Document of the World Bank Report No: ICR00003518 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA-40180 IDA-47560) ON A CREDIT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 151.50 MILLION (US$ 210.42 MILLION EQUIVALENT) TO THE REPUBLIC OF INDIA FOR A TAMIL NADU HEALTH SYSTEMS PROJECT June 27, 2016 Health, Nutrition and Population Global Practice (GHNDR) South Asia Region Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized
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Document of
the World Bank
Report No: ICR00003518
IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT
(IDA-40180 IDA-47560)
ON A
CREDIT
IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 151.50 MILLION
(US$ 210.42 MILLION EQUIVALENT)
TO THE
REPUBLIC OF INDIA
FOR A
TAMIL NADU HEALTH SYSTEMS PROJECT
June 27, 2016
Health, Nutrition and Population Global Practice (GHNDR)
South Asia Region
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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
(Exchange Rate Effective May 31, 2016)
Currency Unit = Rupees (Rs)
Rs 67.29 = US$ 1.00
US$ 1.00 = SDR 0.71
FISCAL YEAR: April 1 – March 31
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS AF Additional Financing
AIDS Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
AMCs Annual Maintenance Contracts
ANMs Auxiliary Nurse Midwifes
BCC Behavior Change Communication
BMEs Biomedical Engineers
CAG Comptroller and Auditor General
CD Country Director
CEmONC Comprehensive Emergency Obstetric and Neonatal Care
CMS College Management System
C-section Caesarean Section
CTFs Common Treatment Facilities
CVD Cardio Vascular Disease
DCA Development Credit Agreement
DIR Detailed Implementation Review
DM&RHS Directorate of Medical & Rural Health Services
DMS Directorate of Medical Services
DO Development Objective
DoHFW Department of Health and Family Welfare
DPH Directorate of Public Health
EmONCs Emergency Obstetric and Neonatal Care
EMRI Emergency Management and Research Initiative
FM Financial Management
GAAP Governance and Accountability Action Plan
GoTN Government of Tamil Nadu
HCWM Health Care Waste Management
HMIS Health Management Information System
HMS Hospital Management System
IAS Indian Administrative Service
ICR Implementation Completion and Results Report
ICU Intensive Care Unit
ICDS Integrated Child Development Scheme
ICWM Infection Control and Waste Management
IDA International Development Association
IEC Information, Education and Communication
IMR Infant Mortality Rate
IO Intermediate Outcome
IP Implementation Progress
ISMR Institutional Services Monitoring Report
ii
ISRs Implementation Status and Results Reports
IT Information Technology
IUFRs Interim Unaudited Financial Reports
M&E Monitoring and Evaluation
MCH Maternal and Child Health
MIS Management Information System
MMR Maternal Mortality Ratio
MTR Mid-term Review
NABH National Accreditation Board for Hospitals
NCD Non-communicable Disease
NGOs Non-governmental Organizations
NHM National Health Mission
NIE National Institute of Epidemiology
OBGYN Obstetrician and Gynecologist
OPD Out-Patient Department
PAD Project Appraisal Document
PDO Project Development Indicators
PHCs Primary Health Centers
PINs Patient Identification Numbers
PMU Project Management Unit
PP Project Paper
PPPs Public Private Partnerships
PWD Public Works Department
QAG Quality Assurance Group
QCE Quality Circle of Excellence
RCH Reproductive and Child Health
RF Results Framework
SC/ST Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe
SCA Sickle Cell Anemia
SHRDC State Health Data Resource Center
SPU Strategic Planning Unit
SPC Strategic Planning Cell
TDP Tribal Development Plan
TNCDW Tamil Nadu Corporation for Development of Women
TNHSP Tamil Nadu Health Systems Project
TNMSC Tamil Nadu Medical Services Corporation
TOR Terms of Reference
TPA Third Party Administrator
UAS University Automation System
Global Practice Director: Olusoji Adeyi
Country Director: Onno Ruhl
Practice Manager: Rekha Menon
Project Team Leader: Bushra Binte Alam
ICR Team Leader: Sangeeta C. Pinto
ICR Authors: Joy de Beyer/Surendra Agarwal/Owen Smith
iii
INDIA - TAMIL NADU HEALTH SYSTEMS PROJECT
Table of CONTENTS
A. Basic Information ....................................................................................................... v B. Key Dates ................................................................................................................... v C. Ratings Summary ....................................................................................................... v
D. Sector and Theme Codes .......................................................................................... vi E. Bank Staff .................................................................................................................. vi F. Results Framework Analysis .................................................................................... vii
G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs ............................................................... xxiii H. Restructuring (if any) ............................................................................................ xxiv
I. Disbursement Profile ............................................................................................. xxiv
1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design ............................................... 1
1.1. Context at Appraisal ......................................................................................... 1
1.2. Original Project Development Objective (PDO) and Key Indicators (as
3. Assessment of Outcomes ....................................................................................... 24 3.1. Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation ................................... 24
iv
3.2. Achievement of Project Development Objectives (rating: Phase 1 –
3.4. Justification of Overall Outcome Rating ........................................................ 37
3.5. Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts ...................................... 38
3.6. Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholders Workshops
40
4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome ...................................................... 40 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance .................................................. 41
5.1. Bank Performance .......................................................................................... 41
6. Lessons Learned..................................................................................................... 43 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners........ 46
Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing .......................................................................... 47
Annex 2. Outputs by Component ................................................................................. 48
Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis ................................................................. 63 Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ............ 68 Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results ........................................................................... 70
Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results ................................................... 71 Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR ......................................................................... 82
Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders ....................... 85 Annex 9. Details on NSS 2004 and NSS 2014 Data on Access and utilization of health
services by poorest 40% and scheduled tribe (ST) populations in Tamil Nadu ........... 86
Annex 10. Tamil Nadu Key Indicators – National Family Health Surveys 2015 and
Note: The Outcome rating is S for the first phase, and HS for the second phase. Under the
methodology for weighting ratings, the overall outcome score is 5.57, which rounds up to 6, HS,
even though there were some small shortcomings in achievement of outcomes.
vi
C.2. Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR)
Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings
Quality at Entry: Satisfactory Government: Highly Satisfactory
Quality of Supervision: Highly Satisfactory Implementing
Agency/Agencies: Satisfactory
Overall Bank
Performance: Highly Satisfactory
Overall Borrower
Performance: Highly Satisfactory
C.3. Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators
Implementation
Performance Indicators
QAG Assessments
(if any) Rating
Potential Problem Project
at any time (Yes/No): No
Quality at Entry
(QEA): None
Problem Project at any
time (Yes/No): Yes
Quality of
Supervision (QSA):
QALP-1 rating 2 (Likely
to achieve DO)
DO rating before
Closing/Inactive status: Satisfactory
D. Sector and Theme Codes
Original Actual
Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)
Health 80 80
Other social services 1 1
Sub-national government administration 19 19
Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)
Child health 17 17
Health system performance 33 33
Indigenous peoples 16 16
Injuries and non-communicable diseases 17 17
Population and reproductive health 17 17
E. Bank Staff
Positions At ICR At Approval
Vice President: Annette Dixon
Praful Patel (Original
Credit)/Isabel M. Guerrero
(Additional Financing)
Country Director: Onno Ruhl Michael Carter/N Roberto Zagha
Practice Manager/
Manager: Rekha Menon
Anabel Abreu
AF: Julie McLaughlin
Project Team Leader: Bushra Binte Alam Preeti Kudesia
vii
ICR Team Leader: Sangeeta C. Pinto
ICR Primary Author: Joy de Beyer
ICR major contributors Surendra Agarwal, Owen Smith
F. Results Framework Analysis
Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document, PAD, p. 5): To significantly improve the effectiveness of the health system, both public and private,
in Tamil Nadu through: (i) increased access to and utilization of health services,
particularly by poor, disadvantaged and tribal groups; (ii) development and pilot testing
of effective interventions to address key health challenges specifically non-
communicable diseases; (iii) improved health outcomes, access and quality of service
delivery through strengthened oversight of the public sector health systems and greater
engagement of non-governmental sector; and (iv) increased effectiveness of public sector
hospital services, primarily at district and sub-district levels.
The PDO statement in the Development Credit Agreement (DCA, p. 17) is worded
slightly differently: “public and private” is omitted from the main clause of the objective
statement; item (ii) omits the reference to piloting interventions and (iv) omits “district
and sub-district levels”. The changes make the statement a little less precise.
Revised PDO July 2010 at Additional Financing (AF) (Project Paper PP, p. 6): To
significantly improve the effectiveness of the health system in Tamil Nadu as measured
by: (i) increased access to and utilization of maternal and neo-natal care services,
particularly by poor, disadvantaged and tribal groups; (ii) effective non-communicable
disease interventions scaled up throughout the state; (iii) improved health outcomes,
access and quality of service delivery through strengthened oversight of the public sector
health systems and greater engagement of non-governmental sector; and (iv) increased
effectiveness of public sector hospital services, primarily at district and sub-district
levels.
Results Framework, baselines and Actual Values
In May 2007 (Management Letter and AM 5/18/2007), the Country Director (CD)
approved the revisions to the results framework and monitoring matrix to incorporate
recommendations of a Bank-wide review of results monitoring frameworks and outcome
indicators (completed in 2006). Minor deletions to the original PDO indicators are
indicated in [square brackets], baseline data were added, two Intermediate Outcome (IO)
Indicators were deleted (road traffic accident case fatality rate, and doctor absenteeism)
and a new IO Indicator was added “Evaluation of pilots being implemented to enhance
management of project facilities in terms of quality of care”.
The results framework documents three sets of changes to the PAD Results Framework:
Additional Financing (April 29 2010): Three PDO indicators were added to monitor
quality of inpatient care, supply and equipment management, and patient satisfaction; one
quality PDO indicator changed, and one PDO indicator change reflected the progression
viii
from NCD pilots to scaling up. Numerous changes in IO indicators were made to
measure specific outputs and activities, indicators were dropped that duplicated the PDO
indicators or were no longer relevant, and “Core Indicators” added as required by new
Bank-wide guidelines.
Restructuring: August 2014 restructuring paper lists 8 dropped, 2 new, 7 unchanged
PDO indicators, 37 dropped IOIs/parts of IOIs, 11 new IOIs and one revised IOI.
Please note: The order in which of some indicators are presented try make the table
easier to follow (e.g. AF indicator for NCD activities follows PAD original indicator 2
which also refers to NCDs) so some indicator numbers differ from their numbers in the
PAD. Indicators that were included in the original or revised project both as PDO and
IOIs are reported once.
(a) PDO Indicators
Indicator Baseline Value
Original Target
Values (from
approval
documents)
Formally
Revised
Target
Values
Actual Value Achieved
at Completion or
Target Years
Indicator 1: Original.
Dropped in 2014
Total in-patient utilization (considering both the public and private sector) by the
poorest 40% of the population increased (as measured by an asset mix)
Surgery with overnight
stay:
Other hospital stays:
Hospitalized cases per
1,000 persons in last
365 days by monthly
per capita consumption
expenditure pattern for
lower 40% MPCE
group
Proportion of (poorest
40%) population
reporting any ailment
in last 15 days, percent
of those who accessed
any form of care
2.45%
1.41%
(Source: Ferguson
Patient Satisfaction
Survey, March 2007).
32.1 cases per 1,000
(Source National Sample
Survey Organization –
NSSO 60th round (2004)
8.5% ailing (NSSO)
76%
10% increase by
2008
20% increase by
2010
14%
9%
(IPSOS Patient
Satisfaction Survey of
2015).
41.9 cases per 1,000
(National Sample Survey
Organization – NSSO
71st round (2014).
13.2% ailing (NSSO)
98%
Date 2004 and March 2007 9/30/2010 2014
Comments
SURPASSED. Increases in inpatient care were far above the 20% goal: 571% increase
in surgery with overnight stay, 638% increase in other hospital stays, and 31% increase
in hospitalization rate per 1,000 people in lowest 40% income group. Percent of those
who reported any ailment and accessed care increased by 29%, well above the original
20% target. NSSO 2014 excluded pre-existing disability from “any ailment”, 2004 had
included it so data are not strictly comparable, but unlikely to make much difference.
ix
Indicator 2: 2007, AF (Originally an IOI. Not
included in 2014.
Increased utilization of out-patient and in-patient services by Tribal Groups
02/19/2010 S MS 87.08 Reallocation of proceeds among
categories.
04/29/2010 Yes S MS 88.59
Approval of Additional Financing,
changes in PDO, indicators and targets,
extension of Closing Date by 3 years to
9/30/2013.
06/28/2010 S MS 92.02
Reallocation of proceeds among
categories, to finance taxes and modify
definition of incremental operating
costs.
05/08/2013 S S 166.22 CD approved extension of Closing Date
by one year to 9/30/2014.
08/07/2014 S S 186.77
CD approved extension of Closing Date
by 11.5 months to 9/15/2015. Results
Framework was rationalized to be more
relevant and reduce number of
indicators.
1
1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design
1.1. Context at Appraisal
Tamil Nadu was the 7th most populous Indian state (65 million in 2001), one of the five most
urbanized, and had the second lowest population growth rate (1.43%). Annual GDP growth was
averaging more than 6%. Good “social determinants” of health, and high coverage and
utilization of health services (e.g., 93% of children fully immunized, 89% of births in health
facilities) had contributed to steady improvement in infant- and under 5 mortality and other
health outcomes. The state’s human development and health indicators were among India’s best.
Health sector trends and challenges. Despite this significant progress in health and access to
services, Tamil Nadu’s infant mortality rate (IMR) of 52 per 1000 live births in 1999 was still
much higher than in Sri Lanka and Kerala (IMRs of 12 and 16 respectively), and maternal
mortality (MMR) had stagnated at 110 (2003).1 Audits of maternal deaths indicated that facilities
-- especially in disadvantages areas -- could not all provide comprehensive emergency obstetric
and neonatal care (CEmONC), and more needed to be done to improve and ensure quality of
care in all facilities in a systematic and well-organized way.
Tamil Nadu’s burden of disease from non-communicable diseases (NCDs) was large and
growing. Heart disease, diabetes, and cancers were already the leading cause of death, and traffic
deaths among the worst in India. NCDs and smoking (a key NCD risk factor) were especially
high among the poor, who were therefore most burdened by the economic effects of illness,
health care costs, lost productivity and premature death.
Although use of health services was far more equitable than in most states, hospitalization
among the poor was only 37% of the rate among the wealthy, and scheduled castes and
scheduled tribes (SC/ST) had very limited access to health services. Health outcomes were
relatively poor in districts and blocks within districts with pockets of SC/ST populations.
Total health spending in Tamil Nadu was low, and predominantly out-of-pocket. Public health
expenditure was less than US$3 per capita per year, and had fallen from 7.5% of the state budget
in the mid-1980s to 5.8% in 2001. Nearly 75% of the health budget went on salaries, leaving
very little for consumables, equipment, infrastructure and maintenance. Most central government
funding for health was for primary care, leaving secondary care chronically under-funded.
State Health Policy and Capacity Gaps. The Government of Tamil Nadu (GOTN) Health
Policy of 2003 laid out ambitious goals, including reducing IMR to 15 per 1000 and MMR to 50
per 100,000 live births by 2020, and doing more to address key non-communicable diseases and
injuries while sustaining vigorous efforts to control communicable diseases including HIVAIDS.
The strategy focus was on improving the health status of the general population, with special
emphasis on low-income communities and families. However, the state lacked experience in
strategic and financial planning for the health sector, and in quality improvement activities such
1 Tamil Nadu Health Indicators at a Glance, 2014-2015, Directorate of Family Welfare, Government of Tamil Nadu
(GoTN))
2
as setting technical standards, ensuring quick adoption of technological advances, oversight of
the private sector, accreditation of health facilities, efficient management of public sector
hospitals, and monitoring health policy impact on vulnerable populations.
Rationale for Bank involvement.
GoTN requested funding and technical advice to help implement its new Health Policy and
improve the quality of care across the state’s health system. In addition to substantial funding,
IDA provided experience in health system strengthening, and the ability to help GoTN build
capacity to develop, evaluate and implement quality assurance mechanisms, test innovative
interventions to reduce NCDs, rigorously evaluate innovations to decide which to scale-up, and
to collaborate better with the private sector to help achieve state health policy goals. Although
Tamil Nadu had not had a state-level health project before, as a progressive state with relatively
high capacity in the health sector, it was considered a good place to put into practice the shift in
state level health system projects recommended by a 2002 major review of all State Health
Systems projects in India.2 Additional Financing was approved in 2010 to continue successful
project activities, expand the scope of some, and roll-out the successful pilot of NCD activities
state-wide. The additional rationale for the AF was that the innovations in the project would be a
valuable model for other states in India and other countries.
The project was fully aligned with the core goals and strategic principles laid out in the World
Bank India Country Strategy for FY05-08 (CS), approved in 2004: to help improve the quality
of life especially for India’s poorest citizens and help India move closer to achieving the MDGs;
selectively expand lending in health (and other specific areas); and focus on outcomes to help
India achieve its development goals. Tamil Nadu was one of the 12 states where over 90 percent
of India’s poor lived, and the project explicitly aimed to expand health service access and
utilization by poor, disadvantaged and tribal groups. The CS noted that the project followed the
guidelines for Bank engagement in the health sector and would “break new ground in forging
public-private partnerships …strengthening oversight of private providers, increasing public
expenditure on health and reorienting health facilities to ensure service for the poor…”3 The
project also reflected “some of the most important elements of the fast reform scenario - most of
which are embodied in the Tenth Plan”: “Refocus health, education and social safety net
programs on outcomes. Improve the private market for health care through training, public
information and accreditation.” (CS p9). Rigorous assessment of the cost-effectiveness of private
provision of publicly financed services would generate information for the broader debate on
how to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of publicly financed services across India. This
would contribute to the third strategic principle of the CS: to expand the role of the Bank Group
as a politically realistic knowledge provider and generator.
The project would also help implement the Government’s core strategy for poverty reduction,
embodied in India’s Tenth Five-Year Plan for 2002/3 to 2006/7. The first two items in the
Plan’s core strategy were: (1) Improve governance and service delivery, placing greater reliance
2 India State Health Systems, Quality Enhancement Review, July 2002. The suggestions included putting more
emphasis on sectoral reforms, beginning to integrate disease programs into mainstream service delivery, giving
more attention to financing issues, and more engagement with the private sector. 3 CS p26 and Annex 5, which lays out the guidelines for Bank engagement in the health sector.
3
on the private sector and on public sector reforms to deliver accountability, reduce opportunities
for corruption and improve the speed and effectiveness of government at all levels. (2) Second,
reduce poverty, including by better access to health care. The project was designed to contribute
directly to higher-level MDG objectives to which India was fully committed: reducing
maternal, child and infant mortality and premature and preventable mortality among adults.
1.2. Original Project Development Objective (PDO) and Key Indicators (as approved)
Project Appraisal Document (p 5): The Project Development Objective was “to significantly
improve the effectiveness of the health system, both public and private, in Tamil Nadu through: (i) increased access to and utilization of health services, particularly by poor,
disadvantaged and tribal groups; (ii) development and pilot testing of effective interventions to
address key health challenges specifically non-communicable diseases; (iii) improved health
outcomes, access and quality of service delivery through strengthened oversight of the public
sector health systems and greater engagement of non-governmental sector; and (iv) increased
effectiveness of public sector hospital services, primarily at district and sub-district levels.”
The PDO statement in the Development Credit Agreement (DCA, p. 17) is worded slightly
differently: “public and private” is omitted from the main clause of the objective statement; item
(ii) omits the reference to piloting interventions and (iv) omits “district and sub-district levels”.
The differences make the PDO statement less precise.
The four key outcome indicators (PAD, p. 31-32) were:
(a) Total in-patient utilization (considering both the public and private sector) by the poorest
40% of the population increased (as measured by an asset mix),
(b) Completion of two rigorously evaluated pilots of clinic-based NCD prevention and control,
careful monitoring of the effectiveness of other NCD prevention activities, and assessment of
the impact of these pilots on the development of state-wide policy.
(c) Improved quality of care (QOC) in public hospitals as measured by a series of indicators
(including management of indicator conditions, patient outcomes, and quality control
mechanisms) and implementation of regulation accreditation system to improve quality of
care in private sector hospitals.
(d) An increase in the number of complicated deliveries by women in the Scheduled Caste/
Scheduled Tribe (SC/ST) population that are handled by CEmONCs that meet standards for
quality and neo-natal care. The PAD Results Framework in Annex 3 listed a slightly different
version: “CEmONCs should handle more than 50% of the complicated deliveries for women
belonging to the SC/ST concurrently meeting the standards of quality of care” (p.29); a few
pages later the table detailing the measurement strategy for the indicators gave a target of
20% improvement on the baseline which was still to be determined (p.32).
1.3. Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and
reasons/justification
Additional Financing (AF) was approved on April 29, 2010 to enable successful NCD pilots to
be scaled up across the state; and to support the continuation of successful activities. The PDO
and key indicators were changed to reflect the focus of the activities that would continue to be
funded and the change from piloting NCD interventions to implementing them across the state.
4
Reference to the private sector part of the health system was dropped from the PDO, an
appropriate change since the project focus was mainly on the public sector, and because GoTN
has little direct influence or oversight of private sector health providers.
The revised PDO in the AF Project Paper was: “To significantly improve the effectiveness of the
health system in Tamil Nadu as measured by: (i) increased access to and utilization of maternal
and neo-natal care services, particularly by poor, disadvantaged and tribal groups; (ii) effective
non-communicable disease interventions scaled up throughout the state; (iii) improved health
outcomes, access and quality of service delivery through strengthened oversight of the public
sector health systems and greater engagement of non-governmental sector; and (iv) increased
effectiveness of public sector hospital services, primarily at district and sub-district levels.” The
project objective in the AF Financing Agreement (page 5) was the same (except for trivial
differences in grammar).
The AF extended the project Closing Date and the end date for expected outcomes by three
years. The Results Framework was revised to reflect the new PDO focus on consolidating and
continuing the achievements made and to roll out NCD programs state-wide, with expected
outcomes defined as follows:
(i.) At least 23% of complicated maternal admissions at certified project CEmONCs (state-
wide) will be for SC/ST. patients.
(ii.) Effective functioning of CEmONCs (state-wide) as measured by % of complicated
admissions and no increase in maternal and neonatal case fatality rates.
(iii.) Scale-up of cancer cervix screening and cardio vascular disease prevention and control
based on a comprehensive assessments of the pilots.
(iv.) Improved access to health care as measured by in-patient utilization of services by the
poorest 40% of the population.
(v.) Improved quality of care as measured by (i) bed occupancy rate, (ii) number of diagnostic
services performed, and (iii) number of night time caesarians at CEmONCs.
(vi.) Patient satisfaction (perceived quality of care) as measured by patient satisfaction
surveys.
(vii.) Strengthened state-level capacity of pharmaceuticals and medical supplies procurement,
repair and maintenance of medical equipment.
This table explains continuities and changes in the outcome indicators:
Original
Indicator
AF
Indicator Comment on continuity and changes
(a) (iv) Same indicator, worded slightly differently
(b) (iii) Indicator for NCD pilots replaced by indicator for scaling up
programs across the state
(c) (v) The revised indicator on improved quality of hospital care dropped
reference to private hospitals, and specified 3 things to be measured
(d) (i), (ii) This revised indicator for ST/SC access to quality care for
complicated deliveries includes neonatal and maternal mortality
outcome measures, and includes baseline data for access to care.
(vi) New indicator
(vii) New indicator to explicitly measure aspects of quality
5
1.4. Main Beneficiaries
The primary target groups expected to benefit most from the project were “poor, disadvantaged,
and tribal groups” – people in scheduled castes and scheduled tribes, or living in tribal, hill,
remote and underserved areas, whose access to health care services would be increased. All
patients using Tamil Nadu’s secondary hospitals would benefit from improved services as a
result of hospital refurbishment and upgrading, equipment repairs and maintenance. The whole
population of Tamil Nadu would benefit from improved quality of health services, and women
and infants and their families would benefit from the expected improvement in maternal and
neonatal mortality. The AF would additionally benefit adults in the state through interventions to
reduce NCD risks, and screen and provide treatment for cervical and breast cancer and cardio-
vascular diseases.
Secondary beneficiaries: Health care providers and other staff working in health facilities were
also expected to benefit. Strengthening the Health Management System (HMIS) would benefit
the Department of Health and Family Welfare (DoHFW), hospital administrators, medical
professionals and other staff of hospitals and other health care facilities by digitizing health
records and reporting, enabling more efficient referral and management of patients, and
providing health facility information that could be used for better budgeting, planning and
accountability. DoHFW staff would benefit from training activities. Improved health care waste
management at health care facilities would enhance safety for patients and service providers.
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to provide
health services in tribal and remote areas would benefit patients, and develop the capacity of
NGO partners. Private sector service providers would benefit from government contracts for
house-keeping services and health care waste collection, transportation and disposal. The
provision of ambulances would benefit women in labor, victims of road traffic accidents and
others requiring emergency transport to a hospital. Strengthening the state health sector would
enable better implementation of ongoing and planned centrally sponsored health programs in the
state, including the Reproductive and Child Health Project, National AIDS Control Project, and
Revised National Tuberculosis Control Project that were funded by the WB. Finally, learning
from NCD pilots and innovations in HMIS would inform state policy and could be replicated in
other states of India.
1.5. Original Components (as approved)
Component 1: Increasing Access to and Utilization of Services (US$43.79 million). This
component would:
Reduce maternal and neonatal mortality by establishing at least 2 CEmONCs in each
district, first in disadvantaged districts, equipped with a trained complement of clinical
and paramedical staff and the equipment, supplies and drugs needed to provide treatment
for all types of obstetric and neonatal emergencies. Contracts would be signed with
NGOs to provide emergency transport services and facilitate referral.
Improve tribal health by strengthening existing primary and secondary health services in
tribal areas through PPPs with NGOs and contracting NGOs to provide mobile clinical
6
services in 12 identified districts; giving grants to NGO hospitals to provide in-patient
services; and training a cadre of village level tribal health volunteers.4
Facilitate use of hospitals by poor and disadvantaged people and stimulate demand for
services through: (i) community mobilization by NGOs and outreach workers, (ii)
behavior change strategies to promote health, (iii) counseling centers run by NGOs and
local self-help groups to guide patients seeking hospital services, and (iv) training health
personnel in inter-personal communication to improve provider behavior.
Component 2: Developing Effective Models to Combat Non-Communicable Diseases and
Accidents (US$5.65 million). The component aimed to develop effective ways to reduce NCDs
and road traffic accidents, undertake pilots and evaluate their impact so as to inform state policy
and future NCD programs. The activities supported under this component were:
Health promotion activities for preventing NCDs by reducing exposure to risk factors,
such as behavior change communication (BCC), interventions in communities, schools
and workplaces, and setting up life-style counseling centers.
Two NCD pilots, each in two districts: Pilot 1 screened for hypertension and provided
medications and advice on modifying risk factors such as diet, sedentary lifestyle, and
smoking in 2 districts. Pilot 2 assessed the costs and benefits of cervical cancer screening
and treatment. In each case, one of the pilot districts was relatively more industrialized,
so that the impact of urbanization on NCD risk factors could be analyzed. Rigorous
evaluation of the pilots provided information for decisions on whether and how to scale-
up across the state.
Traffic injury prevention and treatment interventions in coordination with relevant
Departments (e.g. Transport and Police).
Component 3: Building Capacity for Oversight and Management of the Health System
(US$25.61 million). The activities were designed to achieve four things:
Improve monitoring and evaluation by strengthening the health management information
system (HMIS) to report regularly on quality of care indicators, utilization rates at health
care facilities and hospital activity indicators. Establish a computerized system at all
levels to track patient, service and management information, network all hospitals to
track referred cases and monitor outcome of programs. Provide feedback to service
providers and program managers for follow up and continuity of care.
Improve Quality of Care by mainstreaming continuous quality improvement practices,
developing and implementing quality indicators, establishing Quality Improvement
Circles in health facilities, developing protocols for improved management of key health
conditions, and helping GoTN implement a stronger system for overseeing health
facilities.
Strengthen health care waste management through implementing guidelines on proper
segregation, color-coding, transportation, and disposal of hospital solid wastes; set up
4 Public-private partnerships (PPP) were a relatively novel approach, and included use of public funds to “purchase”
basic services for the poor from NGOs and private health providers, collaboration with the private sector for a range
of professional services by “contracting in” to government health facilities, and encouraging NGOs in remote tribal
districts to operate government facilities to ensure outreach of health services to disadvantaged populations.
7
PPPs with NGOs for waste transportation and treatment; develop training manuals, train
trainers, and monitor progress.
Build capacity for developing and implementing health strategies, by establishing a
Strategic Planning Unit to act as a think tank and conduct studies on important health
systems issues; setting up a PPP “wing” in the GoTN to manage and monitor PPP
contracts; conducting a health insurance pilot, and strengthening Project Management’s
capacity for monitoring and undertaking procurement.
Component 4: Improving the Effectiveness and Efficiency of the Public Sector to Deliver
Essential Services (US$50.90 million). The main activities were to:
Refurbish and upgrade secondary care facilities including assuring basic amenities such
as water and electricity.
Repair equipment and implement a good maintenance system through Tamil Nadu
Medical Services Corporation (TNSMC), equipment suppliers and hospital officials.
Establish and implement staffing norms and train government staff in human resource
planning and development; conduct activities to improve staff morale and courtesy to
patients; introduce accreditation of health facilities and performance appraisal to help
improve workforce efficiency.
Enhance management of public facilities by setting up twinning arrangements between
hospitals, giving recognition to high performing hospital administrators, and testing new
ways to enable hospitals to improve their performance.
1.6. Revised Components
AF of US$117 million was approved on April 29, 2010 to enable the GoTN to consolidate and
continue successful project activities, and scale up selected NCD programs state-wide, based on
the results of the NCD pilots. The AF continued to support three of the original four components,
but the activities under each were enhanced and expanded or fine-tuned (see detailed description
of components below). The second component changed from “Developing effective models to
combat NCDs and accidents” to “NCD prevention and Control”, supporting implementation of
NCD programs across Tamil Nadu, building on the successful pilots carried out under the
original project. The additional funding allocated to each component was as follows:
Component 1: Increasing Access to and Utilization of Service (AF of US$44.79 million,
totaling US$88.58 million allocation for this component).
Reducing Maternal/ Neonatal Mortality: support effective ongoing provision of obstetric
and neonatal services by the 80 CEmONCs established under the project, train doctors
and nurses, finance contractual staff salaries at CEmONCs for two years (subsequently to
be financed by GoTN), construct and equip higher maternity referral institutions at 8
medical colleges, design and provide Information, Education and Communication (IEC)
materials, and broadcast and disseminate information.
Improving Tribal Health: implement the Tribal Development Plan (TDP) in all identified
tribal areas (12 districts) to increase access to health care, and strengthen existing primary
and secondary services in tribal areas through PPPs. The AF supported (i) provision of
additional vehicles, equipment, operating costs, and TV/DVD sets for mobile out-reach
health services based on need; (ii) sickle cell anemia screening at three tribal hospitals;
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(iii) tribal counseling services; (iv) a bed grant scheme for inpatient care for tribal
populations at selected hospitals; (v) performance-based payments, training and
incremental costs for village health volunteers implementing tribal activities; (vi) IEC
activities; and (vii) monitoring and evaluation of the TDP.
Facilitating use of hospitals by the poor and the disadvantaged: (i) retrain patient
counselors; (ii) provide patient counseling services; (iii) provide 200 additional
ambulances and mortuary vans; (iv) contract NGOs to provide mortuary van services; (v)
strengthen laboratories at selected hospitals; and (vi) finance and monitor housekeeping
services at selected hospitals.
Component 2: NCD Prevention and Control (AF of US$22.01 million, totaling US$27.66
million for this component). This component omitted the traffic injury prevention activities
planned under the original component, continued support for health promotion, and added
support to implement NCD screening and treatment programs across the state. The activities to
be funded were as follows:
Health promotion activities to prevent NCDs, training teachers and peer educators for
school-based activities (through the Education Department), interventions in workplaces
and community-based interventions through the Rural Development Department and by
NGOs.
NCD Interventions – on the basis of results of successful pilots, scale-up NCD
interventions state-wide: (i) provide necessary equipment at identified primary and
secondary level facilities, train doctors and nurses, fund honoraria for village link
volunteers/community resource persons supporting cervical cancer screening and breast-
cancer detection; (ii) provide necessary equipment and training for medical officers,
nurses, and laboratory technicians at identified primary and secondary level facilities for
cardio vascular disease (CVD) screening (including diabetes), and finance two years of
salaries for contractual nurses based on needs; (iii) IEC posters, stickers, flip charts,
information boards, broadcasting and dissemination for the scaled-up NCD interventions;
and (iv) monitoring and evaluation of NCD interventions.
Component 3: Building Capacity for Health System Oversight and Management (AF of
US$33.80 million, totaling US$59.41million). The new and revised activities funded under this
component were as follows:
Strengthen M&E Capacity in DoHFW – provide software, IT services and equipment to
roll out Phase II of the computerized Hospital Management System (HMS) in the
remaining 222 Project hospitals (total of 270 hospitals), selected Medical Colleges
(tertiary level hospitals) and attached hospitals.
Improve Quality of Care – support continuous monitoring of quality of care, provide
training in management and rational use of drugs for hospital and PHC staff, and enhance
capacity for the hospital accreditation process within DoHFW.
Strengthen Health Care Waste Management (HCWM) – expand training on infection
control and waste management to all health personnel at primary, secondary and tertiary
levels of healthcare, and carry out an impact evaluation of the implementation of the
Environment Management Plan.
Capacity Building for Strategy Development and Implementation – expand the
Directorate of Medical Services Annex building by adding two floors; train doctors and
9
Tamil Nadu Health Systems Project (TNHSP) staff, finance administrative costs and
additional staff for the TNHSP Society to enable it to scale up project activities, studies,
evaluations, monitoring, dissemination of project lessons learned and achievements,
convene an International Health Conference in 2010; and establish a data resource center.
The community based health insurance pilot was dropped because of its likely negligible
impact on the project objective, especially given the new TN Chief Minister’s Health
Insurance Scheme. Instead, the project provided complete administration and
management support to the health insurance scheme, rolled out with technical assistance
from the Bank in 2012.
Component 4: Improving Effectiveness and Efficiency of Public Sector to Deliver Essential
Services (AF of US$30.18 million, totaling US$81.08 million). This component supported new
and revised activities under two of the original four sub-components:
Equipment Rationalization and Strengthening of Equipment and Pharmaceuticals
Management – provide essential equipment (Intensive Care Unit (ICU), x-ray and poison
treatment centers); strengthen logistics and procurement of pharmaceuticals and
equipment; and strengthen repair and maintenance system in the TNMSC (including
financing salaries of biomedical engineers).
Human Resource Planning and Development -- finance additional contractual staff
midwifes (ANMs), hospital workers, sanitary workers, dental surgeons and cooks) in
project hospitals for the first two years in accordance with established staffing norms in
order to improve overall efficiency and performance.
No civil works to rationalize secondary care facilities were included, as all priority works had
been completed.
1.7. Other significant changes
In January 2005, $20 million equivalent (at prevailing XDR exchange rate) from the
original Credit was cancelled for reallocation to the Emergency Tsunami Reconstruction
Project in response to severe damage caused by the tsunami of December 26, 2004. It
was understood that subject to satisfactory implementation of TNHSP, the Bank would
provide AF to fill the financing gap created by this cancellation.
Minor changes in the Results Framework (noted in data sheet section F) were agreed
with GoTN and approved by the Country Director (CD) on May 18, 2007 (Management
Letter and Aide Memoire, 5/18/2007). This was not processed as formal restructuring.
The changes reflected recommendations from a Bank-wide health portfolio review in
2005-2006, and added newly available baseline data. The details of the main indicators
were aligned better with core activities being supported by the project. Specifically,
“careful monitoring of the effectiveness of other NCD prevention activities” was dropped
from PDO indicator 2 to keep the focus on monitoring and evaluation of the NCD
intervention pilots; “implementation of a regulation/accreditation system to improve
quality of care in private sector hospitals” was dropped because accreditation was to
focus on public (not private) hospitals.
Traffic injury prevention was restricted to surveys of helmet and seatbelt use, instead of
the originally planned state-wide BCC activities, to avoid duplication of effort under a
Bank financed transport project. Although sales and use of helmets were rising, there was
10
strident public opposition to the new helmet use law. GoTN succumbed to public
pressure and backed away from stringently enforcing the law on an unwilling population.
As noted in section 1.6 above, this activity was dropped in the 2010 AF, and the project
focused on NCD activities where there was better traction.
The Community based health insurance pilot in the original project was dropped – an
AM in 2007 noted that it was likely to have only a marginal impact on the PDO,
especially in light of the state-wide Chief Minister’s Health Insurance Scheme that was
rolled-out with technical assistance from the Bank in 2008, and to which TNHSP
provided complete administration and management support.
Closing Date extensions: The Closing Date was extended by three years to September
30, 2013 as part of the AF. After the Bank removed the time limit of 3 years for AF, the
Closing Date was extended two more times – first by one year to September 30, 2014,
and then by 11.5 months to September 15, 2015. These extensions were needed to enable
full completion of innovative interventions that had taken longer than expected to start
up, some activities that had been delayed by back-to-back state and municipal elections in
2011 and national elections in 2014, periodic delays when the procurement workload was
especially heavy, and to ensure full scale up of the NCD interventions throughout the
state and of the HMS/College Management System (CMS) and University Automation
System (UAS) to tertiary level public health facilities. The second extension was also to
ensure that the TNHSP could consolidate the project gains and do a thorough hand- over
to DoHFW and the National Health Mission (NHM).
The Level 2 restructuring (approved August 7, 2014) streamlined the Results Framework
by selecting the most directly relevant outcome and intermediate results indicators (in
addition to the Closing Date extension noted above).
2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes
2.1. Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry
Background. The project was prepared in a little over two years (2002 to 2004)5, a reasonable
time for the India portfolio, especially given the scope, cutting edge reforms, innovative
approaches, and thoroughness of preparation. The GoTN’s Health Policy (2003) laid out a road
map for the next two decades toward reducing IMR to 15 per 1,000 and MMR to 50 per 100,000
live births, improving the health status of the general population and especially low-income
communities and families, starting to address key non-communicable diseases, while sustaining
vigorous efforts to control communicable diseases, and strengthening first referral hospital
services (district and sub-district hospitals) as a priority. The PDO and design of the four
components focused fully on these priorities. The project indicators were well aligned with the
objectives and design of the project components.
Project design was thoughtful, clear and straightforward. Although the project included a
large number of activities at all levels of the health system from communities to tertiary care
hospitals, the design was very “tidy” and coherent. Each of the four components included three
5 Project identification was in October 2002, Project Concept Review in March 2003, appraisal in June 2004,
negotiations on November 3, 2004, Board approval on December 16, 2004, and effectiveness on January 27, 2005.
11
or four mutually supporting sets of activities. Activities were clearly identified, with a tightly
linked results chain that gave the project strong clarity of purpose and design. Management and
institutional arrangements were well-specified, capacity gaps were identified by thorough
assessments documented in PAD annexes, and early activities included to address them. There
were no co-financiers, and only two safeguard policies were triggered and well addressed.
GoTN was fully committed and provided strong leadership throughout. GoTN established a
project preparation team led by a senior officer of the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) with
members from all levels of the health system, academics, and representatives from the DANIDA
funded primary healthcare project. GoTN organized workshops starting in early 2002 to discuss
possible project design, content and the results framework.
Extensive detailed analyses during preparation informed the project design. These included:
Burden of disease study on all causes of mortality and morbidity;
Analysis of regional imbalances and required interventions that identified districts in need of
certain interventions;
Criteria were established to identify four districts including two tribal districts for
investments in the first year, targeting tribal communities and disadvantaged groups with the
worst health indicators;
In addition to a social assessment study, several supplementary studies provided information
on ways to increase access to quality health care for SC/STs and other underserved groups;
District mapping of public and private hospitals;
An analysis of facility planning needs in pilot districts and a health facility survey identified
needs for strengthening facilities;
An environmental assessment included waste management practices and patterns in a sample
of health facilities to inform needed improvements;
Study on drug prescription and dispensing practices;
Service norms and associated staffing and equipment norms were developed for rationalizing
services;
Public and private service providers were mapped;
Private health care providers in 15 of the (then) 29 districts were enumerated, a qualitative
study done on the private sector including informal service providers, and a study on
practices and attitudes of informal rural medical practitioners in Tamil Nadu was completed;
An institutional assessment identified needs for strengthening capacity of GoTN for PPPs,
anticipated staff availability and skill mix issues that might arise in implementing the revised
service norms and planned how to resolve them, systems for personnel management were
developed, and a mechanism for stakeholder/community participation put in place to enable
feedback from communities on the quality of care;
A public-private partnership policy framework and terms of reference (TORs) for a proposed
PPP oversight unit were prepared;
An Environmental Action Plan; and
A Tribal Development Plan.
Preparation for the AF included development of a detailed Governance Accountability Action
Plan (GAAP), as required in the region and as part of the recommendations of the Detailed
Implementation Review (DIR).
12
Stakeholders6 were deeply engaged in project design and preparation, with extensive use of
participatory processes. Development partners provided input in their areas of expertise; for
example, DANIDA was consulted for technical input on the HMIS. Project preparation included
extensive consultation with NGOs providing health outreach services in tribal areas, and with
private providers on their experience of partnering with GoTN to provide services (such as
emergency transport and reproductive and child health (RCH) services). GoTN made special
efforts to increase participation and enhanced ownership of the Social Assessment by actively
engaging staff at all levels of the DoHFW, beneficiaries (individuals and communities), donor
agencies, NGOs, community organizations, local authorities, the private sector and academic
institutions in consultations. The PAD detailed the extensive use of participatory processes in
project preparation including for the Tribal Development Plan, researching how best to increase
demand for services and address the special health needs of the tribal population.
The project design reflects careful thought about behaviors, behavior change, and incentives.
In addition to activities to expand and improve supply of services, the project also included
efforts to increase demand for services, with activities to inform underserved groups and
encourage them to access services. Behavior change (BCC) interventions for providers aimed for
greater responsiveness to poor. Noting that complex “soft” investments may get less attention
from implementers, the project team used a phased approach which began with both
infrastructure and non-infrastructure (“soft”) inputs, but required the “soft” investments to be
completed before the next phase of infrastructure investment could begin.
QER and other project reviews: The Bank-wide Quality Assurance Group (QAG) did not
conduct an assessment. Project design benefitted from the recommendations of a quality
enhancement review (QER) arranged by the Health, Nutrition and Population anchor in 2002
shortly before appraisal. The QER panel were “impressed by the scope and range of preparation
work… and … many positive aspects of the project. The Panel is confident that, if the points
discussed are addressed, a project of good quality at entry will result.” The appraisal package
included the QER report, and the PAD shows how thoughtfully the recommendations were taken
on board.7 A Quality Assessment of the Lending Portfolio (QALP-1) in 2008 concluded that:
“the project was well designed. The design built on the state's successful track record in health as
well as the lessons learned from nine other Bank-financed state health system strengthening
projects in India. The panel was pleased to note the strong focus on the poor, the involvement of
NGOs, and the attention to the growing problem of NCDs through well-designed pilot programs.
The project rightly focuses on emergency maternal and neonatal care including the need for an
effective transportation system. While innovative, the panel did not consider the project to have
been over-ambitious.” (QALP-1, p4) The QALP judged the project’s FM design to be very good.
6 Stakeholders included members from all levels of the health system, academics, the public and private sectors,
civil society, NGOs, academics, and DANIDA. 7 In additional to suggestions on improving explanations in the PAD, the panel recommended: rethinking some of
the indicators; greater clarity about how activities in areas such as personnel, information and financing could help
integrate centrally funded programs and state health services; more attention to ensuring adequate levels of staffing
in facilities used predominantly by the poor; policy dialogue and attention to the state budget for health and
financing mechanisms to reduce out-of-pocket payment for health; considering simplifying the project
implementation arrangements, and stronger economic analysis.
13
The project design incorporated the lessons learned from a systematic review in 2002 of all
Health Systems Development Projects implemented in India since 1995 that considered
future directions for health projects in India. The TNHSP was the first State health system
project designed after this review, and deliberately and explicitly reflected its findings and
recommendations – facilitated by having the same Task Leader as the review. Six key
recommendations/lessons are clearly reflected in the project design: (i) project objectives should
focus on health outcomes among the poor, and special efforts are needed to reach the poorest:
several studies and participatory activities during preparation measured access to and utilization
of health services by the poor and sought their input on how to increase their access and use, the
project activities target least-served areas and populations with poor health; (ii) new ways to
enhance health outcomes need to be explored: the project included pilot testing of innovations in
NCD care on a reasonably large scale with rigorous evaluation to assess their effectiveness; (iii)
deepen public-private partnerships (PPP) by going beyond contracting out “hoteling” functions
which do not impact clinical care: the project contracted with private and NGO providers to
deliver clinical services particularly in underserved areas and enhanced GoTN capacity in PPP;
(iv) special attention should be paid to sector planning which was often weak at state level: the
project set up a strategic planning unit to function as a policy advisory body and think tank; and
to improving the management of public hospitals: the project included measures to enhance
public hospital management including twinning with well-performing private hospitals; (v)
implementation of non-infrastructure “soft” investments typically gets too little attention and is
often a weakness of project performance: the TNHSP team thought carefully about how to phase
implementation and incentivize completion of “soft” investments, as noted above; (vi) centrally
sponsored health schemes (CSSs) and programs and state-financed health services should be
integrated better: the project’s many activities to strengthen the state health system would enable
better CSSs service delivery by improving provider skills and availability, equipment and
supplies, the health information system, state level health planning, etc..
Risk and mitigation measures. Risks and mitigation measures were appropriately identified.
The risk of inadequate budgetary allocations was discussed early with GoTN, assurances were
received, and this was regularly monitored and did not become a problem. Capacity for
implementation was assessed and additional staffing, training and improved management
systems included in the project. New procedures were discussed in detail during preparation, and
groundwork completed during preparation. Detailed preparation for procurement was completed
well before project effectiveness (including all Terms of reference, bid documents, technical
specifications, Requests for Proposals and the procurement plan), to try to avoid early delays.
2.2. Implementation
Especially given the complexity, innovations and long time period, implementation was very
good. As rated in the Implementation Status and Results (ISRs) reports, implementation was
satisfactory or moderately satisfactory during the initial five years of the project (before AF)
except for two ISRs in 2006 that rated Implementation Progress (IP) moderately unsatisfactory.
After AF approval, project implementation was consistently satisfactory (5 years and 9 months).
Ratings for Development Objectives (DO) were satisfactory in 20 of 23 ISRs and moderately
satisfactory in the other three. Annex 2 lists the outputs achieved under each project component.
14
Factors contributing to consistently strong project implementation:
Consistently strong commitment of the Government of Tamil Nadu (GoTN), irrespective of
which of the two main political parties were in power. Successive governments in TN have
given consistent high priority to health (and other social sectors), and to implementing the
2003 health policy. Health has been “above politics” – shifts in political power have not
affected the emphasis on health or the continuity in policy and its implementation.
Successive governments have retained the 2013 health policy, and built on the actions of
previous governments, continuing to strengthen service delivery to improve health outcomes.
The GoTN assigned experienced, very high caliber senior officials to manage the project and
to staff the Project Management Unit and other key posts. The continuity and low turnover
among staff (from 2007) was especially important given the scope and complexity of the
project (and a sharp contrast, for example, to the 9 project directors in 2 years in a health
project in another state in India). GTN’s complete commitment to ensuring the success of the
project comes through clearly in ISRs and AMs, and is noted in the QALP-1.
Strong mutual respect and trust between the Bank team and GoTN. The AMs, numerous
other project documents, and information from people involved in the project attest to the
productive professional relationship between the Bank and GoTN. This enabled frank
discussion and constructive joint problem-solving when needed. It is noteworthy that this
relationship was not at all disturbed by tensions related to the Detailed Implementation
Review (DIR) of five health projects in India 2006-2007.
As a state-level project, it was not affected by the DIR tensions and tendency to centralize
and tightly control fiduciary functions that affected several national projects. The State’s
independent management enabled the project to continue its focus on strengthening the state
health system, including fiduciary aspects, without disruption (although the project was
required to comply with enhanced reporting requirements on procurement and financial
management for several years after the DIR).
The project was fully integrated within Government structures at all levels. Project activities
were an integral part of the DoHFW’s work and activities. This further strengthened project
ownership throughout the DoHFW, boosted commitment and implementation performance,
and enhanced the likelihood of sustainability after project completion. All project activities
were mainstreamed and their full financing absorbed into the state health budget or
nationally-funded health programs during the final years of the project.
Use of a phased approach for most project activities to learn and adapt before scaling up in
all districts in the state. Most activities followed this approach -- training, CEmONCs,
HMIS, NCD interventions, health care waste management, rationalization of health care
facilities, and improving equipment maintenance and repairs. The phased approach to
infrastructure improvements, whereby system reforms and “soft” investments had to be
completed before the second phase of infrastructure upgrading could begin, was an effective
incentive for successful and timely implementation of activities that often lag.
Well-functioning routine monitoring and information flows and feedback triggered clear
actions to continuously improve performance. (Details are provided below, in the section on
M&E utilization.)
15
Extensive independent assessment and validation as important input into decisions. The
project commissioned numerous independent assessments of activities by academics and
other experts, that provided data and unbiased views on strengths and weaknesses of
implementation processes and outcomes. The project team used the findings constructively to
make improvements and decisions on whether to scale up, drop, or change activities.
A strong focus on capacity building and skill enhancement through training and retraining.
The training covered activities essential for efficiently delivering health services across all
public facilities. It included specialized skills for doctors and staff nurses in CEmONCs;
hospital administration and management skills for administrators, senior medical officers and
nursing superintendents; a range of skill training for clinical, paramedical and laboratory
technicians needed for NCD screening and treatment; use of the HMS/HMIS; quality of care
and accreditation interventions; infection control and health care waste management; poison
treatment, and rational use of medicines for all relevant health professionals; and training in
proper equipment use (ventilator, dialysis, echocardiogram) as needed. Continuous quality
assessments helped identify training and retraining needs.
Continuity and a strong Bank team. There was one task team leader from project
identification (2002) to approval of the AF (2010), and two until project closing (2010-2015).
The Bank team was mostly based in the Delhi office, so all the necessary skills (operations.,
financial management, procurement, environment, social safeguards, information technology,
and health care expertise) were readily available during regular supervision missions, and to
respond quickly as needed in between missions. The Operations Officer who joined the team
in 2007 was exceptionally effective in providing continuous supportive supervision, and
ensuring continuity and “institutional memory” for the team including during changes in the
task team leader. The Bank’s Lead Health Specialist was also located in Delhi until the final
months of the project. The team had excellent working relationships with the PMU and
DoHFW. Supervision was systematic, detailed and regular, and the MTR was on schedule,
well-planned, intensive and detailed. There was strong follow-up between missions and
quick resolution of items identified for action. The QALP panel rated supervision inputs and
process as HS, and all other aspects S, noting that: “The Bank task team was proactive and
dealt in a timely and creative way with the hurdles encountered. The panel was especially
impressed with actions such as the team visit to Hyderabad to review a successful model of
emergency transportation that was subsequently adopted for this project.”
Candor in project assessment ratings. The project ratings were realistic throughout the
project, and the team did not hesitate to recognize potential or actual problems and forcefully
bring them to the PMU and DoHFW in a timely manner (the IP rating was downgraded to
moderately unsatisfactory in two ISRs in 2006). Early detection of potential problems and
candid discussions throughout the project contributed to keeping the project on track. The
QALP panel “began with the view that some of the ISR ratings were slightly optimistic…,
but concluded that the team, overall, was justified in its ratings”, rating PDO ratings as HS
and IP ratings as S, noting that the team’s ratings sometimes seemed premature to the sector
manager but were validated by subsequent implementation.
Provision of Additional Financing and recognition of good project performance. The
intention was always to process AF to replace the $20 million reallocated to an Emergency
Tsunami Reconstruction Project in 2005, if progress was satisfactory. The Bank agreed to a
16
much larger AF operation to continue successful activities and scale-up well-performing
ones, notably the piloted NCD screening, prevention and treatment; the HMIS; and maternal
and neonatal health services. Justifiable pride in the project’s accomplishments and
reputation as one of the best performing projects, and the associated “Hawthorne effect”
likely contributed to continued strong implementation performance.
Project extensions enabled the HMIS roll-out to be completed and even expanded beyond the
originally intended scope. This is especially impressive in the light of numerous failed HMIS
efforts elsewhere. Extensions also provided enough time for smooth institutionalization and
absorption of activities by the DoHFW, carefully and well-informed assessment and planning
for future financing by the government, and for all planned assessments to be completed.
Factors that were outside the control of the government and caused implementation
difficulties.
The massive tsunami that struck eleven coastal districts of Tamil Nadu two weeks after
project approval in December 2004 caused large scale destruction. Diversion of GoTN’s
attention, efforts, and resources to disaster relief, recovery and reconstruction activities
delayed project implementation at the start, which would have been an intense period of
activity. Government attention was diverted entirely to managing the damage caused by
tsunami for at least the first half of 2005.
Delays caused by the freeze on all procurement activity for the 45-60 days before all
national, state and municipal elections under the “Model Code of Conduct”. The Model
Code of Conduct caused procurement activities to be put on hold – sometimes for several
months, delaying project implementation. The project was very proactive in requesting
exemptions to the freeze, but these were not always granted, including in 2010 and 2014.
Factors that caused implementation difficulties included:
Turnover of Project Directors in 2005-2006. The turnover of Project Directors (senior
officers from the Indian Administrative Service) in the first two years of project
implementation slowed project progress. There was however stability thereafter.
Ineffective financial management for 15 months. The long-vacant position of Financial
Advisor and Chief Accounting Officer (FA&CAO) early in implementation resulted in
inadequate attention to financial management, notably a delay in submitting the 2006-07
audit report, delays and inadequate follow up in settling advances drawn for training etc., and
inadequate project financial oversight over NGOs. These problems were resolved after GoTN
posted a well-qualified professional to the project in early 2008.
Slow initial procurement affected disbursement. Delays in procurement actions in the first 18
months of the project (especially for civil works and baseline studies) slowed initial project
implementation and disbursements. This was exacerbated by the procurement freeze required
by the Model Code of Conduct before the elections in 2005 and early 2006. Procurement
issues were subsequently resolved as a result of proactive actions by the PMU. The delayed
start of the project in 2005 due to the tsunami, and the procurement issues noted above
slowed disbursements particularly during the first 2 years of the project (2005-2006). Weekly
audio follow-up meetings between the Bank team in Delhi and the PMU in Chennai starting
December 2006 led to an improved pace of procurement and disbursements.
17
Difficulties with contracts to NGOs for providing emergency medical transportation. The
MTR concluded that the NGO contracting and contract management process was not
working well, and needed more oversight and monitoring and action to ensure strong
performance and achievement of the intended results. It recommended that the PMU consider
hiring an external agency to take over this task, and use performance based funding with
clearly defined selection and monitoring criteria, and robust financial control systems. The
GoTN contracted Emergency Management and Research Initiative (EMRI) who were
operating very successfully in Andhra Pradesh, to provide these services, which proved
successful.
The complexity and time needed to design, test, trouble-shoot, implement and make good use
of a new HMIS were underestimated. Conceptualizing, designing, and back-end work to set
up an HMIS/HMS system – especially one that links hundreds of facilities across the state
and multiple levels of the health system, replaces many legacy systems, introduces new work
flow and technologies, and relies on adequate server capacity and extensive end-user
behavior change – was an enormous task. After a slow start and significant implementation
challenges, the MTR team worried that there might not be enough time to fully roll out the
system, and persuaded GoTN to pilot the system in five hospitals before proceeding.
Turn-over of specialist doctors at CEmONCs. Despite the proactive efforts by DoHFW, loss
of specialists – particularly anesthetists – has left some CEmONCs short of the agreed
staffing during some periods. The agreed process of regular recertification of CEmONCs
(every six months) kept a spotlight on staffing relative to norms. This will require constant
monitoring and proactive action by DoHFW.
2.3. Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization
M&E design. Overall, the M&E design had many strengths, and reflected careful and logical
thought, consistent with “best practice thinking” about health systems. The “Flagship
Framework” on Health Systems Strengthening (developed by the Bank’s training institute with
Harvard University and other experts a few years before the project) defines three ultimate goals
of a health system: to improve the health of the population; to provide “financial protection”
(that is, to ensure that health care does not cause financial harm); and to provide patient
satisfaction. These three “ultimate outcomes” require a health system to provide good access,
quality, and efficiency, which the framework calls the “intermediate outcomes” by which to
judge a health system’s effectiveness. The project indicators cover all of these 6 outcomes.
Financial protection is measured less well than the other 5, in the numbers of people who
benefitted from the free ambulance and mortuary transport services, and the bed-grant scheme.8
The original project Results Framework (RF) in the PAD was comprehensive and logical,
developed in consultation with key stakeholders, and with input from the QER and other experts.
It reflected a clear results chain, with four appropriate outcome indicators to measure PDO
8 Financial protection was not a central explicit focus of the project -- activities to overcome financial barriers were
seen as increasing utilization/access. A community-based health insurance pilot added at the suggestion of the QER
panel was later dropped because it was judged likely to have little impact on achieving the PDO, especially in light
of the roll-out of the Special Minister’s health insurance scheme.
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progress – one for each component, and 22 fairly well-chosen intermediate outcome indicators
(IOIs) – one or two for each main activity. The PAD Annex 3 lists data sources, frequency, and
clear responsibility for data collection for all indicators.
The indicators for increased access and use of services, especially by the poorest and Tribal
groups, and for maternal and neo-natal mortality rates (adjusted for risk) were very important for
assessing the core impact of the project. Excellent systems were put in place as part of project
design for routinely collecting data on quality of care, utilization rates at health care facilities,
and hospital activities, and reviewing, analyzing, agreeing on actions and then continuously
following up. This enabled remarkable quality and impact improvements in a very short time.
The project design also included major investments to improve monitoring and evaluation
capacity through a new, integrated, system-wide HMIS to replace manual paper-based, time-
consuming reports that involved minimal feedback or basis for action. The new HMIS was
designed to track patient, service and management information, network all hospitals to track
referred cases, monitor changes in health outcomes, and provide feedback to service providers
and program managers for improved follow up and continuity of care. M&E design also included
an impressive number of independent evaluations of selected project activities that assessed the
impact of innovations – these included surveys and studies on NCDs, patient satisfaction, and
health services available to and used by tribal populations.
However, M&E design had some imperfections, despite the team following advice from the
QER. At appraisal, baseline data were available for only a few of the indicators, and most targets
were vague instead of SMART.9 Many targets were arbitrary placeholders (“10% increase”)
pending collection of baseline data, but relatively few were replaced later with carefully chosen
targets, as had been intended. As noted by the sector manager in ISR#6 (after baseline data had
been collected), targets that aimed only for an undefined increase or to maintain the baseline
value were disappointing in their lack of ambition. They probably reflect risk-aversion, and/or
inability to decide what might be feasible in the absence of evidence and experience on which to
draw. But this is a weakness in the project M&E design that was not well-addressed despite
creditable efforts by the team to improve the results framework during project implementation.
Despite the faults that can be found with the M&E design, it was stronger than in most projects,
especially considering how little experience in health system strengthening projects the team was
able to draw on a decade ago. The 2008 QALP noted that: “The task team, by its own admission,
struggled with getting the results framework right, not an easy task in a project of this type. To
its credit, the [Task Team] employed many experts and continue to revisit, refine and improve
the framework” – which was done in 2007, at AF, and again in 2014.
The 2007 RF revisions made well-considered improvements: over-broad and vague parts of two
of the IOs (e.g. “careful monitoring of the effectiveness of other NCD prevention activities”)
were dropped, base-line data were added, and indicator definitions refined. However, some
“Quality of Care” indicators measured efficiency and not quality (bed occupancy, number of
surgeries) or were ambiguous (night-time C-sections are only a valid quality indicator if they are
emergency and not elective procedures). Even the number of diagnostics tests in itself may not
9 Good practice requires targets that are Specific, Measureable, Agreed/Achievable/Assignable (clearly
defined responsibility), Relevant/Realistic, and Time-bound.
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indicate quality. In its zeal to monitor all of the many project activities, and probably over-
compensating for slow implementation in the first 3 years, the AF added an excessive number of
indicators – for several years the PMU diligently reported on 72 items. (To their great credit, the
documents prepared for each mission were impressively complete and detailed, with thorough
attention paid by both Bank and project teams to each item.) The decision to drop 38 IOIs and
supplementary indicators as the project neared its end, to focus on core activities and impact
measures, was understandable. However, instead of formally dropping the indicators, the Bank
could have agreed with GoTN that reporting was no longer required on the activities already
completed, and retained September 2014 as the target date for activities on which no further
detailed reporting was warranted.
M&E implementation.
The planned M&E was fully and well implemented. Data reporting to supervision missions and
in ISRs was impressive: comprehensive project status reports including data for the RF and all
project activities were provided every six months throughout the project. The range of data
sources used to monitor and report regularly on progress and results included: routine health
system records, routine project data, on-line monthly reports from the hospitals on a set of 20
indicators (Institutional Services Monitoring Report or ISMR), facility surveys, baseline and
endline surveys, and many detailed studies of selected project activities. Data were used well to
monitor progress, check that activities were achieving their desired results, and decide where
corrective actions were needed (details below). The PMU took good advantage of expertise in
the state, for example, partnering with the Christian Medical College in Vellore, the Indian
Institute of Technology, and the National Institute of Epidemiology (NIE) in Chennai to evaluate
pilots and other activities.
Three weaknesses are noted: (i) delays in baseline surveys – 15 months for the NCD baseline
studies for the pilots and for patient satisfaction surveys, (ii) changes in methodology in repeat
surveys of patient satisfaction that make trends difficult to assess; and (iii) mistaken entry of data
on the poorest 40% in the results reporting for SC/ST. This latter was noted when preparing the
2014 restructuring; detailed scrutiny found mistakes in the analysis of NSSO data in a 2007
consultant report. The Bank commissioned a careful new analysis (see Annex 10) to correct the
data for the indicator on access and utilization of services by the poorest 40% and ST/SC groups.
An impressive aspect of M&E implementation was the successful comprehensive Health
Management Information System (HMIS), despite its challenging and increased scope during the
project. Rolled out in a phased manner from December 2008 onwards, the HMIS comprises (i) a
Hospital Management System (HMS) which automates reporting on clinical activities in public
health care facilities; (ii) a Management Information System (MIS) which is an online reporting
platform for clinical and ancillary support services, national health programs and administrative
information for all public health facilities; (iii) the College Management System (CMS) to
capture data from government medical colleges; (iv) the University Automation System (UAS)
for data from the Tamil Nadu Dr. MGR Medical University; and (v) customized web-sites for 20
government medical colleges. By July 2015, the HMIS was fully functional in 264 secondary
care hospitals and at an advanced stage of implementation in the state’s 50 tertiary care hospitals;
the MIS had integrated 1,889 primary health centers, 264 secondary care hospitals, and 50
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tertiary care hospitals; and the CMS was operational in 20 government medical colleges. All
PHCs were reporting through the HMIS effectively, with all reports flowing to the Directorate of
Public Health (DPH), and all data from secondary care hospitals flowing to the Directorate of
Medical & Rural Health Services (DM&RHS). Over 165 million patient visits, 62.8 million
laboratory requests, 81.6 million pharmacy dispensations and 4.1 million in-patient visits had
been recorded in the system.
The new HMIS provides quick access to information of all important aspects of the health
system -- hospital activity and efficiency indicators (in-patient and out-patient data, referrals,
waste management, quality of care, morbidity/mortality), financial management information, and
human resources. In the final years of the project, project monitoring data were provided
exclusively from the HMIS. The HMIS system is a major project achievement, and has received
national and international awards.
A State Health Data Resource Center (SHDRC) was set up to collate, mine, and run higher order
analytics on data from over 20 Directorates of the Health Department. The SHDRC provides
easy to use dashboards for various levels of administrators and managers in the health
department. Its mandate is to drive and enable evidence-based planning, budgeting, management,
forecasting, monitoring and reviews by the DoHFW. The Center is managed by a consulting
firm, contracted (in 2015) to run the Center for two years, and then hand it over to the state, but
continue to maintain and support the activities of the Center until March 2021.
M&E utilization. The PMU was effective in using the data from all sources to make
improvements during project implementation. A few of many possible examples follow:
During the NCD pilots, an evaluation by the National Institute of Epidemiology (NIE) found
that patients were being lost in follow up for treatment, in response the PMU decided to issue
30 day supplies of medicines for hypertension and diabetes so that patients did not need to
visit health care facilities more frequently, and set up an online tracking system for patients
tested positive during screening. In response to the evaluation survey findings that (i)
shortages of staff nurses were affecting screening and treatment under the NCD programs,
and (ii) inadequate skills among health professionals for the NCD interventions, the PMU
sought approval from the State Empowered Committee to recruit nursing staff on contract,
and conducted periodic training programs to remedy specific gaps in knowledge and skills.
Assessments of IEC activities led to changes in the messages and methods used, and also
monitored the extent of changes in awareness and knowledge. The results of the pilot
evaluations were carefully incorporated into the design of the scaled up NCD programs.
Early in implementation, the PMU developed quality and utilization indicators to measure
hospital performance. All public hospitals reported these data monthly (Integrated Services
Monitoring Report). The project used the data to grade hospitals A to D every month;
hospitals with C and D grades were followed up to assess constraints and agree actions to
improve service delivery. Quality Circles of Excellence were set up in hospitals to track
progress, and develop and implement improvement actions. This proved be effective in
improving performance and quality of care at the hospitals.
The project and NHM and DoHFW instituted a practice of monthly reviews (by video/audio)
of every maternal death in which senior medical officials and relevant health facility staff
21
discuss the causes and actions to prevent future similar situations. This contributed to the
substantial fall in maternal deaths in the state.
The HMIS system assigns a unique patient identification number (PIN) to track all health
services provided to each patient, and make the patient medical record available at all points
of care. When the number of PINs began to exceed the estimated number of patients using
the public health system, it was realized that some patients were registering multiple times
(after losing their PIN). A concerted intensive state-wide campaign explained how the PIN
was used and the benefits of having a unique PIN, as a result of which patients made sure to
keep and use their PIN on each encounter (pasting them in notebooks, keeping them on a
small laminated card, etc.).
Despite the extensive use of data generated and reported for the project and by key project
activities, there is still unrealized potential to use the data to improve efficiency, quality, and
allocation of resources. For example, detailed data on the actual use of pharmaceuticals and
medical supplies could enable more accurate projections of need and trigger re-supply. The
established of the SHDRC is intended to realize this potential, which could make Tamil Nadu a
global leader in this area.
2.4. Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance
The project was classified as a Category B and triggered two safeguard policies: OP/BP/GP 4.01
Environmental Assessment and OD 4.20 Indigenous Peoples. Both policies were handled well
and rated satisfactory in all ISRs. There was full compliance with all Bank requirements.
Environmental aspects. Improving management of health care waste and fully institutionalizing
the activities across all programs and facilities in the state under the project were exemplary. A
sound comprehensive Health Care Waste Management (HCWM) Plan was developed. It was
implemented in a phased manner -- first as a pilot in 2006, and based on satisfactory pilot
implementation, from 2008 it was scaled up steadily in 449 health facilities including secondary
care, tertiary care and ESI hospitals, and thirty-bedded PHCs. At AF, health waste management
was integrated with infection control, in line with emergent good practice, referred to as
Infection Control and Waste Management (ICWM). HCWM/ICWM activities were proactively
supervised by a Bank specialist. Implementation and adequacy were assessed at various stages
including near the end of the project (2014). Over 49,500 health personnel from 449 public
health institutions were trained and retrained in health care waste identification, collection,
segregation, disinfection, and disposal, through a network of 9 Regional Training Centers
established by TNHSP. Supervision missions found adequate availability of color coded bins and
bags, trolleys, needle destroyers, protective gear, consumables, handbooks on infection control
and biomedical waste management, IEC materials and training modules. PPPs were established
with 30 Common Treatment Facilities (CTFs) where waste was collected, disinfected and
disposed of. From 2013, the cost of implementation of the HCWM plan was financed through
the NHM, with the project financing training only.
Findings of a comprehensive end-line assessment in 2014 included the following: (i) all hospitals
were implementing Infection Control and Waste Management (ICWM) and had access to CTFs,
(ii) 95% of respondents had been trained in ICWM, 60% mentioned need for additional refresher
22
training and training for new recruits, 89% were fully satisfied with the quality, relevance and
method of training, (iii) best practice of labelling bins was observed in 60% of facilities, (iv)
92% facilities had storage room for biomedical waste, (v) sharps disposal “hub cutters” to
replace needle destroyers were available in 75% of hospitals,10 (vi) 78% of hospitals had an
infection control officer for monitoring ICWM processes, and 80% had infection control
committees. The assessment provided reassurance of well-implemented ICWM and offered
minor suggestions for improvements (e.g. on-line training, better reporting of needle-stick
injuries).
Indigenous peoples. Consistent with the project’s objective of improving health care outcomes
among vulnerable groups including women, ST/SC groups, the poor and populations in remote
areas, a Social Assessment was conducted with good participation of key stakeholders. This
informed preparation of a Tribal Development Plan (TDP) also done in a highly consultative
manner (October 2003) to develop appropriate and carefully chosen interventions to increase
access to health care in tribal areas.
There were some challenges in implementing the TDP. NGOs varied in their willingness to
partner with Government, which was eased by Project efforts to engage with NGOs regularly
through consultations and meetings in the field (facilitated by the Bank). Training/capacity
building of NGOs/field workers could have been improved. It took a long time for proper
guidelines to be finalized and then communicated to the NGOs and field staff. Turnover of field
staff of NGOs was a problem, and repeated capacity building was needed. The NGO consultants
who were supposed to do field supervision of the various NGO activities were never fully on
board, so adequate monitoring of various NGO activities remained a challenge. While the NHM
has taken over various programs for tribal populations, effective absorption of the activities will
require close collaboration between the DoHFW and the NHM.
Despite the challenges in implementation, a 2014 end-line assessment of four of the five
activities carried out under the project found strong results. A survey of the targeted population
found high levels of use and satisfaction with the services and their quality.
Financial management (FM). Overall, financial management was satisfactory. The financial
management arrangements for the project were completely mainstreamed within the regular
government funds flow and accounting systems and procedures. Twenty of the 23 ISRs rated FM
in the satisfactory range (S/MS). Three ISRs (May and October 2007 and April 2008) rated
financial management performance moderately unsatisfactory, largely due to slow
disbursements. Slow disbursements during the initial years were mainly due to delays: in
procurement actions, in releases from the Treasury, in the appointment of the Financial
Advisor/Chief Accounting Officer, and in the submission of monthly financial reports from the
TNMSC and PWD. These issues were satisfactorily addressed. The Bank agreed to the GoTN’s
proposal to change the funds flow mechanism by creating a Society at the state level (an
independent legal entity) for implementing all project activities other than civil works,
equipment and goods. Delays in settlement of advances drawn on training etc. were also
10 To prevent accidental needle sticks, used needles need to be safely disposed of, and re-use prevented. “Hub
cutter” needle-syringe disposal devices cut up the entire device, so the used needle does not have to be removed.
23
addressed. The PMU also took actions to strengthen control and monitoring of NGO contracts by
holding regular annual performance reviews before renewal of contracts, reviewing the cost
elements and building in an institutional fee to NGOs. All audit reports and IFRs were submitted
but in some cases with a small delay. The Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) conducted
external audits per terms of reference agreed with the Bank, Department of Economic Affairs
and CAG. Very few financial statements of the PMU were qualitied and in one instance, because
of a special opinion, an accountability flag was triggered. All issues were addressed to the
satisfaction of the auditors and their observations were answered and resolved. There were no
unresolved audit objections. For the AF, a Governance and Accountability Action Plan (GAAP)
was prepared, and as part of the GAAP, Interim Unaudited Financial Reports (IUFRs) and
internal and external audit reports were hosted on the website of the project. For the AF, it was
agreed to shift to report-based disbursements.
Procurement. Procurement activities were under the overall direction of the Project Director.
The PMU was directly responsible for procuring consultancy services, and coordinated other
procurements. The GoTN Public Works Department (PWD) was the implementing agency for
civil works under the overall control of PMU. The Tamil Nadu Medical Services Corporation
(TNMSC), as the GoTN Procurement Agent, procured all equipment and goods. Capacity to
handle procurement was assessed as adequate and the procurement risk as average. A
procurement plan for the first 18 months was agreed prior to project approval. For the AF, the
Electronics Corporation of Tamil Nadu (ELCOT) was the procurement agent for information
technology (IT) hardware and associated supplies/services for HMIS. The AF assessed the
overall procurement risk as substantial.
As noted above, project implementation was slowed at the start by delays in procurement actions
by PWD and TNMSC, lack of interest by potential bidders in the first 18 months of the project
and in 2008, and slow decisions in processing two consulting services. The massive Tsunami that
struck Tamil Nadu a few days after project approval, causing huge destruction and diversion of
Government’s resources and attention to recovery efforts, greatly contributed to the initial
delays. Procurement issues were subsequently resolved. The triggering of the Model Code of
Conduct by the announcement of elections also put on hold decisions on procurement actions at
critical times of project implementation. Despite these issues, the PMU’s strong team, GoTN’s
commitment to the project’s success, and the Bank’s regular intensive implementation support
throughout the project ensured satisfactory completion of all procurement activities. The Bank
conducted regular ex-post procurement reviews and the PMU took actions as needed in a timely
manner to address issued raised. Overall procurement performance was moderately satisfactory.
2.5. Post-completion Operation/Next Phase
The GoTN is keen to continue its partnership with the World Bank, and is developing a proposal
for technical and financial assistance for a second Health Systems Development Project.
It is greatly to the credit of the GoTN that no immediate follow-up operation was needed to
sustain the project activities, which had all been fully mainstreamed. Transition planning was an
integral part of the project design, and GoTN ensured that programs continued without
interruption, and with adequate financing. Well before project closing, the GoTN started to
absorb project activities into the work and budget of the NHM and the DoHFW (e.g., mobile
24
outreach, counselling services, the bed grant scheme, heath waste management, emergency
transport, HMIS,) with only essential inputs (technical support and monitoring and evaluation)
continuing from the project. By the end of the project, all major activities funded by IDA under
the project had been taken on by the DoHFW Directorates for continued implementation as
engineers, IT coordinators) and other additional staff approved for the programs were retained
and transferred to the Directorates so that programs remained fully staffed. GoTN and NHM are
fully funding these activities. Project assets have been handed over to the Directorates. The few
project programs such as State Health Data Resource Centre, 108 Emergency Ambulance
Services, and Free Mortuary Van Services not integrated into regular DoHFW operations are
continuing, implemented by the TNHS Society, funded by the GoTN, and housed/located in the
Directorate of Medical Services (DMS) Annex. GoTN is continuing the innovations started and
supported under the project including ongoing public private partnership program contracts.
ICWM is a good example of the integrated mainstreaming of project activities. ICWM is now
implemented and monitored by the Directorates of Medical and Rural Health services, Public
Health and Preventive Medicine, and Medical education. To ensure sustainable capacity for
ICWM training, the project strengthened 9 Regional Training Centers. Institutionalization and
strengthening of HCWM in public health institutions under the project was exemplary, and
ICWM activities were integrated across all vertical programs in the state.
3. Assessment of Outcomes
Given the change in the PDO under the AF in 2010, two project phases are assessed, before and
after the AF: 2005 to April 2010, and May 2010 to closing in September 2015. The main
difference was the progression from piloting NCD interventions in the original project, to scaling
them across the state under the AF. The project performed well in all three outcome aspects—
relevance, meeting and exceeding objectives, and efficiency.
3.1. Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation
The project’s relevance is High in all aspects – objectives, design and implementation, for both
phases.
Relevance of Objectives – (rating: High)
The project objective of significantly improving the effectiveness of the health system in Tamil
Nadu responded fully to the state’s needs and policy priorities, and to the Bank’s assistance
strategy, both at appraisal and now. It was ahead of the strong global shift in emphasis to
strengthening health systems (HSS). HSS was advocated in the Bank’s Strategy for Health,
Nutrition and Population Results (2007) which also noted the importance of M&E systems (p. 6),
and concern that the increasing burden of NCDs would strain countries’ health systems. The
project focus on improving effective health services delivery, and access, utilization, and health
outcomes for all, especially marginalized groups, anticipated today’s global focus and
commitment to Universal Health Coverage.
25
The GoTN’s Health Policy (2003) identified strengthening hospital services and quality
(especially at district and sub-district levels) and preventive health as priorities, aimed for
ambitious reductions in IMR and MMR, to improve the health status of the general population
with an emphasis on poor and the disadvantaged, and to address non-communicable diseases.
The project fully reflects these, which remain current health policy. The GoTN DoHFW Policy
Note on Health 2015-16 provides a comprehensive update on health outcomes and services in the
state, including sections explicitly on the project, because the project is fully part of GoTN health
policy. The Policy as set out in 2003 remains in force.
The project objectives remained Highly relevant to successive Country Strategies for India
(2009-2012 and 2005-200811), and to the Bank’s current Country Partnership Strategy (CPS)
for India (2013-2017). The CPS focuses on using the Bank’s financing, knowledge, advisory
services and technical assistance in catalytic and transformative ways to strengthen health
delivery systems, improve access to services for excluded segments of the population, reduce
rates of maternal and infant mortality, address the growing burden of non-communicable
diseases, and improve delivery systems by strengthening accountability and M&E systems (p.
20-21, 27-28, CPS Summary). In lending to more advanced states, the CPS focus is on
innovative and transformative activities to test second generation approaches which can then be
applied to low-income states that often have limited capacity (p 30, 33). This was one of the
explicit justifications for the project’s AF.
Relevance of Design and implementation – (rating: High)
The design of the original project and AF was highly relevant and remained so throughout
implementation. The PDO clearly defined four sets of activities through which the overall goal
would be achieved, and one component was devoted to each of the four. Each component
included three or four intermediate results that were logically linked, with clearly defined
activities for each. The activities explicitly addressed constraints on access, utilization and
quality of health services in Tamil Nadu, with a dedicated set of activities to serve tribal groups.
The indicators kept the focus on the poorest 40% of the population (a key target group for the
Bank’s current “twin goals”). The PAD clearly explains how the project activities relate to the
identified constraints. For example, data on the main causes of most maternal and neo-natal
deaths informed the decision to provide free emergency transport and upgrade facilities to enable
them to provide 24 hour emergency obstetric and neo-natal care. Data and studies documented
Tamil Nadu’s growing burden of NCDs, so the project design included a dedicated component to
11 The project objectives were highly relevant to the third pillar of the Bank’s Country Strategy for India (2009-
2012, p. 2, 14, 16), consistent with the themes of India’s 11th plan (2007-2012). The first of 5 health targets in
India’s 11th five year plan was to reduce the IMR to 28 and MMR to 100. The vision of the 11th Plan was “to ….
ensure broad based improvement in the quality of life….especially of the poor, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes, other Backward classes….create access to essential services in health…. especially for the poor… and good
governance.” The project objectives were also highly relevant to the Bank’s Country Strategy for India (2005-2008)
“…to reduce the health risks of the poor – by improving health outcomes including reductions in maternal and infant
mortality, by improving the overall health system of the states, by focusing on the access to and quality of health
services for the poor, by breaking new ground in forging public-private partnerships, and by reorienting health
facilities to ensure service for the poor, to reallocating public resources to priority areas for the poor, and to
improving governance and service delivery” (p. 31, 38-39, CAS).
26
improve NCD prevention and better enable the health system to detect and treat important
NCDs. Selection of activities was informed by current data on cost-effectiveness and “best buys”
in health.
The project design focus on partnering with the private/NGO sector through PPPs was well
aligned with the Government’s approach and Bank strategy. It was a sensible approach given the
limited capacity of the government’s own health service delivery network, and the very high use
of private sector health services by the population at all income levels. The services that were
delivered through PPPs with private/NGO providers were all things for which the public sector
did not have a comparative advantage (emergency transportation, service delivery to tribal
populations and in remote areas, disposal of health waste, counselling services, diagnostic
laboratory tests). One of many examples of good project design was that the project made the
capital investments (e.g. procured the ambulances) and then “contracted out” operation and
maintenance to NGO/private partners (many of which would not have been able to finance the
needed investments).
All project investments in infrastructure and equipment were informed by careful assessments of
existing situations and needs to achieve the desired reforms and improvements. Investments
included all necessary inputs for the expected output and outcome: equipment, drugs and
supplies, staff increases, training in skills and protocols, supportive supervision and quality
assurance, as well as demand-side activities. Moreover, these mutually reinforcing inputs appear
to have been well phased, sequenced and coordinated, which is an even greater design and
implementation accomplishment. Reforms and “soft” activities such as training, behavior
change, and new quality assurance mechanisms were thoughtfully timed relative to “hardware”
investments in buildings and equipment. The phased approach facilitated effective
implementation. Pilots and first phases were large enough in scale to test innovative and complex
interventions, learn from them, adjust design details, and then appropriately scale up.
Incorporating the new HMIS system as part of the project was important to being able to monitor
and evaluate the effectiveness of the health system, and hence a key part of the project design.
The phased approach to its development and implementation – and to other innovative or
complex activities – enabled design details to be refined and improved during implementation.
This approach, as well as the quality of the project design, and its forward-looking focus on
strengthening the health system to be able to cope with emerging as well as current health care
needs, resulted in very little need for changes in the project scope or design, despite its long
implementation period of more than 10 years. The MTR in 2007, the QALP in 2008, and the AF
processing in 2010 all gave the objectives, design and implementation thorough scrutiny, and all
concluded that the relevance was strong. The change at AF from piloting NCD programs to
scaling up state-wide was a natural progression. The few (minor) activities that were dropped
were in response to changed circumstances, to avoid duplication of effort, and a clear-eyed
judgement on their likely contribution to the PDO.
Institutional and implementation arrangements were based on two sound principles: (1) placing
project management responsibility within the DoHFW, given its responsibility for the state’s
health sector, and (2) the full use of the different health system actors for project implementation.
PMU staff were deputed from different health Directorates, and consultants were recruited only
27
when necessary because the DoHFW or other state agency did not have the specialized skills
needed, or capacity to take on additional tasks. Project extensions were fully justified and
provided sufficient time for critical institutional capacity building and mainstreaming of project
activities, helping ensure a high likelihood of sustainability of the Bank’s investments.
3.2. Achievement of Project Development Objectives (rating: Phase 1 – Substantial;
Phase 2 – High)
As noted in the section on M&E design, the project indicators enable a fairly complete
assessment of changes in the effectiveness of the health system. The impact of the project on the
well-being of Tamil Nadu’s population is assessed through the three “ultimate outcomes” by
which to measure health system performance – health outcomes, financial protection, and
patient satisfaction. The indicators include patient satisfaction; for health outcomes the
important indicators for maternal and infant mortality; and some (although inadequate) measure
of the extent to which the project improved financial protection, through numbers who benefitted
from various free services. The indicators also include various measures of the three intermediate
outcomes by which to measure health system performance – access, quality and efficiency.
Summary of Project Achievements against Results Indicator Targets
Phase 1: 2005 - March 2010 Phase 2: April 2010 - 2015
PDO Intermediate PDO Intermediate
Surpassed 2 1 4 16
Achieved 3 10 5 14
Partially Achieved 0 0 112 113
Not Met 0 114 0 114
Data not available 3 3 0 0
Total indicators 8 15 10 32
% surpassed and/or achieved
(indicators with available data) 100% 92% 90% 94%
Phase 1: effectiveness on December 16, 2004 through AF approval in March 2010
Phase 2: AF (when the PDO was revised) to project closing.
Most project indicator targets were met and many surpassed (summarized in the table above and
detailed in Data Sheet Table F). The only PDO indicator not fully met was the percentage of
caesarean sections (C-sections) that were among ST/SC women. Given the large increase in C-
sections from 15% to 26% of all deliveries in public facilities, the shortfall from this target is not
considered a problem.15 The indicator on use of helmets is relevant for traffic accident fatalities
12 93% of target for “C-section deliveries among SC/ST mothers at secondary level CEmONCs”. 13 “Availability of staff according to norms at all project facilities” was met for 79% of project health facilities (211
out of 267) - an excellent improvement on 8% (22 facilities) in 2005. An IEC unit to coordinate all activities across
the state was not set up in DoHFW. 14 Improved helmet use was not achieved (dropped at AF). 15 An independently conducted study (financed by the project) confirmed that C-sections done at CEmONCs were
medically indicated in response to complications. Women with pregnancy complications were increasingly referred
to CEmONCs – as intended. Treatment for pregnancy complications in Government facilities increased from 46% in
DLHS3 to 64% in DLHS4, and treatment for post-delivery complication rose from 48% to 59%. Thus the
CEmONCs were dealing with more complicated cases, and their rate of C-sections was within internationally
accepted norms for both SC/ST women and other women.
28
but is not a measure of the effectiveness of the health system but of police enforcement of traffic
safety regulations and related state policy.
Assessed using the project indicators only, the project’s achievement of its objectives was much
better than satisfactory. An assessment of whether the project made Tamil Nadu’s health system
more effective follows, drawing on other data in addition to project indicators to assess each of
the six aspects of health system performance.
The original PDO in the PAD explicitly included “both private and public” parts of the health
system. Most project activities were in the public sector, and project indicators measure impact
on public sector effectiveness, as well as that of the NGOs and other private sector service
providers contracted under the PPPs and informal health care providers (including traditional
medicine practitioners) trained under the project. However, this excludes many private facilities
and health care providers. The GoTN (like the rest of India) has almost no oversight over private
sector health care providers. Changing this would have required a difficult, major policy shift
and new enforcement capacity, and was not the intention of the project. The project could have
had an indirect impact on the effectiveness of the private health sector if, by improving the
quality and availability of services provided by the public sector, private providers improved
their own effectiveness in order to compete. There could be a direct impact through a
demonstration effect if private providers adopted treatment protocols or other good practices
developed under the project, and also as a result of providers moving from the public sector into
the private sector after their skills and capacity had been improved by project activities. No
measures are available of the effectiveness of only the private sector, but all data from the NSSO
and other household surveys (for example on health outcomes) reflect the effectiveness of the
whole health system, both private and public.
Ultimate Performance Measure 1 - Health Outcomes. Rating: High (both phases)
The state NFHS surveys 3 and 4 (2005-06 and 2015-16) and the 2010 Census show marked
improvement in TN’s infant mortality per 1,000 live births from 30 in 2005 to 24 in 2010 and 21
in 2015 (nearly half the India national rate of 40 in 2015), and in under-five mortality which fell
from 35 in 2005 to 27 in 2010, with no additional decrease in 2015. Tamil Nadu had by far the
largest decline in IMR of all states in India in the decade before 2010: 46%, a full ten percentage
points more than the states with the next-largest falls in IMR (IMR fell 29% nationally). Tamil
Nadu also has one of the smallest disparities between male and female under-five and infant
mortality in India. There were also improvements in all measures of child nutrition status (see
Annex 10). The maternal mortality ratio (MMR) fell steadily from 134 in 2003, to 97 in 2009-11,
79 in 2012-14, and 68 in 2015, less than half of the all-India rate of 167 per 100,000 births.
Although population-wide data are not available for trends in NCD outcomes, the available data
on risk factors and from evaluations commissioned by the project suggest that a positive impact
is likely to have been achieved. Between 2005 and 2015, there was a notable decline in the
percent of adult men using tobacco from 40% to 32%, and from 2.8% to 2.2% among women,
and high percentages (40% of women and 23% of men) who used tobacco at the time of the 2015
NFHS reported having tried to stop during the past 12 months. Data on other NCD risk factors
were collected for the first time in the 2015 NFHS, so no trend data are available.
29
The NCD screening and treatment programs achieved extensive state-wide population coverage:
77% of people over 30 years of age were screened for hypertension. Evaluations commissioned
by the project found substantial improvements in diastolic and systolic blood pressure among
patients who were regularly followed up. Diabetes screening covered 61% of the population over
30 years of age. Of women aged 30-60 years, 71% were screened for cervical cancer and 86%
for breast cancer. This resulted in a dramatic increase in case detection and – despite some loss to
follow-up – in treatment for these diseases. Although no data are available on treatment
outcomes, it is safe to assume a significant gain in disability-adjusted life-years (DALYs - a
combined measure of prevented deaths and illness). Tamil Nadu has one of the highest burdens
of road-traffic fatalities and injuries in India; the large increase in the percentage of calls for
ambulances after road traffic accidents that were served from 66% in 2009-2010 to 87% in
2014/2015 (exceeding the project target of 79.4%), as well as the investments in hospital
capacity to provide emergency care, are very likely to have improved outcomes for traffic
accident victims.
There certainly are other factors that would have contributed to improved health outcomes
in the absence of the project. During the project period, fertility levels continued to decline,
literacy among women and men to improve, electricity reached most of the 11% of households in
the state who had not had it in 2005, households using clean energy for cooking rose from 31%
to 73% (removing a major risk factor for NCDs), and households using improved sanitation rose
from only 22% to 52%. Much more sophisticated analytic work would be needed than is possible
for this report to try to disentangle the impact of these and other relevant factors from the impact
of the project activities on the improvements in health outcomes in Tamil Nadu over the course
of the project. But the project’s contribution was clearly substantial, given the strong declines in
the rates of neonatal and maternal mortality in project facilities, and the fact that by 2015, 67%
of all institutional deliveries took place in public facilities (see next paragraph).
4 (% = total disbursed/final disbursed amount) 42.65% 57.35%
5 Weigh value (2 x 4) =5x42.65 =6x57.35
6 Final Outcome Rating 2.13 3.44 5.57=HS
Note: HU (1); U (2); MU (3); MS (4); S (5); HS (6)
3.5. Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts
(a) Poverty, Gender Aspects, and Social Development The project central focus on poverty and vulnerability in improving access to, utilization of, and
improved quality and efficacy of public health services particularly by poor, disadvantaged and
tribal groups has been well covered already. Loss of productivity and health care costs are a key
cause of poverty and worsened impoverishment – the improved effectiveness of the health
system and better access to free care would have reduced both. The Tribal Development Plan and
interventions targeted to tribal groups were a core part of the project. In addition to specific
interventions to strengthen service delivery (ensuring adequate medical staff in PHCs, Health
Service Centers and government hospitals in tribal areas, IEC activities and counsellors in PHCs
and general hospitals in tribal areas to encourage use of health services, increased services access
through PPPs with NGOs to provide regular mobile outreach services, the bed grant scheme to
provide free hospitalization in selected private hospitals – as well as free care provided in TN’s
public hospitals), the project also addressed a specific health need of the tribal population –
sickle cell anemia, and arranged for pregnant tribal women to stay at PHCs prior to delivery to
encourage institutional deliveries. The project also gave priority to the poorest regions and
communities with the worst health outcomes in selecting facilities to be the first to get EmONCs.
Criteria for selecting secondary hospitals for upgrading included health indicators (IMR and
MMR), and those that served populations below the poverty line, and in tribal areas.
39
The benefits to the poorest 40% population and ST/SC groups surpassed project targets, with
1.84 million tribal people living in remote rural areas treated through mobile outreach health
services, 11,889 people receiving free hospitalization under the bed grant scheme, and 1.936
million patients using counseling services in tribal PHCs and hospitals. The 30 four-wheel drive
vehicles to transport patients over difficult terrain increased uptake of services by tribal groups
from 16,000 in 2013-2014 to nearly 27,000 in 2014-2015. IEC activities included use of
traditional media such as street plays that brought messages into poor communities, in addition
to use of mass media and print materials that have much lower penetration in poor communities.
Interventions to reduce maternal mortality, cervical and breast cancer obviously benefit women
primarily, and women also benefitted from all other project interventions. In addition, project
preparation included development of a Gender Plan to ensure that all components were sensitive
to the specific needs, constraints, and situation of women.
(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening The project emphasis on institutional development in all activities has been noted above –
notably extensive training of health care staff at all levels in clinical, managerial and process
skills; and setting up the new SHDRC, Strategic Planning Cell, PPP Unit, and system for
inventory control, maintenance and repair of all medical equipment. The project was
instrumental in overcoming GoTN wariness of working with the private sector, demonstrating
the benefits and efficiencies that could be gained through careful contracting. As experience and
skill were gained in contracting, the project began to move from fixed-cost to performance-based
contracts to ensure better value for money and incentivize contracted partners.
The staff and functions of the various cells in the PMU have been absorbed into the relevant
Directorates of the DoHFW without any loss of the expertise and capacity developed under the
project, and project activities smoothly transferred. The additional nurses contracted under the
project have also been added to the state regular payroll. Accreditation of 12 hospitals helped
build hands-on capacity in the Directorates of DoHFW on all quality dimensions of health
service delivery, and has enabled the state to begin the process towards accreditation of another
46 hospitals.
(c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative) Although the demonstration effect of the project was intended, the extent of its influence went
beyond expectations. In addition to the other state governments, the project has also been visited
by USAID, JICA and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (among others), and has had a very
strong influence on national level policies. The extent to which the processes and evaluations
have been documented and disseminated has also been beyond expectations, covering policy,
administration, financial, operational and management aspects. Another unplanned benefit was
the introduction of a unique patient identification number (PIN) that is able to be integrated with
the identifier provided by the Gol Aadhaar program, and also the extension of the HMIS to
include medical colleges and the Tamil Nadu Dr MGR Medical University. Third, the project
provided complete administration and management support for rolling out the state-wide Chief
Minister’s Health Insurance Scheme after 2008. This scheme had not been envisaged when the
project was being developed.
40
3.6. Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholders Workshops
The GoTN held a workshop of stakeholders in Chennai on August 28 and 29, 2015 to solicit
stakeholders’ views on the project’s performance, capture and disseminate experiences, discuss
innovative interventions under the project, discuss challenges and recommend actions to help
address them. Stakeholders included officials from the GoI, GoTN, Governments of Kerela and
Uttar Pradesh, former and current Project Directors, NIE, Indian Council of Medical Research,
academic institutes, Institute of Public Health, officials of various DoHFW Directorates, project
hospitals, Medical Colleges, consultants, NGOs, PPP providers, civil society, and project staff,
as well as eight WB staff. Topics covered project interventions and support to maternal and child
health, HMIS, health care quality, health care waste management, surveys and studies, PPPs, the
Tamil Nadu Chief Minister’s Comprehensive Health Insurance Scheme, tribal health, and NCDs.
Findings are presented in Annex 6. In summary, there was consensus on the strong achievements
made under the project in reducing maternal and infant mortality, improving tribal health,
implementing NCD interventions, strengthening monitoring and evaluation including the HMIS,
improving quality of care and HCWM, and strengthening secondary care hospitals, and making
progress on adequate staffing of public health facilities across the state. There was a shared
conviction that the project has helped improve the functioning of Tamil Nadu’s health system,
and brought together and helped develop a talented group of officials who are now working in
the DoHFW, and will be able to sustain and continue the project impact. A continuing theme
throughout the workshop was the commitment to continue all activities implemented under the
project. Appreciation was expressed for the World Bank’s expertise and rigorous implementation
support throughout the project, complementing Bank financing to help put in place a robust
health sector system and to scale successful ideas.
4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome
Rating: Negligible risk that the PDO will not be maintained, given strong commitment at all
levels in Tamil Nadu to build on the successes and lessons learned under the project, the strong
M&E system, and the availability of financing from the NHM and state budget to continue
activities.
The justifications for the negligible risk assessment are as follows: (i) continued strong
commitment of the GoTN to and its full ownership of the project development objective and
activities including public-private partnership programs, outsourcing contracts and other
innovations started under the project. (ii) Project activities are fully mainstreamed and integrated
into the work programs and budget of Tamil Nadu’s DoHFW. All programs and activities have
been handed over to the Directorates of DOHFW for continued implementation as regular
departmental activities. All contract staff and other new staff sanctioned under the project have
been transferred to the Directorates along with the programs. GoTN and NHM are fully funding
these activities. The State Health Data Resource Centre, 108 Emergency Ambulance Services,
and Free Mortuary Van Services have been retained and funded by GoTN through the TNHS
Society. The GoTN is acting fully on its commitment to provide state budgetary funding for any
activities not financed by the NHM. (iii) The project administrative structure, formalized as the
TNHS Society, together with the DoHFW, has built a strong consistent track record in
implementation performance. (iv) There has been consistent demonstrated strong capacity in
41
monitoring and evaluating project programs, and a culture of evidence-based decision making.
Data are being collected routinely and scrutinized to continue this. (v) TN is justly proud of
being the first state or among the first in India to start and implement innovative activities such
as the HMIS, a large scale NCD program, tapping into the resources of the private sector and
NGOs to help deliver carefully chosen priority health services through PPPs and out-sourcing,
focusing on quality of services simultaneously with infrastructure investments, and developing
and applying more realistic staffing needed to deliver defined services to clear standards, starting
with the CEmONCs. The strong sense of achievement and commitment bode well for the future
sustainability of the programs put in place under the project.
It should however be noted that full success of (i) the NCD interventions will depend heavily on
adequate follow up for confirmatory diagnosis and appropriate treatment of patients who test
positive during screening, and (ii) the CEmONCs in delivering effective 24x7 maternal and neo-
natal health services will depend on continued adequate staffing of specialists and staff nurses.
5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance
5.1. Bank Performance
(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry
Rating: Satisfactory. As discussed earlier (Sections 2.1 and 3.1), project objectives and design
were strongly relevant and remained relevant, and were fully aligned with government and Bank
priorities. The project benefitted from extensive analytic work including an organizational
review of Tamil Nadu’s DoHFW and a quality enhance review in 2002 of the Bank’s experience
in India since 1995 with health systems development projects to inform future directions, and
from workshops in India to disseminate and discuss the review findings. Lessons were
incorporated, as noted in the PAD, p.8-9, for example on the need for special efforts to reach the
poorest and to measure their access to and utilization of health services; to proactively explore
possibilities for experimenting with news ways to improve the public health sector, including
opportunities to partner with private sector providers in underserved areas; and to pay attention
to strategic planning and management in order to strengthen hospital management. The Bank
team engaged fully with important relevant stakeholders in developing the project.
Implementation arrangements were appropriate, and, apart from some baseline surveys, the
project was fully ready for implementation by effectiveness, including a detailed procurement
plan for the first 18 months of planned activities. Risks were sensibly identified and well
mitigated through project design and preparation. Some of the delays in awarding contracts in
the first year of the project indicate that procurement processing capacity of the state’s PWD for
civil works and of TNMSC for goods was overestimated; but this was appropriately and quickly
addressed. Although there were some weaknesses in selection of indicators, other aspects of
M&E design were clear and comprehensive, notably the development of a computerized HMIS
system to replace manual reporting and make real-time rich data available for decision-making,
and independent evaluations of numerous project activities. Environmental and social safeguards
aspects were adequately covered including a sound HCWM plan, a Tribal Development Plan and
a social assessment, which were fully implemented.
(b) Quality of Supervision
42
Rating: Highly Satisfactory
The project was supervised by a strong team with one task team leader from the start of project
preparation in 2002 until after approval of the AF in 2010, and two task leaders in the remaining
five years of the project. After the DIR, project supervision budgets were supposed to increase.
The project did not in fact receive the 30% increase it was supposed to get, but still managed to
provide highly satisfactory supervision. An important factor was that the project team was
mostly based in Delhi, comprising all necessary skills including an IT specialist (for the HMIS
component). The relationship with the PMU and DoHFW was professional and strong.
Supervision was systematic, detailed, and every six months, including a carefully prepared and
rigorous MTR; field visits to hospitals were frequent. Aide Memoires were comprehensive,
detailed, issue- and action oriented; they included the status of results achievements, and
benchmarks. Project ratings were realistic. Potential and emerging problems were recognized
early, discussed candidly, and forcefully brought to the PMU or higher state authority’s attention
as needed. The Bank team in Delhi held weekly audio meetings with Chennai to follow-up issues
and support the PMU in resolving bottlenecks, and was diligent in monitoring fiduciary and
safeguard aspects including implementation of the Tribal Development Plan and the Health Care
Waste Management Plan. The Bank team and PMU jointly paid close attention to the project’s
development effectiveness, and the Bank offered technical advice as needed. The Sector
Manager and Country Management Unit paid close attention to the project.
Satisfactory project implementation (and highly satisfactory for several project activities)
particularly since 2007 justified Bank approval of AF in 2010 to replace the $20 million that had
been released for dealing with the Tsunami aftermath, plus almost $100 million in new financing
to implement the NCD activities across the state and extend well-performing components. The
extensions of the closing date were well justified, and enabled full disbursement and completion
and expansion of planned activities.
(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance Rating: Highly Satisfactory. With a rating of satisfactory for preparation and highly
satisfactory for supervision, overall Bank performance is rated as highly satisfactory in line with
the overall outcome rating of Highly Satisfactory.
5.2. Borrower Performance
(a) Government Performance Rating: Highly Satisfactory. GOI supported the Government of Tamil Nadu at all stages of the
project preparation and implementation including its endorsement of GoTN’s request for the AF.
GoTN’s ownership and commitment to the overall project objective was consistently strong,
reflected in its decisions to establish CEmONCs able to provide 24x7 maternal and neonatal
health services, try using PPPs to deliver health services to low-income communities including
SC/ST populations in remote and tribal areas, to pilot test innovative approaches to NCDs on a
reasonably large scale and subject them to rigorous evaluation before scaling up, and establish
the first fully computerized HMIS in India. The project was fully integrated into Government
structures at all levels. To ensure sustainability, the GoTN began absorbing project activities
(well before project closing) into the work and budget of the NHM and the DoHFW (e.g., mobile
outreach, counselling services, sickle cell anemia, bed grant scheme, heath waste management,
HMIS, emergency ambulance transport), with only essential inputs (technical support and
43
monitoring and evaluation) continuing to be funded by the project. As needed, the government
approved recruitment of doctors and staff nurses on contract for CEmONCs and NCD
interventions to ensure adequate staffing to deliver services, and subsequently absorbed them
into the civil service cadre. The Government is continuing all project activities with financing
from the NHM and state budget. The GoTN showed unwavering strong support and commitment
to the project during thirteen years of preparation, implementation and transition, and managed
to push the project to do much more than originally envisaged and complete all activities.
(b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance Rating: Satisfactory.
The PMU had overall responsibility for managing the project with support from PWD for civil
works and TNMSC for procurement of equipment and maintenance. GoTN appointed a Senior
Officer from the IAS as Project Director of TNHSP. The PMU team was highly experienced and
successfully managed implementation of the many project activities in different technical areas
including new areas of NCD interventions and HMIS -- large undertakings in any context. It
maintained a strong focus on capacity building and skill enhancement and built strong
professional training capacity for the public health sector. The PMU worked diligently with the
Bank, PWD and TNMSC staff to resolve the issues that delayed procurement and
implementation during the first 18 months of the project. It proactively adjusted interventions
during implementation to address bottlenecks or improve efficiency or impact.
The PMU took a strong lead on actions to improve quality of care in hospitals, championed the
system of grading, and regularly followed up agreed actions with hospitals graded C and D. It
was proactive in preparing proposals for the State Empowered Committee chaired by the Chief
Secretary to obtain Government Orders to proceed with project activities when necessary (such
as requests for exemptions to procurement freezes prior to elections). The PMU consulted fully
and regularly with key stakeholders and worked closely with the DoHFW Directorates. On
financial management, audit reports and IUFRs were submitted regularly but with some small
delays. Disbursements were slow in 2005-2006, but picked up pace from later in 2006; one
important action was establishing a TNHSP society to ensure a smooth flow of funds for all
activities except civil works and major equipment and goods procurements. Minor shortcomings
(slow disbursements in the first two years), delayed procurement actions in PWD and TNHSP
and small delays in the submission of audit reports and IUFRs) did not impact the timely and
smooth implementation of the project activities.
(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance Rating: Highly Satisfactory, combining the ratings of highly satisfactory for government
performance and satisfactory rating for implementing agency performance given the overall
outcome rating of highly satisfactory.
6. Lessons Learned
Key Lessons
Careful strategies, including skillful sequencing, can help deal with the complexities of
health system strengthening. Strengthening a health system is a complex undertaking, and
requires appropriate balancing between physical investments and reforms, careful phasing
44
and sequencing, ensuring well-trained personnel, supplies, governance, and a long-term
horizon for institutional capacity building. A health system is as strong as its weakest link, so
there is need to consider the whole chain of care, and identify bottlenecks on which to focus.
For example, the potential health gain of an excellent fast-responding emergency transport
service is lost if the quality and capacity for care upon arrival at the hospitals is not at least as
good (and hopefully better) than the care that the ambulance and its crew are equipped to
provide. If patients are being successfully stabilized in the ambulance, but then die waiting
for care or for want of capacity to provide appropriate care at the hospital, then the
investment in the ambulance service is wasted (at last for that patient). However, the
temptation to try and implement everything at once should be resisted. Phasing enables data
to be analyzed and to inform decisions, and time to learn from and incorporate lessons from
pilots and their evaluations. Skillful sequencing of physical upgrades that are relatively easy
to implement (civil works to ensure running water and good sanitation, and fully equipping
facilities) with the incentive of further upgrades if “soft” investments19 are successfully
implemented, can add strong motivation for reforms that require behavior change. A highly
supportive environment, incentives, and shared belief in their purpose are also needed.
Thoughtful, nimble adjustments are needed throughout implementation, learning along
the way and resolving issues as they arise. It is not possible to anticipate all details when
designing new programs, and very important to put in place good mechanisms and shared
commitment at all levels for making continuous improvements. Regularly measuring and
monitoring performance of CEmONCs and of tribal health interventions including PPPs and
then actively using the information to make adjustments in the interventions and PPP
contracts during implementation were essential to the project’s success in reducing maternal
and neonatal mortality, improving tribal health, and facilitating the use of hospitals by the
poor and disadvantaged groups. The experience of designing and implementing the HMIS
pilot is another good example. The complexity and time required were underestimated, and
the work would not have been able to be completed within only five years. Working
productively with the technical agency hired to design and help implement the system
required intensive and frequent interactions with the government and users, and a significant
amount of “hand holding” and mutual trouble-shooting. It took time to establish good
reporting formats that would be easy to use. Careful behavior change support was needed for
hospital staff at all levels to transition to the new ways of reporting, including to allay the
perceived threats and insecurity, and to overcome the belief that both paper and electronic
reporting were needed, by demonstrating the reliability and robustness of the electronic
system before gradually phasing out paper reporting.
The design of the NCD component offers lessons in successful use of well-evaluated
pilots to make difficult choices and set priorities. The GoTN initially wanted to address all
NCDs and provide a wide range of curative services. Careful and evidence-based discussions
on what was technically possible, especially within the staff and other constraints of the
system, as well as what was most cost-effective, helped reach agreement on a limited initial
scope for TN’s NCD program. The Bank brought in international expertise from CDC and
India’s leading national expert (Dr Srinath Reddy) who is also a highly respected global
19 “Soft” investments refer to new procedures and processes, and other reforms that require behavioral
change, as opposed to “hardware” investments in infrastructure and equipment.
45
expert, to work with the TN team. The result was well-focused pilots to test the feasibility
and impact of screening and interventions to manage hypertension and detect and treat
cervical cancer, with a strong focus on prevention, early detection and disease management.
The pilot protocols were developed through extensive consensus discussions with national
experts. A rigorous evaluation was built into the pilot design, with input from international
and national experts. The data collected throughout the pilot, and impact and process
evaluations were all carefully scrutinized before deciding whether, how, and how fast to
proceed with scaling up. Valuable lessons were learned from the pilots and incorporated into
the scale-up design. One of the most difficult challenges was effective follow up of people
who tested positive in screening to ensure they receive appropriate treatment and education
in life-style changes to help manage and prevent further complications. Careful additional
assessment was needed to understand the systemic and behavioral reasons for high loss-to-
follow up, and how best to address them. This is absolutely central to the success of a
screening program.
Additional Lessons
Well-designed partnerships with the private sector/NGOs through PPPs for delivering
health care services and outsourcing carefully selected services such a diagnostic tests,
cleaning and laundry, can improve efficiency and services, and make health care more
accessible for hard-to-reach populations. There is usually more than one way to deliver
services, and new potential partners can be attracted to service areas where they have not
operated before. When initial contracts with local NGOs to operate emergency medical
transport did not yield the desired results, the GoTN found a very different approach in
partnering with the EMRI that was operating a successful ambulance service in another state.
EMRI proved willing to partner with the project and expand its operations into TN. Careful
monitoring and willingness to acknowledge that the initial arrangement (with NGOs) was not
working well, and to try a different solution, were important. Another lesson is that contract
terms and approaches may usefully be changed over time, as the contractual parties become
more familiar with each other, and with the contractual process, and the activities. For
example, the initial contract with EMRI (and other partners) were lump-sum contracts, but
the project is slowly embracing performance-based contracts that increase the incentive of
the contracted partner to improve efficiency and utilization.
Infection control and health waste management are better addressed in a systematic,
sector-wide, state-wide way rather than a smaller-scale project-specific approach. The
approach adopted under the project was efficient, and enabled the Ministry to rely on the
municipal authorities for regular quality assurance of the private sector disposal facilities. It
ensured that the whole health sector in Tamil Nadu would benefit.
IEC and BCC activities were a well-integrated part of the design of programs and
components, and carefully considered both supply of services, and demand. The project
made skillful use of Information, Education and Communication (IEC) and Behavior Change
Communication (BCC) activities, especially to boost demand and use of services that were
being set up and expanded, and to encourage and enable expanded use of services by SC/TC
members. Counselling sought to reduce loss to follow-up in NCD screening and treatment
programs. The project made thoughtful and strategic use of IEC and BCC.
46
Resistance to being evaluated can be overcome by demonstrated usefulness of good
evaluations. There are many reasons why implementers may not welcome evaluations.
Delay in selecting and contracting the consultants for the NCD evaluation was partly the
result of resistance from a skeptical key official. It took patience and persistence to get the
evaluation underway. During project implementation, the usefulness and value of
independent evaluations was clearly demonstrated, and came to be highly valued for being
able to answer important questions about the impact of programs and activities, and as the
basis for well-informed decisions. The project funded numerous evaluations of specific
programs and activities (for example, to discover whether the increased rate of C-sections
was medically warranted or not).
A “perfect storm” of mutually reinforcing factors all contributed to the project’s
outstanding success. The project was very well designed, implementation was flexible and
evidence-driven, both client and Bank teams had continuity, and high sustained commitment
and competence. The project also had a strong champion in the Department of Health with a
deep commitment to its goals. In addition to health being treated as “above politics” and
being given consistent priority by successive ruling parties, Tamil Nadu’s civil service has a
reputation for seriousness of purpose and “getting the job done well”. Close, collegial,
supportive supervision helped identify early problems and bottlenecks, and to work out
solutions. In the initial period when the project was not doing well, weekly phone-calls
between the Bank and TN team helped resolve issues. The close supervision also enabled the
Bank team to effectively and diplomatically be a “broker” when needed between the TN
team and consultants or external evaluators. The stability in the Bank team was also a clear
signal that the Bank was fully committed to the best interests of the state. Frequent changes
in Bank teams give a negative signal to the client, undermine trust that is achieved over time,
and can generate resistance.
7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners
(a) Borrower/implementing agencies
(b) Cofinanciers
(c) Other partners and stakeholders (e.g. NGOs/private sector/civil society)
47
Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing (a.) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent)
Components
Appraisal Estimate
– Original
(USD millions)
(a)
Total Final
Estimate20
(USD millions)
(b)
Actual
(USD
millions)
(c)
Actual as
Percentage of
Appraised
(c/b) x100
Increasing Access to and
Utilization of Services
43.79 81.60 82.97 101.68%
Developing Effective Models to
Combat Non-Communicable
Diseases and Accidents (Revised
to “NCD Prevention and Control”
at Additional Financing)
5.65 26.72 26.68 99.85%
Building Capacity for Oversight
and Management of Health
System
25.61 55.41 60.86 109.84%
Maximizing Efficiency of the
Public Sector to Deliver Essential
Services
50.90 73.00 73.28 100.38%
Total Baseline Cost 125.95 236.73 243.79
Contingencies 5.64 5.64
Total Project Cost 131.59 242.37 243.79 102.98%
Total Financing Required 131.59 242.37 243.79
(b.) Financing
Source of Funds
Original
Appraisal
Estimate
(USD millions)
(a)
Appraisal Estimate
minus $21 cancelled
due to Tsunami plus
Additional Financing
(USD millions)
(b)
Actual
(USD millions)
(c)
Actual as
Percentage of
Appraised
(c/b) x100
Borrower 20.76 33.84 33.70 99.58%
International Development
Association (IDA) 110.83 208.53 210.09 100.75%
Total Financing 131.59 242.37 243.79 102.98%
Disbursements:
(i) Up to April 29, 2010 (date of Approval of Additional Financing) = US$ 88.59 million (42.17% of the total
disbursed)
(ii) From April 30, 2010 to August 7, 2014 (From AFs approval to the date of change in the Results Framework/
Restructuring): US$ 98.18 million (46.73%)
(iii) From August 8, 2014 to final disbursements: US$ 23.32 million (11.1%)
20 To simplify presentation, this column shows the final estimated cost: the appraisal estimate, less the $21 million
($20 million at 2005 exchange rate) cancelled on June 30, 2005 to use to help finance the Emergency Tsunami
Reconstruction Project in 2005, plus the Additional Financing approved on April 29, 2010
48
Annex 2. Outputs by Component
TNHSP completed almost all planned activities and exceeded targets for many. This Annex
summarizes the main outputs delivered, compared to what was planned under each component.
(Final actual disbursements for each component are noted in the component heading.)
Component 1: Increasing Access to and Utilization of Services (USD 82.97 millions)
Planned Accomplished
Sub-component 1: Reducing Maternal and Neonatal Mortality.
Establish at least two
CEmONCs in each of
the 32 districts, able to
treat obstetric and
neonatal emergencies,
including C sections.
First ones to be in
disadvantaged districts.
Established and strengthened 75 CEmONCs (including 20
CEmONCs in Medical Colleges) and 50 EmONCs in the state to
provide definitive treatment and improved quality of care, 24x7
for all obstetric and neonatal emergencies. In addition,
strengthened 8 identified medical college CEmONCs with
extensive civil works and inputs.
Instituted a mechanism for regular recertification of
CEmONCs using established criteria to ensure adequacy of
resources at the facility and quality of care for provision of 24
hour emergency obstetric and new born care services. Four
rounds of re-certification of CEmONCs were taken.
Equip CEmONCs with
treatment protocols,
trained staff,
equipment, supplies
and drugs needed.
Steadily staffed CEmONCs with doctors and specialists per