UK warhead announcement Immoral, Illogical, Illegal

ENDINFOEuropeanNuclearDisarmament

Issue 23March/April 2021

@ENDInfo_endinfo.net

Published by the Bertrand Russell PeaceFoundation

UK warhead announcement

Immoral, Illogical,Illegal

“We remain committed to thelong-term goal of a world withoutnuclear weapons” claims the BritishGovernment in their ‘IntegratedReview of Security, Defence,Development and Foreign Policy’:Global Britain in a competitive age.It is unclear quite how thissentiment fits with a renewedcommitment to Britain’s nuclearweapon system and theannouncement that the overallceiling on nuclear warheads is tobe increased: “the UK will move toan overall nuclear weaponstockpile of no more than 260warheads.”

If the empty pledge ondisarmament and the allegedimperative of Britain retaining anuclear capability came as nosurprise, the announcement thatthe long-established intent toreduce the overall number ofwarheads ... continued on page 3

2 ... UK Integrated Review

18/03/2021

Dear ....,

If 180 warheads are sufficient to cause a world-ending nuclear winter

and achieve the worst nightmare that any environmentalist could

ever imagine, why would the UK need 260? The answer is to persuade

the US not to delay or postpone the joint W93 warhead programme

on which the UK’s ‘independent’ Trident missile submarines are totally

dependent. The artificial justification is a thinly veiled suggestion that

China - whose policy for nuclear weapons is significantly less

aggressive than UK’s - might pose a nuclear threat. The UK’s

expanding nuclear warhead programme undermines the 1968

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty at a time when the European Union

and others are urging renewed compliance with the Joint

Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran. We repudiate this regressive

move by the UK and urge proper compliance with the NPT and the

Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.

Yours sincerely,

Warhead Alert!The Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation initiated the following letter in response to the UK government’swarhead announcement. The letter was sent to Josep Borrel, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs,Stefano Sannino, Secretary General of the European Union External Action Service; Marjolijn VanDeelen, Head of Disarmament Policy at EEAS; David Sassoli, President of the European Parliament andto other politicians engaged in EU foreign policy. We will publish any responses in future.

Signatories: Commander Robert Forsyth RN (Ret’d) 2nd in Command Polaris submarine, commanded two othersubmarines and the Commanding Officer’s Qualifying Course Commander Rob Green Former nuclear-armedaircraft bombardier-navigator Denis Halliday Former Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations, IrelandJulie Ward MEP 2014-2020, UK Marian Pallister Chair, Pax Christi Scotland Jeremy Lester Clerk (Chair) QuakerCouncil for European Affairs & Chair, Saferworld Europe Ludo De Brabander Vrede vzw, Belgium Reiner BraunExecutive Director, International Peace Bureau, Germany Colin Archer Secretary-General, International PeaceBureau (retired) Professor Stuart Holland University of Coimbra, Portugal Professor Steven Rose Emeritus Professorof Neuroscience, Open University, UK Professor Andreas Bieler School of Politics and International Relations,University of Nottingham Axel Ruppert Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung, Brussels Office Carol Turner Co-Chair LabourCND Earl Turcotte Chair, Canadian Network to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, Canada Tony Simpson & TomUnterrainer Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation Rae Street & Pat Sanchez Rochdale and Littleborough PeaceGroup, UK TJ Milburn Chair, Exeter CND, UK Christine Bousfield UK Christopher Butler UK Ulla Grant UK Ian HewittUK Till Geiger UK Brian Winters USA

UK Integrated Review ... 3

continued from page 1 ... was to be dispensedwith sent a shockwave across the planet. Afurther shocking element of the report comes inthe following passage: “we reserve the right toreview this assurance [that the UK will not use, orthreaten to use, nuclear weapons against NPTstate parties] if the future threat of ... emergingtechnologies ... makes it necessary.”

ImmoralThe British public, like the vast majority of theworld’s population, opposes nuclear weapons.Repeated polling has not registered majoritysupport for UK nuclear weapons, and a recentsurvey found that 77% of the population agreedthat all nuclear weapons should be abolished.

The British government is massively out-of-stepwith the population on this question, yetunknown billions of pounds have been pledgedto manufacture instruments of mass-murder justdays after nurses were subjected to what, ineffect, amounts to a pay cut.

The current British government is a serial rule-breaker and the scrapping of intent to reducethe overall number of warheads fits into thispattern of conduct. Far from providing increased‘security’ the British decision to not only retainnuclear weapons but to increase the number ofwarheads can only increase tensions andgenerate greater risks.

IllogicalAt the time of the announcement, the Britishgovernment made no effort to justify its decisionbeyond general statements about “adversaries”,“threats to stability” and the “evolving securityenvironment”. In subsequent interviews theSecretary of Defence, Ben Wallace, claimed thatan increased number of warheads was aresponse to alleged changes to Russian missiledefence. When questioned, Mr Wallace couldnot explain how 260 rather than a smallernumber of warheads would make a difference.

As the Russian government has pointed out,the British decision comes weeks afteragreement was reached between the US andRussia to extend New START for a further fiveyears: an agreement that will reduce the overallnumbers of nuclear weapons. How does theBritish decision fit with the global trends? Whatdoes the US, on which Britain is dependent forthe vast majority of its nuclear capability, makeof the announcement?

Could the failure to adequately explain theneed for more warheads be linked to the factthat there is no good reason? Or could it be thatthe real story behind this decision is being

deliberately withheld? How does Britain’slobbying of the US Congress over the W-93warhead fit into the picture? Might Britain beplanning to increase the number of Tridentsubmarines on ‘Continuous At Sea’ patrol, whichmight make it necessary to have morewarheads?

Does the shift in nuclear posture embodied in“reserve the right to review” and in the directionof travel detailed in the wider report suggest apotential ‘war fighting’ nuclear posture, ratherthan an alleged ‘deterrence’ posture? MightBritain need more warheads if such warheadsare to be ‘useable’?

The basic lack of transparency on nuclearquestions and the illogical stance offered by thegovernment generates large numbers ofquestions, all of which demand closerexamination.

IllegalBritain is not only a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which demands ‘effectivemeasures’ to end the ‘arms race’ (Article VI) butit is one of three ‘Official Depositories’ of the NPT.This status demands exemplary conduct andaction from such states.

The decision to increase the number ofwarheads appears to be in breach of Article VIand Britain’s status and could, therefore, beillegal under international law. It will be left tointernational lawyers and the other parties to theNPT to decide whether or not this is technicallythe case, and it should be noted that several NPTsignatories are already in breach. Whatever thematerial legal status, Britain’s decision will clearlyact against the interests of non-proliferation andwill surely induce other states - both nucleararmed and non-nuclear - to assess their ownpositions.

4 ... UK Integrated Review

Letter of Protest The Japan Council against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs sent the following letter to UK Prime Minister,Boris Johnson, in response to the warhead announcement.

In its integrated review of the national defense and foreign policy for the next 10 yearspublished on March 16, the U.K. government announced that it would increase the cap ofits nuclear warheads from the current 180 to 260.

With the entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) onJanuary 22, to develop, test, produce, possess, use or threaten to use nuclear weapons haveall become illegal. The recent decision of your government runs counter to this global trend.On behalf of the only A-bombed nation, we strongly protest against, and urge you to retractthe decision.

The 10th NPT Review Conference will be convened on August 2. What is required to do inthe current world is to cooperate in tackling such imminent problems facing the humanityas COVID-19, climate change, wealth gap and poverty, human rights suppression andgenderrelated issues. To that end, the implementation of the previously agreed commitmentsis called for, including “to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals” (2000)and “to achieve the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons” (2010). Thefive nuclear weapon states, including the U.K., should be held most accountable for theirimplementation.

According to an opinion poll in the U.K., almost 60% of the public supports the governmentsigning up to the TPNW. You must respond to the voice of the majority of your people in goodfaith.

UK Integrated Review ... 5

10 reasons why increasing thenumber of warheadsis wrong

Commander Robert Forsyth, RN (Ret’d)

1. The UK is one of three official Depositaries forthe Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Inaddition to administrative duties, UK is requiredto set high standards of conformity. TheIntegrated Review of Security, Defence,Development & Foreign Policy appears to be inbreach of the letter of the NPT and definitely inbreach of the spirit.

2. One 100kt Trident warhead is sufficient tophysically destroy hundreds of thousands ofpeople along with the infrastructure of a smallState. It would also inflict generations ofradiation effects on all its neighbours. Theprevious limit of 180 warheads was sufficient tokill millions of people and cause suchdevastation as would lead to a nuclear winterand extinction of multiple lifeforms. An additional80 achieves no more than doubling up on thisand ensuring any surviving life forms areextinguished

3. It may be that the Government envisagesusing low yield (5 - 10kt) warheads againstchemical and biological threats - even from NPTsignatories. While these may be slightly less thanHiroshima’s blast and radiation effects – still beingexperienced 75 years later – their use could welltrigger a nuclear exchange between thirdparties whose effects would be totallydisproportionate to the reason for using themand replicate delivery of several 100kt warheads.

4. The threat of use of nuclear weapons in thepast has not prevented non-nuclear warfare e.g.Korea and Vietnam. There is no reason tosuppose that it would deter cyber orchemical/biological attacks or any other form ofnon-nuclear warfare.

5. The increase in warheads undermines the UKcommitment to Article VI of the NPT and sosignificantly weakens the Treaty, i.e. ‘The haves

can have more with impunity but not you’ is nota good message.

6. The implication that UK may use nuclearweapons to counter non-nuclear attacks mayencourage non-nuclear weapon States toprovide themselves with nuclear weapons tohave similar enhanced protection.

7. The ‘Global Reach’ military ambitions of therecent Integrated Review exceeds thecapability available, even after implementing itsrecommendations, because of the extreme costof nuclear weapons.

8. Nuclear weapons are a very blunt Cold Warera instrument entirely inappropriate fornuanced reaction to say Russian incursions in theBaltic or China in the Pacific. Neither countrywould seriously consider that UK would actuallylaunch a nuclear attack against them and sowould proceed knowing we lacked theconventional force to oppose.

9. UK professes to be a ‘rules based’ society. Thetargets at which a nuclear warhead could belawfully fired and arguably be compliant withcurrent international laws are limited to midocean or uninhabited desert - provided there isno prevailing wind.

10. The US Biden administration is contemplatingreducing nuclear weapons and to be used on a‘sole use’ and not first use basis i.e. only todeter/retaliate to a nuclear weapon attack. TheUK policy of ‘deliberate ambiguity’ which, bydenying nothing, embraces all, will conflict withthe US. The risk is that technical/political supportfor UK Trident might be withdrawn. The US is sodeeply embedded in UK Trident, from supply ofmissiles, warheads, targeting procedures and thelaunch system, that it has the means to render UKTrident inoperable if it so wishes.

6 ... Nuke Free Europe

Call for action

For a nuclear weapon freeEurope

EUROPE

The world stands at a crossroads. It is time for Europe to make strategic choices in facing existentialthreats. For two consecutive years, the Bulletin for Atomic Scientist have placed the Doomsday Clockat 100 seconds to midnight. Never has this symbolic clock been closer to a possible nuclear and climatenightmare. Nuclear weapon states are investing heavily in new nuclear weapons. The US wants todeploy new B61-12 nuclear weapons in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey.

The COVID-19 pandemic has taught us that we must work together to overcome the two existentialthreats of the 21st century: nuclear war and global warming. Increased military expenditure reducesinvestment in social infrastructure, while extensive military exercises and operations create major carbonemissions, driving us closer to extinction in more ways than one.

Nuke Free Europe ... 7

For years the people of Europe have expressedtheir desire to be nuclear-weapon-free by callingfor the removal of US nuclear weapons. Nowthey are pushing for their governments to ratifythe Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons(TPNW). According to recent online surveys in 6countries, between 77% and 89% of thepopulation want their countries to join the TPNW.

We must work together in the light of anunderstanding that all lives on the planet areinterwoven, rethink what we mean byprotection, redefine ideas of defence anddevelop towards a ‘common security’. A nuclearweapon free Europe would be the mostimportant step in the transition to a civil andshared security, abandoning the road ofcontinuous militarisation.

We call on all citizens to organize against ourpossible extinction and to fight for a just, greenand peaceful Europe, free of nuclear weapons,with security for all provided through othermeans. The situation is urgent. As the risks ofnuclear confrontation spread from Europe,through Russia, the Middle East, China and theKorean peninsula, Europe must take a stand.

We appeal to everyone in Europe to act andto take part in a European month of action -September 2021. We ask social organisations,trade unions, environmental, youth andwoman’s movements, north-south and politicalorganizations, people of all faiths andpersuasions to join, endorse, promote andsupport the appeal for a nuclear-weapon-freezone in Europe.

We call on European governments to:

- stop spending valuable resources on newnuclear weapons and their deployment

- end nuclear sharing

- sign and ratify the Treaty on the Prohibitionof Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)

September Actions• Meeting of young activists in Büchel,

Germany, 5 - 6 September

• Bike Tour: starting at Büchel, Germany, on 10 September and finishing atKlein Brogel, Belgium, 26 September

• Plans are being made for ‘human chain’protests at the Büchel, Klein Brogel andVolkel (The Netherlands) bases

• The Italian peace movement hold regular, ongoing, protests at the Aviano and Ghedi-Torre bases. Plans are in development for a coordination of suchprotests to coincide with the Septemberactions

• The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament(CND) in the UK is developing plans forprotest actions at the Faslane base inScotland, where nuclear-armed Tridentsubmarines are stationed, and at theAtomic Weapons Establishment in England where the UK’s nuclear war-heads are developed and stored

• The French peace movement is in theprocess of planning actions and eventsto coincide with the September Actions

These are provisional details of the times, placesand nature of planned actions. Further details willbe given in future. If your organisation wishes toparticipate or to offer updates on actions, pleasecontact [email protected].

WebinarsThe Nuke Free Europe campaign has a numberof online sessions planned in the months beforeSeptember. The first ‘webinar’ will cover nuclearsharing arrangements in Europe and will befollowed by sessions on Nuclear-Weapon-FreeZones, NATO, French and British nuclearweapons. Check the website for info:

www.nukefreeeurope.eu

8 ... Comment

Persistent objectors

Tom Unterrainer

END Info 22 (Feb 2021) reported on a recentreport from Chatham House, ‘NATO and theTPNW’ (page 5). This report is, available online, isworth closer examination in one particularregard: the matter of ‘persistent objectors’. Thereport states as follows:

While it is a general principle of internationallaw that treaties do not create obligations forthird states, it is also an accepted principle thata rule set forth in a treaty could, under certainconditions, become binding on a third state asa customary rule ... However, this is not anautomatic process. Two distinct concepts arerelevant here: the concept of so-called‘specially affected states’, and that of‘persistent objectors’ ... As the ICJ hasexplained, a lack of consent from speciallyaffected states may have the effect ofpreventing the required general state practicefrom emerging, preventing the rule fromcoming into being in the first place. There is astrong argument that states with nuclearweapons and those in a nuclear alliancewould be specially affected by a proposedban on nuclear weapons. Even if a rule isindeed created, states that have objected toa certain degree to its emergence - so-calledpersistent objectors - will not be bound by it.

[emphasis added]

What does all this mean and what does itexplain? It seems that the hope that the TPNWwill create a decisive ‘normative shift’ ininternational law with respect to nuclearweapons is in question. What Steven Hill1 pointsout in his Chatham House report is that if a stateor alliance of states persistently raise theirobjections to a treaty, then they can - in theterms set out in international law - prevent such

a treaty from becoming ‘customary law’ orbinding on states which have not signed up tothe treaty. So whilst the TPNW will be ‘in force’ inthose states which have ratified the treaty,‘persistent objection’ on the part of the nuclear-armed states and allies could prevent a moregeneral application of the treaty provisions.2

How to address this potential barrier? How toreact to the ongoing insistence of the nuclear-powers that their possession of instruments ofmass murder is in any way legitimate?

An important step is to understand that theTPNW will not steadily accrue widespread legalstatus through the ongoing workings andmechanisms of international law. The ‘persistentobjections’ of the US, UK, NATO and whoeverelse must be met with organisation andmobilisation of great legions of persistentobjectors on the streets, in the conferencerooms, inside political parties and socialmovement organisations. We must continue tofind creative and imaginative means to applythe concrete lessons of the TPNW, to mount sharparguments against ‘nuclearism’, to sound thealarm about the manifold dangers presented bysuch weapons and the geopolitical strategies oftheir possessors.

There is much work to do.

Notes:

1 Hill, Steven (2021) ‘Nato and the Treaty on theProhibition of Nuclear Weapons’, ChathamHouse, London accessed athttps://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/01/nato-and-treaty-prohibition-nuclear-weapons2 See Falk, Richard (2021) ‘ChallengingNuclearism’ in The Spokesman 147: ChallengingNuclearism, Spokesman, Nottingham for anextended discussion on this a related point

8 ... News

NATO countries are preparing for a second major"Defender Europe" exercise. Opening activitiesare scheduled for May. Last year's DefenderEurope 20 would have been, in its originallyplanned version, the largest exercise under UScommand since the end of the Cold War.Defender Europe is conceived as a series ofannual exercises to maintain and expandEurope's new level of militarization. DefenderEurope 21 - also targeting Russia - is planned ona comparable scale as last year's exercise,however, with a different regional focus - theBlack Sea rather than the Baltic region. Germanyis also involved, on the one hand, directlyparticipating with its own soldiers and on theother with logistical support. Last year, civilianinfrastructure had also been placed at thedisposal of NATO troops. In addition to theDefender Europe exercises against Russia, theUnited States is planning a series of DefenderPacific exercises targeting China.

Defender Europe 20 had been initially plannedto be the largest war exercise of NATO troops inEurope since the end of the Cold War. Around20,000 US soldiers were to be relocated acrossthe Atlantic to join US units already stationed inEurope, as well as, alliance and partner troops inthe US-led exercise of an interdisciplinary conflictsimulation. A total of 37,000 soldiers from 16 NATOand two partner countries were to participate. Inessence, the objective was to familiarize themilitary with a variety of transfer routes from theUSA through Europe to the Russian border. Inaddition, numerous war exercises were to beconducted in various countries from the Baltic tothe Black Sea in a simulated "battlefield network."For its planning, the military alliance resorts to thekinds of exercises it has regularly been carryingout in the region for years.

The US-led exercise had just begun in early2020, when the outbreak of the Covid-19

pandemic foiled the military's plans andprevented them from fully carrying out theexercise. Whereas civilian life was massivelyrestricted in large parts of the world due to thepandemic, Defender Europe 20 was scaleddown, but not completely halted. When, inMarch 2020, the decision had been taken toreduce the size of the manoeuvre, nearly 6,000US soldiers had already arrived in Europe. Beforetransporting them back across the Atlantic, theyconducted a few exercises in spite of thepandemic. The Bundeswehr officially haltedexercise activities in Germany in mid-March dueto the pandemic. Germany had not only placedits military infrastructure at the disposal ofDefender Europe 20, but to a large extent itscivilian infrastructure as well. The commandinggeneral of the US Army Europe, GeneralChristopher Cavoli, also stated in an interviewthat - within the framework of the so-called HostNation Support - the German ministry of defensehad subsequently covered the share of the costsof the exercise that the US armed forces normallywould have had to assume.

In the summer of last year, leading US militaryofficials announced that Defender Europe 21was already in planning and should be carriedout from spring to the summer of 2021. Thatannouncement is now being confirmed.According to the German government, themanoeuvre is scheduled for between May 1 andJune 14, 2021 - with around 31,000 militarypersonnel, including 430 from the Bundeswehr.This year fewer German troops will beparticipating than last year, because theregional focus of the manoeuvres will not be theBaltic Sea region, but rather in the south, at theBlack Sea. According to General Cavoli, theparticular emphasis of the manoeuvre will be onthe cooperation with Bulgaria and Rumania.According to the German government, in spite

War Exercise Despite Pandemic

From German-Foreign-Policy.com, 04/03/21

News ... 9

10 ... News

of their distance from the region of focus, theBundeswehr, as was also the case last year, willassume logistical responsibilities for the relocationof the multinational units through Germany andother countries on the continent. Altogether,Berlin has currently earmarked €2.9 million forthese manoeuvres.

As was confirmed by the Germangovernment, the US-led Defender EuropeExercises were conceived as annually recurringmanoeuvres. In even years, the geographicfocus of the exercise series will be "in the north,and, in uneven years, in the south of NATO'salliance territory." In addition, last year, the UnitedStates initiated a series of manoeuvres under thename, "Defender Pacific," aimed at exercisingthe deployment of troops against China.Defender Pacific 21 will focus on the southwestPacific, according to US military sources. Thatvast area is comprised of numerous small islandsand island chains and extends to Australia.During World War II, the Southwest Pacific areaunder allied command also included a largeportion of the Southeast Asian islands includingthe Philippines and parts of Indonesia andMalaysia - as well as the South China Sea. TheGerman government has announced that theBundeswehr will not be participating.Nevertheless, a German warship is scheduled tomake a training cruise this year through the SouthChina Sea on its way to Japan.

Last February US Gen. Cavoli, who is in chargeof the Defender Europe exercises explained, "We

prepare so that we are ready to fight and win."According to Cavoli, a primary aspect of thosewar preparations is military mobility in Europe. TheDefender Europe exercise series were introducedto discover weaknesses in the infrastructure andto overcome political and regulatory obstacles.Cavoli mentions the "informal partnership" thatthe US Army Europe has with the EU, whichprovides enormous financing to enhance militarymobility. The US Army catalogues the currentEuropean infrastructure and checks it outthroughout the exercise, and then informs NATOof the improvements that need to be made.NATO then transmits the US wishes to the EU, and"helps the EU direct their infrastructure funding todual-use." And the US military "has a say" in themilitary aspects of the EU's infrastructuremeasures. The challenge lies in the fact "thatwhen NATO expanded, it expanded into territorythat had previously been on the other side of thefence and its military infrastructure was designedfor Warsaw Pact equipment and it was allpointing westward and we need infrastructuredesigned for western equipment that's pointingeastward" for the new cold war, whose bordersbetween the blocks have been relocated rightup to the Russian borders.

https://www.german-foreign-policy.com/en/news/detail/8542/

Security without Nuclear Deterrence

Sicherheit ohne Atomare Abschreckungby Commander Robert Green

RN (Ret’d)Foreword by Vice Admiral Sir Jeremy Blackham KCB MA

German translation by Dr.-Ing Joachim Wernicke

‘It is hard-won wisdom that today’s nuclear-armed states and those who would follow in their footstepswould do well to heed.’ Dr Zia Mian, Princeton University‘One of the best informed and most searching critiques of the central strategic doctrine of the nuclear age– nuclear deterrence – that I know of.’ Jonathan Schell, author of The Fate of the Earth, Yale University

Price: £17.99 | 266 Pages | Paperback | Fully indexed | ISBN: 9780 85124 8721Contact Spokesman Books to obtain a copy of the German translation.

www.spokesmanbooks.com

The U.S. airstrikes [February 2021] against targetsin eastern Syria escalate Washington's conflicts inthe Middle East, adding more instability to adisastrous situation in Syria and creating newobstacles to the possibility of reducing tensionwith Iran and returning to the nuclear deal. If thisis what President Biden's claim that "America isback" continues to look like, his promises to putdiplomacy before war will show themselveshollow indeed.

The airstrikes were ostensibly in response toattacks in mid-February on Iraqi military siteshousing US military forces. One U.S. contractorwas killed and several U.S. and coalition troopswere injured. As of 48 hours before the U.S.bombing, Pentagon officials were still admittingthey didn't know who had carried out the attackon the Iraqi base, though after the airstrikes U.S.Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said that "we'reconfident that target was being used by thesame Shia militants that conducted the strikes."

Iran has denied any involvement in the Feb. 15attack on the Iraqi base, and it is not clear if theU.S. has any actual evidence to the contrary.Many militia groups operate across Iraq, someidentifying as Shi'a and some not, some of whichsupport and others target the Iraqi governmentand the U.S. troops operating in their country; ofthose, some are supported by Iran, though thelevel of control Tehran actually brings to bearvaries widely.

But regardless of Iran's potential involvement inthis particular attack in February, the U.S.bombing in Syria is an incredibly dangerous andprovocative move. It follows a year of significantU.S. ratcheting up tensions with Iran, starting withthe January 2020 assassination in Iraq of Iran'sinfluential General Qassem Soleimani, part ofTrump's "Maximum Pressure" operation againstIran. Trump launched that campaign followinghis 2018 abandonment of the Iran nuclear deal

signed by Obama three years earlier. The 2020onslaught continued with the intensification ofthe Pentagon's naval and air exercises near Iran'sborders, as well as the U.S. seizure of Iranian oiltankers in international waters. Most significantly,2020 saw a continuing escalation of U.S.economic sanctions reimposed after the U.S.withdrawal from the nuclear deal. The sanctionshave led to widespread poverty across theIranian population, collapse of the health caresystem and resulting inability to respondadequately to the COVID-19 pandemic, foodscarcity and malnutrition, and even the deathsof children from lack of access to medicines,something unprecedented in modern Iranianhistory.

President Biden has reaffirmed his intention toreengage with Iran and re-join the nuclear deal,known as the JCPOA, and he has taken someimportant steps in that direction. Those includemoves to pull back from Trump's close embraceof Iran's regional competitor, Saudi Arabia,pausing some arms sales the Saudis want tocontinue their deadly war against Yemen andreleasing at least parts of the intelligence reportholding Saudi crown prince Mohammed binSalman responsible for the 2018 murder of U.S.-based Saudi critic and journalist JamalKhashoggi. He also appointed Wendy Sherman,a top Obama-era diplomat who led the teamnegotiating the JCPOA as second in commandat the State Department, and significantly, waswilling to spend some political capital to appointRob Malley as lead envoy to Iran, mandated torejoin the JCPOA, despite opposition from manyelite voices hostile to the deal.

This recent bombing, however, points in theopposite direction. The rationale for the U.S.bombing seemed to center on "sending amessage" that the U.S. would use military powerto avenge any attack on its forces anywhere in

US Bombing of Syria WorsensRegional Instability andThreatens Iran Nuclear Deal

Phyllis Bennis and Khury Petersen-Smith, Institute for Policy Studies, Washington, USA

Middle East/Iran Deal ... 11

12 ... Middle East/Iran Deal

the region—particularly if Iran could somehowbe implicated. So the U.S. bombed Syria, acountry whose people have already beensuffering from years of war, repression andsanctions, in response to attacks two weeks agoon U.S.. positions in Iraq, not in Syria, which theU.S. blames on militias ostensibly linked to Iran.Washington had no right under international lawto attack Syria, where almost a decade of warhas already killed some 400,000 people anddisplaced more than 13 million—more thanthree-quarters of the population. The Syrian warhas long passed being a civil war, and has foryears become a venue for regional and globalpowers to carry out proxy conflicts—in whichSyrians continue to die and their country, its cities,water and environment, continue to bedestroyed. Biden's move continues USinvolvement in this shameful pattern.

Pentagon spokesman John Kirby describedthe US bombing as acting "in a deliberatemanner that aims to deescalate the overallsituation in eastern Syria and Iraq." For abombing in Syria that was clearly aimed at Iran,in retaliation for something that happened inIraq, the notion that this would somehow"deescalate" the violence and insecureconditions of eastern Syria was a prettyastonishing claim. The real question in looking atthe US response to the Feb. 15 attack on the Iraqibase is what the U.S. troops are doing in Iraq inthe first place. Deployed in Iraq since 2014ostensibly to take on ISIS, after 11 years ofinvasion, overthrow of the government andoccupation of the country, by every measurethe U.S. presence in Iraq has made life worse forIraqis and others in the region. While the U.S. mayclaim its goal now is against ISIS, we cannotforget that the brutal extremist organization wascreated in Iraq in 2004 at the height of and inreaction to the U.S. occupation. And we cannotforget what so many generals, diplomats, war-makers and policy-makers, as well as peace anddiplomacy advocates, have known andrepeated for so many years, there is no militarysolution to terrorism.

If President Biden and his administration areserious about returning to the Iran nuclear deal—and they absolutely should be—this kind ofattack sends absolutely the wrong message. Isthis what "America is back" is supposed to mean?As Senator Bernie Sanders responded to thebombing, "last night's strike by US forces in Syriaputs our country on the path of continuing theForever War instead of ending it. For far too longadministrations of both parties have interpretedtheir authorities in an extremely expansive wayto continue military interventions across the

Middle East region and elsewhere. This mustend."

There are varying reports, so far, of casualtiesresulting from the U.S. airstrikes in Syria. It's notclear yet how far these bombing raids were fromthe sprawling refugee camps scatteredthroughout eastern Syria, housing desperatepeople who have for so long suffered under theirown and other government's bombs includingthose of the United States. We do know there isno military solution to the political instability andviolence in Syria. And regardless of who is thecommander in chief giving orders to U.S.bombers, we know that deploying U.S. troopsand U.S. drones and U.S. warplanes across theregion does not provide safety or security forIraqis or Syrians. Not for Iranians, or for Americans.

First published on Common Dreams, 26 February2021

Available from Spokesman Books

“The theory of nuclear deterrence isflawed, unproven and poses significant

dangers from accidental use.”

£7.99 | 98 pages | A5 | PaperbackISBN 978 085124 8905

www.spokesmanbookshop.com

TPNW: question raised onItaly’s failure to sign

Maurizio Acerbo & Gregorio Piccin, Party of Communist Refoundation, Italy

PARLIAMENTARY QUESTION

To the Minister of Defense To the Minister ofForeign Affairs

Given that

• On 24 October, with the ratification ofHonduras, the UN nuclear weapons prohibitiontreaty (TPAN) reached the 50 accessionsessential for the entry into force that will legallybind the signatory countries and finally nuclearweapons will be banned as well as chemicaland bacteriological ones;

• prior to the entry into force of this treaty,nuclear weapons were effectively excludedfrom the list of weapons of mass destructionprohibited by international law;

• 50 countries have signed the TPAN but Italy isnot among them despite article 11 of ourConstitution - "Italy repudiates war as aninstrument for resolving international disputes" -and despite 246 deputies and senators(including the foreign minister) have signed theICAN Pledge thus undertaking to support thepath of ratification of the treaty in question byour country;

• on 6 August, on the occasion of the 75thanniversary of the atomic bombing of Hiroshimaand Nagasaki by the United States, PresidentMattarella declared that: “Italy strongly supportsthe goal of a world free from nuclear weapons,through a progressive approach to disarmamentthat provides for the responsible involvement ofeach state. The international agenda cannotignore this goal ”;

• unfortunately, instead, our country participatesin the NATO "nuclear sharing" program by hostingdozens of US nuclear warheads in Ghedi andAviano and training the pilots of the Tornadofighter-bombers for nuclear bombing andrecently confirmed the purchase of the F-35sthat will replace the Tornadoes in this functionand initiated the modernization of the Ghedi airbase for this purpose;

• our country hosts nuclear warheads and thismakes them a target in case of conflict andtherefore after the entry into force of the treatyItaly becomes a country hosting prohibitedweapons of mass destruction on its territory;

• there are no official initiatives by Italy aimed at soliciting adhesion to the treaty by thecountries adhering to NATO and by other nationsequipped with atomic arsenals;

all that being said, we ask to know

- whether the ministers questioned believe thatItaly should accede to the treaty in question andwhat are the reasons why the government hasnot proceeded to do so;

- if they do not deem it necessary to exit theNATO nuclear sharing program and interrupt theF-35 program (2247 million euros provided by theMinistry of Defense for the three-year period2020-2022);

- what initiatives has Italy undertaken at theinternational level in the direction proposed bythe President of the Republic.

Italy ... 13

14 ... Italy

Back in December 1996, the US Air Force Magazinepublished photos of an F-16 at the Aviano base [thephotos of the service are by Guy Aceto and PaulKennedy].

The point is that, just behind the bomber, a bunkerfor atomic weapons is clearly visible [which is verysecret today as then].

Unfortunately, the image is not of excellent qualityand to understand that it is an atomic weaponsdepot you need the original and an expert eye, likethat of William Arkin, who first pointed out the matterin one of his books in 1997.

We report one passage:

"Finally, and probably coincidentally, the coverphotograph of the December 1996 issue ofAirForce Magazine shows an F-16 parked in front ofWhat's Clearly a nuclear weapons storage facilityat Aviano Air Force Base, Pordenone, Italy, about900 miles from Libya.”

See https://www.airforcemag.com/issue/1996-12/

US nuclear bombs in Aviano

Tiziano Tissino

The atomic bombs in Aviano are the classicsecret of Pulcinella: everyone knows they arethere, and everyone pretends not to know it,even if periodically authoritative analysts cometo remind us. We have started a legal case withwhich we intend to demonstrate the illegality ofthe presence of the atomic bombs in Aviano andat the same time their dangerousness.

First published March 13, 2006 at https://www.peacelink.it/editoriale/a/15307.html

I guess you all know by now what the Avianobase is: granted to the US in the 1950s, it was a

secondary base for a long time. Things changedrapidly in the 1990s when Aviano became the USoutpost to the Balkans. F16s were redeployedhere after Spain, following a referendum,decided to evict them from their country. Fromhere the air raids on Bosnia and Serbia started,first in 1995 and then in 1999.

As always, the atomic bombs in Aviano hasbeen the classic secret of Pulcinella: everyoneknows they are there, and everyone pretendsnot to know it, even if periodically authoritativeanalysts come to remind us.

Denying the evidence is the only way not tobe forced to admit the blatant violation of the

surroundings are threatened. Coming to termswith such a reality is not easy, and this explainswhy many people avoid even thinking about it.But refusing to address the issue certainly doesn'tmake the threat go away.

In motivating our request, we made particularreference to the risk to which our life is subjected:the action before the civil judge, in fact, aims atrecognizing the state of danger caused by theatomic bombs ...

We are well aware, however, that atomicbombs are also a threat to the lives of manyother people around the world. Just as we don'twant to live in fear of a nuclear attack againstus, we don't want anyone else to be in the samecondition as us.

So, although on a legal level all we can ask theCourt of Pordenone is that the weapons beremoved from here, it is clear that our goal is nota simple movement of these weapons from onecountry to another, but their dismantling.

Edited and abridged for publication

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT]. By signingthat treaty, Italy has undertaken not to receivenuclear weapons on its territory. For its part, theUS has pledged “not to transfer nuclearweapons to any recipient” …

A few months ago, we were contacted by thelawyer, Joachim Lau, vice president of IALANA(International Association of Jurists AgainstNuclear Weapons). The lawyer Lau proposedthat we sue the US government, saying that –from a strictly legal point of view – we shouldeasily be able to prove the illegality of thepresence of the nuclear weapons in Aviano andat the same time their dangerousness.Consequently, the Civil Court should order theUnited States to take away the nuclear bombs.

In our summons, we collected at least fiveknown incidents that brought the world one stepcloser to nuclear war, in which Aviano would becompletely destroyed. This risk is by no means amemory of the past, because Aviano is still aprimary target in Russian military strategy andperhaps in the plans of some terrorists. Every day,the lives of the inhabitants of Aviano and its

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Full Text | Nuclear Disarmament Bertrand Russell | Challenging Nuclearism Richard Falk

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Italy ... 15

16 ... From the archive

Speaking to the Socialist International in Helsinkiin 1978, Olof Palme made a passionate speechfor disarmament which was re-published inEuropean Nuclear Disarmament, Bulletin of Workin Progress, No 1, 1980. Decades on, Palme’sspeech is worth considered attention as both ahistorical record and as a message from the pastfor future generations.

* * *

At our Geneva Conference in 1976 we stressedthat “the chief object of international socialismis to substitute cooperation amongst peoples forconfrontation between states.” The SocialistInternational recognized “the purpose ofdetente has been achieved and maintainedthrough the effective participation of two super-powers” but that we “nevertheless refuse toacknowledge partition of the world betweentwo immovable and opposing blocs thatproduce tension and run the risk of dangerousconfrontation as a permanent fact ofinternational relations. In the existing situation,lasting security for the world cannot be achievedmerely through equilibrium between the power-blocs on the basis of shared spheres of influence.Nor can it be brought about by a balancenegotiated between the super-powers alone.”

We considered that “the extension of detentemust lead to greater co-operation between thenations, thus progressively reducing the sourcesof conflict and grounds for intervention in thegreat powers in fields that encroach upon thesovereignty and independence of States.”

Two trends in world politics are graduallyeroding our prospects for a future of peace andjustice. If unchecked, they could have disastrousconsequences for [humankind] already withinthe next decades. One is the widening gap

between rich and poor nations. The other is thearms race and the climate of confrontation andapprehension it engenders.

That rich nations grow richer while poor nationsbecome poorer is intolerable from the point ofview of solidarity and justice. But it is alsointolerable because of the dangers inherent insuch a situation of conflicts between the poorand rich, between north and south. Thewidening gap between rich and poor nations willinevitably lead to increased tensions betweenstates and ultimately become a threat to worldpeace.

The arms race has now reached such levelsthat it is getting out of control. Intellectually onecan perhaps afford the argument that there isno direct evidence of the relationship betweenarmaments and the risks of war. In the nuclearage, complacency based on such a hypothesisbecomes too risky a proposition. If the nucleararms race continues unabated it might wellbecome what Herbert York has called a “race tooblivion".

At the root of this gigantic arms race is themutual distrust which has prevailed for quite along time and which prevails between bothsuperpowers and the nations committed toeach. The policy of detente has partly dispelledthis suspiciousness. When in this respect we speakof detente, it important to keep in mind that weare talking about relations between nations withvastly different social systems. Distrust amongthese nations can be further decreased ordispelled mainly in one way: through a dialogue,by broadening contacts, by cooperation in allpossible areas. The greatest possible reciprocalopenness is the only means we have at ourdisposal.

The conference for security and cooperationin Europe has laid an important foundation for

From an economy of war to aneconomy of peace

Olof Palme

continued efforts in this respect. Today there is awell-oiled apparatus for conferences andconsultations. This should provide an incentive forall the parties of the International to go onworking in this field. One of the parties of theSocialist International - the SPD - has, through itsforeign policy, laid some of the most importantcornerstones for a policy of detente. This entailsan obligation, not only for the SPD, but for all ofus who are affected by European security.

If we have a strength in this regard, it is in ourideas. We feel this strength. Only those who areweak and uncertain are reluctant to engage indiscussion with those who have different viewsand ideas. A multitude of contacts among thevarious nations and peoples of Europe should bethe next stage in the policy of detente. Thedialogue should be elaborated into a many-facetted chorus. In this way, information andopinions can be exchanged and ideas testedagainst one another. This could lead to a furtherlessening of distrust. In the wake of this phasingout of distrust there is going to flow mutualconfidence that national security can becreated and maintained in ways far lessfinancially detrimental and eternally deadly thanthe methods which prevail today in the militarysystems of all countries. We have to widen theconcept of national security. A broad offensiveto inject new life into all the elements of thepolicy of detente is thus the first point I would liketo designate as basic to the disarmament effortsof the future.

My second point concerns the question ofwhether the arms race, and particularly thenuclear arms race and the related strategicweapons systems in general, are relevant, if theobjective is to safe-guard national security. AlvaMyrdal has maintained the theory, in hercomprehensive work on disarmament, that thearms race is really just a consequence of agigantic miscalculation. Developments in recentyears have obviously confirmed this theory. Themilitary expenditures in the world were estimatedin 1977 to have amounted to close to 400 billiondollars. This means more than a billion dollarseach day. These enormous expenditures standin no kind of proportion to the increased securitywhich they are intended to buy. In point of fact,they increase the threat to people’s security inall countries. The arms race is also intolerablebecause it represents a tremendous waste ofhuman, material and technological resources fordestructive instead of constructive purposes ...

But even if today we are facing a quantitativearms race of tremendous proportions, perhapsthe qualitative arming is even more perilous. Itseems there is no limit at all to what military

research and development can cost. Newweapons see the light of day, not because theyare needed in any sense of the word, butbecause it is possible to develop and producethem. And if there is no strategy for theiremployment, then such a strategy is invented ...

Nuclear disarmament remains the mostimportant objective. It is obvious that the twomajor nuclear weapons states, the Soviet Unionand the United States, will have to take the leadin this disarmament process. That the powershave been able to achieve agreement onlimitations of their nuclear arsenals must beregarded as an important victory forstatesmanship and rationality. On the otherhand, they have not been able to agree on anygenuine measures of disarmament, and theyhave not been able to agree on acomprehensive test ban treaty, long overdue.They have given solemn pledges to the worldcommunity to reach real results in their talks innuclear disarmament. Impatience in the worldcommunity is growing, not least in view of thefact that other nations have been queuing up toacquire nuclear weapons and the chimericalstatus and security that go with these weapons.

As my third point, I would like to take up aspecial aspect of the nuclear arms race. The vastnuclear weapons arsenals on the EuropeanContinent pose a threat not only to theirpossessors and the countries allied with them.They pose a threat, as well, to all the peoples ofEurope. All the ideas and every initiative whichcan remove or decrease these threats are to bewelcomed. A former Swedish Minister for ForeignAffairs, Östen Undén, once presented thethought to the United Nations of a nuclear-freeclub some 15 years ago. This thought hascontinually been revised in various forms eversince, in international discussions.

In Europe there are no immediate or acutethreats of conflicts of a military nature. But thedisagreements between the great power blocsstill cast their shadows across Europe. No tangibleprogress in the disarmament talks has beenachieved during recent years. This is disturbing.

Thus Europe is no special zone where peacecan be taken for granted. In actual fact, it is thecentre of the arms race. Granted, the generalassumption seems to be that any potentialmilitary conflict between the superpowers isgoing to start someplace other than in Europe.But even if that were to be the case, we wouldhave to count on one or the other party - in aneffort to gain supremacy - trying to open a frontin our continent, as well. As Alva Myrdal hasrecently pointed out, a war can simply betransported here, even though actual causes for

From the archive ... 17

war do not exist. Here there is a ready theatre ofwar. Here there have been great military forcesfor a long time. Here there are programmedweapons all ready for action …

Today more than ever there is, in my opinion,every reason to go on working for a nuclear-freezone. The ultimate objective of these effortsshould be a nuclear-free Europe. Thegeographical area closest at hand wouldnaturally be Northern and Central Europe. Ifthese areas could be freed from the nuclearweapons stationed there today, the risk of totalannihilation in case of a military conflict wouldbe reduced.

This would make it possible to fully exploit theinternational agencies to prevent, postpone andameliorate the effects of a conflict. It wouldimprove the possibility to prevent a nuclear warbeing started by mistake.

Here I would like, as a fourth point, to remindyou of the negotiations which have been goingon since 1973 in the Austrian capital on armslimitations in Europe. The risk that a conflict will betransmitted to our continent would be reducedif the weapons arsenals of Europe could beradically reduced. During the five years thatthese talks have been going in Vienna, however,no positive results have been achieved, so far.Instead, the negotiations seem to have morenearly been paralyzed. There has been no lackof concrete proposals but the paralysis is ofpolitical nature ...

This brings me to my fifth point. I firmly believethat it is imperative to start a process ofdisarmament for development, a process ofredeploying the resources spent on armamentsto civilian purposes. Two trends which threatenpeace - the arms race and the growingdisparities between rich and poor in the world -could be transformed into one process thatwould enhance the possibilities of peace.

The human, material, technological andfinancial resources spent on armamentsconstitute on immense potential reserve fordevelopment purposes, for a new internationaleconomic order.

The changes in the flow of resources which weare working to achieve - away from militaryexpenditures over to constructive appropriationsfor development - present a challenge to ourcommon sense and an incentive for radicalinitiatives in all countries. It is essential to talk overthe various kinds of adjustment problems whichcan arise in the industrialized countries as well,when resources for research and developmentand for production are switched over frommilitary to civilian ends. The structure of the armsindustry should be investigated and an

alternative use of military-industrial technologyfor civilian purposes promoted, in an effort tocontribute toward a continued economicdevelopment which can be used to satisfy socialneeds. Studies of the economic and otherconsequences of such a changeover canfacilitate disarmament talks …

Both at the international and national level wehave to make the general public aware of themagnitude of the resources that are nowdevoted to armaments and the tremendouspotential for development these resourcesrepresent.

Trade unions can play an important role in aprocess of disarmament. One of the greatestobstacles is the widespread misconception thatdisarmament. will lead to unemployment and alower standard of living. I would like to stress herethat the labour unions have a decisive role inworking out plans for change in the employmentstructure and to make such a changeacceptable to their members.

My emphasis on the need to inform andmobilize public opinion derives from my faith inthe principles of democracy and in the soundjudgment and reason of ordinary people. Ibelieve that the vital issues of our time can begrasped by anybody who is in the possession ofthe basic facts. People need not be defencelessvictims of technological progress. And I believein particular that public opinion will react verystrongly once it has been made aware of thecontrast between the needs of the poor and thewaste of resources represented by the armsrace.

A strong and informed public opinion is alsonecessary in order to turn the tide. It is essentialto underpin and strengthen political will in theeffort to initiate the process of disarmament anddevelopment. It is now time to switch over froma world economy based on the threat of war toone dedicated to peaceful social constructionand social needs, - in a word, from an economyof war to an economy of peace.

To establish peace in today's world is first andforemost a question of creating a just social orderfor all the world’s people. The responsibility forfailing to economize the world’s resources lie withthe rich countries who spend colossal resourceson military weapons. It is these countries whomust create an economy of peace. The changehas to begin there. The change has to beginnow.

The Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation has anextensive archive of materials from the ENDinitiatives of the 1980s. Get in touch to find outmore.

18 ... From the archive

More and more people have the feeling that weare living in a time of escalating confrontationand even the possibility of a great war againpresents itself. Uncertainty shapes our daily lifemore and more. The statement of the Bulletin ofthe Atomic Scientists that their ‘DoomsdayClock’ remains at ‘100 seconds to Midnight’, is aconcise expression of these dangers threateningus all, especially - in the long term - the climatedisaster, and directly the 14,000 nuclear weaponson earth.

Is there an alternative that a social andpolitical majority - nationally and internationally– will support? An alternative that helps to ensuresurvival and ensure a better life? A strategy thatcombines historical experiences with answers tocurrent challenges? As Willy Brandt, amongothers, put it: “Peace is not everything, buteverything is nothing without peace”!

The political alternative is a policy of “commonsecurity” – a policy that is conservative andrevolutionary at the same time. Conservativebecause it does not aim to change the socialsystems and political orders of the individualcountries; it accepts socialism and capitalism, orwhatever the rulers characterize their system. Itrecognizes the variants of an authoritarian, liberaland welfare state-regulated capitalism as well asa democratic or authoritarian constitution ofnon-capitalist states as systems that exist andwhich can only be legitimately changed onlyfrom within. In this way, it creates theprerequisites for peaceful competition betweenthese systems in the first place.

It is revolutionary because it excludes war asthe continuation of ‘politics by other means’,because it no longer allows this murderousmethod of ‘conflict resolution’, which has costhundreds of millions of deaths over millennia andhas raised the question of the very existence of

humanity for more than 60 years. In other words,it raises humanity and the planet to a new levelof coexistence based on elementary humanism.

The policy of common security can bring uscloser to one of the great aims of humanity: aworld without war!

Almost 40 years ago, common security wasformulated as a concept in Olaf Palme’s reportCommon Security a Blueprint for Survival, writtenby an international group of experts. Next year itis to be updated with the participation of theInternational Peace Bureau and InternationalTUC.

What are the basic principles of this still currentconcept?

- In the atomic age, security cannot becreated by an individual state or in oppositionto other states, but only together and inpartnership

- War is no longer a political tool in the atomicage; all conflicts and controversies must beresolved peacefully, through dialogue andnegotiation. Violent changes of borders, theappropriation of territory are excluded andstate sovereignty and supranational unionsremain untouched.

- Cooperation is the basis for peacefulcoexistence, this must develop in steps andincludes the development of trust.Cooperation encompasses all levels:economy, ecology, science, culture, sport.Consultations at all levels and joint crisisresponses are part of this.

- Human rights are respected and theirrealization is repeatedly urged in negotiationsand discussions - from all sides and in relation

Common Security ... 19

Remembering and shapingthe future: for a policyof common security

Reiner Braun and Peter Brandt

20 ... Common Security

to all human rights: civic and social. However,human rights are not a fighting instrument ininterstate disputes in order to label the other as“bad guys”.

- Armaments limitation and disarmament areindispensable. This always includes small firststeps to demilitarization, equalization of troopsand other confidence-building measures suchas contacts between the military. Opennessand verifiability of measures are essential. Inthe long term, exclusive military alliances likeNATO should either be demilitarized intoexisting inclusive networks and completelyredesigned (like the OSCE in Europe) ordissolved.

If the policy of common security was originally aEuro-Atlantic concept, it is now a global one andprecisely for this reason it must be regionalizedmore intensively.

Very specific concepts are necessary forcommon security strategies for different regions

"There is one overriding truth in thisnuclear age - no nation canachieve true security by itself. Nomatter how many weapons anation develops, no matter howstrong its armed forces become,they can never guarantee itsfreedom from attack ... The fact isthat there are no real defencesagainst nuclear armed missiles -neither now nor in the forseeablefuture. To guarantee our ownsecurity in this nuclear age, wemust, therefore, face theserealities and work together withother nations to achieve commonsecurity. For security in the nuclearage means common security.’

Cyrus Vance, Former US Secretary of State

from the Prologue to CommonSecurity: A Blueprint for Survival

of the world, not only for Europe.The détente policy of the 21st century is

unthinkable - this is also a further developmentcompared to approaches from the 70s and 80sof the last century - without the peacemovement as one of the large, cross-bordersocial movements and without an internationalcivil society. They are the engine for a new policyof détente, drive these developments forwardand secure them against crises throughcomprehensive diplomacy from below.

The basic idea of the Palme Report is verysimple: My safety is only guaranteed if the safetyof my counterpart is also guaranteed. There isonly security if it is reciprocal.

Disarmament - also a lesson from the 1970sand 1980s - is the indispensable “materialization”of détente policy. That is why disarmament isabsolutely crucial. It could be decisivelyadvanced through unilateral calculated steps,especially by those in the stronger position. In thenorthern hemisphere, that's NATO.

Left, Left, LeftPeggy Duff was the first General Secretary ofCND and a life-long campaigner for peace.

Available from www.spokesmanbooks.com

“Umbrella” vs. “Sharing”

NATO was founded in 1949 with the claim that aUS ‘nuclear umbrella’ would protect non-nuclearmember states. In 2018, the British governmentaffirmed that its nuclear Trident SSBN missiles arepart of “the defense of our NATO allies”1. TheFrench government, meanwhile, never madesuch explicit claims about using its nuclear ‘Forcede Frappe’ for non-French interests.

Besides this ‘umbrella’ situation, five out of the27 non-nuclear NATO member states (Turkey,Italy, Germany, Netherlands, Belgium) havetaken part in US nuclear sharing2, since the 1960s:US nuclear free-fall bombs are stored in thesecountries. In the event of war, fighter-bomberplanes and aircrews from these countries aresupposed to drop US nuclear bombs on selectedtargets. As the NATO commander-in-chief isalways a US general, European aircrews in thenuclear sharing system function as de factoforeign legionnaires of the USA.

The operational radii of the fighter-bomberaircraft are about 1,000 km, thus (except Turkey)the ‘sharing’ targets are necessarily in Europeanregion. Given NATO’s overall posture in Europe,Russia is presumably the main target.

In this precision guided missile era the droppingfree-fall nuclear bombs from decades-oldmanned aircraft is dangerous for the air crew. Inorder to drop the bomb the aircraft has to takea flight path over its target. What chance doesa German nuclear fighter-bomber Tornado – a50 year old ‘veteran’ – have to penetratemodern air defence systems?

Differing risks for NATO members

Nuclear sharing illustrates different levels of riskamong the NATO states: 22 non-nuclear NATO

member states are allegedly “protected”passively by the US “nuclear umbrella”. For the 5“sharing” states this “umbrella” has holes, as they– and only they – are commanded to becomeaccomplice to actions which otherwise wouldlegally burden the USA alone, who are the ownerstate of the nuclear weapons. The US nuclearairbases in the “sharing” states obviously presenthigh-ranking targets for any US adversary. Innone of the five NATO states was nuclear sharingever put to a public vote3. France, CzechRepublic, Denmark and Iceland do not allow USbases in their territory. Iceland doesn’t even havea military. Thus even neighbouring NATO statescarry widely differing risks.

“Sharing” dependent on personal decision

The functionality of nuclear sharing has apeculiarity: It doesn’t depend on government ormilitary decisions. Instead it is up to the will ofindividuals, in this case air force personnel beingcitizens of the ‘sharing’ states. In the decision ofsuch air force personnel to obey or refuse anuclear command the following should beconsidered:

(a) the consequences of personalinsubordination,(b) the consequences of being accused as awar criminal at the International CriminalCourt (ICC) in The Hague (Netherlands) and(c) personal, moral and related aspects.

Insubordination

If air force personnel refuse the command todeploy nuclear bombs, they might have asetback in their professional career, but nothingmore. European ‘sharing’ states no longer shoot

TPNW deflates nuclear sharing

Joachim Wernicke

Opinion ... 21

‘disobedient soldiers’, as historic predecessorsregularly did. This liberalization removed anancient principle of the military: The soldierfollows blindly the commands from the politicalleadership, they are not to ask questions. The‘sharing’ air force personnel are citizens ofdemocracies. They will have experienced thefact that democratic governments can fail andeven lie to the public regarding the ‘justifications’for war. The most prominent example was the2003 US/UK Iraq invasion, as has been shown bythe 2016 Chilcot Report to the Britishgovernment.

Each member of a ‘sharing’ fighter-bombercrew has the personal obligation to respect theinternational law of warfare. To refuse acommand which, according to the availableinformation, appears illegal is no insubordinationcontrary to discipline but a citizen’s obligation. Ifthe air force personnel happens to be a Germancitizen, they are expressly obliged to obeyinternational law by the constitutional ‘BasicLaw’.

Air force personnel as professional soldiers aretrained and familiar with the international law ofwarfare, including awareness of its rapiddevelopment concerning nuclear weapons inthe recent decades. This culminated in the Treatyon the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW),which has been in force since January 2021 forthe – till present – 54 states which ratified it. It isbacked by the consent of 122 of the 193 UNmember states. Major European states whichhave ratified the TPNW are Austria and Ireland.The Treaty has finally internationally stigmatisednuclear weapons in line with chemical andbiological weapons. Thus the question “Is athreat or use of a nuclear weapon legal?” is nolonger pending, as nuclear weapon states andtheir entourage kept claiming over decades, butit is answered for good by a general andunconditional “No”.

So theoretically, each crew member has tomake a personal decision as to whether a givencommand to drop a nuclear bomb on a specifictarget is legal. For the details of this see the workof Robert Forsyth, former Commanding Officer ofa British Polaris nuclear ballistic missile submarine,who points out1: the legal situation demands forthe soldier (a) to know the identity of the target(which the Polaris crew didn’t) and (b) to assessthe damage to be expected at this target fromthe bomb drop under the given conditions,particularly with regard to civilian collateraldamage. For targets in inhabited areas the resultis clear: such attacks are illegal.

Concerning nuclear weapons, a GermanBundeswehr airman or airwoman is in a legally

clear situation: According to the MoD serviceinstructions of 2006, it is forbidden for her or himto use anti-personnel mines, nuclear weapons,bacteriological weapons and chemicalweapons5. So he or she doesn’t have the choicebut the obligation to refuse a command to dropa nuclear weapon, regardless what thegovernment does.

Accusation of war crime

The Rome statute of 1998, the basis of theInternational Criminal Court, contains a cleardefinition of which actions are treated by thecourt as war crimes. It refers explicitly or implicitlyto long existing international law like:

- the Hague Convention of 1907 (prohibitingfiring into dwelling quarters),- the Nuremberg Charter of 1945 (declaringthat a command doesn’t free the soldier fromhis or her obligation to check if this commandmay be illegal, if he or she had the personalchoice to refuse an illegal command),- the Geneva Red Cross Conventions of 1949with their Protocol Additional I of 1977(prohibiting attacks which cannot discriminatebetween combatants and civilians) and - the Advisory Opinion of the InternationalCourt of Justice (ICJ) of 1996 (declaring boththe threat and the use of any nuclear weaponto be illegal).

The US law professor Richard Falk4 adds that theunwritten nuclear taboo (never to use nuclearweapons) has been in effect for more thanseven decades and therefore is evidence that itis a customary legal norm.

Since 2002 the ICC searches, prosecutes,judges and punishes war criminals. Following theRome statute and seeing the effects of nuclearweapons, the use of a nuclear weapon in aninhabited area is unavoidably a war crime,regardless of weapon yield and air or groundburst. In other words: No scenario is known whereuse of a nuclear explosion in an inhabited areacould be legal.

The ‘sharing’ air force personnel who pressedthe nuclear button and survived the mission flightdespite air defence finally will stand alone in frontof the ICC. Except for the US and Turkey, all NATOstates are members of the Rome statute. Thus theUS denies the responsibility of the ICC for actionsof their military personnel which might beassessed as war crimes according to the Romestatute definition. This may be formally right, butis it acceptable for NATO’s supreme command?In the case of nuclear sharing the US will –

22 ... Opinion

perhaps rightfully – argue that the ‘sharing’ airforce personnel were not their citizens so the USare not involved. NATO will – perhaps rightfullytoo – refuse any responsibility for nuclear sharingand will point to the national government of thepersonnel concerned. However, this governmentwill not be able to protect its personnel from theICC procedures. In case of a ‘sharing’ nuclearexplosion the responsible government officials(MPs, MoD and air force command chain) will tobe accused at the ICC too, comparable to theNazi offenders at the Nuremberg tribunal from1945.

Before the TPNW came into force the ‘sharing’air force personnel could claim for her or hisdefence that they trusted, in good faith, thelegality of the actions and commands of theirgovernment to which they may have sworn anoath of loyality. With the TPNW in force it is nolonger a debatable political opinion but anundisputable fact, regardless of whether aparticular government has signed the treaty ornot: The military strategies of the nuclear weaponstates and their entourage are based on thepreparedness to commit monstrous war crimes.

Personal aspects

If the air force personnel has family she or hemight think about their children at home who willask one day what they had done in the war. Shallthey tell them: “I pressed the button and killedsome ten or even hundred thousand people. Fora similar number of surviving people I made theirfuture life hell. These people had never harmedour country. I made their country uninhabitablefor generations. This crime carries my name. Icould have refused the command but Iobeyed”?

The airman or airwomen knows that ‘thesystem’ or ‘the politicians’ do not press thenuclear button, but they themselves accordingto their free will. They also might think about howfor the rest of their life they will be chased in theirdreams by the nightmare scenes on the targetground, either learnt from media reports or fromtheir own imagination. They wouldn’t only ruinthe lives of the victims. They would ruin their ownand their family’s lives too.

And even if they somehow escapedpunishment by the ICC: their name as a crewmember responsible for the nuclear bombing willbe in the history files. Therefore they might expectpersonal revenge by a secret service of thevictim state or even privately by survivors who willtrace and find them. Similar has happened: In2002 a midair collision of two airliners occurredover Southern Germany, killing 71 people

including 49 children. In 2010 the father of avictims family met the responsible ground basedair traffic controller who had ‘mis-performed’and stabbed him to death.

Nuclear sharing in retreat

NATO claims that the TPNW is irrelevant becausethe nuclear weapon states and their entourageare not members. This is formally correct. Butsince the TPNW, according to the will of themajority of the UN states, stigmatises nuclearweapons like chemical and biological weapons,there is no longer space for claims that there areconditions under which the use of nuclearweapons might be legal.

A side problem for NATO is that non-NATOcountries consider the US nuclear sharing aviolation of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty(NPT) of 1970 and an illegal nuclear proliferation:After take-off the non-US national air crew hasthe power of disposal over a nuclear weapon.Exactly this is prohibited by the NPT. For instancethe crew could decide to desert andemergency-land with the nuclear weapon onenemy ground.

To further illustrate the problem, one may thinkabout a fictional nuclear sharing, legally a copyof NATO’s action: Saudi-Arabian or Iranianaircraft carry nuclear bombs shared by Pakistanas the owner state.

NATO member state governments keepclaiming that the 1996 advisory opinion of the ICJis ambiguous for the extreme case that nuclearweapon use is the “Last Resort” to save the veryexistence of a state, and therefore it could belegal (on this question the ICJ judges voted 7:7undecided). Whatever this could mean for anuclear weapon state, such a “Last Resort”scenario can only be valid for the nuclearweapon state itself, not for any third parties likeits allies, thus not for the five European statesinvolved in nuclear sharing.

Will there be at any time any Turkish, Italian,German, Belgian or Dutch air force personnel ofclear mind and morality prepared to obey acommand to drop a nuclear bomb on anytarget in Europe? How will the air forces of thefive European nuclear sharing states under theTPNW – regardless if signed by them – recruit theirnuclear bomber crews? What will be the result ofan open public discussion on this question? Itlooks like the TPNW indeed has deflated USnuclear sharing.

Steadfast Noon

An open question will probably remain as to

Opinion ... 23

Der Aufstand der Kinder

An updated Germanedition of Joachim

Wernicke’s pamphletis available for

download athttps://docdro.

id/TdB25Zv. An Englishtranslation of the firstedition, The Revolt ofthe Children can be

downloaded atwww.spokesman

books.com

whether the participation of air force personnelof the “sharing” states in the yearly NATOmaneuver ‘Steadfast Noon’ is legal. With orwithout nuclear bomb mockups, nuclear missionsare practiced in this maneuver. Is it a threatagainst Russia and her ‘allies’? According to theICJ 1996 Advisory Opinion it is. The ‘sharing’governments may claim it isn’t. By principle avalid statement could be obtained from the ICCfollowing an accusation from a state whichmight see itself as threatened, as a member ofthe Russian-led “Collective Security TreatyOrganization” (CSTO): Russia, Armenia,Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, andUzbekistan. But these states are not members ofthe Rome statute, with the exception ofTajikistan. This country, however, is located morethan 2,000 km from the nearest NATO area(eastern Turkey), so technically it is out of rangeof US ‘nuclear sharing’.

Notes:

1 Robert Forsyth, Why Trident?, Nottingham2020: Spokesman, ISBN 978-0-8512-4890-5.2 Nuclear Sharing: the facts, END Info Issue 22,February 2021, Russell Peace Foundation,www.spokesmanbooks.com/Spokesman/PDF/ENDINFO22.pdf3 Beatrice Fihn and Daniel Hogsta, ChangingEurope’s Calculations - Treaty on theProhibition of Nuclear Weapons, TheSpokesman No. 147, February 2021, RussellPeace Foundation, ISBN 978-0-8512-4895-0.4 Richard Falk, Challenging Nuclearism, TheSpokesman No. 147, see above.5 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung R II 3,Druckschrift Einsatz Nr. 03 HumanitäresVölkerrecht in bewaffneten Konflikten –Grundsätze, August 2006, DSK SF009320187,www.bits.de/public/documents/taschenkarte03-2006.pdf

Contents

Warhead Alert! ... 2Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation

Letter of Protest ... 4Gensuikyo

10 reasons why increasing the numberof warheads is wrong ... 5Commander Robert Forsyth RN (Ret’d)

Call for action: For a nuclear weaponfree Europe ... 6Nuke Free Europe campaign

Persistent objectors ... 8Tom Unterrainer

War Excercise Despite Pandemic ... 9German Foreign Policy

US Bombing of Syria ... 11Phyllis Bennis and Khury Petersen-Smith

TPNW: Question raised on Italy’s failure to sign ... 13Maurizio Acerbo et al

Atomic bombs at Aviano, Italy ... 14Tiziano Tissino

From an economy of war to an economy of peace ... 16Olof Palme

Remembering and shaping the future:for a policy of common security ... 19Reiner Braun and Peter Brandt

TPNW deflates nuclear sharing ... 21Joachim Wernicke

The next issue of END Info will bepublished in May, 2021. Please sendinformation, articles, pictures, news

items and reports to [email protected].