Turkish Foreign Policy and the Capability Approach. Analyzing Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East through Amartya Sen's Lens

Turkish Foreign Policy and

the Capability Approach

2014

ANALYZING TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST THROUGH AMARTYA SEN’S LENS MASSIMILIANO PILLON

SABANCI UNIVERSITY |[email protected]

1

Contents Introduction ....................................................................................................................................................... 2

The Capability Approach ................................................................................................................................... 2

Development as Freedom ............................................................................................................................. 3

Advantages versus Basic Needs ..................................................................................................................... 4

Conversion Factors ........................................................................................................................................ 4

Explaining Turkish Foreign Policy ...................................................................................................................... 5

Turkish Foreign Policy during the AKP Era ..................................................................................................... 5

Zero Problems with Neighbours: the First Phase of AKP Leadership ............................................................ 6

The Shift: The second phase of AKP government ............................................................................................. 7

The Arab Spring: Shifting paradigm ............................................................................................................... 8

Applying the Capability Approach ..................................................................................................................... 9

Primary Goods: identifying Turkey’s resources ........................................................................................... 10

1-Instrumental factor .............................................................................................................................. 10

2-Confidence factor ................................................................................................................................. 11

3-Soft power ............................................................................................................................................ 12

4-Institutional factor ................................................................................................................................ 14

Conversion Factors: Facing constraints ....................................................................................................... 15

The Syrian Case: testing Turkey’s capability .................................................................................................... 17

Fraiming the Syrian Case into the Capability Approach .............................................................................. 19

AKP’s Resources in Syria .......................................................................................................................... 19

Applying Conversion Factors ................................................................................................................... 22

Conclusions ...................................................................................................................................................... 23

References ....................................................................................................................................................... 25

2

Introduction

Turkish foreign policy has undertaken a series of transformations that are linked with internal and

systemic developments. The new path foreseen by Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu

represented a clear rupture with the timid approach of the past, entailing an active role of Ankara

in its external relations. However, internal factors such as the internal concentration of power

enjoyed by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) along with the social storms that hit the Middle

East (meaning North Africa and the Arab countries) provoked a recalculation of Turkey’s interests,

provoking an ‘over-engagement’ of Ankara in the internal affairs of its neighbours.

To assess the role of Turkey in the region, we can apply the capability approach developed by the

Indian economist Amartya Sen, since it represents an effective way to evaluate the real capacity

that an actor has in choosing between alternative courses of action.

The Capability Approach

To start with, we can lay down the main characteristics of Sen’s argument. What does development

mean? The Nobel Prize laureate answers to this question proposing an innovative analytical

instrument, the capability approach. Sen criticizes the prevalent focus on real income and economic

growth (in substance, commodities or incomes) as the main determinants of development and

quality of human life. He points out how sometimes countries with high GNP per capita can have

very low levels of quality of life, as their population can suffer from “premature mortality, escapable

morbidity, overwhelming illiteracy”(Sen 2003, 42). Thus, as the Indian economist and philosopher

suggests, “economic prosperity is no more than one of the means to enriching lives of people.”(Sen

2003, 42)

3

Similarly, Sen goes against the utility-based systems of evaluating development, as they only entail

non-physical states such as happiness and pleasure. According to him, they fail to recognize a

person’s real deprivation, as it might happen that individuals appear well off as they have internally

accepted their hardship with resignation (Sen 2003, 45), especially when they have been exposed

to deprivation for a long time.

According to Sen’s capability approach, we should focus on the effective opportunities (called

‘capabilities’) that a person have to attain a set of beings and doings, called ‘functionings’ (for

example being well nourished or being free of diseases, but also being happy and having self-

respect). ‘Functionings’ represent what a person “manages to do or be”, since they are “constitutive

elements of living” (Sen 2003, 44). The capability to function that a person has derives from the set

of functionings that are available to him or her, and it determines the sphere of choice between

different ways of living available to an individual. Accordingly, the bigger the sphere of choice, the

larger the extent of freedom enjoyed.

Development as Freedom

Indeed, Sen perceives development as the expansion of individual freedom to choose between

different functionings, and the role of individual agency is thus central. However, individual agency

is constrained by the social, political and economic opportunities that are present in a society. Social

arrangements are complementary to individual agency, and we have to take into considerations

these social influences if we want to assess the level of individual freedom. In this framework,

development means removing “various types of unfreedoms that leave people with little choice and

little opportunity of exercising their reasoned agency.”(Sen 1999) At the same time, individuals

become active agents of change acting through societal arrangements that give them room for

action, determining their level of freedom.

4

Advantages versus Basic Needs

The capability approach has also advantages compared to the so-called “basic needs” literature, as

the latter poses the problem of what basic needs have to be taken into consideration to assess

development. In doing so, it becomes a commodity-centered evaluation, ignoring the pivotal

importance of “conversion of commodities into capabilities.” (Sen 2003, 47) As Sen notes, the

capability of people of being well-nourished does not depend only on the quantity of food available,

but also on many other factors such as body size, age, climatic conditions and so on (Sen 2003, 47).

In the same vein, the capability approach differentiates from John Rawls’ notion of primary goods

and his idea of justice as fairness. According to Rawls, we should use the notion of primary goods,

intended as “things that every rational man is presumed to want” (Rawls 1971, 62), in order to make

interpersonal comparisons and assess inequality among people. However, primary goods are

“means to freedoms, whereas capabilities are expressions of freedoms themselves.” (Rawls 1971,

8) The notion of primary goods is not able to take sufficient note of interpersonal differences in the

conversion of social primary goods into valuable beings and doings (functionings).

Conversion Factors

The capability approach’s central idea is that people’s ability to convert the resources they have at

their disposal is influenced by three categories of conversion factors: (Sen 2013)

1- Personal conversion factors (for example physical condition, sex, reading skills, intelligence);

2- Social conversion factors (such as public policies, discriminating practices, gender roles);

3- Environmental conversion factors (notably climate, institutions).

To sum up, the capability approach analyses both the material and non-material resources that

shape people’s opportunity sets, and the circumstances that influence the choices that people make

from those sets, as they are crucial to pursue interpersonal comparisons.

5

Explaining Turkish Foreign Policy

We can thus transform this paradigm in order to make it fit into foreign policy analysis. Replacing

individuals with states, we can assess the room for manoeuvre that Turkey has in its external

conduct. First of all, we need to explore Turkish foreign policy and its transformation in order to

better grasp its role in the region.

Turkish Foreign Policy during the AKP Era

Between 2002 and 2009, the foreign policy advisor of Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan was Professor

Ahmet Davutoğlu, who then became Foreign Minister. Despite the AKP’s Islamist roots, Davutoğlu

rejected the classic Islamist worldview of “inevitable war between Muslims and infidels.” (Hale

2013, 137) According to him, Muslim world could not gather to form an anti-systemic force. Instead,

he claimed for a ‘comprehensive civilisation dialogue’ between the west and Islam. Davutoğlu

forged a new, holistic framework for Turkish foreign policy, urging Turkey to exploit its ‘strategic

depth’ given by its geographical position. Getting rid of the ‘threat assessment approach’ adopted

in the past, Ankara should have developed an active engagement in its neighbouring regions, from

the Middle East to Transcaucasia. Becoming a ‘central country’ in the region, it should be active in

promoting ‘global and regional peace’. As Davutoğlu stated, ‘We don’t want to be on the agenda of

[the] international community as one item of crisis. We want to be in the international community

to solve the crisis.’ Thus, for example, Erdoğan used the strategic cultural importance of Turkey as

an argument in favour of accession to the European Union. The ‘meeting of civilisations’ (Hale 2013,

248) proposed by him was compatible with the need of the European Union to create a dialogue

with Islam, emboldening its multicultural vocation. In the eyes of European leaders such as Tony

Blair (Hale 2013, 247), Turkey was perceived as the perfect partner to bridge the civilisation gap.

6

Zero Problems with Neighbours: the First Phase of AKP Leadership

During the first phase of the AKP leadership (2002-2007), this new framework was enshrined in the

so-called ‘zero problems with neighbours’ strategy. The main elements of this policy were:

1- EU membership as the main aim of Turkish foreign policy. The EU decision of giving Turkey

the status of candidate for full membership during the European Council’s Helsinki Summit

in December 1999 gave Ankara a strong incentive to address political and economic reforms,

in order to meet the Copenhagen criteria (Amuedo 2011, 13). In the early years, the AKP

demonstrated its commitment to reforms, confirming the EU as the “key long-term external

anchor” (Öniş 2014, 4) for Turkey in general. It is argued that this relationship has led Turkey

to pursue “a less hard security policy and a more democratic foreign policy.” (Almuedo 2011,

13)

2- The attempt to diversify and improve Turkey’s external relations with all neighbouring

countries. This was mainly the strategy adopted to ensure internal security and foster

economic growth, two intermingled developments. Indeed, internal security was important

for political stability, while it also helped Turkish economy to expand trade and other

economic factors (Öniş 2014, 4).

The AKP witnessed a period of marked improvement in relations with other countries in the region,

notably Russia, Iran and Syria (the latter after great tensions throughout the 1990s).

However, scholars have warned not to overestimate the AKP’s merits in this new tendency. Indeed,

improvement in relations with neighbouring countries were already in place, notably with Greece

since 1999 and Syria since 1998. Thus, we can affirm that the AKP (at least in some occasions) has

been able to exploit a process that was already set in motion, rather than create new dynamics (Hale

2013, 253). Moreover, there was not a complete refusal of the previous securitized approach, since

7

security and economic concerns were intermingled. Indeed, secure borders were important for a

stable domestic policy (for example to contrast the clashes with the PKK), but also to expand trade,

investment, labour flows and tourism. This set in motion a mutually reinforcing circle of greater

security along the borders and economic interdependence with the neighbours.

The process of diversification of external actor was also linked to the growing initiative of Turkish

business. With the EU crisis, Turkey increased the number of its external business relations, looking

for new markets (for instance, in 2003, 58 per cent of Turkish exports went to Europe, while in 2012

the figure was 38 per cent) (Öniş 2014, 4), and establishing economic linkages “with virtually all the

countries in its immediate and more distant neighbourhood.” (Öniş 2012a, 12) Furthermore, Turkey

became an important donor country, with an increasing role in neighbouring countries. Despite that,

democracy was not in the foreign policy agenda. The focus was on the development of strong

economic relations with Middle Eastern partners, with which Turkey shared a common cultural

heritage. The basic assumption was the respect of internal sovereignty, in line with the Westphalian

understanding, getting rid of any moral considerations. This led to the formation of ties with

authoritarian states such as Syria and Libya, which were beneficial for Turkish economy, trade,

investments and tourism.

The Shift: The second phase of AKP government

In 2007, the ballot box gave the AKP a landslide victory with an outstanding 46.66 per cent of the

votes, confirming Erdoğan as Prime Minister. Benefiting from this strong electoral support, the AKP

was able to acquire progressively a hegemonic position in Turkish political system, eroding the

power of the laic Kemalist bureaucracy and foreign policy establishment. The AKP started to show

8

its religious-conservative attitude, with a rediscovery of the Ottoman past, and identity became an

issue in Turkish foreign policy.

Moreover, the EU membership accession process was halted by several factors, notably the failure

to agree on a mutually acceptable solution to end the Cyprus dispute. This stalemate created

disappointment and resentment among the political establishment, abandoning the EU as the main

aim of Turkish foreign policy (Öniş 2014). In this framework, the process of diversification of external

relationship gained even more strength.

The Arab Spring: Shifting paradigm

In 2011, a series of popular revolutions labelled as Arab Spring stormed North Africa and Middle

East, involving an internally-driven, bottom-up request for change.

Indeed, many countries in the region had been extremely resilient to any democratic change since

that moment. For this reason, Turkey had adopted a “morally neutral” (Hale 2013, 242) foreign

policy towards these countries, focusing pragmatically on trade and economic relationships. The

revolutions that started in the early months of 2011 brought about a dramatic change, raising

considerable optimism concerning the future of political liberalization in the region and potentially

in other parts of the world. Notably, for Turkey the changes taking place in countries such as Tunisia,

Libya, Egypt and Syria were of primary importance, given their profound effects and their political

and economic relevance for Ankara (Hale 2013, 243).

With the breaking out of the Arab revolutions, Turkey faced a dilemma. On the one hand, going on

supporting the existing authoritarian regimes would have prevented Turkey’s ambitions to play a

leading role in the region, proposing itself as a model (dilemma shared by both the US and the

European Union, which have businesses with many authoritarian regimes). On the other hand, it

9

feared that pursuing a more active stance in its neighbours’ domestic affairs would have

undermined its economic interests in the region.

However, the AKP decided that the time was come for Turkey to be an independent regional power

in the Middle East, and the opportunity provided for by the Arab Spring was too good to miss.

Regional powers are usually defined according to four major criteria: “claim to leadership;

possession of the necessary power resources; employment of successful foreign policy strategies;

acceptance of leadership role by other states in the region.” (Öniş 2014, 2)

Despite Turkey could exploit a series of factors to become a point of reference in the region, it has

found itself in a highly complicated environment, with the presence of global powers (notably the

United States, Russia, China) and other regional powers (Saudi Arabia, Iran, Israel) as well as inter-

state and sectarian rivalries. For this reason, it is not possible to assess its room for manoeuvre

unless we take into considerations the constraints that Turkey has in using its resources. To do this,

we can apply the capability approach to Turkish foreign policy.

Applying the Capability Approach

In the sphere of foreign policy, capability is represented by the effective set of choice between

different ‘functionings’ that a country can pursue in the international environment. These

‘functionings’ consists in what we can call ‘primary goods’ in a Rawlsian sense: the resources that a

country can use in its foreign policy. However, these resources face constraints as every country

play its game in a highly competitive environment, constraining and being constrained by the

behaviour of the other players. These constraints represent the conversional factors, as every

country differs in its ability to transform its resources into action. As inter-state comparisons are

10

defined in terms of power, we will call gross power the resources (public goods) that a country has,

while net power the effective capability to achieve its goals, given the transformation factors.

Primary Goods: identifying Turkey’s resources

In this case, we can identify four determinants of Turkey’s primary goods:

1- Instrumental factor;

2- Confidence factor;

3- Soft power;

4- Institutional factor.

1-Instrumental factor

During the AKP experience, foreign policy was perceived as a tool to consolidate its power internally.

For this reason, and thanks to the self-confidence acquired with electoral and economic successes,

Erdoğan started pursuing an increasingly dynamic action, based on “a nationalism with conservative

and religious overtones, yet outward-facing and globalist in its orientation.” (Onis 2014, 12) As Fuat

Keyman states, Turkey is a “Muslim society with a strictly secular nation-state.”(Keyman 2007, 216)

Secularism in Turkey has been “one of the main ‘constitutive’ elements of Turkish modernity”

(Keyman 2007, 216) through which political elites have regulated religious communities.

Nonetheless, Islam is still “a strong ‘symbolic force’” in the process of social identity formation

among Turkish people, giving rise to contradictions in the definition of Turkish modernity and

claiming for a balance between religion and politics. Since the 1990s, Islamic identity has increased

its relevance in various fields, mainly in politics, economy and culture (Keyman 2007, 217) These

developments have to be linked to the view of Turkey as a “post imperial social formation” (Book

Reviews 2011, 247), with a strong state tradition and security concerns due to its geopolitical

position. Merging the two elements, we can assert that Turkey represents an “instrumental pious

11

nationalism” (Book Reviews 2011, 249), defined as “a movement in which religion occupies an

influential position as an element supporting national identity.”(Book Reviews 2011, 249) Taking all

together, the shift towards a more dynamic action paid in terms of internal consensus since the new

focus towards Turkey’s neighbors based on mutual identity touches the right feelings of Turkish

society.

Moreover, the image of a ‘strong Turkey’, able to play a greater role in the international realm, was

merged with a “social and humanitarian dimension” (Öniş 2014, 9), with a new focus on least-

developed countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, giving an image of a ‘strong and caring Turkey’. (Öniş

2014, 9) Both these elements have paid in domestic politics.

2-Confidence factor

Self-confidence is an asset Turkey has in playing its foreign policy. It comes from mainly two

developments: the overwhelming success in 2002, 2007 and 2011 general elections along with the

economic performance that brought Turkey out of the 2001 crisis.

The great results reported by the AKP allowed the government not to worry about internal

consensus, feeling free to adopt a more active stance. At the same time, these elections gave the

government the perception that they were doing well, thus being an incentive for keeping on

pursuing the same line.

Similarly, economic performance was essential in boosting the confidence of the policy-makers. The

economic factor is strictly connected to the electoral one, since the AKP’s strong economic

performance was a key element of the electoral success of the party. A “regulatory neo-liberalism”

(Öniş 2012a) environment along with the use of formal and informal redistributive mechanisms

allowed the AKP to gain political support, which in turn was transformed into further self-

confidence. During the first period of the AKP government, Turkey experienced an outstanding

12

economic growth, and it managed well the global financial crisis in 2008-2009, leading Turkey to be

included in the G-20, as a symbol of its new strength.

All these elements turned out to be beneficial for policy-makers’ confidence, prompting them to be

more active in the relationships with external actors. However, too much confidence could be

conducive for moral hazard, leading to misleading choices dictated by an over-estimation of Turkish

leverage in the global environment. We will see later on that this was the case in Turkey, as the

efforts Turkey has made to play as a regional power have led to the accusation of over-engagement.

3-Soft power

Joseph Nye jr defines soft power as the capacity of a state to “achieve the outcomes it prefers in

world politics because other states want to follow it or have agreed to a situation that produces

such effects.” (Nye Jr. 1990, 166) In this sense, Turkey should have exploit its political, cultural and

economic features to make the other players in the region follow it.

The first element that made Turkey a model was its economic performance. As abovementioned, in

the first period of the AKP’s era Turkish economy experienced a considerable growth, after the

tremendous phase that led to three economic crises in 1994, 2000 and 2001. A new wave of reforms

had already started in the period between 1999 and 2002, despite it gained strength only after the

last crisis in 2001. The AKP committed itself to a regulatory neo-liberal philosophy, with massive

privatization (Öniş 2012a, 5) and room for free-market economy combined with a supervision of the

economic process towards national development (Keyman and Öniş 2010, 167). Thus, on the other

hand, it pursued a policy of formal and formal redistribution (particularly in the fields of health and

education) (Öniş 2012a, 6) that led to the definition of “social neo-liberalism” (Öniş 2012a, 7).

Thanks to the combination of governmental policies and systemic factors, GDP per capita increased

dramatically during the first period of the AKP. The fiscal situation was stable, inflation low and the

13

banking system was not in danger (Öniş 2012a, 7). For all these reasons, many countries in the

region saw Turkish economy as a model to follow.

The second factor was democracy. The success in the democratic path was considered as a model

to emulate by many in the Arab countries (Ayoob 2012, 7), which were stuck in authoritarian

political systems. The process of democratisation began in Turkey in the late 1990s with the

government of Bülent Ecevit (Almuedo 2011, 17), and gained further momentum after 2002. With

the AKP in power, Turkey has demonstrated “the level of maturity and pragmatism political Islamism

has reached […] and the compatibility of Islam with democracy.” (Almuedo 2011, 17) The AKP

stressed its commitment to democratic reforms from the very beginning, considered “the

fundamental and effective basis for the long-term solution to Turkey’s problems.” (Keyman and Öniş

2010, 166) Along with democracy, the protection of individual rights and freedoms was central in

the AKP’s discourse, mostly due to the process of ‘Europeanization’ that saw the EU membership as

the main goal.

Lastly, the Muslim identity was decisive in creating a sense of community with its neighbours. In this

case, the writings of Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoğlu are a clear explanation of the sense of a

common Muslim identity. According to him, the republican project of joining the West is

impossible since it is not compatible with Turkey’s Islamic nature. Rejecting Western political

and intellectual hegemony, Turkey should exploit its strategic depth given by its Ottoman legacy,

which gives it historical and cultural links with the Muslim world. Davutoğlu sees in the common

Islamic identity the alternative “ordering principle” that reflects better the nature of the Muslim

world, and Turkey would have “the potential to become a trans-regional power that helps to

once again unify and lead the Muslim world.” (Edelman et Al. 2013, 28)

14

4-Institutional factor

From 2002, the political system in Turkey has undergone a deep change in power relations. The

landslide electoral successes of the AKP provoked a shift and a progressive over-concentration of

power in the hands of the party, which in turn affected the conduct of Turkish foreign policy.

• First of all, this dramatic shift in power provoked the progressive exclusion of the traditional

Kemalist foreign policy establishment, as the AKP was moving “to the very center of Turkish

politics.” (Öniş 2014, 13).

• Moreover, as the AKP became hegemonic in the internal political system, the balance in civil-

military relations changed, with civilian institutions having the upper hand over the military.

The latter lost its pivotal role on foreign policy, giving rise to a more pragmatic strategy with

economic interests prevailing over purely security issues. This new focus has allowed Turkey

to expand its relations with neighbours.

• Moreover, changes within the AKP itself took place. Indeed, liberal elements such as

religious conservatives and Turkish and Kurdish nationalists within the AKP were

marginalized (Öniş 2014).

• Lastly, the AKP acted in the realm of foreign policy without any relevant opposition.

Generally speaking, opposition parties (notably the CHP) were perceived as too distant from

the society, too technocratic and not focused on social justice (Keyman and Öniş 2010). Their

strict laicism and statist orientation gave the idea of a group ignoring global dynamics and

popular demands. Thus, in the realm of foreign policy, they did not mount an effective

opposition to the AKP, leaving it with any real balance within the Parliament (Keyman and

Öniş 2010).

15

To sum up, all these internal developments has led to an absence of check and balances, giving the

AKP the opportunity to undertake its foreign policy in a long-term perspective. As Ana Almuedo

writes, the key discrepancy between the previous secularist governments and the AKP lays in the

different role foreseen for Turkey (Almuedo 2011). While on the one hand the previous

governments were reluctant in promoting Turkish leadership in the Middle East, the AKP sees

Ankara as the natural leader of the region.

Conversion Factors: Facing constraints

So far, we have discussed the new role that Davutoğlu had foreseen for Turkey. However, Ankara

was not playing in a vacuum, but it had to face many systemic constraints. The great changes that

took place in the region affected the capability of Ankara to realize its aims.

1- First of all, the strong ties that Ankara had developed during the ‘zero problems’ phase were

put in trouble with the emergency of new dynamics in the area. The Arab Spring brought

about instability and popular resentment, urging the international community to choose

between supporting the request for democracy of the population and backing the

authoritarian regimes that were losing legitimacy in their states. Turkey had to face a

dilemma, since during the ‘zero problems’ phase it had pursued pragmatic policies with even

dictators, without caring about popular demands. However, since its aim was becoming a

leader in the region, not supporting popular resistance would have weakened its image as a

role model (Öniş 2014). At least at the beginning of the uprisings, economic factors, together

with identity and personal relationships refrained Turkey from acting promptly. The case of

Libya is a clear example of these dynamics, since the significant Turkish investments, the

common Muslim identity and the personal ties between Qaddafi and Erdoğan made Turkey

join the NATO coalition only in the later stage, and in a rather passive way (Öniş 2014).

Bahrain is another good example, since Turkey decided not to intervene in the uprising that

16

was taking place in the country due to the economic agreements with the GCC states (Ayoob

2012). Thus, these regional developments posed a threat to the ‘zero problems’ strategy of

the AKP, undermining the pragmatic equilibrium that Ankara had established since that

moment.

2- Secondly, deep sectarian rifts pervade the Middle East. The Shi’a-Sunni historical religious

divide has been revitalized in the last years by the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, which

have given rise to extremist tendencies in the region as a whole. Some scholars have argued

that Turkey has joined this fault-line, naturally mirroring the internal backing of Sunni Islam

also in the external realm (Öniş 2014). Öniş, on the other hand, suggests that Ankara aimed

at promoting links with the whole Muslim world instead of just one part of it. He suggests

that the support for Sunni Muslims is “an unintended consequence of excessive involvement

in the domestic politics of key Arab states rather than the outcome of an explicit grand

strategy or policy design,” as the AKP government has sided internal actors in Turkey’s

neighbors without evaluating the potential negative developments (Öniş 2014). In any case,

Ankara has been drawn in a sectarian struggle, compromising its image of neutral regional

power and fostering further instability in the region.

3- The Middle East is also an area where “an interlocking set of conflictual and cooperative

interactions at the domestic, regional and global levels” (Ayoob 2012, 11) has been sparked

by the Arab Spring, with the involvement of both regional (for instance Saudi Arabia and

Iran) and global powers (notably Russia and the United States). Thus, the degree of freedom

that a middle power as Turkey can enjoy is limited by the behavior of all these players. As

demonstrated by the Syrian conflict, for example, the capability of Ankara to impose its new

role was curtailed by the talks between Russia and the US.

17

4- The great instability in the new democratic governments established after the first wave of

protests complicated Turkey’s calculations about the strategy to follow. Indeed, the path of

democratic transition after the overthrow of dictators such as Qaddafi and Mubarak proved

to be troublesome, and the new democracies were too weak to resist social divisions. Thus,

any strategic calculation that implied siding with internal forces was highly risky. The case of

Egypt is a stark example. The AKP decided to back the Muslim Brotherhood and the newly

elected President Morsi, while not grasping the increasing polarization within the Egyptian

society, fostered by the Brotherhood itself. The concerns of especially the secular segments

led to the military coup of July 2013. In this context, the AKP should have adopted a more

balanced stance, supporting the Brotherhood while advocating for a higher inclusion of the

opposition groups (Öniş 2014).

The Syrian Case: testing Turkey’s capability

The Syrian case is striking to assess the role of Turkey in the region. The Turkish-Syrian relationship

was characterized by great tensions, due to Syrian territorial claims,1 the water conflict over the

Tigris and Euphrates rivers and, most importantly, the Kurdish issue. As for the latter, the logistical

support provided by Syria to the Kurdish PKK brought about a full-scale crisis that almost escalated

to an armed conflict in 1998. However, the solution of the crisis with the capture of PKK leader

Abdullah Öcalan normalized the relationship with Damascus (Almuedo 2011). Since 1999, Syria and

Turkey strengthened their ties, and Turkey based its approach on economic interdependence and

cultural interaction. However, while improvements in Syrian-Turkish relationships were already in

motion before the AKP came to power, it was only under Erdoğan that they skyrocketed, also due

1 Over the province of Hatay.

18

to the common concern about the US campaign in the region against Iraq. Syria became the symbol

of the ‘zero problems’ strategy, leading Davutoğlu to say that “Syria is not just a neighboring

country. We have a common history, we share a very long land border and we are destined to live

next to each other.” (Edelman et al. 2013, 39) The two countries signed a free trade agreement in

2007 and established a Strategic Partnership Council in 2009, while mutually abolishing visa

requirements (Edelman et al. 2013). Since that time, the democratic issue2 (as the Assad

government was autocratic) was intentionally left out from the discussions, in respect of the

principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states.

However, Turkey’s relationship with Syria was based on the link with the regime, while not caring

about the will of the Syrian people (Edelman et al. 2013). When the latter started to demonstrate

against the regime itself, amid the broader scenario of the Arab Spring, Erdoğan had to choose

between safeguarding Turkey’s economic interests and supporting Syrian Sunni Arab populations.

At first, Erdoğan asked the Assad regime for political reform, trying to capitalize on its soft power.

Nonetheless, when the Syrian government started to attack the opposition, the AKP openly

condemned the regime action, defining it as a shock and calling for democratic change (Edelman et

al. 2013). When it became clear that Assad was not willing to follow any recommendations from

Ankara, Erdoğan finally called on Assad to leave in November 2011 (Edelman et al. 2013). In the

spring of 2013, Erdoğan called for a multilateral and humanitarian intervention aimed at regime

change, and supported the position of President Obama for a U.S.-led military intervention after the

chemical attack of August 21. When Russia and the U.S. agreed upon a plan for dismantling Syrian

chemical arsenal, excluding military intervention, Erdoğan was disappointed, also given the fact that

Turkey had not been involved in the negotiations (Edelman et al. 2013). In any case, Turkey

2 The Assad government in Syria is an autocracy.

19

remained active in the Syrian scenario, acting to support the waves of refugees escaping from the

conflict.

However, Turkey made some miscalculations in approaching Syria: (Öniş 2014)

1- Erdoğan has over-estimated its leverage on Assad (which was based on personal, economic

and cultural ties);

2- Turkish policymakers have under-estimated the resilience of the Ba’athist establishment and

over-estimated the strength of the opposition forces;

3- Turkish policymakers have over-estimated the willingness of the international community to

intervene in the conflict, especially as far as the United States are concerned.

Fraiming the Syrian Case into the Capability Approach

AKP’s Resources in Syria

Thus, Ankara shifted away from the ‘zero problems’ strategy of respecting internal sovereignty, due

to a series of reasons. Firstly, humanitarian, since it gave support to Syrian population to relief their

sufferance. Secondly, ethical, due to the violence perpetrated by the regime against its own

population. Finally, realpolitik calculations, since Syrian Kurds had potential repercussions on

Turkish Kurds as well, who have been a troublesome issue in Turkey since a long time.

We can now lay down the resources that Turkey has tried to use in its policy towards Syria and frame

them into the capability approach.

First of all, we can see the decision of backing the Muslim Brotherhood (which is one of the

group opposing Assad) in Syria, as well as its active role and humanitarian efforts as

compatible with the use of foreign policy as an instrument to maintain internal consensus.

Indeed, the AKP base was largely in support of the Syrian Brotherhood. The AKP is rooted in

20

the Milli Görüş Islamist movement (Edelman et al. 2013) founded in 1969 by Necmettin

Erbakan, which was substantially the Turkish Muslim Brotherhood. Moreover, the call for

democratic reforms and the humanitarian effort provided for by Ankara are in line with the

image of a ‘strong and caring Turkey’ (Öniş 2014, 9) that the AKP wants to show, as they are

elements that have a strong internal appeal. However, the bombing that took place on May

11, 2013 in the Turkish border town of Rehyanli (were many Syrian refugees lived), together

with other clashes in the border area, started posing security risks to the population living

there, provoking a wave of criticisms also in domestic politics (Öniş 2014).

As for the confidence factor, in June 2011 the AKP gained about 50 percent of the

preferences, while the economy was still resisting amid a global financial crisis. These

elements helped the party’s leadership to feel free to pursue an active role in Syria, both

because it did not have to think about gaining internal consensus and because the ballot box

demonstrated the support for the AKP’s policies. However, this high confidence turned out

to be counterproductive. Indeed, Erdoğan fell in the trap of moral hazard, as feeling safe at

home and confident in Ankara’s role in the region, he was prompted to adopt risky decisions

that did not reflect a balanced approach. As in the case of Egypt (Öniş 2014), Ankara failed

to play the role of neutral mediator between the interests of the different parties in the

conflict, proposing itself as one of the main supporter of an armed strike against the regime.

Furthermore, Turkey tried to exploit its soft power. First of all, Ankara used its economic

blackmail power to push Assad to change its conduct. Davutoğlu announced that "We are

completely suspending all of these trade relations, all agreements between Turkey and Syria

have been suspended." (Sherzai 2012)

In this way, Syria was deprived from an important commercial partner, being punished for the brutal

conduct of Assad. Moreover, democracy and human rights were arguments used to blame the

21

regime and to pose itself as the protector of the will of the people. Lastly, the identity factor was

the most relevant resource of soft power that Turkey used in order to influence the events in Syria.

Nonetheless, in this case Ankara’s behaviour was mainly dictated by instrumental considerations.

Indeed, prior to the widening of the rift between Shi’a and Sunni Arabs, the AKP was managing its

foreign policy relations with all Muslim countries, without any sectarian distinction. The common

element was found in the contrast to Western policies, and the aim was the establishment of a “pan-

Islamic sphere of influence.” (Edelman et al. 2013, 46) However, the Syrian conflict brought about a

dramatic change in the relationships between Shi’a and Sunni, and power in the country was

contended by both. As some scholars argue, “the single constants in the policy have been an

attempt to extend Turkish influence into Syria and to turn it into a client state.” (Edelman et al. 2013,

46) Since the Syrian uprising, Ankara could pursue this aim dealing with the regime. After that, given

the brutal behaviour of Assad and the fact that “the AKP’s ideological affiliates in Syria took up arms

against the regime,” (Edelman et al. 2013, 46) Ankara saw in the opposition the best way to serve

its interests.

However, the use of soft power resources (notably the identity issue) along with the high level of

confidence led the AKP to exaggerate its intervention in Syrian domestic affairs, and gave rise to

accusation of neo-Ottomanism (Tugal 2012).

Lastly, the institutional factor is evident in the lack of check and balances that gave the AKP

freedom of action. Indeed, as abovementioned, the previous governments did not see the

Middle East as the main field for Turkish foreign policy game, which instead reflected the

Islamic roots of the AKP. Furthermore, had the laic and nationalist previous élite been in

charge, it would not have allowed the active and risky stance towards Syria that the AKP

adopted, as it would have been worried about possible repercussions into the internal

security environment.

22

Applying Conversion Factors

We can now recall the main conversional factors that constrained the foreign policy of the AKP in

Syria. First of all, the structural changes that occurred in the region urged Ankara to change its

conduct, shifting away from a mere economic partnership towards an intrusive policy of regime

change in Syria. The evolution of the conflict into a stalemate, with new dynamics involving both

internal and external actors in Syria, halted Turkey’s calculation, which foresaw an armed

intervention against the regime and a swift solution of the struggle.

Secondly, the AKP has fallen in the trap of the Sunni-Shi’a divide. Either voluntarily or not, its

decision to back the Sunni Syrian Brotherhood weakened its image of neutral power in the region.

Thirdly, the presence of regional (like Iran and Saudi Arabia) as well as international (notably the

United States and Russia) powers has limited Turkey’s scope of action, especially after the deal

between the US and Russia to remove Syrian chemical weapons arsenal. Indeed, Erdoğan has been

described as “embarrassed and isolated as a result of the Russian-American deal – a deal that was

struck without consulting or involving Turkey.” (Edelman et al. 2013, 45)

Lastly, the instability of the internal situation made an accurate assessment of the real balance of

power impossible. However, the moral hazard effect stemming out from AKP’s confidence led

Turkey to naively support a Brotherhood-led scenario for a post-Assad Syria (Edelman et al. 2013).

This would require “the Muslim Brotherhood to fully and absolutely dominate the entirety of Syria.

The likelihood of this is close to zero.” (Edelman et al. 2013, 42)

23

Conclusions

After having analysed Turkish foreign policy within the framework of the capability approach, we

can assess that the pro-active stance of the AKP in the Middle East has not been successful in pursing

Ankara’s aims. Instead, it has produced detrimental effects, drawing Turkey into sectarian conflicts

and provoking over-engagement in neighbouring countries’ domestic affairs. Some scholars have

accused the AKP of “neo-Ottomanism,” which in this case would mean the rediscovery of Turkish

imperial tradition merged with a new nationalism based on co-existence of multiple identities

(Taşpinar 2011). This argument was posed by former President Turgut Özal, who promoted

pluralism recalling an idealized vision of the Ottoman Empire (Hale 2013). However, neo-

Ottomanism has been interpreted in a more ‘expansionist’ vein as well, to indicate the fact that

Turkey should play a greater role in the former Ottoman territories, which is in line with Davutoğlu’s

emphasis on Turkey’s neighbours (Hale 2013). Furthermore, someone has argued that neo-

Ottomanism would imply the reestablishment of a territorial empire, a “greater Turkey” similar to

the one proposed by Necmettin Erbakan in the past (Hale 2013, 255). Davutoğlu has always denied

these tendencies, confirming the aim of a “multi-dimensional and dynamic…foreign policy” (Hale

2013, 255) but respecting “the independence and equal status of all regional states.” (Hale 2013,

255)

Erdoğan had to accept that Turkey has not been able to play the role that he and Davutoğlu foresaw

for it, as demonstrated by the Syrian case. The Middle East is a troublesome region that witness an

inter-play of regional and global powers, and imaging a hegemonic role for Ankara is simply out of

question. Moreover, the swift changes that take place would require a neutral, strong power able

to mediate between several interests. Unequivocally backing the Sunni Syrian Brotherhood, as well

as other cases such as Mohamed Morsi in Egypt, has alienated the possibility for Turkey to exercise

an effective power.

24

In the framework of the capability approach, we can conclude that Turkey has not been able to

convert the resources it had into effective capability to pursue its aim. The set of functionings that

it has chosen, among all its soft power, has not been enough to achieve full capability in foreign

policy. The conversion factors involved in transforming its resources into capability have limited its

action, even producing detrimental effects such as security threats in the Syrian border and an over-

engagement in internal affairs of other states, which also brought Turkey into the deep Shi’a-Sunni

sectarian rift.

25

References

Almuedo, Ana. New Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Middle East: Neither so New, Nor

so Turkish. IEMed – European Institute of the Mediterranean with EuroMesco.

Ayoob, Mohammed. 2012. The Arab Spring: Its Geostrategic Significance. Middle East

Policy, 19(3): 84-97.

Book Reviews. 2011. Review of the book Symbiotic Antagonisms: Competing Nationalisms

in Turkey. Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press. Ayşe Kadıoğlu and E. Fuat Keyman.

Edelma, Eric S., Cornell, Svante E., Lobel, Aaron, and Makovsky, Michael. 2013. The Roots

of Turkish Conduct: Understanding the Evolution of Turkish Policy in the Middle East.

National Security Program, Bipartisan Policy Center.

Hale, William. 2013. Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774. Third Edition. New York:

Routledge.

Keyman, Fuat, Öniş, Ziya. 2010. Turkish Politics in a Changing World. Istanbul, Turkey:

Istanbul Bilgi University Publications.

Keyman, Fuat. 2007. Modernity, Secularism and Islam: The Case of Turkey. Theory Culture

Society, 24: 215. http://tcs.sagepub.com/content/24/2/215.

Nye Jr., Joseph S. 1990. Soft Power. Foreign Policy, 80: 153-171.

Öniş, Ziya. 2012. Turkey and the Arab Spring: Between Ethics and Self-Interest. Insight

Turkey, 14(3): 45-63.

Öniş, Ziya. 2012a. The Triumph of Conservative Globalism: the Political Economy of the

AKP Era. Turkish Studies, 13(2): 135-152.

Öniş, Ziya. 2014. Turkey and the Arab Revolutions: Boundaries of Regional Power Influence

in a Turbulent Middle East. Mediterranean Politics, DOI: 10.1080/13629395.2013.868392.

Rawls, John. 1971. A Theory of Justice. US: Harvard University Press.

26

Roemer, John. 1994. Inequality Reexamined. By Amartya Sen. The Philosophical Review,

103(3): 554-557.

Sen, Amartya. 1999. Development as Freedom. The New York Times.

https://www.nytimes.com/books/first/s/sen-development.html.

Sen, Amartya. 2003. Development as Capability Expansion. In: Fukuda-Parr S, et al

Readings in Human Development. New Delhi and New York: Oxford University Press.

Sherzai, Dilawar. 2012. Turkish-Syrian Skirmishes. Outlook Afghanistan, June 26.

http://outlookafghanistan.net/topics.php?post_id=4719.

Taşpinar, Ömer. 2011. The Three Strategic Visions of Turkey. Center on the United States

and Europe at BROOKINGS. US – Europe Analysis Series (50).

Tugal, Cihan. 2012. Democratic Janissaries? Turkey’s role in the Arab Spring. New Left

Review, 76: 5-24.