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Page 1: 3D Printing and Cybersecurity - acg.cs.tau.ac.il

3D Printing and Cybersecurity

Yair Karin

Page 2: 3D Printing and Cybersecurity - acg.cs.tau.ac.il

Additive Manufacturing Workflow

[1]

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Attack on/with 3D Printer

[1]

(Threats)

Page 4: 3D Printing and Cybersecurity - acg.cs.tau.ac.il

Adversial Goals

• Sabotage of manufactured part

• Sabotage of the AM printer

• Intellectual property (IP) theft

• Can you think of more?

[2]

[8]

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Manipulations

[1]

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Manipulations

[1]

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Manipulations

[1]

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Manipulations

[1]

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Manipulations

[1]

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Manipulations

[1]

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Manipulations

[1]

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Compromised Elements

[1]

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Compromised Elements

[1]

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Compromised Elements

[1]

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Compromised Elements

[1]

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Compromised Elements

[1]

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Attack Vectors

• Software Attacks:• General infiltration methods

• Code injection into AM files

• Software supply chain

• Hardware/firmware• Hardware trojans

• Firmware updates

• Network• General network attacks

• Protocol vulnerabilities

And so much more…

Bonus question: what is this?

[7]

Page 18: 3D Printing and Cybersecurity - acg.cs.tau.ac.il

ACAD/Medre.A

• Discovered by eset.

• Steals AutoCAD drawings.

• Written in AutoLISP.

• Over 100,000 designs leaked!

[9]

[4]

[3]

Page 19: 3D Printing and Cybersecurity - acg.cs.tau.ac.il

ACAD/Medre.A

1. User extracts files into directory

2. User opens the .dwg, .fas runs.

3. .fas copies itself to AutoCaddirectory and current project directory (why??).

4. .fas sends the model via email.

5. Further distribution.

.fas

.fas.fas

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[1]

Attack Flow

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Solution?

• Methods of integrating a signature within the printed object.

• Software security of the entire 3D printing flow.

• Physical tests of the printed object.

• More research! FEA - Finite Element Method

[10]

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Questions?

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Bibliography

1. “dr0wned – Cyber-Physical Attack with Additive Manufacturing”.Sofia Belikovetsky, Mark Yampolskiy, Jinghui Toh, Yuval Elovici

2. http://img.etimg.com/thumb/msid-55952298,width-310,resizemode-4,imglength-102138/.jpg

3. https://www.welivesecurity.com/media_files/white-papers/ESET_ACAD_Medre_A_whitepaper.pdf

4. http://www.eset.hk/enews/autocad/en/img/autocad-02e.jpg

5. https://dronebuff.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/DJI-Phantom-2-Vision-Plus.jpg

6. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zUnSpT6jSys

7. https://cdn.arstechnica.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/hd-classes.jpg

8. http://gailbwilliams.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/oh-the-horror.jpg

9. https://www.brandsoftheworld.com/sites/default/files/styles/logo-thumbnail/public/0017/8923/brand.gif?itok=FB8tX8KV

10. http://digitaleng.news/virtual_desktop/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/20110823NEi_in_CAD.jpg


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