Liberty of abode and of travel

Art III, Sec. 6

G.R. No. 88211 September 15, 1989FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS, FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., IRENE M. ARANETA, IMEE MANOTOC, TOMAS MANOTOC, GREGORIO ARANETA, PACIFICO E. MARCOS, NICANOR YIGUEZ and PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), represented by its President, CONRADO F. ESTRELLA,petitioners,vs.HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS, CATALINO MACARAIG, SEDFREY ORDOEZ, MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, FIDEL RAMOS, RENATO DE VILLA, in their capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Immigration Commissioner, Secretary of National Defense and Chief of Staff, respectively,respondents.CORTES,J.:Before the Court is a contreversy of grave national importance. While ostensibly only legal issues are involved, the Court's decision in this case would undeniably have a profound effect on the political, economic and other aspects of national life.We recall that in February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent "people power" revolution and forced into exile. In his stead, Corazon C. Aquino was declared President of the Republic under a revolutionary government. Her ascension to and consilidation of power have not been unchallenged. The failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by political leaders of Mr. Marcos, the takeover of television station Channel 7 by rebel troops led by Col. Canlas with the support of "Marcos loyalists" and the unseccessful plot of the Marcos spouses to surreptitiously return from Hawii with mercenaries aboard an aircraft chartered by a Lebanese arms dealer [Manila Bulletin, January 30, 1987] awakened the nation to the capacity of the Marcoses to stir trouble even from afar and to the fanaticism and blind loyalty of their followers in the country. The ratification of the 1987 Constitution enshrined the victory of "people power" and also clearly reinforced the constitutional moorings of Mrs. Aquino's presidency. This did not, however, stop bloody challenges to the government. On August 28, 1987, Col. Gregorio Honasan, one of the major players in the February Revolution, led a failed coup that left scores of people, both combatants and civilians, dead. There were several other armed sorties of lesser significance, but the message they conveyed was the same a split in the ranks of the military establishment that thraetened civilian supremacy over military and brought to the fore the realization that civilian government could be at the mercy of a fractious military.But the armed threats to the Government were not only found in misguided elements and among rabid followers of Mr. Marcos. There are also the communist insurgency and the seccessionist movement in Mindanao which gained ground during the rule of Mr. Marcos, to the extent that the communists have set up a parallel government of their own on the areas they effectively control while the separatist are virtually free to move about in armed bands. There has been no let up on this groups' determination to wrest power from the govermnent. Not only through resort to arms but also to through the use of propaganda have they been successful in dreating chaos and destabilizing the country.Nor are the woes of the Republic purely political. The accumulated foreign debt and the plunder of the nation attributed to Mr. Marcos and his cronies left the economy devastated. The efforts at economic recovery, three years after Mrs. Aquino assumed office, have yet to show concrete results in alleviating the poverty of the masses, while the recovery of the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses has remained elusive.Now, Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philipppines to die. But Mrs. Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family.The PetitionThis case is unique. It should not create a precedent, for the case of a dictator forced out of office and into exile after causing twenty years of political, economic and social havoc in the country and who within the short space of three years seeks to return, is in a class by itself.This petition formandamusand prohibition asks the Courts to order the respondents to issue travel documents to Mr. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines.The IssueTh issue is basically one of power: whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.According to the petitioners, the resolution of the case would depend on the resolution of the following issues:1. Does the President have the power to bar the return of former President Marcos and family to the Philippines?a. Is this a political question?2. Assuming that the President has the power to bar former President Marcos and his family from returning to the Philippines, in the interest of "national security, public safety or public healtha. Has the President made a finding that the return of former President Marcos and his family to the Philippines is a clear and present danger to national security, public safety or public health?b. Assuming that she has made that finding(1) Have the requirements of due process been complied with in making such finding?(2) Has there been prior notice to petitioners?(3) Has there been a hearing?(4) Assuming that notice and hearing may be dispensed with, has the President's decision, including the grounds upon which it was based, been made known to petitioners so that they may controvert the same?c. Is the President's determination that the return of former President Marcos and his family to the Philippines is a clear and present danger to national security, public safety, or public health a political question?d. Assuming that the Court may inquire as to whether the return of former President Marcos and his family is a clear and present danger to national security, public safety, or public health, have respondents established such fact?3. Have the respondents, therefore, in implementing the President's decision to bar the return of former President Marcos and his family, acted and would be acting without jurisdiction, or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, in performing any act which would effectively bar the return of former President Marcos and his family to the Philippines? [Memorandum for Petitioners, pp. 5-7; Rollo, pp. 234-236.1The case for petitioners is founded on the assertion that the right of the Marcoses to return to the Philippines is guaranteed under the following provisions of the Bill of Rights, to wit:Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.xxx xxx xxxSection 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.The petitioners contend that the President is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so "within the limits prescribed by law." Nor may the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so. They advance the view that before the right to travel may be impaired by any authority or agency of the government, there must be legislation to that effect.The petitioners further assert that under international law, the right of Mr. Marcos and his family to return to the Philippines is guaranteed.The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides:Article 13. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state.(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.Likewise, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which had been ratified by the Philippines, provides:Article 121) Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence.2) Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.3) The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions except those which are provided by law, are necessary to protect national security, public order (order public), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with the other rights recognized in the present Covenant.4) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.On the other hand, the respondents' principal argument is that the issue in this case involves a political question which is non-justiciable. According to the Solicitor General:As petitioners couch it, the question involved is simply whether or not petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and his family have the right to travel and liberty of abode. Petitioners invoke these constitutional rightsin vacuowithout reference to attendant circumstances.Respondents submit that in its proper formulation, the issue is whether or not petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family have the right to return to the Philippines and reside here at this time in the face of the determination by the President that such return and residence will endanger national security and public safety.It may be conceded that as formulated by petitioners, the question is not a political question as it involves merely a determination of what the law provides on the matter and application thereof to petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family. But when the question is whether the two rights claimed by petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family impinge on or collide with the more primordial and transcendental right of the State to security and safety of its nationals, the question becomes political and this Honorable Court can not consider it.There are thus gradations to the question, to wit:Do petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family have the right to return to the Philippines and reestablish their residence here? This is clearly a justiciable question which this Honorable Court can decide.Do petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family have their right to return to the Philippines and reestablish their residence here even if their return and residence here will endanger national security and public safety? this is still a justiciable question which this Honorable Court can decide.Is there danger to national security and public safety if petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family shall return to the Philippines and establish their residence here? This is now a political question which this Honorable Court can not decide for it falls within the exclusive authority and competence of the President of the Philippines. [Memorandum for Respondents, pp. 9-11; Rollo, pp. 297-299.]Respondents argue for the primacy of the right of the State to national security over individual rights. In support thereof, they cite Article II of the Constitution, to wit:Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The Government may call upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law, to render personal, military, or civil service.Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.Respondents also point out that the decision to ban Mr. Marcos and family from returning to the Philippines for reasons of national security and public safety has international precedents. Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic, Anastacio Somoza Jr. of Nicaragua, Jorge Ubico of Guatemala, Fulgencio batista of Cuba, King Farouk of Egypt, Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez of El Salvador, and MarcosPerezJimenez of Venezuela were among the deposed dictators whose return to their homelands was prevented by their governments. [See Statement of Foreign Affairs Secretary Raul S. Manglapus, quoted in Memorandum for Respondents, pp. 26-32; Rollo, pp. 314-319.]The parties are in agreement that the underlying issue is one of the scope of presidential power and its limits. We, however, view this issue in a different light. Although we give due weight to the parties' formulation of the issues, we are not bound by its narrow confines in arriving at a solution to the controversy.At the outset, we must state that it would not do to view the case within the confines of the right to travel and the import of the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court in the leading cases ofKent v. Dulles[357 U.S. 116, 78 SCt 1113, 2 L Ed. 2d 1204] andHaig v. Agee[453 U.S. 280, 101 SCt 2766, 69 L Ed. 2d 640) which affirmed the right to travel and recognized exceptions to the exercise thereof, respectively.It must be emphasized that the individual right involved isnotthe right to travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right involved is the right to return to one's country, a totally distinct right under international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Humans Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave a country, and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights. The Declaration speaks of the "right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state" [Art. 13(l)] separately from the "right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country." [Art. 13(2).] On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the "right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence" [Art. 12(l)] and the right to "be free to leave any country, including his own." [Art. 12(2)] which rights may be restricted by such laws as "are necessary to protect national security, public order, public health or morals or enter qqqs own country" of which one cannot be "arbitrarily deprived." [Art. 12(4).] It would therefore be inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to one's country in the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel.The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is our well-considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of international law and, under our Constitution, is part of the law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.] However, it is distinct and separate from the right to travel and enjoys a different protection under the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof [Art. 12 (4).]Thus, the rulings in the casesKent and Haigwhich refer to the issuance of passports for the purpose of effectively exercising the right to travel are not determinative of this case and are only tangentially material insofar as they relate to a conflict between executive action and the exercise of a protected right. The issue before the Court is novel and without precedent in Philippine, and even in American jurisprudence.Consequently, resolution by the Court of the well-debated issue of whether or not there can be limitations on the right to travel in the absence of legislation to that effect is rendered unnecessary. An appropriate case for its resolution will have to be awaited.Having clarified the substance of the legal issue, we find now a need to explain the methodology for its resolution. Our resolution of the issue will involve a two-tiered approach. We shall first resolve whether or not the President has the power under the Constitution, to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. Then, we shall determine, pursuant to the express power of the Court under the Constitution in Article VIII, Section 1, whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the Marcose's to the Philippines poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar their return.Executive PowerThe 1987 Constitution has fully restored the separation of powers of the three great branches of government. To recall the words of Justice Laurel inAngara v. Electoral Commission[63 Phil. 139 (1936)], "the Constitution has blocked but with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government." [At 157.1 Thus, the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "[the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines" Art VI, Sec. 11, "[t]he executive power shall bevested in the President of the Philippines" [Art. VII, Sec. 11, and "[te judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law" [Art. VIII, Sec. 1.] These provisions not only establish a separation of powers by actual division [Angara v. Electoral Commission,supra] but also confer plenary legislative, executive and judicial powers subject only to limitations provided in the Constitution. For as the Supreme Court inOcampo v. Cabangis[15 Phil. 626 (1910)] pointed out "a grant of the legislative power means a grant of all legislative power; and a grant of the judicial power means a grant of all the judicial power which may be exercised under the government." [At 631-632.1 If this can be said of the legislative power which is exercised by two chambers with a combined membership of more than two hundred members and of the judicial power which is vested in a hierarchy of courts, it can equally be said of the executive power which is vested in one official the President.As stated above, the Constitution provides that "[t]he executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines." [Art. VII, Sec. 1]. However, it does not define what is meant by executive power" although in the same article it touches on the exercise of certain powers by the President,i.e., the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute the laws, the appointing power, the powers under the commander-in-chief clause, the power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of Congress, the power to contract or guarantee foreign loans, the power to enter into treaties or international agreements, the power to submit the budget to Congress, and the power to address Congress [Art. VII, Sec. 14-23].The inevitable question then arises: by enumerating certain powers of the President did the framers of the Constitution intend that the President shall exercise those specific powers and no other? Are these se enumerated powers the breadth and scope of "executive power"? Petitioners advance the view that the President's powers are limited to those specifically enumerated in the 1987 Constitution. Thus, they assert: "The President has enumerated powers, and what is not enumerated is impliedly denied to her.Inclusion unius est exclusio alterius[Memorandum for Petitioners, p. 4- Rollo p. 233.1 This argument brings to mind the institution of the U.S. Presidency after which ours is legally patterned.**Corwin, in his monumental volume on the President of the United States grappled with the same problem. He said:Article II is the most loosely drawn chapter of the Constitution. To those who think that a constitution ought to settle everything beforehand it should be a nightmare; by the same token, to those who think that constitution makers ought to leave considerable leeway for the future play of political forces, it should be a vision realized.We encounter this characteristic of Article 11 in its opening words: "The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America." . . .. [The President: Office and Powers, 17871957, pp. 3-4.]Reviewing how the powers of the U.S. President were exercised by the different persons who held the office from Washington to the early 1900's, and the swing from the presidency by commission to Lincoln's dictatorship, he concluded that "what the presidency is at any particular moment depends in important measure on who is President." [At 30.]This view is shared by Schlesinger who wrote inThe Imperial Presidency:For the American Presidency was a peculiarly personal institution. it remained of course, an agency of government subject to unvarying demands and duties no remained, of cas President. But, more than most agencies of government, it changed shape, intensity and ethos according to the man in charge. Each President's distinctive temperament and character, his values, standards, style, his habits, expectations, Idiosyncrasies, compulsions, phobias recast the WhiteHouse and pervaded the entire government. The executive branch, said Clark Clifford, was a chameleon, taking its color from the character and personality of the President. The thrust of the office, its impact on the constitutional order, therefore altered from President to President. Above all, the way each President understood it as his personal obligation to inform and involve the Congress, to earn and hold the confidence of the electorate and to render an accounting to the nation and posterity determined whether he strengthened or weakened the constitutional order. [At 212- 213.]We do not say that the presidency is what Mrs. Aquino says it is or what she does but, rather, that the consideration of tradition and the development of presidential power under the different constitutions are essential for a complete understanding of the extent of and limitations to the President's powers under the 1987 Constitution. The 1935 Constitution created a strong President with explicitly broader powers than the U.S. President. The 1973 Constitution attempted to modify the system of government into the parliamentary type, with the President as a mere figurehead, but through numerous amendments, the President became even more powerful, to the point that he was also the de facto Legislature. The 1987 Constitution, however, brought back the presidential system of government and restored the separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers by their actual distribution among three distinct branches of government with provision for checks and balances.It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is the power to enforce the laws, for the President is head of state as well as head of government and whatever powers inhere in such positions pertain to the office unless the Constitution itself withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides that the execution of the laws is only one of the powers of the President. It also grants the President other powers that do not involve the execution of any provision of law,e.g., his power over the country's foreign relations.On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise ofspecificpowers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated,It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive. Thus, in the landmark decision ofSpringer v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189 (1928), on the issue of who between the Governor-General of the Philippines and the Legislature may vote the shares of stock held by the Government to elect directors in the National Coal Company and the Philippine National Bank, the U.S. Supreme Court, in upholding the power of the Governor-General to do so, said:...Here the members of the legislature who constitute a majority of the "board" and "committee" respectively, are not charged with the performance of any legislative functions or with the doing of anything which is in aid of performance of any such functions by the legislature. Putting aside for the moment the question whether the duties devolved upon these members are vested by the Organic Act in the Governor-General, it is clear that they are not legislative in character, and still more clear that they are not judicial.The fact that they do not fall within the authority of either of these two constitutes logical ground for concluding that they do fall within that of the remaining one among which the powers of government are divided....[At 202-203; Emphasis supplied.]We are not unmindful of Justice Holmes' strong dissent. But in his enduring words of dissent we find reinforcement for the view that it would indeed be a folly to construe the powers of a branch of government to embrace only what are specifically mentioned in the Constitution:The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and white. Even the more specific of them are found to terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the other. ....xxx xxx xxxIt does not seem to need argument to show that however we may disguise it by veiling words we do not and cannot carry out the distinction between legislative and executive action with mathematical precision and divide the branches into watertight compartments, were it ever so desirable to do so, which I am far from believing that it is, or that the Constitution requires. [At 210- 211.]The Power InvolvedThe Constitution declares among the guiding principles that "[t]he prime duty of theGovernment is to serve and protect the people" and that "[t]he maintenance of peace and order,the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy." [Art. II, Secs. 4 and 5.]Admittedly, service and protection of the people, the maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essentially ideals to guide governmental action. But such does not mean that they are empty words. Thus, in the exercise of presidential functions, in drawing a plan of government, and in directing implementing action for these plans, or from another point of view, in making any decision as President of the Republic, the President has to consider these principles, among other things, and adhere to them.Faced with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow the Marcoses to return to the Philippines, the President is, under the Constitution, constrained to consider these basic principles in arriving at a decision. More than that, having sworn to defend and uphold the Constitution, the President has the obligationunder the Constitutionto protect the people, promote their welfare and advance the national interest. It must be borne in mind that the Constitution, aside from being an allocation of power is also a social contract whereby the people have surrendered their sovereign powers to the State for the common good. Hence, lest the officers of the Government exercising the powers delegated by the people forget and the servants of the people become rulers, the Constitution reminds everyone that "[s]overeignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them." [Art. II, Sec. 1.]The resolution of the problem is made difficult because the persons who seek to return to the country are the deposed dictator and his family at whose door the travails of the country are laid and from whom billions of dollars believed to be ill-gotten wealth are sought to be recovered. The constitutional guarantees they invoke are neither absolute nor inflexible. For the exercise of even the preferred freedoms of speech and ofexpression, although couched in absolute terms, admits of limits and must be adjusted to the requirements of equally important public interests [Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 79690-707, October 7, 1981.]To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the common good against the exercise of rights of certain individuals. The power involved is the President's residual power to protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people. To paraphrase Theodore Roosevelt, it is not only the power of the President but also his duty to do anything not forbidden by the Constitution or the laws that the needs of the nation demand [See Corwin,supra, at 153]. It is a power borne by the President's duty to preserve and defend the Constitution. It also may be viewed as a power implicit in the President's duty to take care that the laws are faithfully executed [seeHyman,The American President, where the author advances the view that an allowance of discretionary power is unavoidable in any government and is best lodged in the President].More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the President's powers as protector of the peace. RossiterThe American Presidency].The power of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to exercising the commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or to leading the State against external and internal threats to its existence. The President is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential duties in times of peace is not in any way diminished by the relative want of an emergency specified in the commander-in-chief provision. For in making the President commander-in-chief the enumeration of powers that follow cannot be said to exclude the President's exercising as Commander-in- Chief powers short of the calling of the armed forces, or suspending the privilege of the writ ofhabeas corpusor declaring martial law, in order to keep the peace, and maintain public order and security.That the President has the power under the Constitution to bar the Marcose's from returning has been recognized by memembers of the Legislature, and is manifested by the Resolution proposed in the House of Representatives and signed by 103 of its members urging the President to allow Mr. Marcos to return to the Philippines "as a genuine unselfish gesture for true national reconciliation and as irrevocable proof of our collective adherence to uncompromising respect for human rights under the Constitution and our laws." [House Resolution No. 1342, Rollo, p. 321.1 The Resolution does not question the President's power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines, rather, it appeals to the President's sense of compassion to allow a man to come home to die in his country.What we are saying in effect is that the request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it must be granted or denied.The Extent of ReviewUnder the Constitution, judicial power includes the duty to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." [Art. VIII, Sec. 1] Given this wording, we cannot agree with the Solicitor General that the issue constitutes a political question which is beyond the jurisdiction of the Court to decide.The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court, under previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political departments to decide. But nonetheless there remain issues beyond the Court's jurisdiction the determination of which is exclusively for the President, for Congress or for the people themselves through a plebiscite or referendum. We cannot, for example, question the President's recognition of a foreign government, no matter how premature or improvident such action may appear. We cannot set aside a presidential pardon though it may appear to us that the beneficiary is totally undeserving of the grant. Nor can we amend the Constitution under the guise of resolving a dispute brought before us because the power is reserved to the people.There is nothing in the case before us that precludes our determination thereof on the political question doctrine. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission cited by petitioners show that the framers intended to widen the scope of judicial review but they did not intend courts of justice to settle all actual controversies before them. When political questions are involved, the Constitution limits the determination to whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is being questioned. If grave abuse is not established, the Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the official concerned and decide a matter which by its nature or by law is for the latter alone to decide. In this light, it would appear clear that the second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution, defining "judicial power," which specifically empowers the courts to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government, incorporates in the fundamental law the ruling inLansang v. Garcia[G.R. No. L-33964, December 11, 1971, 42 SCRA 4481 that:]Article VII of the [1935] Constitution vests in the Executive the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under specified conditions. Pursuant to the principle of separation of powers underlying our system of government, the Executive is supreme within his own sphere. However, the separation of powers, under the Constitution, is not absolute. What is more, it goes hand in hand with the system of checks and balances, under which the Executive is supreme, as regards the suspension of the privilege, but only if and when he acts within the sphere alloted to him by the Basic Law, and the authority to determine whether or not he has so acted is vested in the Judicial Department, which, in this respect, is, in turn, constitutionally supreme. In the exercise of such authority, the function of the Court is merely to check not to supplant the Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act [At 479-480.]Accordingly, the question for the Court to determine is whether or not there exist factual bases for the President to conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines. If such postulates do exist, it cannot be said that she has acted, or acts, arbitrarily or that she has gravely abused her discretion in deciding to bar their return.We find that from the pleadings filed by the parties, from their oral arguments, and the facts revealed during the briefing in chambers by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the National Security Adviser, wherein petitioners and respondents were represented, there exist factual bases for the President's decision..The Court cannot close its eyes to present realities and pretend that the country is not besieged from within by a well-organized communist insurgency, a separatist movement in Mindanao, rightist conspiracies to grab power, urban terrorism, the murder with impunity of military men, police officers and civilian officials, to mention only a few. The documented history of the efforts of the Marcose's and their followers to destabilize the country, as earlier narrated in thisponenciabolsters the conclusion that the return of the Marcoses at this time would only exacerbate and intensify the violence directed against the State and instigate more chaos.As divergent and discordant forces, the enemies of the State may be contained. The military establishment has given assurances that it could handle the threats posed by particular groups. But it is thecatalytic effectof the return of the Marcoses that may prove to be the proverbial final straw that would break the camel's back. With these before her, the President cannot be said to have acted arbitrarily and capriciously and whimsically in determining that the return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat to the national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return.It will not do to argue that if the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines will cause the escalation of violence against the State, that would be the time for the President to step in and exercise the commander-in-chief powers granted her by the Constitution to suppress or stamp out such violence. The State, acting through the Government, is not precluded from taking pre- emptive action against threats to its existence if, though still nascent they are perceived as apt to become serious and direct. Protection of the people is the essence of the duty of government. The preservation of the State the fruition of the people's sovereignty is an obligation in the highest order. The President, sworn to preserve and defend the Constitution and to see the faithful execution the laws, cannot shirk from that responsibility.We cannot also lose sight of the fact that the country is only now beginning to recover from the hardships brought about by the plunder of the economy attributed to the Marcoses and their close associates and relatives, many of whom are still here in the Philippines in a position to destabilize the country, while the Government has barely scratched the surface, so to speak, in its efforts to recover the enormous wealth stashed away by the Marcoses in foreign jurisdictions. Then, We cannot ignore the continually increasing burden imposed on the economy by the excessive foreign borrowing during the Marcos regime, which stifles and stagnates development and is one of the root causes of widespread poverty and all its attendant ills. The resulting precarious state of our economy is of common knowledge and is easily within the ambit of judicial notice.The President has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years and lead to total economic collapse. Given what is within our individual and common knowledge of the state of the economy, we cannot argue with that determination.WHEREFORE, and it being our well-considered opinion that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of former President Marcos and his family at the present time and under present circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return to the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL.,petitioners,vs.JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL.,respondents.Alfonso Mendoza for petitioners.City Fiscal Diaz for respondents.MALCOLM,J.:The annals of juridical history fail to reveal a case quite as remarkable as the one which this application forhabeas corpussubmits for decision. While hardly to be expected to be met with in this modern epoch of triumphant democracy, yet, after all, the cause presents no great difficulty if there is kept in the forefront of our minds the basic principles of popular government, and if we give expression to the paramount purpose for which the courts, as an independent power of such a government, were constituted. The primary question isShall the judiciary permit a government of the men instead of a government of laws to be set up in the Philippine Islands?Omitting much extraneous matter, of no moment to these proceedings, but which might prove profitable reading for other departments of the government, the facts are these: The Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, for the best of all reasons, to exterminate vice, ordered the segregated district for women of ill repute, which had been permitted for a number of years in the city of Manila, closed. Between October 16 and October 25, 1918, the women were kept confined to their houses in the district by the police. Presumably, during this period, the city authorities quietly perfected arrangements with the Bureau of Labor for sending the women to Davao, Mindanao, as laborers; with some government office for the use of the coastguard cuttersCorregidorandNegros, and with the Constabulary for a guard of soldiers. At any rate, about midnight of October 25, the police, acting pursuant to orders from the chief of police, Anton Hohmann and the Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, descended upon the houses, hustled some 170 inmates into patrol wagons, and placed them aboard the steamers that awaited their arrival. The women were given no opportunity to collect their belongings, and apparently were under the impression that they were being taken to a police station for an investigation. They had no knowledge that they were destined for a life in Mindanao. They had not been asked if they wished to depart from that region and had neither directly nor indirectly given their consent to the deportation. The involuntary guests were received on board the steamers by a representative of the Bureau of Labor and a detachment of Constabulary soldiers. The two steamers with their unwilling passengers sailed for Davao during the night of October 25.The vessels reached their destination at Davao on October 29. The women were landed and receipted for as laborers by Francisco Sales, provincial governor of Davao, and by Feliciano Yigo and Rafael Castillo. The governor and thehacenderoYigo, who appear as parties in the case, had no previous notification that the women were prostitutes who had been expelled from the city of Manila. The further happenings to these women and the serious charges growing out of alleged ill-treatment are of public interest, but are not essential to the disposition of this case. Suffice it to say, generally, that some of the women married, others assumed more or less clandestine relations with men, others went to work in different capacities, others assumed a life unknown and disappeared, and a goodly portion found means to return to Manila.To turn back in our narrative, just about the time theCorregidorand theNegroswere putting in to Davao, the attorney for the relatives and friends of a considerable number of the deportees presented an application forhabeas corpusto a member of the Supreme Court. Subsequently, the application, through stipulation of the parties, was made to include all of the women who were sent away from Manila to Davao and, as the same questions concerned them all, the application will be considered as including them. The application set forth the salient facts, which need not be repeated, and alleged that the women were illegally restrained of their liberty by Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, and by certain unknown parties. The writ was made returnable before the full court. The city fiscal appeared for the respondents, Lukban and Hohmann, admitted certain facts relative to sequestration and deportation, and prayed that the writ should not be granted because the petitioners were not proper parties, because the action should have been begun in the Court of First Instance for Davao, Department of Mindanao and Sulu, because the respondents did not have any of the women under their custody or control, and because their jurisdiction did not extend beyond the boundaries of the city of Manila. According to an exhibit attached to the answer of the fiscal, the 170 women were destined to be laborers, at good salaries, on thehaciendasof Yigo and Governor Sales. In open court, the fiscal admitted, in answer to question of a member of the court, that these women had been sent out of Manila without their consent. The court awarded the writ, in an order of November 4, that directed Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Francisco Sales, governor of the province of Davao, and Feliciano Yigo, anhacenderoof Davao, to bring before the court the persons therein named, alleged to be deprived of their liberty, on December 2, 1918.Before the date mentioned, seven of the women had returned to Manila at their own expense. On motion of counsel for petitioners, their testimony was taken before the clerk of the Supreme Court sitting as commissioners. On the day named in the order, December 2nd, 1918, none of the persons in whose behalf the writ was issued were produced in court by the respondents. It has been shown that three of those who had been able to come back to Manila through their own efforts, were notified by the police and the secret service to appear before the court. The fiscal appeared, repeated the facts more comprehensively, reiterated the stand taken by him when pleading to the original petition copied a telegram from the Mayor of the city of Manila to the provincial governor of Davao and the answer thereto, and telegrams that had passed between the Director of Labor and the attorney for that Bureau then in Davao, and offered certain affidavits showing that the women were contained with their life in Mindanao and did not wish to return to Manila. Respondents Sales answered alleging that it was not possible to fulfill the order of the Supreme Court because the women had never been under his control, because they were at liberty in the Province of Davao, and because they had married or signed contracts as laborers. Respondent Yigo answered alleging that he did not have any of the women under his control and that therefore it was impossible for him to obey the mandate. The court, after due deliberation, on December 10, 1918, promulgated a second order, which related that the respondents had not complied with the original order to the satisfaction of the court nor explained their failure to do so, and therefore directed that those of the women not in Manila be brought before the court by respondents Lukban, Hohmann, Sales, and Yigo on January 13, 1919, unless the women should, in written statements voluntarily made before the judge of first instance of Davao or the clerk of that court, renounce the right, or unless the respondents should demonstrate some other legal motives that made compliance impossible. It was further stated that the question of whether the respondents were in contempt of court would later be decided and the reasons for the order announced in the final decision.Before January 13, 1919, further testimony including that of a number of the women, of certain detectives and policemen, and of the provincial governor of Davao, was taken before the clerk of the Supreme Court sitting as commissioner and the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Davao acting in the same capacity. On January 13, 1919, the respondents technically presented before the Court the women who had returned to the city through their own efforts and eight others who had been brought to Manila by the respondents. Attorneys for the respondents, by their returns, once again recounted the facts and further endeavored to account for all of the persons involved in thehabeas corpus. In substance, it was stated that the respondents, through their representatives and agents, had succeeded in bringing from Davao with their consent eight women; that eighty-one women were found in Davao who, on notice that if they desired they could return to Manila, transportation fee, renounced the right through sworn statements; that fifty-nine had already returned to Manila by other means, and that despite all efforts to find them twenty-six could not be located. Both counsel for petitioners and the city fiscal were permitted to submit memoranda. The first formally asked the court to find Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Jose Rodriguez and Fernando Ordax, members of the police force of the city of Manila, Feliciano Yigo, anhacenderoof Davao, Modesto Joaquin, the attorney for the Bureau of Labor, and Anacleto Diaz, fiscal of the city of Manila, in contempt of court. The city fiscal requested that thereplica al memorandum de los recurridos, (reply to respondents' memorandum) dated January 25, 1919, be struck from the record.In the second order, the court promised to give the reasons for granting the writ ofhabeas corpusin the final decision. We will now proceed to do so.One fact, and one fact only, need be recalledthese one hundred and seventy women were isolated from society, and then at night, without their consent and without any opportunity to consult with friends or to defend their rights, were forcibly hustled on board steamers for transportation to regions unknown. Despite the feeble attempt to prove that the women left voluntarily and gladly, that such was not the case is shown by the mere fact that the presence of the police and the constabulary was deemed necessary and that these officers of the law chose the shades of night to cloak their secret and stealthy acts. Indeed, this is a fact impossible to refute and practically admitted by the respondents.With this situation, a court would next expect to resolve the questionBy authority of what law did the Mayor and the Chief of Police presume to act in deporting by duress these persons from Manila to another distant locality within the Philippine Islands? We turn to the statutes and we find Alien prostitutes can be expelled from the Philippine Islands in conformity with an Act of congress. The Governor-General can order the eviction of undesirable aliens after a hearing from the Islands. Act No. 519 of the Philippine Commission and section 733 of the Revised Ordinances of the city of Manila provide for the conviction and punishment by a court of justice of any person who is a common prostitute. Act No. 899 authorizes the return of any citizen of the United States, who may have been convicted of vagrancy, to the homeland. New York and other States have statutes providing for the commitment to the House of Refuge of women convicted of being common prostitutes. Always a law! Even when the health authorities compel vaccination, or establish a quarantine, or place a leprous person in the Culion leper colony, it is done pursuant to some law or order. But one can search in vain for any law, order, or regulation, which even hints at the right of the Mayor of the city of Manila or the chief of police of that city to force citizens of the Philippine Islandsand these women despite their being in a sense lepers of society are nevertheless not chattels but Philippine citizens protected by the same constitutional guaranties as are other citizensto change their domicile from Manila to another locality. On the contrary, Philippine penal law specifically punishes any public officer who, not being expressly authorized by law or regulation, compels any person to change his residence.In other countries, as in Spain and Japan, the privilege of domicile is deemed so important as to be found in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution. Under the American constitutional system, liberty of abode is a principle so deeply imbedded in jurisprudence and considered so elementary in nature as not even to require a constitutional sanction. Even the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, even the President of the United States, who has often been said to exercise more power than any king or potentate, has no such arbitrary prerogative, either inherent or express. Much less, therefore, has the executive of a municipality, who acts within a sphere of delegated powers. If the mayor and the chief of police could, at their mere behest or even for the most praiseworthy of motives, render the liberty of the citizen so insecure, then the presidents and chiefs of police of one thousand other municipalities of the Philippines have the same privilege. If these officials can take to themselves such power, then any other official can do the same. And if any official can exercise the power, then all persons would have just as much right to do so. And if a prostitute could be sent against her wishes and under no law from one locality to another within the country, then officialdom can hold the same club over the head of any citizen.Law defines power. Centuries ago Magna Charta decreed that"No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseized of his freehold, or liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise destroyed; nor will we pass upon him nor condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land. We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either justice or right." (Magna Charta, 9 Hen., 111, 1225, Cap. 29; 1 eng. stat. at Large, 7.) No official, no matter how high, is above the law. The courts are the forum which functionate to safeguard individual liberty and to punish official transgressors. "The law," said Justice Miller, delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, "is the only supreme power in our system of government, and every man who by accepting office participates in its functions is only the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the authority which it gives." (U.S.vs.Lee [1882], 106 U.S., 196, 220.) "The very idea," said Justice Matthews of the same high tribunal in another case, "that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or any material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself." (Yick Wovs.Hopkins [1886], 118 U.S., 356, 370.) All this explains the motive in issuing the writ ofhabeas corpus, and makes clear why we said in the very beginning that the primary question was whether the courts should permit a government of men or a government of laws to be established in the Philippine Islands.What are the remedies of the unhappy victims of official oppression? The remedies of the citizen are three: (1) Civil action; (2) criminal action, and (3)habeas corpus.The first is an optional but rather slow process by which the aggrieved party may recoup money damages. It may still rest with the parties in interest to pursue such an action, but it was never intended effectively and promptly to meet any such situation as that now before us.As to criminal responsibility, it is true that the Penal Code in force in these Islands provides:Any public officer not thereunto authorized by law or by regulations of a general character in force in the Philippines who shall banish any person to a place more than two hundred kilometers distant from his domicile, except it be by virtue of the judgment of a court, shall be punished by a fine of not less than three hundred and twenty-five and not more than three thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas.Any public officer not thereunto expressly authorized by law or by regulation of a general character in force in the Philippines who shall compel any person to change his domicile or residence shall suffer the penalty of destierro and a fine of not less than six hundred and twenty-five and not more than six thousand two hundred and fiftypesetas. (Art. 211.)We entertain no doubt but that, if, after due investigation, the proper prosecuting officers find that any public officer has violated this provision of law, these prosecutors will institute and press a criminal prosecution just as vigorously as they have defended the same official in this action. Nevertheless, that the act may be a crime and that the persons guilty thereof can be proceeded against, is no bar to the instant proceedings. To quote the words of Judge Cooley in a case which will later be referred to"It would be a monstrous anomaly in the law if to an application by one unlawfully confined, ta be restored to his liberty, it could be a sufficient answer that the confinement was a crime, and therefore might be continued indefinitely until the guilty party was tried and punished therefor by the slow process of criminal procedure." (In the matter of Jackson [1867], 15 Mich., 416, 434.) The writ ofhabeas corpuswas devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. Any further rights of the parties are left untouched by decision on the writ, whose principal purpose is to set the individual at liberty.Granted thathabeas corpusis the proper remedy, respondents have raised three specific objections to its issuance in this instance. The fiscal has argued (l) that there is a defect in parties petitioners, (2) that the Supreme Court should not a assume jurisdiction, and (3) that the person in question are not restrained of their liberty by respondents. It was finally suggested that the jurisdiction of the Mayor and the chief of police of the city of Manila only extends to the city limits and that perforce they could not bring the women from Davao.The first defense was not presented with any vigor by counsel. The petitioners were relatives and friends of the deportees. The way the expulsion was conducted by the city officials made it impossible for the women to sign a petition forhabeas corpus. It was consequently proper for the writ to be submitted by persons in their behalf. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 78; Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 527.) The law, in its zealous regard for personal liberty, even makes it the duty of a court or judge to grant a writ ofhabeas corpusif there is evidence that within the court's jurisdiction a person is unjustly imprisoned or restrained of his liberty, though no application be made therefor. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 93.) Petitioners had standing in court.The fiscal next contended that the writ should have been asked for in the Court of First Instance of Davao or should have been made returnable before that court. It is a general rule of good practice that, to avoid unnecessary expense and inconvenience, petitions forhabeas corpusshould be presented to the nearest judge of the court of first instance. But this is not a hard and fast rule. The writ ofhabeas corpusmay be granted by the Supreme Court or any judge thereof enforcible anywhere in the Philippine Islands. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 79; Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 526.) Whether the writ shall be made returnable before the Supreme Court or before an inferior court rests in the discretion of the Supreme Court and is dependent on the particular circumstances. In this instance it was not shown that the Court of First Instance of Davao was in session, or that the women had any means by which to advance their plea before that court. On the other hand, it was shown that the petitioners with their attorneys, and the two original respondents with their attorney, were in Manila; it was shown that the case involved parties situated in different parts of the Islands; it was shown that the women might still be imprisoned or restrained of their liberty; and it was shown that if the writ was to accomplish its purpose, it must be taken cognizance of and decided immediately by the appellate court. The failure of the superior court to consider the application and then to grant the writ would have amounted to a denial of the benefits of the writ.The last argument of the fiscal is more plausible and more difficult to meet. When the writ was prayed for, says counsel, the parties in whose behalf it was asked were under no restraint; the women, it is claimed, were free in Davao, and the jurisdiction of the mayor and the chief of police did not extend beyond the city limits. At first blush, this is a tenable position. On closer examination, acceptance of such dictum is found to be perversive of the first principles of the writ ofhabeas corpus.A prime specification of an application for a writ ofhabeas corpusis restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ ofhabeas corpusis to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. The forcible taking of these women from Manila by officials of that city, who handed them over to other parties, who deposited them in a distant region, deprived these women of freedom of locomotion just as effectively as if they had been imprisoned. Placed in Davao without either money or personal belongings, they were prevented from exercising the liberty of going when and where they pleased. The restraint of liberty which began in Manila continued until the aggrieved parties were returned to Manila and released or until they freely and truly waived his right.Consider for a moment what an agreement with such a defense would mean. The chief executive of any municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and then, when called upon to defend his official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that the person was under no restraint and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this other municipality. We believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a person before the application for the writ is no reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under no authority of law, could deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao, the same officials must necessarily have the same means to return them from Davao to Manila. The respondents, within the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded.It must be that some such question has heretofore been presented to the courts for decision. Nevertheless, strange as it may seem, a close examination of the authorities fails to reveal any analogous case. Certain decisions of respectable courts are however very persuasive in nature.A question came before the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan at an early date as to whether or not a writ ofhabeas corpuswould issue from the Supreme Court to a person within the jurisdiction of the State to bring into the State a minor child under guardianship in the State, who has been and continues to be detained in another State. The membership of the Michigan Supreme Court at this time was notable. It was composed of Martin, chief justice, and Cooley, Campbell, and Christiancy, justices. On the question presented the court was equally divided. Campbell, J., with whom concurred Martin, C. J., held that the writ should be quashed. Cooley, J., one of the most distinguished American judges and law-writers, with whom concurred Christiancy, J., held that the writ should issue. Since the opinion of Justice Campbell was predicated to a large extent on his conception of the English decisions, and since, as will hereafter appear, the English courts have taken a contrary view, only the following eloquent passages from the opinion of Justice Cooley are quoted:I have not yet seen sufficient reason to doubt the power of this court to issue the present writ on the petition which was laid before us. . . .It would be strange indeed if, at this late day, after the eulogiums of six centuries and a half have been expended upon the Magna Charta, and rivers of blood shed for its establishment; after its many confirmations, until Coke could declare in his speech on the petition of right that "Magna Charta was such a fellow that he will have no sovereign," and after the extension of its benefits and securities by the petition of right, bill of rights andhabeas corpusacts, it should now be discovered that evasion of that great clause for the protection of personal liberty, which is the life and soul of the whole instrument, is so easy as is claimed here. If it is so, it is important that it be determined without delay, that the legislature may apply the proper remedy, as I can not doubt they would, on the subject being brought to their notice. . . .The second propositionthat the statutory provisions are confined to the case of imprisonment within the stateseems to me to be based upon a misconception as to the source of our jurisdiction. It was never the case in England that the court of king's bench derived its jurisdiction to issue and enforce this writ from the statute. Statutes were not passed to give the right, but to compel the observance of rights which existed. . . .The important fact to be observed in regard to the mode of procedure upon this writ is, that it is directed to and served upon, not the person confined, but his jailor. It does not reach the former except through the latter. The officer or person who serves it does not unbar the prison doors, and set the prisoner free, but the court relieves him by compelling the oppressor to release his constraint. The whole force of the writ is spent upon the respondent, and if he fails to obey it, the means to be resorted to for the purposes of compulsion are fine and imprisonment. This is the ordinary mode of affording relief, and if any other means are resorted to, they are only auxiliary to those which are usual.The place of confinement is, therefore, not important to the relief, if the guilty party is within reach of process, so that by the power of the court he can be compelled to release his grasp. The difficulty of affording redress is not increased by the confinement being beyond the limits of the state, except as greater distance may affect it. The important question is, where the power of control exercised? And I am aware of no other remedy. (In the matter of Jackson [1867], 15 Mich., 416.)The opinion of Judge Cooley has since been accepted as authoritative by other courts. (Riversvs.Mitchell [1881], 57 Iowa, 193; Breenevs.People [1911], Colo., 117 Pac. Rep., 1000;Ex parteYoung [1892], 50 Fed., 526.)The English courts have given careful consideration to the subject. Thus, a child had been taken out of English by the respondent. A writ ofhabeas corpuswas issued by the Queen's Bench Division upon the application of the mother and her husband directing the defendant to produce the child. The judge at chambers gave defendant until a certain date to produce the child, but he did not do so. His return stated that the child before the issuance of the writ had been handed over by him to another; that it was no longer in his custody or control, and that it was impossible for him to obey the writ. He was found in contempt of court. On appeal, the court, through Lord Esher, M. R., said:A writ ofhabeas corpuswas ordered to issue, and was issued on January 22. That writ commanded the defendant to have the body of the child before a judge in chambers at the Royal Courts of Justice immediately after the receipt of the writ, together with the cause of her being taken and detained.That is a command to bring the child before the judge and must be obeyed, unless some lawful reason can be shown to excuse the nonproduction of the child. If it could be shown that by reason of his having lawfully parted with the possession of the child before the issuing of the writ, the defendant had no longer power to produce the child, that might be an answer; but in the absence of any lawful reason he is bound to produce the child, and, if he does not, he is in contempt of the Court for not obeying the writ without lawful excuse. Many efforts have been made in argument to shift the question of contempt to some anterior period for the purpose of showing that what was done at some time prior to the writ cannot be a contempt. But the question is not as to what was done before the issue of the writ. The question is whether there has been a contempt in disobeying the writ it was issued by not producing the child in obedience to its commands. (The Queenvs.Bernardo [1889], 23 Q. B. D., 305. See also to the same effect the Irish case ofIn reMatthews, 12 Ir. Com. Law Rep. [N. S.], 233; The Queenvs.Barnardo, Gossage's Case [1890], 24 Q. B. D., 283.)A decision coming from the Federal Courts is also of interest. Ahabeas corpuswas directed to the defendant to have before the circuit court of the District of Columbia three colored persons, with the cause of their detention. Davis, in his return to the writ, stated on oath that he had purchased the negroes as slaves in the city of Washington; that, as he believed, they were removed beyond the District of Columbia before the service of the writ ofhabeas corpus, and that they were then beyond his control and out of his custody. The evidence tended to show that Davis had removed the negroes because he suspected they would apply for a writ ofhabeas corpus. The court held the return to be evasive and insufficient, and that Davis was bound to produce the negroes, and Davis being present in court, and refusing to produce them, ordered that he be committed to the custody of the marshall until he should produce the negroes, or be otherwise discharged in due course of law. The court afterwards ordered that Davis be released upon the production of two of the negroes, for one of the negroes had run away and been lodged in jail in Maryland. Davis produced the two negroes on the last day of the term. (United Statesvs.Davis [1839], 5 Cranch C.C., 622, Fed. Cas. No. 14926. See also Robbvs.Connolly [1883], 111 U.S., 624; Church on Habeas, 2nd ed., p. 170.)We find, therefore, both on reason and authority, that no one of the defense offered by the respondents constituted a legitimate bar to the granting of the writ ofhabeas corpus.There remains to be considered whether the respondent complied with the two orders of the Supreme Court awarding the writ ofhabeas corpus, and if it be found that they did not, whether the contempt should be punished or be taken as purged.The first order, it will be recalled, directed Justo Lukban, Anton Hohmann, Francisco Sales, and Feliciano Yigo to present the persons named in the writ before the court on December 2, 1918. The order was dated November 4, 1918. The respondents were thus given ample time, practically one month, to comply with the writ. As far as the record discloses, the Mayor of the city of Manila waited until the 21st of November before sending a telegram to the provincial governor of Davao. According to the response of the attorney for the Bureau of Labor to the telegram of his chief, there were then in Davao women who desired to return to Manila, but who should not be permitted to do so because of having contracted debts. The half-hearted effort naturally resulted in none of the parties in question being brought before the court on the day named.For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were open: (1) They could have produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ; or (2) they could have shown by affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity those persons could not safely be brought before the court; or (3) they could have presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their attorney waived the right to be present. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 87.) They did not produce the bodies of the persons in whose behalf the writ was granted; they did not show impossibility of performance; and they did not present writings that waived the right to be present by those interested. Instead a few stereotyped affidavits purporting to show that the women were contended with their life in Davao, some of which have since been repudiated by the signers, were appended to the return. That through ordinary diligence a considerable number of the women, at least sixty, could have been brought back to Manila is demonstrated to be found in the municipality of Davao, and that about this number either returned at their own expense or were produced at the second hearing by the respondents.The court, at the time the return to its first order was made, would have been warranted summarily in finding the respondents guilty of contempt of court, and in sending them to jail until they obeyed the order. Their excuses for the non-production of the persons were far from sufficient. The, authorities cited herein pertaining to somewhat similar facts all tend to indicate with what exactitude ahabeas corpuswrit must be fulfilled. For example, in Gossage's case, supra, the Magistrate in referring to an earlier decision of the Court, said: "We thought that, having brought about that state of things by his own illegal act, he must take the consequences; and we said that he was bound to use every effort to get the child back; that he must do much more than write letters for the purpose; that he must advertise in America, and even if necessary himself go after the child, and do everything that mortal man could do in the matter; and that the court would only accept clear proof of an absolute impossibility by way of excuse." In other words, the return did not show that every possible effort to produce the women was made by the respondents. That the court forebore at this time to take drastic action was because it did not wish to see presented to the public gaze the spectacle of a clash between executive officials and the judiciary, and because it desired to give the respondents another chance to demonstrate their good faith and to mitigate their wrong.In response to the second order of the court, the respondents appear to have become more zealous and to have shown a better spirit. Agents were dispatched to Mindanao, placards were posted, the constabulary and the municipal police joined in rounding up the women, and a steamer with free transportation to Manila was provided. While charges and counter-charges in such a bitterly contested case are to be expected, and while a critical reading of the record might reveal a failure of literal fulfillment with our mandate, we come to conclude that there is a substantial compliance with it. Our finding to this effect may be influenced somewhat by our sincere desire to see this unhappy incident finally closed. If any wrong is now being perpetrated in Davao, it should receive an executive investigation. If any particular individual is still restrained of her liberty, it can be made the object of separatehabeas corpusproceedings.Since the writ has already been granted, and since we find a substantial compliance with it, nothing further in this connection remains to be done.The attorney for the petitioners asks that we find in contempt of court Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Jose Rodriguez, and Fernando Ordax, members of the police force of the city of Manila, Modesto Joaquin, the attorney for the Bureau of Labor, Feliciano Yigo, anhacenderoof Davao, and Anacleto Diaz, Fiscal of the city of Manila.The power to punish for contempt of court should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle. Only occasionally should the court invoke its inherent power in order to retain that respect without which the administration of justice must falter or fail. Nevertheless when one is commanded to produce a certain person and does not do so, and does not offer a valid excuse, a court must, to vindicate its authority, adjudge the respondent to be guilty of contempt, and must order him either imprisoned or fined. An officer's failure to produce the body of a person in obedience to a writ ofhabeas corpuswhen he has power to do so, is a contempt committed in the face of the court. (Ex parteSterns [1888], 77 Cal., 156; In re Patterson [1888], 99 N. C., 407.)With all the facts and circumstances in mind, and with judicial regard for human imperfections, we cannot say that any of the respondents, with the possible exception of the first named, has flatly disobeyed the court by acting in opposition to its authority. Respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, and Joaquin only followed the orders of their chiefs, and while, under the law of public officers, this does not exonerate them entirely, it is nevertheless a powerful mitigating circumstance. ThehacenderoYigo appears to have been drawn into the case through a misconstruction by counsel of telegraphic communications. The city fiscal, Anacleto Diaz, would seem to have done no more than to fulfill his duty as the legal representative of the city government. Finding him innocent of any disrespect to the court, his counter-motion to strike from the record the memorandum of attorney for the petitioners, which brings him into this undesirable position, must be granted. When all is said and done, as far as this record discloses, the official who was primarily responsible for the unlawful deportation, who ordered the police to accomplish the same, who made arrangements for the steamers and the constabulary, who conducted the negotiations with the Bureau of Labor, and who later, as the head of the city government, had it within his power to facilitate the return of the unfortunate women to Manila, was Justo Lukban, the Mayor of the city of Manila. His intention to suppress the social evil was commendable. His methods were unlawful. His regard for the writ ofhabeas corpusissued by the court was only tardily and reluctantly acknowledged.It would be possible to turn to the provisions of section 546 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which relates to the penalty for disobeying the writ, and in pursuance thereof to require respondent Lukban to forfeit to the parties aggrieved as much as P400 each, which would reach to many thousands of pesos, and in addition to deal with him as for a contempt. Some members of the court are inclined to this stern view. It would also be possible to find that since respondent Lukban did comply substantially with the second order of the court, he has purged his contempt of the first order. Some members of the court are inclined to this merciful view. Between the two extremes appears to lie the correct finding. The failure of respondent Lukban to obey the first mandate of the court tended to belittle and embarrass the administration of justice to such an extent that his later activity may be considered only as extenuating his conduct. A nominal fine will at once command such respect without being unduly oppressivesuch an amount is P100.In resumeas before stated, no further action on the writ ofhabeas corpusis necessary. The respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, Joaquin, Yigo, and Diaz are found not to be in contempt of court. Respondent Lukban is found in contempt of court and shall pay into the office of the clerk of the Supreme Court within five days the sum of one hundred pesos (P100). The motion of the fiscal of the city of Manila to strike from the record theReplica al Memorandum de los Recurridosof January 25, 1919, is granted. Costs shall be taxed against respondents. So ordered.In concluding this tedious and disagreeable task, may we not be permitted to express the hope that this decision may serve to bulwark the fortifications of an orderly government of laws and to protect individual liberty from illegal encroachment.

Information and access to official records

Art III, Sec. 7.

G.R. No. 130716 December 9, 1998FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ,petitioner,vs.PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG) and MAGTANGGOL GUNIGUNDO (in his capacity as chairman of the PCGG), respondents, GLORIA A. JOPSON, CELNAN A. JOPSON, SCARLET A. JOPSON, and TERESA A. JOPSON,petitioners-in-intervention.PANGANIBAN,J.:Petitioner asks this Court to define the nature and the extent of the people's constitutional right to information on matters of public concern. Does this right include access to the terms of government negotiationspriorto their consummation or conclusion? May the government, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), be required to reveal the proposed terms of a compromise agreement with the Marcos heirs as regards their alleged ill-gotten wealth? More specifically, are the "General Agreement" and "Supplemental Agreement," both dated December 28, 1993 and executed between the PCGG and the Marcos heirs, valid and binding?The CaseThese are the main questions raised in this original action seeking (1) to prohibit and "[e]njoin respondents [PCGG and its chairman] from privately entering into, perfecting and/or executing any greement with the heirs of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos . . . relating to and concerning the properties and assets of Ferdinand Marcos located in the Philippines and/or abroad including the so-called Marcos gold hoard"; and (2) to "[c]ompel respondent[s]to make publicall negotiations and agreement, be they ongoing or perfected, and all documents related to or relating to such negotiations and agreement between the PCGG and the Marcos heirs."1The FactsPetitioner Francisco I. Chavez, as "taxpayer, citizen and former government official who initiated the prosecution of the Marcoses and their cronies who committed unmitigated plunder of the public treasury and the systematic subjugation of the country's economy," alleges that what impelled him to bring this action were several news reports2bannered in a number of broadsheets sometime in September 1997. These news items referred to (1) the alleged discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos assets deposited in various coded accounts in Swiss banks; and (2) the reported execution of a compromise, between the government (through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs, on how to split or share these assets.Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to information3and the correlative duty of the state to disclose publicly all its transactions involving the national interest,4demands that respondents make public any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGG's task of recovering the Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth. He claims that any compromise on the alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an issue of "paramount public interest," since it has a "debilitating effect on the country's economy" that would be greatly prejudicial to the national interest of the Filipino people. Hence, the people in general have a right to know the transactions or deals being contrived and effected by the government.Respondents, on the other hand, do not deny forging a compromise agreement with the Marcos heirs. They claim, though, that petitioner's action is premature, because there is no showing that he has asked the PCGG to disclose the negotiations and the Agreements. And even if he has, PCGG may not yet be compelled to make any disclosure, since the proposed terms and conditions of the Agreements have not become effective and binding.Respondents further aver that the Marcos heirs have submitted the subject Agreements to the Sandiganbayan for its approval in Civil Case No. 141, entitledRepublic v. Heirs of Ferdinand E. Marcos, and that the Republic opposed such move on the principal grounds that (1) said Agreements have not been ratified by or even submitted to the President for approval, pursuant to Item No. 8 of the General Agreement; and (2) the Marcos heirs have failed to comply with their undertakings therein, particularly the collation and submission of an inventory of their assets. The Republic also cited an April 11, 1995 Resolution in Civil Case No. 0165, in which the Sandiganbayan dismissed a similar petition filed by the Marcoses' attorney-in-fact.Furthermore, then President Fidel V. Ramos, in his May 4, 1998 Memorandum5to then PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo, categorically stated:This is to reiterate my previous position embodied in the Palace Press Release of 6 April 1995 that I have not authorized you to approve the Compromise Agreements of December 28, 1993 or any agreement at all with the Marcoses, and would have disapproved them had they been submitted to me.The Full Powers of Attorney of March 1994 and July 4, 1994, did not authorize you to approve said Agreements, which I reserve for myself as President of the Republic of the Philippines.The assailed principal Agreement6reads:GENERAL AGREEMENTKNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:This Agreement entered into this 28th day of December, 1993, by and between The Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), a governmental agency vested with authority defined under Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2 and 14, with offices at the philcomcen Building, Pasig, Metro Manila, represented by its Chairman referred to as FIRST PARTY, and Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos, represented by Imelda Romualdez Marcos and Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., all of legal age, and with address at c/o No. 154 Lopez Rizal St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, and Imelda Romualdez Marcos, Imee Marcos Manotoc, Ferdinand E. Marcos, Jr., and Irene Marcos Araneta, hereinafter collectively referred to as the PRIVATE PARTY.W I T N E S S E T H:WHEREAS, the PRIVATE PARTY has been impelled by their sense of nationalism and love of country and of the entire Filipino people, and their desire to set up a foundation and finance impact projects like installation of power plants in selected rural areas and initiation of other community projects for the empowerment of the people;WHEREAS, the FIRST PARTY has obtained a judgment from the Swiss Federal Tribunal of December 21, 1990, that the $356 million belongs in principle to the Republic of the Philippines provided certain conditionalities are met, but even after 7 years, the FIRST PARTY has not been able to procure a final judgment of conviction against the PRIVATE PARTY;WHEREAS, the FIRST PARTY is desirous of avoiding a long-drawn out litigation which, as proven by the past 7 years, is consuming money, time and effort, and is counter-productive and ties up assets which the FIRST PARTY could otherwise utilize for its Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, and other urgent needs;WHEREAS, His Excellency, President Fidel V. Ramos, has adopted a policy of unity and reconciliation in order to bind the nation's wounds and start the process of rebuilding this nation as it goes on to the twenty-first century;WHEREAS, this Agreement settles all claims and counterclaims which the parties may have against one another, whether past, present, or future, matured or inchoate.NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the mutual covenants set forth herein, the parties agree as follows:1. The parties will collate all assets presumed to be owned by, or held by other parties for the benefit of, the PRIVATE PARTY for purposes of determining the totality of the assets covered by the settlement. The subject assets shall be classified by the nature thereof, namely: (a) real estate; (b) jewelry; (c) paintings and other works of art; (d) securities; (e) funds on deposit; (f) precious metals, if any, and (g) miscellaneous assets or assets which could not appropriately fall under any of the preceding classification. The list shall be based on the full disclosure of the PRIVATE PARTY to insure its accuracy.2. Based on the inventory, the FIRST PARTY shall determine which shall be ceded to the FIRST PARTY, and which shall be assigned to/retained by the PRIVATE PARTY. The assets of the PRIVATE PARTY shall be net of and exempt from, any form of taxes due the Republic of the Philippines. However, considering the unavailability of all pertinent and relevant documents and information as to balances and ownership, the actual specification of assets to be retained by the PRIVATE PARTY shall be covered by supplemental agreements whic