Top Banner
Document of The WorldBank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. 75.'2 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT BURUNDI THIRD HIGHWAY PROJECT (CREDIT 1132-BU) DECEMBER 30, 1988 Infrastructure Operations Division South-Central and IndianOcean Department Africa Region This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their ofricial duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized
34

World Bank Documentdocuments.worldbank.org/curated/en/652821468015294400/pdf/multi... · SCEOM Bureau Central d'Etudes pour lee Eouipements d'Outre Mor OGR Direczion 6e6nraie des

Sep 16, 2018

Download

Documents

LeTuyen
Welcome message from author
This document is posted to help you gain knowledge. Please leave a comment to let me know what you think about it! Share it to your friends and learn new things together.
Transcript
Page 1: World Bank Documentdocuments.worldbank.org/curated/en/652821468015294400/pdf/multi... · SCEOM Bureau Central d'Etudes pour lee Eouipements d'Outre Mor OGR Direczion 6e6nraie des

Document of

The World Bank

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Report No. 75.'2

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

BURUNDI

THIRD HIGHWAY PROJECT(CREDIT 1132-BU)

DECEMBER 30, 1988

Infrastructure Operations DivisionSouth-Central and Indian Ocean DepartmentAfrica Region

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance oftheir ofricial duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Pub

lic D

iscl

osur

e A

utho

rized

Page 2: World Bank Documentdocuments.worldbank.org/curated/en/652821468015294400/pdf/multi... · SCEOM Bureau Central d'Etudes pour lee Eouipements d'Outre Mor OGR Direczion 6e6nraie des

4BBREVIATTONS AND ACRONYMS

-DT Average Daily Traffic

MfOB African Oeveiopment Bank

'iGCO Administration 6enoraie de la Cooperation au O6veloppemen% (Belgium)

SCEOM Bureau Central d'Etudes pour lee Eouipements d'Outre Mor

OGR Direczion 6e6nraie des Routes (Highway Oepartment)

EOF European Development Fund

ER Economic Return

FRG Federal Republic of Germany

INTRACO International Transport Company

MTP Ministere des Travaux Publics, do i'Equipoment et du Logemont

MTPT Minist*re des Transports, Poste. et T6licommunicationa (Ministryof Transport and Communications)

OECF Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (Japan)

PPF Project Preparation Facility

RIG Route d'Interet 6eneroi (Secondary Road)

RN Route Nationale (Primary Road)

RP Route Provinciale (Tertiary Road)

UNCOP Unitted Nations Capital Development' Program

UNOP United Nations Development Program

USAID United States Agency for International Development

voc vehicle operating costs

vpd vehicles per day

Page 3: World Bank Documentdocuments.worldbank.org/curated/en/652821468015294400/pdf/multi... · SCEOM Bureau Central d'Etudes pour lee Eouipements d'Outre Mor OGR Direczion 6e6nraie des

FOR OMCAL USE ONLYTHE WORLD BANK

Washington. D.C. 20433U.S.A.

Office of Ouectu.e,r4alOpe.tms Efvaliwi

December 30, 1988

iNMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on Burundi Third HighwayProject (Credit 1132-BU)

Attached, for information is a copy of a repoit entitled"Project Completion Report on Burundi Third Highway Project(Credit 1132-BU)" prepared by the Africa Regional Office. Furtherevaluation of this project by the Operations Evaluation Departmenthas not been made.

Attachiment

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the peffonnanc |of their officiW dutiesL Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without Wofld Bank authonotion.|

Page 4: World Bank Documentdocuments.worldbank.org/curated/en/652821468015294400/pdf/multi... · SCEOM Bureau Central d'Etudes pour lee Eouipements d'Outre Mor OGR Direczion 6e6nraie des

FOR OFFCIAL USE ONLY

BURUNDIPROJECT COMPLETION REPORTTHIRD HIGHWAY PROJECT

CREDIT 1132-BU

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Pace No7.

PIWFACS1 . ..... . o- .. . , .... BASIC DATA EE ee*¢¢@v*@vvo*esvo***oc¢ i

PREF RC OUCTION ..... z........ o..........................*................ 1

.. INTRODUCTION.1

II. PROJECT IDENTIFICATION, PREPARATION AND APPRAISAL ..... 4

III. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ANO COSTS . ................ 8

IV. INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT. ....................... 16

V. ECONOMIC RE-EVALUATION ........ .. ........ ............ . 17

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............

!TALES1. PROJECT COMPOSITIONS AND COST ESTIMATES DURING PROJEC'.-PREPARATION

2. PROJECT COMPOSITION AND COST ESTIMATE AT APPRAISAL

3. APPRAISAL COSTS AND ACTUAL COSTS

4. RECORD OF ACTUAL DISBURSEMENTS

S. TOTAL DISBURSEMENTS bY CATEGORY

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by rezipients only in the performanceof their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Dank authorization.

Page 5: World Bank Documentdocuments.worldbank.org/curated/en/652821468015294400/pdf/multi... · SCEOM Bureau Central d'Etudes pour lee Eouipements d'Outre Mor OGR Direczion 6e6nraie des

(i)

BURUNDI-4OJEC - 6MPLETI1N FEPOPTrHIRD .iGHWAY FOOJECT

CREPIT 1132-;3!

PREFACE.

Credit 1132-BU (SOR 20.5 mtilion _J/ ) was signed on December 17, 1981and became effective on March 17, 1980. The actual closing date was June 14,1985, six months later than estimated at appraisal. The Credit was fullydisbursed.

This Project Completion Report (PCR) was prepared by the

Infrastructure Operations Division, South-Central and Indian Ocean Department,Africa Region on the basis of the appraisal report, project files, supervisionmission reports, and the completion report by the Oirectorate 6eneral of Roads(Direction 66n6rale des Routes - D6R) of the Ministry of Public Works (Ministoredes Travaux Publics - MTP).

The project was co-financed by the Government of Burundi (USS5.2million equivalent including taxes Z ', Japan (US$2 million equivalent), UnitedNations Capital Development Fund (US81.6 million equivalent), Belgium(US$300,000 equivalent) and France (US$400,000 equivalent). The total externalfinancing covered 1001 of the project foreign cost and about 491 of the projectlocal cost net of taxes. The remaining 511 of the local cost net of taxes wasfinanced by the Government, which also met the road-maintenance recurrent costsamounting to about USS9.2 million for the three and a half years of the projectimplementation, or about US$2.6 million equivalent per year.

In accordance with the revised procedures Zor project performancereporting, this PCR was read by the Operations Evaluation Department (OED) butthe project waS not audited by ORD staff. The draft PCR vas sent to theBorrower on November 9, 1988. No comments were received.

j US$25 million at appraisal. Because of currencies realignments, totaldiaburseoments of SOR 20.5 million were actually equivalent to about US$21.4million.

2/ US$2.1 million equivalent excluding taxes

Page 6: World Bank Documentdocuments.worldbank.org/curated/en/652821468015294400/pdf/multi... · SCEOM Bureau Central d'Etudes pour lee Eouipements d'Outre Mor OGR Direczion 6e6nraie des

(ii)

SURUNQ t--0JEC 0 OMPLCTION FrZOFT

1iIFO H!SiHUAV iQOE;,TCREDIT * !Z;-S'KEY PQOJELT OATA

Appraisal Actual oritem Expe2tation Current Estimate

Total Project Cost (US3 million) 32.10 27.80 ILSavings 13.4S

Creait Amount (SOR miilion ) 2o.s5 20.50 Z4Disbursed (6/30/84) 20.50 14.83Disbursed (6/30/85) 20.50Cancelled - -

Date Physical Components Completed 6/30/84 12/31/84Proportion Completed by:Appraisal Comaletion Oate (Z) - 75Actual Compietior. Oate iX) 100Economic Rate of Return L1 18.5

OTHER PROJECT OATA

Originalltn APlan . Aetul

First Mention in Files or Timetable - August 78Government' s Application - _Negotiations 03/13/81 03/19/81Board Approval Date 04/21/81 04/21/81Credit Agreement Date 02/15/81 12/17/81Effectiveness Date 02/25/81 07/17/82Closing Date 12/31/84 06/14/85

Borrower Republic of BurundiMinistere des Travaux Publics,de 1 Equipement et duLogement (MTP)

Executing Agencies: Olrection 6enerale des Routes(06R) of MTP andMlnisthre des Transports, PosteoT6l6cormunications (MTPT)

Fiscal Year of Borrower January 1 - December 31Follow-on Project Name Fourth Highway ProjectCredit Number 1583-BUAmount (SOR million) 18.9Credit Agreement Date 06/14/85

L. Excluding taxesL In US$ million equivalent: 25.00 and 21.4

Page 7: World Bank Documentdocuments.worldbank.org/curated/en/652821468015294400/pdf/multi... · SCEOM Bureau Central d'Etudes pour lee Eouipements d'Outre Mor OGR Direczion 6e6nraie des

( i i i )

MISSION DATA

M1ontni Persons Staff ReportMissions Year Wee*a $ Weeks Date

Preparation 0L 09/78 N.A. 1 N.A. 11/09/78Preparation I/ 02/79 N.A. I N.A. 04/06/79Preparation UL 06/79 N.A. 1 N.A. 08/07/79Preparation 1L 10/79 N.A. I N.A. N.A.Preparation 01/80 1.0 1 1.0 04/01/80Preparation Il 02/80 1.4 1 1.4 05/23/80Appraisal 06/80 2.7 2 5.4 04/01/81

Total Seven missions totalling (N.A.) ataff weeks over 21 ronths.

Supervision 04/82 1.4 2 2.1 07/13/82Supervision 09/82 0.8 1 0.8 11/15/82Supervision 04/83 0.7 1 0.7 06/17/83Supervision 11/83 1.4 1 1.4 12/19/83Supervision 05/84 1.4 1 1.4 05/24/84Supervision ZL 10/84 0.6 1 0.6 12/03/84Supervision 12/84 1.0 1 1.0 04/10/85Supervision 09/85 1.3 2 1.9 02/18/86Supervision ZL 03/86 0.3 1 3.3 i2!31/86Supervision ZL 10/86 0.1 1 0.1 12/31*85

Total Ten missions totalling 10.3 staff weeks over 54 months.

IL In conjunction with supervision of HiQhway Maintenance and Second HighwayProjects.

ZL Accounting and auditing.

Page 8: World Bank Documentdocuments.worldbank.org/curated/en/652821468015294400/pdf/multi... · SCEOM Bureau Central d'Etudes pour lee Eouipements d'Outre Mor OGR Direczion 6e6nraie des

(ivi

EXCHANGE RATES

S-DR ano USS

At the signing of the Credit Agreement 12/1981 SOR 1 US5i.22Year average 1982 1.08

1983 1.071984 1.03

Corpletion and final disbursement yearaverage (first two quarters) 1985 0.97

Average for project implrmentation period (81-85) 1.04S

US$ and FBu

Appraisal year average 1980 USSI - FBu 90.0Year average 1981 90.0

1982 90.01983 93.01984 119.0

Completion and final disbursement yearaverage (first two quarters) I985 126.0

Average for project implementation period (81-B5) 104.S

Page 9: World Bank Documentdocuments.worldbank.org/curated/en/652821468015294400/pdf/multi... · SCEOM Bureau Central d'Etudes pour lee Eouipements d'Outre Mor OGR Direczion 6e6nraie des

(v)

BURUNDIPROJECT COMPLETION REPORTTHIRD HI6HWAY PROJECT

CREDIT 1132-9U

HIGHLIGITS

1. This project was the third financed by IDA in the transport sector.It was designed to assist the 6overnment in improving (i) the road ne'.work tofacilitate dacentralization and to support development efforts in thenortheastern part of the country and (ii) an alternative land connection to theport of Dar es Salaam. The project was a logical continuation of the effortsstarted under the Highway Maintenance Project and the Second Highway Project.

2. Project preparation was difficult and long, because of increasingcosts of road construction in Surundi. Project preparation began in August1978, and IDA approved the project in April 1981. The credit, however, couldnot be signed until Decembar, because of lack of IDA's funds. There were nomajor problems durin¢ projec. implementation; the project w&s completed inDecember 1984, eix months later than estimated at appraisal, because of thedelay in sikning the credit.

3. Project total cost, including taxes, was FBu 3,147 million (US$30.9million equivalent), compared to a total project cost, including taxes andcontingencies of FBu 3,150 million (US$35.0 million equivalent) estimated atappraisal. The re-calculated overall rate of economic return was 18.51, ascompared to 191 estimated at appraisal.

4. All contractors, local and foreign, including DOR's two brigades, andall consultants carried out their works well and on schedule.

Page 10: World Bank Documentdocuments.worldbank.org/curated/en/652821468015294400/pdf/multi... · SCEOM Bureau Central d'Etudes pour lee Eouipements d'Outre Mor OGR Direczion 6e6nraie des

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORTTHIRD HIGHWRY PROJECT

CREgIT 1132-IU

I. !NTRODUCT12M

1.01 Burundi is a small country of about 27,800 kr2. Situated in EasternAfrica, south of the eouator, about 1,400 km from the Indian Ocean, it borderson Zaire, Rwanda ana Tanzania. It is a mountainous country astride theCongo/Nile ridge; the central plateau falls steeply away to marshy valleys inthe north and east and to a plain in the west. Bujumbura, the country's capitaland commercial center, is eccentrically situated in the west on lake Tanganyikaand is separated from tha rest of the country by chain of mountains.

1.02 With about 4 million inhabitants, Burundi is one of the most denselypopulated countries in the world, averaging 155 inhabitants per km2. However,the population is xrregularly distributed, with densities ranging from about 300inhabitants per km2 in the north and center to only 30 in the east. About 95Xof the population lives discersed on subsistence agriculture and on oneprincipal cash crop, coffee, which provides. the major source of foreignexchange.

1.03 The country, therefore, depends heavily on imports. The jxternaltrado is mostly with industrialized countries and averages 200,000 tons of whichSSZ are imports. Mining and industries are very limited. Its ruggedtopooraphy, which makes road construction and maintenance costly, its dispersedrural population and it. landlocked position, have greatly influenced thedevelopment of Burundi's transport system. These geographic features, theimbalance between the in-bound and out-bound traffic, and the seasonal nature ofthe coffee exports, keep the transport costs in Burundi high.

1.04 Internal transport is composed of (i) exports, mainly coffee, tea andcotton, (ii) beer and agricultural produce, and (iii) imports, fuel, consumergoods, construction materials, plant and equipment. Internal transport ismostly by roads there are neither railways nor navigable rivers, and LakeTanganyika is mainly used for international transport.

1.05 As a land-locked country, Burundi depends on the transportinfrastructures and services of the neighbouring countries for access to theOcean ports. External transport is by lake and rail to Oar as Salaam (about1,400 km), and by road (about 2,000 km) or road/rail (about 2,270 km) toMombasa. However, shipments of imports and exports through these two outletshave been beset by frequent delays and losses due to (i) capacity problem3, poonmanagement and thefts on the Tanzania railways and in the port of Oar as Salaam,(iL) cumbersome administrative procedure at border customs, and unroliability ofUganda's railways, and (iii) political instability in the region.

1.06 Wheraos internal transport is within the Government's control,external transport is not: the volumo of its international trade traffic hasbeen relatively so low, that Burundi has had little leverage to get the transitcountries to improve their transport facilitieo. To aosist the land-locked

Page 11: World Bank Documentdocuments.worldbank.org/curated/en/652821468015294400/pdf/multi... · SCEOM Bureau Central d'Etudes pour lee Eouipements d'Outre Mor OGR Direczion 6e6nraie des

:ountries in the Region in identifying the actions ano investments required to.mprove the performance of the internationai routes to the ocean ports. in 1980!he Bank carried out a survev of the external transoort connections of Burundiand Rwanoa. .ater on. UNCTAD carried out a more extensive survey also coveringUganca and easzern Zaire. In 1986 the Bank reviewed the situation of.n;ernational transoort in Burundi ano Rwanoa.

1.07 The three major socioeconomic goals of the Government have oeen to(i) improve institutional ano structural support to the agriculture sector, toincrease production and reduce the country dependence on imports, (ii) diversifythe agricultural sector and deveiop mining and industry, to reduce the countrydependence on coffee exports and (iii) promote the development of other regionaleconomic centers, to decentralize the economic and social activities away fromBujumbura.

1.08 To support these objectives, Burundi needs an efficient and economicinternal and external transport. Therefore, the Government's long termobjectives for the transport sector have been to (i) improve and maintain theinternal road network aoeouately, to support decentralization anddiversification of the economy, (ii) improve in particular those roads whichconnect with international routes to ocean ports, to reduce the country'sdependence on the lake/rail connection to Dar es Salaar, and (iii) develop andstrengthen transport planning.

1.09 At appraisal the transport system consisted of:

(a) about 3,000 km of clessified roads of which 280 km were paved,0 km were gravelled. anl about 160 km were being paved,

(b) about 2,500 km of non-classified rural roads,

Cc) the lake part of Bujumbura and

Cd) the international airport of Bujumbura.

At present about 900 km of roads are paved. 75 km are being paved and650 km are grovelled.

1.10 IDA's involvement in Burundi's highway subsector began in 1970 withthe Highway Engineering Project (Credit SlI-BU, USS3B0,000), which helpilfinance detailed engineering of the Bujumbura-Nyanza Lac road and a study forthe improvement of road maintenance. In 1974, IDA approved of the Highwayflaintenance Project (Credit 467-BU, USS5.0 million), which helped financet

Ca) the preparation and implementation of a four-year maintenanceprogram, including the establishment of a labor intensive roadmaintenance organization and one mechanized maintenance brigade,

(b) the technical assistanice for these activities and for training oflocal staff and

(c) a general road investment study and feasibility studies of theNgozi-Kobero road (106 ki) as well as of other roads identifiedunder the investment study.

Page 12: World Bank Documentdocuments.worldbank.org/curated/en/652821468015294400/pdf/multi... · SCEOM Bureau Central d'Etudes pour lee Eouipements d'Outre Mor OGR Direczion 6e6nraie des

The Highway Maintenance Project. compieteo in Seotemoer 1980 (PCR datedeotemoer 2S, 1981). significantly imoroved the road maintenance organization.

!.11 In 1978. .DA approveo oi the Second Highway Projoct (cracit 773-BU,'JS$14 mllion, 1978). The Project provided for the (U) paving ofBujumbura-Rugomoo roac (6S km) , ( i ) start-up pnase of an improvement programfor selected secondary reads ana bridges, (iii) the construction of a newcentral laboratory, (lv) strengthening of the mechanized maintenance brigade and(v) the provis.on of technicai aasistance and road eQuipnent.

1.12 Serious problema beset the road paving component. In September 1978,the Government awarded a US$10.2 million contract. The contract price wasabout 11% lower than the appraisal estimate. According to the contract, thework was scheduled to be finished by May 1980, i.e. in 18 months. However, thework was delayed by about two and a half years, mainly because transport to andfrom Oar es Salaam and Mombasa were often interrupted due to hostilities betweenTanzania and U.ianda. The contractors equipment arrived at the work site severalmonths late and shorcages of essential supplies occurred frequently.

1.13 In May tS92, two years later than the contract completion date, whenthe work was almcst fini.hod, the contractor went bankrupt, and the Governmenthad to award a US5130,400 contract to another contractor to finish the work.The actual total construction cost was 1S4X higher than the initial contractprice and 691 higher than the appraisal estimate. The work was finished inDecember 1982.

1.14 At the beginning of 1983, some sections of the road began failing andafter a few months about SO km, out of 65, were in urgent need of being eitherstrengthened or repaired. Tho total cost of this additional work was aboutUS08.6 million of which USS1.3 million was financed by the 6overnment, US$3.8million was financed under the Third Highway Project and USS3.5 is beingfinanced under the Fourth Highway Project. In spite of all this, therecalculated ERR for this component was 141 compared to 161 at appraisal. Onthe other hand, the execution of the other components, though also beset byproblems and long delays, was considered satisfactory, and the project, as awhole, still economically justified.

1.15 Also, IDA helped the International Transport Company (INTRACO),engaged in road transport to and from Mombasa (Kenya), reduce Burundi'sdependence on the route through Tanzania. Under a Oevelopment Bank Project(Credit 731-8U, USS3.4 million, 1978) IDA helped INTRACO buy trucks. AfterINTRACO become insolvent in 1980, the Gover.nment liquidated the company and thefunds provided under the credit were used by the Transport Office of Burundi, aGovernment's road transport company.

1

Page 13: World Bank Documentdocuments.worldbank.org/curated/en/652821468015294400/pdf/multi... · SCEOM Bureau Central d'Etudes pour lee Eouipements d'Outre Mor OGR Direczion 6e6nraie des

-4-

II. PROJECT MDENTIFICATION. PREPARATION AND APPRAISAL

Proiect Identification ana P-eaaration

_.01 In 1975, -he Country Program Paper provided for US$10 million forHighway II in 1978 ano USSIS million for Highway III in 1980. Highway II wouldbe a road construction project, and the paving of the Ngozi-Muyinga-Kobero road(106 km) aeeoed to be the best choice. This road passes through a denselypopulated area, where most of the coffee is grown, and is part of the road/railroute linking Bujumbura to Oar es Salaam port via Isaka in tsnzania. HighwayIII, instead, would support the highway maintenance prograri.

2.02 The then ongoing Highway Maintenance Project, IOA 'a first roadproject in Burundi, included a general road investment study and a feasibilitystudy of this road and of other roads identified under the investment study.This atudy indicated that the Bujumbura-Cibitoke road (75 kin) topped the list ofthe investment roads. This roaa carried the highest traffic volumes, traverseda region with the highest development potential and was estimated to yield aneconomic return (ER) of about 18 as compared to 13.5Z of the Ngozi-Kobero roadwhich, then, was set aside for Highway III.

2.03 The 6overnment and IDA's missions began exchanging their views on thecomposition of the Third Highway Project in August 1978. According to theinitial Project Brief, dated June 1, 1979, the project aimed at continuingimproving the road network and comprised the following components,

(a) continuation of the Highway Maintenance Program, includingtechnical assistance and equipment replaoenent,

(b) road investment, including improvemuant of selected earth tracks4o low standard gravel roads, reconstruction to bituminous paved*tandards of the Ngozi-Muyinga-Kobsro road (108 km), and theconstruction of custom and storage facilities at Kobero, situatedat the border with Tanzania, and

(c) a study of the trucking indubtry.

2.04 The estimated total project cost was US$30 million. The estimatedcost of reconstructing the Ngozi-Muyinga-Kobero road wan US$16 million,excluding contingencies, i.e. about US$150,000 per km. Tentatively, IOA'slending program allocated US$15 million to the project, depending on the amountof co-financing available to the Country. The African Development Bank (AfOB)hnd expressed an interest in co-financing the reconstruction of Ngozi-Kob4"%oroad.

2.05 Justification of the reconstruction of Ngozi-Muyinga-Kobero road, waeto be based on the feasibility study, carried out undor the Highway MaintenanceProject. The study of the trucking industry had been included following therecommendation of the Burundi Transport Sector Memorandum (July 26, 1978) toexamine the possibilities for establishing an adequate trucking capacity in

Page 14: World Bank Documentdocuments.worldbank.org/curated/en/652821468015294400/pdf/multi... · SCEOM Bureau Central d'Etudes pour lee Eouipements d'Outre Mor OGR Direczion 6e6nraie des

Surunoi. The study was tq o) examine actuai ano prospective demana for bulk-oaa transportation, %ii) review the operations of the Internationai Tranaportompany (INTRACO) ara (i±i) basea on the findings under 'L) and (ii), recommendiessures to enable Burunci to meet itO road transportation neeos aceouately.Later on, this study was croppeo, and technicai assistance to MTPT anu MTP fortransport planning ana programming was added.

'.06 Project preoaration actually began in mid 1979, wnen under IfDB'sfinancing, the Government entrusted coneultants with the cetailed engineering ofthe reconstruction of the Ngozi-Kobero road, including the update of thefeasibility study. In Septemoor 1979, the consultants submitted their firstreport on the updating of the feasibility study. IOA was not satisfied andrequested clarifications on various points. In particular, IDA suggested thatthe Direction 6enerale des Routes (06R) should carry out some traffic counts andthe consultants should recalculate the rate of return when the detailedengineering would be in an advanced stage and a bctter estimate of theroad-construction cost would be available.

'.07 The project preparation was more difficult and longer than expected.Because of persistently high inflation rates, both world wide and in Burundi,road construction costa continued to go up in Burundi, reaching about US$410,000per km, average cost per km of the lowest bid for the reconatruction of theKayanza-Ngozi road, financed by the European Development Fund (EOF), as comparedto the initially estimated USS150,000 per km of the Ngozi-Kobero road.Therefore, the cost estimates of reconstructing the Ngozi-Kobero road and of thewhole project had to be revised upwards several times.

2.08 The total available financing was not sufficient to cover the totalcost of the project as it had been conceived. Therefore, the Government and IDAhad to revise downwards the project several times, especially theroad-construction component. Table 1 shows the evolution of the projectcomposition and costs during the preparation phase through appraisal. TheGovernment and IDA cut down the length of road to be reconstructed under theproject first from 106 km (Ngozi-huyinga-fobero) to 73.4 km (Ngozi-Muyinga), andthen to 39.4 km (Ngozi-Junction RIG 14). The consultants revised the design ofthe project road on the basis of lower standards. IDA increased its allocationsto the proJect from US$15 million to USSZO million. However, there was still agap of about US$10 million. AI'B agreed in principle to jointly finance theroad-construction component, for which it would make available about US$10million, and Belgium promised about US$1.0 million for tools and equipment. IDAdecided to go ahead with the project.

Aporaisal and Neanotiations

2.09 IDA appraisad the project in June 1980. The total cost was estimatedat US$34.8 million, excluding taxes and duties. The foreign cost was estimatedat US$28.6 million and the local cost at US$6.2 million. IDA thought that theGovernment, who had to me&t the recurrent costs for road maintenance, estimatedat US$11.0 for the three-year period of the project, could finance no more thanl0X of the project cost. With IOA's and Government's contribution to theproject of US$20.0 million and US$73.4 milLion, the amount of co-financingneeded was of US$11.4 million.

Page 15: World Bank Documentdocuments.worldbank.org/curated/en/652821468015294400/pdf/multi... · SCEOM Bureau Central d'Etudes pour lee Eouipements d'Outre Mor OGR Direczion 6e6nraie des

:.I0 Tho main issues concerneo the Government's budgetary allocations tothe roaa maintenance. counteroart staffing and co-financing. 2uringnegotiations, the Government agreeo to (±) allocate at least US$3.0 millioneouivaient in 1981 prices eacn year curing the project implementation and (ii)

consuit with IDA on the levei ana structure of the ouoget in relation to theworK orogram during the last Quarter of each fiscai year of projectimplementation. The Government also agreea to (1) attach three counterparts toeacn technical assistance expert financed under the project, with the exceptionof the project manager and the two economists at the M1nistere des TravauxPublics (MTP) and Ministers des Transports, Postes et Telecommunications (MTPT)to wnom fewer than three counterparts could be assigned. and (ii) requirecounterparts to remain in service of MTP and MTPT for at least three years.

2.11 IOf thought that co-financing of US$11.4 million still needed did notrepresent a real problem, since the Government had obtained the followingagreements, even if only in principle: AfOB would contribute with at leartUS$10.0 million, the Belgian Government with US$1.0 million, and the UnitedNations Develooment Program (UNOP) would continue to provide technicalassistance to MTP at least for 1982 and 1983. IDA decided against makingco-financing a condition of effectiveness to avoid delaying the maintenancecomponent, in which AfOB did not participate. However, it decided that AfBco-financing would be a condition of disbursement for the road-constructioncomponent.

2.12 A formal agreement with AfOB to jointly finance the Ngozi-Junction RIG14 section, however, never materialized. Eventually, AfOB financed theconstruction to two-lane bituminous paved standards of the RIG 14-Muyingasection (37.1 kn). At present, therefore, of the 106 km between Ngozi andKoboro, originally planned to be reconstructed to bituminous paved standards,only the Muyinga-Kobero section (29.5 ki) is not yot paved.

2.13 The 6overnment and IDA revised the project once again downwards. Thenew total cost was estimated at US$32.1 million, excluding taxes and duties.The foreign cost was estimated at US$25.S million and the local cost at USS6.2.IDA increased its allocations again by USSS.0 mill ion to US$25.0 million, andthe 6overnment reached agreements for the following grants: USS1.0 million forequipmont and tools from the Belgian Administration G6n6rale do la Cooporationau D6voloppoment (AGCO), US$2.0 million for equipment from Japan, US$300,000from France ?or technical assistance. In addition, UNOP was planning to grantUS$600,000 for technical assistance for transport planning and programming. TheGoverrment would cover the balance of US$3.3 million.

2.14 IOA approved the project in April 1981. The Credit could not besigned until Docember 1981 because IDA's funds became available only in October1981 and then because the Burundi's ambassador was absent fron Washington untilthe bmginning of December 1981. It became effective on March 17, 1982. Not todelay the project execution, however, IOA agreed to retroactively financeexpenditures incurred by the Government since the date of Board presentation.

Page 16: World Bank Documentdocuments.worldbank.org/curated/en/652821468015294400/pdf/multi... · SCEOM Bureau Central d'Etudes pour lee Eouipements d'Outre Mor OGR Direczion 6e6nraie des

F-oiect Obiec%1ves ang Description

_.t5S The main onIectives of the project were to assist the Government in:arrying out the fol1owing:

(a) improvement of the roao o1etworK to facilitate cecentraiizationano to suoport development efforts in the northeastern part ofthe country,

(b) improvement of an alternative land connection to the port of Oarea Salaam, and

(c) deveoioment and strengthening of the Government's transportplanning and highway maintenance capability.

2.16 The project consisted of:

- construction to two-lane bituminous paved standards of theNgozi-Junction RIG 14 section (39.4 km);

- improvement of selected secondary and tertiary roads totalingabout 360 km,

- procurement of tools and vehicles for the manual maintenance, and

- consultants services.

Table 2 shows the project composition and costs in detail (appraisalreport Table 3.4).

Page 17: World Bank Documentdocuments.worldbank.org/curated/en/652821468015294400/pdf/multi... · SCEOM Bureau Central d'Etudes pour lee Eouipements d'Outre Mor OGR Direczion 6e6nraie des

III. =ROJECT IMPLEMENTATION AND COSTS

Roaa Cons%rucucn

G1I. The project provided for the construction to two-lane oltuminous pavedstanoarUa of the Ngozi-Junction RIG 14 roaa, which is a section,39.4 km long, of the Route Nationale 6 (RN 6). RN 6 traverses thecountry's high northern plateau in the north of the country and ispart of the roaa/rail route linking Bujumoura to the port of Oares Salaam via Isaka in Tanzania. This route 1S 1,578 km long, 880km of road from Bujumbura to Isaka, and 598 km of rail from Isakato Oar es Salaam.

3.02 At appraisal, the importance of this road was based on the followingt

- the area served by the road section had the highest populationdensity (300 innacLtants per km2 as opposed to the country averageof 142) and had the highest production rates for subosBtence cropsand coffee,

- a feasibility study for the exploitation of the Akanyaruriver-Kirundo peat deposits was underwey, and the project road waspart of the extraction route, and

- the project road was part of one of the routes linking the countryto ocean ports and could provide a viable alternative to thetraditional lake/rail route, Bujumbura-Oar es Salaam, via Kigomawithin the next five to seven years..

3.03 At prasent, the area served by the project road is atill the mostdensely populated and fertile of Burundi. Exploitation of the peat deposits hasnot yet started and there is no plan showing if and when it will start. Of the980 km of road between Bujumbura and Isaka, about 802 km are paved to bituminousstandards, and about 35 km near Isaka are being paved and scheduled forcompletion by October 1988. As to the remaining 145 km, the feasibility studyand detailed engineering are finished for Muyinga-Kobero (37.1 km) in Burundiand underway for Bukombe-Isaka (113 kn) in Tanzania, but no arrangements for thefinancing of the construction works have been concluded so far. In 1986,about 5% of the total external trade of Burundi used this route, as compared to1% in 1984.

3.04 The Ngozi-RI6 14 road wao in poor condition, with a tortuousalignment, very poor earth surface and inadequate or non-existent drainage.Maintenance was difficult and expensive because of the rugged terrain, frequentheavy rains and long distances to the aggregate quarries. Traffic was about 100vpd, of which about 30X were cars, 452 pickups and 25% trucks.

3.05 The detailed engineering, financed by AfOB, was carried out byconsultants from 1980 to 1981. The now alignment was about 3 km shorter, downfrom 42,5 km to 39.4 km. The roadway was 8.5 m wide and the pavement, whichconsisted of a selected granular soil sub-base, crushed stone base and double

Page 18: World Bank Documentdocuments.worldbank.org/curated/en/652821468015294400/pdf/multi... · SCEOM Bureau Central d'Etudes pour lee Eouipements d'Outre Mor OGR Direczion 6e6nraie des

oituminous surface treatment. was 6.0 m wide. The aesign standards were:onsistent with those used for otner pavea roaas in Burunci ana were appropriate,or tne terrain. zilmate ana forecast traffic.

3.06 The Government invitea nids for the road construction twice. Thei1rst time, it prequaiified eieven contractors during the second auarter of 1981and receivea f:ve olds by the ciosing date, Novemoer 30, 1981. The lowest bid'as FBu 2,055 million (US$22.3 miilion equivaient), including taxes and duties,about 90% higher than the appraisal eatimate excluding contingencies, or 25%higher than the appraisal estimate including contingencies. To reduce the cost.the Government ano IDA agreea to lower the specifications of the materials forthe base course, raise the maximum grade in the mountainous sections from 7% to10%, and to replace the drainage structures in reinforced concrete with stonelined structures.

3.07 The Government invited new bids by April 23, 1982. The loweot bid wasFBu 1,431 million (US$1S.9 million equivalent). After adjustments, the bidprice was brought down to FBu 1,338 million (US$14.9 million equivalent), i.e.:4% higher than the appraisal estimate excluding contingencies, or 13% lowerthan the appraisal estimate including contingencies. In August 1982. theGovernment awarded a contract for this amount.

3.08 The completion time was 20 months. The work started on February 7,1983, proceeded smoothly without any major problem, though the design waa stillchanged several times, and was finished on October 6, 1984, according toschedule. At appraisal, the estimated total cost, including taxes andcontingencies, was FBu 1,516 million (US$16.9 million equivalent). The finaltotal cost, including taxes, was FBu 1,365 million (US$13.1 million equivalent),i.e. about 11% lower than the appraisal 4stimate. In U.S. dollars, the totalcost was even lower (24%) because of several realignments of the Burundi francvia-a-via the U.S. dollar during the execution of the contract. Excludingtaxes, the total cost was FBu 1,160 million (US$S11.1 million equivalent).

3.09 The project provided for the supervision of road-construction work, atan estimated total cost, including taxes and contingencies, of FBu 83 million(US$900,000 equivalent). On July 23, 1982, the Government awardad a contractfor the supervision of the work to a joint venture of two consulting firrst thefirst firm, who had done the studies, was responsible for the supervision of allthe construction work but the drainage structures and laboratory geotechnicalcontrol, for which the second firm was responsible. The contract price wasabout F9u 6 .5 million (US$717,000 million equivalent) for a total of 19man-months.

3.10 The consultants began working in January 1983, a month before thestart of the physical execution and finished in November 1984, a month after theend of the construction work to prepare the final certificate and report. Thefinal total cost was FBu 69.8 million (US$737,000 million equivalent), i.e.about 8% higher than the initial contract price. This increase is explained bythe longer duration of the consultants'services: actual 20.5 months as againstthe estimated 19 months. In U.S. dollars, the final total cost was about 31higher than the initial contract price. However, compared to the appraisalestimate, the actual total cost was about 16% lower.

Page 19: World Bank Documentdocuments.worldbank.org/curated/en/652821468015294400/pdf/multi... · SCEOM Bureau Central d'Etudes pour lee Eouipements d'Outre Mor OGR Direczion 6e6nraie des

improvement of Seconajrv ana'Te-ttarv Roso5

_.1l The project croviced fTr the improvement ci about 360 km of secondaryand tertiary roads ano for tne procurement of equipment. This conoonent of thepro;ect was the continuation of tne roac improvement program. recommenced by a=tuay carriec out uncer the Highway Maintenance Project (paras 1.10 ano 2.02)ana started uncg,r tine Secono Hignway Project tpara 1.11). Up to 30% of thework, consisting of minor earthworK ano drainage structures, was to be carriedout by contract, i.e. by local contractors, and the balance, consisting ofearthmovement, gracing and regraveling, was to be carried out by force account.

3.12 OGR had only one mechanized brigade, set up under the Sicond HighwayProject, which was not ecuipped adequately: part of the equipment was eitherobsolete or out of order. Besides, one brigade was not sufficient to carry outthe prvogram. The project provided for the replacement of part of the equipmentfor the first brigade and for the acquisition of equipment for a second brigade.The total cost, including taxes and contingencies, was estimated a- FBu 366million (US$4 million equivalent); IDA was to finance about S2X% and the JapanOverseas Economic Cooperation Fund ((OECF) 48%.

3.13 However, the United Nations Capital Development Fund granted theGovernment US$3.1 million for the procurement of road equipment, and IDA's fundswere, then, reallocated to finance the repairs work on RH S (pares 3.29-3.31).The equipment financed by OECF was delivered in February 1982 and could, then,be fully utilized under the project. However, most of the equipment financed byUNCOP could not be utilized, because it was delivered during the last quarter ofCY 1884, i.e. at the end of the project. The cost of OECF equipment was aboutUS$2.0 million, and that of UNCOP was USS1.6 million. The total cost forequipment was, therefore, 10 less than the appraisal estimate.

3.14 At appraisal, the total cost, including taxes and contingencies, ofthe improvement work was estimated at F6u 409 million (US$4.5 millionequivalent): FBu 240 million (US$2.6 million equivalent) for work by forceaccount and FBu 169 million (US$1.9 million equivalent) for work by contract.The work by force account started in March 1982, and by December 31, 1984, endof the project, the OGR's two brigades had improved about 201 km of roads, i.e.about 6 km per month as compared to 7 km estimated at appraisal.

3.15 The following considerations show that the output was actually higherthan that estimated at appraisal. The two brigades, which carried out theimprovement work, were underequipped during the project execution, because ofthe delayed delivery of about half of the equipment (para 3.13), and most of theroads were improved to higher standards than planned. The total cost wasFBu 258 million (USS2.5 million equivalent), excluding taxes and equipmentdepreciation. Including taxes (152), the total cost would have been F8u 303million (US$2.9 million equivalent), i.e. a cost of about US$14,400 per km, ascompared to US$10,S00, cost per km, including taxes and contingencies, estimatedat appraisal.

3.16 Three local contractors carried out some minor work in concrete andstone masonry totaling FBu 21.0 million (US$200,000 million equivalent), whereasa foreign contractor carried out an important work on RIG 7. This road, which

Page 20: World Bank Documentdocuments.worldbank.org/curated/en/652821468015294400/pdf/multi... · SCEOM Bureau Central d'Etudes pour lee Eouipements d'Outre Mor OGR Direczion 6e6nraie des

s5 located in the south ano goes from Boma ou Chef to the Tanzania ooroer viaMabanoa. was to be imorovec entirely by force account. On a section between kmIS ano ie Z6, however. :o reauce tne tortuosity ana the grace. -hat on someEiopes was greater than 17%, .; was necessary to execute heavy earthworKs,Including excavation in roCK requiring the use of exoioSive.

3.17 The Government ano IDA agreec that the origaces could not do this typeof worK. in May 1983. :ne Government, with IOA's agreement. 3warced a contractto a foreign conzractor, registered locally. The work was carried out withoutmajor problems and was finished on scnedule in May 1984. The total cost was FBuZZ1 million (US$2.4 million equivaient), including taxes and duties, the same asthe contract price. The total cost. excluding taxes and duties, was FBu 199million (US$2.2 million equivalent). DGR supervised this improvement work.

Road Maintenance

3.18 The project provided for the procurement of tools, vehicles and campeouiPment for manual maintenance for an estimated total cost, :ncluding taxesand contingencies, of FBu 140 million (USS1.6 meilion equivalent). IDA was tofinance 90X of the cost or this component. However, the 6overnment and IDAagreed to use the funds provided for this component, as well as those providedfor the procurement of equipment (para 3.13), to finance the repaira work onRN S (paras 3.29-3.31). Belgium agreed to grant FBe 27 million (US$300,000equivalent) for the procurement of the items included in this component, andthe Goyernment financed the balance.

3.19 The four regional centers in Bujumbura, Gitega, Bururi and Ngozicarried out both manual and mechanized maintenance of earth and gravel roads, aswell as patching and sealing of paved roads. Each center was responsible forabout 750 km of road. It was staffed with about 42S men, i.e. about one manevery two kilometers, and equipped with hand tools and a few trucks. Also, theGovernment planned to set up a mechanized brigade for the reshaping andregroveling of earth roads, as well as for the haulage of constructionmaterials. This brigade was to be equipped with some of the old eQuipment andtrucks made available by the arrival of the new equipment purchased under theproject.

3.20 In 1994, however, the Government cut down on funds for maintenanceand, in particular, reduced the maintenance labour force. During negotiations,the Government had agreed to make available, for road maintenance, US$9.0million (FBu 810 million) at 1981 prices for the three years of the projectimplementation. On the assumption that the local component of the manualmaintenance cost was 801, and the foreign component 201, and on the basis of thesame rates of price increases as those indicated in the appraisal report (Table3.4, page 26), the Government was to make available for road maintenance aminimum of FBu 1,029 million (US$10.3 million equivalent). During this period,however, the actual total expenditures were about FBu 915 million (USS9.2millionequivalent). Furthermore most of the new equipment financed by UNCOP waSdelivered only at the end of the project, and the old equipment could not bereleased (para. 3.13). Thus, anly few of these mechanized maintenanceoperations could be carried out.

Page 21: World Bank Documentdocuments.worldbank.org/curated/en/652821468015294400/pdf/multi... · SCEOM Bureau Central d'Etudes pour lee Eouipements d'Outre Mor OGR Direczion 6e6nraie des

7ecfnxcai Psistance

The project crovioed tecnnicai assistance to help carry out the-|oao-imorovement worK and road maintenance. uoth manual and mecnanicai.i rnciuding on-the-job training. 7n 1975, uncer the Highway Maintenance Project,JNOP financed consulting services to assist the Government in carrying out afour-year highway maintenance orogram. Under the Secona Hignway Project. IDAana UNOP financeo the services of the same consultants from Marcn 1978 to June1981. In September 1981, the Government awarded a contract to the sameconsultants for the continuation of their services under the Thira HighwayProject. The contract, including two amendments, covered theproject-implementation period,July 1991-December 1984, and was financed byPPF102 up to February 1982 and then by the Credit. The same consultants arestill assisting the Government under the Fourth Highway Project.

3.22 The consultants'team consioted of seven experts: a head of mission, anaccountant, four road construction and maintenance engineers and a mechanicalengineer. The head of mission and the accountant helped the Government

i) manage the road improvement and maintenance programs, (ii) prepare afive-year rehabilitation and maLntenance program for paved roads and (iii)prepare the Fourth Highway Project. The other experts assisted in planning andcarrying out the road improvement and maintenance operations, including thebridge replacement and maintenance work financed by the Federal Republic ofGermany (FR6) as well as the improvement of RP 84 financed by the United StatesAgency for International Development (USAIO). Also. the consultants carried outon-the-job training of their counterparts and of local clerical and fieldpersonnel at all levels.

3.23 At appraisal, 264 man-months, over a period of three years, wereestimated for these consulting services at an estimated total cost of;Bu 396 million (US$4.4 million equivalent), including contingencies. Theconsultanta'contract, including two amendments, provided for 294 man-months,over three years and a half, at a total cost of FBu 80.2 million and 70.3million Belgian francs (FBe), i.e. about FBu 233.8 million (USS2.4 millionequivalent). The consultants actually provided 294 man-months at a total costof FBu 64.5 million and FBe 65.1 million, i.e. about FBu 206.5 million (US$2.2mtilion equivalent). Whereas the actual number of man-months was about 11lhigher than estimated at appraisal, the actual total cost was about 42X lowerthan the appraisal estimate.

3.24 The project provided for technical assistance to train 06R'spersonnel. With IDA's and UNOP's financing, under the Highway Maintenance andSecond Highway Projects, the Government had hired consultants to carry out atraining program for OGR's personnel at all levels, from superintendent tosection chief, including equipment operators, at the Public Works Schools inBujumbura and Gitega, at the Training Center in Gitega and at Rushubi with thetraining brigade. The Government hired the same consultants to continue thetraining progran.

I X~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

3.25 At appraisal, 308 man-months, over a period of three years, wereestimated for these consulting services at an estimated total cost, includingtaxes and contingencies, of FBu 163 million (US$1.8 million equivalent). The

Page 22: World Bank Documentdocuments.worldbank.org/curated/en/652821468015294400/pdf/multi... · SCEOM Bureau Central d'Etudes pour lee Eouipements d'Outre Mor OGR Direczion 6e6nraie des

:Onsuitan%s actuaiiy proviced 114 man-months at a total cost of FBu 45.2niilion, FSw Z. miilion ana USV2S.000, cr atout FBu 1S4.3 miilion WUS$1.Sniilion eau±valent). At aopraisal, the personnei expectee to be trainea eachear was the fcllowing: -oout 10-12 superintendents. 0 overseers, o0 sectionThiefs ano gang foremen, and iE equipment operators. -bout 20 superintenoentsano overseers. 800 section chiefs and gang foremen for manuai maintenance, and:00 eauipment ooerators were actuaily trained unoer the project.

3.26 Under UNOP's financing, tha project provided for 48 nan-months of twoeconomists to help MTP and MTPT pian and program, at an estimated total cost,inciuding taxea and contingencies, of FBu S8 million (US$600,000 equivalent).UNCOP, however, agreed to finance the procurement of equipment (para 3.13) andcancelled the financing of these services, which IDA, then, agreed to finance.The credit Was amenced accordingly. Eventually, the Government hired only onetk-anaport economist, who startedF in December 1983 and carried out various taskafor coth ministries.

3.27 For MTPT, the transport economist carried out the following taska:;i) elaboration of a transaort policy, (ii) study of an alternative means oftransport to the ferry-boat link between Bujumbura and Kigoma, (iii) forecast ofimport and exoort traffic in the year 2000 and needs in maintenance andreplacement of the lake fleet to meet the demand, (iv) survey of the externaltrade, (v) survey of the delays on the main external routea, and (vi)training oftwo counterparts. For MTP, he carried out economic analyses of roadimprovements, the re-evaluation of the Second and Third Highway Projects, and asurvey of the axle loads on the north route, including a proposal forstandardization and taxation for overloading. The economist provided 13man-months at the total cost, including taxes and contingencies, ofFBu 10.5 million (US888,000 equivalent). Under the Fourth Highway Project heprovided 11 man-months more.

3.28 The project provided for the preparation and supervision of theroad-improvement work at an estimated total cost, including taxes andcontingencies, of FSu 35.0 million (UST400,000 equivalent). The 6overnmentassigned this task to the three experts attached to OGR and financed by France.The experts with their counterparts helped select and design the roads to beimproved, and supervise the improvement work.

Road Rena=r

3.29 RN S, Bujumbura-Rugombo, (66 kn), constructed to bituminous pavedstandards under the Second Highway Project, Credit 773-BU, began showing signsof failure at the beginning of 1983, i.e. only a few months after the end of thework. The National Laboratory carried out a study and concluded that the roadneeded to be repaired and strengthened urgently. First, the Government awardeda contract to repair the road to a foreign contractor, the same as for theimprovement of RIG 7 (para 3.16), and financed the total cost of FBu 117 million(US$1.3 million equivalent ) from its own budget.

Page 23: World Bank Documentdocuments.worldbank.org/curated/en/652821468015294400/pdf/multi... · SCEOM Bureau Central d'Etudes pour lee Eouipements d'Outre Mor OGR Direczion 6e6nraie des

_.4-

-7.sO Since more repairs worr was needed. *tie Government anc the contractoragreea to incLude this suopiementary work, estimated at FBu Z71 miillon (US$4.1miilion eouivaientl. in the initiai contract, wnicn was. .ren, amenaeaaccoruingiy. IOA agreec to finance 70% of the aeditionai cosz. However.oecause no funas under tme Secono Highway Project, Credit 773-BU. wereavailable, the Government ano ICA agreea to finance the worK uncer the ThirdHighway Project, using the funds provided for the procurement of equipment andtoois kparas. _.13 ano 3.18). >reoit 113-BU was amenaeo accoraingiy on April4, 1984.

3.31 Tha repairs worK included the strengthening of six road stretchestotaiing about 18 ki, local repairs on four stretches totaling 32 km andreconstruction of drainage structurea. The work proceeded smoothly and wasfinished in April 1984. The total cost was FBu 364 million (US$3.8 millionequivalent), i.e. about 2% less than the initial contract price. In U.S.dollars, the total cost was about 7% less than the initial contract price. Thetotal cost excluding taxes and duties woJ FBu 328 million (US$3.4 millioneauivalent). OGR ana the National Laboratory carried out the supervision of theworK. More repairs work on RN5. however, was still needed. This additionalwork is being financed uncer the Fourth Highway Project, Credit 1S83-BU, at acost of about USS3.S million equivalent.

Construction of RP 84 with labour-intensive methods

3.32 The project provided for technical assistance only to thisroad-construction work (para 3.22). In January 1981, the construction withlabour-intensive methods of Route Provinciale 84, which links Minago and Tora(58 km) in the West of the country, began under Government's and USAID'sfinancing. The work progressed slowly but steadily, and was finished in Marchi985. The total cost, excluding taxes, waS about F-u 312 million (US$3.1million equivalent). The average cost per km was FBu 5.2 million (US$52,000equivalent).

Imroreveient and maintenance of bridoes

3.33 The project provided for technical assistance only to this program(para 3.22). FRG provided the structural elements of bridge decks. The totalcoat was about FBu 78.S million (US$750,000), of which FR6 financed 60X and theGovernment 401.

Renortina

3.34 IDA received reports on the construction of Ngozi-Junction RIG 14 roadand on the improvement work regularly. These reports were prepared by theconsultants who supervised the construction work and by those who assisted theGovernment in carrying out the improvement work. They did not cover all thecomponents of the project and were too detailed on certain project elements andinsufficiently detailed on others. The crodit agreement (section 3.4 b)required the Government to send IDA quarterly reports, and the appraisal reportgave the project progress reporting requirements in annex 7.

Page 24: World Bank Documentdocuments.worldbank.org/curated/en/652821468015294400/pdf/multi... · SCEOM Bureau Central d'Etudes pour lee Eouipements d'Outre Mor OGR Direczion 6e6nraie des

- s 5-

Proiect Costs ano Disbursements

_.35 'Costs of eacn project component and reiative contracts, includingcomparisons between appraisai estimates ano actual costs, are given in detail inthe paragrapha of this chapter dealing with that component. A summary ofestimates and costs by component is given in Table 3. The record of actualdisbursements is given in Table 4, and the total disbursements by category inTable 5. The actual total project cost, including taxes, was FBu 3,147 million(USS30.9 million equivaient), compared to a total project cost of FBu 3,1SOmillion (US$35.0 meilion equivalent) estimated at appraisal. The financing of

the project was as follows:

FBu-.illion US illion

- IDA 2,180 21.4

- Government 535 5.2 (of which FBu 315 or US$3.1for taxes)

- UNCDP 190 1.6

- OECF (Japan) 180 2.0

- Belgium 27 0.3

- France 35... -la

3,147 30.9

The 6overnment financed maintenance expenditures during the threeyears and a half of project implementation for a total amount of about FBu 916million (US$9.2 million equivalent).

Performance of Contractors.- Suoliers and Consultants

3.36 No major problems were encountered during the execution of theproject. All contractors, local and foreign, including DGR's two brigades, andall consultants carried out their works well and on schedule. Most of theequipment ordered and financed by UNCOP woa delivered very late, practically atthe end of the project. The delay is not to be imputed to the suppliers, butrather to slowness in preparing the bidding documents and in evaluating thebids.

.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Page 25: World Bank Documentdocuments.worldbank.org/curated/en/652821468015294400/pdf/multi... · SCEOM Bureau Central d'Etudes pour lee Eouipements d'Outre Mor OGR Direczion 6e6nraie des

IV. :NSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMgNT

4.01 At appraisai, the Association wes concerned about thetransoort-planning caoabolity of the Government and the staffing of 0GR. The3overnmene's capacity to pian and coordinate transports, as well as to prepareroad maintenance and construction programs, was very limited. Under theproject, two planning units were created at MTPT and OGR of MTP, and with theassistance of a transport economist, who also trained counterparts, both MTPTano OGR began improving their planning and programming capacity.

4.02 Because of competition from the private sector, where salaries arehigher, DGR had difficulties in retaining sufficient local engineers andmanagers with experience and competence. During negotiations, the 6overnmentagreed to attach counterparts to each technical assistance expert and to requirecounterparts to remain in the service of MTP and MTPT for at least three years.The situation did not improve much during the pr3ject implementation.

4.03 Under the project, staff at various levels continued to be trained.According to the appraisal report of the Fourth Highway Project, however,transport sector management still needed to be improved, especially coordinationof road, port and lake transport development. Transport planning andcoordination was not yet well established, and assistance to DGR and MTPT forinstitution buLiding was still required for some time. Expatriate experts arestill in OGR in the same positions and In the same number.

Page 26: World Bank Documentdocuments.worldbank.org/curated/en/652821468015294400/pdf/multi... · SCEOM Bureau Central d'Etudes pour lee Eouipements d'Outre Mor OGR Direczion 6e6nraie des

-!7-

V. ECONOMIC RE-EVALUATION

5.01 At aapraisal, the road construction and improvement components wereeconomically evaiuated on the basis of costs estimates and traffic countscarried out by consultants in 1975 ano upoated in 1980. As part of the

preparation of the project completion report, O0R, with the assistance of an

expatriate transport economist, carried out the economic re-evaluation of theproject components in 1985-86, on the basis of 1984 costs and traffic counts.The overall rate of economic return was 18.5X, as compared to 19X estimated atappraisal. We reviewed both the hypotheses and calculations and found themcorrect.

Construction of Noozi-Junction RIG 14

5.0? According to the appraisal report, the construction to bituminouspaved standards of the first section of the Ngozi-Kobero road was (i) to improvecommunications and reduce transport costs between Bujumbura and the provinces ofNgozi and Muyinga, which are the most populated and important in terms of coffeeproduction and (ii) to contribute to the creation of an improved transportconnection, either all road or road/rail to the Indian Ocean. Also, theconatruction of this road section would improve transports to and from the pestdeposits in the Akanyaru river-Kirundo region, should exploitation of thesedeposits start.

5.03 The road connecting Bujumbura to the provinces of Ngozi and Muyinge lsnow all paved to bituminous standards, and communications have improved.However, transport costs have not been surveyed recently, and it is not possibleto know whether now they are actually lower than at appraisal. In 1986, aboutS5 of Burundi's total external trade used the project road, as compared to 1S In1984, when the construction of the Ngozi-Junction RIG 14 was finished.Exploitation of the peat deposits in the Akanyaru river-Kirundo region has notyet started and there is no plan showing if and when it will start.

5.04 At appraisal 1930 traffic was estimated at 96 vp and was to grow atan average rate per year of S.9X. In 1985, ono year after the opening of theroad, traffic was to reach 173 vpd, including about 40 vehicles of generatedtraffic. The economic return (ER), based on vehicle operating costs savings,was estimated at 15S. The re-calculated ER was 17S, i.e. about 131 higher thanat appraisal. This higher than est!Aated ER is explained by the followingconsiderations: (i) actual construction costs were about 10% low4r thanestimated at appraisa., and (ii) counts carried out by 06R in 1904 showed thattraffic on the project road was higher than estimated at appraisal,According to counts carried out in 1986 by consultants, traffic on theNgozi-Junction RIG 14 section averaged 300 vpd, i.e. it had grown at an annualrate of about 20X since 1980.

Page 27: World Bank Documentdocuments.worldbank.org/curated/en/652821468015294400/pdf/multi... · SCEOM Bureau Central d'Etudes pour lee Eouipements d'Outre Mor OGR Direczion 6e6nraie des

-18-

imorovement of Seconnarv .eno Tertiary Roads

:.05 At a praisai. the selection criterion for the earth roads to be

:mproved derivea from a targez minimum ER of 17.1 which required traffic levels

of about 21 vpd. 'On the oasis of the traffic levels on the road sections for

wnich more detailed information was avaliable, Lt was expected that an average

ER of Z22% requiring a traffic of some 30 vpd, would be attained.

5.06 As part of the roac improvement, the project provided for the

financing of road eouipment and of a portion of the brigades'operatingcosts. The actual economic analysis was conducted separately for each brigade.

For the existing brigade. the economic analysis focused on the incrementaloutput of the brigade ootained from the equipment replacement and funding of

operating costs, while for the additional brigade the analysis focused on thetotal output of the brigade. The estimated ER was 27%.

S.07 OGR did not use the same method, but it evaluated the economic return

of this component on the basis of vehicle operating costs savings. The trafficconsidered in the evaluation varied from 50 to 100 vpd according to the road,

and the average growth rate was 6%. According to the counts carried out in 1986

by consultants, the traffic on the roads improved under the project turned out

to be as low as 100 vpd and as high as 185 vpd. The economic rates of return

were as follows:Actual

Total LengthLenoth ImnrovM _ERkm km

- RI6 14, Klrundo-Rwanda border 37.7 37.0 20.5

- RP 61, Mu40mora-Mukenke 32.0 27.0 32.7

- RI6 6, Songa-Mubanga-Soma du Chef 79.3 21.0 63.4

- RIG 7, Boma du Chef-Makamba 38.0 38.0 36.8

- RIG 7, Makamba-Mabanda 20.0 20.0 57.1

- RIG 7, Mabanda-Tanzanta border 19.0 19.0 10.2

- RI6 3, Makebuko-Burembera 48.0 39.C 38.8

Total 201.0

The re-calculated overall economic rate of return of this component

was 38X.

Page 28: World Bank Documentdocuments.worldbank.org/curated/en/652821468015294400/pdf/multi... · SCEOM Bureau Central d'Etudes pour lee Eouipements d'Outre Mor OGR Direczion 6e6nraie des

-19-

i_'-overent by contract of RIG 7 and repairs an RN 5

5.08 OGR evaluated the improvement work executed by contract on RIG 7(paras 3.16-3.17) and the repairs work carried out on RN S, works which were notinitially provided for uncer the project. Tha ratep of the economic return was11.6X for RIG 7 ana 17.9% for RN S.

Page 29: World Bank Documentdocuments.worldbank.org/curated/en/652821468015294400/pdf/multi... · SCEOM Bureau Central d'Etudes pour lee Eouipements d'Outre Mor OGR Direczion 6e6nraie des

-20-

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.01 The project was a logical continuation of the efforts started underthe Highway Maintenance Project and the Second Highway Project to improve theroad network as well as the road maintenance organization and operations. Theproject included basically road construction and improvement components whichwere not particularly difficult, and it was executed without any major problem.The project was completed six months later than estimated at appraisal, butproject implementation had started about six months later, because of lack ofIDA's funds.

6.02 The only difficulties encountered were during the project preparationand appraisal, when the project had to be scaled down several times, because ofincreasing road-construction costs.

Page 30: World Bank Documentdocuments.worldbank.org/curated/en/652821468015294400/pdf/multi... · SCEOM Bureau Central d'Etudes pour lee Eouipements d'Outre Mor OGR Direczion 6e6nraie des

- 21 -

Protet Cim tim ad Cost Esti mte

Project brief Project Wriaf Project Brief lam Pe I RppaL

~~~iLA Z~L LL1 ULL _ L6.1.79 27 6.9," 7.U- 1.1.

- Ngpn- [chin (166 i) 161

- Wi- JUtm 6 (39.4 I) - 10. 1S. Ilii 12.

- Juastim hl64q (3.1 mi) _u I _

= lotal 16J (53) 19J () 27J8AS) 13 (3) 12. (34)

- badlapuut (36CObi) IL U. 5.0(13 Si.00) U.0 W 3.500)

-R o1 4ipmt NJ. 3D() 3.0 6) 3 (a) 3J (9)

- 'blh tatmm NJ. - - 1 ).3 1.2

- t fasildU J. _ _.

- cultusw v UJ. 3.3 (8) 3.? C?) 5.(1) 53i

- PolcUaaSehr s - 0.5 (1) - - -

- L - I t3) 1J (2) 1 (3) 1J (3)

-Ftp ts ulu NJ. 33(8 U (9) 230 2.6()

* Price Coalapla .u i gi (5 IL ) t.LL(1?) ±1(18)

- ttad 30.0 39.5 503 375 3EJ

TI,edalt IIJ. 35. 1S Hi 32.1

C ) * d agtltoa

- abtu1u

j !b ~~~~a* d rtk W k be awae t den in tl t *eXt brids.I~~~~ u fad fohr tecla mt

Page 31: World Bank Documentdocuments.worldbank.org/curated/en/652821468015294400/pdf/multi... · SCEOM Bureau Central d'Etudes pour lee Eouipements d'Outre Mor OGR Direczion 6e6nraie des

Ml6t ITaI,& 9.0S' 0'6 $,CT k

* In ~~~~~~~~~~~~t" PtPwo eo M a" _ - t'lsY ' ma-, sr:630.}w_ 09) AN o'ml ftrI St

it v at PR 2SW a m

in"O'* 1r4 s s iii0itr Mr

%Wm,tTl-2 ;' rgg E6t 6s a % w

9-t s'z o'l "C LIZ L6

1710"4 tn} .O's 61- 'E- vtg ti1 t9 *

91 r 76-g =7g O-VE-77* 6tt t'RatOs

Lf9 9-s ° ' fi 6

to-a Ot0 1 ' 0

n I t * ;tup "09 146 Z tt 9 0 919t Lzot is

t "- t oto 9 a

_f f _m_goft tv*1643

-Wjrwq l_ow06 0-I ?w -t (in OK .

0i S*;t z ti t "I-ttt ~(tst {st *.t Pt a titt tt ~ ~~ ~A"13z VWg- a o }

otju f_6l ttt 0^°%ta £71-f -0 ° " U -

ml*"*aw_t|;t" s3 t60*t~~~~~~~~IW

oo i Test.q. 2

Z~~~~~~~~~~~~0 vu * t£

Page 32: World Bank Documentdocuments.worldbank.org/curated/en/652821468015294400/pdf/multi... · SCEOM Bureau Central d'Etudes pour lee Eouipements d'Outre Mor OGR Direczion 6e6nraie des

- 23 -

.T ^ ~~~~~~~~~~1~L

Nomuxul Cost Estiutes andctua Costs IL

; ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ lvu d - - Rtonl RctluintaLa roruip lot l loca Vru ie Lu r iTotd Lod fro_ teotd I of ?W. ELt-fhallu - - S allim-n - - fL -uIm- *v, 1

R-UI6 1 19 1,03 1,51 4.. 121 16.9 409.0 956.0 I,.0 3.9 9. 131 S n8. bJru_t uwk 181 Z2S 409 z2 2.5 t.5 215 31J 5f5J 2.5 2.? 5.2 W.".

C. Elwqit 35 31 350 0.9 3. 3.9 3pi 3333 370. 0.9 32 3.6 151. 2

0. tw.M~H sdtue, etc 1 126 110 0.2 1.1 1.6 3.0 210 Z?.J 0.0 0.3 0.3 19 19

E. LSou1uuuA 1? 66 83 0.2 0.7 03 119 55J 69J 01 0.6 0.7 ? R.

r. - _.S_uimsfS 70 a iS 0.3 0.1 7.0 28535 0 0103 0.9 1U 1Ut

6. TJLwINA 79 31? Al 03 3.5 4. U3 1652 2065 0.4 IJ 22 cZm in-

R. t.f.rfrut 1i 33 130 1i3 0.4 1.4 1.3 3I A. 1543 0J 1.2 1.5 N M.I. Ii. f Woniud

NM? 12 165901 0. 0.6 ZI 0.4 1050QJ0010.1 l3ie i3. Ib- _ - - _- - . teem 36mm Lm t J 3]J. kpiuIUwk -. - - e - -

L.JtebIulua U 2,311 3,150 9.1 25.9 35n 5 3 UJ,19J 3,14 9.9 21 305 lOU Ui

L. Tobl udzdltr a 2,31 ,8 6.2 25. 321 63J 2,13J 2,131 63 21.5 273

IL owraiul abaftiu icelak sbpiul ad price Cutap .in.

Page 33: World Bank Documentdocuments.worldbank.org/curated/en/652821468015294400/pdf/multi... · SCEOM Bureau Central d'Etudes pour lee Eouipements d'Outre Mor OGR Direczion 6e6nraie des

- 24 -

1BURUNDTHIRD HIGHWAY PROJECT

CREDIT 1132-BU

RECORD OF ACTUAL DISBURSEMENTS

(SOR' 000)

Appraisal Actual as X ofFiscal Year and Quarter Actual Estimates Anoraigal Estimates

December 31, 1981 0 410 0March 31, 1982 100 820 13June 30, 1982 1,200 2,460 49

September 30, 1982 1,610 4,510 33December 31, 1982 3,160 7,380 43March 31, 1983 4,530 11,480 39June 30, 1983 S,700 15,580 37

September 30, 1983 7,910 17,220 46December 31, 1983 10,650 17,630 60March 31, 1984 11,S70 18,860 61June 30, 1984 14,830 19,680 7S

* September 30, 1984 17,270 20,090 86December 31, 1984 - 19,280 20,500 94March 31, 1985 ' 20,210 98June 30, 1985 20,500 100

Page 34: World Bank Documentdocuments.worldbank.org/curated/en/652821468015294400/pdf/multi... · SCEOM Bureau Central d'Etudes pour lee Eouipements d'Outre Mor OGR Direczion 6e6nraie des

- 25 -

BURUNDIPROJECT COMPLETION REPORTTHIRD HIGHWAY PROJECT

CREDIT 1132-BU

Total Disburagn2nts bv Cateoorv

Category Orioinal ActualSOR SOR

(1) Main Road Construction 8,030,000 10,374,343.24

(2) Road Improvement,

(a) by force account l.lSO,OO 1,613,803.53

(b) by contract 870,000 4,335,651.09

(3) Equipment and Tools 950,000 0.00

(4) Consultants and Technical Assistance 3,730,000 3,278,821.14

(5) Refunding of PPF 820,000 897,381.00

(6) Unallocated 4,950,000 0.00

Totals 20,500,000 20,500,000.00

- ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~mnimuum m

I ~ ~ ~ ~ _ _