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THEENTREPRENEURIALBUREAUCRAT:LOCATINGSTATEPOWERINGLOBALIZINGMUMBAI
LizaWeinstein
NortheasternUniversityThis paper considers the reconfiguration of state power in the context of global urbanrestructuring inMumbai, India. BasedonacasestudyoftheongoingDharaviRedevelopmentProject,atwo‐billiondollarefforttransformMumbai’sinfamousslumsettlementofDharaviintoa mixed‐use, mixed‐income township, it details the configurations underlying the project’splanning process. It highlights, in particular, the appropriation of state power by a privatedeveloper. Exploiting certain weaknesses in the state’s development institutions, this“entrepreneurial bureaucrat” was able to carve out autonomous role for himself and aprivileged place for the project, thus establishing a novel configuration of local state power.Althoughthesearrangementssharecertainfeaturesoftheneoliberalgovernancearrangementsand public‐private partnerships identified in other globalizing cities, the paper argues thatparticular features are grounded in Mumbai’s unique history and historical specificity. Thepapersituatesthiscaseinemergingunderstandingsofthechangingnatureofstatepowerinthecontext of globalization and global city formation. While this literature has contributedimportantinsightsabouttherescalingandreconfigurationofstateauthorityandresources,thepaper argues that remains disproportionately focused on transformationswithin the nationalstate. It concludes that a parallel set of transformations – including the new configurationsrevealed in the Dharavi case – may be evenmore important for understanding global urbanrestructuringwithinlargefederaliststateslikeIndiathatcontainconsiderableregionaldiversity.Introduction
Themid‐1990smarkedaturningpointinMumbai’slandpolitics,andparticularlyinthe
waythecity’sdenselypopulatedslumlandsandsquattersettlementswereviewed–and
ultimatelymanaged–bypoliticians,bureaucrats,anddevelopers.Longrecognizedasoneof
thecity’smostintractablesocialproblems,slumswouldsoonbereframedasadevelopment
opportunityandslumredevelopmentwouldbecomeanintegralpartofthecity’snew
developmentagenda(Nijman2008).Helpingtoframethisagendawasanewpopulistpolitical
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coalitionthattookcontroloftheMaharashtra1Governmentin1995.Oneofthefirstactions
takenbythenewgovernment(afterchangingthecity’snamefromBombaytoMumbai)wasto
instituteanewhousingschemeforresidentsofslumsettlements.Actingonacampaign
promisetoprovide“freeandquickhousing”tofourmillionslumdwellersthroughoutthe
MumbaiMetropolitanRegion,theprogramwouldprovideresidentswithsmalltenement
apartmentsinmidrisebuildingsforonlythecostofamonthlymaintenancefee(Hansen2001).
Apartmentsundertheprogramwouldbefinancedandconstructedbyprivatedevelopersin
exchangefortheopportunitytodevelopandsellotherpropertiesatmarketrates(Mukhija
2003).Althoughvariousmarket‐basedapproachestohousingconstructionhadbeendevised
overthepreviousdecade,theprogrammarkedadramaticexpansionoftheroleofprivate
developersinhousingconstructionforlowerincomegroups(Mukhija2003,Nijman2008).The
newprogrambecamemorethanawaytoimprovethehousingconditionsofthecity’smost
disadvantagedresidents;italsopushedhundredsofacrescentrallylocatedlandsontothecity’s
lucrativepropertymarket,thusenablingthecommercialandinfrastructuredevelopments
consistentwiththestate’semergingdevelopmentagenda.
Amongtheinvestorsanddeveloperswhorecognizedtheopportunitiesentailedinthis
newapproachwasMukeshMehta,aMumbai‐bornarchitectandpropertydeveloperwhohad
beenlivingandworkinginsuburbanNewYork.EnticedbacktoMumbaibyopportunities
associatedwithIndia’seconomicliberalizationandbyneweffortstoattractglobalinvestment,
Mehtarecognizedthenewslumpolicyasaplatformforalarger‐scaledevelopmentstrategy.
Overthenextdecade,MehtawoulddesignaplanfortransformingoneofMumbai’slargest–
andcertainlythemostfamousofits–slumsettlementsintoamixed‐use,mixed‐income
1MaharashtraistheregionalstateinwhichthecityofMumbaiislocated.MostinstitutionsofdevelopmentplanningforMumbaiarehousedatthestate‐level,intheGovernmentofMaharashtra.
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development.Afterattemptingtopursuetheprojectindependently,heeventuallysoldittothe
stategovernment.Eventuallyembracedbythestateandpromotedaspartofitsbroaderefforts
totransformMumbaiintoa“worldclasscity,”theDharaviRedevelopmentProject(DRP)
becamethecenterpieceoftheseefforts.AstheDRPtransformedintoagovernment‐sponsored
initiative,Mehta’sroleshiftedfromanindependentdevelopertoaconsultantemployedbythe
statetohelpmanagetheproject.
Puttingthiscaseatthecenteroftheanalysis,thispaperexaminesthenew
configurationsofstatepowercreatedoverthepastfifteenyearsaspartofIndia’seffortsto
promotethetypeofurbandevelopmentdesignedtoattractforeigninvestmentandimproveits
cities’positioninglobalurbanhierarchies.Thiscaserevealsonesuchconfiguration:the
appropriationofstatepowerbyasingleentrepreneurialindividual.Referredtohereasan
“entrepreneurialbureaucrat,”thepaperarguesthatMehtahasbothestablishedanew
approachtounderrestructuringinIndia’sglobalizingcitiesandproducedanovelconfiguration
oflocalstatepower.Exploitingcertainweaknessesinthestate’sdevelopmentbureaucracies,
heestablishedrelativelyautonomousroleforhimselfandaprivilegedplaceforhisproject.An
exampleofthetypeofstaterestructuringthathasenabledmegaprojectdevelopmentandelite‐
orientedurbanrenewalschemesincitiesthroughouttheworld,thiscaserevealsanattemptto
depoliticizedevelopmentanddisenfranchisetheurbanpoor.2Yetwhilethisconfiguration
sharescertainfeaturesoftheneoliberalgovernancearrangementsandpublic‐private
partnershipsidentifiedinotherglobalizingcities,itsparticularfeaturesaregroundedin
Mumbai’suniquehistoryandhistoricalspecificity.
2Ihavearguedelsewhere,however,thattheseattemptswererelativelyunsuccessfulandcertainsegmentsoftheurbanpoorandactivistsactingontheirbehalfhavesuccessfullyinsertedthemselvesintotheproject’splanningprocess(XXXX).
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Thepaperbeginswithabriefdiscussionoftheliteratureonstaterestructuringin
globalizingcitiesandinurbanIndiainparticular.Itsituatesthisnovelconfiguration–the
“entrepreneurialbureaucrat”–intotheseemergingunderstandingsofreconfiguredstate
power.Thisdiscussionsuggeststhatwhileimportantinsightshavebeenmadeaboutthe
rescalingandreconfigurationofstateauthorityandresources,thisliteratureremains
disproportionatelyfocusedontransformationswithinthenationalstate.Itarguesthata
parallelsetoftransformationsareunderwayintheorganizationoflocalstatepowerthatmay
beevenmoreimportantforunderstandingglobalurbanrestructuringwithinlargefederalist
stateslikeIndiathatcontainconsiderableregionaldiversity.
ThepaperthenmovesontoadetaileddiscussionoftheplanningprocessfortheDRP,
highlightingtheuniqueroleassumedbyMehtaasproject’schiefarchitect,managerand
advocate.Basedoninterviewswithpoliticiansandofficialsinthestategovernmentandthe
municipalcorporation,aswellaswithprivatedevelopers,includingMehtaandothersworking
inhisoffice,thenextseveralsectionsdetailtheprocessbywhichMehtainsertedhimselfinto
thestate’shousingandurbandevelopmentagenda.Thisdiscussionemphasizes,inparticular,
roleplayedbyelectedwardpoliticiansintheproject’splanningprocess.Itrevealsthatdespite
theirspecificandpotentiallyimportantknowledgeabouttheirconstituencies,localpoliticians
remainlargelyexcludedfromMumbai’songoingdevelopmenteffortsdespitecertainreforms
designedtodecentralizeurbangovernanceanddevelopmentplanning.Yetdespitethe
marginalizationofelectedpoliticiansandmunicipalofficials,itisnotaccuratetosaytherehas
beennolocalinvolvementintheproject’splanningprocessorthatMehta’sconsolidationof
powerovertheprojecthasgoneuncontested.Theempiricalsectionsconcludewitha
discussionoftheoppositionthathasemergedinrecentyears,revealingthecontestations
entailedinlocalstaterestructuring.Thepaperconcludesbyreturningtobroader
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understandingsofstaterestructuringinglobalandglobalizingcities,situatingthiscaseinrecent
analysesoftheprivatizationofurbangovernancefunctionsinMumbaiandoutsideofIndia.This
discussionarguesthatalthoughthiscasereflectsthepartialprivatizationofurbanplanningand
administrationactivities,itwouldbeinaccuratetocharacterizetheseshiftsasadiminishedstate
roleinurbandevelopmentandhousingconstruction.
ReconfiguringLocalStatePower
Recentresearchonthescalartransformationsofstatehavehasofferedtheimportant
insightthatglobalizationdoesnotsimplyactuponthelocalscale,asaforcefromabove,but
thatglobalizationandstatepoweraremutuallyconstitutive(Brenner1999,Brenner2004,
Swyngedouw2004,Sassen2006).Ratherthansimplyappropriatingpowerpreviouslylocatedat
thenationalscale,thisresearchhasrevealedthatglobalizationentailstheterritorialde‐scaling
andrescalingofstatepowerwithinthenation.Contributingtothisperspective,Sassen(2006)
hasidentifiedseveralconfigurationsofstatepowerthathaveemergedsincethe1970saspart
ofglobalization.Specifically,shehighlightsthechangingbalanceofpowerbetweentheUnited
States’threebranchesofgovernment,theprivatizationofstatecapabilities,andchangingforms
ofcitizenshipandpoliticalmembershipasexamplesofreconfiguredstatepower.Sheexplains
thattheseshiftsarepartofglobalizationbecausetheyreflecttransformationsthat“are
orientedtowardglobalagendasandsystems”(Sassen2006,3).Whileparticularcomponentsof
nationalstatesaretransformedorunderminedbyglobalization,thestateremainsakey
“enabler”oftheseprocesses,sheargues.
NeilBrenner(2004)hasmeanwhileassertedthaturbanregionshaveemergedaskey
institutionalsitesofstatepoweramidsttheseshifts.Inresponsetobroaderstructuralchanges
underwayinWesternEuropesincethe1970s,suchasdeindustrialization,theretrenchmentof
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thewelfarestate,andEuropeanintegration,theeconomiccontextofEurope’scitieshave
changedandmajormetropolitanregionshavebeenforcedtoadoptentrepreneurialpoliciesto
attractcapitalinvestment.Althoughadministrativeboundariesremainfixed,changesinstate
practicesandregulatorypoliciesreconstitutethemeaningsofterritorialdivisionsand
intergovernmentalrelations.Insteadofadoptingaviewoflineardecentralization,Brenner
emphasizesthereshufflingofstatepowerandcirculationofresourcesbetweendifferent
geopoliticalscales.
Brenner’sandSassen’sworkhaveofferedtheimportantinsightthatglobalizationacts
uponurbanspaceandurbanpolitics,inpart,byrescalingtheauthorityandresourcesrequired
forurbanrestructuringwithinthenationstate.Buttheseauthors,andcorrespondinglymuchof
theworkinthisarea,havetendedtoneglectthetransformationsofstatepowerunderwayat
theurbanscale.Asurban‐leveltransformationsareparticulartolocalcontextsand,therefore,
difficulttoanalyzewithinamoregeneralframework,thesetheorizationshavelargelyscaledat
thenational‐statelevel.Whilethisemphasisisusefulforcontextsinwhichacoherentsuper‐
nationalornationalurbanpolicyisdiscernable,itdoeslittletorevealthepoliticaldynamicsof
urbanrestructuringinaregionallydiverse,federalistcontextlikeIndia.Consequently,after
presentingthedetailsofthecase,theconcludingdiscussionconsidersarguesthatthiscasecan
contributetoamoredecentralizedorlocalunderstandingofthereorganizationofstatepower
usefulforunderstandingtheIndiancaseandotherregionswithdiversesub‐nationalurban
contexts.
AManwithaPlan
Inthemid‐1990s,MukeshMehtawasworkingasanarchitectandpropertydeveloperin
suburbanNewYork.OriginallyfromMumbai,MehtahadsettledintheUnitedStatesandearned
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adegreeinarchitecturebeforespecializinginthedevelopmentofhigh‐endresidential
propertiesintheNewYorkarea.LikemanyNon‐residentIndians(NRIs)observingthepolitical
reformsandeconomicgrowthunderwayintheircountryoforigin,Mehtamadethedecisionto
returntoIndiaandexplorebusinessopportunitiesinthenewIndia.Morespecifically,Mehta
sawopportunitiesinMumbai’slucrativepropertymarketsandpossibilitiesentailedin
Maharashtra’snewslumhousingpolicy.
Justoneofmanybuilderanddeveloperswhosawthecity’sslumsettlementsasa
developmentopportunity,hisplanandhisambitionswerelargerthanoriginallyenvisionedin
theslumpolicy.Uptothatpoint,theSlumHousingScheme(SRS)hadbeenusedonlyona
piecemealbasis,tore‐housesinglehousingsocieties,comprisingroughlyahundredfamilies,at
atime.AlthoughmanybuilderswereworkingonseveralSRSprojectssimultaneously,nonehad
soughttoredevelopcontiguoushousingsocietiesaspartofalargerdevelopmentproject.Yet
Mehtacouldseenoreasonwhythepolicycouldn’tbeusedonalargerscale,allowingforthe
redevelopmentoflargerplotssimultaneously,thusfreeingupmuchlargeramountsofspacefor
marketratedevelopments.AconsultantworkingwithMehtaexplained:
TheSRA [SlumRehabilitationAuthority]had justbeen formed.And theyweregoingabout–well,theystilldotoday–goingaboutitinthispiecemealkindofapproach. Sohemetwithpoliticalpeopleat that timeandsaid, lookyouaregoing about this all wrong. When you have large areas, you should try todevelopthemassuburbs…Theywerelike,likewhat,areaslikeDharavi?Andhesaid,well,yes,areaslikeDharavi.Anditsortoftookofffromthere.3
AlthoughitisunlikelythatMehta’sideatoredevelopthesprawlingsettlementofDharavi
emergedfromthissingleconversation,thisstoryhastakenonsomethingofamythicalquality,
asMehtahasworkedtoportrayhimselfasDharavi’saccidentaldeveloper.
3DiscussiononJune19,2006.
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IfslumsarecharacterizedasMumbai’smostintractableproblem,Dharaviisportrayed
asitsmosttangiblerepresentation.Anareaofroughlyonesquaremilesituatedinthevirtual
centerofGreaterMumbai,thesettlementofDharavihousesupwardsofamillionpeoplein
housingofvaryingquality.Photographstakenfromnearbyhigh‐risebuildingsshowaseemingly
endlessexpanseofcorrugatedaluminumandblue‐tarpedrooftopsprecariouslysittingatop
squatshanties.Thisimagehasnowbeenseenacrosstheglobe,astheworld’sleading
newspapersandmagazineshavepublishedrecentprofilesofDharaviandseveralmemorable
scenesfromtheSlumdogMillionairewerefilmedinthesettlement.Yetmorethanjustavivid
depictionofMumbai’sslumproblem,Dharaviisalsoavisualrepresentedthegovernance
failuresthathavehinderedearliereffortstoupgradeslumsettlementsandimproveconditions
slumresidents.Everyfewdecades,anewefforthasbeendevisedto“solvetheDharavi
problem.”Thelastsucheffortwasamegaprojectproposedinthemid‐1980sbyRajeevGandhi,
thenPrimeMinisterofIndia.Earlier,whileasimilarlyambitiousschemeforDharaviwas
outlinedinthe1948BombayMasterPlan.Inthemeantime,piecemealeffortslikeSRShave
slowlyrebuiltsomeofthehousingandimprovedbasicinfrastructuresinthesettlement,but
havefailedtotransformeitherthesettlement’sbasicconditionsor,perhapsmoreimportantly,
itsnotoriousimageasoneofAsia’slargestslums.Therefore,whenMehtasethissightson
Dharaviinthemid‐1990s,hewasdismissedoffhandasoneofIndia’snowmanyambitious,but
ultimatelynaïve,return‐NRIs.
DeterminedtoredeveloptheentiresettlementofDharavi,Mehtasettoworkonland
useplansandfinancingformulas.Hesooncametorealize,however,thathisplanentailedtoo
greatafinancialriskforhimtotakeonalone.“Aprojectofthissizeneedsmoney.”heonce
explained.“Ifitgotobstructedbygovernment,Icouldhavelostalotofmoney.Thefinances
hadtocomefromsomewhereelse.Andgovernmentneededtoputaguaranteeonthe
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financing.”4Inadditiontothefinancialrisk,herecognizedthatthestate’sdevelopment
regulationswouldhavetobeamended.Consequently,hedeterminedthatprojectcouldonly
proceedifitsecuredgovernmentsponsorship.HebegansellinghisDharaviplantothestateof
Maharashtra.
Bytheendofthe1990s,Mehtawasreceivingsomeencouragementfromgovernment
officialsbuthewasyettogarneranofficialpledgeofsupport.Withitspoliticalbasefound
primarilyinMumbai,thecurrentgovernmentsituatedhousingandurbandevelopment
initiativesmoreprominentlyonitsagendathanhadpreviousadministrations.Infact,thestate’s
ChiefMinisteratthetime,ManoharJoshi,representedtheMumbaidistrictthatincluded
Dharavi.AlthoughMehtarecallsthatJoshiremainedsomewhatcriticalofhisplans,hewas
beginningtoelicitsupportfromotherswithinthegovernmentatthetime.YetinOctober1999,
thecoalitioninpowerlostthestate‐wideelectionsandtheoppositioncoalitionledbythe
CongressPartyformedanewgovernment.ThepoliticalgroundMehtahadgainedwaslost.
Becausethepreviousgovernmenthadbegunexpressingsupportforthescheme,thenewly
electedCongressgovernmenttookstepstopubliclydistanceitselffromit.Hewenttowork
againtobuildthenecessarypoliticalsupportwithinthenewgovernment.Notalignedwithany
ofthestate’spoliticalparties,Mehtafeltfreetoworkwithwhichevergovernmentwasin
power.Hiseffortsbegantopayoffin2001and2002whenhisplanwonfavorwiththestate’s
HousingSecretarySureshJoshi.Mehtarecalls:
Wehadbeenpetitioningthemforyears.EveryHousingSecretarythatcamein,wewould go straight to himand say,whydon’t you get involved?Whydon’tyou do this? And then [Housing Secretary] Dr. Suresh Joshi came to us. Theywereinterestedallofasudden.Maybeitwasdestiny,orwhatever…Rightthen
4DiscussiononNovember14,2006.
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the government had taken this huge initiative for infrastructure projects, so Iguessitallfellintoline.5
TheHousingSecretaryJoshiencouragedMehtatoapproachgovernmentasapartner,rather
tryingtosellhisplantothegovernment.TakingJoshi’sadvice,Mehtaclaimsthathewasableto
presenttheprojectasa“win‐win”situation.“Politiciansgotanewwaytolookatslums,andI
gottheprojectIwanted.”6Hebeganbuildingsupportthroughoutthegovernment,butthe
statestillrefusedtoofficiallybacktheproject.Overthenexttwoyears,however,aglobally‐
orienteddevelopmentagendacametogether,premisedontransformingMumbaiintoa“world
classcity.”Framedasacenterpieceofthisagenda,thestatewouldeventuallyembraceMehta’s
Dharaviplan.
MorethanjustavisualrepresentationofMumbai’sintractableslumproblemandthe
failuresofthestate’sresponse,muchoftheattentionDharavihasgarneredovertheyearsis
rootedintherecognitionoftheprimepropertyonwhichthesettlementsits.Whilean
insatiabledemandforlandhaslongplaguedthisislandcity,newcallstoconvert“underutilized”
slumlandsintodevelopablepropertiesweremadeinthisperiod,bolsteredbyanewdesireto
attractglobalinvestorsandimproveMumbai’sworldcitystanding.Whilethecity’spowerful
businesscommunityhadlonglamentedMumbai’sdecliningcompetitiveposition,theirconcerns
movedtothetopofthestate’spolicyagendauponpublicationoftheso‐calledMcKinseyReport
inlate2003.Althoughfewnewrevelationswerepresentedinthewidelyheralded“Vision
Mumbai:SummaryofRecommendationsforTransformingMumbaiintoaWorldClassCity,”
producedbytheinternationalconsultingfirmMcKinseyandCompany,theMcKinseyReport
restatedtheirconcernsandrenewedcallsforgovernmenttopromoteslumredevelopmentas
5DiscussiononJune19,2006.6DiscussiononNovember14,2006.
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partofabroaderdevelopmentagenda.Thestategovernmentimmediatelyadoptedthis
agendaandtheChiefMinisterformedataskforcetoexploretheimplementationofthe
McKinseyReport’smainrecommendations.AlthoughMehta’splanwasnotmentionedinthe
report,itsobjectiveswerecloselyaligned.TheChiefMinister’sTaskforcenotedthe
redevelopmentof“atleastthreesectorsofDharaviforcommercialorofficeuse”amongits
shorttermobjectives(StateofMaharashtra2004,14).SoonaftertheTaskforcewasconvened,
theChiefMinisterpubliclyendorsedMehta’splan.
InacabinetmeetinginFebruary2004,Maharashtra’sChiefMinistercommittedhis
politicalsupporttothecomprehensiveredevelopmentofDharavi’shousing,infrastructure,
industriesandcommercialspaces.AmidstmediafanfareandboldproclamationsthatMumbai
wouldbe“slumfree”andDharaviwouldbetransformedintoacultural,business,and
knowledgecenter,anewpubliccommitmentwasmadetoDharaviingeneralandMehtain
particular.AsMehtastoodatthepodium,detailinghisplaninaPowerPointpresentation,
completewithcolor‐codedlandusemapsandcatchyacronyms,themeetingresembledthe
launchofanewproductmorethanacabinetdiscussionofahousingprogram.Nowpartofthe
state’seffortstotransformMumbaiintoa“worldclasscity,”thispresentationrevealedthenew
objectivesofslumredevelopment,consistentwiththeoveralltoneandobjectivesofeconomic
liberalizationundertakenoverthepastdecade.
Althoughthestateendorsement’sMehta’splanstemmedprimarilyfromitscongruence
withthebroaderagendaofimprovingMumbai’scompetitivenessandworldcitystanding,the
project’sprofilewasalsoraisedbygrowingsupportfromthecentralgovernment.InJanuary
2004,Mehta’seffortstobuildpoliticalsupportwonanimportantvictorywhenthecentral
government—thenacoalitiongovernmentheadedbytheright‐wingBharatiyaJanataParty
(BJP)withtheformerChiefMinisterofMaharashtra(andDharavirepresentative)ManoharJoshi
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inthepositionofSpeakerofParliament—committedroughlyonehundredmilliondollarsfor
Dharavi’sredevelopment.TheinterventionoftheCentralGovernmentintoMumbai’surban
affairswasinterpretedasadirectchallengetothestategovernment’sauthority.Giventhat
urbandevelopmentisconstitutionallydefinedasa“statesubject,”itwasremarkablethatthe
centrewouldcommitfinancialresourcestoaprojectthathadnotyetreceivedthestate’s
backing.Morethanintergovernmentalconflict,thesubversionofthestate’sauthorityinthis
casealsorepresentsinter‐partyconflict,giventhatthecentralgovernmentwasruledbytheBJP,
whiletheCongressPartyheldpoweratthestatelevel.Thisactionlikelyshamedthe
GovernmentofMaharashtraintoofferingsupport,andtheStateannouncedthefollowingweek
thatitwouldpartnerwithMehtaontheprojectandprovidefinancialbacking.Laterthatyear,
theBJP‐ledgovernmentatthecentrelosttoaCongressParty‐ledcoalitionandthepromised
financialresourceswereneverdelivered.
Inadditiontotheplan’scongruencewiththeMcKinseyReportandthesupportit
garneredfromNewDelhi,thestate’sendorsementofMehta’splaninearly2004shouldalsobe
attributedtohisperseverance.AlthoughhehadsomeconnectionsinBombaywhenhereturned
inthemid‐1990s,hewasbasicallyanoutsidertostatepoliticsandhadfewtiestocity’spolitical
andbusinesscommunities.Yetoverthebetterpartofadecade,Mehtaworkedtoelicit
governmentsupport,portrayinghimselfasjustamanwithaplan.Reflectinguponthese
efforts,Mehtamused:
Iamanentrepreneur.IfirstdecidedIwasgoingtodoitmyself,buteventuallyIhadtocontractwithadeveloper–inthiscase,thegovernment.WhenIsold it
to them, I said, only pay me if I’m successful. I should only get paid on thesuccessoftheproject…Therewillbetwomeasuresofsuccess:firstgovernmenthadtoaccepttheplan.Then,thebuildershavetogivemoney toredevelopit.
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Only once the builders make the investments, can the project be deemed asuccess.7
OncethestateannounceditsendorsementoftheprojectinFebruary2004,MehtacreatedMM
ProjectConsultantsPvt.,anentitysubcontractedbythestatetosupporttheplanningforthe
newlylaunchedDharaviRedevelopmentProject(DRP).MehtawasnamedtheProject
ManagementConsultantandmostoftheactivitiesassociatedwiththephysicaldesigns,
regulatorychanges,andcommunityrelationsfortheDRPwerecoordinatedthroughhisoffice.
Fortheseefforts,hewouldbepaidaconsultancyfeeofonepercentoftotalproject
expenditures.Withtheprojectcostsinitiallyestimatedattwobilliondollars,Mehta’sfeewas
expectedtoberoughly$20million.Althoughhenotedthathisfeesshoulddepend“onthe
successoftheproject,”asoflate2010,Mehtahadbeenpaidroughly$3millioneventhough
theworkhadnottechnicallybegunandthebuilderswereyet“togivemoney.”Meanwhile,
Mehta’sroleasProjectManagerandthepaymentsreceivedwouldbecomeacontentious
politicalissueinthecomingyears,leadingtocallsforhisremovalandthegovernment’s
withdrawalofsupportfortheproject.
“One‐ManHandled”
Mehta’snewroleasProjectManagementConsultantrepresentsashiftintheway
governmentplansandcarriesoutdevelopmentplanningefforts.Althoughthestatehasalong
traditionofhiringconsultantstodesigntownplansoradvisepoliticiansondevelopment
projects,thepositionthatMehtacraftedforhimselfentailedamoresignificantscopeof
authoritythanistypicallyheldbyaprivateconsultant.Althoughherecognizedthathisrole
7DiscussiononAugust18,2006.
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shouldprobablybeperformedbyagovernmentofficial,hemaintainedthathisparticipation
hadbeenessentialfortheproject’ssurvival.
That’s where the bureaucracy comes in. But I don’t think we have creativebureaucrats; we have very few of them. We have the Dharavi project. It’svirtually one‐man handled…I even type letters for them, interdepartmental
letters!Why?BecauseMukeshMehtaistheonlyoneintheentireuniversewhowantsDharavitogoon!”8
InadditiontoensuringthatDharavi“goeson,”Mehtaoncedescribedhisroleasoneofa
coordinator.Giventhenatureofdevelopmentplanningtoday,heasserted,someoneis
requiredtobringtogetherthevariousactorsandinterestsinvolvedinaprojectofthisscale.
Equatingprojectmanagementwith“dealmaking”andadevelopmentplanwitha“business
model,”heexplained:
Iamfillingavoid.Thatvoidisofcoordinationfunction,tomakepeopletalkto
eachotherandmakedeals. Istartbyaskingthequestion:whatdoweneedtodo to redevelopDharavi?…And I am coordinatingwith groups tomeet theseneeds.We need urban designers, entrepreneurs, service providers.We need
thebestofthebestandmyjobistobringthemintotheproject.Iambringingabusinessmodeltoworkthroughtheseissues.9
Ultimately,Mehtaattributesthisvoid,aswellasotherweaknessesinthestate’s
developmentbureaucracies,tothesystemofplacinggovernmentofficersinpositionsand
providingthemwithrewards.
The typical government officerwon’t do this. They generally believe that if you
don’tdoanything,youcan’t lose your job–which is true in thecurrent system.They also don’t have deep knowledge on the issues they’re working on. Theymove fromposition to position. Theymaywork on education and thenhousing
andthenenvironment.Thoserunningministriesshouldbeexpertsinthoseareasofwork,butthey’renot.10
8DiscussiononJune19,2006.9DiscussiononAugust18,2006.10DiscussiononAugust18,2006.
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Yet,despitehisattributionofgovernment’sineffectivenesstostructuralweaknessesratherthan
toindividualpersonalities,Mehtarecognizesthatgovernment’scontinuedbackingforthe
projecthasdependedonindividualsupporterswithinthestate’sdevelopmentbureaucracies.
ThemostcrucialpositioninthisregardhasbeentheheadoftheSlumRehabilitationAuthority
(SRA),thestate‐levelagencyresponsibleforimplementingSRS.Atthetimetheprojectreceived
statebacking,theSRAwasheadedbysomeonethatMehtanoted“hadanagendatostopthe
project.”11HeclaimsthatturfbattlesandconcernsaboutrecognitionledtheformerSRAchief
tostalltheproject.EventuallyhewasreplacedwithsomeonethatMehtasawasaninitialally
butwhoheclaimsprovedsimilarlyunhelpful.Inmid‐2005,IqbalChahalwasappointedasthe
newheadofSRAandreceivedthedesignationof“OfficeronSpecialDutywithresponsibilities
fortheDharaviProject.”MehtadescribedChahalas“verysupportive,”notingthatheultimately
seestheDRPas“themostimportantprojectofhiscareer.”12
DespiteMehta’scharacterizationoftheprojectas“one‐manhandled,”theDRP
ultimatelybecameintegratedintotheSRA’sadministrativestructure.WhileMehtamaybe
fillingavoidbycommunicatingbetweenthevariousgroupsinvolvedintheproject,Chahal’s
mainrolewastocoordinatebetweenthestate’sChiefMinister,Mehta,andtheSRAstaff
assignedtohelpdesignandcarryouttheproject.(SeeFigure1).TwoSRAofficers,reporting
directlytoChahal,weregivenresponsibilitiesfortheproject’spoliticalandtechnicalsides.
RoopaShinde,13ChiefCommunityDevelopmentOfficer,waschargedwithcommunityrelations;
11DiscussiononAugust18,2006.12DiscussiononAugust18,2006.13Mehta,Chahal,highrankingbureaucratsandpoliticians(likeSureshJoshiandManoharJoshi)havenot
beengivenpseudonymsduetothehighprofilerolestheyhaveplayedintheprojectandthemediaattentiontheyhavereceivedfortheseactivities.Thenamesoflowerlevelbureaucratsandlocalelectedofficials,however,havebeenchangedandthedistrictstheyrepresenthavebeenobscured.
16
Thispaperisaworkingdraftandshouldnotbecitedordistributedwithouttheauthor’spermission.
whileRajeevTalreja,wasassignedtotheproject’stechnicalaspects,includinglanduseand
buildingregulations.GiventhecloseworkingrelationshipthatMehtaandhisstaffatMM
ConsultantsmaintainedwithChahal,Shinde,andTalreja,hischaracterizationoftheprojectas
“onemanhandled”didnotseemlikemuchofanoverstatement.
Figure1:DRPAdministrativeStructure
SpeakingtoRajeevTalrejaonedayinhisofficeattheSRAheadquartersnearDharavi,
heconfirmedthecentralroleMehtaplayedthroughouttheproject’splanningprocess.Talreja
explainedthatevenbeforethegovernmenthadendorsedtheproject,Mehtahaddonemuchof
thetechnicalwork,includingthoseactivitiesthatwouldtypicallybeperformedbyhisoffice.For
example,MehtahadacquiredthelandrecordsfromthecitysurveyorattheMunicipal
CorporationofGreaterMumbai(MCGM),includingtherecordsoflandownershipandthe
surveysofslumencroachment.Thisinformation,heexplained,wasusedtodeterminethe
areasofDharavithatcouldbedesignatedslumareasandincludedintheplan,aswellas
determinehowDharaviwouldbedividedintosectorsandassignedtothedevelopersselected
Officer on Special Duty (SRA) for DRP – Position later renamed CEO of the Dharavi Redevelopment Authority
Chief Minister of Maharashtra
Sub-Engineer (SRA) for DRP (technical aspects of implementation)
Project Management Consultant for DRP (Mukesh Mehta)
Chief Community Development Officer (SRA) for DRP (community relations)
17
Thispaperisaworkingdraftandshouldnotbecitedordistributedwithouttheauthor’spermission.
tocarryoutthework.Mehtahadalsosurveyedthestructurestoidentifywhichwere
residential,commercial,industrial,orsomecombination.AccordingtoTalreja,theSRA’s
primaryrolehadbeensimplythatofaregulatoryagency,toensurethattheprojectcomplied
withthestate’sDevelopmentControlRulesandchangesweremadetothoseruleswhere
necessary.Buteventheseactivities,heacknowledged,hadbeenundertakenin“close
consultation”withMehta.OncetherevisedruleswereapprovedbyagroupofSecretariesin
theChiefMinister’scabinet,anexpressionofinterestdocumentwouldbeissuedanddeveloper
interestwouldbesolicitedontheproject.Outliningtheeachofthesesteps,Talrejaconfirmed
Mehta’scentralityintheprocessandhisassertionsthatitwashethatkepttheprojectmoving
forward.Meanwhile,conversationswithRoopaShindeconfirmedthatMehtaplayedanequally
centralroleonthecommunityrelationssidethroughouttheplanningprocess.
DiscussingtheseadministrativeissueswithMehta,hesuggestedthatthecontrolhe
maintainedthroughouttheproject’splanningprocesswasanadministrativenecessity.He
acknowledgedthathehadultimatelyconsolidatedtheauthorityoverdevelopmentplanning,
characterizingitasnecessarytoensuretheproject’ssurvival.Speakinginparticularabout
projectdelays,heexplained:
Dharaviisjustoneofthemillionprojectsthegovernmentisworkingon.Sofrom
theirpointofview,why isDharavimore important thansomething else? Thegovernmentclaimsthatitisahyper‐priorityproject.Thisistheirclaim.Butwhathappens is that the claimmight not bepercolating to all the people from the
lowest to thehighest rungs.So itmightbea superhighpriority for the PrimeMinister or theChiefMinister and the Secretaries, but their deputies and thedeputiesoftheirdeputiesmightnotthinkit’sthatimportant.14
14DiscussiononJune19,2006.
18
Thispaperisaworkingdraftandshouldnotbecitedordistributedwithouttheauthor’spermission.
ForMehta,ontheotherhand,Dharaviwashisonlypriority.Andbyoverseeingeverystepof
theplanningprocess,hecouldn’tpreventdelaysbuthecouldmakesurethattheprojectwould
berealized.
Morethansimplyamatterofpriorities,Mehtaalsoattributedthelackofsupporthe
hadreceivedtoconcernsaboutwhathetermed“turfstealing.”Heexplainedthatnotonlyare
bureaucratsunwillingtoundertakelargescaledevelopmentplanning,butthattheyalsowantto
undermineothers’effortstodoso.Heexplainedthattheoppositionhehadreceivedfrom
withinthegovernmentwas“notbasedonthemeritsoftheplan,butonwhattheyperceiveas
turf‐stealing.Powerfulpeopleareacceptingmymodel,”headded,“sothesepeopleare
beginningtofeelmarginalized.”15Mehtaspokewithsuchaclearsenseofownershipoverthe
projectthatIhadtoremindmyselfthat,butthispoint,theDRPwasagovernment‐sponsored
endeavor.Yet,operatingasan“entrepreneurialbureaucrat,”Mehtahasdevotedthealmosta
decadebythistimetohisplantoredevelopDharavi.Allthiswhile,hehadtocontinuelobbying
tokeeptheprojectontheChiefMinister’sagenda.Inthesameperiod,hehadbeenlobbyingto
elicitinvestorinterest,makingpresentationsabouttheschemeatconstructionindustry
symposiathroughoutIndiaandinmeetingsabroad.Determinednottolettheprojectfall
betweenthecracksofadministrativeauthority,Mehtahascarvedoutspaceforhimselfandhis
projectinsideofthestate’sdevelopmentplanningbureaucracy.
TheLocalPoliticsofDevelopmentPlanning
Meanwhile,thecentralizedauthorityMehtahasassumedovertheDRPstandsin
conflictwitheffortsundertakenoverthepasttwodecadestodecentralizeprocessesof
developmentplanningthroughoutIndia.In1992,thecentralgovernmentadoptedthe
15DiscussiononAugust18,2006.
19
Thispaperisaworkingdraftandshouldnotbecitedordistributedwithouttheauthor’spermission.
Seventy‐fourthAmendmenttotheIndianConstitution,stipulatingthedevolutionofsubstantive
powersandresourcestomunicipalgovernments.Morespecifically,theAmendmentcharged
statelegislatureswiththedevolutionof:…powers and responsibilities upon the Municipalities with respect to
preparationofplans for economicdevelopmentand social justice,and for theimplementationofdevelopmentschemesasmayberequiredtoenablethemtofunctionasinstitutionsofself‐government.16
Althoughpredictionsweremadethaturbangovernancewouldbetransformed,localdemocracy
wouldbeinvigorated,andmunicipalrepresentativeswouldbeempowered,theAmendment
hashadlittleactualeffectontheplanningforprojectsliketheDRP.Thewordinginthe
amendmentwasweak,specifyingthatstatesshouldsimply“[put]onafirmerfootingthe
relationshipbetweentheStateGovernmentandtheUrbanLocalBodies,”aswellas
“recommendprinciplesfor”institutinggreaterrevenuesharing.Althoughsomereformswere
madebytheGovernmentofMaharashtra,mostobserversagreethattheSeventy‐fourth
Amendmenthasdonelittletoalterthedistributionofpowerbetweenthestateandmunicipal
levelsinMumbai.ThetimeIspentwithlocalpoliticiansdiscussingtheDRP’splanningprocess
confirmedtheseobservations.
IhadbeentryingforweekstosetupameetingwithSatishSheynde,theelectedMCGM
CouncilorforDharavi’s176thWard.IhadheardfromseveralpeoplethatSheyndehadpublicly
expressedhisoppositiontotheproject.ThisstoodincontrasttotheCouncilorsrepresenting
Dharavi’sotherfivemunicipalwardwhohadlargelyremainedsilentabouttheproject.Sowhen
Ifinallyreachedhimbyphoneandhetoldmetomeethimrightawayathiswardofficeinthe
industrialwarehousedistrictonDharavi’snortheastside,Irushedrightover.WhenSheynde
16GovernmentofIndia1992.
20
Thispaperisaworkingdraftandshouldnotbecitedordistributedwithouttheauthor’spermission.
arrivedaboutanhourlater,accompaniedbyanentourageofsixmen,heapologeticallyushered
meintooneoftheofficesandinstructedmetotakeaseat.Wesatinfacingchairsandhissix
companionssatonbenchesbehindus,quietlylisteningtotheconversation.Withoutmuch
prompting,SheyndebegantellingmehisconcernsabouttheDRP.Firstofall,heexplained,“the
publicisconfusedabouttheplan.MukeshMehtaisnotexplainingitveryclearly.”Hewentonto
explainthattheresidentsinhiswardwereprimarilybusinesspeople–industrialists,leather
workers,tailors–andthatmanyofthemcurrentlyhavemuchmorespacethanispromised
undertheplan.Headdedthatsomeresidentscurrentlyhaveasmuchastwoorthreethousand
squarefeet.Heestimatedthatthirtypercentofthehouseholdsinhiswardhavemorethanthe
promised225squarefeet;fivepercenthavelessthan225squarefeet;andsixty‐fivepercent
haveroughly225squarefeet.“Ifthirtypercentofmyconstituentsaregoingtobeharmedby
theplan,howcanIsupportit?”heaskedrhetorically.Heexplainedthatthosewhohavemore
spacearebusinesspeoplewhoneedtheadditionalspacetodotheirwork.Heexplainedthe
Mehta’splan“looksnice,withitsgardensandhospitals.Buthowwillthepeopleliveifthey
cannotdotheirbusinesses?”17
IaskedSheyndehowhelearnsofhisconstituents’concerns.Dotheymeetwithhimto
discussthesespaceissuesandtheirotherconcernsabouttheplan?Thendoesheinturnbring
thoseconcernstoofficialsintheSRA?Herepliedemphaticallythatyes,hisconstituentscometo
himtodiscussallofthesematters.Buthequicklyclarifiedthattheirconcernswillnotbe
addressedintheDRP’sdevelopmentplan.“MukeshMehtaandtheSRAwillnotchangethe
plan.Theyaremakingallthedecisionsthemselves.”HefurtherexplainedthatasaWard
Councilor,hehaslittlesayin“howthecitygetsrun.”ThecityisrunbyMaharashtra’sChief
17MeetingtookplaceonAugust4,2006.
21
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Minister,henoted,andlocalpoliticiansarenotveryinvolved.Heseemedresignedtothelittle
influencehehadintheDRPandovermunicipalaffairsmoregenerally.Butaswasapparentby
therespecthecommandedandtheentouragethataccompaniedhim,Sheyndewasan
importantfigureinDharaviandthereweremanydomainsoverwhichheclearlyhadinfluence.
SpeakinglaterwithMukeshMehtaabouttheparticipationofmunicipalpoliticiansinthe
DRP’splanningprocess,heconcurredwithSatishSheynde’sassessmentthattheyhavelittlesay.
Heexplainedthattheinfluenceoflocalpoliticiansoverdevelopmentplanningis“negligible.”18
“TheMCGMonlymatters,”henoted,“whenspeedmoney19isinvolved.Butspeedmoneyisn’t
importanthere.”Hequicklyclarifiedformethatpoliticiansandbureaucrats“donotoperateon
conviction,onlyonwhattheycanget.”ButbecausetheMunicipalCommissioner20isinsupport
oftheproject,therestoftheMCGMwilleventuallysupportit.“TheMunicipalCommissioner
willmakeeveryonefallinline,”heexplained.
Speakingmorespecificallyaboutthepoliticians,likeSatishSheynde,whorepresent
Dharavi’ssixMCGMCouncilorwards,heconcededthattheymatterbecausetheirconstituents
matter.Buthequicklyclarifiedthateventheydon’thaveasay.“Theyoperateonthekickand
licktheory.Youcanmanagethembymanagingthetoppartybosses.”Thismodeofparty
managementisparticularlyimportantinDharavi.IncontrasttomostotherareasinMumbai,
Dharavi’ssixwardCouncilors(atthetimeIwasconductingresearch)wereallmembersofthe
18DiscussiononNovember14,2006.19Speedmoneyreferstothepaymentofbribessometimesnecessarytogetpermitsapprovedorprojectsmovingalong.Whenbribesarenotpaid,projectscanbestalledand“speedmoney”getstheprojectmovingagain.
20TheMCGMoperatesona“weakmayorsystem.”Thismeansthatalthoughthereisanelectedmayor,hisroleislargelyceremonial.TheheadoftheMCGMisthemunicipalcommissioner,whoisappointedbythestate’sChiefMinister.Manymunicipalofficials,criticalofthestate’sinfluenceoverlocalaffairs,describetheMunicipalCommissioner’spowertobeanextensionofthestategovernment’s.
22
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CongressParty,thepartyinpoweratboththestateandnationallevels.21BecausetheShiv
SenapartyholdsamajorityofseatsintheMCGM,mostlocalwardsarerunbyShivSainiks,
whichcreatescertainconflictsbetweenthemunicipalityandthestategovernment,makingit
moredifficultforhigherlevelpartyofficialsto“manage”localrepresentatives.Butbecause
SatishSheyndeandDharavi’sotherfiveWardCouncilorswereCongressmembers,Mehtafeltit
wouldbeeasierto“manage”them.HeelaboratedthattheMemberoftheLegislativeAssembly
(MLA)22andtheMemberofParliament(MP)23–afatheranddaughterpairwhoarealso
membersoftheCongressParty–“willmakethemtoetheline.”
AlthoughDharavi’sMunicipalCouncilorslikeSatishSheyndeacceptthattheyhavelittle
sayoverthedraftingoftheproject’sdevelopmentplan,theycontinuetoexpressfrustration
aboutthesituation.InthatfirstmeetinginDharavi’smunicipalwarehousedistrict,Sheyndehad
describedsomeoftheparticularitiesaboutlandownershipandDharavi’ssocialstructurethat
hesuspectswillmakeDRP’simplementationmoredifficultandcausehardshipforthe
residents.24Henoted,inparticular,thedifficultiesresidentsfacewhenlivinginthetransit
camps.“ButMukeshMehtaandtheSRAdon’tknoworcareabouttheseproblems,”hesaid
angrily.“Theyhaven’tthoughtthroughtheseproblems.Theyaresittinginair‐conditioned
officesandaren’tthinkingabouthowitwillactuallywork.”Hesuggestedthathisknowledgeof
thelocalcontextshouldmakehimaresourceintheplanningprocess,implyingthatMehtaand
theSRAwillfacechallengesbecausetheyhaven’tvaluedtheparticularknowledgeandpotential
contributionsofSheyndeandtheotherCouncilors.
21Municipalelectionswereheldin2007andtwoofDharavi’sCongress‐heldseatswerelost,onetotheShivSenaandonetotheBahujanSamajParty(BSP).
22MLAisarepresentativeinthestate‐levellegislativebody.23MPisarepresentativeinthenationallevel‐legislativebodyorLokSabha.24DiscussiononAugust4,2006.
23
Thispaperisaworkingdraftandshouldnotbecitedordistributedwithouttheauthor’spermission.
ThisintimatelocalknowledgewasrevealedoneeveningasIsatinthewardofficeof
VishnuDamle,theelectedCouncilorofDharavi’s177thwardandlistenedtohimspeakwithhis
constituents.25Hisofficeisasmall,unornamentedroomadjacenttotheAmbedkarMunicipal
SchoolonthedirtpathcalledDharaviCrossRoad.DamlesatbehindhisdeskwhileIsatonthe
otherside,leavingroomforhisconstituentstositrightinfrontofhimwhentheycameinthe
office.Betweenmeetings,Damleturnedtomeanddiscussedhisopinionsabouttheproject.
Thefirstpersontocomeintotheofficewasasmall,thinwomanwhosewrinklesmade
herlookmucholderthanheryears.SheexplainedinMarathithatherhusbandhadlefther
withnomoneyandnofamilyhereinMumbai.Shewantedtoreturntohervillage,whereshe
hadfamilyandpeoplewhowouldhelpher,butshehadnomoneyevenforthetrainticket
home.Sheexplainedthatherchildrenwerehungryandhadnothingtoeat.AsDamlelistened
toherstory,heworealookofmildfrustrationratherthanoneofconcern.Asheaskedher
questionsaboutthesituation,itwasclearthathewastryingtofindholesinherstory.“Soyou
havenoonehereinMumbaiatall?”heaskedwithskepticism.No,shereplied,whichiswhyshe
wasaskinghimformoneyforthetrainticket.Afterafewmoreminutesofquestions,Damle
saidthathewouldbuysomefoodforherandherchildren,buthewouldnotgivehermoneyfor
theticket.ShethankedhimasshewasusheredoutbyDamle’sassistantandtakentoanearby
foodmarket.Whentheyleft,hetoldmethathedidn’tbelieveawordofherstorybutthatshe
wasclearlyinadifficultsituation.Iaskedifmanyofthepeoplewhocomeseehimaskfor
similarfavors.Heexplainedthat,yes,thisisthemajorityofhispoliticalwork.Hisassessment
seemedaccurateasIlistenedtohisconstituentscomeinanddescribesimilarhardshipsall
evening.
25DiscussiononSeptember11,2006.
24
Thispaperisaworkingdraftandshouldnotbecitedordistributedwithouttheauthor’spermission.
Giventheconditionsofhisconstituents,heexplained,thepromisesbeingmadeby
MehtaandtheotherpromotersoftheDRPdidnotmatchtheactualneedsinDharavi.He
describedthetroubleshisconstituentshavefacedbecauseoftheirquasi‐legalstatusandthe
government’sdisinterestinaddressingtheirbasicneeds.Heexplained:
Governmenthasopposedthepeopleandnotallowedthemtoconstructanicespace.Therearenomarkets inDharaviorcollegesorevenfootpaths.ButnowtheyaremakingafullplanforDharavi,abigplan.But itwouldbenice ifthey
justdidsmallthingstoimprovetheconditionshere.
“But,”Damlesighed,“thattypeofdevelopmentwouldnotmakethekindofmoneythatthisbig
projectwill.”HecommendedMehtaforgettingthegovernmenttoacceptthisredevelopment
planwhensomanyearlierschemesforDharavihadfailedtogenerategovernmentinterest.But,
heexplained,it’snotthetypeofthingthehisconstituentsneed.
WhileSheyndeandDamleexpressedtheiroppositiontotheDRPbecauseitdoesnot
adequatelyaddresstheneedsoftheirconstituents–inSheynde’scase,thelargerproperty
ownerswhooperatebusinessesfromtheirhomesor,inDamle’scase,thepoorerresidentswho
needbasicservicesmorethanhigh‐enddevelopments–mostofDharavi’sotherWard
Councilorsweregenerallymoresupportiveofthescheme.Severalofthemsawtheirroleonthe
projectasintermediariesbetweenDharavi’sresidentsandthestategovernment,helpingto
maketheresidentsfeelcomfortablewiththedevelopmentplan.Thisrolewasexplainedtome
bySubashKale,aMCGMadministratorassignedtotheDRP.SittingwithhimintheG‐north
administrativewardofficeaboutthreemilesfromDharavi,heexplainedthattheMCGMasa
wholehasaverysmallroleintheproject’splanningprocess.26Heexplainedthathisonlyrole
wastoworkwiththeSRAandhelpthemdeterminewhichresidentsareeligibletoparticipatein
26DiscussiononSeptember18,2006.
25
Thispaperisaworkingdraftandshouldnotbecitedordistributedwithouttheauthor’spermission.
theproject.HesaidthatneithertheMCGMadministratorsnorelectedCouncilorswillhavea
sayaboutwhattheprojectwillactuallylooklike.TheCouncilors’role,heexplained,isto
convincetheresidentsthattheprojectis“agoodthing.”“First,theCouncilorswillconvincethe
peopleandtheactivists.Andthentheactivistswillconvincethepeople.”Heexpressed
confidencethattheresidentswouldeventuallycometosupporttheplan.
UlkaKorde,theCouncilorofDharavi’s178thwardconcurredwithSubashKale’s
assessmentofherrole.Sheacknowledgedthatherprimaryroleontheprojectwasto“explain
ittothepeople.”Sheexplainedthattheprojectisagoodthingandwillimprovetheconditions
ofDharavi’sresidents.Itwasherjobtohelpherconstituentsunderstandthis.Shesuggested
thatitwouldnotbetoodifficulttodobecausetheprojectisperceivedasaCongressParty
projectand“thepeopletrusttheCongressParty.”SheexplainedthatthisgoesfortheMember
ofParliament(MP),theMemberoftheLegislativeAssembly(MLA),andtheWardCouncilors.
TheyknowthatCongresswilldoagoodjobforthepeople. Fromabout1985,this has been an all Congress area…The Shiv Sena and BJP are saying thatCongress wants to pull you out of Dharavi. But people have full trust in the
CongressParty.Sotherewillnotbeaproblem.Theywillnotbesuccessful.27
ShefeltitwouldberelativelyeasytohelpDharaviresidentsunderstandhowtheprojectwill
benefitthem.
Inspiteofthisperceivedroletoconvincetheconstituentsandexplainthefeaturesof
theproject,itstruckmeinmostofmyconversationswithwardCouncilorsthattheyknewvery
littleabouttheproject.AlloftheCouncilors,evenSheyndeandDamle,spokeinbroad
generalitiesabouttheprojectanddodgedmyquestionswhenIprobedformoredetailsabout
itsspecificfeatures.InoticedthismodeofavoidancewhenIwastalkingtoShivdasMane,
27DiscussiononSeptember8,2006.
26
Thispaperisaworkingdraftandshouldnotbecitedordistributedwithouttheauthor’spermission.
CouncilorforDharavi’s175thward.28Afterdodgingseveralofmyquestionsaboutwhich
Dharaviresidentswouldbeeligiblefortheprojectorhowmuchspacetheeligibleresidents
wouldreceive,Iaskedwherehegetshisinformationabouttheprojectandhowhelearnsabout
thefeaturesandrulesastheyevolve.AssoonasIaskedthequestion,hisassistantsittingnext
tohimjumpedinandsaid,“he’stheWardCouncilor,ofcourseheknowsabouttheproject.”
“Yes,buthowdoesheknowabouttheproject?”Iinsisted,turningbacktowardMane.
“DoyoumeetwithofficialsattheSRA?DoyoumeetwiththeChiefMinisterdirectly?Howdo
WardCouncilorsgetinformationabouttheproject?”
Aftermuchprodding,hefinallyexplainedthattheMLA,VarshaGaikward,toldhim
abouttherecentchangesanddevelopmentswiththeplan.Althoughitwasnotclearthatthey
wereoperatingonthekickandlicktheory,”asMukeshMehtahadsuggested,itdidappearthat
WardCouncilorsgottheirinformationfromhigherlevelelectedofficialsintheirparty.Yetwhen
IaskedthesamequestiontoanotherofDharavi’sWardCouncilors,SeemaJoshi,theCouncilor
forDharavi’s179thward,sheadmittedthatnoonesharesinformationabouttheprojectwith
her.Shestatedplainlythatthegovernmentdoesnotdiscusstheprojectwiththepoliticiansor
withthepublic.
Inspiteoftheirintimateknowledgeoftheirconstituents’conditions,Dharavi’selected
wardCouncilorshavenotbeenconsultedabouttheplansforDharavi’sredevelopment.While
manyCouncilorsseetheirprimaryroleasintermediariesorprojectadvocates,theygenerally
haveonlylimitedaccesstotheinformationthey’resupposedtobesharing.Thisinformation
hasremainedtightlycontrolledbyMehtaandhighrankingstategovernmentofficials,
disseminatedthroughthepoliticalsystemalongthefederalisthierarchy.Consequently,with
28DiscussiononAugust8,2006.
27
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theSeventy‐fourthAmendmentimplementedinonlyaverylimitedmanner,development
planningingeneralandtheDRPinparticular,appearstoremaininthepossessionofthestate
governmentandmorespecificallyintheofficeoftheProjectManagementConsultant.
ChallengingtheEntrepreneurialBureaucrat
DespitetheresignationexpressedbysomewardcouncilorsandDharavi‐basedactivists,
MukeshMehta’spositionandthecentralizedplanningprocesshecreateddidnotgo
uncontested.Between2008and2009,asmallbutinfluentialgroupofhousingadvocatesand
formerhigh‐rankingbureaucratsraisedconcernsaboutMehta’sroleontheproject.Petitioning
theChiefMinistertoremovehimfromhispostandspeakingcandidly–althoughmostly
anonymously–tonewspaperreportersabouttheirconcerns,manywithinMumbai’s
developmentcommunityopenlyresistedtheascendanceofDharavi’s“entrepreneurial
bureaucrat.”AlthoughtheChiefMinisterchosetomaintainhissupportforMehtaandhisplan,
thepublicchallengesraisedbythisgrouprevealedthepoliticalcontestationsentailedinthe
ongoingreconfigurationsofMumbai’sdevelopmentplanninginstitutions.
Bymid‐2007,itappearedthatMehta’sdecade‐longefforttoredevelopDharaviwould
finallyberealized.InJanuaryofthatyear,thestategovernmenthadfinalizedthenecessary
amendmentstoMumbai’sDevelopmentControlRules,thusputtingintoformalpolicythe
processandproceduresfortheDRP.Bytheearlyspring,theExpressionofInterest(EOI)
documentwasdrafted,outliningtheproject’sobjectives,financingarrangements,andthe
detailsoftheinternationalbiddingprocessthatwouldselectthefivedeveloperstocarryoutthe
work.OnJune1,2007,theEOIdocumentwasmadepublicwhennewspapersthroughoutthe
worldprintedahalf‐pagecoloradvertisementinviting“internationaldevelopstotransform
Dharavi,oneofthelargestslumpocketsintheworld,intoanintegratedtownshipofMumbai
28
Thispaperisaworkingdraftandshouldnotbecitedordistributedwithouttheauthor’spermission.
withallmodernamenitiesandcompleteinfrastructure”(SlumRehabilitationAuthority2007;
IndianExpress2007).AsdomesticandinternationaldeveloperspreparedEOIapplications,
Mumbai’shousingadvocatesmobilizedanoppositionandactivatedtheirtransnational
networks(Weinstein2009).InaletteremailedtofriendsandcolleaguesinIndiaandabroad,
SheelaPatel,DirectorofSPARC,aprominentMumbai‐basedNGOworkingonhousingand
livelihoodissues,articulatedthepositionofmanyoftheproject’scritics,writing:
Dharavi, we believe is symbolic of the struggle between local struggles
overcomebyglobalinvestmentinfrontofwhomourgovernmentsbowdowntodeliverprojectswhichareoftenatthecostoflocalconcerns.Weseriouslyfeelconcerned about the capacity of the present state institutions to arbitrate
betweentheinterestsofthecommunitiesofthepoorandinternationalcapitalandlocalandnationalrealestatebusinesses,whoareinfactthenewplannersofcities.29
InresponsetoPatel’semail,aletter–signedbyprominentactivistsandacademicsbothinand
outsideofIndia–wassenttoIndia’sPrimeMinisterrequestingthattheprojectbeplacedon
holdwhiletheinterestsofthelocalcommunitieswerebetteraddressed(Weinstein2009).The
projectmovedforward,asdozensofEOIapplicationswerereceivedthatsummer,butthe
oppositionremainedvocal.
Inadditiontoraisingconcernsabouttheinfluenceofglobalinvestorsandcertain
featuresoftheplan,theactivistsmadeadirectchallengetotheproject’splanningprocess
includingtheprominentpositionheldbyMukeshMehta.InAugust2008,adelegationof
Dharaviresidents,ledbyrightwingpoliticalleaderUddavThackeray,madethischargeina
meetingwiththestate’sChiefMinister.Meetingsomeofthedelegate’sdemands,theChief
MinisteragreedtoestablishacommitteecomprisedofDharaviresidentstohelpensureamore
openplanningprocess(TimesofIndia2008,DNA2008).Soonafterthemeeting,aten‐person
29PersonalemaildatedMay30,2007.
29
Thispaperisaworkingdraftandshouldnotbecitedordistributedwithouttheauthor’spermission.
committeewasestablished;butratherthanacommitteeofDharaviresidents,itwas
establishedasa“CommitteeofExperts,”madeupofprominenthousingactivistsandformer
bureaucrats,includingSheelaPatel,aswellasthestate’sformerChiefSecretaryandtheformer
ChiefPlanneroftheMetropolitanMumbaiRegionalDevelopmentAuthority.
WhiletherelationshipbetweenMehtaandtheCommitteeofExpertshadneverbeenan
easyone,theseconflictscametoaheadinJune2009whenthecommitteereportedlysenta
lettertotheChiefMinisterrequestingMehta’sresignation.Theletterwasnevermadepublic,
butmembersofthecommitteediscussedtheletteranditscontentsinaJune9articlepublished
intheTimesofIndia(Bharucha2009a).Accordingtothearticle,theletterexpressedconcerns
aboutthewaythatMehtahadbeenselectedasprojectconsultant,hisqualificationsforthe
position,andthecompensationhewouldbereceiving.
Thestandardprocedureofgoodgovernance requiresa transparentprocessofselection, which includes an invitation of expression of interest by agencies
which fulfill certain basic pre‐qualifications and experience, a rigorous processofscrutinyandobjectiveevaluation.Wewerehowever,shockedtofindthatnosuchprocedureshadbeenfollowedandthepresentconsultantswerearbitrarily
andhastilyappointedonacolossalfeetobepaidfromthepublicexchequer.30
NotingthatMehta’s“furthercontinuancewillbedetrimentaltotheinterestsoftheprojectand
thecity,”membersofthecommitteecitedinconsistentinformationprovidedintheEOIbidding
document,aswellasinmeetingswithbiddersastheirprimarymotivationforwritingtheletter
(Bharucha2009b).Thefollowingmonth,theCommitteeofExpertsraisedanewsetofconcerns
abouttheprojectinanopenlettertotheChiefMinister.Makingthisletterpublic,itnotesthat
“earlierletterstoGovernmentregardingourstrongreservationsabouttheDharavi
30QuotedinBharucha2009a.
30
Thispaperisaworkingdraftandshouldnotbecitedordistributedwithouttheauthor’spermission.
RedevelopmentProject(DRP)havenotbeenacknowledged.”31NotmentioningMehta,“the
presentconsultants,”orspecificconcernsabouttheproject’splanningprocess,theJulyletter
detailedthecommittee’sconcernsaboutthecurrentplanandidentifiedrevisionsthatwould
betteraddresstheresidents’needs.Apparentlyunmovedbythepublicnatureofthe
committee’saction,theChiefMinisterissuednoresponsetotheletter.
Relationsbetweenthegovernment,Mehta,andthecommitteeremainedstrainedover
thenextseveralmonths.InOctober2009,whenfinaldocumentationfromtheproject’sbidders
wastobesubmittedtothestategovernment,sevenofthefourteenremainingdevelopers
withdrewfromconsideration(Bharucha2009c,Mehta2009a).Althoughnoexplanationswere
publiclygiven,oneofthedevelopers,speakingtoaTimesofIndiareporterontheconditionof
anonymitysimplystatedthat“it’samessyaffairandwe’vedecidedtostayout”(Bharucha
2009c).ReportsbegantosurfaceofstrainedrelationsbetweenMehtaandtheCEOofthe
DharaviRedevelopmentAuthority(Mehta2009a),assomepoliticalleaderswerereportedly
lobbyingtheChiefMinistertodisbandtheCommitteeofExperts(Mehta2009b).TheMP
representingtheMumbaidistrictthatincludesDharavireportedlyraisedconcernstotheChief
MinisterthatthecommitteewasobstructingtheDRPplanningprocess.Heexplainedtoa
newspaperreporterthat“ifthecommitteeisfulfillingitsroleforwhichthememberswere
appointed,Ihavenoobjection.”Hecontinuedthat,“theprojectismeantforthepeople’s
benefitandthelocalresidentshavereposedtheirtrustinmebyelectingmefromthis
constituency”(Mehta2009b).Thesepublicfightsultimatelyservedtounderminetheproject
andbothMehta’sandthegovernment’scredibilityontheproject.
31PubliclettertoHonShriAshokChavanfromCommitteeofExperts,dated7July,2009.
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Discussion
CertainreconfigurationsassociatedwithIndia’seconomicliberalizationandeffortsto
positionMumbaiasaglobalcityhavealteredthenatureofstateinterventionintheareasin
urbandevelopmentandhousingconstruction.Throughoutthesecondhalfofthetwentieth
century,developmentschemewereperiodicallyproposedforslumsettlementsingeneraland
forDharaviinparticular,butmanyoftheseprojectswereeitherleftunimplementedorhadonly
limitedtransformativeeffectsonthephysicalandsocialconditionsofslums,dueinparttoa
lackofresourcesandauthorityatthelocallevel(Sharma2000,Shaw2004,Dossal2010).
AlthoughofficialswithintheIndianGovernmentintheearly1990sacknowledgedtheseissues
andadoptedtheSeventy‐FourthConstitutionalAmendmenttobegintoredressthem,therehas
beenonlylimitedcomplianceintheStateofMaharashtraandalocalpowervacuumhas
remainedinthedevelopmentplanningagenciesforMumbai.Despiteanewagendaforslum
redevelopmentemerginginthemid‐1990s,persistingpoliticalweaknesseshave,tocertain
extent,preventedinterestsfrombeingtranslatedintopolicyandprogrammaticinterventions.
AsthecaseofDharavi’splanningprocessreveals,however,MukeshMehtasteppedin
tothelocalpowervacuumandsimplyseizedtheauthorityneededtoplanaprojectofthisscale.
Givenhisdeterminationinspiteofalargelydisinterestedstategovernmentandvarious“turf”
battles,Mehtainsertedhimselfintothisprocess,actingasanentrepreneurialbureaucrat.His
roleintheDRPbroadlyresonateswithgovernanceshiftsidentifiedbySassen(2006),Shatkin
(2007),andothersofprivatesectoractorsassuminggreatercentralityinactivitiesthathad
previouslybeentheexclusiveorprimarypropertyofpublicactorsactingonbehalfofthestate.
Furthermore,inadditiontoanentrepreneurialbureaucratengagedinplanningfortheDRP,this
projectalsoentailsaprivatefundingmodelbasedontheleasingofpubliclandtoprivate
developers.Aninnovativeapproachtosharingthecostsofdevelopmentbetweenpublicand
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privateinstitutions,thesearrangementsarepossibleonlywherethestateeitherownsorhas
theauthoritytoseizelandandlandpricesareexpectedtoremainhighenoughfordevelopersto
recouptheirinitialinvestments.
Whilesomehavesuggestedthatarrangementssuchasthese,entailinganincreased
scopefortheprivatesector,reflectthewithdrawalofthestatefromdevelopmentplanning,the
historicalcomponentofmyresearchshowsthat,underthesearrangements,thestatemay
actuallybeassumingamoreactiveroleinurbandevelopmentthanithashadbefore.Yetby
forming“strategicpartnerships”withbetterresourcedactorsandinstitutions,suchasMehta
andtheprivateinvestorsanddeveloperswhowillprovideresourcesnecessarytocarryoutthe
project,MaharashtraandMumbaihave,toacertainextent,bolstereditscapacitytoundertake
developmentplanningactivities.Somescholarshaveassociatedtheincreasedauthorityofthe
privatesectorandNGOswithadeclineinstatepower–withsomeevensuggestingthatsuch
initiativesrepresent“politicsbeyondthestate”(Wapner1995,Evans1997).Althoughthis
associationofincreasedprivateinvolvementwithdecreasedpublicresponsibilitymaybe
relevantinsomecontexts,thisviewofstatewithdrawalpresumesthatthestateonceplayeda
centralroleindevelopmentactivities.HistoricalresearchonhousingschemesinDharaviand
Mumbai,however,donotsupportthisclaim(Dossal2010,Weinstein2008).AsMukeshMehta
hasbeengiventhechargeofdraftingtheDRP’scomprehensiveplan,overseeingthe
consultativeprocesswiththevariousstakeholders,andmanagingtheproject’simplementation,
somestateofficials,includingcertainindividualswithinthestate‐levelSRA,havealsoengaged
moredeeplyintheseactivities.
Thesefindsareconsistentwithrecognitionsmadebyexaminationsoftheongoingshifts
underwayinMumbai’sdevelopmentcontextandparticularlyinthepoliticsofslumhousing
construction.AnthropologistArjunAppadurai(2000,2001),forexample,hasidentifiedtherole
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ofnon‐stateandincreasinglynon‐localactorsinslumredevelopmenteffortsinMumbai,buthas
emphasizedthecontinuingroleofthelocalstateintheseactivities.Detailingtheactivitiesofan
allianceofthreeMumbai‐basedhousingadvocacyorganizations,Appaduraifindsthatthrough
theAlliance’sconnectionstoglobalnetworksofhousingadvocatesandpro‐poororganizations,
thelocalstatehasbeencompelledtocreateamoreopenanddemocraticprocessforre‐
housingslumdwellers.JanNijman(2008)hasalsoexaminedthemannerinwhichneoliberal
globalizationhasalteredthenatureofstateinterventioninhousingconstructioninMumbai,
concludingsimilarlythatthestatecontinuestoplayamuchlargerroleintheseactivitiesthan
mostanalysesofneoliberalurbandevelopmentwouldsuggest.Ratherthantakingpoweraway
fromthestate,thisresearch,aswellasthecasepresentedhere,revealsthatthelocalstatehas
undergoneaninternalreconfigurationinthewayitplansforandcarriesoutdevelopment
projects.ItfurthermoresupportstheclaimsmadebySassen(2006)andBrenner(2004)that,in
thecontextofeconomicglobalization,theinternaldynamicsofstatepowermaybereorganized
andnewinstitutionalconfigurationsmaybeproduced.
Conclusion
Thebasiccontentioninthispaperisthatongoingreconfigurationsinglobalizing
Mumbaihavebeguntoalterthenatureoflocalstatepowerandthecapacityofthestateto
promoteurbanrestructuringandglobally‐orientedurbandevelopments.Dueinparttothe
relativelydisempoweredinstitutionsoflocalgovernanceinurbanIndia,apowervacuumhas
existedinthefieldofurbandevelopmentanddevelopmentplanninginthecity.Yetavarietyof
politicalshifts–shapedinpartbyIndia’songoingeconomicliberalizationandeffortstoraise
Mumbai’spositioninglobalurbanhierarchies–havecreatedtheconditionsforan
“entrepreneurialbureaucrat”toinserthimselfintothepowervacuumand,withstatesupport,
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buildthebureaucraticinfrastructurenecessarytoplanandpromotealarge‐scaleurbanrenewal
effort.Incertainimportantways,thiscaserevealsthepartialprivatizationofurbanplanningand
municipaladministrationfunctions.Theseassertionsareconsistentwiththewidelycited
observationintheglobalcityliteraturethatidentifiestheincreasedparticipationofprivate
actorsandinstitutionsinurbangovernanceasoneofthefundamentalwaysthatneoliberal
globalizationhasledtothespatial,political,andeconomicreconfigurationsofurbanspace
(Mayer2001,BrennerandTheodore2005). Withaweakmunicipalgovernmentandcompetingprioritiesthatcontinuetodivertthe
state’sattentionandresourcesawayfromurbanaffairs,localpowerinMumbairemains
fragmented.Itiswithinthislocalpowervacuum,thatMukeshMehtahasbeenableto
consolidatethepowerandresourcesneededtocarryoutDharavi’sredevelopment.Takingona
projectthatfewstateofficialshavetheinterest,authority,andresourcestomanage,Mehtahas
beenintimatelyinvolvedineachstepoftheproject’splanningprocess.Andrecognizingthe
inertiaandprojectdelaysthatcanoftenresultfromadministrativeandpoliticalfragmentations,
hehasretainedatightgriponthispower,believingtheproject’ssuccessdependsonhistight
administrativecontrol.Politiciansandbureaucratscontinuetolackthepower,resources,and
administrativecapacityneededtocarryoutdevelopmentschemes.
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