What, If Anything, Is Mahāyāna Buddhism? Problems of Definitions and Classifications Author(s): Jonathan A. Silk Reviewed work(s): Source: Numen, Vol. 49, No. 4 (2002), pp. 355-405 Published by: BRILL Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3270595 . Accessed: 28/02/2012 07:39 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. BRILL is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Numen. http://www.jstor.org
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7/27/2019 What, If Anything, Is Mahāyāna Buddhism? Problems of Definitions and Classifications
What, If Anything, Is Mahāyāna Buddhism? Problems of Definitions and Classifications
Author(s): Jonathan A. SilkReviewed work(s):Source: Numen, Vol. 49, No. 4 (2002), pp. 355-405Published by: BRILLStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3270595 .
Accessed: 28/02/2012 07:39
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
BRILL is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Numen.
This study investigates some problems regardingthe definition of Mahayana
Buddhism.Tracing he historyof the notion in modem scholarship, t pays particular
attention o the questionof the relationbetween Mahayanaand so-called Hinayana
or SectarianBuddhism.Findingthe commonlyused methodsof classificationwhichrely on necessaryand sufficient conditions to be inadequate o the task, it suggests
the alternativeemploymentof polythetic classification,a method which permitsa
constantlyvariableset of questions and data to be taken into account in the most
flexible andaccommodatingmanner.
Any attemptto focus on a given object of study presupposes, in
the very first place, the ability to recognize that relevantobject, to
distinguisht from the
surroundingworld,that
is,to define the
object.And any attempt o sortor ordermore thanone objectrequiresus to
classify thosemultipleobjects.Thus,ourvery attempts o perceivethe
worldaroundus requireus to define and to classify.
Usually,of course,we have no needto consciouslyreflecton the de-
finitionsand classificationswe employ.Butwhen we are unsureof the
statusof anobject,when we thinktheremaybe some errorsn theway
objectsareorganized,when we encounter omeapparent isagreement
with those with whom we areattemptingo communicateconcerningan object,or when the very identityor even existence of an object is
in question,thenwe must resortto explicit strategiesof definitionand
classification n order o clarifythe discussion.
*I wish to express my sincere thanksto my erstwhile studentMs. Bonnie Gulas,
whose insights into taxonomyfrom the viewpoint of paleontologyhave been very
helpfulto me. Thanks also to Profs. KennethBailey andRichardEthridgefor their
encouragement.
? KoninklijkeBrillNV,Leiden(2002) NUMEN,Vol.49
Also availableonline- www.brill.nl
7/27/2019 What, If Anything, Is Mahāyāna Buddhism? Problems of Definitions and Classifications
The identityand the status of MahayanaBuddhismarepointsverymuch in question, and it is virtually self-evident that communica-
tion concerningMahayanaBuddhismoccasionsmany disagreements.Therefore, he need for the definitionandclassificationof Mahayana
Buddhism is obvious. But how we should approachsuch definition
and classification s somewhat ess plain.For it is basically truethat
in order o define anobjectone must have some fundamental ense of
what it is. I cannotknow thatmy definitionof applesmustaccommo-
dateMacintosh,Red Delicious andFuji,but not naveloranges,unless
I knowbeforehandhattheformerareapplesand the latter s not. And
yet, this processmustbe more than circular. must be able to refinemy understanding nd my definition,to correctmisclassificationsor
even alterentirelythe basis of the classificatory cheme as my famil-
iaritywith my objectof study grows.How this process may begin in
the firstplaceis a questionprimarilyor cognitivescientists,andneed
not concern us here. We may accept as an irreduciblegiven that an
objectof studyexists,whichhas been labeled"MahayanaBuddhism,"and thatcertainsenses of its definitionand classificationare and have
been heldby studentsof thisobject.Wemaytherefore ruitfullybegin
by examiningsome of theseideas.1
An apparentlyundamentalpresuppositionn at least most of the
conceptualizationsof MahayanaBuddhism so far is that it is one
pole of a binary set, that is, it is seen in oppositionto something
else, some other form of Buddhism. The questionthen arises how
the two are related.Dependingon who is talking,the opposite pole
may sometimes or even usually be called "Hinayana," r by those
with somewhat more historical awarenessdenoted by such namesas SectarianBuddhism,Nikaya Buddhism,ConservativeBuddhism,
Sravakayana, ndrecentlyMainstreamBuddhism or similarterms in
otherlanguages).Whatever he namesused, the conceptualizations
1One of the terminological ssues thatmightbe addressed s whetherwe aim at
typology or taxonomy;the former s conceptualand qualitative, he latterempiricalandquantitative. thinkwe will see below thatultimatelywhatwe seek is a taxonomy.
See Bailey 1994:6-7.
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is partlyon thebasisof theseaccounts hatEtienneLamotte, orexam-
ple, wrote his highlyinfluential tudyon theoriginsof theMahayana.8
Since the generaland overall honesty and accuracyof the informa-tion in thesepilgrim'srecordscan be verified romarchaeologicaland
otherevidence,thereseemedprima acie to be littlereasonto questiontheir accounts.Butthe interpretationf these documents s not always
straightforward,ndit is perhapsronicthatAugusteBarth,basinghis
ideas of the relationshipbetween the Mahayanaand the Hinayanaon
exactlythe sameaccounts,reachedconclusionsdiametrically pposedto those of Lamotte.
Among the writingsof the Chinese traveller-monks axian,Xuan-zangandYijing,9 hatof Yijing,theRecordof BuddhistPractices,dat-
ing from691, is the only one which makesa pointof carefullydefin-
ing its terminology.This makes it, for us, probably he most impor-tant of the availableaccounts.Yijing'scrucial definitionruns as fol-
lows:?1"Thosewho worshipthe Bodhisattvasand read the MahayanaSutrasare called the Mahayanists,while those who do not performthese are called the Hinayanists."n a phraseimmediatelypreceding
thatjust quoted,it seems to be statedthat schools or sects may be-
long to eithervehicle, andon this basis JunjiroTakakusu lreadyob-
servedover one hundredyearsago, in the introductiono his transla-
is a matter of Abhidharma or doctrine. "There were in all the sects,
in all the groups subject to a certain archaic Vinaya, adherents of
the two schools, Hinayana and Mahayana, schools which are furthersubdivided into Sautrantikas and so on."18
La Vallee Poussin has clarified a very important distinction here,
although later scholars have not always followed his lead. Since
some confusion seems to have been caused heretofore by a certain
inconsistency in vocabulary, it is perhaps best to clarify our terms. By
the term "sect" I follow La Vallee Poussin and intend a translation or
equivalent of the term nikdya. A nikdya is defined strictly speaking not
by any doctrine but by adherence to a common set of monastic rules,a Vinaya. One enters a nikdya or sect through a formal ecclesiastical
act of ordination, an upasampadd karmavdcand. My use of the term
"sect" here differs, therefore, from at least one established modem
usage. A common presumption of Western uses of the term "sect"
posits a Weberian dichotomy, even an antagonism, between Church
and sect.19 This is not the case for the sects of Indian Buddhism,
as I use the term. All independent institutional groups in Indian
Buddhism, as defined by their (at least pro forma) allegiance to their
own governing Vinaya literature, are sects. The Buddhist Church in
India is constituted by the sects.20 There is no implication here of
18La Vallee Poussin 1929:234. In what is perhapsan isolated case in Japan,the
samepositionwas espousedby TomomatsuEntai1932:332.Therecan be little doubt
thatTomomatsu,who studied nFrance,wasdeeplyinfluencedby Przyluski's hought.19van der Leeuw 1938:1.261goes even farther:"[T]he sect ... severs itself not
only from the given communitybut from the "world" n general. ... [T]he sect is
not foundedon a religiouscovenant hat s severedfrom another eligious community
such as the church; t segregatesitself, rather, rom community n general. ... The
correlate of the sect is therefore not the churchbut the community; t is the most
extremeoutcome of the covenant."
20Theonly meaningfulcandidate or a "BuddhistChurch"n India s the so-called
UniversalCommunity, he samighaof the four directions.However,it appearsthat
this was a purelyabstractandimaginaryentity,with no institutionalexistence. (But
it is not known, for example,how gifts to this universalcommunity,often recorded
in inscriptions,were administered.)It may, in this sense, be something like the
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7/27/2019 What, If Anything, Is Mahāyāna Buddhism? Problems of Definitions and Classifications
schism, of an old and established institution set off against a new and
innovative one.21
The term "school," on the other hand, refers to the notion designatedin Sanskrit by the word vada. Schools are defined primarily by
doctrinal characteristics, and are associations of those who hold to
common teachings and follow the same intellectual methods, but they
have no institutional existence. A Buddhist monk must belong to a
sect, that is to say, he must have one, unique institutional identification
determined by the liturgy according to which he was ordained.22
There is no evidence that there was any kind of Buddhist monk other
than one associated with a Sectarian ordination lineage until someChinese Buddhists began dispensing with full ordination and taking
only "bodhisattvaprecepts."23To break the ordination lineage in these
terms would be to sever oneself from the ephemeral continuity which
"Brotherhood f Man."This Brotherhood, houghit may exist, has no officers, no
treasurer, o meetinghall,no newsletter.21It is this lattertype of definition,however,which was assumedby T.W.Rhys
Davids 1908:307a when he wrote about "Sects(Buddhist)"
or theEncyclopediaof
Religion and Ethics. Rhys Davids assumedthe meaningof "sect in the European
sense-i.e. of a body of believersin one or more doctrinesnot held by the majority,a body with its own endowments, ts own churches or chapels, and its own clergy
ordainedby itself." He went on to say 308b: "Therewere no 'sects' in India,in any
properuse of thatterm.Therewere different endenciesof opinion,namedaftersome
teacher ..., or after some locality ..., or after the kind of view dominant. ... All the
followers of such views designatedby thetermsornamesoccurringn anyof the lists
were membersof the same orderandhad no separate rganization f anykind." think
this view is alsoquestionable,butin anycase thepointis thatRhysDavidsis applyinghere a verydifferentdefinitionof the term"sect" hanI am.
22Thispoint,and theterminologicaldistinction,hasbeen noticed andreiterated yHeinz Becherta numberof timesrecently.Becherthoweverrefers n his notesonly to
LaValleePoussin'sdiscussion.
23LaVallee Poussin 1930:20wrote:"Ibelieve that n theIndiaof Asangaas in that
of Santidevaone could not havebeen a Buddhistmonkwithoutbeingassociatedwith
one of the ancientsects, withoutacceptingone of the archaicVinayas."On the other
hand,I mean exactly what I say by the expression"there s no evidence. .." This
does not meanthat thereabsolutelywere no monksother than those associatedwith
Sectarianordinationineages.It meanswe have no evidenceon thispoint.
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7/27/2019 What, If Anything, Is Mahāyāna Buddhism? Problems of Definitions and Classifications
guarantees he authenticityof one's ordinationby tracingit back to
a teacher ordaineddirectly by the Buddha in an unbroken ine of
teachers,each of whom had in turnreceived ordination rom such aproperlyordainedteacher.Thus the mythology is such that if one's
ordination annotbe tracedback in a line whichbeginsatSakyamuni,it is not valid. It is again La Vallee Poussin who offers a crucial
observation:24
All the Mahiaynists who are pravrajita [renunciants]renounced the world
entering nto one of the ancientsects.-A monk, submitting o the disciplinarycode (Vinaya)of the sect into which he was received,is 'touchedby grace' and
undertakes he resolution o become a buddha.Will he rejecthis Vinaya?-'If hethinksor says "Afuturebuddhahasnothingto do with learningor observingthe
law of the Vehicle of Sravakas," e commitsa sin of pollution(klistaapatti).'
In the samestudy,La Vallee Poussin concludedthus:25
From the disciplinary point of view, the Mahayanais not autonomous.The
adherentsof the Mahayanaare monks of the MahasSamghika,harmaguptaka,
Sarvastivadinand other traditions,who undertake he vows and rules of the
bodhisattvaswithout abandoningthe monastic vows and rules fixed by the
traditionwith which they are associatedon the day of their Upasampad[fullordination].In the same way, at all times every bhiksu was authorized to
undertakehe vows of the dhiitagunas...
TheMahayana,n principleandin its origins,is only a 'particular evotional
practice,'precisely a certain sort of mystical life of which the center is the
doctrineof pure love for all creatures: his mystical life, like the mystical life
of ancientBuddhismwhich was oriented owardNirvanaandpersonalsalvation,
has for its necessary support he keepingof the morallaws, the monastic code.
The Mahayana s thus perfectlyorthodox and would have been able to recruit
adeptsamongthose monks most attached o the old disciplinary ule.
24La Vallee Poussin 1930:25. The reference at the end of this quotationis a
translation,althoughwithoutany mentionof the source,from the Bodhisattvabhumi
(Wogihara1936:173.5-10). La Vallee Poussin had in fact quotedthis passage years
earlier, 1909:339-40, theregiving the Sanskrit n note 1. At that time he also noted
After the time of La Vallee Poussin, few indeed are the scholars
who seem to have noticed these observations or pursued the study of
the Mahayana with an eye on this hypothesis. One scholar who has,however, paid attention to the hypotheses of La Vallee Poussin is Heinz
Bechert.26 I think, however, that Bechert has gone beyond where his
evidence leads him. He writes, for example:27
We learnfrom the accounts of Chinesepilgrims,andfromthe IndianBuddhist
sources themselves,that there had been Mahayanicgroupsin variousnikayas.
Thus,a latetextliketheKriyasangrahapafijikatill emphasizes hat he adherents
of Mahayanamustundergo he ordinationor upasampada s prescribedby their
nikayabeforebeingintroducedasMahayanamonksby another ormalact.Thus,the outside forms of the old nikayaswerepreserved, houghthey did not retain
theiroriginal mportance.
The claim that the old nikayas did not retain their original impor-
tance is not defended, and as far as I know there is little evidence that
would suggest this is true. What is more, without specifying what we
think "their original importance" was, how would we begin to inves-
tigate whether this may or may not have been retained? In another
formulation, Bechert has suggested the following:28
Forthose who acceptedMahayana, heirallegianceto theirnikayawas of quitea differentnature rom that of a Hinayanist: t was the observanceof a vinayatraditionwhichmade them membersof the Sangha,butit no longer necessarilyincluded the acceptanceof the specific doctrinalviewpoints of the particular
nikaya.Inthe context of Mahayana,he traditionaldoctrinalcontroversiesof the
nikayashadlost much of their mportance nd,thus,as a rule,one wouldnotgive
up allegianceto one's nikayaon accountof becominga follower of Mahayanisticdoctrinesoriginatingwithmonks ordained n the traditionof anothernikaya.
26Becherthas repeatedlypublishedmore or less the same remarks,sometimesin
thesame words. See forexample:1964:530-31; 1973:12-13; 1976:36-37; 1977:363-
64; 1982:64-65, and 1992:96-97. HisashiMatsumura1990:82-85, note 53, has also
offered some bibliographicnotes which indicate his awareness of the opinions of
Barthand his successors.
27Bechert1973:12.Thereference o theKriyasangrahapanjikas evidentlyto Dutt
Whether or not this is partiallyor even totally true, I know of no
evidence which mightdecide the mattereitherway, and neitherdoes
Bechertprovideany.It is worthkeeping firmly n mind thatwe almostalways wish to say more thanthe availableevidence actuallyallows.
These are urges which, if not resisted, will almost surely lead our
studiesastray.29One thing that the approachesmentioned above have in common
is theirimplicit assumption hat the conceptof Mahayanamovements
is meaningful,but only in the context of some contrastwith what is
not Mahayana.This is generallyunderstood o refer to pre-Mahayana
Buddhism,althoughit need not, and I think in very many cases infact certainlydoes not. This non-MahayanaBuddhism s often desig-natedin modem writing"Hinayana."I think it is quitecertain,how-
ever,that the referentof the term"Hinayana,"when it occursin Bud-
dhist textsthemselves, s neveranyexistent nstitutionororganization,buta rhetorical iction. We can say rather reely,butI thinkquiteac-
curately, hat"Hinayana" esignates"whomeverwe, the speakers,do
not at the presentmoment agree with doctrinallyor otherwise here
in our discussion."30Althoughthe example is not from the earliestperiod,the scholarAsafga's commentin his Mahayanasutralamkara"Thatwhich is inferior (namely, the Hinayana)is truly inferior,"31
can hardlybe construedas referringto an actual, specific, and in-
stitutionallyidentifiablegroup of HinayanaBuddhists.In addition,
the rhetoricalcontextin which we find such referencessuggests that
such "enemies"were imaginedto be contemporary,which in turnis
a strongindicationthat whatever"Hinayana"mightreferto, it is not
pre-MahayanaBuddhism as such. A fundamental rror s thus made
29As an example see Cohen 1995:16, who says, without a shred of evidence:
"Mahayanistsmight come from all nikayas;yet there is an expectationthat prior
nikayaaffiliationsaremoot once a yanic conversion s made."
30It is in this sense formallysimilar o thedesignation irthikaortirthya, heformer
definedby Monier-Williams1899 s.v. quitewell as "an adherentor headof anyother
than one's own creed."The termsare,of course,derogatory. It is perhapsalso worth
notingthat,as far as I know,Buddhist exts do not referto otherBuddhistsas tTrthika.)
31Levi 1907:I. Od:yat hinah hrnam va tat.
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7/27/2019 What, If Anything, Is Mahāyāna Buddhism? Problems of Definitions and Classifications
when we imagine references to "Hinayana" in Mahayana literature
to apply to so-called Sectarian Buddhism, much less to Early Bud-
dhism.32It may be largely due to the numerous vitriolic references in
Mahayana literature to the "inferior vehicle" that some scholars, such
as Stephen Kent, have found it hard to believe that there could be any
sort of continuity between Sectarian Buddhism and the Mahayana.33
This misunderstanding is based on a series of erroneous identifications,
which we can encapsulate as the equation: Hinayana = Sravakayana= actual identifiable nikayas. Sasaki Shizuka points to the equally
erroneous equation: sravakaydna = sravaka = bhiksu.34 While it is
32An example of a scholar led into just such an erroris Cohen 1995:20, who
says: "Of all the categories throughwhich to reconstruct ndianBuddhism'shistory,
MahayanaandHinayanaare the most productive.Nevertheless,our reconstructions
have a secret life of their own. Eachyana can be definedpositively, througha nec-
essary and sufficient characteristic or individuals'membershipwithin that taxon.
Moreover,because these two yanas are logical opposites, each can also be defined
negatively, hroughts lackof the other's
necessaryand sufficientcharacteristic.How-
ever,in bothcases, thesepositiveandnegativedefinitionsare not conceptuallyequiv-alent. That is, the Mahayana s positively characterizedby its members'pursuitof
thebodhisattvapath;the Hinayana s negativelycharacterized s the non-Mahayana,
i.e., its membersdo notnecessarilypursueBuddhahood s their deal.However,when
positivelycharacterizedhe Hinayana s definedby members'affiliationwith one or
anothernikdya,which,of course,meansthattheMahayanas knownnegativelyby its
members' nstitutional eparationromthose samenikayas."33See Kent 1982. Kent, a specialist in sectarian movements but not terribly
knowledgeableabout Buddhism, suggested that the rhetoric of Mahayanasutras
resembles the rhetoric common to embattledsectariangroupsin variousreligions.He portrayed he contrastbetweenMahayanaand Hinayanamonks as one of great
hostility,and emphasizedthe role of the laity as a force in formingthe Mahayana
communitiesand theiroutlook. Notice here that Kent'suse of the term"sect" ollows
the standarddichotomousWeberiandefinition,andessentiallydiffers from the way I
use the term.
34I will discuss below the views of Lamotte,who considersthe Mahayana o be
probablytrue that all sravakas are bhiksus,35 he reverse certainlydoes not follow. The polemical attacks on sravakas that we find in
some, although certainly far from all, Mahayanascripturesshouldbe understoodas a criticism not of all monks but of those who do
not accept the Mahayanadoctrines. Since the term Hinayana s not
an institutional abel but an ideological one, we might even looselytranslateit as "small-minded."The term embodies a criticism of
certaintypes of thinkingand of certainviews, but does not refer to
institutionalaffiliations.I thereforestrongly doubt, pace Kent, that
the Mahayana iteraturewhich criticizes the Hinayanais a product
of sectarianswho isolatedthemselves,or were isolated,physicallyorinstitutionally.Rather,I would suggest that it is a productof groupswhichdoctrinallyopposedothergroups,quite possiblywithinone and
the samecommunityorgroupof communities.
If MahayanaBuddhism is not institutionally separatefrom the
sects of SectarianBuddhism, and if it might exist in some form
more tangible than a set of abstractdoctrinalideas, how then can
we define it, how can we locate it? Let us posit that Mahayana
Buddhistswere the authorsof Mahayana criptures,and a Mahayanacommunitywas a communityof such authors.One immediate and
fundamental esult of this formulations that we must stop referring,at theveryleastprovisionally, o "theMahayana"n thesingular.Until
and unless we can establish affinitiesbetween texts, and therefore
begin to identify broadercommunities, we must-provisionally-
supposeeach scripture o representa differentcommunity,a different
Mahayana.36We should note here that if each Mahayanascripture
on monasticismin general (thatis, sravakabhiksu),but attacks on those who hold
doctrinalpositions which are worthyof criticism,that is anti-Mahayanapositions.
There s nothing"anti-clerical" bout t. Nevertheless,as Sasaki hasemphasized, his
misunderstandingervadesHirakawa'swork on the subject.See Sasaki 1997.
35At least in Mahayanaiterature, s far as I know. On this point,however,see the
interesting tudyof PeterMasefield 1986.
36Quite obviously, in the case of some texts, as Shimoda 1991 has arguedfor
the Mahiyana Mahaparinirvana-sutraor instance, a given literarywork may be
the productof more than one community,as it grew over time. I do not necessarily
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7/27/2019 What, If Anything, Is Mahāyāna Buddhism? Problems of Definitions and Classifications
37This should not be taken to mean that, with a certainhindsight,we may not
findtraditionalattributions o be occasionallywrong.We do find, for example,that
Chinesescripture ataloguessometimesdesignatealternate ranslations f Mahayana
scripturesas non-Mahayana.We may note for example the cases of T. 1469, in
fact a section of the Kdayapaparivarta, r T. 170, in fact a translation of the
Rastrapalapariprccha. either extis recognizedbytraditionalChineseclassifications
as a Mahayanascripture. am of course awareof the fact that the classificationof
scriptures n Chinaand Tibet (anddoubtlessin Indiatoo) was a polemical activity,motivatedby a multitudeof forces. These sources are not "objective," f course, a
trait heysharewitheveryothertypeof source.
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orthodoxordinationineages,membersof sects as I havedefinedthem
above.
Could the monk-authors f thesetexts,ourprototypical arlyMaha-yanists,have split from those ordination ineages and the sects theydefined? What would it mean to leave such a sect and start another
in its own terms-be broken?WithoutaVinayaof theirown,thebreak-
awaymonks would havebeen unable to carryout furtherordinations
of new monks in their own lineage. If correct, this suggests that
most probably t would not have been possible, in an IndianBuddhist
context,for one to become a Buddhistmonkat all without ordinationin an orthodox ordination ineage. Again, if this is true, Mahayana
communities could not have become institutionally ndependentof
Sectariancommunities,for they wouldhave hadno way of effectingthe continuityof the movement other thanby conversion of alreadyordainedmonks. Such an approach o the maintenanceof a religious
community,while not uninstancedn worldreligions, s relativelyrare,
and difficult to maintain.Moreover, f these Mahayanistswere either
doctrinalrebels or reactionaries-which is also far from sure-howcouldtheyhave coexistedwith their sectarianbrethren?Would t have
been necessaryto establisha new sect in orderto freely professtheir
strictcategoriesa moreuseful distinction s that between "laicizing"and "monachizing," nd "secularizing" nd "asceticizing."47 y this
Robinson means to emphasizetendencies toward ay participation r
lay control,as opposedto monasticcontrol,or a greaterconcernwith
worldly activities or values as opposedto the values of renunciation
andascetic practice.There is quitea bit of grey space in Robinson's
definition,but it serves to highlightthe fact that a strict distinction
betweenlay andmonastic,regardlessof the roles the individualsplay
in the social life of the community,can be misleading.His distinctionallows us to speakof an asceticizedlaity,for examplea householder
who vows to give up sex with his wife altogether,or secularized
monastics,forexamplea monk who lives ata royalcourt.
Lamotte,who stronglyadvocated he idea thattheMahayana epre-sents thetriumph f lay aspirationsnBuddhism,48sedtheexpression"anti-clerical"o characterize arlyMahayana utras,pointing specifi-
cally inhis influentialpaperon thesubject o theRdstrapalapariprcchd,
46Let us recall the words of La Vallee Poussin yet again 1925:20: "Scholarsset
up between monk,novice and lay people a differenceof degree,not of nature.All
three aresdmvarikas,people who have accepteda samvara[vow-JAS]... All three
possess the 'moralityof engagement,' amadantasila, hemoralitywhichconsists not
in the simpleavoidanceof sin butin the resolution o refrain rom it."
47Robinson1965-66:25-26.
48He flatly stated this in Lamotte 1955:86:"The advent of the Mahayanaconse-
crated he triumphof lay aspirations."
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7/27/2019 What, If Anything, Is Mahāyāna Buddhism? Problems of Definitions and Classifications
whichhe calls an "anti-clericalract."49t is truethatthe single verse
he quotesappears o be a violent criticismof monks,50buta glanceat
the contextmakes it quiteclear that the Rastrapalapariprcchd is notcriticizingmonks in generaland is far fromanti-clerical-ratherquitethe opposite.The text is concernedwith (future)evil anddegenerate
monks,andthedecayof the trueteaching.Inthis sense the textmightbe consideredmore a reactionarydocument hana revolutionary ne.
Whatwe see here is notanti-clericalism, utagainrather heopposite:a concernwith the purification f the clergy,andthe relatedassertion
of its superiority ndrightfulplaceas the sole legitimaterepresentative
of Buddhistorthodoxy. haveaddressed his theme in anotherpaper,51andobservetherehowpervasive hisideologyis in Buddhism,notonlyin Mahayana utras,but even in earliercanonical extsbelongingto the
Nikaya/Agama orpus.
If, as I have argued,the Mahayanacame into existence and per-sisted withinpre-existingBuddhist ocial and nstitutional tructures,t
would follow thatall monasticmembersof theMahayana houldhave
been associated with a traditionalordination ineage. I have further
suggestedthat the Mahayana extsmust havebeen writtenby monks,andhavedefinedmy notion of a Mahayana ommunityas one consti-
tutedby theauthorsof these texts.Theremay,of course,have also (or
instead)been another ype of Mahayanacommunity,but it would be
incumbentupon whomeverassertedthis to be the case to show how
thiscould havebeen so. HirakawaAkira s probably hemost influen-
tial of those who do not believe the earliestMahayana o have been a
monasticmovement,and he suggeststhat formalMahayanaBuddhist
socialunitsdidexistindependently f thetraditionalectarian afghas.Hehasofferedanalternativeolution o ourquestions,centeringonthe
suggestionthatwhatmade suchnon-monasticMahayanagroupspos-sible was theirorientation round tuipaworship.
49Lamotte1954:379.50He gives noreference,buttheverse is in fact to be found n Finot1901:28.17-18.
51See Silk forthcoming.
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Hirakawa holds the Mahayana to have been a movement promotedin contrast to Nikaya communities by non-ordained people who de-
voted themselves to stupa worship.52 One of the main presuppositionsbehind Hirakawa's thinking on this subject is the contrast between
Nikaya Buddhism and the Mahayana, in which he was perhaps influ-
enced by the writings of Nalinaksha Dutt.53 The importance of this
should be clear. If we compare, as we inevitably must, Mahayana Bud-
dhism with its ubiquitous background, mistaken ideas about that back-
ground or pre-existing Buddhism will lead to erroneous conclusions
about the situation of the Mahayana. In one particularregard I think it
is precisely here that Hirakawa has gone astray.Hirakawa's ideas are based on a very wide reading in the Vinaya
literatures, Agamas, and Mahayana sutras. Basically stated, his posi-tion is that the Mahayana grew out of lay communities institutionally
external to the Nikaya Buddhist communities. These lay communities
grew up around stuipasnot associated with any Nikaya Buddhist sect,
and the lay groups managed and administered the stupas. Gradually
they infiltrated the monastic communities, and in response to this there
was a transformation within the monastic communities in which someof these outside ideas and practices were adopted. This is the genesisof the Mahayana.
Hirakawa's argument for this theory runs as follows: According to
the Mahaparinirvana sutra, just before the death of the Buddha he
forbade monastic participation in the stupa cult, ruling that this was
521 translate s "Nikaya ommunity"Hirakawa's apanese xpressionbuhakyodan.
Although Hirakawahas publisheda certainnumber of articles in English, and an
Englishtranslation f one half of his popular urveyof IndianBuddhismhasappeared
(Hirakawa 1990), I refer in all cases to his latest Japanesepublications,on the
assumption hat hesepresenthis most recentand consideredviews. Hehas, moreover,
been publishinga series of Collected Works n which manyof his older studies are
reprinted, ometimes with some modifications.When newer versions of old papersareavailable,I generallyreferto the moreupdatedpublication. n themain,the ideas
discussed n the presentcontextare foundin Hirakawa1954 (rpt.1989).53Hirakawa eldom refers to Westernscholarlyworks,but does occasionallytake
note of Dutt 1930-not however n Hirakawa1954.
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permitted o claim fully to understand.The lay impulsehas been to seek more
immediate piritualhelpwith less of the manipulative pparatusn whichpriestly
classes tend to invest.Consciously
orunconsciously,
helay
movement seeks a
reorientation oncerningthe vital focus of spiritualendeavor(for example,by
emphasison faith rather han on ritualperformances).Priests seek to preserve
orthodoxyand become custodiansof sacredobjectsandplaces. They mark off
theirpurported iety bydistinctivemeans of training,by tonsure,dress,andritual
routines,all of whichleadthem to distance hemselvesfromordinarypeopleand
everydayaffairswhich not infrequently hey see as mundane,andperhapseven
as a sourceof pollution.In suchcircumstances,aymenare sometimesprompted
to seek new means by which to acquireprotection rom the untowardand for
new sources of reassuranceabout salvation(in whatever ormsalvationmay,in
theirculture,be conceived).Such a growing divergenceof orientation s likelyto be exacerbatedf a priesthood-purportingto offerindispensable ervice-in
itself becomescynical, corrupt,andself-indulgent.A processof this kind leads a
disenchantedaityeither o have recourse o competingagentswho claim to offer
assistancetowardsalvation,or to takespiritualaffairs nto their own hands.61
I do not mean to imply that Hirakawa has knowingly borrowed a
model from the sociology of religion, but ratherI want to suggest that
this model is fundamentally taken for granted in much of the thinking
concerning religious history, especially that which is seen to relate
to the evolution of "sects." There is little point in speculating on the
general applicability of the model in religious studies as a whole, but
even if the model were generally applicable, it would remain true that
it need not necessarily apply to each and every case.
61The authorsgo on, in the following paragraph,o makeexplicit the applicationof theirremarks:"Theprocess outlined in the abstractapplies to various historical
instances,conspicuouslyto the historyof Protestantism.The Reformation,whist not
an initially lay movement, met, with its doctrine of the priesthoodof all believers,
the aspirationsof the laity, whilst subsequentdissentingand schismatic movements
soughtmore directaccess to saving grace, and wideropportunities or lay spiritual
experience.Such strugglesbetween priests and laity are by no means confined to
Christianhistory: they have occurred in various religious contexts." The authors
continue, n an overlycredulousmanner, believe, to discuss theissue of the schism
between the NichirenShoshuand the S6ka Gakkai,relyingalmostentirelyit seems
on polemicalmaterials in English!)publishedby therespectiveparties,primarily he
latter.
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Philosophersof languagedistinguishbetween two basic types ofdefinitions,"Stipulative" efinitionsand "Lexical"definitions.In the
former,one stipulatesexactly what one means by a certain term,
whetheror not that sense is intuitive or even acceptableto others.
In many cases we must rely on stipulativedefinitions,and in fields
like science andlaw, they areusuallyessential. For instance,laws or
contracts without stipulateddefinitions are unenforceableand often
meaningless.On the otherhand,for manyuses stipulativedefinitions
are obviouslynot what are needed. In most cases, in fact, we couldnotcarryoutordinary ommunicationf we were to relyon stipulativedefinitions. What we are concerned with in these cases is "lexical"
definition.
Lexical definition s what a dictionaryaims for. How is a word most
generallyused? What do most users of a word intendby it? What
do they intendit to mean?A dictionaryaims, amongotherthings,to
formalize for us the consensus of a word's usage. One problem,of
course,is that this meaningis often extremelyhardto pin down. TheAmerican Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, for example,
defines "red"as
Any of a groupof colors thatmay varyin lightnessand saturation,whose hue
resembles hatof blood;the hue of thelong-waveendof thespectrum; ne of the
additiveor lightprimaries; ne of the psychologicalprimaryhues, evoked in the
normalobserverby the long-waveend of the spectrum.
It is clear how deeply contextualized this definition is. "Red"
resemblesblood. How close does somethinghave to be to "resemble"
somethingelse? What is the "long-wave"end of the light spectrum?How long is long?62The same dictionarysays that a "hero" s "anyman noted for feats of courageor nobilityof purpose,"or "aperson
prominentn someevent, field,period,or causebyreasonof his special
62Itmaybe thatthereare technicaldefinitionsof "longwavelight" n optics,stated
for instance in terms of a range of Angtr6ms.This simply makes this partof the
definition nto a virtual autology,however.
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achievementsorcontributions."ut what s "nobilityof purpose"?Are
notvillainsalso "prominent"?What s theproblemhere?
One problemis that this type of definition aims at identifyinganessence. These definitionsaim to locate one or a veryfew characteris-
tics thatare definitive.And this is very problematic.A definition s a
descriptionof a class. All membersof a class are included n thatclass
because the definitionappliesto them. Classes are definedby defini-
tions, and what definitionsdo is define classes.63But a definitionwill
notonly qualifya given particularor inclusion n a class; it mustalso
excludeotherinstances.A definition ells us whatqualifiesas a mem-
berof a class, and also what does not qualify.That is one reason thatthedefinitionof "hero"has a problem.The word"prominent"-whichthe samedictionarydefinesas "widelyknown"-does not exclude vil-
lains. And of course,our commonusage tells us thatvillains are not
heroes.While this definition s perhapssufficiently nclusive,it is not
sufficientlyexclusive.
And what of essences? A good definition lets us make explicitthe implicit characterof the object of the definition,and establish
its unity as an object. In other words, it allows us to include and
excludeappropriately.Generallyspeaking,we ordinarilyassume that
we can do this by locatingthe definitivefeaturesor characteristics f
the object of our definition,the feature or group of featureswhich
are necessary and sufficientto determinemembership n the class.
This is what we generallymeanby essence. If such featuresexist, we
can establishwhat is called a MonotheticClass (see below). When
we are using real language,however,we generallydo not function
in this way. We work, as the dictionaryquotedabove recognizes,by
associatingresemblances.We work by analogy. Somethingis "red"
if it resembles-in the appropriateways-other thingswe think of as
63It is worthstressinghere that while individualsmay evolve, classes do not. The
characteristics f an individualmaychangesuch that the individualmayno longerbe
includedas a memberof a certainclass, but the class itself cannotchange.
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In a PolytheticClass, to be considereda memberof the class each
objectmustpossesses a large(butunspecified)numberof featuresor
characteristicswhich are consideredrelevantfor membership n thatclass. And each such set of features must be possessed by a largenumberof members of the class. But-and this is the key-there is
no set of features which must be possessed by everymember of the
class. There s no one featureor setof featuresnecessaryand sufficient
for inclusionin the class. When a class has no single featureor set of
featurescommon to all its members, t is calledFullyPolythetic.This maybe expressed n over-simplifiedormgraphically:66
Individuals
1 2 3 4 5 6
Characteristics A A A
B B B
C C C
D D D
F F
G G
H H
Here individuals1, 2, 3, 4 form a fully polytheticclass, while 5 and
6 form a monotheticclass.
Onecansee how this is anattempt o formalize henotion of FamilyResemblances.We can think about it this way: How does one define
a "family"?We might want to consider features such as marriageor blood relation,but what of adoptedchildren?We might want to
considercohabitation,but of course,manyfamilymembers ive apart.And so on. Any single featureis open to the challenge of counter-
example,butat the same time ourclassificationmust also exclude,so
we cannotsimply relyonexhaustiveistingof possiblefeatures, est we
be forced therefore o include ndividualswe want to exclude.So while
66Needham1975:357.
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many Buddhistsdo not considertheir object of ultimate concernto
be God or a god. So, some scholarshave suggestedthatBuddhism s
not, in fact, a religion, but rathera philosophy.These scholars triedto impose a stipulativedefinitionwhere a lexical definitionbelonged.But those who were willing to let the data direct the theory, nstead
of letting the theoryor definition make them manipulate heirdata,
realizedtherefore hat theism is obviouslynot a good touchstonefor
the definition of a religion. The suggestion that Buddhism is not a
religion is an exampleof failureto properly nclude an object in the
class.
On the other hand, if we look to the functionalists,those who
suggest that religion is what produces meaning and focus in one's
life, what organizes one's social interactions and so on, we have
anotherproblem-not this time of inclusionbut of exclusion.A theistic
definitiondid not enableus to include Buddhismas a religion,which
we want to do. A functional definition, on the other hand, may
preventus fromexcludingAmericanBaseball,for example,from the
class ofreligions.
For ofcourse,
baseballprovides
a sourceofgreat,
perhapseven ultimate, meaning for many people, it can structure
their worldviewand their social interactions,can produceand focus
meaning,and so on. But we shouldexpect our definition of religion
to excludebaseball,andso while the functional eatureswhichmight
determine nclusion in the class are certainlyimportant, hey cannot
be necessaryandsufficient.A polytheticapproach,on the otherhand,
allowsus to incorporate smanyfeaturesas we feel necessary,without
makinganyone particulareaturedecisive. This is its greatstrength.Before we try to applythis all to the problemof MahayanaBud-
dhism, let us make the assumption,which I think is not radical,that
MahayanaBuddhism s a kind of Buddhism,andthat there are kinds
of Buddhismwhich are not Mahayana.But this is not necessarilythe
samethingas sayingthatMahayanas a species of Buddhism,an im-
portantdistinction.Forwhat, ndeed, s the relationbetweenMahayana
Buddhism and the rest of Buddhism,or between Mahayanaand the
largerclass of Buddhismof whichit is a part?
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can be no such thing as an absolute location, but only a location
relative to otherobjects in the space (just as is the case in the three
dimensions of our physical universe).This is related to the "degreeof resemblance" alculationswhich,as I mentionedabove,numerical
taxonomistsemploy. Slightly more thoughtwould show us that the
problem s morecomplicatedstill. For what are the criteriaby means
of which we would locate our texts in this space?In fact, there is an
infinite numberof possible criteria we might want to use to locate
the objects of our study,and an infinite numberof ways of relatingour data points to each other,and thus an infinitenumberof multi-
dimensionalmatrices. For instance, we should recognize that eventhe unit "text" s itself amenableto furtheranalysisand localization.
Let us consider the exampleof one sutra,the Kasyapaparivarta,ustfor the sake of argument.We have a Sanskrit version (in this case
only one nearly complete manuscript,with a few variantfragments,but sometimes we will have more), a Tibetan translation,and a
number of Chinese versions, not to mention a commentaryto the
text extantin severalversions,quotations n otherworks,and so on.
From one perspective,we would expect all of these to be located
veryclosely together n ourimaginaryspace;they are all versionsof,
or intimatelyrelatedto, the "same text." From anotherperspective,
however,if we are interested n translationvocabulary or instance,
we might also have good reasons to want to relate the Chinese
translationof the Kasyapaparivartaof one translatormore closelyto other translationsof the same translator han to other Chinese
versions of the Kasyapaparivarta,and certainlymore closely than
to the Tibetan translationof the same text. Or again, a text withdoctrinalcontentmightfromthatperspectivebe relatedmorecloselyto anotherof similarcontent,the HeartSuitraPrajndpdaramitdhrdaya)with theDiamondSutra Vajracchedikd),orinstance,whileif we were
interested n the same text used liturgicallywe might groupit with
quiteanother extortextsto which it mightbe unrelatedn termsof its
contentbut with which it may be used togetheror similarlyin ritual,
the same Prajidpadramitahrdayaith the Smaller SukhdvatTvyuha,
perhaps.So the sortsof groupings he datawill producewill dependon
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whatwe areaskingof ourdata.There will not be one final definitive
grouping,that is to say, no one unique localization of our objects
withinourimaginarymulti-dimensionalpace.And the moreflexibletheorganization f ourdata, he morecomprehensivelywe will be able
to understandand classify its internalrelations.To put this another
way, none of the objectswe are interested n-no matterhow we are
likely to define those objects, singly or as groups-will be relatedto
anotherobjector set of objectsin a single, uniqueway. The relation
will dependon whataspectsof the objectswe choose to relateeverytime we ask a question.And if we mapthe relationsbetweenobjects
withinour multi-dimensional pace, the geographyof thatspacewillthereforebe determinedby the combinationof objectsandaspectsin
question.Sincewe havemultipleobjectsandvirtually imitlessaspectsto compare-constrained only by the imaginationwhich generatesour questions-no unique mappingor solution is even theoretically
possible.There are in fact establishedtechniquesavailable n the so-called
Social Sciences for thinkingabout such problems.One of the most
importantnumerical echniques s called ClusterAnalysis.What clus-ter analysisenables one to do is rationallydeal with a large amount
of data,clustering t into morecompactforms for easiermanageabil-
ity. The clustersmay be definedin any numberof ways. It mightbe
possiblefor us, for instance,to select features,such as the occurrence
of doctrinalconcepts,key words, stock phrasesor the like, and code
them 1 or0 forMahayanaornon-Mahayana.Butgivenourgoals, one
of which is to avoid prejudicing he relationshipbetweenMahayana
and otherforms of Buddhismas this monotheticclassificationwould,
such anapproach an be seen to embodythe same sortof flaw inherent
in previousthinkingon the subject.76A much betterapproachwould
be to clusterdiscretelyratherthancumulatively, hat is, to measure
the presenceor absence of given factors,andthen measure the total
clustered actors ndividually,not additively.The clusterswhich result
76This is also the sameflawto which cladisticanalysesareprone.
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a partof thatquestionwe want to understandabove all how objectsare defined as "Mahayana"n the first place. But cladistics cannot
helpus here.Askingaboutthe relationof Mahayanao Buddhismas awhole is closer to askingaboutthe relationof the zebrato thecategory"animal"orperhaps"mammal").The tools we must use to approachthe definitionandclassificationof MahayanaBuddhismare much less
rigid and dichotomousthancladistics,much more fluid,variableand
flexible. And so, with an aesthetic reluctancebut a methodological
confidence,I concede that this incarnationof Gould's title does not
properlyset the stage for the taskfacingus as we attempt o confront
the problem of how to define MahayanaBuddhism.But after all,
perhaps ormmay be permitted o trumpcontent ust this once. As a
title "TheDefinitionof MahayanaBuddhismas aPolytheticCategory"seems sufficientlyanaemictojustifythepoetic licence.