ImperialFootprints:
ColonialLegacies,PartyMachinesandContemporaryVoting
KeithA.DardenYaleUniversity
PaperPreparedfortheMidwestPoliticalScienceAssociationMeetingsApril24,2010
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PLEASEDONOTCITEWITHOUTPERMISSIONOFTHEAUTHOR
Abstract:Thepapercombinesfieldinterviews,historicalprocess‐tracing,andaspatialdiscontinuityanalysis of the 2010 Ukrainian Presidential elections to explain why contemporary voters cleavealongonestretchofa formerimperialboundaryinUkraine. FormerlyOttomanacquisitionsoftheRussianEmpirefaceddirectrule,education,urbanization,andRussificationinthelate18thand19thCenturies,creatingadistinctivepro‐RussianregionalculturethatsuppliesthebaseofsupportfortheParty of Regions. Areas annexed from Poland in the 18th Century were subject to indirect rulethrough the Polish nobility, which led to less peasant education andmore limited cultural ties toRussia. Analyzinga60‐kmwidebandofpollingdistrictsalongthe former frontierbetweenPolishandOttomanterritoriesinUkraine,wefindsubstantiallygreatersupportforYanukovichinpollingdistricts on the Ottoman side of the former frontier. The results suggest that pre‐Communistimperiallegacieshaveasignificanteffectoncontemporaryvotingpatterns.
Voting patterns in many central European countries have taken on a
decidedlyregionalcharacter in thedecades following thecollapseofCommunism.
ThemostrecentUkrainianPresidentialElectionsrepeatedaregionalvotingpattern
inUkrainian politics that is nowquite consistent and familiar. The southern and
easternprovincesofthecountry1consistentlyvoteforthesamecandidateorparty.
Andtheydosobylargeandnearlyuniversalmajoritiesacrosseverypollingdistrict
within the region. The formerlyAustrian territoriesof Ivano‐Frankivsk,Ternopil,
and Lviv consistently vote for the rival candidate in extraordinarily high
percentages, and they consistently carrywith them the remainder of the country,
with the exceptionof Zakarpatska, Chernivtsy, andKirovohrad (where the vote is
often mixed). Again in 2010, regional voting dominated all other patterns in
Ukrainianelections.
Ukraine is not unique in this regard. Similar divides exist in Poland and
Romaniagoingbacktosomeoftheearliestpost‐Communistelections.Moreover,as
theelectoralsystemscontinuetomature,theregionalvotingpatternsappeartobe
solidifyingratherthandiminishinginsignificanceandpredictivepower.Itisnotan
exaggeration tosaywhen itcomes topredictingelectoraloutcomes in these three
countries, themost important piece of information to know about a voter is not
wheretheywork,howmuchtheyearn,orhowoldtheyare,butinwhichregionof
thecountrytheyreside.
1TheoblastsofDonetsk,Luhansk,Kharkiv,Dnipropetrovsk,Kherson,Zaporizhia,Crimea,Mykolaev,andOdessa.
More important, these electoral regions do not reflect an arbitrary
geography.Inallthreecases,theboundariesoftheregionalvotingblocsfallalong
theold anddefunct boundaries of the empires out ofwhich these countrieswere
constructed. The correlation between imperial boundaries and contemporary
voting is so close, in fact, that the best predictor of which party would win an
electoraldistrictinthe2007legislativeelectionsinPolandwaswhetherthatdistrict
fellwithinthePrussianpartitionpriorto1918.Thesamehasbeentrueforthemost
recent Romanian elections, which were dominated by a distinction between
formerlyHabsburgandformerlyOttoman(Moldavia,Walachia,Dobrogea)sections
ofthecountry. AlthoughUkraine’s imperial legaciesaremorevariedandcomplex
thananyothercountryinEurasia,allofitsPresidentialandParliamentaryelections
since2002exhibitaclearelectoraldividethatappearstofollowlooselytheareasof
historicPolish settlementand control. These remarkable imperial “footprints”on
the contemporary electoralmap of Europe beg a fundamental question: Why do
18th and 19th Century Imperial boundaries provide such a powerful predictor of
votingbehaviorinthe21stCenturyinthelargestcountriesinCentralEurope?
Toprovideapartialanswertothisquestion,thispaperfocusesontheresults
of the2010Presidentialelections inUkraine,a countrywhere the regionalvoting
patterns have gained a great deal of attention and one which offers a richer
patchworkofimperiallegaciesthananyothercountryinEurope.Tobetterisolate
the effects of a possible imperial legacy, I focus on election results within an
approximately 60‐km wide band of territory straddling the old border that
distinguished the Ottoman Empire from the Polish Commonwealth when the
RussianEmpireannexedtheterritoriesattheendofthe18thCentury.Myhopeis
that a detailed analysis of imperial legacies and contemporary voting patterns in
thisregionwillilluminatetheprocessesandmechanismsbehindthedeepimperial
footprintoncontemporaryelectionsthatwefindinUkraineandelsewhere.
My initial findings suggest that two factors play an important role in
determining the imperial voting pattern: regional political culture and the
orientation and strength of the provincial party machine. To be more precise, I
argue that the different strategies that the Russian Empire employed in the
incorporationofformerlyPolishandformerlyOttomanterritoriesledtothesetwo
areas to differ significantly in their regional political culture, orientation, and
dominantidentification—inparticulartheirattitudestowardRussianculture.Inthe
New Russia (Novorossija) province, comprising areas acquired from the Ottoman
Empire,thestrategyoftheTsaristEmpirewastocolonizethenewterritoryrapidly
andtoimposedirectrule.Intheseareas,anewandlargelymartialRussiannobility
wascreated,theschoolswereinRussianandwerewidespreadbythebeginningof
the20thCentury,andserfdomwasuncommon.Asaresult,themobilizedandfreer
peasantryhada greater attachment to and identificationwithRussia andRussian
culture. In contrast, the Russian Empire pursued a strategy of indirect rulewith
limited central influence in the areas annexed fromPoland at the end of the 18th
Century. Intheseareas,thePolishnobilityremainedinplace,preserveditspower
and privilege, and resisted the education of the peasantry and worked to block
cultural developments thatwould lead to greater associationwith Russia. These
areasbecamelessRussianinidentification,aprocessthatwasenhancedbySoviet
nationalitiespoliciesinthe1920sand1930s.
I contend that when there is genuine electoral competition and parties
choose to raise the salience of cultural issues, as was the case in the 2010
PresidentialelectionsinUkraine,thesedistinctiveregionalculturesthenshapethe
character of the party organizations that can succeed in the region. Issues that
pertain to Ukraine’s political and cultural relations with Russia (NATO, EU
membership,languagepolicy)havebeensalientincontemporaryUkrainianpolitics
for the past decade or more. Pro‐Russian candidates developed stronger party
organizationsintheprovincesofNewRussiaandmoreUkrainian‐andpro‐Western
partieshavedevelopedmachinesintheformerlyPolishimperialterritories.These
regional machines—through their superior organization and vote‐buying
resources—are then able to secure the vote of those voters with much weaker
cultural orientations or partisan preferences. The result is that the party
organizationsthenextendandhardenthemajoritiesforthedominantpartywithin
animperialregion,sharpeningtheregionalelectoraldivideovertimeandleadingto
a stronger “imperial footprint” in the electoral results. This interaction between
regionalpoliticalcultures,issuesalience,andpartyorganizationsappearstobethe
linkbetweenthe19thCenturyboundariesandcontemporaryvotingpatterns.
Thepaperproceedsinthreesections.SectionIdescribesthemethodbehind
thepaperandclarifiesthelogicofthespatialdiscontinuityresearchdesign.Section
IIdescribestherelevantdifferencesinRussianimperialincorporationstrategiesin
this area of the Russian empire and [partially!] traces out the processes and
mechanisms linking the 220 year‐old imperial boundary to the development of
different regional cultures evident in contemporary Ukraine. Section III then
presents the findings showing the effect of the imperial boundary on voting
behavior in the2010UkrainianPresidentialElectionsandshowshowoblast‐level
partymachinesenhanceandhardentheseregionalculturalcleavagestoproducea
substantiallystrongerregionaleffect.SectionIVconcludeswithadiscussionofour
understanding of potential causal pathways throughwhichprocesses in the fairly
distantpastcanbeconceivedascausesofcontemporaryevents(legacies).
I.SpatialDiscontinuitiesinImperialTreatment
This paper takes advantage of sharp, historically contingent, spatial
discontinuitiestodeterminetheeffectsofimperiallegaciesonvotingbehavior.The
logicofthedesignissimilartothatofnaturalexperimentsandcanbeconsidereda
subset of a broader category of discontinuity designs.2 Rather than examine all
UkrainianelectoraldistrictsIfocusonamorehomogeneousregionalsubsetofthose
polling districts that fall within a narrow band on opposite sides of a former
imperialboundary.Becauseallofthedistrictsareincloseproximitytooneanother
andsharethesamegeographicandnaturalenvironment,andbecauseofthegeneral
commonalities inpolitical institutions,socialstructure,andeconomicorganization
generatedby70yearsofSovietCommunism,thepresumptionisthatwecanmore
2 For an example of spatial regression discontinuity designs see David Card and Alan B. Krueger,“Minimum Wages and Employment: A Case Study of the Fast‐Food Industry in New Jersey andPennsylvania,”AmericanEconomicReview,vol.84(4),pages772‐93,September1994.Onregressiondiscontinuity designs more generally, see Imbens, G.W., Lemieux, T., “Regression discontinuitydesigns:Aguidetopractice,”JournalofEconometrics(2007).
confidentlyidentifytheeffectofanimperiallegacywiththisnarrowersubsetofthe
data.Ifthedistrictsoneithersideofthepreviousbordersharerelevantattributes
otherthanthosedirectlyattributabletothetreatment,thenanydifferencesseenin
the districts on either side of the border should therebymore closely reflect the
effectsoftheimperiallegacy.Becauseimperiallegaciesarespatiallydiscontinuous
variables—they have clear and known edges—a comparison of groups on either
side of a frontier approximates the assignment of similar groups randomly into
treatmentandcontrolandallowsustoidentifytheimperialeffect.
Theempiricalstrategyfirstcallsforidentifyinganareawherethepopulation
is quite homogeneous by contemporary measures, but which is divided by an
historicalimperialboundarythathaslongsinceceasedtodemarcateanypoliticalor
administrative differences. For this purpose I have chosen a stretch of territory
alongtheKodymariverinSouthwesternUkraine(seeFigure1).TodaytheKodyma
runsthroughthenorthernpartofOdessaprovince(oblast),butinthe18thCentury,
theKodymaservedasthedividinglinebetweentheOttomanEmpireandthePolish
Commonwealth,approximatelybetweenthebordertownofBalta(PolishJozefgrod,
briefly Russian Elensk) and Olviopol (Polish Bohopol, Ottoman Golta, today’s
Pervomaisk).3TheKodymaisessentiallyasmall,sandystreaminmid‐summerand
notamajorgeographicimpediment. Theslightrisetothesouthof itmightafford
some strategic advantage, but only marginally so. It does not differentiate soil3Notethatinthe18thCentury,theOttomanEmpire,PolishCommonwealth,andtheRussianEmpireeachmaintained their own border towns in the same general location for the purposes of borderprotectionandtrade. Hence“Balta”wasthenameofthetownthat fellontheOttomansideof thefrontier,whereasJozefgrodwasthePolishfortificationontheoppositesideoftheKodymariver.Itwasonly after theRussian empire annexed thePolish andOttoman territories (and in the caseofPervomaisk, only after the Bolshevik revolution) that the towns were incorporated into a singlepoliticalunitunderacommonname.
regions, climates, or transportation networks and it is not significantly different
from the rivers to the north (the Savran) or to the South. In short, the border
betweenthetwoempireswasnotinitiallyselectedonthebasisoflocalphysicalor
demographicattributesthatmightconfoundouranalysis.Theriverappearstohave
been chosen arbitrarily as a dividing line between the Polish and Ottoman
territories, possibly because it runs almost exactly from West to East and thus
servesasaconvenientNorth‐Southborder.
Figure1:TheStudyArea
(shaded,withtheKodymarivershowninred)
BoththePolishandOttomanterritoriesthatwereseparatedbythisborder
were acquired by the Russian Empire at approximately the same time in the last
decadeofthe18thCentury.TheRussianEmpireannexedthePolishterritorynorth
oftheKodymainthePolishpartitionof1793andacquiredtheterritorytothesouth
of the Kodyma at the conclusion of the Russo‐Turkish war in 1792 and the
dissolutionof theCrimeanKhanate. In theNorth, thePolishprovinceofBratslav
becametheRussiangovernorshipofPodolia(capitalinKamenets)atthebeginning
ofthe19thCenury. IntheSouth,anewgovernorshipofNovorossija(NewRussia)
was initially established and then divided in 1802 into the governorships of
Kherson,Ekaterinoslav,andTavrida. TheareastothesouthoftheKodymaunder
analysisherefellentirelywithintheKhersongovernorship.
II.StrategiesofImperialIncorporationandtheSourcesofRegionalCulture
The border between the Polish Commonwealth and the Ottoman empire
demarcatedsignificantdifferences inhowtheRussianEmpiregoverneditsnewly‐
acquired territories. Put in the simplest terms, the Empire pursued a strategy of
rapidcolonizationanddirect rule in theareasacquired fromtheOttomanEmpire
andastrategyof incorporationand indirectrule inareasthatwereacquiredfrom
Poland. These differences had a long‐term impact on the development of the
regionalculturesinthesetwoareas.
FormerlyOttomanTerritories:DirectRule
The goal for the territories acquired from the Ottoman empire was to
populate them as rapidly as possible, to cultivate the land for the purpose of
creating a tax base and to sustain sizable military settlements in a critical
borderlandoftheEmpire.Therewasnopre‐existingnobilitytodrawuponandthe
areaswerethinlypopulated.
To attract settlement, the Russian empire pursued a colonization strategy
focused on easy access to land, rapid upwardmobility, and direct rule (in many
regions—martiallaw).UnlikeotherareasoftheRussianempirewherelandholding
rightswerereserved for thenobility, in the territoriesannexed fromtheOttoman
EmpireandtheCrimeanKhanate,settlersofvirtuallyanybackgroundwereoffered
hereditaryprivateproperty.4AccordingtotheprinciplesoutlinedbyCatherinethe
Great,thegoalforthenewterritorieswas:
To divide the Lands amongst the Families which had none, and to
enablethemtocultivateandimprovethem.ThisDivisionoughttobe
madewithout Loss of Time, as soon as ever oneMan can be found
whowouldundertakeitonthoseTerms,thatnotaMomentmightbe
lostbeforetheWorkisbegun.5
4 JamesA.Duran,“CatherineII,Potemkin,andColonizationPolicy inSouthernRussia,”TheRussianReview,Vol.28,No.1(Jan.,1969),pages23‐24.5CatherineII,DocumentsofCatherinetheGreat,TheCorrespondencewithVoltaireandtheInstructionof1767intheEnglishTextof1768.Ed.ByW.F.Reddaway(Cambridge,England,1931)Article280,p.260)citedinDuran,“ColonizationPolicy,”page25.Capitalizationasitappearedintheoriginal.
Toincreasetheincentivestooccupyandimprovetheterritory,settlerswereoffered
taxexemptionsforperiodsof6,8,or16yearsdependingonanassessmentofhow
difficultthelandwastocultivate.Estatesofanysizeupto3888acres(48parcels)
weregrantedwithoutpayment topeopleofanyrank(zvanie). Toretain the land,
thenewownerneededonlytosettleonehouseholdperparcel.6
Nearly75%ofthenewsettlementregionwasdesignatedtosupportmilitary
settlers, who would reside in specific districts and be organized into regiments.7
Indicativeoftheremarkablepotentialforupwardmobilitythenewsettlementareas
entailed, military rank was a function of howmany settlers one could recruit to
resideonantheterritory.Amilitaryrankofmajorwastobegrantedtoanyonewho
recruited300militarysettlersor600ordinaryagriculturalsettlersfortheirestates.
Intheferventdesireformilitarysettlers,imperialdecreesestablishedamnestiesfor
fugitives,deserters,andrebelliousCossacks—thoseguiltyofanycrimeother than
murder—iftheywouldonlyreturntotheRussianempire.8
The goal was to settle, develop, and militarize the southern frontier as
rapidlyaspossible. Asaresultofthisdistinctivestrategyofcolonization,serfdom
was relatively absent from the territories acquired from the Ottoman empire
between1770and1796.9InsharpcontrasttotherestofEuropeanRussia,in1784
6Duran,“ColonizationPolicy,”page27.7 According to the decree (ukaz) of March 22, 1764, which set the policy for the occupation andsettlementofthenewterritories,anareaofsettlementwastobedividedinto70districts.These,inturn,were tobedivided into700parcelsof landof60.2or81acres. Of the70districts,52werereservedformilitarysettlers.Duran,“ColonizationPolicy,”page26‐27.8Duran,“ColonizationPolicy,”page29.9NotethatthiswastruealsofortheTiraspoluezd(futureTransdniester),whichwaspartofKhersongubernia,butnotfortherestofnorthernBessarabia(inso‐calledRussianMoldavia),whichwasstilldominatedbyMoldovanboyars.Foramapoftheterritoryseepage38ofE.I.Druzhinina,Iuzhnaia
only 2.7% of the rural population were privatelyowned serfs and the area was
dominated by “state peasants,” of whom 80% were organized into military
settlements.10 Withnopriornobility, social rankwas acquiredwith relative ease
andanewRussianelitewasestablishedinshortorderandcloselyassociatedwith
militaryserviceandtheagriculturalproductionneededtosustainit.
Culturally, these territories became considerably more Russian in
orientation. In part this was due to the fact that the inhabitants were culturally
distinct.TheformerlyOttomanterritorieswerecolonizedbyimmigrants,although
many of these immigrants were Ukrainian‐speakers (fleeing serfs, resettled
Cossacks) moving southward. Throughout the 19th Century, with the spread of
urbanization and schooling, Russian culture and language came to predominate.
ThelanguageofthecitieswasRussian,aswasthelanguageandthecontentofthe
schools. 11 Moreover, as is common in areas of diverse settlement (Germans,
Moldovans,Jews,andSerbswereencouragedtosettleintheseareasinaneffortto
populatethemquickly)thisledtotheuseofRussianasalinguafranca.Druzhinina
alsonotesthatmanyoftheearlysettlersweredrawnfromotherpartsoftheempire
and that the regionwasquitedistinctive in its openness toprivateproperty, new
Ukraina v 18001825 [Southern Ukraine from 1800‐1825] (Moscow: Nauka, 1970). For thepopulationdataonTiraspoluezdseeDruzhinina,pages86‐87.10Duran,“ColonizationPolicy,”page35.Druzhininaprovidesfiguresfrom1801showingthatoutofatotalpopulationof488,965ofNovorossiskaiaGubernia,451,812weresmallagriculturalproducers.Of these, 151,573 were in military settlements. Only 28,166 were serfs. (Druzhinina, IuzhnaiaUkraina,Table1,page70‐71).Thereducednumberofmilitarysettlementsweredue,inpart,tothefact that theBugCossacksandtheOdessaGreekdivisionwerereleased fromservice in the1790s.Bothreturnedtoserviceby1819.11AnenormousgymnasiumandteachertrainingcollegewasconstructedinAnanivandservedtheseareasofnorthernKherson.
economicmodelsandeducation. Laterarrivalsassimilatedtoexistingresidents.12
Asaresult,theseweresomeofthemosteducatedprovincesintheRussianempire
by 1910 and thus the population was more directly exposed to and attached to
RussianhighculturethanothersintheWesternborderlandsoftheempire.
ThePolishRightBank:Indirectrule.
IntheareasthattheRussianempireacquiredfromthepartitionsofPoland,
therewasawell‐establishedsystemofserfdominplaceandanextremelypowerful
Polish landowning classwith a coherent sense of corporate identity, the szlachta.
TheseareaswestoftheDnieperandNorthoftheKodymariverhadinsomecases
been under the control of the Polish nobility for centuries. Leading up to the
partition, theRussianempirehadsupported thesePolishnobles in their struggles
withthePolishmonarchy,hadnegotiatedseparatetreatieswiththem,andinitially
didnothingtochallengetheirstatuswhentheywereincorporatedintotheRussian
empire. The Polish landowners in the newly‐acquired territories were given the
samerightsasRussiannobleswithintheRussianempire,andweregivende facto
control over their regions. The language of administration in these regions
remained Polish.13 The Polish nobility retained control over the schools, the
textbooks and curriculum remained as they were before the partition, and
educationwasextendedonly to theirowngentry.14 Insummary, theempirekept
12Druzhinina,IuzhnaiaUkraina,p.69.13AlekseiMiller,TheUkrainianQuestion,page143.14N.Hans,“PolishschoolsinRussia1772‐1831,”SlavonicandEastEuropeanReview,Vol.38,No.91(June1960),pages399‐400.
the previous social order intact and ruled indirectly, entirely through the Polish
nobility.15
After the firstPolishuprising in1830‐31, theRussian imperialgovernment
formally changed its approach to the Polish nobility in theWestern borderlands.
AccordingtoMoon:
Following the revolt of 1830‐31 the Russian authorities tried to
address the 'Polish' and 'peasant' questions simultaneously. They
wanted to reduce the power and influence of the unreliable Polish
nobility, and to gain the support of the Lithuanian, Belorussian and
Ukrainian peasantry, lest they be won over to the Polish national
cause. The social andpolitical situation in thewesternprovinces, in
particular thedisaffectionamong thePolishnobility,gaveNicholas I
andhis advisers theopportunity to introduce the typeof regulatory
reformofserfdomtheywerecontemplatingfortheempireasawhole.
Theydidnotneed toworryaboutalienating thenobility sincemost
Poleswerealreadydisaffected.16
But the Russian imperial governmentmade little headway in uprooting or
supplanting the szlachta’s dominance in the region. Decrees were signed which
were to transfer Polish landholdings to the state as punishment for the rebellion,15Moon,“InventoryReform,”page655.16Moon,“InventoryReform,“page655.
but for themost part thesewere never broadly implemented.17 Throughbribery
andinformalmeans,thePolishnoblespreservedboththeirlandholdingsandtheir
localpoliticaldominance.ThelatereffortsoftheRussianempiretotrytomobilize
thepeasantsandlowerclassestosupplantthePolishnobility18werestymiedbythe
successoftheszlachtainblockingtheprogressofeducationandsocialmobilization
thatwere soadvanced in theNewRussian territoriesandalsoextending toother
parts of the empire.19 The spread of the zemstvos (local peasant self‐governance
institutions) to theSouthwestern (Polish) regionwasachievedonly in1911. And
since thezemstvoswereproviding for the largest shareof theeducationexpenses
for peasant schools, spending on primary education per capita was three times
lowerinthoseareasoftheEmpirewherenozemstvoswereinplace.20Accordingto
Miller, “the assimilation potential of the poor, scattered Russian gentry, with a
weaklydevelopedcorporatespirit,couldhardlyoutweighthedominanceoftheage‐
oldPolishszlachta,unitedbythecommoncauseofresistancetothosemeasuresof
the imperial government that violated the property rights of the Polish
landowners.”21PeasantsinthePolishareasweresimplynotRussifiedtonearlythe
sameextent.
Moreover, towards the end of the 19th Century the imperial government
came to be more concerned about the dangers of politicized peasants than its
17Moon,“InventoryReform,”page655.18 To some extent the szlachta responded in kind, however, fostering the publication of books inUkrainianandcultivatingadistinctiveUkrainian identitybeforesucheffortswerecutshortby theValuevcircular(censoringUkrainianbooksandpreventingtheiruse inschools)andtheEmsUkaz(banningthepublicationofUkrainianliterature).SeeMiller,TheUkrainianQuestion,19N.Hans,“PolishschoolsinRussia1772‐1831,”SlavonicandEastEuropeanReview,Vol.38,No.91(June1960),pages404‐405.20Miller,TheUkrainianQuestion,page149.Eklof,RussianPeasantSchools,p.89,94.21Miller,TheUkrainianQuestion,page140.
disloyalPolishnobility,soeventheseeffortstomobilizeandRussifythepeasantry
tocounterbalancePolishinfluencewereabandoned.Strikingly,outofatotalof720
thousandserviceestatesinEuropeanRussia,Polesconstituted48%.22Insummary,
the Russian empire initially ruled through the Polish nobility, and Polish nobles
continuedtousetheirentrenchedpowertoblockeffortstoeducate,toRussify,and
to mobilize their serfs out from under them. As a result, literacy rates were
considerably lower in formerly Polish territory and the attachments to Russian
identityandculturewererelativelyweakintheSouthwesternRegion(Figure2).
Figure 2 Provinces with Literacy Above 50% in 1917
In Areas With Predominantly Russian Schools (1939 oblast boundaries)
22Miller,TheUkrainianQuestion,page143.
Tosumup,thecontrastincolonizationstrategiesandtheresultantcultural
differencesbetweenNovorossijaandtheSouthwesternregioncouldnotbestarker.
In Novorossija we see colonization and direct rule, with the establishment of
predominantly military settlement, high upward mobility, and a newly‐created
Russianelite that fostersacommonRussianculturethroughschools,urbanization
andcommerce.IntheareasoftheRussianempireacquiredatthesametimefrom
Poland,weseeastrategyofindirectrulerelyingontheexistingPolishnobility.The
landed aristocracy in these areas was able to preserve its dominance and to
successfully blockRussian imperial efforts to centralize the state and build direct
linkstothepeasantrythrougheducation.Thepopulationinhabitingthepreviously
Polishimperiallandshadlimitededucation,limitedattachmenttobroaderRussian
culture,andremainedlargelyUkrainianinitslanguage.23
Thecausalpathwaylinkingthebordertodistinctiveimperialtreatmentsand
theresultantculturaldifferencesisshowninFigure3below.
23Theparticularconfigurationofthetriadicrelationshipbetweenthemonarchy,thenobility,andthepeasantry appears to have had a significant impact on subsequent national identity among thepeasantry. In areas of EuropeanRussiawhere therewas anon‐Russiannobility—Germans in theBalticandPolesintheWesternborderlands—thenobilityblockedRussificationofthepeasantry.Inareaswhere thenobilitywasRussianOrthodox—regardless ofwhether thesewerenewly‐createdelites as in Novorossija or more established nobility on the Left Bank of the Dnieper river—Russification of the peasantry proceeded with considerably less resistance. On the NorthwestterritoriesseeWeeks2001,Thaden(ed.)1981.
Figure3
RussianColonizationStrategiesandRegionalPoliticalCulture
HowConsistentandDurableistheTreatment?
There are three areas of concernwith the use of this imperial border in a
quasi‐experimentaldesign.First,itisnotclearthattheoldimperialfrontierdefines
theboundariesof the imperial treatment, since Ihavenotbeenable todetermine
how heavily the border region was populated. Maps from the final years of the
PolishCommonwealthshowthedensityofroadsandsettlementsgrowingthinner
as one approaches the border region. Settlement appears to have concentrated
further to the north (the capital of the Polish province was Bratslav, which falls
outsideoftheareaofstudytotheNorth)andtheprimarytransportationroutesrun
tothecitiesofJozefgrod(partoftoday’sBalta,inOdessaoblast)andBohopol(part
of today’sPervomaisk, inMikolaevoblast).24 This appears tohave remained true
during the Russian Empire, asmaps of Podolia Guberniya from 1900 continue to
24 TheprimaryPolishmilitary and trading road, theKuczmanski Szlak, passed just to theWest ofBalta.SeeW.Faden,“AMapoftheKingdomofPolandandGrandDutchy[sic]ofLithuaniaincludingSamogitia and Curland, Divided according to their dismembermentwith the Kingdom of Prussia.”(London: W. Faden, Geographer to the King, 1799). (Note that this map has rather significantinaccuraciesinmanyrespectsandthereforemaynotbereliable.)
showthesouthernreachesoftheprovincetobemorethinlypopulated.25Itmaybe
thecasethattheareasclosestotheoldfrontierdidnotreceiveasstronganimperial
treatmenton thePolish side. It is almost certain that the imperial treatmentwas
nothomogenous.26Inthisway,measurementatthefrontierwouldbeexpectedto
underestimatetheimperialeffectontheformerly‐Polishside,sincewecanassume
theborderregionreceivedaweakertreatment.
Second,thereisnowaytoreliablyestimatethefidelityofthetreatmentand
controlgroupssincetherewassomemovementacrosstheborder.Thisconcernis
amelioratedsomewhatbythefactthatmobilitywassomewhat limitedbothinthe
RussianempireandintheSovietUnion,but220yearsisalongtimeandcertainly
interminglingandresettlementacrosstheboundarytookplace.Peasantsfromthe
countryside moved into the towns across the course of the 20th century, and
sometimes this meant moving across the former imperial frontier. Military
settlement continued in the area, which was home to several intercontinental
ballisticmissilesilos.Wewouldexpectmobilityandmigrationtodiminishevidence
of the imperial effect in the areas closest to the former frontier, since the edges
would“blur”overtime.
25 See Kudravtsev, “Karta Podolskoi Gubernij,” (1900). Downloaded on March 29, 2010 fromhttp://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/1/15/Podoliskaia_gubernia.jpg26 The story of Balta itself illustrates this problem. The fortified town on the Polish side of theKodymawascalledJozefgrodandwasaprivateholding,alongwithalloftheterritorybetweentheSavran and the Kodyma, of the Polish Count Liubomirski.When the Russian Empire annexed thisterritory,themilitaryactuallypurchasedJozefgrodfromLiubomirskiandrenamedthetownElensk.In1797,byorderofEmperorPavelI,theformerlyOttomantownofBalta(oppositeJozefgrodontheother side of the Kodyma) was absorbed into Elensk and the whole town, now straddling theKodyma,wasnamedBalta and incorporated into thePodolianguberniya. As a result,wehaveanareawherethePolishnobilitywasdisplaced,butwithinthePodoliangubernia.ThismeansthatforBalta, at least, the former imperial border does not demarcate the boundary of the treatment.BogdanSushins’kij,Balta:Misto,OsviacheneVichnistiu,istorichniese.(Odessa:Druk,2005),pages94‐97.
Third,unliketheidealdiscontinuitydesignorrandomizedfieldexperiment,
theanalysisofthetreatmentis“retrospective”ratherthan“prospective,”sincethe
assignmentofdistrictstotreatmentandcontroltookplaceinthe18thcentury.The
attributes of the two populations are only subsequently homogenized by a set of
commonhistoricalexperiencesthatdonoteradicatethepersistentculturaleffectof
thetreatmentthatisofinteresttous.Assuch,thedesignispredicatedontheidea
that the homogenizing experience of Communism combined with contemporary
physical proximity standardized many of the underlying conditions that are not
directlyaffectedbythe“treatmentvariable”,theimperiallegacy.Itmustbenoted,
however, that all of the control variables canonlybemeasuredpost‐treatment in
thiscaseandtheircurrenthomogeneityistakenasanassumption.Inthisrespect,
thedesignisratheratypical.
Althoughatypical,astrongcasecanbemadethatinthiscasetheassumption
is reasonable precisely because Soviet Communism was such an atypically
significanthistorical intervention. TheSoviet legacy indeederadicateddifferences
inallrespectsexceptfortheculture,whichmakestheassumptionofhomogeneity
reasonable in this case. Soviet Communism certainly standardized many of the
societal featuresthatmighthaveinfluencedthevotein2010. Intermsofpolitical
institutions, both experienced the same Soviet establishment of single‐party rule
and the same formal governing institutions. Agriculture on both sides of the
Kodyma was collectivized in the 1930s and privatized and de‐collectivized in
preciselythesamefashioninthe1990s.Bothsidesoftheriverhadsomeindustrial
factories, which were largely non‐operative or greatly scaled back by the time
electionswereheldin2010. Atthetimeoftheelections,villagesoneithersideof
theKodymariverweresimilartooneanotherinsizeandlayout.Becausebothsides
of the riverwere in the same oblast (Odessa), they experienced the same oblast‐
level influences. WithinOdessaoblast, thepopulationswereexposed to thesame
radioandtelevisionbroadcasts.TheysharedthesamelegacyaspartsoftheSoviet
Union and they were not permitted to express many of their differences in the
Sovietperiod.Inthisway,noneofthepartisan‐reinforcingtendenciesreportedby
Converse, for example, could be expected to operate.27 In essence, I rely on the
standardizingtemplateofSovietCommunismtoprovideexogenouspost‐treatment
homogeneityinabroadrangeofpotentiallyrelevantcausalfactorssothatwemight
better identify the effects of the persisting regional cultural differences that stem
fromthedifferentpre‐communistcoloniallegacies.
FollowingJasonWittenberg’spioneeringworkonthepersistenceofpolitical
party loyalties in Hungary, we might expect local church institutions to play a
particularly important role in preserving pre‐Communist traditions.28 Yet church
institutionsonbothsidesoftheborderweredecimatedduringtheearlyyearsofthe
Bolshevik regime. Moreover, because there were sharp restrictions on church
attendance, with very few exceptions the churches in the region were
decommissioned and converted to other functions or, more commonly, were
physically destroyed. The large Franciscan monastery in Chechelnik (Vinnitsa
oblast),forexample,wasconvertedintoagymnasiumandthenintoanautomotive
27Converse1968.28 Jason Wittenberg, Crucibles of Political Loyalty: Church Institutions and Electoral Continuity inHungary(CambridgeUniversityPress,2006).
repair shop under Communism. Villages on both sides of the border rebuilt new
churches following the Communist collapse, but there was no institutional
continuityofChurchinstitutionsinthispartofUkraineinthewaythattherewasin
HungaryorinotherareasofCentralEurope.
Moreover,theculturaleffectsoftheinitial“treatment”wouldbeexpectedto
survivecommunism.Priorresearchhasshownthatdifferencesinnationalloyalties
and other pre‐Communist cultural legacies of the type we are discussing here
persisted,preservedwithinfamiliesandlocalcommunities,despitetheexperience
ofCommunismandtheSovietstate’ssuccessineradicatingthemfrompubliclife.29
In this respectwemight think of the Soviet Communist experience as a powerful
sieveinwhichallpublic,institutional,andsocio‐economicfeaturesofasocietywere
all caughtup, radically transformed,andstandardized,butcertainprivatecultural
attributes slipped through and were preserved relatively unaltered through the
moresubtlesocializinginfluencesofhomeandfamily.
III.RegionalCultures,PoliticalPartiesand2010UkrainianElections
What isthe linkbetweenthesecultural legaciesandsupport forcandidates
in the 2010 elections? As in previous elections, issues surrounding the place of
Russian culture in Ukrainian life played a central role in the campaign and in
differentiatingthecandidates.ThePartyofRegions,headedbyViktorYanukovich,
was initially foundedonaplatformsupportingtheuseofRussian languageandof
preserving ties to Russian culture. Yulia Timoshenko was not an anti‐Russian
29Darden,ResistingOccupation,forthcoming.DardenandGrzymala‐Busse,“TheGreatDivide,”2007.
candidatebyanymeans,butshewasassociatedwiththeOrangecoalitionandwith
agovernmentthatcontinuedtopursueUkrainianizationofpubliclife.Ininterviews
conducted in the summer of 2009 prior to the elections, respondents clearly
associatedTimoshenkowiththeOrangecoalitionthatcametopowerfollowingthe
elections of 2004 and, in Odessa oblast, shewas associatedwith policies like the
mandatetodubforeignfilmsintoUkrainianandotherdivisiveculturalpolicies.In
short, cultural issueswere salient in the 2010 Presidential elections, just as they
wereinthe1994Presidentialelections,the2002Parliamentaryelections,the2004
Presidentialelections,andthe2006Parliamentaryelections.
Inpart,culturalissuescontinuetobesalientbecausethedevelopmentofthe
mainrivalparties,theBYuTandPOR,tookplaceinacontextinwhichtheseissues
werecontinued tobe theprimarymeans fordifferentiating the twomainpolitical
blocs. Thedifferences in the stated economicpolicies of the twoblocs cannot be
easily discerned, the continued competition between the parties maintains the
salience of the cultural cleavage as away that they are able tomobilize support.
Whileitisclearlythecasethattherearedifferentbusinessfactionsassociatedwith
eachpartyandwitheachpresidential candidate, inorder topreserve thepolitical
powerneededtomaintaintheireconomicholdingsthesebusinessfactionsneedto
winelections. Whichpartyorcandidatewinsinagivenpollingdistrictappearsto
bea functionof the cultural inclinationsof thevoter (which isdeterminedby the
imperial legacy) and which party is dominant in the oblast (which is also
determinedbytheimperiallegacyandtheboundarylinesoftheoblasts).
Ifwethenassumethatthetreatmentimpliesthatpolingdistrictssouthofthe
KodymashouldbemoreinclinedtosupportthecandidacyofViktorYanukovichand
pollingdistrictstotheNorthoftheKodymashouldbemoreinclined,ceterisparibus,
to support the candidacy of Yulia Timoshenko, the results in favor of an imperial
effect are quite positive. Despite the long period of time since the initial (pre‐
Communist) treatment and the potential for cross‐contamination of populations
acrosstheinitialboundarybetweenPolishandOttomanterritories,wefindthatthe
differenceinpoliticalsupportinthetwoformerlyimperialterritoriesinsubstantial.
TheresultsareshownbelowinTable1.
Table1ImperialLegaciesandElectoralResultsinthe2010Elections
(withina60kmbandincludingnorthernOdessaandsouthernVinnitsaoblasts)
Turnout Yanukovich Timoshenko
Polish Territories 69.4% 31.2% 64.7%
New Russia 62.4% 66.0% 29.8%
Asshowninthetable,withinthisapproximately60kmwidestripalongtheKodyma
river, and dividing the population into the two categories of formerly Polish
territoriesandtheformerly‐OttomanareasthatbecametheprovinceofNovorossija,
we see a strong association between imperial legacy and voting behavior. In the
formerly‐Polishareas,TimoshenkobeatsYanukovich2‐1.Theresultsarereversed
fortheareasthatwereoncepartofNewRussia.
Uponcloserobservation,itisclearthatthestrengthoftheseresultsstemsin
part from differences in the oblasts into which these districts fall. South of the
Kodyma,allof thepollingdistricts fall inOdessaoblast. Immediatelynorthof the
KodymaanduptotheSavranriver,thedistrictsalsofallwithinOdessaoblast,but
this is a fairly narrow strip of land containing only 51 polling districts. The
remainingdistrictsnorthoftheKodymafallinVinnitsaoblast,whichisdominated
byBYuT.
Toeliminate thepossibilityofbothoblast‐levelrather thanpurely imperial
effects, it is useful to control for oblast‐level effects by comparing the results for
different imperial territoriesonlywithinOdessaoblast, i.e. the51pollingdistricts
north of theKodyma to the 45 closest districts to the South of theKodyma. The
Kodyma in thiscasealsopartiallysplits tworaions (BaltaandLiubashiv), soeven
localgovernanceisheldconstanttoacertainextent. Inmanycasesthesedistricts
are walking distance apart, with towns occupying opposite sides of the river.
Barring any effects of the imperial legacy, we would expect no difference in the
electoralbehaviorofthesetwogroups.
Yet even herewe find a significant effect. Both themedian and themean
percentage of the vote for Yanukovich in districts within Odessa oblast that are
South of the Kodyma river are approximately 10 percentage points higher than
thoseNorthoftheKodyma.
Table2:MedianVoteShareforCandidatesinthe2010UkrainianPresidentialElections(secondround)withinOdessaOblast,comparingacrossthe51pollingdistrictsnorthoftheKodymatothe45nearestdistrictstotheSouth(narrowband)
TURNOUT Yanukovich Timoshenko South of the Kodyma (New Russia) 63.9% 65.2% 30.3% North of the Kodyma (Polish) 69.4% 53.6% 42.2%
The effect is certainly not as strong as when we include the polling districts in
Vinnitsa oblast, and Yanukovich wins in both districts. Yet the difference is still
substantialandYanukovichactuallylostthesedistrictsNorthoftheKodymainthe
thirdroundofthe2004Presidentialelections.
PartyMachinesandtheOblasteffect
These findings are particularly striking given the close proximity of these
districts, our anticipation that the treatment effects might be somewhat weaker
rightalongtheformerimperialboundary,and,particularlygiventheimportanceof
oblast‐levelfactorsonthevote. Thestrengthofoblastleveleffectsisclear. Inthe
past decade, both the Party of Regions andBYuThave developed extensive party
organizationsattheoblastlevel.Withfewexceptions,onecandidatenotonlywins
theoblastasawhole,butineverysingleelectoraldistrict(andthevastmajorityof
pollingstations)withintheoblast.Whymightthisbethecase?
Field interviewsthatIconductedpriortotheelections inJulyof2010with
voters, party strategists and agitators revealed that each of the parties had a
hierarchically‐organized campaign structure, centered in the regional capital, and
linkedthroughachainofcommandtoatleastoneactivist(agitator)ineverysingle
poling district. At this lowest level, the agitator was responsible for delivering
voterstothepolls, fordistributingmaterialsandpersuadingvoterstosupportthe
candidate,and,ifnecessary,vote‐buying(withpricesrangingfromapproximately4
USDto10USDdependingonthearea,ageandprofessionofthevoter).Becausethe
strengthandresourcesofthepartyorganizationisconcentratedattheoblastlevel,
itmeantthatthemostpowerfulorganizationattheoblastlevelwastypicallybetter
able to mobilize voters in all districts throughout the oblast. Agitators with the
dominantpartyreceivedhighersalaries,hadmoreresourcesavailabletothem,and
the partieswere better able to recruit themost talented cadres towork on their
behalf.Inmanyways,thestrengthofthepartyorganizationlaymoreinitspowerto
draw the most respected local authorities into the ranks of the party than in
mobilizingvoterstothepollsor inbuyingvotes.30 Thiswascertainlythecasefor
PORinOdessaoblastandforBYuTinVinnitsaoblast.31Itwouldbeverysurprising
30Theresourcesavailableforvote‐buyingweresimplytoosmalltobeabletoaccountforthesizableoblast‐leveldifferencesinvoting.AccordingtointerviewswithonePORagitatorspeakingaboutthe2004elections,eachagitatorresponsible forapollingdistrict (village)wasgiven1200hryvnia (atthetime,approximately$300)forthecampaign. Thiswastocovertheirpersonalsalaryaswellasthe resources tobeallocated topurchase the supportofvoters. Votes costapproximately40hrn.With such limited funds, the agitators were unable to buy a substantial enough portion of theelectoratetoaccountforthedifferencesacrossoblasts.31Iamnotspeakinghereoftheuseofso‐called“administrativeresources”toinfluencetheelectionoutcomes,i.e.theuseoftheapparatusofthestateadministrationtocampaignandapplypressureonbehalf of a candidate or party. The use of administrative resources has declined considerably inUkrainianelectionsfollowingtheelectionsof2004.
ifdifferencesinthepartyorganizationsaloneaccountfortheenormousoblast‐level
differences,butthisiscertainlypartoftheexplanation.32
Yet party strength at the oblast level cannot be easily separated from the
regional cultures and the imperial legacy. The initial strength of the party
organizationsattheoblastlevelwasitselflikelyafunctionoftheconsistencyofthe
Partyplatformwiththegeneralculturalorientationofthemajorityofvotersinthat
oblast. Giventhatregionaloligarchswishtobeassociatedwiththewinningparty,
andthewinningpartyistheonewhoseappealsalreadyresonatewithvoters(hence
requiring fewer vote‐buying resources), these trends lead to strong pressures
towards the dominance of one party at the oblast level. One can see this in the
electoralresults.Thereareveryfewoblastswhereonepartyorcandidatedoesnot
winalloftheelectoraldistrictswithinanoblast,andinwhichoneparty/candidate
doesnotwinby a largemargin. The initial cultural orientationof thepopulation
appearstohavedeterminedwhichpartywouldbedominantinagivenprovince,but
thishasmeantthatthepartymachinessubsequentlyhaveadditionalresourcesand
canextendandexpandtheirdominance.
VI.ConclusionsandImplications
Howbesttointerpretthesefindings? Ithinkthatthedatasuggestastrong
link between Russian imperial policies, contemporary cultural differences, and
32NordoestheboundarybetweenVinnitsaoblastandOdessaoblastdoesnotdemarcatea
sharplinguisticboundary.WhileitistruethattherearemoreRussiansintheraionsontheOdessasideoftheOdessaVinnitsaborder(approximately5‐6%ofthoseraions,asopposedto1‐3%ontheVinnitsaside),theseminordifferencesaresodwarfedbythedifferencesinvotingbehaviorthattheyareunlikelytoaccountformuchofit,ifanyatall.
patterns of voting in Ukraine. Voting largely cleaves along former imperial lines.
Even when we only examine polling districts within Odessa oblast, there are
substantialandsignificantdifferencesbetweentheresultsofdistrictsdependingon
whether they fell within the territory thatwas once called “NewRussia” and the
formerlyPolishareasoftheRussianempire.Butwhy?
I have suggested one possible process thatmight be driving this effect, i.e.
thattheregionalelectoralcleavagereflectsaculturalcleavage,andthatthiscultural
cleavage can ultimately be traced to different strategies of incorporation initially
pursued by the Russian empire in the 18th Century and carried through the
development of these regions in the 19th and early 20th Centuries. North of the
Kodyma, the local nobility empowered by indirect rule was more interested in
creating impediments to peasant power and peasant education. As a result,
peasantsinareaswherethePolishszlachtaretainedlocalpowerweremorelikelyto
be educated only after the Bolshevik revolution, during a period of “nativization”
thatwouldimbuethemwithUkrainianratherthanRussianculture.33Theopposite
was true in the formerly Ottoman areas, where a new Russian elite was created
following the annexation, one that fostered rapid development in education,
urbanization, and the spread of Russian culture and loyalties. In this way, the
33YuriSlezkine,“TheUSSRasaCommunalApartment,orHowaSocialistStatePromotedEthnicParticularism,”SlavicReview53,2(Summer1994),414‐452.TerryMartin,AffirmativeActionEmpire:Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 19231939 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001).Provincial officials interviewed along the study areamentioned that Party communicationswithinVinnitsa oblast, for example,were always in Ukrainianwhereas theywere typically in Russian inOdessaoblast. TerryMartin’sworkalsosuggeststhattherewasresistancetokorenizatsiaandtheforceduseofUkrainianmetconsiderableresistanceinthemoredevelopedsouthernandurbanpartsof the Ukrainian SSR. I suspect that further research would bear out the argument that regionalculturaldifferencespersistedunderCommunism,and thata strongattachment toRussian identityandculturepersistedintheareasofNewRussiaevenunderCommunism.
specificmechanismthatIhavesuggestedlinkingtheimperialpastwiththeelectoral
presentdrawsonmypreviousresearchlinkingschoolingwiththedevelopmentof
regional cultures, andwhich suggests that such culturaldifferences arepreserved
despite themany changes that takeplaceunderSoviet rule. Theargument about
imperiallegaciespresentedherejustdeepensthatcausalchaintoshowthecolonial
originsofdifferencesinhowpeasantswereeducated.
The explanation that I have provided here is consistentwith the available
data, but it certainly does not exclude the possibility of alternative processes and
accounts. Precisely what is generating the imperial effect, however, demands
further research and while the available data. Given the spatial discontinuity
researchdesignemployedhere,wecannotknowwhichimperialexperiencesmight
bedrivingthecontemporarydifferences(onlythattheimperiallegacy—takenasa
whole—appearstohaveasignificanteffect).
There were many differences between the (formerly Polish) Podolian
governorship and the “New Russian” province of Kherson within the Russian
empire. Thelatterwaspopulatedalmostentirelybymigrants. Evenaslateasthe
1897censusapproximatelyhalfofthepopulationoftheprovincehadnotbeenborn
intheprovince. ItsnobilitywasRussianandtheterritoryhad, for themostpart,
neverknownserfdom.ThisiscontrasttothePolish‐dominated,lessurbanized,less
educated,anddeeplyenserfedpopulationofPodolia. Given thecomplexityof the
differences between these two imperial provinces, we have difficulty identifying
preciselywhichimperial“treatment”mightbedrivingtheeffect. Furtherresearch
is needed to determinewhether othermechanismsmight be atwork, and also to
determine whether there were similar mechanisms at work in other areas of
Ukraine(Poltavaoblast,forexample).
Nonetheless,thefindingspresentedhereareusefulindirectingourattention
totheimperialandlargelyculturalsourcesofthecontemporaryelectoralvariation.
They suggest that empires leave cultural footprints that have significant
implications for explaining contemporary voting in ways unanticipated in most
models of electoral behavior, and which significantly impact both the domestic
politicalcleavagesandinternationalrelationsofthecountriesinquestion.