FINAL REPORTOperational Peer Review 1 OPERATIONAL PEER REVIEWRESPONSE TO THE YEMEN CRISISRELEASE D ATE:26J ANUARY,2016 MISSIONDATES:28NOVEMBER –8DECEMBER 2015Summary.......................................... 1Key Course Correctors ..................... 3 Context............................................. 5Rationale for the Operational Peer Review.............................................. 5Findings and Recommendations ..... 6Leadership and Coordination........... 6 Delivering Assistance........................ 8 Accountability to Affected Populations…………………………………..12 Protection....................................... 12 Global Issues……………………………………………15 Next Steps...................................... 18 Annex I. Action Plan....................... 19 Annex II. Glossary of Terms ............ 27Annex III OPR Schedule. ................. 29Annex IV. List of Meetings and People Consulted ....................................... 30 SUMMARY 1.The Saudi-led coalition, consisting of ten countries 1 , began targeted air strikes on Houthi positions in Sana’a, Yemen on 26 March 2015. The coalition airstrikes escalated an already unstable situation into a fully- blown conflict. Humanitarian operations are being conducted in an active war zone wh ere bombs are being dropped daily. The levels o f insecurity under which the operation is being implemented cannot be overstated. The coalition also imposed an aerial and naval blockade as part of the military intervention, Operation Decisive Storm, which has radically limited the import of goods which are essential to the daily lives of all people in Yemen, and has exacerbated the suffering of affected people. 2.As a result of the coalition’s escalation of hostilities, the UN started evacuating staff from Yemen on the 28 March. The majority of international NGOs also left the country, leaving Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) as the only international humanitarian presence in the country. 3.UN agencies started to return to Yemen shortly after with a limited number of staff due to the security ce iling that was put in place. The initial ceiling allowed 17 UN staff into Yemen. This was increased incrementally to more than 105 slots (37 reserved for security staff) as of 14 October 2015, but fluctuates. During the OPR mission, the security ceiling was reduced to 80 slots due to insufficient security guard capacity in the Diplomatic Transit Facility, the residence of all UN staff in Sana’a.
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Strengthen delivery of assistance to the people in need.
Limited field presence and proximity to people affected by the crisis is impeding a
clear understanding of humanitarian needs and consequently hampering the
delivery of assistance in terms of scale, speed and appropriateness of response.
International humanitarian agencies and organisations need to expand their field
presence to ensure proximity to affected people in priority areas. This will result in
better information analysis, stronger evidence based assessments and direct
monitoring to accurately understand risks and needs and ensure adequate direct
support to those most in need.
A more effective security management system at the country level is required to
achieve better field presence (currently only one out of six field hubs is fullyoperational). Security decisions need to be made by the Senior Management Team
(SMT) in Sana’a, including the review of the “evacuation” status for locations
outside the capital, to support the long overdue request by operational agencies to
roll out their presence. In addition:
- The Chief Security Advisor (CSA) needs to lead the effort to roll out operations
to the field through support and advice to the DO and SMT and by participating
in missions outside Sana’a.
- Security Risk Assessments need to be carried out in support of operations.
UNDSS needs to adopt more of a robust, pro-active approach to support the roll
out of operations. The DO should make the most of Agency Field Security
Advisors (FSA) capacity to enable field presence.
Engage emphatically with actors that influence the humanitarian response to
create the space to deliver assistance.
Humanitarian partners need to engage more emphatically with all actors that
influence humanitarian operations in an effort to overcome impediments to
delivering assistance and engaging with affected people. Humanitarian partners
need to initiate a closer dialogue and raise awareness on humanitarian operations
as a trust building exercise with local authorities, community leaders, and other
parties to the conflict. This needs to be done strategically and with a common
approach between all actors to ensure consistency. The Humanitarian Country
Team (HCT) need to identify the most appropriate system based on the skills and
capacities in-country, to engage with these actors. A possible approach could be the
establishment of an access team that can include: OCHA (Civil-Military), the
Protection Cluster, and security actors (UNDSS and agency FSA). A similar model
functioned well in South Sudan.
Substantial and consistent engagement with interlocutors can trigger a positive
spiral of confidence building that will ensure substantial understanding of
humanitarian principals (neutral, impartial, independent) and the benefits it brings
to civilians caught in the middle of the conflict. Building trust with all interlocutors
will reduce risks and improve the security environment for humanitarian actors, it
will allow wider access to deliver assistance with minimal delays and open up the
space for direct monitoring of assistance and engagement with affected people.
Sustained engagement will also provide a basis from which to engage authorities on
the issue of bureaucratic impediments to reduce these.
20. The primary aim of an OPR is to review four areas of the response: (1) leadership and coordination, (2) delivery, (3)
protection (4) accountability to affected people (AAP), and to recommend adjustments to the response as appropriate
(course correctors). The Terms of Reference for the OPR, additionally, requested that the team consider the specific
situation of women and girls, and how the response accounts for this. The OPR also looked into best practices for
system-wide learning and issues requiring support and policy adjustment from the global level.
21. Prior to the mission, the OPR team held bilateral interviews with Emergency Director level representatives (or
identified alternates) of UN agencies and humanitarian NGOs, and arranged two group discussions in Geneva withprominent donors and the international NGO community.
22. The OPR team initiated the mission with a day in Amman, Jordan, to meet with humanitarian partners and support
functions that are not present in Yemen, due to security restrictions. This included OCHA’s support of fice,
international NGOs, the Information Management Working Group (IMWG), donors, and some cluster coordinators.
The team then proceeded to Sana’a to meet with humanitarian agencies, international NGOs, national NGOs, cluster
coordinators and cluster partners in a series of group meetings (self-assessments), bilateral meetings, and focus group
discussions. The team was restricted in its ability to travel outside Sana’a due to security restrictions, but engaged with
humanitarian partners in the Area Humanitarian Country Team (A/HCT) in the Hudaydah hub via skype. The team also
met with a limited number of representatives from affected communities at an IDP centre in the outskirts of Sana’a.
23. The team reviewed secondary data, collected qualitative feedback and perceptions through four self-assessment
exercises, and organized a retreat with the HCT in Sana’a to jointly review the findings and pinpoint potential areas for
improvement. The retreat formed the basis of the HCT action plan that will be implemented in the next three months.
24. The OPR team would like to thank all individuals that have contributed to the mission and report, and particularly
OCHA staff that provided exceptional organisational support for the team during the mission, despite the substantial
demands of the humanitarian operation. The OPR team would also like to praise the commitment, energy, and good
nature of almost everyone that supported, helped with, and participated in the mission.
25. The OPR team consisted of four core members representing UN agencies and NGOs. The team was made up of Panos
Moumtzis (OPR Team Leader), Kate Halff (Standing Committee for Humanitarian Response, SCHR), Zlatan Milišić
(World Food Programme, WFP), Roberto Mignone (UN High Commission for Refugees, UNHCR). Stuart Kefford (Senior
Transformative Agenda Implementation Team, STAIT) participated in the mission, providing organisational support.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
26. The following narrative section of the report is organised in four sections that relate to the Transformative Agenda and
the specifics of the Yemen crisis: (1) leadership and coordination; (2) delivery of assistance; (3) protection; and (4)
accountability to affected people (AAP).
LEADERSHIP AND COORDINATION
27. The split between the HC and DO functions created a disconnect between security analysis and the humanitarian
operation which disempowered the HC’s decision-making capacity, particularly related to security and programme
issues. This has significantly impeded the expansion of humanitarian operations to field locations and the delivery of
assistance to people that need it the most. The appointment and deployment of the tripled hatted RC/HC/DO(December 2015) brings these functions under one leader and should address the disconnect. It is disappointing,
though, that the appointment and arrival of the RC/HC/DO (ASG) has come more than five months after the
declaration of the L3 (and nearly nine months after the start of the conflict).
28. The new RC/HC/DO will be expected to orient security decisions to be better balanced between the need for
humanitarians to work safely, and the need to deliver assistance. Security decisions, to date, have been perceived as
risk averse by most agencies, even though such concerns have not systematically been brought up in SMT meetings,
which is a reflection of the SMT’s functionality . SMT members need to be more engaged and vocal at the SMT and
ensure that its function addresses the relationship between humanitarian delivery and security, rather than security
and safety as a stand-alone issue.
29. The multiplication of leadership functions for the international humanitarian response in Yemen has provided some
benefits to the response. However, the need for two ASG-level functions in the region (outside Yemen) and none
inside the country (until the appointment of the RC/HC/DO) to support a humanitarian operation is questionable and
has created more confusion than clarity in terms of achieving a coherent response under an established and
empowered leader in the affected-country. The lack of an identifiable unified structure has clouded accountability
lines and created confusion within the response, and for interlocutors that engage with the response.
30. Furthermore, the creation of multiple leadership functions in the region has created inconsistent communications and
messages from (and between) Sana’a, Riyadh and New York. There has also been ad hoc engagement by different
parts of the leadership with donors, authorities and parties to the conflict on issues related to humanitarian access,
operational priorities, the protection of civilians, and resource mobilisation. As a result, parties to the conflict havestarted to see the UN-led humanitarian response as disorganised, at best, and at worst subsumed by a political
agenda. It was not conclusive, and was not commented upon during the mission, as to whether the NGO community
was viewed in the same way. The different messages and confusion over leadership functions has not helped to build
trust with the various interlocutors that the humanitarian community have to engage with.
31. The leadership of the humanitarian response needs to be centred in Yemen and that needs to be clear for all
stakeholders, both in Yemen, and in the region. The appointment of the triple-hatted RC/HC/DO should go a long way
to providing the clarity and direction that is needed. However, a review of the roles of the Regional HC and the Special
Advisor is needed.
32. The potential to abolish the RHC and Special Advisor positions, as they currently stand, should be considered. The
opportunity to appoint a Senior Advisor or Liaison Officer to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia authorities, in place of the
ASG-level Special Advisor, should be considered. This position should report to the RC/HC/DO in Yemen.
33. The HC/RC/DO and the HCT should also consider a stand-alone Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator (DHC) based in
Sana’a, to support the HC function of the RC/HC/DO. The proposed DHC would have a particular focus on expanding
and supporting field operations. This would retain the crucial support functions that are needed to strengthen the
delivery of assistance, and create the space for the RC/HC/DO to be empowered as a leader for his roles, both inside
Yemen and in the region.
34. De-confliction procedures with the coalition in Riyadh are perceived as overtly cumbersome and unnecessarily
bureaucratic. The excessive information required to be ‘de-conflicted’ only adds an administrative burden onto
humanitarian actors with little or no security benefit. The necessity for humanitarians to provide photographs of the
front and back of each truck in a convoy, and a photograph of the driver of each truck was questioned when the
coalition’s military engagement is in the form of air strikes. These requirements are at the request of the KSA
authorities, and not the OCHA de-confliction team working in this area, and streamlining the process is not in the
hands of the OCHA or the Special Advisor. However, the possibility to streamline and simplify the process needs to be
considered and taken up with the KSA authorities. The importance of de-confliction for the safe delivery of assistance
and the safety of those delivering assistance should not be understated. But the mechanism needs to be simplified
and be less of an administrative burden.
35. There is a clear need for a consistent “whole-of-system” access strategy. There are several obstacles that are impeding
humanitarian access. The security situation is the main one, nevertheless, a lot more could be done to tackle other
issues such as the administrative and bureaucratic impediments and internal restrictions on movement of staff. The
RC/HC/DO and the HCT needs to develop a coherent access strategy to create and maximise opportunities to deliver
assistance in this challenging environment. Such a strategy would need to identify approaches and strategies to
engage with actors that can provide or influence access (parties to the conflict, local authorities, community, religious
and business leaders, etc.), finalise a plan to operationalise the hubs, and clarify criteria and processes for programmeprioritisation. It should also articulate roles and responsibilities of different actors, including the UNDSS) and agency
security advisors. Furthermore, this strategy will need to articulate how advocacy efforts can be harnessed from the
leadership of the IASC and other branches of the UN, including the office of the Secretary-General to encourage those
that control access, to open it up. This could include substantial advocacy efforts from the leadership of the IASC, the
UN Secretary-General and authoritative figures at the highest level. The strategy should be grounded in a regularly
reviewed analysis of risks, and its implementation should ensure that in-country leadership remains in the driving seat
and has final clearance on reviewing messages before they are issued.
36. There is also a need to improve dialogue between UN humanitarian and political actors to understand the activities of
each other, but more importantly to ensure a clear distinction between the political and humanitarian roles of the UN.
The humanitarian response needs to illustrate that it is grounded in the principles of impartiality and neutrality.
37. The strategic and operational levels of the humanitarian response are too de-linked, and neither fulfils its function tothe other. The HCT does not provide sufficient strategic direction to the Inter-Cluster Coordination Mechanism
(ICCM), and the ICCM does not engage sufficiently with the HCT to provide analysis on operational issues to support
strategic decision-making. The Head of OCHA in Yemen has committed to take on the leadership of the ICCM to ensure
there is: (a) a clear vision and that priorities exist within the group, (b) the strategic guidance from the HCT is
transferred into operations through the clusters, and (c) that the inter-cluster mechanism provides sufficient input to
the HCT to support its strategic decision-making function.
38. Furthermore, the ICCM needs to be more focused on operationalizing the strategic guidance provided by the HCT. At
the moment, the clusters are utilized as a mechanism for primarily responding to information requests from a varietyof sources. This is distracting them from their primary function of operationalising the response. The reporting
structures and processes for the clusters need to be clarified and better organised to reduce the amount of time
cluster coordinators spend ‘chasing information’ from frequent requests from senior leadership in different locations.
If this is managed, cluster coordinators will be able to spend more time coordinating their members and
understanding operational challenges which will help HCT strategising (through the ICCM).
39. The Yemen crisis is under-reported in relation to other humanitarian situations around the world. It is incredibly
difficult for journalists to gain access to Yemen, and consequently the conflict, and its human impact, receives limited
coverage in international and regional media. The security ceiling also means that humanitarian agencies are
compromised in who they can bring into the country, and programme officers are prioritised over communications
officers (understandably so in the context and respecting the need to deliver). The absence of journalists and the small
number of communications officers working with the agencies and NGOs means the humanitarian story of Yemen isunder-represented to the outside world. This is negatively impacting on fundraising efforts, and is exacerbating the
perception by parties to the conflict that UN-led humanitarian action is subsumed by a political agenda. The story
needs to be clearly and accurately communicated.
40. OCHA and other agencies should appoint a Senior Arabic-speaking Communications Officers with experience of
working in the region, to drive and lead a coordinated inter-agency communication strategy and implementation plan.
The plan should be grounded in the complementarities offered by different agencies and organisations, and should
capitalise on communications capacity at regional and headquarters level to compensate for the limited presence of
these people inside Yemen. The work should be aimed at raising awareness and raising the profile of the operation
both internationally and regionally, and highlighting the plight of Yemeni citizens. This could catalyse and support
advocacy efforts on the humanitarian operation, human rights issues, protection, and contribute to fundraising
efforts. The potential for communications products and messages to support advocacy should be exploited as well,
including the need to ensure communications work does not undermine advocacy. Again, the RC/HC/DO and the HCTneed to be in the driving seat on communications and advocacy.
41. The humanitarian community has not effectively prioritised its programming in Yemen. This is particularly apparent in
the draft Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) for 2016 which identifies 82 per cent of the population is in need of some
form of humanitarian assistance requiring a USD 2 billion dollar appeal2. It was clear throughout the OPR mission that
the emphasis of the statement is on some form of humanitarian assistance. There needs to be a more focused
approach on prioritisation in the response. The RC/HC/DO and the HCT need to understand the humanitarian needs
(assessment, information, listening to the affected people) and establish a prioritisation exercise that reflects the
capacities of agencies and NGOs to respond (including national NGOs) in relation to the needs of the people. The
clusters will need to provide strong justifications for plans and priority activities which address the strategic objectives
of the HRP. The Strategic Objectives of the HRP may also need to be adjusted to ensure they clearly reflect what is
needed and achievable in the response, rather than bland statements which are highly principled, but excessivelyaspirational.
DELIVERING ASSISTANCE
42. The conflict has had a brutal impact on the people of Yemen. Insecurity has dramatically hampered the ability of
humanitarian workers to access and deliver aid to people in need. It is a testament to the dedication and perseverance
of the humanitarian community that assistance is being delivered in all affected governorates (though not at the scale
required), despite strict security restrictions placed on UN agencies and NGOs that limits the number of international
2 NOTE: the original draft of the Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan (YHRP, 2016) requested USD 2 billion, of which USD 1 billion was for food assistance
alone. The newly arrived HC/RC/DO has indicated his concerns regarding this figure and would like to apply a higher level of prioritization to the originalplan to reflect implementation capacity and a more realistic financial ‘ask’.
staff working in the country, and significantly impedes their ability to travel outside Sana’a. At this point all UN
international staff are based in Sana’a with the exception of one sub-regional hub in Hudaydah. There are national
staff based in the other hub locations, but there was general agreement from interviews and assessments that
international staff are needed to take some of the risk burden away from national staff and national partners and help
strengthen assessments, delivery and monitoring.
43. The humanitarian response is compromised by the limited number of international staff working with UN agencies and
the 32 international NGOs operating in country, all of whom are working with reduced levels of staffing because of thesecurity situation, and international NGO concerns about evacuation procedures and capacity and restrictions on
visas, amongst other issues. Furthermore, agencies and NGOs have lost national staff members who have been
forcibly displaced themselves as a result of the conflict which has further compromised their ability to deliver.
However, these capacities are being rebuilt and there is an increasing ability for programmes to be implemented as a
result. It should be noted that few agencies and international NGOs stopped implementation during any part of the
crisis. National staff remained in the country and continued to operate in the absence (or reduced levels) of
international staff. The role of national staff should be recognized. Equally so, the role of national NGOs.
44. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF)3 have the largest presence
in Yemen of the international actors (outside the combined UN presence), and operate in multiple field locations. Both
organisations felt their ability to remain in the country and deliver assistance with relative safety, while other UN
agencies and NGOs evacuated, was a result of consistent advocacy to their partners (authorities, community leaderetc.) on their principled approach to humanitarian work, their visibility when delivering assistance in an impartial and
neutral manner, a higher appetite for risk4, and their independence in terms of logistics and evacuation capacity. The
impression that they are there for the people is clear, and this creates the space for the ICRC and MSF to remain in
Yemen and continue their work.
45. The limited presence of international staff from UN agencies and international NGOs i n locations outside Sana’a and
Hudaydah severely impedes the ability to deliver assistance. International NGOs need to continue to get international
staff back in country to expand their operations. This has happened substantially already, but the need for them to
return with full capacity was expressed several times, in a testament to their ability to deliver where needed. Many
international NGOs are facing restrictions over entry visas for their security officers and are concerned that evacuation
procedures are still not in place to ensure they can evacuate their international staff. Both of these issues restrict
their commitment to return fully and scale up their presence in Yemen. The HCT and SMT need to revisit and clarify
evacuation procedures to encourage international NGOs to return and provide a level of confidence that the UNsystem, with the support of UNHAS, will evacuate international NGO staff if needed. If these procedures are already in
place, as was communicated to the OPR team, then they need to be adequately communicated to all NGOs. This
should include providing details on eligibility requirements for evacuation, and confirming evacuation options,
including the availability of stand-by aircraft, or designated aircraft that can be provided from UN missions in the
region. This would go a long way in giving international NGOs the confidence to scale up their operations in Yemen.
The HC/RC/DO also needs to ensure that they are supported in advocating for visas for security officers.
46. The need to utilize the full capacity of national NGOs is also essential. UN agencies and international NGOs work
primarily with only six national NGOs from a total of forty-nine that are referenced in the HRP. Both the UN and
international NGOs need to review and expand partnerships with well reputed and experienced national NGOs in a
spirit of equal partnership and mutual learning. They also need to support national NGOs to satisfy the demands of
donors and their own requirements for partnership. The HCT should develop a curriculum or approach (training,mentoring, and partnerships) to build national NGOs capacities to operate effectively and based on humanitarian
principles. Such capacity building exercises have been initiated prior to the conflict and need to be built on. National
NGOs are of paramount importance to the humanitarian response, particularly in view of the access constrains that
exist in Yemen. They need to be supported, respected, and engaged as equal partners in the response.
47. The humanitarian response to Yemen is hampered by the limited footprint of humanitarian agencies and international
NGOs. The L3 benchmarks identified five humanitarian hubs (six including Sana’a) that needed to be operationalized
3 MSF is represented by four societies, MSF-Netherlands, MSF-France, MSF-Spain and MSF-Switzerland.
4 It should be noted that ICRC lost two staff members in September in an attack on one of their vehicles, and a further two were abducted in December.
One was subsequently released. MSF health facilities have been bombed and destroyed by coalition forces in September, December, 2015 and January,2016.
to allow the response to expand to areas outside of Sana’a: Aden, Mukalla, Hudaydah, Sa`ada and Taizz. However,
only the hubs in Sana’a and Hudaydah had been established with international staff presence at the time of the OPR
mission. It is acknowledged that efforts to re-establish the hubs in Aden, Hudaydah (now operational), Sa`ada and
Taizz have been made, and that some agencies have some national staff based in these locations. But the hubs have
not been set up and the capacity to deliver at scale is inadequate. The SMT needs to review the processes and
arrangements which have not permitted these hubs to be adequately operationalized. It needs to reconsider its
strategy to expand the response to areas outside of Sana’a . The need for a safe and secure environment needs to be
balanced with the need to deliver humanitarian assistance.
48. OCHA has provided plans for expanded field presence in the hubs which require approval from the SMT. However, the
current approach to Security Risk Management has not prioritized or enabled the expansion of humanitarian field
presence. It has inadequately supported the concept of ‘Stay and Deliver’. Many humanitarian actors referenced an
absence of a pro-active and hands-on approach to security risk assessments by UNDSS staff, and that there is a clear
need for DSS staff, including the Chief Security Advisor (CSA) to undertake missions to the field in order to better
advise the operation. Several actors felt compelled to report that the CSA had primarily focused his attention on
Sana’a and had never gone to Aden or other field locations (except one visit to Hudaydah). There is a need for UNDSS
to have a more client-oriented approach that supports humanitarian actors carry out their functions. The disconnect,
or misunderstanding, of the need for security advice to support humanitarian operations and not only ensure safety of
staff and assets is concerning.
49. The separation of the DO and HC functions has contributed to the disconnect between security advice to keep people
and assets safe, and security advice to support humanitarian delivery. Security decisions have regularly been deferred
to New York as opposed to making the decision at the field-level based on analysis from the ground. As already
mentioned, the combined RC/HC/DO function should overcome many of these issues. The SMT, as a body, also needs
to ensure security advice is provided in support of the humanitarian imperative. The responsibility does not rest with
one person alone.
50. The bottom line is that operationalizing the field hubs has been highly ineffective for several months and this is not
only due to insecurity. There has been insufficient detailed analysis to differentiate the security situation in different
parts of the country. The SMT has assessed the security level of the country as a whole, rather than assessing the
different level of risk in different areas of the country. This could at least have opened up access for a partial
expansion of operations. In addition, this has also impeded the lifting of the ‘evacuation status’ and ‘relocation status’
in less unstable areas. UNDSS needs to adapt its approach to security analysis to support the delivery of humanitarianassistance rather than putting staff safety and security above the needs of the people directly affected by the crisis.
The approach should not be reckless, but more balanced than it currently is.
51. UNDSS needs to immediately expedite Security Risk Assessments (SRAs) in priority locations to support SMT decisions
on the expansion of field presence (particularly operationalising the hubs), and to permit more extensive field travel.
UNDSS and UN agencies have to work together on establishing more streamlined processes for expediting field
mission requests, and ensure decisions for such missions are made at the field-level based on substantial security
analysis and programme criticality. There is significant potential for UNDSS to capitalize on the security capacities that
exist in UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP and IOM (ten senior Field Security Advisors). This will significantly help bring a stronger
humanitarian mind-set to security discussions and provide the balance between a safe and secure environment, and
an environment that facilitates humanitarian delivery. Finally, an approach to engage international NGOs in security
discussions needs to be developed, and security information needs to be shared with the international NGOcommunity. The SMT is comprised of UN agency heads only, and exceptionally an invitation was extended to one
NGO representative in Yemen. But this was not sufficient to ensure all NGOs were privy to security information and
decisions discussed at the SMT. It is unclear why security information that is relevant to all international humanitarian
actors is not systematically shared with them.
52. Sub-national coordination structures need to be revived with the operationalization of the hubs. The coordination
structures for the hubs need to be re-established and need to be delegated authority by the HC/HCT to be focused on
delivery, despite the unstable security situation. The HC needs to designate an Area Coordinator with clear reporting
lines and a delegation of authority that allows the decentralization of certain decisions to the field level. The expansion
of field presence needs to proceed as a matter of priority.
53. Limited access is not only a consequence of insecurity alone. The potential to expand the humanitarian community’s
presence to areas where it needs to work is also undermined by bureaucratic impediments to access: the denial ofclearances to work in certain locations by authorities and/or armed groups, the denial of visas for staff waiting to
enter the country, holding armoured vehicles at the port which are badly needed by humanitarian agencies. These
issues, and the internal constraints mentioned in the preceding paragraphs have severely curtailed the presence of the
UN in the field, and their visibility. Furthermore, international NGOs are increasingly facing bureaucratic delays and
blockages imposed by local authorities over project agreements and travel authorisations. The humanitarian response,
as a whole, has not been present where it matters and has not been sufficiently engaged with interlocutors and
parties to the conflict to articulate the impartial and neutral role of the humanitarian response, and its importance.
Consequently, the UN’s reputation has been damaged and its humanitarian purpose questioned. It is not always
considered impartial, and according to information from interviews and groups session, its help is not always
welcome.
54. The HC/HCT needs to develop a strategy on how to overcome such impediments and to win back the trust that is
being lost as a result of field absence. This should include reaching out to all interlocutors to sensitize them to the
principles of humanitarian action and illustrate clearly that the humanitarian response is neutral and impartial in
delivering assistance based on needs. This will not only raise awareness of humanitarian principles amongst
interlocutors but it will also build trust and confidence between individuals or groups that control access, and
humanitarian actors. The need to engage in dialogue with all actors cannot be overstated. We need to be engaging
with all actors that influence humanitarian access.
55. The Protection Cluster, with a grounding in international humanitarian law and human rights law, is well-positioned to
support activities as part of this trust building and access strategy (see also para. 73 - 75), and could be a critical playerin developing the strategy. There are also critical roles for OCHA (Civil-Military and Access), and UNDSS with agency
security staff for security analysis. A similar structure for engaging with interlocutors and establishing access and has
been rolled out in South Sudan previously with some success, when resourced.
56. But the HC/HCT should not be left alone to overcome access challenges. The potential for senior level support and a
strong lobby from the highest levels of the UN needs to be harnessed to help unlock bureaucratic (and security)
impediments to access. Consistent senior level support to the HC in Syria (and the HCs individual efforts) has resulted
in an increase in visas approvals in recent months, and a ceasefire agreement to allow assistance to be delivered in
three enclaves that were previously beyond the reach of the humanitarian community. This indicates the potential for
senior level advocacy to work in other contexts. Similar support needs to be provided to the leadership in Yemen.
However, it needs to be consistent, substantial and regular to help the HC/HCT overcome the bureaucratic and
security impediments to access that they face.
57. The Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) and cluster plans do not clearly illustrate a correlation between needs and
planned activities. Firstly, there is insufficient data to support a strong evidence base to build the response plan and
prioritise activities. In response to this, clusters and cluster partners need to clarify their assessment work. The clusters
have produced 79 assessments since the start of the conflict i.e. no lack of assessments, but it feels like there is a lack
of information and understanding of needs collectively. The links between needs, capacities, targets, and results are
not clear, and consequently difficult to assess and measure. There is a clear need to systematize assessments, better
coordinate processes for reporting, and improve information management as part of this process. The clusters and the
inter-cluster mechanism are central to this. It needs strong leadership at the cluster level, and experienced
information management staff to support the cluster coordinators. This leadership and information management
capacity has not been fully supported by all cluster lead agencies since the declaration of the L3, and is only starting to
take shape now. Agency headquarters need to support their country offices and their inter-agency obligations to the
clusters with the necessary and appropriate staff at the right time and with sustainability. This has largely nothappened in Yemen and the coordinated and collective response has suffered as a result.
58. There is also a significant gap in understanding activities funded outside the official HRP process which is undermining
the efficiency of the response. There is a need for the HCT to build a planning and reporting process into the HRP that
takes into account funding that is disbursed, and activities that are planned and implemented, outside the HRP and
the clusters. In the context of Yemen, the issue is particularly relevant for the Gulf States and charities that that have
contributed approximately USD 500 million to the response in 2015. There is a limited understanding of how this
money is spent and what activities it supports. The outputs of this funding are most likely contributing to humanitarian
goals and objectives, but this is not captured or measured effectively in relation to the HRP. The potential for OCHA’s
Financial Tracking System (FTS) to track such funding should be explored, and these donors and operational partners
should be encouraged to engage with the clusters. The clusters should also look at ways of adapting their modus
operandi to accommodate partners from other parts of the world that have not traditionally engaged with the
conventional humanitarian structures. At the moment, a significant part of the response is not coordinated.
59. Development agencies also have a role to play in Yemen, but they are currently struggling to reflect how best they can
contribute to humanitarian operations. These agencies have a considerable understanding of context and strong
networks of national actors that can be utilized in the humanitarian response. Humanitarian operations cannot (or
should not) work independently from the recovery and development agenda and the two are clearly interlinked.
There needs to be continuity between humanitarian response and the recovery effort and this needs to be planned.
This is not a new issue, and this is the essence of early recovery which has been an enduring discussion for many years
but still remains a debate. However, there is an increasing understanding that early recovery is a process which UNDP
(but not only) can provide leadership on, strategically in-country with direct support to the HC and to humanitarian
and strategic planning. The process needs to be seen less as a series of early recovery activities sitting under a cluster,
and more as an approach that sees the humanitarian response open the way for, and potentially contribute to, a
recovery agenda as and when the time is appropriate. This approach needs to be operationalized and recovery and
development actors need to clearly articulate their role and function in the Yemen context, and illustrate this function
to the HCT. The newly arrived RC/HC/DO has indicated a desire to resume meetings of the UNCT, which last met in
May 2015. This is an indication that the RC/HC/DO feels the space exists for recovery and development actors to carve
out a role that is complementary to the humanitarian response. Development actors need to illustrate their function
clearly in this situation and show how they can contribute to the collective response.
ACCOUNTABILITY TO AFFECTED PEOPLE (AAP)
60. The potential for humanitarian actors to reach out to communities and understand their needs is compromised by thelimited presence of humanitarians on the ground, and access to people affected by the crisis. However, the high
number of assessments (approximately 79 according to OCHA’s statistics, but probably more) indicates that it is
possible to engage with communities to seek their feedback, understand more clearly their needs, and communicate
clearly what can be expected in terms of assistance i.e. give account, take account, and be held to account.
61. However, the information collected from assessments is not considered of a sufficient quality for decision-making and
planning, and there is a general feeling that feedback from affected people is not adequately influencing cluster plans
and programmes, and is not supporting the operationalisation role of the ICCM and the strategic direction and
decision-making of the HCT.
62. As in other humanitarian crises, UN agencies and NGOs are engaging with the people that they are assisting, and
numerous systems have been established to collect feedback on programmes, assistance, and needs. This includes the
use of telephone call centres to register complaints from beneficiaries (UNHCR and WFP); the use of WhatsApp toregister issues of concern and raise issues that need to be addressed (Education Cluster); and focus group discussions
facilitated by national NGOs in areas beyond the reach of international actors. However, there is no common
mechanism that brings these various modalities together to provide an overall picture of the situation to support the
HCT, ICCM and clusters to provide strategic guidance and operational direction broadly, that reflects feedback from
the people that we, as humanitarians, are accountable to.
63. A strategy on Accountability to Affected People has been developed which identifies approaches to bring information
from numerous sources together in a way that would assist the HCT understand, from the perspective of affected
people, how the response can be adapted to ensure humanitarian programmes are appropriate to the context and the
needs. There is great excitement about this strategy amongst the majority of agencies, and rightly so. It is well-defined
and has been developed with significant contributions from the humanitarian community i.e. it has the ‘buy-in’ that is
necessary for it to become operational. However, there are also concerns about the implementation and roll out ofthe strategy following the departure of the OCHA SURGE staff that developed it.
64. OCHA needs to ensure that dedicated capacity is recruited, or is committed by another agency, to ensure the strategy
is implemented and rolled out. It is an excellent start to an issue which is often neglected in crisis situations. There is a
need to make sure that the initiative has enough fuel to keep it going to its destination.
PROTECTION
65. The Yemen crisis is characterized by indiscriminate killings; disappearances and torture; arbitrary detentions; sexual
and gender-based violence (SGBV); recruitment of children into armed groups; landmine incidents; aerial bombings
and attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure by all parties to the conflict. There has been massive internal
displacement and refugee outflows; there are severe restrictions on freedoms; and there is little access to basic
services. The benchmarks for Yemen specifically reference the importance of operationalizing the ‘centrality of
protection’ as a fundamental theme in the humanitarian response to ensure that it is given the attention it deserves
(benchmark 7.1).
66. Despite the importance of protection and its high profile on the humanitarian agenda, there is still an insufficient
common understanding of it in regard to the different dimensions that it entails, given the broad and expanding scope
of protection: mainstreaming protection; a protection cluster strategy and protection programming; the centrality of
protection and links to the Human Rights Up Front (RUF) initiative. Consequently, protection, in all its facets has not
been operationalised sufficiently, although progress has been made. The Protection Cluster and its sub-clusters (childprotection, SGBV) have been established, have capable coordinators, and work well together. An experienced Cluster
Coordinator (Protection) was key in facilitating progress on protection in several aspects of the work, but this initial
work needed to be continued with the deployment of a dedicated and full-time cluster coordinator. For example, a
Protection Strategy has been produced, as has a draft Rights Up Front Framework and Action Plan. The Protection
Cluster and Child Protection and SGBV sub-clusters have started to work with other clusters to ensure protection is
mainstreamed in all clusters across the response, and a Committee on Arbitrary Detentions has been promoted by a
member of the Protection Cluster. Also, a PROCAP Advisor is being deployed imminently (at the time of writing). But
more needs to be done to strengthen the collective understanding of protection, and there needs to be a stronger and
clearer link to the HCT to bring the centrality of protection to the senior level. This would also create the space for a
clearer articulation of issues to be taken up with the RUF initiative.
67. Despite progress on protection, there is still a need to identify why and how protection needs to, and can be,
operationalized in the response. There needs to be a clearer and stronger articulation of (1) the life-saving dimensionof protection, and (2) how a protection approach can support and improve the whole response. The protection
narrative has become a little lost amongst the various strategies on the different strands of protection that are
expected from the Protection Cluster, other clusters, and the HCT.
68. A report by Action on Armed Violence and OCHA registered that 2,355 civilians had been killed in the six months up to
mid-September. The death toll from bombings and other forms of violence continues to rise. 93 per cent of the total
killed was civilians. 32,200 casualties (injured) have been accepted into health facilities since the conflict started in
March, 2015 (as reported in October 2015). OHCHR has verified 8,875 reports of human rights violations since the
start of the crisis, an average of 43 violations every day (as reported in November 2015). Due to limited direct access
and difficulties in collecting data, it is likely that these figures do not reflect the reality, and the actual impact on the
population is probably higher. It is clear that there has been a substantial impact on human life but the protection
narrative focuses on strategies, advocacy and protection as a cross-cutting issue.
69. Despite the best efforts of the HC in the past months, protection has not gained sufficient traction with the HCT to
highlight and operationalize an approach on key protection concerns. The protection cluster, or the in-coming PROCAP
Advisor, needs to engage more substantially with the HC/HCT (or a smaller team of senior members) on drafting the
HCT Centrality of Protection Strategy and operationalising it, as well as assisting the HCT to capitalize on potential
support from, and links to, the RUF initiative. This will require the development of a strong advocacy approach based
on clear evidence.
70. Protection needs to be more focused on the human security dimension of the crisis and clearly identify ways toprotect people from the direct impact of the conflict. This includes raising the profile of the crisis, highlighting the
impact of the conflict in terms of people killed and injured, collecting data, compiling an analysis on violations of
human rights and of international humanitarian law, and advocating for action to be taken to mitigate the impact of
the conflict on people’s lives: stressing the life-saving dimension of protection. This is being done to a certain degree.
OHCHR continues to collect data, and UNDP has recently received funds to do a similar activity (and will coordinate
with the work of OHCHR) but it is not clear how this data will be utilized and what action is planned or being taken to
strengthen the protection of civilians. All of these issues and approaches will underpin the centrality of protection
strategy and its implementation, and establish the most pressing protection concerns on the agenda of the HCT.
71. In order to support advocacy, a key element of the centrality of protection strategy (and links to the RUF initiative),
protection actors need to strengthen data collection and analysis and agree to use a common system for harmonizing
data from different actors. Information exists, but it is not sufficiently consolidated. Protection actors have carried out58 rapid assessments, alone, but bringing this information together to paint a holistic picture is mitigated by the
absence of direct access, common indicators, joint analysis, and a common system for protection information
management. Several of these efforts were rapid assessments at the ‘big picture’ level and do not have the level of
granularity for a comprehensive analysis of needs and gaps to inform plans, programmes, and underpin a credible
advocacy approach. UNICEF’s Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism (MRM) on grave violations against children in
conflict situations is a leading example of information collection for advocacy purposes, and is working well in Yemen.
As mentioned, OHCHR is active in collecting information on human rights violations and is supported by other actors.
UNDP has been funded to implement a similar activity, and UNFPA have a GBV information management system that
collects evidence on rights violations against women, men, boys and adolescent girls. The combined efforts of these
systems, and others, would provide a strong evidence base for advocacy on protection and provide a platform for the
HCT and the highest levels of the UN system, through the RUF initiative, to hold parties to the conflict accountable for
violations carried out on their watch. The ActivityInfo information management system has been set up in Yemen and
could have the potential to operate as a collective platform for information management, and many agencies and
NGOs are inputting to this and using it. But it needs to extend its reach and encourage more operational actors to
participate and utilise it.
72. It is important that information is not derived from quantitative data only. It is equally important to collect qualitative
data to provide the context of protection and underpin the numbers with analysis and explanations of the situation
that needs to be addressed. For instance, in the case of IDPs, numbers alone do not paint the whole picture. Trends,
profiles, needs and reasons for displacement need to be explained and understood in order to convey the gravity of
the situation and to plan appropriate responses. A holistic and collective approach to information management is
required and the protection cluster needs to discuss how this can be done, together with the ICCM and the HCT. The
potential to reach out to the Information Management Working Group could be utilized to take this forward.
However, this group is currently based in Amman, and the evidence from interviews and discussions during the OPR
indicated that it is insufficiently engaged with the clusters to be of much value, and there is limited confidence thatthis group is sufficiently active or has the capacity to establish a common information system (with the exception of
one or two strong individuals).
73. The Protection Cluster could have a significant role to play in terms of access. The Protection Cluster is well-positioned
to reach out to interlocutors to raise awareness of humanitarian obligations and principles. This would help develop a
better understanding of humanitarian principles and humanitarian action (especially neutrality and impartiality), and
help to build trust with interlocutors that influence access to areas most affected by the conflict. The Protection
Cluster and its members should support the HCT to start a programme to engage more substantially with all
interlocutors to raise awareness on humanitarian principles and build trust with actors that influence access. This is a
strategy that is successfully implemented by the likes of ICRC and MSF (and other NGOs) to maintain access in areas
off-limits to other international actors. These organizations clearly demonstrate their value to communities affected
by the conflict, maintain a close working relationship with interlocutors that have the authority to allow humanitarian
operations to deliver assistance, and retain the ability to deliver assistance. This idea of building trust to support
access is highlighted in the course correctors, and is also covered in the ‘Delivery’ section of this report (see para. 55
also). It is replicated here to reference the key role of the Protection Cluster, and other actors ( such as OCHA’s Civil-
Military section, and security actors from DSS and the agencies) have in the development of strategies and activities to
support its implementation.
74. The Protection Cluster should take a step-by-step approach to this activity (trust building), and start engaging with
relevant actors in Sana’a and Hudaydah, where humanitarian actors have some level of consistent and predictable
presence, and then progress to other areas of the country. The Protection Cluster should engage a variety of actors
(local authorities, tribal leaders, parties to the conflict, if possible) in a dialogue and mutual learning exercise. Thiscould be done through a systematic and progressive roll out of workshops on the Guiding Principles on Internal
Displacement, and on humanitarian principles (independence, neutrality, impartiality) to counter the concern that the
UN is not viewed as neutral and impartial.
75. This approach, if done successfully in the initial stages, will catalyse a positive spiral as it will raise awareness of
humanitarian principles and build confidence between the humanitarian community and key stakeholders that have
influence on granting access. This increased level of trust will reduce some misperceptions of the international
community’s (mainly UN agencies) humanitarian work, and reduce the risk of operating in insecure areas, though it
will never nullify the risk. This will permit wider access for the humanitarian community to deliver assistance and
provide better protection for people affected by the crisis.
76. The Protection Cluster should also expand workshops to include national partners on humanitarian and protection
principles. This is particularly critical, given that many national NGOs are still the main deliverers of assistance and
services and need to be doing it in accordance with the principles of humanitarian work. This relates to a formal
capacity building approach for national NGOs referenced in para. 46, which should be driven by the HCT.
77. The Protection Cluster has initiated specialized trainings on protection mainstreaming to all its members, its sub-
clusters (child protection, SGBV), and to national NGOs. But the cluster needs to accelerate the planned roll out of
trainings to other clusters. The Protection Cluster also needs to ensure that protection is embedded in the functions of
the ICCM to support the mainstreaming approach in the operational response as a whole, and also to make the vital
link between the clusters and the HCT to ensure protection is high on the agenda at the decision-making and strategic
level of the humanitarian response. Currently, protection is rarely discussed at the ICCM and even less at the HCT
level. The commitment, during the OPR mission, of the OCHA Head of Office to chair the ICCM is expected to improve
the linkages between the HCT and the ICCM.
78. The Protection Cluster also needs to identify organisations in the response that are dealing in specialized areas to
ensure all people that are affected by the conflict are taken care of the extent possible. This should include
organisations covering the protection needs of the elderly, the disabled, and other marginalized groups. This is not
only important to support these marginalized groups, it would also illust rate the humanitarian community’s presence
in communities and indicate the humanitarian value of the work being undertaken as part of the response. This would
build trust and support the spiral of trust already mentioned (para. 73-75).
79. There was an almost complete absence of discussions during the OPR mission on the humanitarian community’s
obligations to the Protection against Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (PSEA) agenda. The fact that it was rarely
mentioned, is mentionable in itself. It was agreed, when it was brought up in discussion groups, that a stronger
commitment on PSEA from agencies, NGOs and the HCT, collectively, needs to be taken. The absence of allegations
against humanitarian workers abusing their position vis-a-vis affected people (or other people, for that matter) is
positive. However, this should not detract from agencies and NGOs taking a proactive approach to PSEA to make surethat the absence of reports against humanitarian staff in terms of sexual exploitation and abuse, continues. Further
action needs to be taken to ensure the positive record is maintained. The first step to this has already been taken by
the out-going HC who appointed a focal point for PSEA in each cluster, and requested a workshop on the issue to be
organised in early 2016.
GLOBAL ISSUES
80. The OPR identified several issues that have impacted the response in Yemen which are more relevant for the global
level to take action on, rather than resting with the HCT or other actors in Yemen. Some of these issues have been
mentioned already and are included in the main narrative of this report and in the course correctors, but they are
reiterated in this section for clarity. Several of these issues are relevant to all level-three (and non-level-three) crises,
not only the Yemen context.
81. Leadership arrangements should be reviewed immediately when a level-three is declared and action taken promptly
by the IASC Principals, and ultimately by the ERC. The Yemen crisis started in March 2015, and the L3 was declared on
1 July 2015. The triple-hatted RC/HC/DO was only identified and deployed to Yemen on 6 December. It is advisable
that more prompt action for such an important position be taken.
82. All humanitarian agencies need to review the capacities that exist in-country when a level-three is declared,
particularly their leadership arrangements. The L3 declaration did not trigger a change in leadership for any
operational UN agency or international NGO (members of the HCT) in Yemen despite commitments to deploy senior
and experienced leaders to a level-three crisis. The importance of strong leadership and experience of level-three
situations is not only relevant to the operational impact of the agencies, but also to the collective approach. The SMT
would have had the ability to exert more influence on security and programme decisions if seasoned humanitarian
professionals with previous level-three (or similar) experience participated in these meetings. The obligation to
strengthen leadership and commit the highest capacity human resources to level-three emergencies needs to be
taken into account by agencies and NGOs operating in level-three crises.
83. All humanitarian agencies need to review their SURGE processes. A key element of the Transformative Agenda is the
deployment of senior staff as part of the SURGE, during the early stages of the level-three activation. SURGE was also
referenced as a key benchmark for the Yemen response. Significant concerns were raised, however, that SURGE staff
sent in support of leadership and coordination functions were often too junior and inexperienced in complex
emergencies, and were deployed for an insufficient period of time to be of any real value (two or three weeks only, on
occasions). The turnover of SURGE staff has been excessive in the Yemen crisis and the utility of short-term
deployments undermined the consistency, continuity and predictability of the response. The short-termism of such
deployments is damaging to the reputation of the collective humanitarian response, and more importantly,
undermines the capacity to respond effectively to the crisis and serve people that are suffering. Agencies, at
headquarters level, should review their approach to SURGE and support coordination and programme functions with
SURGE deployments of no less than two months initially, with replacements recruited on fixed term contracts or other
contractual modalities for a duration of no less than six months. Senior staff should be recruited at the P4/P5 level for
these important positions. This is relevant to all crisis situations, not only Yemen.
84. Cluster coordinators are insufficiently supported by the global clusters. The global clusters have developed manyproducts that can be beneficial to cluster coordinators in-country, which are under-utilized. As an example, cluster
coordinators in Yemen struggled to develop common indicators for their partners to work with, and few coordinators
were aware of the indicator registry that has been developed by all global clusters and is available on
humanitarianresponse.info. This is just one example of how the global clusters can help support their in-country
coordinators. There is also a tendency for headquarters functions to overload cluster coordinators with excessive
demands which strains the relationship with cluster partners. There appears to be a limited awareness that every
request that is put to a cluster coordinator means the coordinator needs to request information from its partners.
These partners have programmes to run and other tasks to fulfil for their own agency or organisation, and this needs
to be respected. Cluster Lead Agencies (CLAs) and senior leadership need to better understand that the effectiveness
of clusters relies on strong partnerships with the members, and requests for information need to be planned, clear
and concise to retain these partnerships and not abuse the good will of cluster members. Demands for information
need to be given with realistic deadlines and the type of information required needs to be agreed and predictable socoordinators can plan for anticipated requests. CLAs, OCHA headquarters, and senior humanitarian leaders (HCT,
ICCM, and global actors) need to give cluster coordinators the space to coordinate rather than be used as information
gatherers only. The information requests may be communicated through the HC, the Head of OCHA, agency heads or
someone else. But each request usually gets loaded onto the cluster coordinator.
85. There is a need for a fundamental reform of safety and security processes and capacities in humanitarian operations.
The current culture reflects a risk averse approach which undermines the ability to deliver assistance. The IASC
Principals need to be more involved in supporting UNDSS recruit and deploy security staff with a profile more relevant
for humanitarian operations. UN agency security staff consistently demonstrate a better understanding of the balance
between safety and security with the need to deliver assistance. UNDSS needs to adapt its approach to reflect the
need to assist agencies and NGOs to ‘stay and deliver’, and support humanitarian operations in a safe and secure
environment, rather than stress safety and security to the detriment of the operation. UNDSS need to consider the
importance of training its security officers in international humanitarian law, humanitarian principles, and the conceptof stay and deliver. The potential for developing stronger relationships between UNDSS and UN agency security
officers will help to orient security processes towards a more appropriate balance between safety and security and the
need to deliver assistance.
86. Protection is consistently identified as an issue which needs strengthening in all humanitarian crises. It is often
inadequately articulated and consequently misunderstood by many actors. The Global Protection Cluster should adopt
a position where it deploys, without question, a senior expert immediately after the declaration of the level-three to
ensure that the HCT and inter-cluster mechanism are clear on their role in regard to protection (centrality of
protection, Rights up Front, protection mainstreaming, protection programming, advocacy and data and informationcollection). The deployment of the PROCAP Advisor (pending at the time of the OPR mission) had not happened nine
months after the start of the conflict, and almost six months after the L3 declaration i.e. slower than the selection and
deployment of the RC/HC/DO.
87. The linkages between the ICCM and the HCT are inadequate in Yemen. The same situation has been evident from
other OPR (and STAIT) missions. The inter-cluster mechanism needs to have a better capacity to operationalize the
response and link its work to the strategic level that is provided by the HCT. HCs and inter-cluster coordinators (Heads
of OCHA) need to be fully aware of the importance of the functions and how they inter-relate. There is an argument to
create a roster of dedicated inter-cluster coordinators that are highly experienced and have previously operated in
senior positions in level-three or level-three-like operations. There is a need, as has been mentioned in para. 37 and
38, to manage the demands that are increasingly being placed on cluster coordinators (and by extension, the ICCM)
which is detracting them from the coordination function. The operationalization of the humanitarian response, andthe linkages between the HCT and the ICCM will remain weak if cluster coordinators are not given the space to
coordinate their clusters and contribute clear operational challenges to the ICCM for consideration by the HCT. There
is a tendency at the moment to utilize cluster coordinators as an extension of an information management function.
88. The self-assessment methodology of the OPR mission clearly reflected areas for the HCT (and broader humanitarian
community) to improve the response. The HCT members felt that the suggestions would have been useful even earlier
in the mission in steering the response in the right direction from day one (after the L3 declaration). This led to an ad
hoc recommendation from the HCT that a light inter-agency team should be deployed at the onset of an level-three
emergency to provide immediate support to the HC and the Head of OCHA to help identify specific issues that are
predictable in a mega-crisis and need to be addressed, and to set up appropriate systems and processes to ‘set the
direction’ for the first months of the response. The Yemen HCT voiced appreciation for the OPR mission and suggested
the direction provided during the OPR would have also been relevant at the start of the L3.
89. There is an understanding that approximately 50 per cent5 of the humanitarian response to Yemen (financial
contributions and programmes) is not programmed through traditional humanitarian tools such as the HRP and
OCHA’s Financial Tracking Service (FTS). This means a substantial contribution to the response is not tracked and
therefore not well coordinated, thereby affecting the efficiency and effectiveness of the response. There is a need to
better understand the financial and programmatic contributions of donors and organisations operating outside the
HRP. The IASC Principals, led by the ERC, need to engage with traditional and non-traditional donors and operational
partners to encourage them to participate in existing systems, or alternatively revisit the existing systems (FTS, OPS) to
understand how they can be adjusted to accommodate contributions and programmes that currently fall outside the
HRP. A similar recommendation was suggested in the OPR for the Whole of Syria Response, to disaggregate donor
contributions between the three main hubs in that response.
90. Development agencies have a significant role to play in an emergency context but have difficulty articulating what this
role can be i.e. how best they can contribute to the humanitarian response. These agencies have a considerable
understanding of context and strong networks of national actors that can be utilized in the humanitarian response.
There is also a recognition that humanitarian operations cannot work independently from a recovery and
development agenda. There needs to be continuity between humanitarian response and the recovery effort. This is
not a new concept, and is the essence of early recovery. UNDP and its Global Cluster on Early Recovery need to clearly
articulate how recovery and development actors can contribute to a better humanitarian response that links to
recovery and development and illustrate how this can be achieved. This could include holding discussions with donors
on the need for more flexible arrangements for humanitarian and development funding, in addition to deploying early
5 NOTE: other estimates suggested 30 per cent. However, it is clear that accurate information is not available. The point is that a significant part of the
humanitarian funding and response happens outside the official humanitarian system.