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UvA-DARE is a service provided by the library of the University of Amsterdam (http://dare.uva.nl)
UvA-DARE (Digital Academic Repository)
Corporate Financial Risk Management
Ligterink, J.E.
Link to publication
Citation for published version (APA):Ligterink, J. E. (2001). Corporate Financial Risk Management. Thesis Publishers.
General rightsIt is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s),other than for strictly personal, individual use, unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).
Disclaimer/Complaints regulationsIf you believe that digital publication of certain material infringes any of your rights or (privacy) interests, please let the Library know, statingyour reasons. In case of a legitimate complaint, the Library will make the material inaccessible and/or remove it from the website. Please Askthe Library: https://uba.uva.nl/en/contact, or a letter to: Library of the University of Amsterdam, Secretariat, Singel 425, 1012 WP Amsterdam,The Netherlands. You will be contacted as soon as possible.
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