What constitutes a theoretical contribution? - CIRU

What constitutes a theoretical contribution?

Davide Ravasi

Cass Business School

City University London

If you ask a positivist,

a theoretical contribution is…

Not the addition of new factors or boundary conditions…

A significant theoretical contribution…

• is not simply a new “what” (adding or subtracting a factor or two to an existing model)…

• … or a new set of “who”, “where”, and “when” (application of an old model to a new setting)

… unless these new “whats”, “who”, “where” and “when” “alter our understanding of the phenomenon by reorganizing our causal maps”

… but a new understanding of causal relationships (Whetten, 1989)

New “whats”, “who”, “where” and “when” “alter our understanding of the phenomenon by reorganizing our causal maps” when:

• they imply a substantial change in the “how” (the hypothesized relationship among variables)

• they challenge the “why” (fundamental assumptions about psychological, economic or sociological explanation of the pheomenon)

e.g. Cross-cultural extension of management studies; firm-specific components of performance; ecological approach to organizational change

What theory is not (Sutton & Staw, 1995)

• Not a list of references: it is not enough to cite prior work to support your arguments, you need to articulate an explanation!

• Not data: Empirical patterns (what) must be interpreted (how and why) to become meaningful! Prior findings cannot motivate hypotheses.

• Not a list of variables and constructs: A theory must specify and explain connections among variables.

• Not diagrams and figures: “Some verbal explication is always necessary. The logic underlying the portrayed relationships needs to be spelled out”

• Not (only) a set of hypotheses: They are “concise statements about what is expected to occur, not why it is expected to occur”

Approximations of Theory (Merton, 1967)

• General orientations: broad frameworks that specify types of variables that are relevant to understand a pheomenon (e.g. strategy, industry structure, and culture affect performance)

• Analysis of isolated concepts: defined and clarified, but not interrelated

• Post-factum interpretations: hypotheses derived ex post from a single observation, with no effort to explore alternative explanations (e.g. the Hawthorne effect on productivity)

• Empirical generalization: an isolated proposition summarizing the relationship between two variables, with no attempt at further interrelations (e.g. size positively affects performance)

How developed is your theoretical contribution?

Have you really built theory?

If you ask a social constructionist,

a theoretical contribution is…

…whatever persuades the editor and the reviewers!

“An idea becomes a contribution when it is constructed as important by the members of

a scholarly community, relative to the accepted knowledge constituted by the

field’s written work” (Locke & Golden-Biddle, 1997)

Constructing opportunities for contribution (Locke & Golden-Biddle, 1997)

In organization studies “what counts as a contribution is that which is perceived as unique or novel in light of the extant literature.”

Constructing an opportunity for contribution requires: – Constructing intertextual coherence (building a

map of a body of work)

– Problematizing the situation (highlighting a problem with the map)

Constructing intertextual coherence

• Synthesized coherence (“Hey, there’s a territory!”): drawing connections between studies not typically cited together

• Progressive coherence (“The way we have mapped a territory has changed over time”): showing how a research program has changed and advanced over time

• Noncoherence (“The maps we have do not agree”): highlight disagreement in works belonging to a common research program

Problematizing the situation

• Incompleteness (“Some areas on the map have not been charted”): Highlighting need for further specification or investigation.

• Inadequacy (“The map fails to provide important information”): Pointing to important perspectives that are overlooked by the extant literature.

• Incommensurability (“The map we have is wrong!”): Suggesting that the literature is moving in the wrong direction

What is YOUR map of the literature?

What makes a theoretical contribution “interesting”

(Davis, 1971)?

That’s Interesting! (Davis, 1971)

• New theoretical propositions are not paid attention to and cited because they are true, but because they are interesting.

• New theories are considered interesting (as opposed to obvious, irrelevant, or absurd) because they partially challenge the taken-for-granted beliefs of an audience

Types of interesting propositions (1)

• Organization a) What seems to be a disorganized (unstructured)

phenomenon is in reality an organized (structured) phenomenon (e.g. garbage can model)

b) What seems to be an organized (structured) phenomenon is in reality a disorganized (unstructured) phenomenon (or it is organized differently) (e.g. Postmodern critiques of culture)

• Composition a) What seem to be assorted heterogeneous phenomena

are in reality composed of a single element (e.g. Transaction cost theory)

b) What seems to be a single phenomenon is in reality composed of assorted heterogeneous elements (e.g. Culture vs. sub-cultures)

Types of interesting propositions (2)

• Abstraction (whole vs. part) a) What seems to be an individual phenomenon is in

reality a holistic phenomenon (holism) (e.g. cultural theory)

b) What seems to be a holistic phenomenon is in reality an individual phenomenon (particularism) (e.g. Hofstede’s theory of culture)

• Generalization a) What seems to be a local phenomenon is in reality a

general phenomenon (e.g. corporate entrepreneurship) b) What seems to be a general phenomenon is in

reality a local phenomenon (e.g. cross-cultural studies)

Types of interesting propositions (3) • Stabilization

a) What seems to be a stable and unchanging phenomenon is in reality an unstable and changing phenomenon (e.g. identity change)

b) What seems to be an unstable and changing phenomenon is in reality a stable and unchanging phenomenon (e.g. institutional theory)

• Function a) What seems to be a phenomenon that functions

ineffectively as a means for the attainment of an end is in reality a phenomenon that functions effectively (e.g. strategic planning; brainstorming)

b) What seems to be a phenomenon that functions effectively is in reality a phenomenon that functions ineffectively (e.g. rhetorics of TQM)

Types of interesting propositions (4)

• Evaluation a) What seems to be a bad phenomenon is in reality a good

phenomenon (e.g. lack of consensus and decision making)

b) What seems to be a good phenomenon is in reality a bad phenomenon (e.g. critical analysis of culture)

• Co-relation a) What seem to be unrelated (independent) phenomena

are in reality related (interdependent) phenomena (e.g.

configuration theory)

b) What seem to be related (interdependent) phenomena are in reality unrelated (independent) phenomena (e.g.

strategy and survival in population ecology )

Types of interesting propositions (5)

• Co-existence a) What seem to be phenomena which can exist together are

in reality phenomena which cannot exist together (e.g. legitimacy and efficiency)

b) What seem to be phenomena which cannot exist together are in reality phenomena which can exist together (e.g. org. identity as claims and beliefs; strong culture and change)

• Co-variation a) What seems to be a positive co-variation between

phenomena is in reality a negative co-variation between phenomena (e.g. change and survival in population ecology)

b) What seems to be a negative co-variation between phenomena is in reality a positive co-variation between phenomena (e.g. control and productivity: Theory X vs. Theory Y)

Types of interesting propositions (6) • Opposition

a) What seem to be similar (nearly identical) phenomena are in reality opposite phenomena (e.g. different types of sensemaking)

b) What seem to be opposite phenomena are in reality similar (nearly identical) phenomena (e.g. discourse theory and the notion of text)

• Causation a) What seems to be the independent phenomenon

(variable) in a causal relation is in reality the dependent phenomenon (variable) (e.g. “strategy follows structure”)

b) What seems to be the dependent phenomenon (variable) in a causal relation is in reality the independent phenomenon (variable) (e.g. Weber’s theory of protestant ethic and capitalism)