Integration Through Magnet Schools
Dan Eisler
Introduction:
Magnet schools emerged as one of several tactics employed by
the United States education system to achieve integration in
response to racial tensions during the civil rights era. This
paper will attempt to answer if, and to what extent this goal was
accomplished, and how magnet school policies today continue to
address issues of race and discrimination. To do this it is
first necessary to explore the conditions and demands that led to
the development and implementation of policies that promoted
magnet schools. This paper will attempt to establish that this
was in response to a demand for desegregation. After an
introduction to the historical context, we can understand what
led policymakers to choose magnet schools, over other means to
achieving integration. In doing so, I plan to develop an
argument as to the values policymakers were ascribing to when
crafting legislation. The next focus of this paper will be on
those specific court cases and legislation that promoted the
growth of magnet schools. After first identifying what the
policies were intended to do, the next step will be to compare
the impact that policy has had on the integration of classrooms
through the development of magnet schools. The focus will be on
implemented policy, and the discrepancies between the policies’
intentions and their outcomes. I will then discuss whether the
development of these magnets has successfully addressed the
demand to integrate, pulling from both sides of the issue. To
illustrate the impact that these policies have had in real
communities, I will include a review of some existing magnets.
These will be useful to help understand what the produced
outcomes of implemented policy have been. Finally, I will compare
magnet schools and charter schools to argue why magnet schools
are a more appropriate tool for accomplishing integration. It is
important to note that I am assuming the continued purpose of
magnet schools is to promote integration. There is no doubt that
academics are still a priority, but I believe that policies
regarding magnet schools have and continue to pertain primarily
to their function as a tool of integration.
History
Despite the passage of Brown v. Board of Education in 1954, which
declared state laws establishing separate public schools for
black and white students were unconstitutional, desegregation was
“largely token and voluntary throughout the United States” until
1970 (Rossell. 1990, p. 3) The reason for this lack of real
change was the ineffectiveness of policies initially adopted in
response to the legal mandate of Brown v. Board of Education to
integrate schools. Many school districts did nothing, and those
that did enact integration policies adopted choice plans that
were riddled with issues.(Rossell, 1990, p. 4).
These plans looked like change politically, but did very
little to desegregate schools. Northern states implemented
“majority-to-minority” desegregation plans that allowed any child
to transfer to any school in which his or her race was the
minority. (Rossell, 1990, p.4). The result of this was that
disproportionate numbers of black students, up to 25% from a
district, were getting on buses at their own expense to travel to
predominately white schools (Rossell, 1990, p.4). Southern states
some similar varieties of court approved choice plans, including
pupil-placement laws and freedom-of-choice plans (Rossell, 1990,
p.4). Pupil placement plans continued to assign students to
schools based on race, then accept applications for transfers.
The law disallowed the denial of applicant students based on
race, but allowed students to be rejected for a number of other
infractions, varying from overcrowding to bad character (Rossell,
1990, p.5). After these policies were found unconstitutional in
the early 1960’s, school districts adopted freedom-of-choice
plans which required each student to select what school they
wanted to be placed in (Rossell, 1990, p.5). These plans also
failed largely due to lingering racial tensions that discouraged
black students from enrolling in white schools and vice versa. As
a result of these failed policies, despite it being a decade
since the passage of Brown v. Board of Education, almost 94% of
southern black students were still in all-black schools in 1965
(Rossell, 1990, p. 5).
Parents and civil rights groups grew impatient with the slow
pace of integration, and frequency with which districts subverted
the new laws. There was a demand for affirmative action rather
than simply making discrimination illegal, and a response came in
1968, when the Supreme Court ruled in Green v. County School Board that
some deregulation plans were ineffective enough as to be
unconstitutional (Rossell, 1990, p.6). The ruling set a precedent
that policies must prove themselves to be effective at
facilitating integration as well as being non-discriminatory
based on race. It then fell to district courts to draft and
implement theses policies.
Enacted Policy
Despite the court’s insistence on results, there was not a
set of specified integration plan characteristics until Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg in 1971. In its decision, the Supreme Court
outlined acceptable remedies for urban school desegregation as
being “(1) Racial balance; (2) nondiscriminatory one-race
schools; (3) altering of attendance zones, and pairing,
clustering, or grouping of schools; and (4) transportation of
students out of their neighborhood to another school in the
district” (Rossell,1990, p.8). After Swann, integration strategies
typically included a target racial balance, and then used
involuntary school assignment plans to attempt to reach these
goals.
Racially balanced schools were schools whose racial
composition approximated the racial composition of the entire
school district with some allowance for marginal deviation
(Rossell, 1985, p. 218). To achieve this, the majority of
districts adopted busing policies, under which districts would
transport students from one part of the district to another part
of the district to integrate schools. Despite opposition from
effected families, there was a surge in busing between 1970 and
1976. There was evidence that it had positive effects on school
segregation and racial intolerance, but it continued to face
opposition from both white and black families. (Rossell, 1990, p.
10)
In addition to questions about the ethics of busing, when
determining the most effective reassignment of students, models
focused only on the “costs” associated with busing students to a
school in terms of “white flight” (Rossell 1985, p. 218). White
flight is the term given to an observed phenomenon in which white
families begin to leave a community when it reaches a certain
percentage of minorities. Rossell identifies a problem with using
white flight as the primary consideration when evaluating the
effectiveness of integrating a district. “It can estimate how
many students have left, but not the effect of that loss on
interracial contact in the district” (Rossell, 1985, p. 220).
Though white students may leave schools when minority students
are bused in, the net result may still produce more white and
non-white student interaction. With this in mind, Christine
Rossell provides a different framework for thinking about
successful integration. She defines the aims of a school as
ideally being “(A) Raising minority achievement so that the gap
between the races is reduced and eventually eliminated, (B)
Achieving equal status interracial contact and friendships (C)
Increasing minority self-esteem and motivation, and (D) improving
minority life chances”(Rossell, 1985, p. 219).
Magnet school policy intended to address this when first
implemented in 1976, when federal district courts in Buffalo New
York, and Milwaukee approved integration plans that relied
primarily on magnet schools in black neighborhoods in addition to
majority-to-minority transfers in order to desegregate elementary
schools (Rossell, 1990, p. 24). Voluntary integration plans with
magnet schools as a component were emulated in several other
major cities across the U.S, after amendments made to the
Emergency School Assistance Act (ESAA) allocated federal funding
for the creation of magnet schools aimed at desegregation and
integration. (Price & Stern,1987, p.294). This inducement
produced results, by 1982 there were over 130 school districts
running over 1,000 magnet schools across the country for the
express purpose of desegregation (Price & Stern, 1987, p.294 ).
The defining characteristics of these first magnet schools
continue to describe the core characteristics of magnet schools
today: “(1) A distinctive school curriculum organized around a
special theme or method of instruction. (2) Voluntary enrollment
elected by students and their parents. (3) Students are drawn
from many attendance zones” (Price & Stern, 1987, p.292). Having
a distinctive, specialized, or innovative curriculum was intended
to attract white families to black neighborhoods, and prevent
white flight in schools that were receiving an influx of
minorities. Voluntary enrollment meant that students could not be
systematically assigned to schools based on qualifications such
as a race or ability. Finally, by not restricting the student
pool by geographic location, this model attempts to insure that
an imbalance in the racial composition of a district does not
negatively affect the integration of the school.
In 1983 the United States Department of Education
commissioned a study of ESAA funded magnet programs to determine
what had been accomplished,. The study discovered that 40% of the
districts that developed magnet schools experienced positive
results in district wide desegregation (Price & Stern, 1987, p.
295). The researchers defined a successfully integrated school as
one in which there was “equality among students, intergroup
respect, educative use of cultural differences, and inclusiveness
towards all students” (Price & Stern, 1987, p. 297). The study
found that larger districts, districts with economic growth, and
districts that were already multiracial and multiethnic were more
likely to find success with a magnet school, and that magnet
schools were most effective when used in conjunction with other
integration policies (Price & Stern, 1987, p. 295).
And so policy makers began implementing desegregation plans
that relied, at least partially on students choosing to attend
integrated magnet school for their curriculum, rather than giving
students mandatory school assignments. This shift to a choice
model did not produce results as quickly as mandatory
reassignment plans, but over time the voluntary plans produce
greater interracial exposure and, on average, half as much “white
flight” as mandatory plans such as busing (Price & Stern, 1987,
296).
Magnet schools experienced a boom in popularity with funding
increasing under Clinton to over 100 million dollars (Siegel-
Hawley, & Frankenberg 2012, p. 6). A study in 1995 then indicated
that magnet schools, in addition to integrating students, were
producing higher rates of student achievement than public high
school, private or catholic schools (Siegel-Hawley & Frankenberg,
2012, p. 8) It appeared, however, that these accomplishments may
have required deprioritizing integration. A study the following
year indicated that only 42% of new magnet programs were
operating under obvious desegregation guidelines, compared to 60%
reported in 1983 (Siegel-Hawley & Frankenberg, 2012, p. 8).
This came after many districts had been given “unitary
status” indicating that they had achieved the racial balance in
their district mandated by the courts, and was relieved of
mandatory desegregation strictures (Smrekar, C., & Goldring,
2010). These schools were then forbidden from using strategies
they had used under previous desegregation plans to insure racial
balance, like holding separate admissions lotteries based on race
(Smrekar, C., & Goldring, 2010). Schools then faced the
difficulty of maintaining a racial balance, without using race as
primary criteria for admission. The Bush administration
exacerbated this difficulty by holding magnet schools applying
for funding to a strict standard of race-neutral means of
reducing or eliminating racial isolation (Siegel-Hawley &
Frankenberg, 2012, p. 8). Challenges to these policies culminated
in 2007 with Parents Involved in Community Schools (PICS) v. Seattle School District
No. 1 and Crystal D. Meredith v. Jefferson County Board of Education, which
explicitly limited the use of race in student assignment and
school choice plans in “unitary” districts (Smrekar, C., &
Goldring, 2010).
Most recently, the Obama administration has granted
“unitary” districts receiving federal funding more flexibility in
how they comply with the Parent Involved ruling. (Siegel-Hawley &
Frankenberg, 2012, p. 9). In the case ruling justice Kennedy
offered a number of acceptable mechanisms for achieving the aims
of racial integration to inform future policy. His suggestions
bear some resemblance to those characteristics and aims of a
magnet school listed previously by Price and Rossell. “1)
Devising student attendance zones to encompass racially
defined/segregated neighborhoods; 2) Building new schools in
racially mixed neighborhoods or in areas that straddle racially
identifiable neighborhoods; and 3) developing special or unique
programs” (Smrekar, C., & Goldring, 2010).
Implementation and Critique
One issue that arose immediately was the implementation of a
model of magnet school called a partial-site magnet. Implementing
a full-site magnet requires first having a building to fill with
students, which either requires building a new school, or closing
an existing school and emptying it of it’s students. Unlike a
full-site magnet that constitutes an entire school, partial-site
magnet programs exist as an “enclave” within a larger regular
school (West,1994,p.2569). The comparatively low cost of
implementation, coupled with the excitement around school choice
as an alternatives to involuntary integration policies made
partial magnets an incredibly attractive plan. “Nearly every
court-ordered desegregation plan since the early 1980’s has
resulted in the creation of several partial-site magnet schools
and only one, two, or often no full-site magnet schools”(West,
1994, p. 2571).
The problem with this model, as Kimberly West argues, is
that although partial-site magnet programs are successful at
attracting white students to schools in black neighborhoods, they
are also particularly prone to segregating students within the
school building (West, 1994, p.2566) The white transfer students
are isolated to the magnet program, and rarely take classes with
non-transfer minority students in the general classes (West,
1994,p.2567). West concedes that research on in class segregation
is sparse, but insists that the evidence is present, and the lack
of literature is a result of lack of research, not an absence of
segregation. She points to one example of an academically
successful magnet school in Dade County, Florida. “The building
was desegregated - 52% black, 38% white, and 10% Hispanic - but
in regular classrooms outside of the magnet program, 75% of the
fifth and sixth graders were black, and 95% of the
kindergarteners were black”(West, 1994, p. 2575).
A couple of factors, however, have been identified in both
partial and full-site magnets, which can negatively affect
integration efforts. One is the use of highly competitive
admittance criteria, which can create a culture of elitism and
exclusion. The best students go to the most competitive schools,
while the rest get shuffled into the remaining schools. These
students are disproportionately lower class minority students as
indicated by a study conducted in 1985 by the Advocates for
Children which documented far worse acceptance rates to selective
magnet schools for children from minority neighborhoods (Price &
Stern, 1987, p. 301). Not only do selective schools
systematically marginalize minority populations, but selective
schools were not any more likely to be of high quality than
schools that selected students using the lottery method (Price &
Stern, 1987, p.300). Rather than selective admissions criteria,
the paper suggests that the most equitable way to go about
assigning students in a magnet school system is to select
applicants by lottery. A second issue is insuring that a magnet
system has an effective information system to present true
opportunities to all students (Price & Stern, 1987, p. 315). If
there is not a proactive effort on behalf of the district to
provide schools with information to pass on to students, the
system will privilege those families with the social capital to
learn about and take advantage of different choice opportunities.
As more districts are being designated as unitary, and
relieved of their court-mandated desegregation plans, school
choice has become less restrictive and more criticism has arisen
of the school choice model in general. Advocates of the school
choice model assert that the majority of students will select
schools based on their academic quality, rather than the race or
class composition of their student body. Taking this to be true,
the argument is that if schools are allowed to compete for
students across the district, students will flock to more
effective schools, incentivizing other schools to improve and
innovate. In theory, all schools will step up their performance,
and students’ choices will distribute them evenly between the
available options.
A particularly salient criticism of this argument is that
“white and wealthier students will take steps to maintain their
social status by distancing themselves from groups they perceive
to be of lower standing” (Saporito, 2003, p. 182) In an attempt
to explore the validity of this claim, Salvatore Saporito
conducted a large-scale study on all eighth graders in the
Philadelphia public school system. The study looked at the
magnet school applications, acceptances, and attendances of
nearly eleven thousand students from eighth to ninth grade. The
students decisions were then analyzed on a large scale, taking
into account a myriad of factors that would effect school choice
including student’s race, poverty, and test scores as well as the
demographics and crime statistics of schools and surrounding
neighborhoods.
The study first finds that both racially and economically
advantaged families are more likely than their disadvantaged
counterparts to leave schools with higher rates of poverty and
non-white children (Saporito, 2000, p.192). The study further
demonstrates that the application rate of non-poor white students
increased when the number of non-white students increased, even
when the economic composition was held constant (Saporito, 2000,
p. 191). This is in contrast to findings that non-white students
application rates actually declined when the number of non-white
students in the district increased and economic composition was
held constant (Saporito, 2000, p. 191). “When I hold student and
school characteristics constant (i.e. student test scores,
student poverty rates, and school quality factors), I still find
race-based avoidance patterns among white families” (Saporito,
2003, p.198). Saporito concludes that there is no empirical
support for arguments that unfettered school choice policies will
reduce segregation by race and class. Rather, he claims that the
strong preferences of white families to be in predominantly white
schools results in increased segregation (Saporito, 2000, p. 199)
Outcomes and Feedback
Despite opposition to school choice, magnet schools continue
to be a very popular option. In 2008-09, federal data from the
National Center for Education Statistics indicated that more than
2.5 million students enrolled in magnet schools across the nation
(SiegelHawley & Frankenberg, 2012, p. 9). In a study of a sample
of Magnet schools in 2012 respondents reportedly enrolled twice
as many black students, and nearly 10% more Hispanic students
than public schools (SiegelHawley & Frankenberg, 201, 2p. 10).
This diversity corresponded with consistent demand for
enrollment; magnet schools reporting increasing levels of racial
diversity over a ten-year period were associated with the highest
levels of parental demand (SiegelHawley & Frankenberg, 2012, p.
13). There was also an indication of a surge in inter-district
magnet enrollment in response to school segregation between
different school districts, rather than in a single district
(SiegelHawley & Frankenberg, 2012, p.15).
Considerations for future policy in response to these
outcomes should include the development of outreach to
communities lacking access to mainstream social and informational
networks, provision of free transportation, the development of
specific diversity goals, and the use of non-competitive
admissions criteria like open enrollment, lotteries or interviews
(SiegelHawley & Frankenberg, 2012, p. 17) These suggestions
closely mirror those characteristics of a magnet school listed
earlier by Price and Stern. These authors provide an example of
a magnet school system that effectively takes these
considerations into account.
Community School District Four in Harlem, host to a model
magnet school system of junior high schools. Every school in the
district is unzoned, meaning they accept students from anywhere
in the district, as recommended by both Price and Stern, and
SiegelHawley and Frankenberg. Most schools have special themes
or unique philosophies to attract students, and the district
makes a conscious decision to develop programs to accommodate
students’ individual needs and keep the number of enrolled
students down. All of this is accomplished in a school district
that is not wealthy and has a large population of minority
students. None of the schools in the district have extensive
admissions criteria, and do not screen applicants by geographic
location. Finally, every magnet school has a system of checks in
place to ensure that all students are aware of the options
available to them, and that they make an informed choice about
their future. “Students are selected by the receiving school
directors, who hand-select based mainly on the sending schools’
appraisals of who would do well in a particular
program...Directors actually meet together to divide up the
entering class. Generally, students are accepted into one of
their top three choices” (Price & Stern, 1987, p. 312).
Allison Roda and Amy Wells offer a competing example of what
can happen when a diverse school system is left to its own
devices. They describe another district in New York City,
however this one took a colorblind stance when it came to student
assignment policies, meaning they did not promote policies that
would purposefully create diverse schools such as public
information systems or expanded attendance zones (Roda & Wells,
2013, p. 271). As a result, almost all of the district’s white
elementary school students were enrolled in 6 out of 18 schools
(Roda & Wells ,2013, p.271) In the remaining 12 schools the
demographics ranged from 80-100% black and/or Latino (Roda &
Wells ,2013, p. 271). Not only were the demographics skewed, but
the programs were as well. The only three schools with gifted
and talented (G&T) programs were among those six schools attended
by a relatively high percentage of white students. To attempt to
answer why this unequal appropriation of students existed, Roda
and Wells conducted interviews with the parents of 57 students in
district. Despite the apparent segregation in the district, when
asked speci cally if they wanted their children to attend afi
diverse school, a full 80% of the white parents interviewed said
yes (Roda & Wells, 2013, 277). Because there are very few
racially balanced schools in the district, however, parents of
white students are typically forced into a choice between a
predominantly low-income black and Latino school, or the
exclusive homogeneous G&T schools (Roda & Wells, 2013, 278). In
this situation, white parents almost always chose the school
where their child would not be the minority.
In sum, the primary differences between the magnet schools
looked at in the two examples above were the use of
nondiscriminatory admissions criteria, the use of attendance
boundaries and the existence of a support system to promote
informed choice. The effective magnet school system exhibited
all of these things, while the ineffective system had none. This
would suggest that these factors are of some considerable
influence on the racial balance of a district, regardless of the
critiques of the choice model discussed previously.
Policy Alternatives
In recent years, charter schools have assumed the spotlight
of public choice options. Although charter school, only account
for about 2% of total students nationwide, they have been growing
steadily in numbers over the past few years (Sugarman, 2103, p.
4). This has corresponded with federal funding being made
available in 1996, and then increasing to over double that of
magnet schools by 2010 (SiegelHawley & Frankenberg, 2012, p. 6).
There are a few major differences in terms of design between
magnet and charter schools. Both typically have a special
curricular emphasis, accept students from across one or multiple
districts, and generally operate in the public school sector. The
major difference, however, is the populations that each model
serves.
Compared to regular public schools, both charter and magnet
programs enrolled a larger share of black and Latino students
(Siegel-Hawley & Frankenberg, Issue brief no. 6). Between the
two, however, twice as many magnet students attend majority non-
white schools than charter students. White students in charter
schools also experience considerably less exposure to low income
students than magnets or public schools (Siegel-Hawley &
Frankenberg). In general magnet school students are more likely
to enroll in racially and socioeconomically diverse environments
than charter school students (Siegel-Hawley & Frankenberg).
This difference is the possible result of the fact that
fundamentally, charter schools have not been implemented with
intentions of promoting integration. The implication of this is
that while magnet schools funding is still often tied to
desegregation plans, and racial balance, charter schools do not
have these restrictions. The result has been the racial and
economic imbalance described above. This supports the further
discussion that when school districts do not implement proactive
legislation, and instead leave integration to be managed by the
market, schools have a tendency to segregate (Saporito, 2013,
p.198 ). In sum, charter schools should not be considered an
alternative to magnet schools due to their lack of integration as
a primary consideration.
The differences in design and success among magnet school
systems suggest that if a magnet program is ineffective, an
appropriate alternative may be different model of magnet school,
for instance replacing a partial-site magnet with a full-site
magnet. Districts looking to develop more effective magnet
systems should look to other similar districts that have already
gone through the process to get a sense of how they can more
successfully integrate students. Limited admittance criteria and
open enrollment to all students in the district are two common
factors of successful magnet school which Price and Stern
identify. They suggest a magnet system model in which every
school is a magnet school with these characteristics (Price &
Stern, 1987, p. 318) The reasoning being that if every student
makes a choice about what school they wish to attend, no school
becomes a “school of last resort” to be overburdened with the
difficult children of the district. Although this is more of a
radical concept that could only be accomplished with serious
political inertia, it has been shown to be successful where it
exists such as the Community School District 4 in Harlem.
Finally, if the answer to facilitating integration is going
to be choice, we have to make sure that each student is actually
being given a real choice. Requiring school applications to be
signed off on by multiple authority figures, as in the example
provided by Price and Stern, seems like an affective change that
could be accomplished with legislation. Simply requiring a few
points of contact between the student, the parents, and the
school administration is a good place to start making sure the
student is adequately informed about the available options. The
evidence is there that magnet schools are a powerful tool in
accomplishing integration. My concern is that as we move further
away from their origins in the civil rights movement, the
emphasis on integration will fade, as it did in the example Roda
and Wells provide. This cannot be allowed to happen, there are
still too many factors working against working-class minority
families to leave integration up to a free market system. The
responsibility then falls on legislators to do their part to make
sure that every magnet school embodies those components that have
been shown to successfully combat segregation.
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