TURKISH FOREIGN POLI CY AT THE END OF THE COLD WAR: ROOTS AND DYNAMICSı MUSTAFA AYDIN ABSTRACT Starti ng wi th the mi li ta ry co up d '<.~ta t of Sept embe r 12, 1980, Turk ey had ex peri en ced fundamenta l chan ges in it s pol it ic al st ru ct ur e, economic sys tem, social strata, cul tur a! pat ter ns, rel igi ous exp res sio nis m, and fore ign po li cy . With th e end of the Co!d Wa r te n ye ar s after, the wo rl d en te re d a period of historic system ic cha nges. A!ong the way, Turkey mov ed suddenly from a staun ch ly pro-western isolati on ist ex istence in its immediate ne ig hbou rh oo d in to a centra l po st ur e with an int en ti on to have an ef fe ct across a vas t re gi on exte ndin g 'f rom east er n Euro pe to wester n Chin a' . Th is change in Turkey's stance and mentality was due to wider changes ex peri en ce d withi n and ar oun d Tu rk ey during th e 1980s. Th is pa pe r, employing theoretic and practical explanations, explores Turkey's tr ansf orma ti on in d omestic and fore ig n poli cies duri ng the 1980s and ea rl y 199 0s, in order to se t the stage to th e anal ysi s of Tu rki sh for eig n pol icy at the en d of th e Co ld Wa r. It wi ll sp ec if ic al ly lo ok at the na tu re of th e po li ti ca l re gi me , soci o- ec onomic dy namics, an d exte rnal environmen t as fa ctors that br ought abou t change in Turk is h fo re ign policy in the wake of the end of the Col d War . KEYWORDS Turkish Foreign Policy, Change, Foreign Policy Analysis, Det erm ini ng Fac tor s, Cou p D'e tat, Int ernationa l Setti ng, Eco nomic Structure, Decis ion- Makin g Syste m. 'This is a follow-up work to my two previous papers, in an attempt to dete rmine th e var İ ous fa ct ors that sha pe Turkish fore ign poli cy in the 20 lh cen tur y. Wha t i have terme d as 'str uct ura l det erm inants' of Tur kis h for eig n po li cy , we re ex am ined in 'Determinants of Tu rkish Fo re ign Po licy-I: His tor ica l Fra mework and Tradit ion al Inputs', Mi ddl e Eas tem Stu die s, Vol. 35, No. 4 (üctober 1999), pp. 152-186; and 'conjunctural factors' in 'Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy II: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures Dur ing the Col d War', Mi ddl e Eastem Stu die s, Vo l. 36, No. 1 (Januar y 2000), pp . 103-139. Th is pa pe r wi ll upda te the m an d look at 1980s, duri ng whic h Tu rkey expe ri ence d import ant ch ange s th at la rgel y aff ect ed its fo rei gn pol icy since then.
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8/6/2019 Turkish Foreign Policy at the End of the Cold War
TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY AT THE END OFTHE COLD WAR: ROOTS AND DYNAMICSı
MUSTAFA AYDIN
ABSTRACT
Starting with the military coup d '<.~tatof September 12, 1980, Turkey
had experienced fundamental changes in its political structure, economicsystem, social strata, cultura! patterns, religious expressionism, and foreignpolicy. With the end of the Co!d War ten years after, the world entered aperiod of historic systemic changes. A!ong the way, Turkey moved suddenlyfrom a staunchly pro-western isolationist existence in its immediateneighbourhood into a central posture with an intention to have an effectacross a vast region extending 'from eastern Europe to western China'. Thischange in Turkey's stance and mentality was due to wider changesexperienced within and around Turkey during the 1980s. This paper,employing theoretic and practical explanations, explores Turkey's
transformation in domestic and foreign policies during the 1980s and early1990s, in order to set the stage to the analysis of Turkish foreign policy at theend of the Cold War. It will specifically look at the nature of the politicalregime, socio-economic dynamics, and external environment as factors thatbrought about change in Turkish foreign policy in the wake of the end of theCold War.
Determining Factors, Coup D'etat, International Setting, Economic Structure,Decision-Making System.
'This is a follow-up work to my two previous papers, in an attempt todetermine the varİous factors that shape Turkish foreign policy in the 20lh
century. What ihave termed as 'structural determinants' of Turkish foreignpolicy, were examined in 'Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy-I:Historical Framework and Traditional Inputs', Middle Eastem Studies, Vol.
35, No. 4 (üctober 1999), pp. 152-186; and 'conjunctural factors' in
'Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy II: Changing Patterns andConjunctures During the Cold War', Middle Eastem Studies, Vol. 36, No. 1(January 2000), pp. 103-139. This paper will update them and look at
1980s, during which Turkey experienced important changes that largelyaffected its foreign policy since then.
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Dramatic changes in world politics that accompanied the end of the Cold War, though was greatly welcomed, have not yet providedfor the anticipated arrival of an unprecedented era of peace, stabilityand democracy. Initial euphoria and optimism is now replaced byextremely intractable problems and difficult policy choices that haveemerged. While the international society proved to be iii prepared andtoo slow to successfully deaiwith the multitude of threats and
problems, the 'change' (be it political, economic, social, or systemic)has become a constant feature of international politics.
Amidst the historic systemic changes, Turkey, once a distantoutpost of NATO on the European periphery, moved to the centre of the problematic post-Cold War world politics. She stood surroundedby 13 of the 16 threat generating regions, identified by NATO at theend of the Cold War. Yet, from a staunchly pro-western isolationistexistence in its immediate neighbourhood, Turkey, at the end of theCold War, suddenly moved into a posture, intended to have an effectacross a vast region extending 'from eastern Europe to westernChina'.2 This change in Turkey's stance and mentality was notaccidental, but due to wider changes experienced within and aroundTurkey during the 1980s. Without denying the importance of themomentum provided by the end of the Cold War, this paper aims toexplore Turkey's transformation in domestic and foreign policiesduring the 1980s and early 1990s, in order to discern developmentsbehind the powerful impetus in Turkey at the end of the Cold War tograb emerging opportunities. While doing this, Turkish experiencewould be juxtaposed against the wisdom from the theory of foreignpolicy analysis, in an effort to enhance attempts to sketch out atheoretical framework for Turkish foreign policy.
Constant transformation was one of the unchangingconsistencies of Turkish socio-political life during the 1980s. Starting
2For earlier analyses of Turkey's newly-found self-reliance on foreign policyat the end of the Cold War see M. Aydin, 'Turkeyand Central ASİa;Challenges of Change', Central Asian Survey, IS, No. 2 (1996), pp. 157-177; S. S. Gurel and Y. Kimura, Turkey in a Chaııgiııg World (Tokyo,1993); and G. Fuller and 1. O. Lesser, Turkey's New Geopolitics; From the
Balkans to Western China (London, 1993).
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Nations also take into account the way in which theinternational environment responds to their policies. Accordingly, the'spill-back process' or the 'negative feedback' from the internationalenvironment mayaıso create pressures for change.12 Hence, thequestions of whether western pressure had an impact on Turkey'sdemocratisation-human rights policies, and whether the negativefeedback Turkey received from European countries and organizationsafter the 1980 coup d'etat forced it to look for new areas of linkage,are particularly interesting.
While the first two possible determinants of change are relatedto the internal domain, the latter is to the internationaL. Sinee thegovernments formuIate foreign policy in the context of domestic aswell as international pressures, foreign policy studies should involvean understanding of both domestic and external environments and theinteraction between the two.13 Thus, the institutional structure, i.e.,the type of political and economie regimes, by which goveJllmentsmake and implement their foreign policies, is also important.14
Finally, linkages between national and international systemscontinually reinforce eaeh other,15 and the impact of any aetion ininternational politics 'on a polity will vary according to partieularnations, struetures and groups to whieh the polity is linked and thenature of that link. Nations do not react to the international system asa whole, but to the way it is retlected in partieular actors with whomthey have most contact'.16 In connection with this, Turkey'svocational linkages with the West in general and espeeially theeffects of European criticism and Turkish responses are important.
12Goldman,op. cit., p. 4.
13W. Wallace, Foreign Policyand the Political Process (London, 1971), p.12; P. A. Reynolds, An Introduction to International Relations, 3'd ed.
(London, New York, 1994), p. 54; J. N. Rosenau, 'Introductİon: PoliticalScience in a Shrinking World' in J. N. Rosenau (ed.), Linkage Politics:
Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systenıs (NewYork, 1969), p. 7.
14Wallace,op. cit., p. 12; K. J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework
for Analysis, 3rd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1977), p. 108.
15Rosenau,op. cil., p. 7.
16D. A. Chalmers, 'Developing on the Periphery: External Factors İn LatinAmerican Politics', in Rosenau (ed.), op. cil., p. 69.
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Without denying the importance of other factors, the actualchoices of policies within states are determined to a considerabledegree by the interpretation of the environment by the leaders andtheir conception of altematives. Decision-makers' understanding of the nature of their choices in tum depends on many factors, includingtheir experience while rising to eminence, the structure in which theymust operate, and the values of their society. In this context, thepersonality of leaders, who control the focus of power, may haveimportant influences on foreign policy. This is especially important in
authoritarian regimes, in which power of dictators is not restrained bydemocratic bodies, and where they exercise decisive influence overthe conduct of foreign policy.23
In the modem world, the political \eadership in most societiesacts in order to maintain the security of their national state:24 so muchso that foreign and security policies have merged to the point wherestatesmen and military strategists must collaborate c1osely.25Therefore, it goes without saying that military leaders are needed for
expert advice, and it is possible that their considered opinion canstrongly influence policy decİsions. However, it is the responsibilityof the decision-makers to determine 'how much influence the militarymay be permitted to exert on foreign policy decisions and whethermilitary personnel should be permitted to state conflicting views inpublic'.26 Whether the influence of military leaders can be keptwithin bounds by a civilian govemment will always be crucial to anation's position in international affairs and to its internal politics.Since Turkey was ruled by a military regime during 1980-1983, and
the military was effectiye in policy choiccs even after 1983, the civil-military relationship and its effect on foreign policy-making areimportant aspects of this paper.
Analysts do not normally regard military regimes as a variablein foreign policy studies. However, at \east one study has showed that
23Gros,Op. cit., p. 123.
24R. C. Macridis and K. W. Thompson, The Comparative Study of ForeignPolicy' İn R, C. Macridis (ed.), Foreign Policy in World Politics, 21ı d ed.
(Englewood Cliffs, 1962), p. 12.
25London, op. cit., p. 73.
26Ibid., pp. 100-101.
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full military regime, though one can differentiate it from othermilitary regimes in various points.34 Its officially proclaimed aim wasto guide the country into a full democracy as is understood in thewesı. Howcver, in practice, democratic identity was denied to Turkey,both under the military regime and during the subsequent transitionperiod (1983-1987) by a combination of factors, ranging fromcontinued restrictions on fundamental rights and freedoms to explicit(implicit for the post-1983 period) usage of military's control andauthority on various aspects of sociao-political life.
Not surprisingly, being less than a full democracy createdtensions for Turkey during the 1980s, not only in domestic politicsbut in foreign policy, too. Since the military regime up until 1983, orthe quasi-democracy thereafter, clearly contradicted with thefundamental values of Westem Europe, with which Turkeyendeavoured to identify itself, it created tensions for Turkish foreignministry where it seemed to matter mosı. As a result, Turkish foreignpolicy had to operate under straİn as the military regime in Turkey
attempted to 'reconcile the divergent objectives of moving towardsintegration with Westem Europe while defending the rationale of being less than a full democratic regime'.35
In amore general sense, the frequency of military regimes inrecent Turkish political history, together with a general tendencytoward the suppression of certain ideas and freedoms, have becomeimpediments for Turkey in its overall relations with the wesı. Suchpractices, especially the Turkish human rights record, have been
instrumental İn creating a general lack of sympathy for Turkey inwestem public opinion.36 As a result, being govemed by a military
34For differences of the Turkish military from other interventionist armies,see A. Kemal, 'Military Rule and the Future of Democracy in Turkey',
Merip Repo rts , MarchlApril 1984; W. Hale, 'Transition to CivilianGovernments in Turkey; the Military Perspective' in M. Hep'er and A. Evin(eds.), The State, Democracy and the Military; Turkey in the i980s
(Berlin, New York, 1988), pp. 160-165; D. A. Rustow, 'The Middle
Eastem Society And Politics' İn S. N. Fisher (ed.), The Military in the Middle East (Columbus, 1963).35Sezer,op. cit., p. 66.
36p. Robins, 'The Overlord State: Turkish Policyand The Kurdish Issue',international Affairs, Vol. 69, No. 4 (1993), pp. 292-293; Sezer, ibid.
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differences in international arena were disregarded for expectedeconomic benefıts. Of course, the most telling change in the balanceof power within the policy-making system during the 1980s was thegradual concentration of powers in the hands of Iate president TurgutOzal, which was strongly resisted and opposed by traditional foreign
policyelite.
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND RISE OF ETHNO-
RELIGIOUS IDENTITIES
In Theory
The socio-economic conditions of a country, closely connectedwith its political evolvement, form an important factor of foreignpolicy. The standard of living, the distribution of income, and thesocial structure related to the facts of production and consumption areelements of social strength or weakness, while political institutions,
civil rights, are political stability are measure of political vigour, andboth are closely interwoven.
The degree to which the economy of a state has developed mayhave important consequences for its foreign policy as different statesat different levels of developments have different needs and thereforedifferent links to their environments.44 In addition, the level of economic development greatly conttibutes to the internal demandsfrom governments to formuiate external policies that reflect and serve
the diversity of interests that it produces.45 Moreover, the level of economic development mayaıso be effective in determining anation's capability to implement foreign policy plans.46 'The more acountry is develop, the larger is the proportion of its GOP that islikely to be devoted to external purposes, whether these be military
44Rosenau, İn Rosenauffhompson/Boyds, op. cit., p. 20.45lbid.
46H. 1. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and
Peace, Brief ed., revised by K. W. Thompson (New York, 1993), pp. 133-
134.
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situations, but whether he actually makes those decisions may dependon his 'decisiveness'. Equally, the office gives him certain powers,but whether he enlarges the power of the office may depend on his'assertiveness' .50 The objective situation would obviously influencethe decisions of any man, but his personal views of national interestand his own personal interests and his personal style would alsoshape the decision. Therefore, it should be remembered thatpersonality of decision-makers is an important determinant of nation' s foreign policy, and 'the higher in the hierarchy of the foreign
policyorganization an individual's role is, the more likely are hispersonal characteristics to affect foreign policy decisions' .51
Apart from personal expedience, ideological indinations andsocietal pressures, man's values are formed, in part, by his rcligiousbeliefs. Therefore, it is also relevant to our assessment that the role of religion, in Turkish case Islam, in foreign policy-making should beconsidered, especially since Islam, unlike Christianity, does notprescribe the separation of religion from politics.52 Indeed, devout
Muslims argue that Islam is a complete social, political, legal andcultural system, and has its law: the Sharia. Consequently, Sharia isthe only legitimate rule and there can be no separation betweenpolitics and religion. The importance of Islam's influence on foreignpolicy of Moslem countries, therefore, should to be considered. As aninfluence, 'it can act (...) as an integrative force, creating consensuson foreign policy objectives ...[providing] ['esprit de corps ...to apopulation, and ...mobilizing external sources in support of state ....Inother cases, Islam can be constraint on policy' .53 According to
Dawisha, an important problem which foreign policyanalysts face alltoo frequently when trying to uncover the effect of Islam on specificforeign policy actions, is the question of whether 'a particular policy
50J. de Rİvera, Psyclıological Dimension of Foreign Policy (Columbus, Ohio,
1968), p. 165.
51M. G. Herman, 'Leader Personality and Foreign Policy Behaviour' in J. N.
Rosenau (ed.), Comparing Foreign Policies: Theories, Findings, and
Methods (New York, London, 1974), p. 202.52For a comparatiye discussİon of Islam's place in determining foreign policy
mainly in the Middle Eastemi Arab context see A. Dawisha (ed.), Islam in
Foreign Policy (London, 1983).
53Ibid., p. 4.
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pronouncement or decision motivated by Islam, or was it motivated
by some other value or consideration ... whereby Islam would be used
to simply to bestow credibility and legitimacy on the policy'.54 Thisalso c1early relates to the Turkish case.
In Practice
It was c1ear during the 1980s that Turkey's international
affınities affected its economic policies. Especially, Turkey's movetowards a liberal economy in early 1980's had much to do with its
linkages with, and aspirations to be part of, the western political
system. 55 Turkey's partnership in the western political system and its
essential contribution to western security interests provided it with
much more foreign aid and help during its economİc transition than
any other country that tried to do the same thing.56 Therefore there
came into existence yet another linkage between Turkeyand its
western vocation through its transition in 1980s to liberal economy.
Once Turkey made its switch, its new liberal economic system
demanded a certain set of politieal aetions and international
connections. The eommon attribute of the programme that introdueed
the liberal economy to Turkey on 24 January 1980, and other
austerity programs introdueed since than with the backing of IMF and
the World Bank for the reeovery of the Turkish eeonomy, is that they
all necessitated massiye net foreign eurrency inflows. The ways to
generate the necessary amount included heavy borrowing from
abroad, persuading foreigners to invest in Turkey, and increasing anddiversifying Turkey's export potentials. However, the crucial point to
all the economİc measures aimed at obtaining the above mentioned
results was that theyall, in one way or an other, depended on the
willingness of other countries to respond in a way that would favour
54Ibid., p. 5.
55This linkage was analyzed in Aydin, Foreign Policy Formation, 'Chp. 7:
Foreign Policyand the Revitalisation of Turkish Eeonomy'.56For a comparision between foreign aid fıgures to Turkeyand to Argentina
and Mcxico in the same period and their connection to political reasons,see, S. Hewin and R. O'Brien, et.a!., Turkey's International Role (London,ı988), p.ıı o . .
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that the 'Islamic faction' of the party was pre-occupied most of thetime with a power struggle against the 'nationalisı' and 'liberal'factions, and, at the same time, the leader of the party, Turgut Özal,who controlled the party completely, had strong foreign policy ideasof his own and thus, thanks to his delicate balancing between variousfactions of the party, did not allow any one faetion to dictate hispoliey-making. Moreover, most of the time, the presenee of ever-watchful President Evren against 'Islamic' manifestations withinTurkish politics, was also a restraining factar for Islamic intluences
on foreign policy.
As a result, the Islamic revival within the country did notparticularly affected Turkey's foreign policy-making during the 1980s- provided that there was a desire and pressure for change from the'Islamists' since this is, save sporadic demands for closer relationswith the Islamic countries, also difficult to pin down. Therefore, oneof the actions that the Islamists were supposed to oppose strongly,that is Turkish application to the EC membership, went smoothly in
1987 without significant opposition.
However, since 1989, the effects of the Islamic affinities, inconnection with the ethnic and historic sentiments, secmed on therise. Yet again, it was stilI very diffieult to aseertain whether theTurkish public' s outcries regarding the Karabakh and Bosniancontlicts were the results of Islamİc connections, or rather originatedfrom what was pereeived, by public at large, as attempts to wipe outTurkish ethnie brethren in the east and Ottoman legacy in the wesı. It
is rather safe to argue that the role of Islam in Turkish foreign policyduring the period under consideration was mostly confined to the justifieation of the policies for which the government opted for otherreasons, and Turkey's reorientation towards the Middle East duringthe 1980s was the result of a combination of factors, among which theIslamic revival occupied a smail part - as indicated by the fact thatTurkey turned towards the Western Europe and the Soviet Union(Iater on former Soviet Republies) when the political and economicincentives for closer cooperation with the Middle East declined after1985.
This diseussion brings us to the question of the public's role inthe making of Turkish foreign policy during the 1980s. All thechannels of public expression were ruthlessly suppressed under the
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