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AREAEE/Rep.~301

ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT

ATOMIC ENERGY ESTABLISHMENT

PLASMA PHYSICS AND ACCELERATOR DEPARTMENT

A SAFEGUARDS APPROACH

APPLICABLE TO A PLUTONIUM MIXED OXIDE POWDER

PLANT

BY

ISMAIL: BADAWY

1988

NUCLEAR INFORMATION DEPARTMENT

ATOMIC ENERGY POST OFFICE

CAIRO, A.R.E.

CONTENTS

Page

ABSTRACT ii

INTRODUCTION #J 1

CHARACTERISTICS OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL .. 2

SAFEGUARDS SIGNIFICANCE AND POSSIBLE DIVERSION

STRATEGIES............ 3

SAFEGUARDS APPROACH 3

SAFEGUARDS MEASURES. 4

CONCLUSIONS.. 9

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT. 10

REFERENCES; 11

ANNEX-I 14

ANNEX-II 15

ANNEX-III 16

ABSTRACT

This report describes a safeguards approach possible to

apply in a plutonium mixed oxide powder plant which handles

large amounts of plutonium in the light of experience gained

in some other plutonium bulk handling facilities in the

nuclear fuel cycle under IAEA Safeguards,,

The approach is based on performing two routine

verifications of the nucloar material per month without

interrupting the process operations in the plant- combined with

continual flow verifications for ongoing process and transfer

operations; and two Physical Inventory Verifications per year.

The total annual effort to cover all the verificationSwas

estimated to be in the range of 150 to 240 Man Day.

The analysis of the approach showed that with further

advances in the Non Destructive Assay measurement techniques

for the determination of plutonium content in solutions and

MOX powder would lead to development of the approach towards

increase in effectiveness and decrease in the verification

effort,,

I. INTRODUCTION

The present study describes a safeguards approach

possible to apply in a plutonium mixed oxide powder plant.

A plant of this kind uses highly strategic and sensetive

Nuclear Material (NM) from the point of view of . . _•

safeguards (1).

It has been pointed out by H. Grumm that plutonium

separated from fission products subject to IAEA safeguards

requires a special approach (2). Some safeguards approaches

for plutonium fuel fabrication and plutonium conversion fac­

ilities have been done recently (3,4,5).

A plutonium mixed oxide or MOX powder plant is a

facility in which NM in form of plutonium nitrate and uranium

nitrate solutions can be processed to produce (Pu-U) oxide

powder. The safeguards approach in this study will be direc­

ted to a MOX powder plant selected to be of capacity in the

order of:

Maximum Inventory 700 kg Plutonium

and 1300 kg Uranium

Maximum Throughput 1000 kg Plutonium

and 1000 kg Uranium

Maximum Uranium Enrichment 4%

II. CHARACTERISTICS OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL

The categories of NM in a plutonium mixed oxide plant may

be characterized mainly as :. feed material (plutonium nitrate

solution, uranium nitrate solution and mixture solution of

Pu and U)j process material (Pu-U mixed nitrate solution and

Pu-U mixed cxide powder) and product (Pu-U mixed oxide powder

in storage).

The process flov/ in o plutonium mixed oxide powder

plant is presented in Fig.l. The plant receives Pu~

nitrate solution and U-nitrate solution in separate recieving

tanks. The two solutions are mixed in mixing tanks.

The mixture solution of adjusted Pu/U ratio (ranges from 0.2

to 1) ic directed to a process unit , ivhero it Is converter! to

nlutonium-Uranium mixed oxide or KOX powder, which goes to

a blending unit to adjust the Pu/U ratio. Then the product

HOX. powder is packed inside metal cans (capacity 1-4 kg),

and the cans are loaded inside metal canisters (capacity

1-4 cans) for storage Nuclear material in form of scrap,

solid waste and liquid waste are stored in suitable storage

t3'"',Niy .in the plont«

A bulk handling facility such as a MOX powder plant may

be divided into two or more Material Balance Areas (MfiAe.)

ond; Flow and Inventory Key Measurement Points (KMPs) to

control the NK in the plant- A two MBAs type plant is shown

in Fig.2.

- 3

III. SAFEGUARDS SIGNIFICANCE AND POSSIBLE DIVERSION

STRATEGIES

The MOX powder plant under this study is assumed to

have an annual capacity of about 1700 kg of plutonium and

2300 kg of low enriched uranium (U-235 of 4% maximum).

Plutonium and uranium in nitrate solutions or in mixed powder

are present. Plutonium is the NM of highest safeguards

significance which is possible to diversion for weapon man­

ufacture whithin a short period of time (1 to 3 weeks) (6)

(Annex-! and Annex-il). In the frame work of this approach,

the detection goal quantity is one significant quantity of

Pu (1 SQ is 8kg of Pu of total element) and a detection time

of two weeks may be assumed. The detection probability has

been set for the accountancy measures at 95% and the false

alarm probability at 5%. The possible diversion strategies

and concealment methods are listeed in Table 1,

IV. SAFEGUARDS APPROACH

The MOX powder plant considered in the present study

handles large amounts of plutonium and uranium. From the

safeguards point of view, the knowledge of the exact amounts

of NK in particular-the plutonium comming in and leaving

the process area is of extreme importance. Consequently, the

implementation of safeguards would necessitate a nearly

continuous verification strategy or a very frequent one in

order to maintain adequate assurance that the NM in-storage

and in-process are duly accounted.for.with the detection

time of two weeks (6),

The safeguards approach should consider the following

items:

•• /\. mm

1. Book auditing and checking of the facility NM accounting

system.

2, Verification of NM Inventory, including NM waste.

3. Verification of NM in-process,

4, Verification of NM in-floiv,

5, Implementation of Containment and Survillance systems

wherever possible.

6. Verification of the plant measuring systems, including : 1 he tank calibrations (for the tanks of solutions of

Pu, U, etc.).

V. SAFEGUARDS MEASURES

The basic safeguards measures in the plutonium bulk

handling facility of the present work are the NM accountacy

and its verifications at input, intermediate and output stages

V.l.l.. MBA 1...

The f i r s t Ma te r i a l Balance Area i s regarded as an "SRD+MUF " MBA ( i . e . Shipper/Receiver D i f fe rence + Ma te r i a l Un-accounted For- type MBA)(6). I t covers the rece iv ing of feed mate r ia l and the process ing . The NM may be i n the form of Pu, U and (Pu+U) mixture n i t r a t e so lu t i ons ( i n t anks ) : MOX powder and scrap ( i n cans) j s o l i d waste ( i n drums) and l i q u i d waste ( i n t anks ) .

The safeguards measures at MBA 1 may cons is t o f : I ) For the Pu, U and (Pu+U) mixture n i t r a t e s o l u t i o n s b y . :

Measurement of volume and dens i t y (or weight and concen t ra t i on ) .

- 5 -

- Destructive Analysis (DA) sampling for chemical

analysis and isotopics.

ii) For MOX powder and scrap in-process by:

- Weighing.

- DA sampling for chemical analysis and isotopics.

- Application of sealing of the MOX canister after being

loaded with the MOX cans.

iii) For solid waste by.:

- Weighing.

- Non-destructive Assay (NDA) measurement for Pu content

for partial defects test (variables in attribute mode)

or at least for gross defects test.

iv) For liquid waste byj

- Measurement of volume (or weight).

- DA sampling for chsmical analysis.

V.l .2., MBA 2.

The second Material Balance Area is regarded as a Book

Inventory type-MBA. It covers the receiving and storage of

the product NM, i.e. the MOX powder (in canisters), the scrap

material and solid wasto (also stored in canisters) comming

from the MBA 1 and the transfer back to it.# The MBA 2 covers

also the final coi.irol and the shipment of MOX powder (in

canisters) to other facilities.

The safeguards measures at MBA 2 may consist of:

i) For MOX powder and scrap (in canisters) by:

Item counting of MOX canisters and Seal verification.

- NDA measurement for Pu content for bias defects test (7)

(or equivalent by weighing and DA sampling for chemical

analysis and isotopics. This action may be taken in

case of a physical Inventory Verification "PIV" and or

a large disagreement between the NDA results and the

declared NM quantity).

- 6

- If the sealing of the MOX canister was removed for

any reason, the canister-after being reverified has to

be resealed.

ii) For solid waste (in canisters) by:

- Item counting of the solid waste canisters.

- NDA measurement for Pu content for partial defects

test, or at least for gross defects test.

V.1.3. The Physical Inventory Verification

The interm verification activities explained in

items V.l.l. and V.1.2.for MBA 1 and MBA2 respectively do not

necessitate the shut-down of the process operations in the

plant. Consequently, the NM in ;the process line will be

only partially accessible at any time for the purpose of

verification.

The basic objectives of a Physical Inventory Verification

(PIV) is to verify that the NM in the Physical Inventory

Listing (PIL) declared by the plant is accounted for in each

MBA in the plant. In general, during PIVs, the plant is shut­

down and the process line is cleaned (to the extent possible)

i.e., all the NM strata in the plant have to be accessible

for verification. It is assumed in the present approach to

perform two PIVs per year. The safeguards measures to be .

taken during a PIV follow the same verification methods

indicated in V.l.l and V.l„2 A standard deviation of the

material balance closing of 0.5% or less is expected for the

MOX powder plant (6).

- 7 -

V.2. Safeguards Measures for NM Flow

The safeguards measures to be taken for the NM flow at

the different flow key measurement points (KMPs), i.e.

the receipt of Pu and U nitrate solutions;; the transfer of

MOX powder and scrap and solid waste, and the shipment of

liquid waste consist of the same mentods of verification

for each category of NM as explained in items V.l.l and

V.1.2.

V.3. Calibration of TAnks

The accurate accounting of NM in liquid form-

specifically where large amounts of plutonium (in nitrate

solution) are stored is of extreme importance for satisfying

the safeguards goals. Internationally recognized Volume

Calibration Techniques and associated estimation procedures

(8) should be applied for the calibration of all the NM

solution tanks in the facility. Recalibration of these tanks

should be performed regularly, i.e., according to the

following proposed regime;

- For Pu-nitrate solution receiving tank and (Pu~U)

mixture tanks, once every year.

- For U-nitrate solution receiving tank;

once every two years.

- For liquid waste;

once every four years

- 8

V.4. Estimated Inspection Effort

As explained above, the verification target is to

meet the objectives of timely detection of a diversion of at

least one Significant Quantity of NM (6).In order, .that appropriate

verification activities would cover an abrupt diversion

regime, it is suggested in this approach to apply two routine

inventory verifications per month combined with continual flow

verification within the month. Book accounting of the NM in­

ventory and inventory changes, and checking of the accounting

and operating records may be performed on monthly basis, with

up-dating of book inventory during the mid-month inspection.

The estimated inspection effort is listed in Table 2„

V.5. Data Collection and Reporting

The different types of verification of the MM may be

documented on special logsheets. The technical details of

the activities including the results of the measurements,

etc^,may be recorded on data collection forms to be specially

designed for the pupose.

Since two inspections are assumed per month, then,

two reports may be prepared per month. Each report should

include the results of all the other interim verification

activities performed to cover tank calibration, NM transfers,

the NM flow, etc., within its period.,

The report for a PIV should include the Material

Balance Report (MBR) for the total Material Balance

Period (MBP), (the period is assumed to be 6 month in the

present approach)„ The Material Un-accounted For (MUF) is

calculated for each MBA as indicated in Annex—III

.- D -

VI. CONCLUSIONS

The safeguards approach In this work presents a

possible approach which may be applied in a plutonium mixed

oxide powder plant which handles large quantities of

plutonium

The analysis showed that the approach can be based on

performing two routine verifications of the NM per month

combined with continual flow verifications, and two PIVs per

year. The total annual effort was estimated to be in the

range of 150 tc 240 Man Day.

It may be also concluded that with further advances in

the NDA measurement techniques for the Pu content in solution

and MOX powder would lead the present approach towards

higher effectiveness and decrease in the inspection effort.

- 10 -

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The author wishes to present his sincere thanks

to Prof. Dr. M. Sultan and Prof. Dr. F. H. Hammad.

for interest and encouragement.

- 11 -

REFERENCES

1. IAEA Safeguards-:; An introduction, IAEA/SG/INF/3, 1981.

2. IAEA Safeguards-Status and Prospects, H. Grumm, INMM

Annual Meeting, San Francisco-USA, 1981,

3. Safeguards considerations for mixed oxide fuel element

fabrication facilities, ch. Beets, 3. Challe and R. CJules,

IAEA/AG-244, 1979.

4. Some safeguards considerations for a reference mixed oxide

fuel element fabrication plant with an annual throughput

of 500 kg Pu02jW. Bahm, T. Shea, D. Tolchenkov, IAEA/STR-

89, 1981.

5. Safeguards approach to plutonium conversion development

facility, I. Badawy, IAEA/SGOA2-Draft, 1981 (Unpublished).

6. IAEA Bulletin, Vol. 22, No. 3/4 ..

IAEA INFCIRC/153; IAEA INFCIRC/66-Rev. 2; IAEA Safeguards

Glossary, IAEA/SG/INF/1 (Rev.l) 1987.

7. Plutonium canister counter operations and procedures

manual, H.O. Menlove, E.L. Adams, E. Dahn, A. Ramalho,

LANL Report, No. LA-10S15-M, 1986.

8. Selected topics in calibration of NM accountability tanks,

M.F. Mullen, IAEA-EM Workshop 102, Vienna, 1982.

- 12 -

Table 1.

Possible Diversion Stratagies and Concalment

Methods in a Plutonium Mixed Oxide

Powder Plant.

Diversion Strategy Concealment Method

., Receipt Area of Pu and U nitrate i) Unrecorded transfer of

solution ii) by-passing the receiv­

ing tanks iii) Removal of Pu, U nitrate

from storage and mixing tanks

2. Process Area

i) Removal of (Pu+U) solu­tion from conversion unit

ii)Removal of(Ptn-U) powder at production stage, or at intermediate storage stage

iii) Partial removal of MOX powder at can filling stage Removel of MOX-cans iv)

v) a MOX-Removal of canister

, Product Storage Area (MOX-powder) i) Removal or replacement

of one or more cans from a eanister

ii) Removal of a canister

by falsification of records and documents of Pu,U receipts

- tampering with measuring instruments (manometers;..) for volume and density, etc. - falsification of represen­tative DA samples - amplifying of measurement errors

-by falsification of operat-tion records, and accounting - tampering with measuring instruments - falsification of representa­tive DA samples

- Inflation of measurement un­certainties - exaggeration of looses and v/osto - partial loading of canister, or substitution with HU or DU - falsification of the canister

- by falsification of records and shipping documents

N.B.* DA Destructive Assay for chemical analysis

MOX (Pu-U) mixed oxide,

HU High Enirchment Uranium (U-235 of 20% or higher)

DU Deplated Uranium

- 13 -

Table 2.

Estimated Verification Effort for a

Plutonium Mixed Oxide Plant.

Inspection Effort Type of Inspection Remarks

TnoI!°' °!a Days MD Inspectors '

F i r s t Half-month V e f i f i c a t i o n Second Half-month v e r i f i c a t i o n

I n t e r im V e r i f i c a ­t i o n

- Transfer & Flow - Tank C a l i

o r a t i o n - Checking of

ope ra to r ' s measuring system

PIV Inspect ion

3

2-3

1-2

1-2

1-2

3 -4

1-2

1-2

1-2

3 -4

1-2

3 -4

3-6

4 -6

2 -4

4 -8

3 -4

9-16

Should include acc­

ounting activities

Should include only up-dating

No accounting, no up-dating is requir­ed

- Two PIVs yearly

- A PIV Inspection would substitute one of the Routine Inspections accord­ing to its timing

N.B. ; MD Man Day

PIV Physical Inventory Verification

- 14 -

ANNEX-I

QUANTITIES OF SAFEGUARDS

SIGNIFICANCE

o -a.

Material

Quantity of Safeguards Significance (SQ) SQ Appl ied to

*•> H O (0 03 <H i_ L .

Q *»

0) CO

, 3 _

Pu 8 kg Total element

233LJ 8 kg Total isotope

U( 2 3 5U>20%) 25 kg 235,j

Plus rules for mixtures where appropriate

CO CD

• H -o c M

0) 4J (0

U( 2 3 5U < 20%) 235 U 75 kg

TH 20 t Total element

Plus rules for mixtures where appropritate

N#B.: See also Ref. No. 6.

v

- 15 -

ANNEX-II

ESTIMATED MATERIAL CONVERSION

TIMES

Material

Classification

Estimated Conversion

Beginningform Material End process Tin,e

Pu, High-enriched uranium (HEU),or U-233 Metal

Finished order of Plutonium or days uranium Metal (7-10) components

PuO„ Pu <N03), ,or Finished '2 ' M "w3'4' otherpure. compounds ' Plutonium or

HEU.U-233 oxide, or uranium metal other pure compounds components

MOX or other non-irradiated pure mixtures of Pu or

U (U-233+U-235) ^ 2 0 % Pu.HWU and/or U-233 in scrap or other miscellaneous impure compounds

order

weeks

(1-3)

order weeks (1-3)

of

of

Plutonium,HEU or U-233 in irradiated fuels

Finished order iof Plutonium or months uranium metal (1-3)

components

Uranium conta in ing < 20% U-235 and U-233;; thor ium

order of 1 year

N.B. See a lso Ref. No.6.

- IG v

ANNEX-III

MATERIAL DALANCE CALCULATION

The "Material Unacoountod For" (MUF) io calculated

for each MBA according to the following)

MUP PD + v - Y » PE

whara ;

PB beginning phyelool Inventory for porlotf'U)

X , oum of incrcoeob to Inventory (recoipto, nuclear

. procluotlon, do-exemption,, .etc)

V eum of dooreoeoe from inventory (ehlpMunto, nuclccn

loee, meaeurod dlecard, accidental Ipso,,fetc)

PS ending phyeloal inventory for period (1)

N.D,i The PE of poriod (1) la the PB of period ( i ^ l )

Tho valuo oftho 'MUP io calculated from 'Vlio Mooourcid valuoo of PD, xY^PE'-teking In conoldorotlon tho rcinclor.i and eye tome tic arrore,., Erroro other than noaouremont or.'rors r.ioy occur from undetected loesoe, or hijman errors. An analysis of MUF including these kinds of errors should bo done, opoc'ifioally when tho MUF oxeeds tho expected .lAnitjn,

- IV-

Pu nitrate Reoeiving tank

pu Suffer tank

Analytioal Laatratery

Pu-U Buffer tank

.Liquid waste tank

K

I

<£:

I

A-V nit rata Receiving tank

« Buffer tank

Pu-U Nixing tank

Cenveralan Preoaae Unit

Blending Unit

Mox pevdar Packing

Me* atarage

Loading tut atatioa

Fig. 1 • Preoese Flov In A Pu Mixed Oxide Pander Plant.

-18 -

MBA 1 HPA ?

6 *—J <

U—u r~T

d>

Fie* KXPB

Receipt #f Fu nitrate selutien

Receipt ef U nitrate eelutlen

0 0 R« Receipt and Sklpaent e f BB«11 quantity

nuolear aaterlal

Shipment e f l iquid waste

Measured discard af ee l ld waste

Transfer e f Pu - U alzad ai ida pawdor from MBA 1 te MBA 2 k froa MBA 2 ta KBA 1

Saipient af Pu -U nixed aside pewder ta etker fac i l i t i e s

Inventery KUPB

A

C

In-process inventory

Max pewder storage

B Analytical Laboratory

. 2 . Material Balance AreaB And Kay Measurement Feints In A Pu Mixed Oxide Plant.