Understanding overtime in the Police Servicelibrary.college.police.uk/docs/homeoffice/police... · 2010-02-09 · 2 Understanding overtime in the Police Service Executive summary

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors, not necessarily those of the Home Office (nor do they reflect Government policy).

Understanding overtime in the Police Service

Laura Brasnett, Mahlon Evans-Sinclair and Eva GottschalkHome Office Police Productivity Unit

© Crown copyright 2010 ISBN 978-1-84987-153-2 February 2010

Key implications for decision makers

● To establish a national picture of police overtime use and management, a self-completion survey was emailed to all forces in England and Wales in 2008. Interviews were also carried out in four case study forces (West Midlands, Hertfordshire, Northamptonshire and Sussex) to provide more detailed information and to identify good practice.

● The research found that police forces can reduce their overtime spend, thereby enabling financial gains to be reallocated to other areas of policing. There are a range of options available which can be used depending on the needs and circumstances of specific forces.

● To do this requires the collection and analysis of overtime data. This can help identify high-spending teams and units as well as identifying ‘peak’ days and times, allowing forces to be more proactive in developing strategies to reduce or manage overtime more effectively. The appointment of an Overtime Governance Manager to kick-start this process in Sussex proved to be successful.

● Forces should make an assessment of whether their current shift arrangements adequately match the demand for resources from the public. This will help the force to deliver a responsive, customer-focused service. It is possible that the highest spending departments are those whose working patterns have not been adapted to match public demand.

● It is important that best use is made of officer and staff time so that they are in the right place at the right time to deliver for the public. Force managers should see these deployment issues as being at the heart of their role. Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) workforce inspection in 2010, Working for the Public, will examine six key elements

of workforce management that support public confidence and police responsiveness. One of those elements is the effective deployment of officers and staff across the range of policing functions, with a focus on investigation.

● Clarification of overtime processes and procedures (including authorisation, payment rates, use of time off in lieu (TOIL) and the ‘half- hour rule’1) is crucial. This could be done through staff training events (aimed particularly at the supervisory grades) and/or through the development and distribution of ‘user-friendly’ guidance (as was done in Sussex).

● It is also important for forces to work towards changing the culture, from one where overtime is ‘the norm’, to one where use of overtime is largely aimed at meeting unplanned resource pressures where its value for money is maximised, backed up by the appropriate level of scrutiny and accountability. This culture change may need to be driven from the top, with clear direction provided by (for example) the Basic Command Unit (BCU) Commander, Head of Department or Chief Officer team. Increasing accountability among budget holders and assessing supervisors on their financial management skills may prove to be effective, along with further developing business skills among chief officers.

● Sergeants also have a key role to play in how they deploy and manage front-line officers. The HMIC report, Leading from the Frontline, contains a number of recommendations designed to enhance their role in enabling policing teams to deliver a good quality service. As first-line managers and supervisors, Sergeants act as leaders and coaches to others and are well placed to use staff to provide effective service delivery.

1 The ‘half-hour rule’ states that the first half-hour of unplanned/casual overtime is unpaid.

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Executive summary

This work was designed to provide an understanding of the drivers of overtime and the practices used for managing overtime in police forces across England and Wales.

In order to establish the national picture of overtime use and management, a self-completion survey was emailed to a representative from all forces in England and Wales (including the British Transport Police) in 2008. This was supplemented by interviews carried out in four case study forces (West Midlands, Hertfordshire, Northamptonshire and Sussex) to provide more detailed information on overtime management and to allow the identification of good practice.

The findings from the national survey highlighted that there were differences in the use and management of overtime between forces. This ranged from whether forces had a formal overtime policy in place, to the proportion of overtime that was planned in advance.

The survey also drew attention to some potential actions which forces could consider if they are aiming to reduce overtime spend. These include:

● developing a formal overtime policy and ensuring that officers (particularly those in supervisory grades) are trained in monitoring and managing overtime;

● monitoring planned overtime to identify scope for introducing/adapting shift patterns across all teams/departments, to better reflect demand for resources. This could also reduce the need for ‘predictable’ overtime (e.g. bank holidays, summer holidays, Christmas); and

● more proactive workforce planning to minimise the impact of vacancies and abstractions (i.e. temporarily moving to other duties).

The findings from the case study interviews lend support to these approaches. They also highlight additional areas of good practice in the use and management of overtime that other forces could consider if they are aiming to make savings in this area. These include:

● increasing accountability (through devolving budgets and ensuring that financial management is included in officers’ performance development reviews (PDRs);

● investing in improved IT systems; ● simplifying overtime regulations and procedures and clarifying the ‘half-hour rule’2; and ● improving communication between all ranks and departments to raise awareness of how overtime should be

managed.

Although it was difficult for representatives from the case study forces to specifically link these (and other) actions to reductions in overtime spend, it is likely that they will have made a significant contribution, particularly when implemented together. If other forces can learn from these experiences, there is potential for substantial savings to be made.


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1. Introduction

Overtime in the Police Service is set out in regulation 25 of the Police Regulations 2003. The regulation specifies that overtime is potentially payable either when officers a) remain on duty after their shift should have ended; b) are recalled between two shifts; or c) are required to begin earlier than the rostered time of their shift without at least eight hours notice and on a day when they have already completed their normal shift.

Spending on police overtime has been an area of interest for some time. In 2002 the Police Negotiating Board (PNB) set a national target over a three-year period (2003/04 to 2005/06) for police forces to reduce overtime spend by 15 per cent based on the 2001/02 baseline of £284m. In 2006, 25 forces reported to HMIC that they had achieved their overtime reduction target, while 17 forces reported that they had not.3 Although the target was achieved by some forces, there was no information provided about how forces had achieved these reductions or about drivers of overtime spend.

The most comprehensive source of data on police overtime is from the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA). CIPFA accounts provide data on officer and staff overtime, by force, for the past ten years. These data are collected by police authorities and checked by force Finance Officers and CIPFA officials to ensure entries are valid. Although these data are comprehensive, there are two potential drawbacks to their use:

● the data only provide a headline figure for each force, with no breakdown of reasons for or distribution of overtime; and

● the data are published around six months after the end of the financial year, which means that they provide a retrospective look at performance rather than real-time management information.

Police overtime should be considered within the wider context of a move towards a more efficient and effective police service. CIPFA data confirm that police officer overtime spend for 2006/07 was £412m, or just over three per cent of the total policing budget. Nationally, despite the PNB target, police officer overtime spend has increased by almost 45 per cent since 2001/02 despite a 12.5 per cent increase in police officer numbers during the same period. The Police Service is under significant pressure to deliver a good quality of service and operational capacity within a tighter financial settlement in future years. The recent Green Paper, From the neighbourhood to the national: policing our communities together, also emphasised the need for the service to make the best use of their workforce, ensuring that the supply of police resources adequately matched demand from the public. In 2010, HMIC will conduct a workforce inspection to check forces’ progress in these areas.

With the renewed focus on efficiency and demand planning there is an increased need for: improved understanding about the variance in overtime spend nationally and why this occurs; what ‘good practice’ looks like in terms of managing overtime effectively; and which information and accountability mechanisms need to be in place to facilitate such management. Whilst there is evidence of reductions of overtime spend in some forces, the mechanisms by which these have been achieved have not been catalogued or disseminated to enable other forces to replicate successful schemes. The Home Office therefore conducted a research study to identify and summarise the issues in relation to overtime and also identify ‘good practice’ in the use and management of overtime. This report sets out the methodology, research findings and finally the implications of the research results.

3 Based on self-reported figures.

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2. Methodology

This work was designed to provide an understanding of the drivers of overtime and the practices used for managing overtime within police forces. In 2008, data were gathered using two methods: firstly, a national survey, and secondly an in-depth case study analysis. Further detail on each is provided below.

National survey

In order to establish the national picture of overtime use and management across forces, a self-completion survey was emailed to a representative from all forces in England and Wales, including the British Transport Police. The survey can be found in Annex A and covered overtime budgets, authorisation of overtime and drivers of overtime. The survey was accompanied by a letter from Chief Constable Dr Timothy Brain, the Association of Chief Police Officers’ (ACPO) lead on finance and resources, explaining the nature and purpose of the survey and encouraging individuals to respond.

There are some limitations to the questions used in the national survey:

● Firstly, questions four and sixteen in the survey did not clearly indicate whether or not it was appropriate to provide more than one response. This means that for these two questions, some forces may have interpreted it as appropriate to only tick one response, whilst others thought it possible to tick all those that applied.

● Secondly, the response categories (c) and (d) for question 20 were not mutually exclusive. Specifically, the concept of half of all overtime being planned in advance was captured across the two response options:

- (c) between half and three-quarters of all overtime is planned in advance;- (d) between a quarter and a half of all overtime is planned in advance.

This should be borne in mind when interpreting the survey results.

Case studies

To provide more detailed information on overtime management and to allow the identification of good practice, a number of detailed case studies were also conducted.

Selection of case studiesCIPFA data from 2002/03 to 2006/07 were examined, together with force efficiency plans, to identify potential case studies for in-depth exploration and identification of good practice in the use and management of overtime. The analysis looked for forces that had either achieved significant reductions in overtime spend in recent years; were a stable low-spending force (compared with their most similar force (MSF) groups; or had identified efficiency savings resulting from overtime in the force efficiency plans. The analysis highlighted the forces that might potentially be demonstrating good overtime practice and where lessons could be learnt. From these forces, four case studies across a mixture of urban and rural areas were carried out (see Table 1).4

4 There may also be additional good practice examples of overtime management from other forces that are not captured in this research.

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Table 1 Case study forcesForce Rationale for selection

West Midlands l Overtime spend low compared to others in MSF group

l Recent decreases in overtime spend

Hertfordshire l Reductions in overtime spend

l Efficiency savings identified

Northamptonshire l Force with lowest spend on overtime

l Modest reductions in overtime spend

l Efficiency savings identified

Sussex l Reductions in overtime spend

l Overtime spend low compared to others in MSF group

l Previously high spending force with recent reductions

Group discussions and interviews with front-line officersIn each case study force, initial exploratory discussions were held with senior finance and HR representatives as well as other senior operational officers.

The discussions focused on overtime management processes and whether the force had introduced new approaches aimed at reducing overtime spend. Questions were also asked about how forces had approached the PNB target, whether there were any specific initiatives within the force to address overtime and how overtime was managed and monitored within the force.

In total, discussions were held with 23 senior individuals across the four forces. At least five individuals from each force were interviewed. The findings from these initial discussions were used to develop semi-structured interview schedules for use with frontline officers (see Annex B).

One BCU in each of the four forces was selected for the follow-up interviews with front-line officers. Within this BCU, interviews were conducted with:

● senior managers (BCU Commanders, Finance Officers or Head of Operations); ● Sergeants; and ● Constables.

The interviews sought to understand participants’ views on overtime management practices and any changes that had taken place with regards to the use or management of overtime within the force. Due to a desire to restrict impact on resources, interviews were carried out with up to three officers (of the same rank) at any one time. In total, interviews were carried out with twenty-five individuals across the four forces (see Table 2).

Table 2 Number of front-line officers interviewed in each forceForce Senior managers Sergeants Constables Total

West Midlands 2 3 2 7

Hertfordshire 2 3 2 7

Northamptonshire 2 2 2 6

Sussex 2 1 2 5

Total 8 9 8 25

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* Respondents could select more than one option

Figure 1 Information on overtime recorded by forces

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3. Results from the national survey

In total, 38 forces responded to the survey (a response rate of 86 per cent). Findings from each of the following survey themes are provided below: overtime records; authorisation; monitoring; and causes of overtime.

Overtime records

All of the forces that responded to the survey reported that they have an allocated budget for overtime. Respondents from 37 of the 38 forces (97%) also stated that teams/units have allocated budgets for overtime.

All forces keep a record of money spent on overtime. This includes information such as level of payment, officer names, day and time of overtime undertaken and the reason (see Figure 1).

Fifteen forces (39%) also collected additional information on overtime, including:

● overtime type (planned, unplanned, short/long notice, rest day, bank holiday); ● cost centre codes charged for overtime; ● monetary value of overtime paid; and ● whether overtime was taken as ‘time off in lieu’ or payment.

In all forces the Finance Department has access to information on overtime. Additionally, Area Commanders (37 or 97%) and supervisory grades (33 or 87%) also have access to this information in the majority of forces. In three forces (8%) all staff have access to overtime information (see Figure 2).

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Figure 2 Access to overtime information


Figure 3 Authorisation of overtime for major operations/events

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Overtime authorisation

Thirty-one forces (82%) reported having a formal overtime policy for officers to adhere to and seven (18%) did not. The policy is made available to all officers in 27 out of these 31 forces (71% of forces overall).

In all forces, authorisation is required for overtime relating to major operations or events (planned overtime). Figure 3 shows which departments/ranks are responsible for authorising overtime for major operations. In the majority of forces, more than one rank/department could authorise overtime, although this was often dependent on circumstances (e.g. an Inspector authorising most overtime claims, but those involving rest days requiring authorisation by a Superintendent).

Figure 4 Information collected for monitoring purposes

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OtherAuthorisingofficer

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The ‘other’ category included, for example:

● Major Incident Co-ordinators; ● Divisional Commanders; ● Superintendents; ● Chief Inspectors; and ● Senior Investigating Officers.

In all forces, authorisation is also required for unplanned overtime. In most forces, this authorisation is obtained from an Inspector (33 or 87%) or Sergeant (20 or 53%) or from the planning department (9 or 24%).

In 37 forces (97%) unplanned overtime is meant to be authorised before the end of previous duty (i.e. before the overtime commences). However, in 17 forces (45%) authorisation could also take place during the overtime or after it had been completed. In the majority of forces, authorisation for unplanned overtime was given either verbally or electronically.

Monitoring overtime

In half of forces, Area Commanders (21 or 55%) and Inspectors (19 or 50%) are responsible for monitoring overtime. Overtime is generally monitored either monthly (35 or 92%) and/or weekly (12 or 32%). Figure 4 illustrates the type of information that is included in monitoring reports. In 35 forces (92%), overtime can be monitored on an individual officer level.

In just over two-thirds of forces (26 or 68%), training on overtime monitoring is provided to supervisors.

In most forces, Inspectors (34 or 89%) and Sergeants (23 or 61%) were responsible for approaching an officer if they were considered to be working too many hours.

Thirty-three forces have made changes to overtime authorisation/management procedures in the past two years. Details of the changes made by four case study forces and the impact of these changes are outlined in the next section of the report.

Figure 5 Main causes of overtime

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2927 26 25

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Figure 6 Proportion of planned overtime5

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Less than 1/4Between 1/4 and 1/2Between 1/2 and 3/4sMore than 3/4s

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Causes of overtime

The most common causes of overtime reported by forces were major operations (35 or 92%), sickness or abstractions (29 or 76%) and staff shortages (27 or 71%) (see Figure 5).

The proportion of planned overtime varied between forces, but in most (15 or 44%) between one-quarter and one-half of overtime was planned in advance. In 11 forces (32%) more than three-quarters of overtime was planned in advance and in four forces (12%) less than one-quarter was planned (see Figure 6).

Respondents from 35 forces (92%) confirmed that there are peaks in the use of overtime throughout the year, which are fairly predictable. These peaks are summarised in Figure 7.

5 The questionnaire response categories allowed ‘half ’ to be entered across two categories. Therefore it is unknown exactly how many forces had half of overtime as planned.

Figure 7 Peaks in overtimeN

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In the majority of forces (36 or 95%) it was reported that particular teams incur more overtime than others. Just over two-thirds of forces (28 or 74%) noted that the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) teams incurred the most overtime.

Over half the forces surveyed (21 or 55%) reported ‘other’ reasons for peaks in overtime. The other reasons were policing football matches, local events (e.g. festivals, local shows), responding to major incidents and New Year.

Key themes from survey results

The national survey has shown that there is considerable variation between forces in the use and management of overtime.

Seven forces (18%) which responded to the survey do not have formal overtime policies for officers to adhere to. Although these forces do not necessarily have high levels of overtime spend compared to other forces, the lack of a formal policy may mean that this spend is greater than it needs to be. This is because officers will not have a clear definition of when overtime is acceptable and could therefore be using overtime in unnecessary circumstances. Clarifying when overtime is acceptable in these forces could lead to reductions in its use.

Similarly, around one-third of forces do not provide training for their supervisors on the use and management of overtime. Again, although these forces may not have comparably high levels of overtime spend, ensuring that supervisors know the correct procedures for authorising and coding overtime could result in savings being made.

It emerged that in 44 per cent of forces, over half of all overtime is planned in advance. This suggests that in some forces there is scope for changing shift patterns to better match demand for resources, thereby minimising the use of planned overtime. Similarly, vacancies, sickness absences and ‘lack of staff ’ were raised by over two-thirds of forces as being key drivers of overtime. This suggests that better workforce planning may be the key to reducing overtime use in some forces.

Finally, in just over two-thirds of forces, it was reported that the CID tend to generate more overtime than other teams or departments. This may partly explain why 16 forces specified that ‘peaks’ of overtime occur at weekends: CID teams’ regular working hours tend to occur on Monday to Friday in the majority of forces and therefore if they are required to work on a weekend, this is considered overtime. This issue will be explored further in HMIC’s planned 2010 workforce inspection.

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4. Results from the case studies

This section outlines results from the interviews and discussions carried out within the four case study forces (West Midlands, Hertfordshire, Northamptonshire and Sussex). The findings focus on drivers of overtime and the methods introduced by forces to improve management of overtime. The interview schedule can be found in Annex B. A description of the main approaches used by each force can be found in Annex C.

Drivers of overtime

A number of common drivers of overtime were highlighted during the course of the interviews. These are summarised below.

Operational and staffing pressures1. Events staffing. Regular and one-off events (e.g. horse racing, motor racing, political party conferences and football

matches) which required a police presence often resulted in officer overtime. In some instances, the costs that the force incurred were either fully or partly recoverable, but in other cases the force had to cover these costs themselves.

2. Unexpected events. Responding to unexpected events (e.g. the Buncefield oil depot explosion and other high profile investigations) was also seen as a key driver of unplanned overtime. This type of overtime was seen by some interviewees as being particularly difficult to plan for.

3. Vacancies and abstractions. Providing cover for officer abstractions (e.g. to specialist teams/units/operations) and covering sickness absence and officer vacancies was also mentioned as a driver of overtime. Interviewees from two forces noted that “losing officers to the Met” was a particular problem, which led to vacancies that needed to be covered by overtime.

4. Prisoner handling. Dealing with prisoners was cited by interviewees from three forces as being particularly time-consuming, often requiring officers to work over their allotted shift time.

5. Court attendance. Interviewees from three forces mentioned that court attendance generated a lot of overtime, with officers having to attend court on rest days or during annual leave. Interviewees from one force noted that an agreement had been reached with the court service to “minimise this happening”. However, interviewees from another force reported that “the court service don’t seem able to plan around this”.

Organisational and procedural issues1. Shift patterns. In some forces, interviewees highlighted that shift patterns, or handover between shifts either

generated or encouraged overtime. For example, in one force, officers joined their 4pm shift an hour early to allow time for handover. However, it was noted that not all officers regularly claimed this as overtime.

2. Lack of clarity about overtime procedures. Respondents from most forces reported problems around the understanding and enforcement of overtime regulations and management procedures. For example, the ‘half-hour rule’ was not fully understood or correctly applied by all officers/supervisors.6

3. Problems with monitoring systems/procedures. In one force, it was reported that the Airwaves system was not particularly effective at monitoring overtime: “systems are too busy and it takes too long to get yourself off the allocated job”. It was also reported that there were no repercussions for officers not logging off a job when they were finished. This reportedly led to “some people clocking up more hours than they have actually worked”. In another force, the default setting on the IT system led to the majority of claims being wrongly classified as ‘non-casual’: this meant that officers were being paid for the first half-hour of unplanned overtime, in contravention of the ‘half-hour rule’.


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Approaches to improving overtime management

The four forces included in the study had all taken steps to reduce overtime spending. The different approaches are presented below with some illustrative examples.

Stricter enforcement of overtime regulationsThree out of the four forces had introduced new authorisation procedures that required all overtime requests to be pre-approved and/or challenged by Sergeants or Inspectors. This had been introduced either on a force-wide basis or in particular BCUs or teams where overtime budgets were a particular problem.

GOOD PRACTICE

In West Midlands, respondents described how supervisors have become “more intrusive” in their challenge to officers who wanted to undertake overtime. Each overtime sheet needs to be signed by an Inspector.

In Northamptonshire, all overtime has to be approved and signed off by an Inspector or above before it is paid. This allows the force to maintain more accurate records of overtime spend and ensures that officers are accountable for the overtime costs that they incur or authorise.

In Hertfordshire, all overtime has to be pre-authorised by an Inspector. Any overtime not pre-authorised has to be approved by a member of the command team before payment is made.

Respondents also indicated that efforts had been made within their force to encourage supervisors to enforce the overtime regulations appropriately and encourage all officers to comply with force overtime guidelines.

GOOD PRACTICE

Sussex, as part of their bid to reach the PNB’s 15 per cent reduction target, introduced an easy-to-read version of the regulations, in partnership with the Police Federation. Sussex also conducted sessions with supervisors to explain the overtime regulations and the new procedures aimed at reducing unnecessary overtime.

Sussex also started checking the application of the half-hour rule, to ensure that officers were not claiming for the first half-hour of unplanned overtime. This has led to estimated savings of £300,000 over three years.

Hertfordshire and Northamptonshire issued either email reminders or specific guidelines to all officers. This was aimed at ensuring that officers and supervisors coded overtime at the correct pay rate.

Increased accountabilitySome respondents said that their forces had devolved budgets to Inspectors, or had given discretion to Chief Superintendents as to how far their overtime budgets could be devolved. In these forces, budget managers were held accountable for their spend by Chief Officers. Some forces also allowed Inspectors to reallocate any under-spend on overtime to other areas.

GOOD PRACTICE

In Hertfordshire, each Neighbourhood Inspector knows his/her overtime budget. Inspectors are allowed to keep any overtime under-spend and use it in other areas under delegated budget arrangements subject to the overall area budget being secure. Finance teams produce analysis and reports to identify teams which are at risk of over-spending and work with the Area Command Teams to put in place the appropriate actions to reduce spending where necessary.

In Sussex, all Inspectors have an overtime budget. Overtime spend is discussed by Chief Inspectors and Chief Superintendents at fortnightly team meetings. An effort is made to let officers know that overtime under-spend is reinvested in other areas of policing such as buying head cameras.

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In Northamptonshire, Inspectors are allocated ‘units’ of overtime (each unit representing £5.70 or 15 minutes of overtime) according to their teams’ needs. Using units as opposed to budgets has apparently facilitated the management of overtime, making the process easier to manage, control and monitor. This was because calculating the cost of each individual’s overtime, when officers are on different rates of pay, is complicated and can lead to errors. Therefore, taking the averaging pay point to calculate an average unit cost per 15 minutes is a far more manageable approach for Inspectors.

As well as devolving control of overtime budgets, some forces had incorporated financial management objectives into officers’ PDRs, so that they were assessed on this as part of their annual appraisal.

GOOD PRACTICE

Hertfordshire had recently introduced a new objective into Area Commanders’ PDRs which meant that financial management would be a component of their performance assessment, including overtime control. Some Area Commanders had passed this objective on to their Chief Inspectors and Inspectors.

In West Midlands, all Inspectors have a financial management objective in their PDRs.

Improved monitoringIn addition to management approaches, respondents also felt that forces had placed much greater emphasis on the monitoring of overtime spend, including: the amount spent; details of officers with the greatest overtime; details of who authorised payments; the reasons for overtime claims; and peak times and days for incurring overtime. Senior managers were then made aware of this information on a regular basis, so that appropriate action could be taken.

GOOD PRACTICE

In Hertfordshire, the Resource Management Unit (RMU) produce regular reports for Area Commanders showing working hours for all team members over the previous 16 weeks. This report assigns Red/Amber/Green status to all officers to show whether they are working in excess of Working Time Directives (WTD). Officers with Red/Amber status will have one-to-one meetings with their Inspectors to discuss their working hours.

In West Midlands, the finance team have a central database of overtime which provides a mechanism for Operation Command Units (OCU) to review data according to individual officers, activities, sectors and operations. However, this information is not live and instead is lagged by six weeks.

Most forces had dedicated finance or business support officers for BCUs who were responsible for monitoring budgets and overtime spend to feed back to senior managers.

GOOD PRACTICE

In West Midlands and Hertfordshire, each BCU has a Business Manager (BM) who monitors overtime spend. The BM has monthly performance meetings with the Commander, where overtime spend is discussed.

Improved use of information technology systemsA number of IT systems had been introduced to aid overtime management practices.

GOOD PRACTICE

In Sussex, respondents outlined a system called Overtime Management Control (OMC). This system was developed by a Chief Inspector in the force to facilitate authorisation of overtime and provide an audit trail for overtime approvals.

A Constable or Sergeant uses the OMC system to request permission for overtime. Once approved, an email is generated with a reference number which is used on the overtime claim form. The finance team processing the

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overtime claim can then check the claim against the original approval. The finance team will have access to information on who submitted and authorised the claim and the amount of overtime carried out.

It is anticipated that the system will be subject to further improvements to include within SAP7 time management so that it will be clear exactly how many hours an officer has worked to ensure that WTD are not being overridden.

In Hertfordshire, the PROMIS IT system is used as a resource management system. The system aids overtime management and control, monitoring of working hours and is able to produce reports by authoriser, by officer, by team and by type of overtime in order to help identify drivers of overtime spend.

Improved communication and culture changeFinally there was some indication that part of the success of changing overtime practice was an increased level of communication between Inspectors, Sergeants and senior managers. There was a sense that by communicating the new formal procedures, officers were more educated about forces budgeting and were subsequently more conscious of their overtime commitments.

A change in culture among officers in the forces was also seen as being key to reducing overtime spend. In one of the case study forces, staff and officers described an important shift from a culture of “we’ll find the money” to one of “there is no available money to spend” unless there was a very strong and definite case for overtime. The influence of the Area Commander was seen as being critical to this shift.

7 SAP is an electronic duties management system where officers can self-record when they are off-duty or on leave. The system also automatically notifies officer location so controllers can be aware of staff availability to respond to operational needs.

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5. Conclusion and implications

The findings from the national survey highlighted that there were differences in the use and management of overtime between forces. These ranged from whether forces had a formal overtime policy in place to the proportion of overtime that was planned in advance. This finding is not unexpected given the operational independence of Chief Officers. In addition, the context within which each force operates will be important. Forces that are urban, rural or metropolitan will have different perspectives on overtime availability and use and different funding available for this.

The research has found that police forces can reduce their overtime spend thereby enabling financial gains to be reallocated to other areas of policing. The survey identified the following potential actions which forces could consider to reduce overtime spend.

● Developing a formal overtime policy and ensuring that officers (particularly those in supervisory grades) are trained in monitoring and managing overtime. This will ensure that all officers across the force are operating the same arrangements and are appropriately skilled to manage overtime effectively.

● Monitoring planned overtime to identify whether current shift arrangements adequately match the demands for resources. There may be scope for introducing/adapting shift patterns (particularly in CID) to better reflect the likely demand for staff resource and reduce the need for overtime arrangements. It is likely that higher spending departments are those whose working patterns have not been adapted.

● More proactive workforce planning to minimise the impact of vacancies and abstractions. This would ensure that there were sufficient officers available all year round to reduce the use of overtime.

The findings from the discussions and interviews lend support to these approaches. They also highlight additional areas of good practice in the use and management of overtime that other forces could consider if they are aiming to make savings in this area. These include the following.

● Increasing accountability (through devolving budgets and ensuring that financial management is included in officers’ PDRs) to encourage officer motivation to reduce overtime spend.

● Investing in improved IT systems to collect and analyse overtime data. This can help to identify high-spending teams and units as well as identifying ‘peak’ days and times, allowing forces to be more proactive in developing strategies to reduce or manage overtime more effectively.

● Clarifying overtime processes and procedures (including interpretation of the relevant police regulations, authorisation, payment rates, correct use of TOIL and the ‘half-hour rule’) is crucial to ensure that all officers understand how overtime works. This could be done through staff training events (aimed particularly at the supervisory grades) and/or through the development and distribution of user-friendly guidance.

● Improving communication between all ranks and departments to raise awareness of how overtime should be managed.

● Forces working towards changing the culture, from one where overtime is ‘the norm’, to one where use of overtime is largely aimed at meeting unplanned resource pressures and where its value for money is maximised. This may need to be driven from the top (e.g. BCU Commander or Head of Department) and by senior officers also championing restricted overtime.

● Sergeants also have a key role to play in the deployment and management of front-line officers. As first-line managers and supervisors, Sergeants act as leaders and coaches to others and are well placed to use staff to provide effective service delivery.

Although it was difficult for representatives from the case study forces to specifically link these (and other) actions to reductions in overtime spend, it is likely that they will have made a significant contribution, particularly when implemented together. If other forces can learn from these experiences, there is the potential for substantial savings to be made.

One of the Home Secretary’s Strategic Policing Priorities for 2009/10 is “...in line with the efficiency and productivity strategy for the Police Service, to ensure the best use of resources to deliver: significant cashable improvements; more effective deployment of the work force; and to realise the benefits of new technology.”

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In the current economic climate a relentless focus on value for money is more than ever necessary to sustain the efficiency and productivity improvements already delivered and to ensure that resources are effectively targeted at improving front-line services. Better management of the use of overtime resources has the potential to deliver significant gains.

Annex A: Survey

PLEASE NOTE THAT THE BLANK SPACES FOR OPEN RESPONSES HAVEBEEN REMOVED FROM THIS VERSION OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE TO REDUCETHE NUMBER OF PAGES.

PPU (6th Floor Fry) Home Office, 2 Marsham Street, London, SW1P 4DF

To: Force Finance Directors

Dear Colleague

Overtime Questionnaire

I would be grateful if you could spend a few minutes to complete the attachedquestionnaire. It has been drawn up by the Home Office in full consultation withACPO.

We are interested in understanding more about the drivers of overtime and ways ofmaking the best use of overtime in order to share ideas across the service. Thequestionnaire will help us to get an understanding of how overtime is managed andthe different models in use across forces in England and Wales.

A better understanding of the issue will help forces and authorities in their quest todeliver efficiency and productivity improvements. It is, however, recognised thatovertime is often the most efficient way of dealing with immediate needs andproviding resources for emergency or public order situations.

The questionnaire is being sent to you as the force’s Finance Director to complete inconsultation with colleagues as necessary. I can assure you that published reports ofthese findings will not be attributed to any force or individual.

In returning the questionnaire, an attached copy of your forces policy documentwould be much appreciated and useful in understanding a full and rounded picture ofovertime in your force.

It would be helpful to receive a reply, sent to Mahlon Evans-Sinclair([email protected]) by Friday 7 November 2008.

Thank you for your co-operation, and for your time in providing a response.

Kind Regards,Laura BrasnettMahlon Evans-Sinclair

February 2010

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Overtime Questionnaire

NOTES OF GUIDANCE:

• THE QUESTIONNAIRE IS CLEARLY MARKED FOR REFERENCE INTO THREE PARTS.o PART 1: BUDGETSo PART 2: AUTHORISATION OF OVERTIMEo PART 3: CAUSES OF OVERTIME

THESE ARE AND WHERE NECESSARY CAN BE CIRCULATED TO THE RELEVANTPARTS OF THE TEAM FOR FURTHER ELABORATION.

• WHERE NECESSARY, THERE IS SPACE AFTER A QUESTION IN WHICH TOELABORATE ON YOUR ANSWER.

• W HERE THE ANSWER IS GIVEN AS ‘YES/NO’ (OR OTHER SUCH DIRECTEDRESPONSE) PLEASE DELETE AS APPROPRIATE.

• WHERE TICK BOXES APPEAR: DOUBLE CLICK THE BOX, AND SELECT ‘CHECKED INDEFAULT VALUE: BEFORE CLICKING OK.

Please complete after reading guidance.

NAME:

FORCE:

TEAM/UNIT:

OUTLINE OF RESPONSIBILITIES:

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PART ONE:OVERTIME BUDGETS

1. Do you have an allocated budget for overtime?

a. Yesb. No

2. Do teams/units have an allocated budget for overtime?

a. Yesb. No

3. Does the force have a record of money spent?

a. Yesb. No

If yes, who records it, and how often?

4. What other information, if any, is collected on overtime?

a. Officer namesb. Day of overtime takenc. Time of overtime undertakend. Number of hours per monthe. Reasonf. Level of payment – i.e. time 1/3 etcg. Name of authorising officerh. Other (Please list below)i. None

5. Who has access to this information (Please tick all that apply)

a. Area Commanders/Department Headsb. Financec. HRd. Supervisory grades – Inspectors/Sergeantse. All stafff. Other

February 2010

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PART TWO:OVERTIME AUTHORISATION

6. Is there a formal overtime policy for officers to adhere to?

a. Yesb. No

7. If yes, is this made available to all officers?

a. Yesb. Noc. Not sure

8. Who is responsible for authorising overtime for major operations orevents? (Please tick all that apply)

a. Planning dept b. Inspectorc. Sergeantd. No authorisation requirede. Don’t knowf. Other – please specify

9. Who is responsible for authorising overtime for immediate day-to-dayactivities such as dealing with prisoners, arrests and so on? (Please tickall that apply)

a. Planning deptb. Inspectorc. Sergeantd. No authorisation required. e. Don’t knowf. Other – please specify

10. Are officers required to seek authorisation for unplanned overtime?

a. Yesb. No

If yes, at what point are officers required to seek authorisation from aline manager for unplanned overtime? (Please tick all that apply)

a. Before end of duty (i.e. before overtime) b. During the shiftc. At end of overtime dutyd. Later datee. Not required.

11. How is it authorised? (E.g. verbal, electronic, written)

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12. Who is responsible for monitoring the number of overtime hours beingworked by individual officers? (Please tick all that apply)

a. HR b. Financec. Area Commanders/Departmental Headsd. Inspectore. Sergeantf. All of the aboveg. No one

13. How often do those monitoring the number of overtime hours beingworked by individual officers see information about overtime spend?(Please tick all that apply)

a. Daily b. Weeklyc. Monthlyd. Quarterlye. Annually

14. What information does this include? (Please tick all that apply)

a. Officer namesb. Day of overtime undertakenc. Time of overtime undertakend. Number of hours per month e. Reasonf. Level of payment – e.g. time ‘1/3’ etcg. Name of authorising officerh. Other/further information

15. Is there any training provided to supervisors to assist with overtimemonitoring?

a. Yesb. No

If Yes, please give further details below

16. Who would be responsible for approaching a police officer if it was feltthat they were working too many hours?

a. HRb. Financec. Sergeantd. Inspectore. No onef. Other

February 2010

21

17. Have there been any recent changes to authorisation and managementof overtime, including measures to reduce it, in the past two years?

a. Yesb. No

If yes, please give further details below

18. What has been the impact of the changes described above?

PART THREE:MOST COMMON OCCURRENCES/CAUSES OF OVERTIME.

19. What are the most common causes of overtime in your force? (Pleasetick all that apply)

a. Lack of staffb. Sickness or abstractionsc. Vacant positionsd. Major operationse. Night-time economyf. Completion of task*g. Other – please specify details below.

*If ‘f.’ Completion of task is applicable, please state most commonexamples below

20. Approximately what proportion of overtime is planned in advance? (i.e.before the shift is due to start)

a. All overtime is planned in advanceb. More than three-quarters of all overtime (but less

than all) is planned in advancec. Between half and three-quarters of all overtime is

planned in advanced. Between a quarter and a half of all overtime is planned

in advancee. Less than a quarter of all overtime is planned in

advance

21. Are there particular peaks in the use of overtime over the course of theyear?

a. Yes b. No

22. If yes, what are the causes of these peaks? (Please tick all that apply)

a. Bank holidaysb. Christmasc. Summer holidaysd. Weekendse. End of the financial year.f. Other (Please list below)

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23. Are there particular teams or units that incur more overtime thanothers?

YesNo

24. If yes, please state which teams/units in your force incurs the mostovertime. (Please select ONE option)

a. Responseb. Neighbourhoodc. CIDd. Other (Please list below)

25. Is the majority of this team/unit’s spending on overtime planned orunplanned?

a. Mostly plannedb. Mixture of planned and unplannedc. Mostly unplannedd. Don’t know

26. Please indicate in the box below any advantages of usingovertime.

27. Please indicate in the box below any disadvantages of using overtime.

Please include any further information that you feel may be relevant to thisquestionnaire. In doing so, please attribute your response to a question.

THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME IN COMPLETING THIS QUESTIONNAIRE.

February 2010

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Annex B: Interview schedule

Interview schedule for Constables/Sergeants/Inspectors

Introduction

– Names, where our teams fits in the Home Office etc.

– Purpose of the research is to find evidence of good practice in the management and use of overtime

– We have already spoken to HR, Finance and Senior Management in this force and three others.

– We wanted to speak to officers on the front line to see how changes have affected overtime practices

– Notes will be taken during this discussion but will not necessarily be attributed to individuals.

First we would like to ask a few questions about how overtime is identified/authorised etc.

1. Can you briefly outline how overtime is (generally) authorised within this unit/BCU? a) Use IT/paper-based/verbal system? b) Are officers required to specify reason, how long they would like etc? c) Which rank agrees overtime?

2. Has this process changed recently (in the two years)? a) If yes, how has it changed? b) Why was it changed? What was the problem?

3. How is overtime per officer monitored in this BCU? a) Which team collects the info?b) Who is accountable for the overall BCU spend?

4. What impact does the current/new system had on how overtime is scrutinised or managed? a) Constables only – does your Sergeant or Inspector question or challenge overtime use/reason or length of

time? b) Sergeants/Inspectors – do you have info on all your officers?

5. What do you think are the main causes of overtime? a) e.g. Court/working on prisoners/events/providing cover?

6. Have there been any attempts in this BCU to reduce any of these causes (where possible)?

7. What more can be done to reduce these? e.g. IT systems/training on supervision/regulations?

8. [SERGEANTS/INSPECTORS ONLY] How would you deal with an individual/team you believe is incurring excessive overtime? Would you feel confident in challenging these individuals?

9. [SERGEANTS/INSPECTORS ONLY] Have there been any attempts to look at whether overtime provides value for money?

10. Do you think overtime spend can be linked to performance improvement or specific outcomes?

February 2010

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Annex C: Case studies

Sussex Police

Sussex Police force’s approach to managing overtime was a response to both the PNB 15 per cent reduction target and internal pressure regarding overtime processes. One of the first things they did was appoint an Overtime Governance Manager in 2003. The aim of the project was to establish why overtime was worked and to ensure that it was done for the right reasons.

The overtime project began by identifying issues with the current management processes and use of overtime. A key problem area was regarding the authorisation and management process – some overtime forms were signed and authorised by Sergeants despite being blank – leaving the system open to potential misuse. There was also evidence of lack of understanding about overtime regulations and the correct amount to claim, particularly regarding the ‘half-hour rule’. Another issue was lack of experience amongst Sergeants and lack of specific training to enable them to manage overtime and use the regulations effectively.

The steps taken by Sussex included conducting sessions with supervisors to give them information on overtime regulations and overtime processes; this has continued beyond the life of the three-year project. The Overtime Governance Manager also wrote an ‘easy-to-use’ guide to the regulations to ensure that officers were claiming the appropriate amounts. This was written in conjunction with the Police Federation and was generally well received. The project also targeted top earners of overtime, especially those in CID departments where there was evidence that some officers were doing the same amount of overtime each week. There was also advice to officers about ensuring appropriate use of casual and pre-planned overtime rates. The impact of these changes was that Sussex achieved a 22 per cent reduction in overtime over the three years, exceeding the PNB’s 15 per cent target.

Since the initial three-year project, Sussex Police has taken further steps to ensure that overtime continues to be managed effectively. Although there is no longer a dedicated Overtime Governance Manager, a number of initiatives have been taken forward by finance and operational staff. One particular success was the decision to create a new electronic authorisation process, a web-based tool designed by a Chief Inspector, called Overtime Management Control (OMC). OMC requires a Constable or Sergeant to request authorisation before undertaking overtime using an electronic system. This system then generates an email to the authorising inspector. If the request is approved, the officer will receive a reference number for use on the overtime claim form. The system now forces Inspectors to consider whether overtime is the best way of dealing with an issue and, if it is, then restricting the amount used rather than officers working for as long as they wish.

OMC is viewed as a very positive step in overtime management. It provides real time information about the amount of overtime being used, solving the previous problem of unpredictable overtime returns. OMC also provides additional functions for officers to select the hours, rate, reason and actual cost for the Inspector to approve. OMC also provides a prompt to Inspectors if they have less than ten per cent of their overtime budget left. Additionally, OMC provides a number of checks for the system including closer monitoring of rest day working and extended duty.

Views from front-line officers were positive: they felt that the OMC tool was fairly easy to use and convenient as it calculated the correct rate and level of overtime instead of officers having to do this themselves. Officers spoke favourably about the training they received on OMC.

Overtime management has been embedded into management processes. A command team, headed up by a Chief Superintendent, will look at overtime figures, prepared by the divisional finance team, during fortnightly meetings.

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Hertfordshire Constabulary

Hertfordshire Constabulary was historically a high-spending force regarding overtime. The force’s initial response to the PNB target in 2002/03 was simply to reduce their overarching overtime budget by taking a ‘top-down’ target-setting approach. However, to deliver overtime budget cuts of £700,000 over recent years the force has developed a more sophisticated approach to uncover greater savings and to improve the use of resources.

In recent years there has been increased pressure on the overall force budget and a drive for efficiency savings. The force has investigated their spending by undertaking a benchmarking exercise to compare BCUs and the level of overtime spending. Hertfordshire also reviewed their use of overtime and invested in a new IT system for resource management, which includes a module for overtime authorisation, monitoring and control.

In 2007, Hertfordshire Constabulary produced reports for the Police Authority outlining the risk of over-spend in the overtime budget and the measures being taken to address it. The review identified difficulties with the distinction between casual/non-casual overtime, together with an IT system that automatically defaulted to paying non-casual rates (meaning that the first half-hour was always being paid as the default unless overridden to advise otherwise). This default setting was reversed. Overtime resulting from court attendance was problematic; as officers were generally only given two weeks’ notice to attend court, they frequently had to cancel rest days. It was difficult to monitor overtime because it was frequently recorded as ‘cover’ without sufficient information regarding the reason for the overtime being undertaken.

Improvements in overtime management and control were significantly assisted by implementing the new ProMis Resource Management System and regulations being redistributed to officers regarding the ‘half-hour’ rule. The new system enabled the force to look more closely at the drivers of overtime and can produce reports to show who is undertaking and authorising overtime and the type of overtime being undertaken (e.g. shift extension, briefings and rolls calls, court appearances, emergencies, planned events beyond normal call of duty). This was an improvement on the previous manual system, which only identified whether overtime was ‘routine’ or ‘task’. The new system and improved clarity of the regulations enabled savings to be made across the force.

Hertfordshire Constabulary also established improved working arrangements with the Court Service to minimise the impact of officers attending court. Additionally, all Area Commanders now have a PDR objective for financial management that can be passed down as far as Inspectors. The force also underwent a recalibration exercise examining demand and supply of officer time and introducing new variable shift patterns (VSPs) across some units.

Following the IT development, Hertfordshire’s Resource Management Unit are able to use ProMis to monitor and investigate drivers of overtime. RMU now produce regular reports for the Area Commander to show the working hours of team members, who are allocated a Red/Amber/Green status depending on the number of hours they have worked. Red status is given for officers who have worked 50 or more additional hours in a month, Amber for 33 to 29 additional hours and Green for up to 32 additional hours. RMU’s wider remit is to look at resource management issues such as demand/supply match of officers and recalibration of shift patterns to enable a better match.

The most significant changes in overtime process and authorisation took place in the Eastern Area, which had historically incurred budget over-spends. In order to undertake overtime, officers in this area now require pre-authorisation from an Inspector rather than a Sergeant. Officers request authorisation via either email or using the Airwave radio system, specifying the reason and time required. Officers can also complete an electronic form using ProMis and send this to the Inspector for authorisation. Officers find this to be simple to use because it automatically works out the appropriate rate when sending the email for authorisation. As a rule, overtime records need to be completed within five days and unauthorised overtime will be held and not paid pending approval. There is also an agreed working practice of paying overtime resulting from working rest days and staying late only if linked to an arrest or immediate operational needs rather than for the purposes of completing paperwork.

February 2010

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Officers and staff from Hertfordshire believe that this new system has improved overtime use. The culture of Eastern Area has changed and been embedded as more new recruits work in the area and use the new system. Most significantly, staff and officers working in the Eastern Area described the culture shift within the area from “we’ll find the money” to “there is no available money to spend” and referred to the influence of their Area Commander in giving clear direction about reducing overtime.

Eastern Area (as with other BCUs in Hertfordshire) has an Assistant Account Manager (AAM) who reports to the Area Commander providing fortnightly information about officer overtime, reason, authorisation and rate. The AAM also reports risk of over-spend.

Officers (Sergeants and Constables) were aware of budgetary pressures and the new procedures for authorisation and monitoring mechanisms. However, they highlighted a few challenges with the system. In particular, Constables sometimes found it hard to get hold of duty Inspectors to request overtime; they also found it challenging to get necessary claims approved for payment within the required five days. There were some discrepancies about overtime authorisation; for example, senior officers viewed evening and weekend overtime or overtime completed by particular teams more favourably than other teams.

Overall, Hertfordshire recognised that the key success factor was the shift in culture across the organisation that overtime is not guaranteed. This was complemented by the development of both a new IT system and greater scope for investigation of overtime figures. Hertfordshire also benefited from a change to shift patterns, particularly within CID. In terms of next steps it is recognised that there is further work to do to ensure that overtime is coded and recorded accurately to maximise its ability to analyse data trends and that shift patterns need to be monitored to ensure they have the right supply/demand match to enable the most efficient use of officers to prevent unnecessary overtime.

West Midlands

West Midlands was the largest police force visited. They had a clear understanding of where and when overtime occurred across the force. Some of the key drivers they identified included officers called for court duty, dealing with prisoners, policing the night-time economy and overtime requirements in particular units, for example CID.

West Midlands did not necessarily undergo any specific organisational changes in response to the 15 per cent PNB target. The force had focused on improving efficiency and ensuring that they were using their resources, including overtime, in the best way possible. The force had already devolved budgets to particular teams and units and overtime is part of local monitoring responsibilities.

Each BCU area has a business manager who provides overtime data to the Area Commander on a regular basis. Budgets are divided up, including funds for day-to-day overtime, court overtime and a contingency fund (for major incidents and events). West Midlands receive significant amounts of external funding for a number of overtime operations including night-time economy policing and football matches.

Some of the recent changes introduced by West Midlands aim to improve financial management across the force. Officers attended financial management training and Inspectors have a financial management objective within their PDRs. The presence of Business Managers within each area has improved overtime recording.

Actual overtime processes varied amongst units: while most units (including CID) require authorisation from Sergeants, others (such as 24/7 Response) require authorisation from Inspectors. Within the Aston BCU, temporary measures to improve overtime practices were introduced, with Inspectors having to authorise all overtime requests. However, the BCU returned to the original system of Sergeant authorisation after a few months once they felt processes had improved and “learning had set in”.

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Officers noted a reduction in overtime particularly within 24/7 Response, partly due to changes in shift patterns. The new ten-hour shift pattern meant that there was less need for overtime as there was more time available for handovers and improved quality of handover information. Across the force, there was also a culture of increased accountability, with supervisors more frequently questioning the use of overtime. One example was that within 24/7 Response, Sergeants were clear that officers should finish their work before rest days and not chase detections towards the end of their shift.

In comparison with Hertfordshire, West Midlands CID unit was a high overtime- spending unit. Officers viewed overtime as inevitable given that most officers worked a nine-to-five shift and that overtime was almost part of the job because they were often required to work outside of those hours.

West Midlands had experienced some difficulties and limitations with their IT system. Overtime claims are processed manually, taking up administration time and delaying reporting time (the system reports on information that is already six weeks out of date). In addition to this, there is no set time limit for overtime claims (beyond the three-month regulation), so claims can be a couple of months old, which also impacts on the accuracy of reporting data.

One of the key future developments for West Midlands is the use of a GATEWAY IT system to record officers’ hours and location. It is possible that this will also provide some solution to the overtime recording problems described above.

Northamptonshire

Northamptonshire were the lowest overtime-spending force in 2006/07 after a previous period of being high spenders. Respondents attributed this to an improvement in overtime-management processes.

Northamptonshire had identified a number of challenges with tackling overtime. A key problem was officers holding onto overtime then claiming time off in lieu at a later stage, resulting in resourcing pressures. They also identified that units were working with fewer than the required number of officers which had a negative impact on overtime.

As a result, Northamptonshire decided to pay officers overdue TOIL, to prevent this having an impact later. In co-operation with the HR department operational units began a policy of over-recruiting to prevent long delays waiting for new officers.

The process for authorisation varies across units and areas. In one BCU, officers were required to get authorisation from a Sergeant or Inspector, depending upon which team they were in. The senior officer would subsequently sign the pocket book, noting the time and reason for audit purposes. However this proved problematic for some teams when it was difficult to reach duty Inspectors.

The IT system used by Northamptonshire enabled Finance Officers to report on officers’ hours and overtime levels. As with West Midlands, the system meant that overtime was only recorded at the time it was claimed which meant the Finance Department was unable to access real-time information.

The next steps for Northamptonshire were to investigate options for shift patterns which would assist in improving demand/supply match further. There was also interest in investing in new IT systems which could enable more real-time information for monitoring purposes.

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