali Chinese. Over time they and
their descendants created an enduring local Chinese community, which, while subject to many
changes in its nature and makeup, has a strong historical continuity and connection to the rest of
Mexicali. “Mexicali fue mi cuña” is a lyric well-known among them, and one that must tug at the
heartstrings.46
On the other side of the coin, however, one of the darker pieces of middleman
theory applies to the Baja California Chinese. Middleman minorities are often the targets of
ethnic persecution or violence, due to their economic role in the community. While one can
argue, strongly, that the Mexicali Chinese held a very different place in community life, the
violence and xenophobia of the Chinese expulsions from northern Mexico did eventually reach
them. Thus, middleman theory may become a valuable tool for describing outside perceptions
45
Lee Mancilla, p. 187-191 46
From Antonio Valdez’s “La Canchanilla”, a corrido celebrating that corner of the world.
25
of the Mexicali Chinese, both on the state and regional levels. This may help explain the
dissonance between the attitudes of the local community, whose direct interactions with their
Chinese neighbors seems to have produced a more enlightened attitude, and the hostilities
encountered in Baja California as a whole and across the rest of the border states.
26
Chapter 2
Home on the Range: The Chinese in Mexicali Life and Politics
Introduction
Due to both the circumstances of its creation and the efforts of its members, the Chinese
community in Mexicali was unique in Mexico. As an integrated component of the larger
society in which they lived, the Mexicali Chinese were on better terms with their neighbors,
with whom they worked, played, and occasionally intermarried. The frontier offered both
shelter from the anti-Chinese nationalism that was prevalent in northern Mexico during the early
decades of the 20th
century, and access to the United States and the economic opportunities
therein. La Chinesca was, in many respects, closer to its counterparts in San Francisco and Los
Angeles than to any Chinese community in Mexico itself.
It is true that the Chinese of Baja California escaped the horrors of the various Chinese
movements of the time. This was, in part, due to their role in their communities, particularly in
places like Mexicali. Their integration and outreach to the other ethnic groups around them
helped soften the blow, and Baja California escaped the expulsions that wracked the rest of the
border states. The secondary literature is quick to suggest that this is solely a result of efforts
by the Chinese themselves, whose political and social organizations were strong enough to
secure the protection they needed at the local level. This assumption is not entirely correct.
While it is true that the Chinese were, for various reasons, able to secure their own place in the
community, other factors did contribute to their success in avoiding the more violent
persecutions of the era.
The central assumption of this thesis is that community organizations among the
Mexicali Chinese were key in the development of that community’s unique character and
identity. In examining the ways in which la Chinesca survived the tumultuous years of the
27
1930s and the anti-Chinese movements one must pay close attention to the role played by such
organizations and the people involved with them. An examination of both their strengths and
their limitations helps to explain the events of times and the ways in which the community
responded to them.
This chapter will explore the development of community organizations among the
Mexicali Chinese, the various social and economic roles these groups played, and their
interactions with the broader world of Mexican politics. In the political realm, it becomes clear
that community organizations, while important, were not the only thing protecting the Chinese
of Mexicali. The government of Baja California and US diplomats in the region both took
courses of action intended to shelter the Chinese from the storm, albeit for reasons of their own
benefit. The international diplomatic response to the anti-Chinese movement in Baja California
is largely unexplored in the secondary literature on the subject, going unmentioned in most
scholarly publications. This is rather unfortunate, as an exploration of the international response
furthers our understanding of Mexicali as a both a transnational community and a unique event
in the Chinese Diaspora. The community’s history and connections abroad were crucial to
events as they unfolded.
Community Organizations
Community organizations of various kinds are a common feature of the Chinese
Diaspora. On a basic level, these organizations offer mutual economic support and social
interaction. In practice they take many different forms. The most common are familial groups
formed on the basis of a common native village, surname, or regional affiliation. Some groups
take the form of business guilds and cooperatives, where members contribute to the organization,
28
which redistributes the funds as startup or development capital to members in need. The more
blatantly commercial groups resemble modern corporations. As in most established overseas
Chinese communities, Mexicali was home to several such organizations which played a crucial
role in its unique development and character.
By 1921, there were over 40 Chinese community organizations present and active in
Mexicali. The most significant of them was formed by 5000 single Chinese men in 1917, as the
result of a union between several existing groups. The Cantonese name for the group, Chung
Wah Wooey Goon, translates as “Consolidated Chinese Benevolent Society”. In Spanish it is
more commonly referred to as the Asociación China—the Chinese Association. The
membership of Asociación was initially comprised of 28 smaller Chinese groups which banded
together as a larger organization for mutual support, dispute mediation, and as a point of
connection with the non-Chinese community.47
From its offices at #120 Avenida Juarez, the
Asociación quickly involved itself with many aspects of community life.48
Its first major
charitable project was the establishment of a free clinic, under the direction of a Mexican doctor,
Manuel Montier. With a large annual budget, the Asociación’s hospital provided free treatment
and pharmaceuticals to both the Chinese and non-Chinese communities.49
The Asociación
engaged in other community building projects, including the construction of two theaters which
hosted visiting Cantonese Opera troups, a Chinese school, several churches, and an insane
47
Mexicali was at the time a fairly diverse city, home to not only Chinese and Mexican communities, but also
Americans and smaller numbers of Japanese, East Indians, and Europeans.
Auyon Gerardo, Eduardo. El Dragon en el Desierto: Los Pioneros Chinos en Mexicali. Mexicali: Instituta de
Cultura de Baja California, 1991, pp 98-102. 48
The Asociación is alive and well and still open part-time at their offices on Avenida Juarez. The author would
like to thank them for such assistance as they were able to render in the completion of this thesis. 49
Auyon Gerardo, Eduardo. El Dragon en el Desierto: Los Pioneros Chinos en Mexicali. Mexicali: Instituta de
Cultura de Baja California, 1991, pp 92-93.
29
asylum.50
The Asociación also retained legal counsel to help members involved in disputes
outside the Chinese sphere. The regional press credited the Asociación with the success and
continuance of the Mexicali Chinese community, as noted in the Excelsior newspaper:
Tienen pues, por fuerza que permanecer en suelo mexicano y como las
asociaciones admirablement fuertes y admirablemente organizadas de los
ciudadanos chinos permite a estos trabajar en una especie de comunismo, que en
muy rara vez determina pérdidas, ellos, los chinos, a pesar del desastre del
algodon, por efecto de la baja del precio de esta fibra, están y estarán siempre a
flote.51
They are therefore bound to remain in Mexican soil and the Chinese citizen’s
admirably strong and well-organized associations allow them to work in a sort of
communism, which rarely determines losses, they, the Chinese, despite the
disaster of cotton due to the low price of this fiber, are and will always be afloat52
The Excelsior article indicates awareness of the Asociación from outside of the Chinese
community, and of the real value of the Asociación itself to the city as a whole. These
organizations serve as a means to promote and perpetuate the community in the face of disaster,
both man-made and natural—in this case, the collapse of the price of cotton in 1920-1921.53
For
Diaspora Chinese, the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. This is especially true when one
looks at the ways in which the Chinese economic presence in the region evolved.
In 1919, the Chinese in Mexicali definitively made the leap from labor to ownership.
During the bumper harvest and resulting economic boom of that year, a San Francisco Chinese
50
Reportedly, this asylum was built initial to house homesick Chinese men, who had gone to the opera and “went
mad from the sight of a [Chinese] female on stage.” It is interesting to note that in Cantonese opera, women’s roles
were traditionally played by male eunuchs
Ibid pp 57-58.
Curtis, James R. “Mexicali’s Chinatown”. Geographical Review. 85:3 (July 1995) pp 344-346.. 51
Cardiel Marin, Rosario. “Los Chinos en Baja California Norte: El Caso de Mexicali”, La Comunidad China del
Distrito Norte de Baja California (1910-1934), Mexicali: Instituto de Investagaciones Historicas del Estado Baja
California, 1992. pp 77. 52
This is a rough, accurate and direct translation, reflecting the spirit of the original newspaper account. Any
inaccuracies are my fault alone. 53
Auyon Gerardo, Eduardo. El Dragon en el Desierto: Los Pioneros Chinos en Mexicali. Mexicali: Instituta de
Cultura de Baja California, 1991, pp 55-57.
30
businessman named Wong Co Huen relocated to Mexicali in search of business partners and
investment opportunity. He quickly established himself, buying cotton concerns and helping to
found the Mexicali Mercantile Bank.
Chinese agricultural investment expanded rapidly. While the Chinese ranches never
rivaled those of the American-owned corporations in size, they were impressive in number. The
1921 census mentions nearly two thousand Chinese farmers who owned and worked their own
land in the region. However, Eduardo Auyon Gerardo’s work suggests that this number is wildly
inaccurate, and that the actual number of Chinese farmers numbered closer to ten thousand.54
The biggest of the farms, owned by one Kam Li Yuen, employed over four hundred Chinese
workers. The second largest had two hundred employees.55
The Chinese ranchers bought their
land for something between one dollar and ten dollars per hectare, depending on the condition
and location of the property.56
As the Chinese immigrants expanded into farming, one finds some
of the earliest examples of community organization and collectivization. One of the largest
landholders in the region was the Asociación itself, which held half a dozen ranches called La
Chinesca 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6.57
This collectivization is a direct response to the exploitive monopolies
which had been held by the Colorado River Land Company. By creating Chinese control of the
crop and its processing and sale, more wealth remained within the Chinese community. This
wealth reached its peak over the course of the 1920s, when soaring cotton prices propelled the
resident Chinese to new heights of commercial success.58
54
Auyon Gerardo, Eduardo. El Dragon en el Desierto: Los Pioneros Chinos en Mexicali. Mexicali: Instituta de
Cultura de Baja California, 1991, p 56. 55
Ibid, p. 51 56
Ibid p. 113 57
Ibid p. 51 58
Auyon, Dragon en el desierto, pp. 51-52
31
The influence and scope of the Asociación extended beyond the local level, crossing the
border and penetrating to some degree into state and national politics. In June 1920 the Governor
of Baja California, Esteban Cantú, revolted against the short-lived de la Huerta regime. While
raising a local army to resist the “invading” federal troops, Cantú received a great deal of
financial support from the Mexicali Chinese community, which “offered to subscribe any sum he
needed”.59
This generosity had its roots in Cantú’s history with the Mexicali Chinese. After
becoming governor in 1915, Cantú arranged for the importation of thousands of Chinese coolies,
to fill the labor shortage and speed the development of the region. This continued despite the
Federal ban on Chinese immigration to Mexico, which Cantú at least publicly supported.
Cantú’s defiance of federal law can be traced to both his dislike of the regime and the
commission of $35-$40 he collected per coolie.60
Many researchers have suggested that the
leaders of the Chinese community recognized in Cantú an alley whose friendship could be
purchased, and took steps to support him. While that may have been true, a closer look at
Cantú’s career in Baja California reveals a much more complex relationship with the Chinese
community, and with minority politics in general. It also reveals the limitations of the Chinese
community and its organizations in providing for their own security.
The Good Colonel
Colonel Esteban Cantú is an often-overlooked figure in the history of 20th
century
Mexico. After coming to power in Baja California in 1915 he proved adept at navigating the
complexities of the region, handling cross-border relations, national politics, and the unique
cultural and ethnic mix of the frontier to his own advantage.
59
“Cantú Raises Army to Resist Federals”. New York Times, July 30, 1920, p. 2. 60
Hu-Dehart, Evelyn. “La Comunidad China del Distrito Norte de Baja California”, La Comunidad China del
Distrito Norte de Baja California (1910-1934), Mexicali: Instituto de Investagaciones Historicas del Estado Baja
California, 1992. p 27-28.
32
As noted above, Cantú’s relations with the Chinese were more complex than has been
suggested by much of the secondary literature. While they were occasionally political allies,
Cantú’s self-interest often led him to take advantage of the growing Chinese community in Baja
California. Chinese immigrants to the Mexicali Valley became enmeshed in the complicated
business of the Colorado River Land Company, whose American backers demanded a return on
their investments. Cantú, mindful of the potential profit involved, enforced the often uneven and
exploitive agreements into which the CRLC had forced the Chinese. As Joseph Richard Werne
reports, via Catalina Velázquez Morales:
The Chinese had to borrow great sums of money to finance their cotton crops.
American businessmen gave them 24% annual interest, stipulating that the
debtors should take their cotton for processing to the owner of the mortgage. In
general, the habilitator felt that the colonist kept their word, but they felt more
secured by the guarantee that [Col.] Esteban Cantú gave them, when he offered to
use every legal or illegal means to force the Chinese to honor their obligations.61
To provide some context: such a contract would be neither ethical nor legal in the contemporary
United States, and the involvement of a government official would elevate the whole affair to the
level of a federal felony. Cantú’s submission to corporate pressure is a testament to both his
own profit-seeking motives, and the enormous power that the CRLC held in the region.
Colonel Cantú was the first territorial governor of Baja California, a region which was, in
the 1920s and 30s, both Mexico’s last frontier and the nation’s dumping ground for ethnic and
political minorities. This social mix created a complex political situation, which Cantú attempted
to use to his own advantage. In particular, Cantú used minority politics as a way of accessing
international influence and trans-border commerce. This was not limited to his relationship with
61
Lan Cassel, Susie. The Chinese in America: A History from Gold Mountain to the New Millennium. Altimara
Press, Walnut Creek, CA, 2002. P. 406
33
the Baja Chinese, but extended to whatever avenues might most benefit him.62
As noted in
Chapter 1, Baja California was home to other communities of Asian immigrants, in particular
those from Japan and the Indian Subcontinent. While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to
fully explore their history in the region, the Japanese interaction with Cantú deserves some note.
A peculiar conjunction of the Governor and international investment illustrates the point.
The California and Mexico Land and Cattle Company was historically overshadowed by
the Colorado River Land Company, which had much larger assets and greater political clout in
the region. Founded in the waning years of the 19th
century, at its peak the CMLCC controlled
thousands of well-watered acres in Baja California. A survey by the US Department of
Agriculture, completed in 1904, assessed the land there thus: “I can most emphatically state,
taking into consideration the climate and water supply, that this is the best large body of virgin
land yet encountered in the work of our Bureau.”63
Owned by many of the same shareholders
who were invested in the Colorado River Land Company, the CMLCC led to the creation of over
2,500 miles of canals linking water supplies and ranches on both sides of the border. The CM
ranch, as the CMLCC holding was known, was the largest single producer of cotton in the world
by 1909, with a then-record crop of USD $18 million. Interestingly, the ranch was also home to
the world’s largest cotton gin.
Like the better known Colorado River Land Company, the CMLCC employed thousands
of Mexican peasants, as well as importing additional thousands of Chinese immigrants as labor.
The monopolies held on cotton production and processing, as well as water rights, by the two
corporations may have accelerated the creation of community organizations among the Chinese
62
Stowell, Jay Samuel. The Near Side of the Mexican Question. George H. Doran Company, New York, 1921.
pp.25-26 63
Price, Charles Ryan, and Power, J. Clyde. Irrigated Lands of the United States, Canada, and Mexico. Pan-Pacific
Press, Los Angeles. (1909). p. 182.
34
ranchers, who saw collective bargaining as the best way to disarm the behemoth facing them.
Cantú, as always, was willing to enforce the will of his corporate benefactors, ensuring that the
Chinese kept to their agreements with the Colorado River Land Company and the CMLCC. The
good colonel was also willing to play both sides of the fence, facilitating land sales across the
border. In April 1919, Esteban Cantú was accused of colluding with a Japanese syndicate over a
land sale in Baja California. The holding, which was part of the CMLCC spread, represented a
significant transfer of wealth at a time when Japan was beginning to assert itself as a world
power. As one journalist of the time notes:
The impression is gaining headway in official quarters in Washington . . . that the
Japanese question as related to the land question in Lower California is being
raised for purely political purposes. It was stated in both American and Japanese
official quarters that the Japanese Government is not interested in any actual or
contemplated attempt by Japanese individuals to obtain land in Mexico.64
While there may have been no official interest, Japanese immigration to the West Coast of the
US exploded in the early years of the 20th
century, as did Japanese business interest and
investment. Cantú, ever willing to work with immigrant politicians for his own benefit, may
have been attempting to repeat his successes in dealing with Chinese trans-border investment.
Trans-border issues, economic or political, played an important role in the development of the
Mexicali Chinese community. A close examination of the cross-border politics involved sheds
new light on the limits of ethnic tolerance and the power of community organizations among the
Baja California Chinese.
US Intervention and the Mexicali Chinese
The Mexicali Chinese enjoyed cordial relations with their non-Chinese neighbors, and
were in general well accepted into the community. The secondary literature attributes this to
64
“Domestic News” April 12, 1919, The Literary Digest, Volume 61, Issues 1511-1516. Funk and Wagnalls, 1919.
P. 142.
35
several causes: the active role of Chinese community organizations, the presence of the Chinese
since the founding of Mexicali, and the general apathy of the Mexican community toward
expulsions and persecution. These assumptions are only partially correct, and the existing
research has overlooked several other important factors which allowed the Mexicali Chinese to
survive relatively unscathed during the tumultuous years of the Revolution and the Chinese
expulsions of the 1930s. The anti-Chinese movement in Baja California was larger and more
active than is generally acknowledge in the secondary literature. As that movement grew, the
traditional means by which the Mexicali Chinese had conducted relations with their immediate
neighbors were unable to fully meet this new challenge. In addition to their political allies in
Mexico, the Baja California Chinese also received some unexpected international support from
the US and even China itself.
During the heady days of the Mexican Revolution, American officials did what they
could to shield the Chinese from the violence. Villa’s irrational and focused hatred of the
Chinese has been discussed previously, but a closer look at his actions against the Chinese during
the revolution throws light on the history of US support for Mexican Chinese communities. The
anti-Chinese movements of the Mexican Revolution are well researched, but the role played by
American diplomats is often overlooked. In May 1911, more than 300 Chinese residents in
Torreón, Coahuila were murdered by a faction of Villa’s army. The US diplomatic response was
immediate, with news of the atrocity arriving in DC less than 10 days later.65
US officials in the
area offered such support and protection as they could to the beleaguered Chinese. A
communiqué dated June 19, 1911 states that “such aid as is possible should be taken in behalf of
the Chinese, in order to prevent a recurrence of so regrettable an incident as that recently taking
65
One must allow for the imperfect communications of the time, and the difficulties of movement of information in
wartime Mexico. Ten days is the best that could have been reasonably hoped for.
36
place at Torreón.”66
Later that summer, a number of Chinese were allowed to seek refuge in the
US. In reviewing the relevant communiqués and dispatches, it is interesting to note that they
contain evidence of the transnational nature of the Chinese community in northern Mexico. A
number of the Chinese involved were US citizens, including several of the community leaders.67
In 1915, Chinese communities in Sonora were again subject to harassment, robbery, and
physical violence. The US Consul, one Robert Simpich, reported on March 25, 1915 that “not
many Chinese have been killed, but scores have been robbed and maltreated.”68
Between
January 29th
and October 28th
, the consul bombarded the State Department in Washington with
dozens of such reports and repeated requests for aid.69
Hampered by the limited size of his staff
and the constraints on available resources, Consul Simpich’s ability to aid the Chinese directly
was limited. Instead, he turned to political influence, pressuring Villa and his generals to enforce
better behavior amongst the troops. It is difficult to know how effective these tactics were,
though Villa did apparently acknowledge US concerns and promise to enforce better discipline
amongst his troops.
The strongest examples of US intervention, and the ones which most directly affected the
Mexicali community, occur during the Chinese expulsions from the Mexican border states in the
1930s. Beginning in 1933, US diplomats again took an active role in supporting and protecting
various communities of Chinese residents in Mexico. US concerns over the influx of Chinese
66
United States Department of State / Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States with the annual
message of the president transmitted to Congress December 7, 1911 (1911) “Mexico”, pp. 617 67
United States Department of State / Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States with the annual
message of the president transmitted to Congress December 7, 1911 (1911) “Mexico”, pp. 615-617 68
United States Department of State / Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States with the address of
the president to Congress December 7, 1915 (1915), “Mexico”, p 1090. 69
United States Department of State / Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States with the address of
the president to Congress December 7, 1915 (1915) “Mexico”, pp. 643-1096.
37
refugees date back to 1931.70
Chinese refugees from the Mexican border states sought entry into
the US, as guaranteed deportation to China was preferable to what they faced in Mexico. These
deportations were carried out at taxpayer expense, with the US government eventually spending
over $500,000 dollars by 1935—the equivalent of nearly $8 million in contemporary currency.
While some $10,000 was repaid by the Chinese consul in March of 1943, the bulk of the debt
stands.71
Baja California was never the center of the anti-Chinese movement—that dubious honor
goes to Sonora. However, the movement did reach Lower California, albeit in an uneven state.
Some early attempts to rally the Mexican community against the Chinese were largely
unsuccessful. An anti-Chinese demonstration in Tijuana on March 4 1934 had to be cancelled
for lack of an audience. Similar scheduled public demonstrations in Mexicali also failed to
materialize. On the surface, it is easy to understand why the Anti-Chinese movement was not as
unsuccessful in northern Baja California. The initially low population density of the region
helped disperse the tension. As some of the earliest pioneers to settle the Mexicali Valley, the
Chinese were socially and economically entrenched in the community. While it is difficult to
verify Governor Olachea’s claim that the Chinese had paid off politicians in the capital, it must
be noted that in Mexico City on February 24 1932, Deputy Jose Maria Davila, representing the
northern district of Baja California publicly called for an end to the Anti-Chinese campaigns—
ostensibly in support of the Republic of China then under attack by Japan. It is not too much to
suggest that a combination of US diplomatic pressure and the influence of Baja California’s large
Chinese community may have influenced his decision.
70
United States Department of State / Foreign relations of the United States : diplomatic papers, 1933. The
American Republics (1933), “Mexico”, p. 839 71
United States Department of State / Foreign relations of the United States diplomatic papers, 1934. The American
Republics (1934), “Mexico”, p. 490
38
The majority of both the academic and popular literature reflects this idea: that the
Chinese in Baja California were relatively safe, due to a deeply rooted presence and strong
organization, which meant that “the clans were strong enough to protect their own”.72
While this
may have been true in retrospect, an examination of diplomatic communiqués written at the time
reveals that expulsion and harassment were very real concerns for the Chinese communities in
Mexicali, Ensenada, and Tijuana. As these communities sit on or near the US/Mexico border,
American diplomats were forced to intervene on behalf of the Chinese in Baja California. 1934
seems to have brought the worst of the Anti-Chinese movement in the state. US diplomats
voiced concerns about the imminent expulsion of Chinese immigrants, beginning in January of
that year. The diplomatic dispatches include a copy of a circular, distributed by a Mexican
nationalist group:
Mexicans—Awake!
The Nationalist Committee has been Legally Constituted in this Port.
The Anti-Chinese campaign will begin immediately with full force.
It is a Matter of Hours.
Families soon will receive all classes of well-presented literature; but at once must
abstain from patronizing the Asiatic element.
Our campaign will be carried out energetically until it triumphs.
Mexican Commerce is united.
There is no one to fear—our being Mexican compels us and reason and right
assist us.
The Nationalist Committee of Ensenada
72
http://chinese-mexico.blogspot.com/2007_03_01_archive.html Accessed on February 16, 2011
http://learningboosters.blogspot.com/2009_08_01_archive.html Accessed on February 16, 2011
It is interesting to note the language here. “Clan” is not a unit of social organization applied to most Western
nations—the good people of Scotland notwithstanding. Its use here implies a persistent, anachronistic attitude
toward the Chinese and their culture.
39
Ensenada, BC, January 23, 193473
Further diplomatic correspondence details the threats made to Chinese merchants and
landowners throughout the region, who were told that if they failed to close up shop and leave
the territory “strong and illegal measures will be employed to cause them to do so.”74
US
diplomats in the region were directed to use all available means to prevent such a turn of events.
This concern was not wholly humanitarian; US officials consistently expressed concerns about
the possibility of a mass migration of illegal Chinese refugees across the border into
California.75
The records indicate that US efforts were successful. A dispatch, dated 15
February 1934, recalls a conversation between the US Ambassador and the Mexican Minister of
Foreign Affairs, in which the latter “has transmitted, with the authorization of the President,
telegraphic instructions to the Governor of Northern District of Lower California to take
necessary steps to prevent Chinese residents there from entering the United States at
unauthorized points.”76
A month later, US pressure caused the President of Mexico to instruct
the state governor to secure and protect the Constitutional rights of Chinese residents in the
region. This did not completely prevent a backlash—a selective enforcement of local laws
effectively closed many Chinese businesses in Mexicali and Ensenada.77
However, this further
serves to illustrate the point: the anti-Chinese movement did reach Baja California. Its attempts
at xenophobic violence and deportation were stymied, however, by a complex series of political
and social pressure. The combined efforts of the Chinese community organizations, their
73
United States Department of State / Foreign relations of the United States diplomatic papers, 1934. The American
Republics (1934), “Mexico”, p. 485
The eccentricities of capitalization and grammar are present in the original. 74
Ibid 75
United States Department of State / Foreign relations of the United States diplomatic papers, 1934. The American
Republics (1934), “Mexico”, p. 486-488. Similar examples exist in previous years. 76
United States Department of State / Foreign relations of the United States diplomatic papers, 1934. The American
Republics (1934), “Mexico”, p. 487 77
United States Department of State / Foreign relations of the United States diplomatic papers, 1934. The American
Republics (1934), “Mexico”, p. 488
40
Mexican political allies, and the international relations conducted by American, Mexican, and
Chinese diplomats were enough to spare the Baja California Chinese the worst of the Anti-
Chinese movements sweeping Revolutionary Mexico.
Conclusion
Community organizations among the Mexicali Chinese were key in the development of
the community as a whole, establishing important services and helping to assure that the Chinese
of the region were relatively integrated and accepted. Chinese and Mexican lived side by side,
traded with each other, and intermarried to a degree unheard of in the rest of the country. Once
again the Mexicali Chinese emerge as exceptional. Rather than practicing a pariah capitalism
and the resulting way of life, with one eye always on mobility, they were attempting to build
something lasting, as for the first few years of the century they function as the heart of the city.
During the years of the Mexican Revolution, however, the situation became more
complex and precarious. Like their counterparts in the other border states, the Baja California
Chinese came under threat of violence and expulsion as a wave of xenophobia swept across the
region. Subject to forces far beyond their control or their local sphere, the community groups
and mechanism which had allowed the Mexicali Chinese to flourish as a core component of the
life of the city were not wholly adequate to meet this new challenge. Their survival hinged on
forces beyond Mexicali. As such, their access to the corridors of power at the state and national
level—largely accomplished through their ongoing friendship with Cantú—gained them the
influence and protection they needed to prevail. This task also found unlikely allies in a complex
piece of international diplomacy, involving US, Chinese, and Mexican officials in an attempt to
negotiate greater protections for the Chinese of Baja California.
41
An important question has remained unasked thus far. Why were the Baja California
Chinese subject to such radically different treatment, both domestically and internationally, than
their counterparts in the other border states? While US diplomats were well aware of the plight
of the Chinese in Mexico, beyond some general statements and unavoidable encounter with
refugees there are few attempts to outright curtail the assault on the Chinese community. This
chapter has directly touched on several of the reasons for this. Due to their organization and
benevolent outreach, the Baja California Chinese were strongly integrated into community life,
particularly in Mexicali. Their wealth and political influence won them valuable allies among
the native Mexicans. And perhaps surprisingly, their position as a transnational community led
to multinational diplomatic intervention. Given Mexicali’s close social and business ties to the
well-established Chinese communities in San Francisco and Los Angeles in US California, their
situation came to the attention of Chinese diplomats. Their position on the border, and the
relatively late arrival of the anti-Chinese movement to Baja California gave US officials both the
time and the impetus to act. Fear of widespread violence and the resulting wave of refugees
effectively forced US diplomats to act in the defense of the Chinese community in Baja
California.
A close examination of these issues is vital in gaining a full understanding of the story of
the Mexicali Chinese. Their responses and experiences during the anti-Chinese movements of
the early 1930s throw light on their role in political life at all levels and the influence they had
managed to gain beyond their own region. While their community organizations, and the good
will built thereby, were not wholly enough to protect them, their wealth and social and political
clout filled that void. This should not be seen as a flaw or limitation in the approach used by the
Chinese community in Mexicali to establish itself and build community with its non-Chinese
42
neighbors. Rather, it puts such organizations in context, showing the ways in which they were
able to exercise agency in a dangerous and evolving situation. Their successful integration in
Baja California made the difference between survival and expulsion. Meanwhile, the
transnational nature of the community and its ability to maintain connections well beyond its
own borders led to some unexpected international support. This stands in direct contrast to the
Chinese communities in other border states, who were not so well-organized or fortunate. Once
again, the Mexicali Chinese emerge as a unique community.
43
Chapter Three: Border Wars
Introduction
Community organization among the Mexicali Chinese allowed them to succeed beyond
what could have been reasonably expected in Baja California. Such organizations founded a
community, integrated their lives with those of their Mexican neighbors to an unusual degree,
and in part sheltered them from the political and social storms of the era.
However, as the community evolved, changing social and political circumstances
changed the nature and purpose of community organizations among the Mexicali Chinese. The
benign outreach of the Asocación China and the supportive role that many native-place or dialect
organizations played in the lives of new immigrants were challenged by the growth of criminal
organizations in the community. Due to the political situation in the US and Mexico, Mexicali
became a locus point for trans-border crime. Additional violence arrived as the frontier town
became more closely tied to other communities on either side of the border, and the politics of
broader world introduced political rivalries that often resulted in bloodshed. This chapter will
explore these events and attempt to put them, and their causes, in the context of the city’s social
and political evolution.
The research for this chapter relies heavily on the media accounts chiefly from the 1920s
and early 1930s, which were both consistent and far-ranging in their coverage. While American
and Mexican phobias about the “Yellow Peril” were, and are, both disgustingly xenophobic and
highly regrettable, they did result in media focus on the problems in the Chinese community in
both countries. Such media accounts contain many Chinese names, transliterated into English
using the now-archaic Wade-Giles system. Without more information, transliterating them into
the modern pinyin romanization would be impossible to do with any degree of accuracy. While
44
pinyin is preferable in every respect, for consistency’s sake the Wade-Giles will be used
throughout. Thus, the Guo Min Dang will remain the historical Kuomintang, and Beijing will
revert once again to Peking.
Crime and Punishment in the Tierra Cálida78
There was a clannishness evoking Sicilian omertà, but the spirit of fraternity was
by no means universal, and wherever the triad lodges formed themselves, whether
in Singapore or San Francisco, they were apt to do so in rival dialect groups.
Grouping by dialect was the first and most spontaneous of the characteristics of
the overseas Chinese community, and the special sentiment of the emigrants for
their home district was reflected in the remarkable network of native-place or
dialect associations which they established in all the places in which they settled.
From Sons of the Yellow Emperor: A History of the Chinese Diaspora, by
Lynn Pan79
Befitting its position as a frontier border town, Mexicali was a center of criminal activity
in Baja California. While the Asociación itself appears to have been law-abiding, many Chinese
organizations were involved in crime both locally and internationally. A great deal of this crime
involved human smuggling—moving Chinese immigrants across borders illegally. Due to the
restrictive immigration policies of both the United States and Mexico, it was difficult in the
1920s and 1930s for Chinese to move in and out of either country. Newspaper accounts from as
early as 1912 indicate that Baja California had become a center of illegal Chinese immigration to
the US.80
The most common destinations seemed to be the Chinese community in San Francisco
and to a lesser extent Los Angeles. Initially this smuggling involved movement overland or by
sea, but by the late 1920s the use of airplanes had become common enough to warrant a public
statement by the US Immigration Service and subsequent media attention.81
American and
78
Tierra Cálida is the motto of the city of Mexicali. 79
Lynn Pan, Sons of the Yellow Emperor: A History of the Chinese Diaspora. New York : Kodansha Globe, 1997.
ISBN : 9781568360324 Kodansha Globe Series Volume: no. 197. 432 p. 80
“Smuggle Many Chinese”. New York Times, June 22 1912, p 4. 81
“Smuggling Aliens Into US By Plane Grows”. The Daily Constitution, Chillicothe, Missouri, December 22 1927.
45
Mexican citizens were most often hired to do the actual smuggling, many times making use of
Mexicali’s proximity to the US and the many “little-used” roads in the region. This access to
local knowledge made the smuggling difficult to control or even to quantify accurately. More
disturbing perhaps is the allegation that forces larger than individual smugglers were at work, as
the New York Times reported:
The Federal officers say that there is a strong organization that protects the
smuggled Chinese. In it are many Chinamen who have gardens and ranches.
They give the immigrants employment while it is safe or see that they are sent
away from the coast to some place were the immigration officials are not so
vigilant.82
As a San Francisco Tong leader stated publicly, the Tongs functioned in the community as a
welfare league, dedicated to the support of its members. They were also sophisticated
transnational networks with access to financial and personnel resources. Newspaper accounts
indicate that the methods used for smuggling Chinese across the border became more
sophisticated and costly over time. In one account of March 1930, a Chinese underworld
association engaged two US pilots and a $50,000 transport aircraft to move Chinese immigrants
from Baja California into the state of California in the US. Significantly, this was the first
documented use of a large, modern transport aircraft by smugglers on the US/Mexico border.83
Previous air smuggling efforts had been restricted to smaller, older aircraft.84
This jump in size
and technology indicates the level of sophistication of the organization behind it.
Due to Mexico’s more permissive laws regarding drugs and alcohol and its location,
Mexicali became a center of vice for both locals and vacationing Americans. During the dry
years of American Prohibition, the booze flowed free in Mexicali, and La Chinesca became the
center of tourist activity. The Chinese quarter hosted bordellos, gambling establishments, bars,
82
“Smuggle Many Chinese”. New York Times, June 22 1912, p 4. 83
“Five Men Seized in Chinese Smuggling Plot”. New York Times, March 22, 1930, p 1. 84
“Chinese Runners Arrested, Two Airplanes Seized”. The Fresno Bee, Fresno, California, January 15, 1929, p 1.
46
and opium dens. One California newspaper estimated that in February 1924 there were at least
seven ‘disorderly houses’ already open for business in Mexicali, and a new one was due to open
later that month, built at a cost of USD$110,000.85
The expense was not atypical. Rather than
the dusty cantinas of frontier myth, Mexicali’s casinos and bordellos were opulent, high class
establishments, offering high stakes gambling, fine food and drink, and where the guest and staff
were expected to “dress” appropriately for the fashion season.86
Less visible but perhaps more
intriguing were the subterranean tunnels, which housed underground establishments of ill-
repute.87
At least one of these tunnels crossed underneath the border to Calexico for the benefit
of bootleggers and drug smugglers. The tunnels, revealed publicly after the 1923 fire which
destroyed much of Mexicali, were built by various Tongs as a means for the purposes of storage,
concealment, and ease of mobility. Similar to the larger tunnel network under San Francisco’s
Chinatown, they indicated a significant expenditure of time and labor on the part of the
organizations that built them. They expected a return on this investment, which they found in
bootleg liquor and opium smuggling.
Wars and Rumors of Wars
Competition is conflict, and the various Tongs operating in Mexicali were competing for
the same resources and access to the same markets. Political and personal disagreements added
to the tension, which culminated in a series of violent clashes in the 1920s, popularly referred to
as Tong Wars. Newspaper accounts of Tong violence in Mexicali begin in 1921, and grow in
intensity as the decade progressed.88
The first major violent outbreak began on May 9 1924,
85
The report cited in the article also suggests building a fence along the Mexico/California border as a means to
control vice and illegal immigration. Plus ca change….
“Fence on Border Advised by Investigator”. Oakland Tribune, Oakland, California, February 16 1924 p A3. 86
Hall, Chapin. Where Gambling Flourishes Along The Mexico Border. New York Times, September 28, 1930, p.
X16. 87
Curtis, James R. “Mexicali’s Chinatown”. Geographical Review. 85:3 (July 1995) pp 345-346. 88
“Two Chinese Killed in Mexicali Tong War”. Oakland Tribune, Oakland California, May 13 1921.
47
when two Chinese laborers were shot and killed on a ranch ten miles south of Mexicali.89
The
following day another Chinese man was fatally wounded in a Mexicali Police station,
presumably in retaliation.90
Two more shootings were committed before the end of the week.
Things were relatively quiet until June, when a violent gunfight between opposing Tongs in the
Chinesca left five Chinese dead, and several more people wounded, including a Mexican soldier
severely injured when troops were called in to restore order.91
The military response indicates
that this clash took place in public and was severe enough to warrant an armed military response.
Among those killed was Jose Cam, a wealth Mexicali merchant, though it is difficult to
determine whether Cam was involved directly, the target of the shooting, or just an innocent
bystander.92
In response to the shooting, sixty-two Chinese were placed under arrest. Twenty of
them would eventually be deported. The civilian and military authorities placed the entire
Chinese quarter under heavy guard due to the fear of rioting by the Chinese population.93
The
violence continued, but less publicly. Bodies of murdered Chinese were found occasionally for
the rest of the summer, shot, stabbed, and in one case strangled with a handkerchief. At least
twelve deaths were confirmed, and due to a number of “disappearances” many more may have
occurred.94
The violence occurred consistently for the next few years, with few deaths but frequent
outbreaks. Things came to a head again in 1928. On February 27, another Tong War began.
Francisco Chao, owner of the “Casino Chino” and the “Mexicali Cabaret” and one of the
wealthiest men in Mexicali, was shot in front of one of his establishments. Chao was shot seven
89
“Tong Troubles Cause of Killings”. Nebraska State Journal, Lincoln, Nebraska, May 10 1924. 90
“Five Chinese Killed in Mexicali Tong War”. Oakland Tribune, Oakland California, May 10 1924. 91
“Chinese Tong War to the South”. Oxnard Daily Courier, Oxnard California, June 19 1924.
“Four Killed in Tong Battle”. The Chronicle-Telegram, Elyria Ohio, June 19 1924. 92
“Four Killed in Tong Battle”. The Chronicle-Telegram, Elyria Ohio, June 19 1924 93
“Chinese Tong War to the South”. Oxnard Daily Courier, Oxnard California, June 19 1924. 94
“Mexicali Tong War Toll Is Now Twelve”. Oakland Tribune, Oakland California, July 9 1924.
48
times, taking five rounds to the head and two to the chest. Two of his employees, Chee Gee and
Alfonso Yee, were also killed.95
The event took place in one of Chao’s establishments in a
manner that could be likened to a modern drive-by shooting. The next day another wealthy
Chinese was killed in a similar fashion. Known as the “Big Hat Man”, the deceased was known
as “Czar” in Mexicali and Tijuana. Unconfirmed reports from some Chinese witnesses state that
the “Big Hat Man” was Gee Yuk, a well-known leader of the Long Sing Tong.96
This
precipitated another round of killings, dead bodies, and disappearances.
The motivations of Tong violence in Mexicali are difficult to determine precisely. Local
issues and personal grievances certainly played a part, particularly in lower profile killings.
However, broader events shaped the Mexicali Tong wars. Across the United States, Tong
conflicts had been growing in number and intensity through the 1920s, just as they had in
Mexicali. A broad based conflict between the Hip Song Tong97
and the Bing Kong Tong had
escalated, drawing in affiliated groups across the United States. By 1926 the violence had
penetrated as far afield as Kingman, Arizona, Butte, Montana and Toronto, Ontario.98
These
events garnered considerable legal and media attention in the US, with the accompanying grand
jury trials, deportations, and executions.99
As in Mexicali, fear of mob violence from the
95
Chee and Yee are referred to as “henchmen” in some press accounts.
Untitled Article, Reno Evening Gazette, Reno Nevada, February 28, 1928. 96
“Tong Victim Killed”. San Mateo Times, San Mateo California, February 28 1928. 97
Also spelled “Hop Sing Tong”. 98
“Chinese Begin Racketeering in US”. The Fresno Bee, Fresno, California, December 31, 1927. Arizona
Department of Corrections Record of Executions. Inmate 007049 GEE KING LONG, 7048 JEW HAR, 7047
SHEW CHIN, 7046 B W L SAM, found at
http://www.azcorrections.gov/adc/datasearch/executed_1992.asp?InmateNumber=007049&InmateName=GEE%20
KING%20LONG,%207048%20JEW%20HAR,%207047%20SHEW%20CHIN,%207046%20B%20W%20L%20S
AM 99
“Tongmen of Merced Warned After Killings”. The Modesto Bee, Modesto, California, April 2 1923.
“Select Jury to Hear Case Against Wong”. The Fresno Morning Republican, October 19 1927 p 14.
“Grand Jury Probe of Tong War is Asked After Fatal Shooting”. Oakland Tribune, Oakland, California, February
7 1921.
49
Chinese community was common following Tong killings or arrests by the authorities.100
The
major incidents of Tong violence in Mexicali coincide with Tong wars in major US cities and
across the Southwestern US. The two tongs involved existed as part of a complex system of
organized crime that spanned North America and extended back to China. Mexicali’s family-
name and native village Tong had connections to both the Hip Sing Tong and Bing Kong Tong.
Until these two organizations called a truce in 1929, Tong violence was common in Chinese
communities across the US and in Mexicali.101
When placed in this context, the Tong Wars that
rocked Mexicali’s Chinese community during the 1920s are part of a much larger transnational
web of violence, with motives beyond those of the individuals at the local level.
An Evolving Locale
As a transnational community, Mexicali was influenced by forces from beyond its
borders. However, it would be incorrect to assume that larger networks of affiliation,
competition and violence were the sole cause of surge in crime in that community during the
1920s. As the city itself evolved, social and economic changes at home created conditions
necessary for criminal organizations to take root.
Mexicali, like most frontier towns in the Americas, started out as an agricultural center,
taking full advantage of the fertile and relatively well-watered location. And like many
agricultural communities, over time it moved away from that base and toward a more urban
character. By 1921 this shift was firmly underway. The cotton boom of the early 20th
century
equated to economic success for the Chinese farmers of the region, who used their surplus capital
100
Burg, Copland C. “Rioting Feared at Gas Executions”. Oakland Tribune, Oakland, California February 7 1924, p
A1.
“Guard Against Tong Warfare”. Night Journal, Lincoln, Nebraska, October 15 1928. 101
“Truce Called in Tong Warfare”. Modesto News-Herald, Modesto California, August 4 1929. This marks the
end of the major Tong violence, particularly in Mexicali. Smaller tong conflicts continued in Chinese communities
in the US, and allegedly persist until today.
50
to move into the next level of production. This began with an expansion into the processing and
sale of cotton. Chinese-owned cotton gins and markets began to appear within Mexicali itself,
followed by Chinese owned business which sold farming supplies and agricultural goods.102
Utilizing their connections to the Chinese communities in San Francisco and Los Angeles, these
new merchants began to import wholesale quantities of Chinese goods, which were resold to the
Chinese shops in the city.103
Mexicali grew rapidly, and the expanding urban community created a demand for
manufactured goods. The newly-emerged urban Chinese expanded their economic activities to
include this as well, opening small factories and workshops dedicated to the production of
consumer goods such as cigarettes, cigars, shoes, automobile repair, carpentry, and tannery
work.104
To house workers and new arrivals, Chinese bunkhouses and tenements began to spring
up throughout the city.105
The large Chinese community in Mexicali functioned, in many
respects, as a separate economy than that of their Mexican neighbors, with Chinese consumers
greatly preferring the goods produced and sold by their countrymen.
These shifts in business practice both urbanized the Mexicali Chinese, and strengthened
their ties across the border with Chinese communities in the US. This shaped both retail
development and the financial practices of the community. Wealthy Chinese founded their own
banks and lending institutions in response to the booming business and rapidly growing
investment needs of the community. The Chinese Mercantile Mexican Company rapidly became
102
Sandborn Fire Insurance Company Maps/Mexico, Mexicali 1921, sheets 5 and 6 103
Velázquez Morales, Catalina, “Tres migraciones Chinos en Baja California, 1899-1945”. Found at
http://www.uabc.mx/historicas/Revista/Vol-I/Numero%201-8/Contenido/Tres%20migraciones.htm Accessed on
February 8, 2011 104
Sanborn Maps, in particular 2,3, 5, and 6. Whole blocks within the community are labeled “Chinese”, with
business descriptions on individual buildings.
See also Velázquez Morales, Catalina, “Tres migraciones Chinos en Baja California, 1899-1945”. Found at
http://www.uabc.mx/historicas/Revista/Vol-I/Numero%201-8/Contenido/Tres%20migraciones.htm Accessed on
February 8, 2011 105
Ibid, sheet 6. There are no fewer than 20 in an area of about 6 square blocks.
51
one of the most important lending institutions in the region. Owned by a Chinese business
conglomerate in San Francisco, the company provided loans to new arrivals and financing for
both farmers and merchants. Together with the city’s location on the border and the influx of the
American vice trade during the Prohibition era, Mexicali’s connections with communities in the
US were stronger than ever.
To return to the focus of this thesis, the growth of organized, trans-border crime is linked
to these changes in Mexicali’s economic and social development. It is a nearly-universal truth
that more crime takes place in urban areas, which feature higher population densities and often
have greater disparities between rich and poor.106
Urbanization also took place as a result of
changing economic conditions, in particular cross-border trade and investment, and the shift
towards industrialization. This in turn resulted in increased contact and involvement with
communities across the border, both Chinese and American. In turn, the problems of the greater
world (Conflict between different Chinese groups, the wonders of Prohibition) found their way
to Mexicali bringing crime and violence with them. Mexicali’s frontier location had allowed it
to escape violence and political strife before. As it grew as an urban center, and became closer to
the rest of the world, this distance disappeared and larger problems encroached. This is also
apparent in the political realm, as Mexicali’s Chinese organizations became enmeshed in a larger
political dispute.
Politics and Nationalism
As discussed previously, the Chinese of Mexicali were active in local and state politics,
and may have made forays into the complex political world of Mexico City. However, the
community’s connections with the broader Chinese diaspora also brought it into contact with
106
The Sandborn Maps, on sheet 6, label a large chunk of the city “Indian Hovels”. A built-in urban underclass is
another avenue toward criminal development, albeit one beyond the scope of this thesis.
52
questions of nationalism and political divisions originating in their distant homeland. As
different community organizations among the Mexicali Chinese found themselves on different
sides of the issues, the result was political conflict and often violence. A closer look at the
groups involved is the surest means of gaining insight into these events.
The Chee Kung Tong was one of the largest and best-developed Chinese fraternal
organizations in the Americas. The organization first established itself in San Francisco in 1863,
and from their quickly spread across the western part of the continent, reaching Vancouver by
1892, Hawaii by 1897, and establishing a lodge in Mexicali by 1914107
. Often referred to as the
“Chinese Masonic Lodge”, the Mexicali chapter built a lodge house on Avenida Benito Juarez,
less than a block away from the Asociacion China and equally close to the US/Mexico border.108
The Chee Kung Tong was, in fact, a Masonic-style fraternal order, allegedly complete with the
rituals, customs, and secretive nature thereof. It function, in Mexicali and across the continent,
as a society of mutual support for new immigrants, and as a means of consolidating local
political and economic influence in order to deal with common concerns.
Wherever the Chee Kung Tong sprang up, it was also a political organization. The early
years of the 20th
century were heady ones for Chinese politics, as the nation struggled with both
traditionalist and modernizing forces. The Chee Kung Tong originally sided with the Kuo Ming
Tang and Sun Yat-Sen, but following 1912 felt increasingly alienated from that organization and
its founder109
. The Chee Kung Tong’s membership began to attract the more conservative
elements in the Chinese community worldwide, and rejected Sun’s democratic ideals in favor of
107
Chinese Freemasons: Dispelling the Myths. Found at
http://freemasonry.bcy.ca/history/chinese_freemasons/index.html#sun, last accessed on February 9th
, 2011. 108
Sandborn Maps, Sheet 6. 109
Sun Yat-Sen allegedly joined the Chee Kong Tong while living in Hawaii in 1904. Politics makes for strange
bedfellows, and in some cases even stranger enemies. He also openly courted their support during his visits to the
US and Canada, apparently with uneven success.
53
a pro-monarchist traditionalism.110
These differing ideologies and the standing bad blood
between the Chee Kung Tong and the KMT lead to conflicts in many Chinese diaspora
communities, and Mexicali was no exception.
The Chee Kung Tong lodges in northern Mexico were under the authority of the older
lodge in San Francisco. Their opponents in the KMT had established a chapter in Mexicali in
1921, which enjoyed considerably more local autonomy. Both groups were militant in their
political and social views, with hundreds of members both in Mexicali and across Baja
California.111
Tensions between the two groups were high throughout the 1920s, and
increasingly so after the KMT established an official presence in the region. These tensions
manifested in a variety of ways: the use of political or economic influence to hamper the
activities of the rival group, organizing political demonstrations in order to advance one’s
ideology, and the usual media campaign in local publications.112
This, in part, backfired, as the
ongoing tensions brought government attention, resulting in efforts toward regulation of both
groups by the Governor of Baja California, Abelardo L. Rodriquez, later interim president of
Mexico following the resignation of Pascual Ortiz.113
Chinese diplomats from the local
consulate also became involved, attempting to broker a reconciliation between the two groups
and diffuse the tensions they had created within the community.114
Initially, these efforts were
only in part successful, and violent incidents between the groups became more common. The
relatively peaceful and isolated world of the Mexicali Chinese had been invaded by outside
forces, and the far away conflicts of Chinese politics had become surprisingly local. After a long
110
Velázques Morales, Catalina. “ Diferencias políticas entre los inmigrantes chinos del noroeste de México (1920-
1930)”. El caso de Francisco L. Yuen. Historia Mexicana, vol 55, No. 2 (Oct.-Dec. 2005), pp.467 111
Ibid, pp. 479-483. The Chee Kung Tong had nearly 500 know members, while the KMT had over a hundred
active members and many more supporters throughout the community. 112
Velázquez Morales, pp 482, 484 113
Ibid, p. 484 114
Ibid, p. 486
54
series of arrests and high profile murders, the direct intervention of President Obregón and the
threat of mass expulsions finally forced peace between the two groups.115
Conclusion
The 1920s brought vast changes for Mexicali and its Chinese community. As the frontier
came to a close, Baja California became increasingly connected to the outside world, in ways big
and small. While the political tensions of the time involved one of the traditional and ongoing
issues of Mexican politics—the attempt to assert state control over the nation’s periphery—the
social issues facing the Chinese community involved political and social issues from beyond
their immediate borders. The causes and consequences of this were complex, difficult to
distinguish from each other, and continue to shape the community to this day.
As a result of its geography, founding, and the particular circumstances of its
development, the Chinese community in Mexicali was more closely connected to its counterpart
in San Francisco than to any comparable Chinese community in Mexico—the exception, of
course, being nearby Ensenada. San Francisco Chinese businessmen were instrumental in the
founding of Mexicali’s community, as they were the conduit through which Chinese immigration
flowed, and their financial investments began Chinese business in the area. However,
geography kept Mexicali’s Chinese politically and socially removed from their San Francisco
counterparts. As the 1920s progressed, however, Mexicali became more accessible and ties with
San Francisco grew stronger. This happened, in part, because of improvements in transportation
across the region as the population grew. It is also a result of the changing economic and
political character of the community. Mexicali’s Chinese are almost unique in that rather than
taking part in typical Chinese business ventures—a pattern than is consistent across the rest of
115
Ibid p. 503-504
55
the diaspora—they were heavily agrarian initially. Rather than renting their plots, they conspired
to buy them, and thus build a lasting presence in the area. This was not the typical pariah
capitalism; it was a foundational community which was built to last.
However, wealth brought urbanization, and as that process developed elements of the
Chinese community in Mexicali came to more closely resemble their counterparts elsewhere.
Increased trade in Chinese goods meant increased financial involvement with San Francisco’s
Chinese, who were wealthier, well established, and had extensive economic relations across the
country and internationally. These ties brought changes to Mexicali, whose Chinese residents
reconnected with the rest of the diaspora. This was most evident in the changing nature and role
of community organizations among the Mexicali Chinese. As discussed in the first chapter of
this thesis, such organizations were key in founding the community, integrating the Mexicali
Chinese more closely with their Mexican neighbors, and helping to protect their political and
economic interest. The results were a community that is unique in the Chinese diaspora.
However, as Mexicali changed, so did its community organizations. Increased contact
with the broader world brought organizations and groups with their own issues and agendas. The
politics of the Chinese mainland finally arrived in Mexicali, causing more than a little trouble in
that once isolated town. Mexicali’s location as a border community made it the perfect transfer
point for illegal drugs and immigrants, and thus criminal elements, both Chinese and other,
arrived, bringing vice and violence with them. This suggests that Mexicali’s original and unique
approach to community organizations were not only key to their initial success, but helped to
avoid some of the ongoing problems facing other Chinese diaspora communities. Problems
emerged however, when similar organizations with very different goals and ideals came to the
community, disrupting the status quo.
56
The violence and crime indirectly undermined some of the success enjoyed by the
Chinese, by becoming an excuse for legally sanctioned action against them. As Velázquez
Morales points out, political violence among the Mexicali Chinese quickly came to government
attention, with both Mexican politicians and Chinese diplomats working to intervene. While
ostensibly to quell the bloodshed, a more complex pattern emerges. Legal action, including
arrest and deportation, more often than not worked to the political and financial benefit of
prominent Mexicans in the community. Selective enforcement of the legislation targeted key
Chinese business and political figures, leaving a void to be filled by their Mexican counterparts.
Inter-Chinese violence not only failed to grant one side control of either crime or politics, but
weakened the overall health and standing of the whole community. It is perhaps ironic that the
kind of institutions which secured Chinese success in Baja California later did such harm.
Likewise, the transnational nature of Mexicali Chinese was an important part of their arrival in
the area and their initial success. That same transnationalism brought political strife from across
the Pacific, which cost lives and damaged the community as a whole.
57
Conclusions and Goodbyes
This thesis has been a modest attempt to explore the history of a unique city and, in
particular, the Chinese community that founded and formed the core of it. As the story of
Mexicali unfolds, the city’s character and the set of historical factors which shaped it came to
light as well. The various community organizations formed among the Mexicali Chinese were
the integral in shaping their experience, unprecedented for a Chinese diaspora community in the
Americas. The following pages will present the overall themes and conclusions derived from
this piece of research.
Mexicali as a Transnational Community
It is a simple enough statement: from its founding the city of Mexicali was a transnational
community. There are some rather obvious reasons why this is the case. Located directly on the
US/Mexico border and relatively isolated from the rest of Mexico for the first few decades after
its founding, Mexicali had no choice but to look across the border and toward the Pacific. The
city’s transnationalism goes beyond mere geography, however. The circumstances of its
founding were far more important to the unique variation of diaspora transnationalism which
developed in Mexicali. The relatively rapid development of the region, chiefly by the Colorado
River Land Company, created both opportunities for investment and a need for large amounts of
cheap labor. These needs were met by transnational forces. Wealthy San Francisco Chinese
poured money into the region, mostly in the form of cotton farms. Rather than bringing in native
Mexican labor, they instead imported large numbers of coolies from southern China, via their
social and business ties with the motherland. Thus, from the beginning, Mexicali was socially
and economically more closely tied to San Francisco or Los Angeles in the US state of California
than it was with any community, Chinese or otherwise, in the rest of Mexico.
58
Mexicali was incorporated in 1903, as a result of the investment of money and labor into
the region. As such, the Chinese population was the core, founding group of the community,
forming the majority of its population. This gave the Chinese the rare opportunity to create a
city from the ground up, built to meet their needs and to help them take advantage of the
opportunities presented by this location on Mexico’s last frontier. In building this brave new
world, the early Chinese settlers in Mexicali fell back on some very traditional Chinese practices,
in particular community organizations of various kinds. Initially there were dozens of such
groups, formed around common surnames or native places as is typical in the Chinese diaspora.
They quickly coalesced however, becoming the Asocación China, which would be one of the
driving forces in community life for several decades. Via the Asocación, the Mexicali Chinese
embarked on a series of benevolent projects, intended not just for their benefit but for that of the
city as a whole. The hospitals, theatres, churches and schools built by the Asocación were of
great benefit to all, rapidly improving the quality of life in a small frontier town. When disputes
did arise, the Asocación typically sought mediation rather than litigation, and maintained lawyers
to look out for interests of all concerned. These charitable actions, plus their status as the
majority population in the city, put the Mexicali Chinese on unique terms with their native
Mexican neighbors. By improving life for the whole city, the Mexicali Chinese also built a large
amount of good will and, for lack of a better term, neighborliness. Thus, rather than adopting a
xenophobic attitude and viewing the Chinese as a separate community of foreigners, the native
Mexicans in the area saw the Mexicali Chinese as friends and neighbors of great benefit. This
openness facilitated even greater cooperation and integration, via intermarriage between Chinese
men and Mexican women, and increased economic ties between Chinese and Mexican interests.
59
Nothing lasts forever, and the golden age of Chinese/Mexican relations in Mexicali
eventually gave way to violence during the Prohibition years. Transnational interests once
again gave rise to community groups, in the form of criminal organizations and competing
political ideologies. These came to Mexicali via the same networks that had played a key role in
the city’s founding and initial success: the transnational connections with Chinese communities
in the US and across the Pacific to China. The politics of the Kuomintang, and the competing
criminal interests of the Tongs led Mexicali into a period of violence which spanned nearly the
whole of the 1920s. This regrettable period represents many changes: a shift in the role that the
Chinese community’s organizations played in civic life, further changes in the relationships
between Chinese and Mexicans in Mexicali, and—more broadly—a shift in the character of the
US/Mexico border. While these differences do exist and should be acknowledged, they are
thematically consistent with the developing history of the city and the central thesis statement of
this research: Mexicali was a transnational community, and became such due to the community
organizations which grew among its Chinese population.
Community Organizations and Integration
Community organizations helped the Mexicali Chinese to integrate themselves into the
civic and economic life of both the city and the broader sphere beyond. The Chinese who
initially settled the region quickly became an unqualified economic success, investing in cotton
farms and vertically integrating their hold on every step of the production process. From the
beginning, community organizations were key to their success in this endeavor. The Asocación
was one of the largest early landholders in the region, owning and managing half a dozen
ranches which employed hundreds or thousands of Chinese workers. The organization also
furthered their collective profits by taking control of the ginning process refining raw cotton into
60
useable fiber. By boycotting an American backed middleman, more profits flowed into Chinese
coffers.
Traditional Chinese organizations brought traditional Chinese business practices. In this
respect, the Mexicali Chinese more strongly resemble a typical diaspora community. Diaspora
Chinese typically rely on mutually supporting Chinese trade networks. Labor is handled in a
similar fashion, via family relationships on a small scale and connections to a native place for
larger demands. These are practices designed to keep costs low for local business ventures, and
in addition to supply newcomers with jobs and perhaps startup capital. In the case of Mexicali,
however, these networks took then well beyond their own borders. In addition to working with
local suppliers and business, they maintained strong ties to San Francisco in the US state of
California. They were then able to parlay this transnationalist trade into local success, becoming
a dominant business force in the region.
It should come as no surprise, particularly in our contemporary political and social
environment, that economic success brings political clout. The Mexicali Chinese were able to
gain access to political influence beyond the local level, finding strong allies in state politics,
particularly in the form of their relationship with Esteban Cantú, and even gain vocal support in
the capitol itself. Always beneficial, this access to the corridors of power became especially
important during the anti-Chinese campaigns of the early 1930s. As the xenophobic movement
brought violence and outright expulsion to Chinese communities across northern Mexico, the
Chinese of Baja California were the recipients of a great deal of political protection. Despite
their complex and occasionally adversarial relationship, Cantú was invested in the Chinese
community and took steps to protect them. Additionally, their representative in Mexico City,
Deputy Jose Maria Davila, publically called for an end to the anti-Chinese campaigns across
61
Mexico in February of 1932. Herein we see the power of close community organization and
social outreach. Beyond building goodwill at the local level, they also helped accrue the sort of
financial and political influence that both gives a community a competitive edge and protects it
in times of trouble. While this is not as simple and direct as some of the secondary literature
would lead us to believe, particularly in the case of the relationship between Cantú and the
Chinese, it speaks to the power and effectiveness of their community organizations
A Theory for Mexicali
The success of the Chinese in Mexicali and the unique nature of their community are due
to the circumstances of its founding and the role played by their active community organizations.
These factors combined to create a community that remains without a comparable counterpart
elsewhere in the Chinese Diaspora. This is a wonderful opportunity for academia, as the
complex story of this community offers many points of inquiry and provides fodder research
fodder for a wide variety of disciplines. And, as will be discussed later, much more research is
needed.
There are however certain problems raised by the very uniqueness of Mexicali. It is very
difficult to compare the Mexicali Chinese to any of their counterparts across the diaspora. As
such, they complicate the traditional theoretical approaches commonly used in understanding the
overseas Chinese as a whole. Max Weber’s vaunted and eminently useful theory of Pariah
Capitalism has been successful applied to diaspora Chinese over and over again for much of the
last century. Landed, heavily invested, and integral to community life, the Mexicali Chinese
simply do not function as outsiders, living their lives such that liquidation is easy and relocation
can be done quickly. Instead, their community was heavily grounded and built to last, with
62
Chinese citizens integrated into every aspect of civic life in the city of Mexicali. Likewise, H.M
Blaylock’s more recent theory of the “middleman minority” has proven very useful as an
approach to the Chinese Diaspora in general, but fails to adequately describe or throw further
light on Mexicali. The Chinese community there did not occupy a “middleman” position in the
community; rather they were fully a part of all levels of local life. They failed to adopt a
sojourner orientation, instead making social and economic choices toward permanent settlement.
While the Mexicali Chinese did retain a great deal of social and cultural uniqueness, they also
integrated and intermarried with the native Mexicans, leading to ethnic and cultural blending.
They did not have a distinct, “outsider” economic identity, but successfully and permanently
integrated into the local economy.
It cannot be overstated that this approach to localization and settlement is unique in the
Chinese diaspora. One must then humble suggest that Mexicali both requires a different
theoretical approach in academic research and also challenges some of the standing ideas of the
ways in which overseas Chinese communities develop and grow. A theory of Mexicali would
have to consider not just economic roles played by immigrant or “other” communities and the
attitudes facing them, but the means by which communities are founded and how they deal with
outsiders.116
A close look at Mexicali gently suggests a more dynamic approach than is offered
by the conventional theories. The case of the Baja California Chinese suggests that the
“middleman” or “pariah” role is not simply imposed from without by a xenophobic mainstream
culture. Rather, it should be situated as part of a complex series of interactions between the
“other” and the mainstream. It is a complex, Foucaultian dynamic. The choices made by “the
other” in response to their alienation from the mainstream culture feed the feelings of
116
For the record, it must be noted that I personally detest “the other” as a piece of academic jargon or
psychobabble. However, like many things it is occasionally and regrettably useful, and thus it appears here. De
profundis clamo ad te, domine!
63
xenophobia which create that alienation, furthering “the other’s” self-segregation. In addition to
suggesting this pattern as a new approach, the Mexicali Chinese would also suggest that this is a
dynamic that can be altered. “The other” can take steps in outreach toward the mainstream if the
circumstances are right, and the mainstream can be receptive toward that sort of community
building. This remains at present a humble suggestion toward a theory. It is clear that further
research is needed in order to flesh out and detail this potentially interesting new approach. It is
also not intended as a refutation of the existing bodies of theory, which have proven constantly
useful. Rather it is intended as an augmentation to further our understanding and increase the
number of intellectual tools available to researchers.
As stated above, any development of this proposed theoretical approach needs further
case studies as a means of support and expansion. Toward that end, a two-pronged approach
may prove useful:
1) What are the nearest comparable examples in the Chinese Diaspora? How
does their historical experience compare to that of the Mexicali Chinese, and can
such a comparison throw greater light on the issues at hand?
2) Beyond the Chinese Diaspora, can we find examples of similar communities
of immigrants, of whatever origin, in the rest of the Americans, particularly Latin
America? In making a similar comparison, what can be learned?
As has been stated many, many times throughout the course of this thesis, the Chinese
community in Mexicali is without a direct counterpart among other overseas Chinese
communities. The nearest comparison may be made with the Chinese diaspora in insular
Southeast Asia, particularly in Malaysia and Indonesia.
Superficially, the Chinese of Malaysia and Indonesia bear some resemblance to the
counterparts in Mexicali. The bulk of the Malaysian Chinese trace their ancestry to a large wave
of immigration from China in the 19th
and early 20th
centuries. Predominantly from southern
64
China, these immigrants came to Southeast Asia as coolie labor, chiefly in support of plantation
agriculture. Once the population was established, they formed traditional Chinese community
organizations, chiefly based around a shared native place or surname, for mutual support and
financial gain.
Here, though, the similarity ends. The demographics of the initial Malaysian Chinese
settlers were much different, coming from a wide swath of southern China and reflecting the
linguistic diversity thereof. By contrast, the Mexicali Chinese were almost exclusively
Cantonese speaking. Settling across a wider swath of territory in their new land, the Malaysian
Chinese faced a complex process of integrating into established communities and trade networks,
rather than creating new ones on a frontier. This led to a very different pattern of localization
and assimilation. Forming nearly self-contained localized societies, and thus deliberately self-
segregating, the Malaysian Chinese did not show the same desire for social integration as their
counterparts in Baja California. They showed a more typical Diaspora Chinese economic
pattern. Rather than farming or owning property like the Mexicali Chinese, they relied instead
on more traditional avenues such as selling dry goods or establishing import/export business.
These practices, coupled with their traditional frugality and access to profit maximizing Chinese
trade networks, quickly led to economic success which was resented by their Malay neighbors.
Chinese wealth tended to stay within the Chinese community, and there are few benevolent
organizations taking part in the outreach practiced by the Asocación China. There were
additional social obstacles to integration. The Malaysian Chinese practiced a variety of religions
common in southern China—chiefly Buddhism, Confucianism and variations of Taoism. The
native Malays, by contrast, were overwhelming Muslim, albeit with a small Hindu minority.
Religion became an obstacle to both day to day social interaction—Chinese and Muslim dietary
65
practices are very different, for example—and to intermarriage. Muslim law would requires a
Chinese marriage partner to formally adopt Islam as both a religion and a lifestyle before
marrying a Malaysian Muslim. The broad pattern of intermarriage between Chinese men and
Mexican women found in Baja California is not present, leading to further generational patterns
of social isolation.117
This short comparison highlights the sui generis nature of the Mexicali Chinese, and
offers a counterexample to their story of integration and assimilation. The processes by which
they were able to achieve their ends are not present, either in the circumstances of their
community’s foundation or in the practices in which they engaged subsequently. They have
always maintained a social and economic apartness, having their own systems of education and
business in addition to a sense of social separation. A full exploration of the life of the
Malaysian Chinese defies the space and time available here, but as the closest point of
comparison to the Chinese of Mexicali they reveal the failings of conventional theory in
discussing the latter, and the need to look beyond the Chinese Diaspora for a comparable
community.
Looking to another group of East Asian immigrants to Latin American proves a bit more
fruitful. The history of Japanese immigrants to Brazil has much in common with the story of the
Mexicali Chinese, and even the important differences prove insightful. The Japanese began
arriving in Brazil in 1908, in part to meet the demand for agrarian labor. Brazil had emerged as
an attractive option, as the interior of the country remained relatively undeveloped and presented
opportunities for land ownership and smallhold farming. A strong demand for agrarian labor
117
For a full discussion of the Chinese in Southeast Asia, see the relevant chapters of Pan et al, The Encyclopedia of
Chinese Overseas. It provides a good, thorough overview and references to more detailed sources, as needed.
66
offered job opportunities.118
International factors also served to push the Japanese in this
direction. As stated previously in this thesis, the US had implemented policies strictly limiting
the amount of non-Caucasian immigrants it would absorb annually. Likewise Australia, another
attractive spot for Japanese immigration, had recently adopted the infamous “White Australia”
policy, which placed similar restrictions on immigrants. Nearly 15,000 Japanese relocated to
Brazil between 1908 and 1914. The First World War led to a new boom in Japanese
immigration, with another 165,000 Japanese arriving in Brazil between 1917 and 1940.
The timing and reasons for immigration parallel, but the real similarities between the
Japanese in Brazil and the Chinese in Mexicali is in their social behavior. When viewed over
roughly the same time period (for the Japanese in Brazil, 1908-1940), one notes that the
Brazilian Japanese adopted similar strategies in their attempts of localization and integration as
their counterparts in Chinese Mexicali. Beginning in the early 1920s, many Japanese
communities in Brazil made concerted efforts to integrate into the mainstream of Brazilian life.
This was, necessarily, a multifaceted approach. The Japanese-language press in Brazil dates
back to the earliest days of the immigrant community there. From its beginning, Japanese
language print media in Brazil focused their reporting on news from Japan. However, over the
course of the 1920s, Japanese language newspapers in Brazil began to introduce sections of
Portugues-language news, focusing on affairs within Brazil itself.119
This is telling, in that it
represents a shift toward a more local focus, and growing interest in the politics and social events
of their new country. The use of Portuguese as the language of choice is especially telling, in
that it indicates both a push by the Japanese Brazilian media toward greater integration, but also
118
Masterson, Daniel M. and Funada-Classen, Sayaka. The Japanese in Latin America. University of Illinois Press,
2004, p. 51-52. 119
Lone, Stewart. The Japanese Community in Brazil, 1908-1940: Between Samurai and Carnival. Palgrave Press,
New York, 2001. p. 83-84
67
a demand for Portuguese language news by an audience literate in that language. Rather than
aggressively maintaining a distinct separate community and culture, the Japanese Brazilians were
beginning to reimagine themselves as citizens of their new country.
Indeed, the language issue would only grow in importance. Serious discussions took
place among Japanese Brazilians about the appropriate roles of both Japanese and Portuguese in
culture, education, and day to day life. While contrarian voices existed, the overall position
presented by many prominent voices in the community was toward greater integration and—for
lack of a better term—Brazilianization. Like many immigrants to the Americas during the late
19th
and early 20th
centuries, the Japanese in Brazil had established their own schools early on.
While those schools initially taught only in Japanese, over the course of the 1920s that practice
began to change. Prominent intellectual and academic figures among the Japanese Brazilians
began to push for the adoption of Portuguese as the primary language of academic instruction,
limiting the role of Japanese to that of a foreign language. One prominent Japanese-Brazilian
academic suggested that the children of the immigrant community should be taught “only
enough of the Japanese script as was necessary to communicate with relatives back in Japan.”120
This is an important mode of outreach, avoiding linguistic isolation and the resulting self-
segregation and while embracing a new identity in a new land. The nature of the Japanese
community in Brazil was changing. Rather than coming to Brazil in the relatively short term and
then returning to Japan, increasing numbers of immigrants were beginning to settle permanently.
By mid-1925, the majority of Japanese immigrants were choosing to remain in Brazil
permanently.121
As such, they were making conscious decisions to pursue adaptive strategies to
120
Lone, Stewart. The Japanese Community in Brazil, 1908-1940: Between Samurai and Carnival. Palgrave Press,
New York, 2001. p. 88 121
Ibid; also Masterson, Daniel M. and Funada-Classen, Sayaka. The Japanese in Latin America. University of
Illinois Press, 2004, p. 68-70
68
ensure their integration and long term success. Among these choices was a public push for
greater intermarriage between the Japanese and Brazilian communities. This was, one must not,
note universally well received—one commentator referred to it as “ethnosuicide for we
Japanese.”122
However, over the course of the 1920s and into the 1930s, the practice became
more prevalent and the social stigma against it among the Brazilian Japanese fell silent.123
While
the path was rockier and more drawn-out, the Japanese Brazilians chose this path to integration
much as the Mexicali Chinese had.
A comparison between the Japanese Brazilian community and the Chinese in Mexicali
must, in the context of this thesis at least, contain a discussion of community organizations.
There, frankly, the comparison gets rather murkier. Active community organizations existed in
Japanese Brazil, as in Mexicali, from the beginning.124
Due to the wider geographic scope of the
Japanese in Brazil, hundreds of such organizations sprang up both in major cities and rural areas.
They existed for many of the same reasons as their Mexicali counterparts: as support for
newcomers, as a source of funding for civic projects such as schools, and as a means of mutual
economic and social support.125
Due to their interest in athletics, these community organizations
became some of the first points of contact between the Japanese and native Brazilian
communities, who met in friendly competition in a variety of sports.126
After listing these
contributions to civic life, the comparison with Mexicali ends. While the various community
organizations among the Mexicali Chinese were seen in an overwhelmingly positive light, their
122
Lone, Stewart. The Japanese Community in Brazil, 1908-1940: Between Samurai and Carnival. Palgrave Press,
New York, 2001. p. 70 123
Ibid p. 70-71 124
Masterson, Daniel M. and Funada-Classen, Sayaka. The Japanese in Latin America. University of Illinois Press,
2004, p. 51-52. 125
Lone, Stewart. The Japanese Community in Brazil, 1908-1940: Between Samurai and Carnival. Palgrave Press,
New York, 2001. p. 85-86 126
Ibid p. 93
69
counterparts in Japanese Brazil received a different reception. They often were viewed as a
means of social control, closely linked to Japanese diplomatic authorities in Brazil.127
For
newcomers enjoying the freedoms offered by life in a new country with a much less restrictive
society, this was something to be avoided at all cost. Rumors of consular involvement foundered
efforts to synthesize the hundreds of various civic organizations into a large scale version of the
Asocación China.128
This disunity led to occasional political infighting among the various
Japanese Brazilian community organizations—although, one must note, nothing like the violence
and organized crime which plagued Mexicali during the 1920s and early 1930s.
While lacking perfect symmetry, the case of the Japanese Brazilians does offer strong
similarities to the history and development of the Mexicali Chinese community. This affords us
the opportunity to suggest a means of further development for the proposed theoretical approach
presented in this thesis. Like the Mexicali Chinese, the Japanese in Brazil actively chose
strategies and ways of living which allowed for greater outreach to the local community in their
new countries and enabled them to actively and positively integrate into the day to day life of
their new nation. As such, things rapidly reached a point at which “. . . there were Japanese at
the level of city, town, and settlement living comfortably among non-Japanese.”129
One may
suggest, again, an addendum to the existing theories often applied to communities of immigrants
from East Asia: that the “middleman” or “pariah” role is not simply imposed from without by a
xenophobic mainstream culture. Rather, it should be situated as part of a complex series of
interactions between the “other” and the mainstream. The Mexicali Chinese and—it would
appear—their Japanese Brazilian counterparts both made active choices which facilitate their
127
Ibid p. 85 128
Lone, Stewart. The Japanese Community in Brazil, 1908-1940: Between Samurai and Carnival. Palgrave Press,
New York, 2001. p. 86 129
Ibid
70
acceptance and integration. Rather than merely being subject to an imposed structure, they
exercised their own agency in pursuit of a lasting presence in their new country. They were thus
able to avoid a pariah or middleman role and become a more broadly integrated part of economic
and social life.
One would hope that this research answers the proposed questions about the Chinese in
Mexicali while raising some new ones. There are many points of inquiry for future research,
which should be answered in order to give us a fully realized picture of the history of this unique
community. This paper has focused on the Chinese of Mexicali, but they were not the only
immigrant group in the city. As has been noted, there were smaller communities of both
Japanese and South Asian immigrants who had arrived at the same time. An examination of
their historical experiences and their interactions with both the Chinese and native Mexicans is
an important starting point in understanding the community dynamics of Mexicali, as well as
providing, perhaps, an opportunity to further examine the demands of historical theory. Moving
beyond the social sphere, the political ties between the Mexicali Chinese and the rest of the state
and nation need further explication. The connection between Esteban Cantú and the Chinese of
Baja California is complex and multifaceted; they function as rivals as often as allies despite the
mutual benefits of their cooperation. More archival research is needed in order to fully explore
this question. More difficult, but perhaps even more necessary, is a look into the trans-border
relations of the Mexicali Chinese. Their connections to the Chinese communities of San
Francisco and Los Angeles in the US state of California are well established, however more
detailed research would offer additional insights into the economic and social practices and ties
between them, further our understanding of the business life of both communities. Likewise, the
role of US officials of all strips in dealing with this trans-border community, particularly during
71
the awful days of the Chinese expulsions, is vital. Greatly overlooked in the existing secondary
literature, this complex series of events could offer new understandings of the Chinese in both
Mexicali and across the border as a whole.
At the time of this writing, Mexicali is a greatly changed community when compared to
the small border city that is the subject of this thesis. Its border location still provides a
multitude of opportunities for international trade. It has become a technology center for Mexico,
leading the nation in aerospace manufacturing, information technologies, and is becoming an
increasingly important center in the global manufacturing of semi-conductors. Relatively
sheltered from the drug cartel wars currently gripping most of the border states, Baja California
has emerged as one of the most prosperous and forward-looking regions in Mexico.
Sadly, even as the city they helped found thrives, the Chinese community in Mexicali has
fallen upon harder times. Once the majority population in the city, their numbers have dwindled
through intermarriage, acculturation, and a decline in immigration from China. The Asocacíon
China still exists, although in a greatly diminished capacity. Open only part time, it serves
mainly as a social center for the elderly and is no longer the font of community improvement and
charity that it was during its heyday. The demographics of the Mexicali Chinese who remain
have changed, as well. The initial founding population was almost exclusively Cantonese
speaking, hailing from a fairly specific region in southern China. Following decades of the
People’s Republic of China’s reformist language policies, new immigrants are overwhelmingly
likely to be speakers of Mandarin. This may seem like a small change to those lacking a
familiarity with the various languages of China. One must note, however, that Cantonese and
Mandarin are roughly as different as English and German. Language serves to transmit both
72
culture and identity, and as such this change in the language dynamic is also a change in the very
nature of the community, such as it remains.
Despite my best efforts, I have been unable to locate the original article from a culinary
magazine which eventually led to this thesis. This is, perhaps, fitting. We are in the waning
days of the Mexicali Chinese as a distinct and historically coherent community. Their unique
story thus takes on a greater importance. The historical insight and potential for broader
understanding it offers are crucial, and must be fully explored before they fade from living
memory.130
130
If you’re found this footnote, you’ve probably read my thesis all the way through. I welcome your comments on
my work: [email protected].
73
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