Unique Spain History

8/13/2019 Unique Spain History

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THE LIBRARY OF IBERIAN RESOURCES ONLINE

A History of Spain and PortugalVol. 2

Stanley G. Payne

Chapter 19

The War ! In"epen"en#e an" L$%eral$&'()1*+The Reign of Carlos IV (17!1"#

The Old Regime in Spain ended with the reign of Carlos IV, which collapsed beneath the weight ofFrench Napoleonic imperialism. Spain seemed a comparativel peacef!l and progressive land when

Carlos IV came to the throne in "#$$. The order and decor!m shown b the man tho!sands of

Spaniards who crowded into %adrid for the official coronation the following ear contrasted sharplwith the revol!tion that was developing in France. The new &ing was abo!t fort ears old, good'

hearted b!t wea& and simple'minded. (e hoped to contin!e the general policies of his father)s reign and

retained as chief minister the %!rcian lawer *os+ %oino, Conde de Floridablanca, a strong'mindedregalist who had long served Carlos III capabl.

The beginning of the French Revol!tion in "#$- drasticall altered the polic of the Spanish crown.

Floridablanca adopted a sharpl hostile co!rse and imposed censorship on all news from France. The

atmosphere was even more tense after the attempted assassination of Floridablanca b a dementedFrenchman in "#- and a ta/ revolt b the overb!rdened 0alician peasantr in "#-'"#-". The nascent

Spanish press was also s!b1ected to severe censorship, and the progress of the Spanish enlightenment

was bro!ght to a near halt. 2arl ()1,+in "#-3, Floridablanca)s enemies, both personal and political,combined to force him from power. Carlos IV replaced him with the now elderl Conde de 4randa,

who while no s!pporter of the French Revol!tion, was a liberal and a Francophile, convinced of the

importance of the French alliance. (e rela/ed the censorship, allowing Spanish p!blicists and

reformers to contin!e their proselti5ing activities. 6efore the end of the ear, however, 4randa wasshoved o!t b palace intrig!es, replaced as first secretar b a handsome, st!rd o!ng g!ards) officer

from 2/tremad!ra, %an!el 0odo, friend of the roal famil and sometime social escort 7cortejo8 of

the Italian 9!een, %aria :!isa di ;arma. Carlos IV considered him a tr!e friend, one of the few reliableco!nselors among a bev of fops and intrig!ers, and made him

For most of fifteen ears "#-3'"$$ 0odo was the real r!ler of Spain. (e was not a politician or

administrator of great ed!cation or mental power, b!t considered himself a man of the new generation,

a reformer and contin!er of the policies of Carlos III. Thro!gho!t these ears, the overriding concern ofthe Spanish crown was the challenge presented b revol!tionar France and its s!ccessor, Napoleonic

imperialism. Spain 1oined the alliance of legitimac against the French revol!tionar regime in "#-='

"#-> and scored some initial s!ccesses, occ!ping (endae and ;erpignan.


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however enlightened''was starting to form. This trend toward the e/pression of critical political ideas

bro!ght a reimposition of censorship on boo&s at the beginning of "#-$.

4side from its semiliberal polic on ed!cation and printing, the crown)s principal attempt to contin!e

and e/pand reform policies came in the fields of ta/ation and commerce. Roal finances weres!fficientl strong to permit Spain to enter the war of "#-='"#-> on a fairl so!nd footing''so!nder

than that of ;r!ssia, for e/ample''b!t after a ear of f!ll'scale war fiscal press!res mo!nted. Ta/es on

salaried officials and on the ch!rch were raised, and new iss!es of paper mone were bac&ed b speciallevies on landowners and on the ch!rch. For the first time, the aristocrac was bro!ght directl !nderta/ation, and this e/plains part of the opposition to the government in central Spain. In "#->, 0odo)s

government too& the step of abolishing the specialserviciota/ on peasants that had first been levied in

si/teenth'cent!r Castile, ma&ing the b!rden somewhat less ine9!itable.

The econom too& a t!rn for the worse after "#-, when the government allowed itself to bemane!vered b French press!re and its longstanding trans'4tlantic rivalr with the 6ritish into

declaring war against the latter in October "#-, after signing an alliance with France.

few ears, Spanish commerce s!ffered grievo!sl as the fleet !nderwent ma1or reverses. Thisnecessitated drastic changes that portended far'reaching conse9!ences, as in the case of two significant

new decrees iss!ed in "#-#. One permitted foreign craftsmen of Christian religions other than Roman

Catholic to enter Spain and open shops or factories with a g!arantee of freedom of religion. The secondrecogni5ed the effectiveness of the virt!al 6ritish naval bloc&ade b s!spending commercial

restrictions within the Spanish 4merican empire, permitting all ne!tral nations to trade freel. This was

a fatef!l step toward the !ltimate independence of the colonies, for it admitted that at least for the timebeing Spain co!ld not maintain its pretended monopol.

4nother important precedent was set in "#-$, when the government decided to raise mone b

a!ctioning off s!rpl!s b!ildings owned b m!nicipalities. This was the first time that entailed propert

was sei5ed and a!ctioned b the state to pa for war e/penses. In ()19+"#-$, the government alsodecreed the sale of the propert of most ch!rch charitable fo!ndations, as well as of all remaining

!nsold *es!it propert, and d!ring the s!bse9!ent ears f!rther levies were agreed to b the ch!rch to

meet militar e/penses. In "#--, a new propert ta/ was levied on the wealth. These meas!res ro!sedthe ire of aristocrats and the clerg, while discontent increased among the lower classes. 4s pricesincreased, real wages fell, and there were several minor riots in "#-#'"#-$.

0odo himself bro!ght in a new gro!p of liberal appointees at the end of "#-# b!t, beca!se of French

press!re, was forced to retire as first secretar in %arch "#-$. (e was replaced b the secretar of

finance, Francisco de Saavedra, in t!rn s!cceeded a few months later b the anticlerical and regalistforeign minister, %ariano :!is de Dr9!i1o. The financial sit!ation contin!ed to deteriorate, and the

crown became increasingl conf!sed b the p!lling and ha!ling of factions. Conservatives among

ch!rchmen and aristocrats la!nched a co!nteroffensive against the new reform government of "#-$'"$, bringing first the dismissal and imprisonment of Dr9!i1o at the end of "$, then that of the

eminent progressivist and reformist minister of 1!stice, *ovelianos, earl in "$". Th!s within less than

a decade the press!res of the French revol!tionar wars had completel bro&en the !nit of the Spanishpolit.

4fter two ears absence, 0odo ret!rned to de facto control of Spanish government at the end of "$

and held that infl!ence !ntil the whole Spanish regime was overthrown in the spring of "$$.

his second period in power he followed a more moderate line than before, since the luces''the criticsand progressivists''remained his committed enemies. Eet 0odo s!ccessf!ll maintained a reform

program in some areas and re1ected a gen!inel reactionar polic. One ma1or reform was the partial

abolition of theseoroeclesisticoin "$. ;apal permission was obtained to sell one'seventh of

ch!rch properties in ret!rn for state bonds. This was the last great step of eighteenth'cent!r regalist


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polic and opened the wa to all'o!t disamorti5ation of ch!rch lands b the s!cceeding liberal regime

thirt ears later.

Eet all domestic problems had become secondar to the irresistable press!re of French imperialism,

whose militar dominance of the western half of the continent had held Spain in satellite stat!s since"#-. In "#--, Napoleon forced the cession of the vast :o!isiana territor in North 4merica that the

Spanish crown had gained from 6ritain onl si/teen ears earlier. 6 "$", 0odo had been

mane!vered b France into the pett border Aar of the Oranges against pro'6ritish ;ort!gal. Ahenpeace was temporaril signed with 6ritain, Spain was able to &eep the 2/tremad!ran border district of

()/0+OlivenGa it had sei5ed b!t lost the island of Trinidad to 6ritain. The peacef!l ears of "$3'"$B

helped to revive the faltering econom briefl. 4 high vol!me of trade was momentaril regained with

Spanish 4merica, and the co!ntr)s domestic prod!ction reached a new pea& in "$>'"$. (owever,the res!mption of war with 6ritain !pon Napoleonic dictates mar&ed the beginning of the end. The

naval disaster of Trafalgar 7"$>8 completed the virt!al destr!ction of the Spanish nav, and the

s!bse9!ent 6ritish domination of the 4tlantic, co!pled with the imposition of Napoleon)s French'controlled economic Continental Sstem the following ear, threw the Spanish econom into

profo!nd depression. Commerce declined catastrophicall, !nemploment grew in the towns, inflation

mo!nted, the government)s financial sit!ation became almost hopeless, and real wages for wor&ers

contin!ed to decline.

This completed the discrediting of the government, and the !npop!larit of 0odo increased ear b

ear !ntil he became the target of almost !niversal e/ecration. R!mors abo!t 0odo and the 9!een,

co!pled with the ineptit!de of Carlos IV, dragged the prestige of the roal famil in the m!d. Theregime drew the opposition ali&e of progressivists and of !ltra'conservatives within the aristocrac and

ch!rch. The latter fo!nd a ralling point in the heir to the throne, the prince


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nobilit, and commons''in part elected, in part chosen b town co!ncils, in part appointed b the &ing.

Once in power, the 6onapartist administration tried to enact the same reforms bro!ght b French r!le to

other lands. The legal and administrative sstems were reorgani5ed, establishing greater !niformit and

opport!nit for the middle classes, the In9!isition was abolished, the ch!rch was bro!ght !nder closerstate reg!lation, and in "$-, most monasteries were abolished and their properties sei5ed. Eet for

m!ch of the co!ntr these were mere paper reforms that co!ld not be p!t into effect beca!se of the

warfare that raged thro!gho!t the brief ears of French dominion.

months of the ear, however, Napoleon concentrated his attention on Spain, personall leading an

invading force of =, men from his best !nits. %adrid was sei5ed, and d!ring "$- the Frenchocc!pied most of the &e points in the north, center, and northeast, moving into the so!th and east in

"$". The organi5ed Spanish field forces dwindled to no more than ", b the close of "$- and

were hard p!t to maintain that strength for the remainder of the war.

6ritain immediatel 1oined hands with the Spanish governing 1!nta, and dispatched an e/peditionarcorps !nder Sir 4rth!r Aellesle 7later the

Aellesle proved a master of defensive tactics in holding his position against heav odds for three

ears. On the other hand, 6ritain never committed more than >, troops to the penins!lar war, as

6ritish commentators have termed it, and Aellesle)s strateg proved ca!tio!s in the e/treme, ref!singopport!nities to sei5e the strategic initiative after French forces had grown wea&er. 6ritain)s other main

contrib!tion was economic, providing mone and man of the militar s!pplies !sed b the Spanish

and ;ort!g!ese forces.


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The heart of the Spanish Aar of Independence of "$$'"$"= la ()/+not in the mane!verings of the

field armies b!t in the massive pop!lar resistance of all classes. It became the first great people)s war of

modern histor. Tho!gh the Spanish field forces were no match for the Napoleonic armies, the main

b!rden of the war was carried b irreg!lar forces waging aguerrilla7little war8. Thisguerradepartidas7war of irreg!lar partisan bands8 was a spontaneo!s creation of the Spanish peasantr and ma

have involved 3, or more combattants. The French fo!nd themselves a beleag!ered island in a

hostile ocean, controlling no more than the main towns. The simplest comm!nications became ma1orproblems of militar logistics, and the French dared move thro!gh the co!ntrside onl in great force.

Small detachments and stragglers were relentlessl c!t down. In the long r!n, the b!l& of the French

arm of occ!pation was limited to garrison and s!ppl d!ties. %ost French cas!alties''possibl asman as "$, over a five'ear period''res!lted from the wor& of theguerrilleros, who probabl lost

no more than 3>, of their own activists.

The main s!ffering, and the main heroics, of the war belonged to the Spanish civilians. French

occ!pation polic was harsh, and savage reprisals were e/acted in cities that resisted or in areas closelassociated with g!errilleros. Ahole towns were sac&ed, riot and rape b the French soldier were not

!ncommon, and tho!sands of civilians were shot merel as e/amples. In t!rn, the most vivid smbols

of the Spanish will to resist were given b the pop!lace as a whole, highlighted b the two spectac!lar

sieges'to'the'death of arago5a in "$$ and "$-. ;op!lar resistance in Spain served as an inspiringe/ample to other peoples held s!b1ect !nder Napoleonic imperialism, most notabl in 0erman, where

the post'"$- patriotic awa&ening was directl stim!lated b the Spanish revolt.

The Aar of Independence was in the long r!n a str!ggle of attrition in which the French were gro!nddown b constant harassment and, from "$"3, b the commitment of Napoleon)s main strength to

eastern and central 2!rope. The depletion of French forces in that ear made possible a strategic

co!nteroffensive b the reg!lar 4nglo'Spanish';ort!g!ese field arm, b!t Aellesle)s overweening

ca!tion wasted the opport!nit. The final victorio!s campaign of "$"= bro!ght a stead retreat b theshr!n&en French forces, no longer able to contest ma1or battles in the main part of the penins!la.

Tho!gh the final o!tcome was complete victor, the cost was heav. To the destr!ction of the Spanish

state was added the devastation of the penins!la)s econom. No other co!ntr in 2!rope s!ffered soheavil from thefrancesada.

()/)+The Cadi Cortes and the 112 Constitution

Collapse of the Spanish monarch !nder the press!res of French imperialism opened the wa for the

first brea&thro!gh of modern Spanish liberalism. This was not the prod!ct of French intervention, for

the proponents of drastic reform and a more or less representative sstem of government had slowlbeen gathering strength for twent ears. Rather, the brea&down of the Spanish sstem !nder French

dominion gave reformers the opport!nit to p!t their ideas into practice.

Ahen the roal famil crossed into France to meet Napoleon in the spring of "$$, Spanish affairs

were left in the hands of a small Regenc Co!ncil that ref!sed to recogni5e the abdication of theSpanish throne s!bse9!entl wr!ng from Carlos IV and his heir


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Central in September "$$.

The scene of the greatest social ferment d!ring the reign of Carlos IV had been Valencia, and in this

region the most revol!tionar o!tb!rsts of the Aar of Independence occ!rred. Aithin the span of a few

ears, Valencian political societ moved from the traditional bread riots of the !rban poor, anintermittent phenomenon since ancient times, to organi5ed modern revol!tionar conspiracies. Social

revol!tionar riots bro&e o!t in both town and co!ntrside, and several revol!tionar local 1!ntas were

formed before the a!thorit of the captain general and the more moderate regional 1!nta co!ld bereimposed over the district.

The national *!nta Central meanwhile fled so!th in "$$'"$- to escape the French advance, and fo!nd

itself increasingl hard p!t to establish e/ec!tive a!thorit on the e/isting ad hoc basis. Reformist

leaders in local 1!ntas demanded thro!gho!t "$- that a representative national Cortes assembl be

s!mmoned to reorgani5e the govern'()/*+ment and restr!ct!re national instit!tions. 4t the end of*an!ar "$", the *!nta Central resigned its e/ec!tive a!thorit to the Regenc Co!ncil b!t at the same

time called for the selection of representatives to a new Cortes''a potentiall revol!tionar act of

political representation.

This was not merel a sp!r'of'the'moment attempt to fill the gap left b captivit of the roal famil in

France, it was the res!lt of the predevelopment of Spanish liberalism that had been ta&ing shape d!ringthe reign of Carlos IV, based on political ideas derived from :oc&e, %ontes9!ie!, and other theorists. It

was a liberalism derived from a somewhat romantici5ed conception of Spanish histor that tended toe/aggerate the achievements of the medieval Cortes, positing a parliamentar Spanish tradition of

libert that had been c!t short b the imposition of (absb!rg despotism after the defeat of the

comunerosin ">3'">3".

The seat of Spanish government d!ring the greater part of the Aar of Independence was C@di5, theco!ntr)s leading 4tlantic port, separated from the mainland b a narrow penins!la easil defended

from French assa!lt, protected and provisioned b the 6ritish and Spanish fleets. The liberal Cortes and

its res!lting constit!tion co!ld probabl have ta&en the shape the did onl in C@di5, the most liberalcit in the penins!la at that time. Open to foreign infl!ence, living off the 4merican trade, led mostl

b a middle class that had made its mone from commerce and not landed dominion, the C@di5environment gave a decisive thr!st to constit!tional reformism.


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()/,+Ta)le 2. Co%position of the Cortes of C*di+ 11"

Clerg -#

:awers

0ov)t emploees >>

%ilitar B

Intellect!als 3

:andowners ">

%iscellaneo!s "

==

So!rceJ %. Fern@nde5 4lmagro, Orgenes del rgimen constitucional en Espaa7%adrid, "-3$8, p. $3.

The dep!ties immediatel re1ected the idea of forming a traditional three'estate Cortes and met as a

!nicameral assembl. :iberal elements sei5ed the initiative and set the pace of deliberations from the

start. The dominated press and propaganda and incl!ded most of the elo9!ent spo&esmen in thechamber. The Cortes immediatel set to wor& to provide a progressivist written constit!tion for Spain

which wo!ld embod both the social and economic ideals of eighteenth'cent!r monarchist reform and

the political norms of parliamentar liberalism. 4t that time the onl written representative constit!tionanwhere in the world was that of the Dnited States, and the C@di5 dep!ties were pro!dl aware that

the were ta&ing the lead in continental 2!ropean liberalism.

The new constit!tion, completed in "$"3, was based on the principle of national sovereignt rather than

roal a!thorit. It established a !nicameral legislat!re with general control over legislation, leaving thecrown onl a s!spensive veto. 2lectoral provisions for !niversal male s!ffrage b ho!seholders) votes

on an indirect basis made this theoreticall a more democratic constit!tion than that of either the Dnited

States or 2ngland. :ocal administration was placed !nder central control, b!t provision was made forprovincial co!ncils, half of whose members wo!ld be appointed and half elected, to deliberate on

provincial affairs. Dniform reg!lations for m!nicipalities were created and the archaic g!ild sstem

abolished. Sweeping social reforms were established, as all aristocratic legal privileges, seigne!rial

()/-+1!risdiction, and the right of entailment were abolished. In s!bse9!ent reg!lations of "$"=, thehighl !neven and indirect provincial ta/ str!ct!re was replaced with a series of direct ta/es on

b!siness and propert. Catholicism was recogni5ed as the official religion of the state and of the people,

b!t the In9!isition''in part an arm of the government''was officiall abolished. Ch!rch censorship wasstill !pheld, and heres in religion remained a nominal crime.

The constit!tion contained =$B articles, nearl three times as man as an s!bse9!ent Spanish code of

government, and represented an attempt to wor& o!t a thoro!gh new liberal scheme of government and

societ in harmon, as m!ch as possible, with traditional Spanish val!es. It was the most advanceddoc!ment of its time in 2!rope, and, while drawing on both 2nglish and French ideas, it tried to form a

!ni9!el Spanish snthesis of old beliefs with new rights and liberties. For the ne/t 9!arter'cent!r it

stood as the classic doc!ment of constit!tional liberalism in western continental 2!rope, and infl!encedliberal aspirations in Ital and ;ort!gal partic!larl.

The constit!tion of "$"3 was the wor& of the middle'class political intelligentsia, s!pported b most of

the middle and part of the !pper classes. The degree of s!pport in the co!ntr at large is !ncertain.

Scarcel more than " percent of the pop!lation were literate at the beginning of the nineteenth


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cent!r, and the lower classes lac&ed political conscio!sness. On the other hand, it was clear eno!gh

that in a n!mber of regions the peasants stood directl behind liberal reforms insofar as the bro!ght

the abolition of seigne!rial e/actions, against which there was increasing protest.

Conservatives were o!tn!mbered, o!tmane!vered, and o!ttal&ed at C@di5. The had not e/pected aninstit!tional revol!tion of s!ch dimensions, b!t opposition to the new constit!tion grew rapidl. It was

led b the officeholders of the government of the old regime, b aristocrats who feared the loss of

seigne!rial dominion, b senior members of the militar hierarch 7who felt their a!thorit was being!ndermined8, and b most ch!rch leaders, opposed to loss of ch!rch seigne!rial 1!risdiction7abadengo8, growth of state control, and the danger of renewed attac&s on ch!rch propert. In the

electoral campaign for the first reg!lar Cortes in "$"=, most of the clerg sw!ng into the ran&s of the

antiliberal opposition. In t!rn, advanced anticlerical liberals demanded that priests be e/cl!ded fromsitting in Cortes. 6 the time the last French troops had deserted the penins!la, Spain was an arena of

sharp political strife between s!pporters and opponents of the constit!tion.

()/+The ,ernandine Rea'tion+ 11-!12"

The immediate f!t!re of the Spanish political sstem depended on the attit!de of the heir to the throne,who ret!rned from French e/ile in 4pril "$"B to begin his reign as Fernando VII. (e proved in man

was the basest &ing in Spanish histor. Cowardl, selfish, grasping, s!spicio!s, and vengef!l,


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the Spanish'4merican independence movement was limited mainl to a Spanish creole or Spanish'

mesti5o minorit of the landed !pper classes and commercial elite who insisted !pon the right to

cond!ct their affairs independentl. Aith certain e/ceptions, the lower classes in 4merica tended to be

ne!tral or even pro'Spanish. Onl the collapse of the Spanish state !nder the weight of the Frenchinvasion had made it possible for the revolts to achieve s!ccess. 4fter "$"B, Fernando)s corr!pt and

incoherent regime was incapable of a ma1or effort to restore Spanish control. The empire was lost

mainl b defa!lt. *!st as the si/teenth'cent!r con9!est had been a largel private enterprise thatreceived onl marginal assistance from the roal government, so the nineteenth'cent!r independence

movements met onl marginal opposition from the Spanish homeland. 4t one point even that was

almost eno!gh to thwart them, for the one notable e/pedition dispatched !nder 0eneral ;ablo %orillorestored Spanish control over the northern part of So!th 4merica, while an imperial vicero held fast

the Spanish bastion of the 4ndean regions. Their efforts event!all failed in a str!ggle of attrition that

drew no f!rther s!pport from the mother co!ntr, whose government was e/ha!sted b financialdeficits and, after "$3, renewed political conflict.

fever epidemic in the so!th, and the disma felt b a large part of the politicall conscio!s over the

capricio!s, inept r!le of


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direct co!p b!t simpl prono!nced or raised the flag of revolt against e/isting government polic.

The pron!nciamiento then !s!all had to rel !pon s!pport from other 9!arters or the willingness of

the government to compromise. The pron!nciamiento of "$3 demanded a complete change of

instit!tions from absol!tism to constit!tionalism, b!t s!bse9!ent pron!nciamientos were often aimed atlesser changes of polic or simpl a shift in personnel.

Restored constit!tional government was at first placed in the hands of veteran doceaista 7"$"38

liberals who had gained e/perience at C@di5. The had profited from the events of the past decade, andproved moderate men eager to conciliate national interests. Indeed, man of the doceaistas were rather!ncomfortable with their own ()1+"$"3 constit!tion and not !nwilling to reform it in order to give the

crown somewhat greater a!thorit, add a second chamber to the legislat!re, and restrict the s!ffrage to

the propertied elements. From the ver beginning, however, secret organi5ation and conspiratorial societies. :ocal chapters of Spanish %asonr had become a

common conspiratorial vehicle, and the practice of clandestine sectarian plotting was not given !p after"$3. The sectors of the arm led b e/altado officers were praised as a necessar pretorian g!arantee

of the liberal sstem, and e/altados insisted that s!ch sectors be allowed to f!nction almost as an

independent instit!tion.

The e/altados rallied s!pport b plaing on the local interests of ()/+provincialism, reenforcingcommon hatred of militar conscription 7and the rel!ctance to fight the incomprehensible campaigns in

4merica8, demanding red!ction or abolition of the depised consumos7e/cise ta/es8, and insisting on

direct democrati5ation of the s!ffrage. These claims formed the basis of the radical liberal program thattended to dominate the politics of man provincial towns 7tho!gh not the co!ntrside8 for half a

cent!r, !ntil "$#B. 4 main factor in cementing the factional !nit of the radical political intelligentsia

itself was the intense desire for more government 1obs, partic!larl on the local and provincial level.

This was a ma1or political motive for professional and white'collar elements in a societ whose


12/26

econom co!ld not provide ade9!ate emploment. In %adrid, b contrast, the same social elements

were less radical, perhaps beca!se emploment opport!nities were greater, b!t there the mob co!ld be

mobili5ed on occasion, as the same lower class strata that had cheered


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Religio!s sentiment plaed a ma1or role in this opposition. The ch!rch was at first disposed to accept

constit!tional government in "$3, 1!st as it had initiall in "$"'"$"3. This transigent attit!de was

sharpl reversed, however, b the abolition of ecclesiastical 1!risdic'())+

tion and the restrictions on orders and their propert, with the beginning of the s!ppression of themonasteries. 2/altados came into power on a flood of anticlerical propaganda, and a n!mber of priests

were m!rdered b liberals in the civil strife of "$33'"$3=. 2ven in the elections of "$33 that were won

b the e/altados, however, nearl 3 percent of the dep!ties chosen were clerg. 4 considerableproportion of these were s!pporters of moderate liberalism who s!bse9!entl had to go into e/ile,indicating that as late as "$33 the liberal clerg who had plaed a ma1or role at C@di5 were still

infl!ential.

4lmost from the start of the constit!tional trienni!m, Fernando VII tried to enco!rage intervention b

the conservative 2!ropean powers of the M!adr!ple 4lliance to save him from constit!tionalgovernment. For the first two ears there was little disposition on their part to do so. The Spanish &ing

had lost prestige, even among conservative 2!ropean leaders, b his blindl reactionar and vindictive

co!rse in "$"B, which had contrased so sharpl with that of the restored 6o!rbon crown in France. Thedoceaista cabinet of the first part of the trienni!m did not !nd!l alarm the conservative powers, and

tho!gh 4!strian troops intervened in Ital to s!ppress liberal government there in "$3", that was based

on general recognition of a distinct (absb!rg sphere of infl!ence in the Italian penins!la. There was nosimilar determination b France to meddle in Spanish affairs. It was not !ntil after the rise to power of

the e/altados, attended b new e/treme meas!res, and the o!tbrea& of virt!al civil war in Spain, that a

French e/peditionar force entered the penins!la in "$3=. Indeed, it has been s!spected that insisted that French militar detachments remain in the co!ntr to protect him, et his behavior

embarrassed conservative French militar and political leaders, who tried !ns!ccessf!ll to moderatethe Spanish reaction. Fernando)s onl program at first was the complete restoration of absol!tism,

bringing the ret!rn of seigne!ries, entailments, the ecclesiastical f!ero, and ()*+ nearl all the laws

and instit!tions that had been abolished, save the In9!isition.

,ernandine A)solutis% )et0een ltra!Royalis%and i)eralis%+ 12-!1//

The &ing)s main concern was to preserve absol!te a!thorit for himself, et he had to govern thro!gh

ministers whom he was rarel disposed to tr!st and so contin!ed to rel on personal favorites. (ence

his alarm on discovering, after the restoration of absol!tism, that a strong !ltraroalist faction of r!ral!pper class and ch!rch leaders had emerged who insisted on stringent reorgani5ation of government to

s!ppress liberalism totall. The also wanted to place government completel in the hands of their own

reactionar ministers. The apostlicosor negros, as the !ltraroalist reactionaries came to be called,

also demanded restoration of the In9!isition as a chec& on p!blic moralit, anticlericalism, and politicals!bversion. :ocal *!ntas de la fe 7Committees of the Faith8 were organi5ed in man districts,

partic!larl in the northeastern regions of the co!ntr, and the force of Roalist Vol!nteers that had

s!pplanted the arm in "$3= was event!all e/panded to "3, men. Fernando VII came more andmore to fear becoming a prisoner of the negrosand, in so doing, losing French militar bac&ing to


14/26

s!stain his government against the liberals. (is rel!ctance to give complete control of affairs to the

negrosled to several !ltrareactionar militar revolts in "$3B'"$3>.

%ore serio!s was the o!tbrea& of theguerradelsmalcontentsin the western districts of the Catalan

co!ntrside in "$3#. This revolt among poor peasants in the Catalan bac&lands, whose econom hadbeen even more depressed than !s!al d!ring the past twent ears, seems to have been instigated b a

coterie of !pper'class r!ral reactionaries and apostHlico ch!rch leaders. The apostHlico faction was

absol!tel doctrinaire with regard to its reactionar program? the capricio!s, personal, opport!nistabsol!tism of Fernando VII seemed to them little more than the prel!de to another ro!nd of liberal r!le.Their aim was to spar& a general r!ral ins!rrection that wo!ld demand absol!te monarchist r!le,

nominall !nder Fernando VII b!t act!all !nder complete control of the apostHlicos, restoration of the

In9!isition as a g!arantee of tr!e religion, and destr!ction of all remnants of liberalism. This somewhatartificial !prising never spread beond r!ral Catalonia, and was s!ppressed after several months b the

newl reorgani5ed roal arm. Nonetheless, the g!erra dels malcontents gave voice to the first formal

appeal b the negrosfor the (),+leadership of


15/26

red!cing the Roal Vol!nteers f!rther and eliminating as m!ch of the local administrative infl!ence of

the apostHlicos as possible.

The death of Fernando VII at the close of "$== left the throne to a three'ear'old da!ghter !nder the

protection of the o!thf!l 9!een mother, %arLa Cristina. This Neapolitan regent was a 1oll,spontaneo!s, good'nat!red o!ng princess lac&ing in special ed!cation or intelligence b!t determined

to hold the throne for her da!ghter. To accomplish this and beat bac& the e/pected assa!lt of the

apostHlicos, it wo!ld be necessar to reno!nce Fernandine e/tremes of absol!tism and reach acompromise that wo!ld gain the s!pport of moderates. 4t the beginning of "$=B, the 9!een regentappointed a new ministr headed b the most prominent of the moderate doceaista liberals, *os+

%artLne5 de la Rosa, who had served briefl as prime minister d!ring the trienni!m.

This res!lted in prom!lgation of the Roal Stat!te of "$=B. The new Spanish doc!ment was not a cop

of the French Charter of "$"B, as has been alleged, nor was it a gen!ine constit!tion. It was an attemptb %artLne5 de la Rosa to replace the C@di5 constit!tion with a new charter fo!nded on ajuste milieu

between traditionalism and liberalism. The stat!te was th!s a compromise between a real constit!tion

and the mere reform of traditional laws, and was also based in part on the st!d of the limited post'"$"> constit!tions of several west 0erman principalities. It provided for a bicameral legislat!re, the

lower ho!se to be chosen b the indirect s!ffrage in two stages of some "$, electors

7appro/imatel ."> of " percent of the pop!lation8, and the senate to be composed of grandes, ch!rchhierarchs, and roal appointees. The legislat!re wo!ld have little more than a cons!ltative f!nction, for

the crown retained absol!te veto powers and the government was responsible to it alone. No bill of

rights was incl!ded and administration was centrali5ed in %adrid, b!t regional f!eros were stillrecogni5ed.

The elections of "$=B were then made from %adrid, initiating what became a common nineteenth'

cent!r practice. One ob1ective of government manip!lation was to get more of the middle class

interests of the co!ntr represented, as distinct from clerics, b!rea!'()+crats, and the radicalintelligentsia. This attempt was to some e/tent s!ccessf!l, as indicated b table =.

Ta)le /. Professional $a'grounds of Cortes 3e%)ers

Eear of election 6!siness and professional 0overnment and militar Clerg

"$3 B> - =>

"$33 " 3$

"$=B "= >= >

"$= -$ $ B

So!rceJ FermLn Caballero,El Gobierno y las Cortes del Estatuto7%adrid, "$=#8, p. ///iv.

Eet even !nder so restricted a s!ffrage, the dep!ties in the new 2stamento de ;roc!radores, as the

lower chamber was called, did not merel form a safe, progovernment bloc. The debates of an openchamber, f!ll p!blicit, and freedom of the press were !sed to disc!ss iss!es e/tensivel. 6 September

"$=B the newl emerging ;rogressive faction, heirs of the e/altados of the trienni!m, co!nted ## of the

"$$ votes in the lower ho!se and bro!ght !p cens!re votes against the government. %oreover, thewere given armed strength in man parts of the co!ntr b reorgani5ation of the middle class Drban

%ilitia first formed d!ring the trienni!m. In most towns the %ilitia fell !nder ;rogressivist control.

4nticlerical violence reappeared almost immediatel. In *!l "$=B several monasteries in %adrid were


16/26

set afire and a n!mber of mon&s were m!rdered b a mob. The rioters were inflamed b the o!tbrea& of

a cholera epidemic''apparentl blamed on the religio!s''and b the armed depredations of clerical

Carlists in the northern co!ntrside.

6ands of g!errilleros were formed in the northeast in s!pport of the ca!se of the e/iled

the more bac&ward and r!ral areas of 4ragHn and the :evant.

()9+There was also a following in other parts of northern Spain. The common denominators of the

movement were localism, religio!s and political traditionalism, and to some e/tent r!ralism. It gro!pedthe provincial elements that were most strongl opposed to liberalism, and its &enote was reaction,

witho!t a clearl and f!ll artic!lated program save ret!rn to absol!te monarch. The first Carlist

contingents were based on former members of the Roal Vol!nteers and local patriots of the mo!ntainareas. The were led b priests, gentr, and village notables. In the 6as9!e provinces the regard for

regional f!eros, partiall threatened b liberalism, was a ma1or factor. In Navarre, religio!s 5eal and

respect for traditional leadership ma have been even stronger in enco!raging the movement. In someof the more bac&ward r!ral areas of the northeast there was general resentment of the new !rban'

dominated econom and the interests fostered b liberalism. In parts of the Catalan co!ntrside the

rebellio!s propensities of peasants and gentr, resentf!l of the o!tside world and given to semi'anarchist o!tb!rsts of banditr in an earlier time, were once more revived.

In less than a ear Carlist vol!nteers were formed into reg!lar battalions in Navarre and the 6as9!e

co!ntr, their stronghold, and a small field arm began to ta&e shape. Eet the Carlists were !nable to

win over the cities, even in that region, and the were alwas considerabl wea&er in manpower ands!pplies than the government forces. Carlist !nits in Catalonia and the east were more loosel

organi5ed, and man of them operated as g!errilla forces. In the 6as9!e core area, conscription was

introd!ced and reg!lar discipline b!ilt !p. Fighting in or near their home region, their morale was!s!all better than that of government draftees of so!th and central Spain, and tho!gh the remaineddeficient in more sophisticated e9!ipment, the baonet charges of the Carlist infantr proved to be the

most effective single tactic in the war. Eet the Carlist arm was most s!ccessf!l on the defensive,

reling partl on g!errilla !nits. It never developed m!ch offensive strength, and the climactice/pedition to the o!ts&irts of %adrid in "$=# was !nable to la!nch an assa!lt on the capital. That the

civil war lasted nearl seven ears was d!e in large meas!re to the disarra of the nascent liberal

regime, !nable to generate the considerable reso!rces of mone, manpower, and material needed tofight campaigns of attrition against regional forces.


17/26

the border in "$B.

Eet Carlism did not die after its militar defeat. Tho!gh the dnastic iss!e of Salic male legitimac

remained the central Carlist claim, what reall &ept the movement alive was the strength of religio!s

traditionalism and the insistence on regional identit and privileges. The so'called Second Carlist Aarof "$B'"$B- was no more than a rising of the Catalan bac& co!ntr, not et integrated into the liberal

social and economic sstem. (owever, the fr!stration and relative fail!res of representative

government d!ring the middle decades of the cent!r made it diffic!lt to create real !nit andovercome the t!g of localism and c!lt!ral traditionalism. 4 more dnamic societ than that of theSpanish middle classes might have been able to integrate the interests of vario!s parts of the penins!la,

b!t the halting development of the co!ntr left archaic interests intact. The liberal regime in %adrid

tended to !s!rp local privileges witho!t offering the advantages of a modern central government. Thee/cesses of Spanish radicalism in a later generation also contrib!ted to the revival of traditionalism

after it had seemed to be losing m!ch of its s!pport. Tho!gh the Carlist movement la largel dormant

!ntil after "$-, it &ept m!ch of its latent appeal in the conservative r!ral areas of the northeast.

The Triu%ph of i)eralis%+ 1/4!1-"

6 the mid'"$=s, Spanish liberalism had become distinctl stronger than d!ring the trienni!m. The

beginning of economic recover d!ring the last ears of Fernando VII, the spread of liberal ideas and a

growing rev!lsion against Fernandine absol!tism, which sw!ng &e regions s!ch as the !rban districtsof Catalonia on the liberal side, all plaed a part in this. The need for allies to s!pport the Isabeline

s!ccession had provided for a smooth governmental transition !nder the Stat!te of "$=B, b!t d!ring

"$=B and "$=> the Carlist reaction ())1+gathered strength in the 6as9!e co!ntr and othernortheastern regions.

The moderate government of %artLne5 de la Rosa soon fo!nd itself between two fires, 1!st as its

predecessor had d!ring the trienni!m. 4 wave of radical revolts in man of the leading provincial

towns bro&e o!t in *!l "$=>, e/ceeding anthing in "$33'"$3=, and the government had little choiceb!t to strengthen itself b moving to the left. In September, the financier *!an 4lvare5 de %endi5@bal

replaced %artLne5 de la Rosa as prime minister, and his cabinet was charged with the tas& of amending

the Stat!te in a more liberal direction.

their sale immediatel at p!blic a!ction.

into law. The aim of this broad disamorti5ation of formerl entailed ch!rch propert was not simpl to

dispossess the ch!rch and finance the civil war? it was meant to strengthen the middle classeseconomicall, and it was hoped b some that it wo!ld create a stable, liberal, lower'middle'class,

propert'owning peasantr.

The beginning of the great disamorti5ation of ch!rch land completed the total estrangement of the

Spanish Catholic Ch!rch from liberalism. Tho!gh a few bishops s!pported the %oderates, most ch!rchleaders became completel committed to Carlism, and legal sanctions were ta&en against some gro!ps

in the clerg for political reasons. 4s a res!lt of this tension between ch!rch and state, thirt'two of the

si/t'two sees in Spain were vacant b "$B.


18/26

Tho!gh nearl all Spaniards remained nominal Catholics, and religio!s or spirit!al anti'Catholicism, as

distinct from political anti'clericalism, was almost !n&nown, the middle decades of the cent!r mar&ed

the nadir of Spanish Catholicism)s p!blic position and infl!ence on the elite. %iddle class Catholic

b!sinessmen saw no spirit!al contradiction in despoiling the ch!rch of its lands, and even the%oderates protested the wa it was done more than the act of ())/+disamorti5ation itself. %an mon&s

and priests of !ncertain vocation left the clerg, and it has been estimated that d!ring the first decades

of liberalism appro/imatel one'third reno!nced their vows altogether.The 9!een regent, %aria Cristina, who f!nctioned as head of state, was a comparativel simple womanb!t b no means lac&ing in common sense. She reali5ed that the %oderates were m!ch more interested

than the ;rogressives in preserving strong roal prerogatives in Spain. 4fter more disorders and m!ch

intrig!ing b the %oderates, she dismissed %endi5@bal in %a "$= and replaced him with a %oderateleader, Istri5. For the elections to be held in *!l the s!ffrage was broadened b decree, lowering

propert 9!alifications to enfranchise appro/imatel >, of the wealth and ">, ed!cated men

and officials 9!alified as capacidades7those who are speciall 9!alified8, of whom abo!t , werearm and national g!ard officers. This total of >, amo!nted to .> to . of " percent of the Spanish

pop!lation, and was act!all a greater proportion than were enfranchised at that time in France, which

had no provision for capacidades. In the elections of *!l "$= some government infl!ence was no

do!bt emploed, b!t the %oderate factions also relied on more effective organi5ation, forming analliance with nonradical ;rogressives. 4ppro/imatel two'thirds of the new electorate made !se of the

ballot. In the first ro!nd of voting, the government alliance won abo!t eight seats, to fift'si/ for the

opposition, which carried most of the larger cities.

The radical sectors had no intention of being eliminated from power. 6efore the second ro!nd of voting

co!ld be held, the ;rogressives began a series of revolts in provincial capitals, starting at %@laga on

*!l 3>. These c!lminated in a pron!nciamiento b noncommissioned officers at the roal s!mmer

palace of :a 0ran1a in 4!g!st, forcing the 9!een to restore the C@di5 constit!tion of "$"3. 4;rogressive ministr too& power !nder *os+ %aria Calatrava. It mobili5ed new militar and financial

reso!rces for the civil war, and then held elections''the third in less than a ear''in October "$=, on

the basis of the "$"3 sstem of !niversal male ho!seholders) s!ffrage in a three'stage indirect process.

6 that time the b!l& of the p!blic were growing wear of t!rmoil, and the more moderate elements ofthe ;rogressives gained control of the Cortes.

The ear "$=# was a cr!cial one in the First Carlist Aar, as the government forces were nearl

paral5ed b m!tin and the traditionalist arm came close to sei5ing %adrid. 4t the same time, theCortes was occ!pied with preparing a new constit!tion to s!persede that of "$"3. The res!ltant

constit!tion of "$=# was a conciliator and balanced doc!ment. Tho!gh the principle of national

sovereignt ())+was restored, government a!thorit was shared b crown and parliament, with theformer retaining ma1or powers. The new constit!tion stated that the crown co!ld not r!le witho!t the

parliament, b!t government ministers were to be s!mmoned and dismissed b the crown alone. The

legislat!re was made bicameral, with the senate to be appointed b the crown from among names

proposed b wealth electors. Finall, m!nicipal governments were placed !nder local control thro!ghpop!lar elections b a broad s!ffrage and were also given 1!risdiction over local !nits of the

reorgani5ed National %ilitia,

The semidemocratic voting provisions of "$"3 were dropped in favor of a censitar s!ffrage onl

slightl broader than that of "$=. 4ppro/imatel #$, voters were enfranchised directl, b!tprovision for capacidades was considerabl red!ced b comparison with the "$= law. Eet the s!ffrage

provisions in general were m!ch broader, for there was also concern to enfranchise peasant

smallholders who paid little in the wa of direct ta/es. (ence a secondar provision gave the vote toan peasant farmer who owned a o&e of cattle. In some provinces of the northwest this incl!ded man


19/26

comparativel poor peasants, res!lting in 33, 9!alified voters in ;ontevedra and "$, in 4st!rias.

4ltogether, the s!ffrage list for the co!ntr as a whole was increased to 3>, 73." percent of the

pop!lation8. This amo!nted to " voter for ever B$ inhabitants, compared to " for ever 3 !nder the

"$=" electoral law in France.

The %oderates deno!nced the "$=# constit!tion as too radical. In the campaign for the ne/t elections

7September "$=#8, the developed the first appro/imation of a reg!lar political organi5ation in Spain

b forming coordinated committees of 1o!rnalists and other activists to promote their propaganda.Dnder the broader s!ffrage, there was onl > percent participation. %oreover, radical ;rogressivesabstained in man of the larger cities in protest against the government leadership of the more moderate

;rogressives, whose constit!tion the deno!nced as too conservative. The %oderates gained primar

s!pport from the larger landowners of central and so!thern Spain and benefited both from the radicals)abstention and from a general rightward swing among the middle and !pper classes after the recent

series of revolts and m!tinies. The won 3 seats to the ;rogressives)s in one of the fairer elections

to be held in nineteenth'cent!r Spain.

The %oderates held power for nearl two ears, b!t on increasingl poorer terms with the liberalleaders of the reg!lar arm. The latter finall bro!ght the crown to dissolve the Cortes once more and

hold new elections in "$=- that, co!pled with the abstention of the %oderates, res!lted in a radical

;rogressive victor. This coincided with the end of the primar phase of the civil war and the tri!mphfor ()))+the liberal ca!se, b!t bro!ght new tension and drastic polarit to liberal politics. The

;rogressive Cortes was then in t!rn dissolved, and the %oderates organi5ed a Central Commission to

give them official leadership in new elections at the beginning of "$B. These ma not have been sorelativel free of governmental interference as the preceding contests of "$=# and "$=-. 4t an rate,

the res!lted in a new victor for the %oderates, who then prepared to safeg!ard the tri!mph of

moderate liberalism b new instit!tional changes that wo!ld eliminate the bases of ;rogressive

strength.The 3ilitary in Politi's+ 1/-!1-"

It was d!ring the First Carlist Aar that the basic pattern of militar intervention and leadership in

politics was established, a pattern that persisted for at least fort ears. This intervention was e/pressedin a variet of forms, ranging from o!tright m!tin, partic!larl in "$=#, thro!gh directpron!nciamientos in "$=> and "$=, to more indirect forms of s!asion behind the scenes, beg!n in

"$=B b moderate arm liberals who became spo&esmen for a more representative polic.

That militar leaders plaed s!ch cr!cial roles was d!e first of all to the instit!tional vac!!m in which

liberalism was reintrod!ced after the final decade of Fernandine absol!tism, and to the poororgani5ation of the liberal forces and the relative wea&ness of the interests on which the were

established. The two main rival factions, the %oderates and ;rogressives, co!ld not even agree !pon

r!les of the game, and the ;rogressives, partic!larl, felt 1!stified in s!mmoning both civilian mobs andarmed intervention b smpathetic militar elements. 29!all important was the fact that liberalism

was being established d!ring a ma1or civil war in which the militar leadership was of cr!cial

significance and hence plaed a disproportionatel infl!ential role.

%ost of the arm and its officers remained aloof from politics, b!t of the minorit who becameinvolved, the greater n!mber reinforced either %oderate or ;rogressive liberalism. This proliberal

orientation can be e/plained b a n!mber of factors. %ost officers felt a patriotic responsibilit to

s!pport the liberal ca!se with which the established national government was becoming identified.%ost were of middle class bac&gro!nd? the leaned toward liberalism beca!se of its msti9!e of

moderni5ation and new opport!nit. Th!s the plaed the role of a moderni5ing middle class elite in a

societ in which the core of the middle classes were not et read to ta&e f!ll charge. %ore m!ndane

factors were also involved, s!ch as poor pa 7and after the war, !nemploment8, personal rivalries, and


20/26

the fact that the liberal ())*+government was so ill organi5ed d!ring the war that commanding officers

sometimes had to intervene in government administration simpl to care for the needs of their troops.

5spartero and the ,ailure of Progressi6is%+ 1-"!1-/

The dominant fig!re in the Spanish arm at the close of the First Carlist Aar was 0eneral 6aldomero2spartero, who commanded the government forces in the north d!ring the climactic campaign that

concl!ded with the compromise peace of Vergara in "$=-. (e had become identified with ;rogressive

interests in opposition to rivals in the militar who s!pported the %oderates, and his infl!ence was inlarge meas!re responsible for the dissol!tion of the %oderate Cortes and the brief ret!rn of the;rogressives to power in "$=-'"$B.

The %oderate government that regained control in "$B then passed legislation raising propert

9!alifications for the vote, and moved to c!t the base from !nder ;rogressive strength in the provincial

towns. Tho!gh the principle of pop!lar election of provincial assemblies and m!nicipal co!ncils wasretained, a new law stip!lated that the ministr of interior in %adrid wo!ld alone have the right to

appoint maors and other officials of provincial capitals from among all those local co!ncilors elected,

and that the appointivejefes polticosin charge of provinces wo!ld choose all officials for smallertowns from among those elected in them. These laws were in fact constit!tional amendments, however,

and co!ld not be instit!ted simpl b ma1orit vote of parliament. Their imposition amo!nted to a

civilian pron!nciamiento, and the ;rogressives threatened revolt.

4t this point the 9!een regent tried to gain the s!pport of the commander'in'chief of the arm,2spartero, who was in 6arcelona. 6!t 2spartero was even more vehementl implored b the

;rogressives to be their savior, and he ref!sed to sanction the new laws, while stressing his s!pport of

the 9!een regent and the o!ng 9!een. (ence %arLa Cristina offered to appoint 2spartero primeminister as the onl hope of finding a compromise that wo!ld s!pport the throne. Ahen she ref!sed to

sanction ann!lment of the m!nicipalities law, however, the ;rogressives bro&e into two months of

protracted street demonstrations and minor disorders in provincial capitals all over Spain. This forcedappointment of 2spartero as prime minister on the ;rogressives) own terms, and !ltimatel drove %aria

Cristina to abdicate the regenc.

2spartero then became interim regent in October "$B, and de facto head of state, the first and onltime that a militar fig!re held that position !ntil "-=. New elections in "$B" nat!rall bro!ght an

()),+overwhelming ;rogressive victor and ratification b the new Cortes of 2spartero as regent for

life. The ;rogressive ca!dillo was the son of a Castilian wheelwright. (e had little ed!cation and scant

political !nderstanding or talent, and was given to bo!ts of indolence alternating with periods of

activit. (e had not so!ght a political career b!t had been eagerl pressed into service b the;rogressives as the onl means of ass!ring their tri!mph. (is political ideas were limited to vag!e

notions abo!t the c!rrent of the times and pop!lar sovereignt, later e/pressed in his pop!lar

catchphrase :et the national will be f!lfilled''a slogan witho!t content adopted in lie! of a program.(e was gratified to be hailed b ;rogressive crowds and en1oed the stat!s which politics had bro!ght

him, b!t he had little in the wa of p!rposef!l leadership to offer. The onl significant initiative of the

government in "$B" was to begin to p!t the lands of the sec!lar clerg as well as monasteries on themar&et for private p!rchase.

The onl wa in which Spanish politics became more liberal !nder 2spartero was in the s!ffrage.

Than&s to theyuntero7cattle owner8 cla!se of the "$=# constit!tion, the n!mber of electors had risen to

=B=, in "$=- and B3B, in "$B 7=.> percent of the pop!lation8. This amo!nted to " voter forever "= inhabitants of 4lava, l for ever "B in 0!ip!5coa, "> in amora, " in Orense, and "# in

;ontevedra''the broadest 2!ropean s!ffrage of the period. 6 "$B=, the voting lists had increased to

>, or more.


21/26

The response of one gro!p of the %oderates to the 2spartero regime was a co!nter'pron!nciamiento b

a handf!l of militar and civilian fig!res in the 6as9!e co!ntr in October "$B". This was easil

9!ashed, for it drew no s!pport from the temporaril e/ha!sted Carlists. It did bring the elimination of

6as9!e f!eros. ;rovincial governments were established in place of the traditional 1!ntas, 6as9!e tariffprivileges were abolished, and reg!lar conscription was introd!ced.

Reaction to the attempted %oderate pron!nciamiento served as catalst in a new ;rogressive o!tb!rst

in 6arcelona. There a *!nta de Vigilancia was set !p to defend against the danger from the right, b!twithin a month it had been converted into a *!nta ;op!lar that demolished the Ci!dadela, 6arcelona)sfortress b!ilt b Felipe V as a smbol of centralist sovereignt in the Catalan capital. The *!nta ;op!lar

represented a broad mobili5ation of elements of the middle and also the lower classes. 6efore it was

forcibl s!ppressed, it demanded government protection for domestic ind!str and collaborated withthe first significant efforts to organi5e trade !nions in Spain.

One ear later, in November "$B3, the str!ct!re of government in 6arcelona bro&e down altogether.

The possessing classes were alien'())-+ated b 2spartero)s free'trade polic, while the wor&ers were

disgr!ntled over the uintasstem of general militar recr!itment''a comp!lsor draft for certainelements of the poor''and over the high level of e/cises. Aithin fort'eight ho!rs a ta/ riot of sorts had

flamed into a broad pop!lar revolt, and a new *!nta


22/26

government in Spain.

The last ro!nd of this conflict was fo!ght b the radical left in 6arcelona, where the pop!lar militia

ref!sed to disband after the new government had been formed. The third pop!lar revolt in 6arcelona

within two ears occ!rred d!ring September "$B=, when the cit was dominated b a new radical 1!ntarepresenting artisans, factor wor&ers, and the !nemploed. It lac&ed clear leadership or program b!t

made demands for greater democrati5ation and for social and economic concessions from both the

government and propert owners. The revolt ac9!ired the slang name of the!amancia, from the gps!sagejamarmeaning to eat, indicating its identification with the lowest social strata. :i&e itspredecessors, the *amancia was s!ppressed b force 7November "$B=8, b!t this time there were no

fearf!l reprisals.

,oreign Affairs+ 114!1-/

the res!lting economic prostration, the revolt in 4merica, and the total ineptness of the Fernandine

regime placed the co!ntr in a position of diplomatic impotence after "$"B. Spanish representativesplaed no role at the Congress of Vienna and were almost completel ignored, nor did Spanish

diplomac fare better in s!bse9!ent ears. The pett, vengef!l, e/traordinaril narrow'minded

Fernando en1oed no esteem even among other conservative r!lers. The ma1or effort which hisgovernment e/erted in "$"$ to elicit help from other 2!ropean powers to repress the Spanish 4merican

revolt was a complete fail!re. In addition, the 6ritish government stood read b "$3= to bloc& an

marshalling of s!pport for the Spanish repression in 4merica, and the Dnited States adhered to thisposition in its %onroe almost inevitable res!lt of being deprived of the b!l& of Spanish 4merican reso!rces and the trade andreven!e accr!ing from them, especiall at a time when the ())9+

co!ntr was s!ffering from heav war losses and the administrative sstem had fallen into deca. There

was some improvement in the handling of the national debt d!ring the second half of the reign, insofaras it was better administered and new loans were negotiated, b!t as a res!lt of these loans the foreigndebt do!bled between "$3B and "$=B.

4fter the death of Fernando VII, the Spanish government was able to enter a phase of more fr!itf!l

diplomatic relations. 6etween "$= and "$=B, France, Spain, and ;ort!gal all 1oined the ran&s of

constit!tional monarch alongside 6ritain, and in the latter ear the fo!r powers signed a M!adr!ple4lliance. This was not an association of e9!als, however, and merel ina!g!rated a phase of 6ritish

and French t!telage. 4mbassadors of these two powers tried fre9!entl to intervene in domestic affairs

d!ring the "$=s and "$Bs, the 6ritish government leaning toward the less radical of the ;rogressives

and the French toward the %oderates. The domestic division res!lting from civil war and politicalstalemate was s!ch that the principal effort to sec!re more h!mane treatment of prisoners d!ring the

First Carlist Aar was not arranged b Spaniards b!t was negotiated thro!gh 6ritish intermediaries in

the 2lliott Convention of "$=>. 6ritain s!pplied m!ch of the e9!ipment and mone for the governmenttri!mph, which also represented victor for the polic of the two main western powers and was viewed

!nfavorabl b the conservative governments of central and eastern 2!rope. Tho!gh 6ritish infl!ence

seemed predominant for a time, French diplomac ass!med a stronger role after the overthrow of the;rogressives in "$B=, and government reliance on foreign loans accent!ated this relative dependence.


23/26

5'ono%i' e6elop%ent+ 114!1-/

The political cleavages and fail!res of the 9!arter'cent!r that followed the Aar of Independence

wo!ld !ndo!btedl have been m!ch less severe had the period not been one of economic doldr!ms.

The ears "$"B'"$3 were a time of !nrelieved postwar depression. 4 brief revival began d!ring theliberal trienni!m, then was cho&ed off b international depression. Revival of Catalan man!fact!res

was hampered b the flow of French te/tile e/ports that !ndersold Catalan prod!ction inside Spain.

0eneral recover in Spain did not get !nder wa !ntil "$3#, and Catalan te/tile prod!ction increasedmar&edl after abo!t "$=. The general !pswing owed comparativel little to government policJ theprogram of hard mone and general deflation that was followed in "$"B'"$3 reenforced depression.

This ()*0+financial polic was reversed d!ring "$3"'"$3= b!t was restored !nder the second

Fernandine reaction. %!ch of the mone bro!ght in b foreign loans between "$3= and "$3# wassimpl stolen b the co!rt camarilla. 6eginning in "$3#, the state began to wor& in greater cooperation

with private finance, achieving a higher level of honest and coherence in its financial operations, and

this assisted the importing of machiner for te/tile prod!ction. The polic of liberal government d!ringthe trienni!m and after "$=B also stressed bringing in mone thro!gh foreign loans, b!t incl!ded a

degree of monetar deval!ation, which apparentl stim!lated prod!ction.

6 "$=B those with social and economic power were in fair agreement on the desirabilit of liberal

constit!tionalism, b!t disagreed among themselves abo!t the e/act form. :arge landholders and proto'ind!strialists favored the %oderates, while commercial interests and smaller entrepene!rs and

shop&eepers s!pported ;rogressivism. Nevertheless, man of the r!ral districts of Spain still lived

largel o!tside the orbit of the commerce and ind!str of a new and developing nineteenth'cent!reconom. Self'contained regions of local artisan prod!ction were still almost more the r!le than the

e/ception in the geograph of Spanish man!fact!res, and this was et another factor that made the

social and economic mobili5ation of a cohesive liberalism 9!ite diffic!lt. In t!rn, economic distress

enco!raged the drift of marginal elements to the towns, where the formed a s!bclass easil stirred !pb ;rogressive agitation.

Seigne!rial 1!risdiction over r!ral properties was not definitivel eliminated !ntil after "$=, and the

new settlement of propert rights was at first not f!ll clear. Seigne!rial territorial 1!risdictions wereoften transferred into private propert rights, an enormo!s boon to the landholding aristocrac, for thehenceforth held in absol!te title what had previo!sl been restricted b a &ind of condominial

relationship. Nevertheless, propert titles to small towns !nder former Seigne!rial domain, and land

from which onl marginal d!es were collected, remained bones of contention.

settled !ntil decades after the act!al abolition of seigne!ries in "$=. Tho!gh some aristocrats who

formerl held e/tensive domains were recogni5ed as private owners of these h!ge tracts, s!chownership normall co!ld not be e/tended over small towns, villages, and mo!ntain areas. Some

nobles lost the economic benefits of most of their seigne!ries almost entirel. :aws!its went on for

ears, and certain dispossessed lords were event!all awarded pensions or other compensations.


24/26

()*1+ Ta)le -. Sales of Chur'h and Co%%on ands+ 1/8!148+6alued in reales (4 reales e9ualled

one peseta#

Eears :ands of sec!lar clerg :ands of reg!lar clerg

"$='BB =--,3>$,-# >=,>#",B33

"$B>'>B B>,=$,- 33,B>,#B>

"$>B'> =>B,-"3,B-3 $,>-=,->"

Total cost of ch!rch lands sold, "$='> ",B,"$=,B$=

Cost of common and wastelands sold, "$='> >"-,"$,#3$

0rand total ",-3>,=>3,3""

So!rceJ :. S@nche5 4gesta,"istoria del constitucionalismo espaol7%adrid, "->>8, p. B=.

The transfer and sale of ch!rch lands was not completed for several decades. 4ll ch!rch properties

were not thrown on the mar&et !ntil the new r!lings b the 2spartero regenc in "$B", and the sale ofthe properties of the sec!lar clerg was not f!ll cons!mmated !ntil the "$>s. The most val!able lands

transferred to private ownership were in New Castile, 2/tremad!ra, and 4ndal!sia, the regions of the

great thirteenth'cent!r endowments.

The disamorti5ation was a comparative political s!ccess b!t a distinct economic fail!re. The first phasewas carried o!t in "$='"$=# amid great haste to complete the first ro!nds of sales to ;rogressive

s!pporters before the %oderates co!ld intervene. :ands were sold at little more than " percent down,

with ten ears to pa. Rates were often well !nder the fair mar&et val!e. Tho!gh the state gained thes!pport of a new elite, its finances deteriorated. Concentration of landholdings accelerated after "$=.

:and rents from peasants rose, while bracerowages remained stagnant. The heavil !nbalanced

agrarian str!ct!re of modern Spain, partic!larl in the center and so!th, had ass!med its f!lldimensions b the "$Bs.

Since the new liberal elite was f!ndamentall land'based, one of the first acts of restored constit!tionalgovernment in "$3 had been to contradict its nominal doctrines of the free mar&et b setting rigoro!s

import restrictions on grain. This violated Spain)s cent!ries'old tradition of cheap food imports,g!aranteeing higher grain prices that lowered the standard of living b!t maintained the principal so!rce

of income for the new elite.

()*/+Spanish Ro%anti'is%

For the first time in more than one h!ndred ears Spanish esthetics, e/pressed in the romantic art of the

earl nineteenth cent!r, gripped the 2!ropean imagination. The central fig!re in this was Francisco

0oa :!cientes 7"#B'"$3$8, whose finest achievements were his later paintings done in the

nineteenth cent!r. Change in the perception of the Spanish esthetic was also the res!lt of a reval!ationb art critics and historians of western 2!rope, who began earl in the cent!r to pro1ect the image of a

Romantic Spain. Foreign writers who tavelled in Spain''Th+ophile 0a!tier, ;rosper %erim+e,

Aashington Irving, and others''elaborated this image in the literar world of the "$=s and after,contrib!ting to a msti9!e based on one'sided glimpses of gpsies, bandits, flamenco dancing, and

%oorish resid!es which in its e/treme form was more 4ndal!sian than Spanish. Eet with this there

came, for the first time in modern 2!ropean c!lt!re, an appreciation for the positive as well as thenegative 9!alities of the !ni9!el (ispanic.


25/26

There was a romantic generation in Spanish literat!re and criticism as well, headed b the essaist

%ariano *os+ de :arra and lin&ed with the liberal political movement in %adrid and the provincial

capitals of the so!th. In Catalonia, on the other hand, the sense of romanticism was more conservative

and was associated with historical themes and infl!enced b 2nglish and 0erman writers, partic!larlScott. 4 sense of the individ!alit of Catalan societ was intensified.

The development of (ispanic romanticism had the effect of reviving regional lang!ages and

9!ic&ening their literar !se? the hegemon of Castilian that had end!red for three cent!ries waschallenged. 6 mid'cent!r there were also evidences of more pop!lar c!lt!ral forms in the Catalan'spea&ing regions, with wor&ing class choral gro!ps in 6arcelona and pop!lar theatricals in both

6arcelona and Valencia. This reawa&ening of pop!lar c!lt!re was reinforced b the costumbristatrend

in the literat!re of the ne/t generation, devoted to capt!ring regional stles and mores. The growth ofregionalist c!lt!re did not at first challenge Spanish !nit or the broader hegemon of Castilian Spanish

c!lt!re. 6 the end of the nineteenth cent!r, however, it helped to inspire dissociative regionalism,

compo!nding the diffic!lties of integrating a liberal sstem.

B$%l$2raphy !r Chapter 19

(-0)+The most detailed acco!nt of Spanish government from "#$> to "#-> is still (ermann

6a!mgarten, Gesc#ic#te $paniens %ur &eit der fran%'sisc#en (evolution76erlin, "$"8. The last

chapters of Richard (err, )#e Eig#teent#*Century (evolution in $pain7;rinceton, "->$8, deal with thepolitics of the "#-s. 4 recent brief acco!nt is Carlos Corona,(evolucin y reaccin en el reinado de

Carlos +,7%adrid, "-38. 4ntonio 2lor5a,-a ideologa liberal en la +lustracin espaola7%adrid,

"-#8, gives e/amples of the passage from 2nlightenment reformism to political preliberalism.Salvador de %o/H,-a incorporacin de seoros en la Espaa del .ntiguo (gimen7%adrid, "->-8,

treats meas!res to red!ce seigne!ries.

0eneral st!d of nineteenth'cent!r Spain sho!ld begin with Ramond Carr)s $pain /010*/232

7O/ford, "-8. ;olitical histor is s!pplemented b 8, provides a descriptive acco!nt of Spain d!ring the Aar of Independence. The

classic Spanish narrative is the Conde de Toreno)s"istoria del levantamiento8 guerra y revolucin deEspaa, > vols. 7%adrid, "$=>'=#8. Several &e aspects of the str!ggle are st!died in the smposi!m

-a Guerra de la +ndependencia espaola y los sitios de &arago%a7arago5a, "->$8, and V. 0enov+s

4morHs, ,al9ncia contra 5apole7Valencia, "-#8, treats the conflict in the :evant. On the rise ofSpanish liberalism d!ring the war, see two wor&s b %ig!el 4rtola,-os orgenes de la Espaa

contempornea7%adrid, "->-8, and-os afrancesados7%adrid, "->=8? (ans *!retsch&e,-os

afrancesados en la Guerra de la +ndependencia7%adrid, "-38? RamHn Solis,El Cdi% de las Cortes

7%adrid, "->$8? the special vol!me devoted to the "$"3 constit!tion b the (evista de Estudios:olticos, no. "3 7Nov.'


26/26

e/treme right in the last decade of Fernando VII. Spanish %asonr can be approached thro!gh Vicente

de la F!ente,"istoria de las sociedades secretas antiguas y modernas, 3d ed. 76arcelona, "-==8, and

Iris %. avala,7asones8 comuneros y carbonarios7%adrid, "-#"8.

There is no ade9!ate histor of Carlism, b!t see Rom@n Oar5!n, "istoria del Carlismo7%adrid,"-B8, and %elchor Ferrer et al., eds.,"istoria del )radicionalismo espaol, = vols. 7Seville, "-='

"->-8. 2dgar (olt, )#e Carlist >ars in $pain7:ondon, "-#8, is a brief descriptive acco!nt. *ess

;abHn,-a otra legitimidad7%adrid, "->8, is a caref!l st!d of the claims of dnastic legitimac. Therevolt of "$3'"$3# is st!died b *aime Torras 2lias,-a guerra de los .graviados76arcelona, "-#8.R. RodrLg!e5 0arra5a,5avarra de (eino a provincia ;/0?0*/0'"->=8, dealsmainl with the ears "$3'"$B>. See also :. %. 2nciso Recio,-a opinin espaola y la

independencia #ispanoamericana8 /0/2*/0?17Valladolid, "-#8. 0iorgio Spini,7ito e realtF della

$pagna nelle rivolu%ioni italiani del /0?1*/0?/7Rome, "->8, shows the infl!ence of earl Spanishliberalism in Ital.

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