Turkey Oil & Gas Intelligence Report 2016

Turkey: An Oil & Gas Inflection Point

Stephanie Morrison, Final ProjectINTL- 580 Intelligence Communications

Professor Melonie RicheyFebruary 23, 2016

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Table of Contents

About This Document......................................................................................3

Key Findings.....................................................................................................4

Overall Estimate.........................................................................................5-13

LFAR’s (Long Form Analytic Reports)........................................................14-17

SFAR’s (Short Form Analytic Reports)......................................................18-21

Annexes (ACH - Structured Analytic Technique).....................................22-24

Contact Information......................................................................................25

Endnotes..................................................................................................26-30

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About This Document

This document contains analytic products resulting from research done by an intelligence analyst supporting Professor Melonie Richey in determining the likelihood of Turkey’s Oil and Gas Energy Sectors improving in the next twelve to twenty-four months. The analyst focused specifically on oil and gas developments as it pertains to global oil prices, its role on the energy stage, the Turkish economy, oil and natural gas pipeline infrastructure development and construction, key strategic allies, certain energy partners as suppliers, and regional conflicts in the general area. The analyst used only Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) to make their estimates, meaning that there are many unknown factors.

The Key Findings are the culmination of estimates regarding different aspects of the Turkish oil and gas industry sectors including geopolitics. The findings support insight into specific oil and gas issues relevant to the overall estimate by multiple analytic reports (SFARs, LFARs). Two structured analytic techniques used in this assessment are The Analysis of Competing Hypothesis (ACH) and Strength, Weaknesses, Opportunity and Threat (SWOT) Analysis.

The analytic confidence is moderate with the analyst having minimal expertise. Sufficient time allowed for completion of the estimate and analytic methodologies used for this report. Level of requirement was difficult to moderate. There were high source corroboration and the analyst worked alone. The analyst’s contact information is included on the “Contact Information” page.

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Key Findings

It is likely Turkey’s oil and gas sectors will improve in the next one to two years, due to the country’s role as an energy transit hub, the country’s increasing energy demands from its economic growth, investment in pipeline infrastructure and storage capacity, its expanded relationships with suppliers and neighboring countries despite regional conflicts and continued oil and gas development.

Turkey’s energy sector needs an investment amount of approximately USD 130 billion by 2020. Driven by strong population growth, urbanization, economic expansion, its energy consumption rates have more than tripled since the 1980s and 1990s. Recent surveys suggest that until 2020, oil consumption is likely to increase two fold, and gas consumption four fold.

Turkey’s role as a transit energy hub-corridor is a key component to its long-term energy strategy. Its advantageous geographic location functions as a connector between east and west energy suppliers and the European Markets.

Turkey has the fastest emerging energy market in Europe due to economic growth paralleling energy demands. Liberalization of energy markets is dependent upon outside expertise and technology opening up foreign trade/investment opportunities.

Infrastructure is key to developing alternatives in supply and demand. Major pipeline development, transportation routes, investment in storage/capacity, and additional ports for shipment of the import and export commodities are necessary.

Relations with regional partners are at risk by geo-political conflicts with the Syrian civil war and refugee crisis, compromised with Russia and Iran involvement, issues with its own domestic Kurd population potentially destabilizing Turkey’s overall security, economic and long-term energy interests.

Oil – With very limited domestic oil reserves, Turkey imports nearly all of its oil supplies. Turkey’s economy has expanded and its petroleum and other liquid consumptions have increased significantly outpacing annual production rates.

Gas- With nominal domestic gas production, Turkey currently imports over 90 percent annually - 60 percent alone from Russia – driving a need for greater supply diversification and away from single source dependency.

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Overall Estimate

Turkey’s Oil And Gas Sectors Likely To Improve For The Next One To Two Years

Executive Summary:

It is likely Turkey’s oil and gas sectors will improve in the next one to two years, due to the country’s role as an energy transit hub, the country’s increasing energy demands from its economic growth, investment in pipeline infrastructure and storage capacity, its expanded relationships with suppliers and neighboring countries, despite regional conflicts and continued oil and gas development.

Turkey’s energy sector needs an investment amount of approximately USD 130 billion by 2020. Driven by strong population growth, urbanization, economic expansion, its energy consumption rate has more than tripled since the 1980s and 1990s. Recent surveys suggest that until 2020 oil consumption is likely to increase two fold, and gas consumption four fold.

Discussion:Role as an Energy Transit Hub

Turkey’s role is increasing on the global energy stage from a transit country to an international energy hub because of its strategic location.1 Simply said, Turkey lies in regions where over 70 percent of the world’s proven oil and gas reserves reside.2 Turkey’s location among multiple sources and consumers of primary energy will continue to drive the pipeline investments, port development, storage capacity and opportunities for shipping.3 The geographic disparity between the sources or suppliers of primary energy and demand for oil and gas; is also driving growth for transportation of these commodities.4 Its location is allowing easy connection from neighboring countries to European markets. Turkey has placed an emphasis on factors contributing to its position by prioritizing energy supply security, improving the investment environment and its strategy of diversification.5

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Source retrieved from: http://tinyurl.com/jr4ej7r

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Turkey’s shift from being merely a gas consumer and transit country to a major energy hub player is due to investment of infrastructure in pipeline projects. Oil and gas commodities from other countries will force competition in the markets, boosting Turkey’s bargaining power against other suppliers.6 Turkey is the nexus of supply and demand transit routes that stand to profit Turkey significantly marked by its geostrategic importance. 7

Emerging Economic Growth

Turkey’s economy is large, diverse and dynamic in the European region with open trade and investment policies facilitating significant export and import volumes and foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows.8 Since 2010, Turkey has experienced some of the fastest growth in total energy demands among other countries in the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).9 In 2010 and 2011, Turkey was the fifth fastest growing economy in terms of GDP, averaging 9 to 10 percent.10 The economy grew 4.3 percent in 2013.11 According to the IMF, the Turkish economy grew only 2.3 percent in 2014 and 3.1 percent in 2015.12 GDP growth is likely to increase above 4 percent in 2017.13 Turkey’s USD 800 billion-dollar economy relies on imports for almost all of its fossil fuel needs.14 At present, domestic resources meet approximately 30 percent of Turkey’s total energy demand, the other by a diversified portfolio of imports.15

Turkey has liberalized the energy sector to attract new and competitive investments.16 Through market liberalization, opportunities exist for foreign companies to invest and provide advanced technologies in electric and natural gas prospects.17 These include electricity distribution and generation assets, equipment, and gas networks.18 In the past ten years, Turkey has been privatizing energy assets, but the government still controls about half of the power generation market.19 In business taxes, Turkey has positive treatments for oil and gas exploration and production – with a 12.5 percent royalty to the government and a flat 20 percent corporate tax rate.20 Annual investments of USD 12 billion will be required until 2023 to meet Turkey’s overall energy needs.21

Infrastructure

Turkey’s infrastructure investment and development is part of an overall economic and political priority.22 Pipelines forge connections between countries, creating a political and economic integration.23 Turkey has been active in pursuing international oil and gas pipeline projects.24 Many are underway, are at various stages or within completion in the next several years.25 As of 2013, Turkey had more than 7,600 miles of natural gas pipelines, including interconnections to four international import pipelines and one international export pipeline.26 This will improve the security of supply in Turkey and maintain its role as an important “energy corridor” between East and West.27

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The transit of foreign gas and oil across Turkey from suppliers in the Caspian/Central Asia and Middle East to the Southern and Central Europe is a major opportunity for the Turkish energy sector.28 The Southern Gas Corridor is a major component of the EU energy policy. It ensures that viable routes are established and maintained for future decades.29

As a gas consumer Turkey has a gas storage capacity of just over 2 (bcm).30 This storage capacity of about 5 percent is one of the lowest in Europe.31 With its current take-or-pay requirements, it has to take the gas and if not, pay anyway.32 Because of inadequate gas storage and infrastructure problems, Turkey has struggled to meets its obligations for piped gas from Russian, Iran and Azerbaijan.33 Turkey needs to address its storage capacity issue and Ankara is addressing this problem by offering USD 10 billion in incentives to expand and develop new underground facilities which could increase storage capacity to over 5 (bcm) by 2019.34

TANAP (Trans-Anatolian Pipeline) - The Caspian Sea-Turkey-Europe natural gas pipeline project from Azerbaijan is the first step in the South Caucasian Gas Pipeline project (SCP).35 The EU backed project involves 7 countries and 11 companies.36 The TANAP pipelines aim is to transport natural gas produced in Azerbaijan from the vast offshore Shah-Deniz gas fields carried through Georgia to Turkey and further to other European markets.37 TANAP's initial capacity is to reach 16 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas per year. Around six billion cubic meters of the gas is marked for delivery to Turkey and the rest of the volume to Europe. Turkey will obtain gas in 2018, while Europe will get it in early 2020 after the connector pipeline the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) is completed.38 Construction began in March 2015, with expectations of completion in 2018. 39 TANAP’s construction has highlighted growing competition between the EU and Russia for influence over Turkish energy export routes. The TANAP is part of a larger EU diversification plan via the Southern Gas corridor route.40

The Trans Adriatic Pipeline - (TAP) At the Turkish border, the TAP pipeline will deliver gas to Italy via Greece, Albania, and across the Adriatic Sea. It is a connector pipeline and second

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Map of the Southern Gas Corridor from the Caspian Sea region to Europe.Source retrieved from: http://tinyurl.com/zrtmhu6

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phase that forms part of the Southern Gas corridor route. Initially, 16 (bcm) of gas will run through the corridor with 6 (bcm) allocated to Turkey. The timetable if met, will reach Turkey by late 2018 and southern Europe by 2019. The TAP’s potential lies in its ability to connect to existing and proposed lines.41 It also has a feature that will allow for a “reverse flow” that can redirect energy supplies if there is a disruption or increase capacity in a certain region.42

The (KRG) Kurdistan Regional Government Pipeline – The Iraqi-Kurd/Turkey (Sirnak) pipeline project is under construction and will transport up to 10 billion cubic meter (bcm) of natural gas per year from the gas fields in northern Iraq.43 A finalized agreement, signed in 2013 between the AKP and KRG governments is to import 4 (bcm) of gas in 2017 and 10 (bcm) by 2020.44 Genel Energy and BOTAS will develop and construct the new pipeline that will extend to the Turkish-Iraqi border at Silopi.45 On-going disputes between Erbil and Baghdad over whether the KRG has the right to develop its own oil and gas fields and export hydrocarbons without the permission of the central Iraqi government could cause delays and Turkey not receive gas from Iraqi Kurdistan until 2018.46

Regional Relations/Partnerships

Political conflicts threaten relations with Turkey’s regional partners.47 Turkey is ground zero of geo-political uncertainty with the Syrian civil war along its border complicated by Russian and Iranian intervention.48 Security threats from a de-stabilized Syria and a Russian and Iranian military presence pose uncertainty-intensifying risk to the area.49 The on-going Syrian civil war with 2.5 million refugees fleeing into Turkey’s borders is causing a humanitarian crisis that Turkey finds itself unable to manage on its own.50 While the UN has provided financial aid to Turkey, its ability to continue to absorb more people has resulted in the country closing its borders stating it has reached maximum capacity.51 Turkey is also experiencing issues with its own domestic rebel Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) population potentially undermining Turkey’s overall security, political economic, and long-term interests.52 Diversification and growing demands from the EU is also causing strains in the geopolitics in the region.53 This has made Turkey seek partners that are friendly to its economic and long-term energy strategy.54

Russia –

Natural gas trade between Turkey and Russia collapsed after Turkey shot down a Russian Su-24 jet on Nov. 24 for a violation of Turkish airspace along the Syrian border.55 This has caused a response from Russia that threatens supply disruptions, leaving Turkey vulnerable.56 The incident has resulted in Turkey seeking diversification of partners to break

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Source from: http://tinyurl.com/z5zz5ky

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its Russian dependency as its main oil and gas importer.57 Political tensions arose, followed by a wave of economic sanctions and the banning of the import of Turkish produce and industrial goods into Russia, along with Russian refusal to issue work permits to Turkish workers in Russia.58 While Moscow has damaged its reputation as a reliable partner in trade in the eyes of Ankara, state-run Gazprom announced they would continue to supply the gas promised in the agreement.59 Other negotiations of pipelines and projects between the two countries have stopped due to continued delays of pricing discounts furthering a decline in their relationship.60

Iraqi-Kurds –The Iraq Kurds are an ethnic group operating autonomously within northern Iraq without a recognized state status, commonly called Kurdistan.61 Many have migrated into Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria, but with division between the factions and lack of political boundaries, it creates instability in the region.62 Masoud Barzani governs the Iraqi-Kurds and relations with Turkey’s President Erdogan are one of a growing collaboration.63 Since 2009, Erdogan has sought closer relations by encouraging investment and permitted exports to go through Turkey’s borders.64 Drawn together out of mutual interests and dependency, both have common concerns of energy issues and regional threats of Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS).65 The interdependent relationship is stronger by the construction of the (Sirnak) natural gas pipeline currently underway and expected to produce and ship gas to Turkey by 2017.66 The Iraqi Kurdish region has become one of Turkey’s most important trading partners, particularly in crude.67 Turkey offers the sole route to market expanding the Kurdish oil industry, and Turkish companies provide builders and consumer goods.68

Since 2014, the KRG forces captured the city of Kirkuk and are in control of the oilfields, Erbil and most of the disputed northern region of Iraq.69 Recently, terrorism to the infrastructure and oil fields has been on the rise.70 ISIS militants in the area have sabotaged and attacked pipelines causing disruption along the Ceyhan pipeline in southeastern Turkey along the border.71 The struggle to protect and secure the pipelines from insurgent attacks will become increasingly important to Turkish imports.72

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Source from: http://tinyurl.com/hyy3j48

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Azerbaijan –Turkey and Azerbaijan is a mutually beneficial and economic relationship as a buyer and seller. Azerbaijan needs Turkey to transport oil and gas to eager European markets and Turkey lacks the natural resources to supply its domestic consumption demands.73 Turkey provides the most secure export routing to the Mediterranean via the (1,098-mile) Baku-Tiflis-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline. Azerbaijan is also investing with Turkey in a joint railway project, building refineries and collaborating in oil processing and distribution networks each adding wealth to its economies.74

Israel –In December 2015, a meeting between Turkey and Israel resulted in normalizing diplomatic relations since 2010.75 Turkey and Israel represent strong US allies and their reuniting will stabilize the area to confront and manage the growing threats caused by Iran, Iraq, Syria, ISIS, and Al Qaeda.76 Both nations have strategic interests in reconciliation.77 Restoring ties with Israel has a lot to do with politics and security in the region, as much as finding another source for Turkey’s increasing energy needs.78 Economically, both share important trade routes that could help each other. Israel’s offshore gas fields, Leviathan and Tamar, both operated by U.S. oil and gas company Noble Energy, offer the potential to become a gas exporter in the Middle East.79 Implications for Turkey are access to Israel’s gas reserves for selling to both Turkey and Greece via Turkey’s pipelines.80 In the past, both countries have had good trade, shared intelligence and some military cooperation.81

Recently, leaders from Israel, Greece and Cyprus have formed a trilateral committee to study plans to build a gas pipeline between Israel and Cyprus and on to Greece for gas exports to Europe.82 They also discussed plans for an underwater cable to connect the electricity grids of the three countries.83 Gas imported from Israel and other Eastern Mediterranean countries can play an increasingly important role in Turkey’s effort to diversify its supplies of natural gas away from a very expensive Russian supplier.84

European Union (EU) – With Europe facing its own gas market challenge, import dependency will continue to increase.85 European gas import requirements are set to increase by almost one-third between 2014 and 2020.86 Europe has been at odds with Russia for years over pricing of long-term energy contracts and monopolization of the markets.87 Russia is the largest gas exporter to Europe via Ukraine – an important transit country.88 In 2006, when a dispute between the Ukraine and Russia occurred with Russian cutting off all gas supplies disrupting European delivery, this led the EU to seek a new energy policy.89 The EU policy is to ensure its energy security by diversifying its natural gas supply as well as transport routes endangering Russia’s position of the largest exporter of oil and natural gas to the EU markets and consumers.90

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The result was the identification and development of the Southern Gas Corridor to supply Europe with gas from the Caspian Sea area and Middle Eastern sources.91 Like Turkey, the EU is wary of its heavy dependency in a geopolitical background and the growing sense of security of supply.92 By 2020, the EU’s gas import dependency currently at 41 percent is likely to be approximately two-thirds of its total gas demand. Much of that can be supplied via Turkey and prevent supply disruptions.93

Oil

In the next ten years, Turkey’s crude oil imports are likely to double.94 More than 90 percent of the country’s total liquid fuels result from importing.95 According to the US Energy Information Administration, in 2014 most of the oil comes from Iran and Iraq.96 Imported oil from Russia has declined and is being redirected to Asia or Indian markets.97 Most of Turkey’s proven oil reserves are located in the southeastern region in the Batman and Adiyaman Provinces.98 Turkey produces only a small amount of its own crude and other liquids, approximately 61,000 barrels a day, that provide 9 percent of Turkey’s oil consumption.99

There are only two major imports crude and condensate oil pipelines in Turkey, the (Baku-Tbilsi-Ceyhan) BTC from Azerbaijan and the (Kirkuk-Ceyhan) pipeline from northern Iraq.100 The Kirkuk-Ceyhan line is 1,876 km long (1,297 km in Turkey) and has a capacity of transporting 553 million barrels a year, making it Turkey's largest pipeline.101 Although frequent disruptions of supply occur, in 2012, Turkey and Iraq entered into an agreement to continue oil imports for 15 more years.102 The Iraqi-Kurds are exporting oil directly to Turkey outside of Baghdad via the KRG line to the Ceyhan port.103 Operating independently, the Kurds are producing approximately 600,000 barrels a day from the Tac Taq oil fields.104 The KRG relies on Turkey to export its goods in order to receive revenue.105 Implications of an Iraqi-Kurd independent state would mean a huge loss of revenue for Iraq generated by oil and gas assets and jeopardize relations the US has with Iraq.106

Turkey’s unique location plays a key role in shipment and transportation of oil.107 Approximately 2 to 3 million barrels of oil a day are carried on tankers, passing through the Bosporus and Dardanelles waterways – (the Turkish Straits) connecting the Black Sea to the Mediterranean.108

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This accounts for roughly 3.7 percent of the world’s daily oil consumption (around 150 million tons) carried through Turkey on its way to the global markets.109

Gas

With domestic gas consumption growing, Turkey produces a very small amount of natural gas.110 Most of Turkeys gas imports come from others.111 Turkey is a natural Gas-based economy and depends on imports for 99 percent of its natural gas. Russia pipes in nearly 60 percent of Turkey’s total gas use.112 Turkey operates take-or-pay contracts with Algeria, Iran, Nigeria and Russia.113 It is expecting to receive gas from Azerbaijan in 2018 and export it to Europe via Greece through the Trans-Adriatic pipeline (TAP).114 Turkey is the second largest consumer of Russian gas and paid Gazprom USD 10 billion in 2015. Iran supplies 20 percent of Turkey’s gas and Azerbaijan 10 percent, all via pipeline.115

Natural gas, which passed oil in 2012, is becoming Turkey’s main source of energy.116 Natural gas is mainly used in power generation and space heating, and consumption is expected to remain strong, as rising electricity, consumption will create more demand.117 More gas has been a strategic choice in Turkey (and around the world) because it is cleaner, more flexible, and highly reliable.118 Turkey’s goal is to decrease its share of natural gas in the power generation sector to 30 percent by 2030.119

Gas generates over 50 percent of Turkey’s electricity, but accounts for only 30 percent of installed capacity.120 Any interruption in gas flow to Turkey also poses a risk to the electricity network as the country generates 48.1 percent of its electricity via natural gas, according to government data.121 Turkey benefits from the transit of gas and the importance of transiting non-

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Source retrieved from: http://tinyurl.com/juhwdpd

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Russian gas volumes across current and planned pipelines giving Turkey added revenue.122 The state owned Turkish Pipeline Corporation (BOTAS) opened a tender to construct the new (Sirnak) natural gas pipeline in northern Iraqi Kurdistan that will tie into Turkey’s gas grid.123 With reported reserves of 5 trillion cubic meters, it will connect into the national network in the Mardin province.124

Analytic Confidence:Analytic confidence for this assessment is high. Source reliability is high with very little conflict among sources and information updated within the last week. The analyst expertise is minimal and the analyst worked alone with no input from others on a team or peer evaluation. The task complexity is moderately complex and the time allowed was ample.

For questions or comments, please contact the author:

Email: [email protected].#: (512) 555-5555

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Turkish and Iraqi Kurds Energy Alliance Likely To Strengthen Despite Difficulties in the Next 12-24 Months

Executive Summary:Pipeline development, combined with the Iraqi Kurds drive for economic autonomy from Baghdad, is likely to strengthen Turkey’s oil and gas industry in the next 12-24 months. Turkey has invested in building a commercial business zone in the northern Iraqi Kurd region for many years, upgrading infrastructure to help the Iraqi Kurds better monetize their natural resources, making the venture attractive for both countries. Despite bilateral benefits of this partnership, certain issues confront Iraqi Kurd-Turkish relations in the next 12-24 months, including: globally depressed oil prices, the KRG’s increasing financial debts, continued control sought by Iraq’s central government and attacks by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) terrorists on people and oil and gas assets in the region.

Discussion:Oil and Gas Distribution Routes Likely to Increase In Next 12-24 Months The Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG) export pipeline is under construction and scheduled to come online in 2017, transporting natural gas from the Iraqi Kurd region through Turkey to Western European markets.125 The KRG holds about 3-percent of the world's total gas reserves, and aims to play a prominent role in regional and global gas markets.126 Turkey and the KRG signed a comprehensive energy cooperation agreement in 2013, with an objective of annually delivering up to 2 million barrels of oil per day from the Iraqi Kurd region to other markets, plus at least 10 (bcm) of gas per year to Turkey,127 supplied by Genel Energy from the

Miran and Bina Bawi gas fields.128 Current plans to connect Turkey’s gas grid include construction of the (Sirnak) natural gas pipeline in 36 months, with earliest production in 2017.129 Expectations are that the KRG will ship natural gas to Turkey within the next three years.130 Intentions are to export 10 (bcm) of natural gas to Turkey over the next two years, and then double the volume to 20 billion by 2020, according to the KRG’s Minister of Natural

Resources.131 It is estimated Turkey is spending USD 750 million to construct the Kurdish section, built by the state-owned Turkish pipeline company BOTAS. The pipeline will run

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Map of Regional pipeline infrastructure and border crossing into Turkey. Kurdistan area is in green and Kurdish area in grey. Source retrieved from: http://tinyurl.com/pxo8sd8

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parallel to the existing KRG oil line.132 The pipeline will deepen the Turkey – Iraqi Kurd relationship, which has improved in recent years, following the collapse of a ceasefire with autonomy-seeking Kurds in Turkey earlier this year. 133 With Turkey’s consumption needs for more oil and gas, and the Iraqi Kurd’s need for revenue and access to sell on the open market, the benefits of an interdependent partnership will likely deepen.134

In 2010, the Iraqi Kurds were levied with a pipeline tariff from Baghdad stating that all fluids transmitted through the Iraqi Kurd pipeline (KRG) in Iraq were the possession of the Iraqi government and thus subject to taxation. This included oil transited through the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline, despite falling within Turkey’s border.135In June 2015, the Iraqi Kurds began exporting crude oil independently outside Baghdad’s control via the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline through Turkey, and selling on the international markets, mainly to Italy.136 The KRG’s direct oil exporting and production levels have steadily increased over the last eight months to raise needed revenue due to budget deficits arising from the central Iraq government’s non-payment.137

Business Trade and Upgrading Infrastructure Likely To ContinueWith Turkey’s energy growth not slowing, its infrastructure development focus is on three areas, namely the oil, gas and electrical sectors.138 The government is prioritizing the private sector in order to finance these large investments.139 The Port of Ceyhan is a key outlet for exporting oil coming from the Caspian Sea and Iraqi oil shipments.140 Turkey has plans to build up the Ceyhan Port into a regional hub seeking private investors adding refineries at the oil terminal. 141 In 2012, the KRG began trucking condensate to the terminal and stated it would work with the Turkey government to open new border crossings, increasing volume of exports by truck.142

The KRG’s Prime Minister of Trade and Industry states that twenty-five new companies open every month in the Iraqi-Kurd region with more than half of the companies registered were Turkey.143 The mutual strategic alliance has increased business-investment relations resulting in around 1,500 Turkish companies operating in the KRG and engaged in many consumer and commercial sectors including agriculture, banking/finance, construction,

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KRG’s independent oil exports. Kurdistan Regional Government Ministry of Natural Resources Source: http://tinyurl.com/gkvrcdu

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education, electric/power systems, health care, oil/gas extraction, transportation, tourism, and water industry.144Trade between the two countries is approximately USD $8 billion per year. Turkish money has provided funding for upgraded highways and other large-scale projects. Two new airports, one in Erbil with domestic and international traffic beginning in 2010 and Dohok International scheduled to open in 2016.145

Issues Threatening Kurdish-Turkey Progress Likely to PersistThe KRG is struggling to pay its bills and debts, namely foreign investment oil companies, government employees and the peshmerga fighters on the front-line battling the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). 146 In the past two years’ oil prices have dropped from over USD $100.00 a barrel to below USD $30.00 severely affecting the KRG economy.147 This impact has amounted to the Kurds facing a financial budget crisis that pays the salaries of its government employees, oil workers, teachers, civil servants and the peshmerga forces with monthly expenses at about USD $1 billion per month.148 The KRG have fallen behind on salary payments for an average of four to five months.149

Since 2014, Baghdad has exercised control by withholding the Iraqi Kurds share of national oil revenues, which has led to a budget deficit.150 Under the Iraq constitution, the KRG is entitled to 17 percent of the state budget for oil sales.151 The Iraqi government has provided minimal financial support to the KRG for war against ISIS including arms, protection and the two million refugees in the region.152

Compounding the KRG’s troubles is the USD $4 billion in debts and arrears owed to foreign oil companies and contractors.153 Dana Gas, one of the earliest companies to enter the northern Iraqi Kurd region, has filed multiple lawsuits against the KRG, claiming its owed more than USD $2 billion in unpaid natural gas invoices.154 The Iraqi Kurd government has tried to rebuild trust by making regular payments for continued investment as well as the KRG’s need for oil production and exporting as a source of revenue.155 The KRG’s 2016 goal is to increase its oil production capacity to 1 million barrels a day from 700,000. 156

In 2014, ISIS overtook and captured areas in the northern Kurdish region seizing oil fields and damaging pipelines causing disruptions to supply. In July 2015, a bombing occurred on the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline in Turkey near the province of Sirnac.158 Other sabotages and attacks have occurred creating instability and loss

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Pipeline protection at a refinery near Erbil in the Kurdistan region. Source retrieved from http://tinyurl.com/9wezf

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of revenue when the line is down for repairs delaying shipments of crude for which both Turkey and the Kurds rely on. The PKK (Kurdistan’s Workers Party) and ISIS have made claims their forces have carried out the attacks.159The Iraqi Kurd government is unable to pay the peshmerga and is experiencing desertions. The affect is damaging morale and undermining the war effort against the Islamic State militants.160 Recently, the US and Turkey are working together, with Turkey launching bombing campaigns targeting the PKK rebel bases in northern Iraq and along the southeastern border of Turkey.161

Comment:The Iraqi-Kurds national fate took a turning point in August 2014 with the retaking of the city of Kirkuk and its oil fields. With victories by the peshmerga, Kurdish nationalism has surged and a sovereign state appears closer to becoming a reality. The Iraqi-Kurds having adopted a foreign policy position from western allies, is trying to assert steps towards becoming an independent state.162

Analytic Confidence:Analytic confidence for this assessment is high. The analyst’s expertise on topic matter is minimal knowledge and worked alone. Source reliability is high (49.92) with little conflict among sources and information updated within the last week. The task complexity is moderate and the timeframe was adequate. The SWOT analysis contained in Annex 1 directly supports the information presented in this report. The SWOT analysis indicates that the Iraqi Kurd-Turkey Threats and Weaknesses are limiting factors that will continue to plague the Iraqi Kurds with respect to their economy and energy goals while becoming more independent from Iraq’s central government.

For questions or comments, please contact the author:

Email: [email protected].#: (512) 555-5555

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Turkey’s Energy Future Highly Likely To Expand Infrastructure and Partnerships

Executive Summary:Because of long-standing Russian gas dependency and foreign imports, it is highly likely that Turkey will invest in infrastructure and seek partnerships to be more energy independent. The development and expansion of key pipelines will determine routes for supply making Turkey’s central location a vital role as a transit hub to European and Mediterranean markets. Complicating matters are on-going conflicts with the Iraqi Kurds, as well as international and regional politics.

Discussion: With limited reserves and consumption outweighing annual production rates, Turkey receives more than half its natural gas from Russia.163 Turkey is expanding its pipeline system to better accommodate growing domestic natural gas consumption as well as to transit more natural gas to European consumers. Several pipelines are under construction or proposed to begin construction.164 The larger issue is the power struggle between Russia and Europe hinging on pipelines that will provide long-term energy security and bring competition to Russian dominance.165 President Erdogan has vowed to break its dependency by investing more in pipelines, ports, and storage and railway infrastructure by attracting foreign investment making Turkey more economically competitive.166 According to Bloomberg Business, "It is possible to find different suppliers," Erdogan said in a speech, referring to Qatar and Azerbaijan”.167 Erdogan is mending diplomatic ties with Israel to build a pipeline and import natural gas from Israel's vast Leviathan field in the eastern Mediterranean Sea.168 Turkey is seeking a partnership with Qatar for a long-term liquefied natural gas (LNG) agreement.169

The Trans-Anatolian Pipeline is a EU-backed project that will carry gas from Azerbaijan and potentially Iran and Turkmenistan across Turkey to an interconnector line, the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP). The TAP line will expand into Europe via Italy to an existing EU pipeline network. Construction to The South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP) is an expansion starting in 2015 that will provide markets to Turkey, Georgia and southeast Europe.170

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Map of Turkey’s major oil and natural gas pipelines. Source from: http://tinyurl.com/z6sz4xr

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A section of the Kirkuk-to-Ceyhan pipeline in northern Iraq is under control by regional Iraqi Kurds amounting to USD $8 billion dollars in trade with expectations of exports to continue to go through Turkey.171 Cypress is yet another place where Turkey’s potential to discover offshore resources would stand to gain barring the uncertainty of territorial and maritime borders.172

Analytic Confidence:Analytic confidence for this assessment is medium. Source reliability is high with little conflict among sources and information updated within the last week. The analyst’s expertise is minimal and the analyst worked alone with no input from others or peer evaluation. The task complexity is moderately complex and the time allotted was ample.

For questions or comments, please contact the author:

Email: [email protected].#: (512) 555-5555

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TANAP Pipeline Likely To Provide Increased Transit Capacity By 2018

Executive Summary:The Trans-Anatolian pipeline (TANAP) is likely to change energy dynamics and strategic relations for Turkey and the European Union by providing increased transit capacity and alternate gas solutions. Part of a planned comprehensive infrastructure pipeline project, the Southern Gas Corridor’s purpose is aimed at improving the security and diversity of the energy supply by bringing natural gas from the Azerbaijan-Caspian Sea region to Turkey and Europe in order to reach many different markets and consumers.

Discussion:Azerbaijan is the primary source of gas for the Southern Gas Corridor. The Shah Deniz is one of the world’s largest gas-condensate fields, with 40 trillion cubic feet (over 1 trillion cubic meters) of gas in place.173 Azerbaijan’s relationship with Turkey as a strategic supplier and ally

has been strengthen by this project and has a significant role as the only country producing as a natural gas supplier to Europe.174 The TANAP pipeline project has the potential to provide 20 percent of Europe’s gas needs in the future.175 Formal construction began in March 2015 with expected completion in 2018.176 The vast resources from the Shah

Deniz gas fields will provide a reliable gas supply of up to16 billion cubic meters (bcm) per year initially from Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan.177 Turkish companies SOCAR and BOTAS, both with percentage stakes in the project, will operate the TANAP.

The route will originate in Azerbaijan through Georgia across Turkey and onto Europe by connecting to the Trans-Adriatic pipeline (TAP) via Greece. 178 Due to technology advances, global gas production has tripled since 1970 making its extraction, processing and transportation a more viable option.179 Natural gas is cheaper, more efficient and less damaging to the environment than oil.180 Proponents of the project believe once the pipeline is on-line, it will provide a cheaper alternate gas supply to Russia by introducing competition and create a long-term energy security easing the power struggle between Russia and Europe.181

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Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) routing from Azerbaijan through Georgia across Turkey and connecting to Europe. Source retrieved from: http://tinyurl.com/hl2bpgp

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Analytic Confidence:Analytic confidence for this assessment is high. The source reliability is high with very little conflict among sources and information updated within the last week. The analyst’s expertise is minimal and the analyst worked alone. The task complexity is moderate and the time allotted was ample. For questions or comments, please contact the author:

Email: [email protected].#: (512) 555-5555

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AnnexesSWOT Analysis

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Analysis of Competing Hypothesis (ACH) Technique

Annex 2:LFAR2: Likelihood of Turkey’s oil and gas sectors improving over the next two years.

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Analysis of Competing Hypothesis (ACH) Technique, con’t.

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Analyst Contact Information

For questions or comments, please contact the author:

Stephanie Morrison Email: [email protected].#: (512) 555-5555

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Endnotes

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1 http://www.dailysabah.com/energy/2015/11/21/turkey-goes-from-a-transit-country-to-an-energy-hub(medium)2 http://www.forschungsstelle.uni-bremen.de/UserFiles/file/fsoAP118.pdf (high)3 http://www.forschungsstelle.uni-bremen.de/UserFiles/file/fsoAP118.pdf4 http://www.taccsoutheast.com/pictures/Turkey_Energy_Sector.pdf (medium)5 http://www.dailysabah.com/energy/2015/11/21/turkey-goes-from-a-transit-country-to-an-energy-hub(medium)6 http://www.forschungsstelle.uni-bremen.de/UserFiles/file/fsoAP118.pdf (high)7 http://www.forschungsstelle.uni-bremen.de/UserFiles/file/fsoAP118.pdf (high)8 http://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/11/4-things-to-know-turkey-economy (high)9 http://www.oecd.org/economy/turkey-economic-forecast-summary.htm (high) 10 http://www.imf.org/external/index.htm (high)11https://www.academia.edu/5604883/Turkey_An_Emerging_Energy_Transit_State_and_Possible_Energy_Hub 12 http://www.imf.org/external/index.htm (high)13 http://www.oecd.org/economy/turkey-economic-forecast-summary.htm (high)14 http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/european_energy_policy/turkeys_energy_strategy_en.pdf (high)15 http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/european_energy_policy/turkeys_energy_strategy_en.pdf (high) 16 http://www.platts.com/latest-news/electric-power/istanbul/feature-pace-of-turkish-energy-market-liberalization-26813977 (high) 17 http://www.taccsoutheast.com/pictures/Turkey_Energy_Sector.pdf (high)18 http://www.taccsoutheast.com/pictures/Turkey_Energy_Sector.pdf (high) 19 http://www.reuters.com/article/turkey-electricity-idUSL6N0E21G520130522 (medium) 20 http://www.wallstreetdaily.com/2014/09/24/turkey-oil-fields/ (medium)21https://www.academia.edu/5604883/Turkey_An_Emerging_Energy_Transit_State_and_Possible_Energy_Hub (high)22 http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkeys-energy-strategy.en.mfa (high) 23http://www.kesikli.com/tanap-a-long-awaited-gas-pipeline-project-and-turkey-as-a-prospective-influential-actor/? utm_source=Mondaq&utm_medium=syndication&utm_campaign=View-Original (high)24http://www.mondaq.com/turkey/x/445042/Oil+Gas+Electricity/ Turkeys+Fast+Growing+Economy+And+Rising+Energy+Demand (high)25http://www.mondaq.com/turkey/x/445042/Oil+Gas+Electricity/ Turkeys+Fast+Growing+Economy+And+Rising+Energy+Demand (high)26 http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/european_energy_policy/turkeys_energy_strategy_en.pdf (high)27http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/european_energy_policy/turkeys_energy_strategy_en.pdf (high)28http://www.mondaq.com/turkey/x/445042/Oil+Gas+Electricity/ Turkeys+Fast+Growing+Economy+And+Rising+Energy+Demand (high)29 http://www.kesikli.com/tanap-a-long-awaited-gas-pipeline-project-and-turkey-as-a-prospective-influential-actor/?utm_source=Mondaq&utm_medium=syndication&utm_campaign=View-Original (high)30 http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/12/turkey-russia-qatar-cannot-replace-russian-gas.html (medium)31https://www.academia.edu/5604883/Turkey_An_Emerging_Energy_Transit_State_and_Possible_Energy_Hub (very high) 32 http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/12/turkey-russia-qatar-cannot-replace-russian-gas.html (medium)33 http://www.platts.com/latest-news/natural-gas/istanbul/turkey-to-give-10-billion-incentives-for-new-26241615 (high)34 http://www.platts.com/latest-news/natural-gas/istanbul/turkey-to-give-10-billion-incentives-for-new-26241615 (high)35 http://www.tanap.com/media/press-releases/) (medium)36 http://www.tanap.com/media/press-releases/ (medium) 37 http://www.tanap.com/media/press-releases/ (medium)38 https://www.oilandgaseurasia.com/en/news/fiber-optic-cable-along-tanap-turn-turkey-regional-telecommunication-hub (medium) 39 http://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/news/turkey-and-azerbaijan-begin-construction-of-tanap-pipeline/(high)40 http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2015/03/18/construction-of-tanap-pipeline-begins-in-turkey-as-eu-and-russia-spar-for-upper-hand/ (medium)41 http://www.tanap.com/tanap-project/why-tanap/(high)42 http://www.tap-ag.com/the-pipeline (medium)

43 http://ekurd.net/tender-kurdistan-gas-pipeline-2015-12-29 (high)44https://www.academia.edu/5604883/Turkey_An_Emerging_Energy_Transit_State_and_Possible_Energy_Hub (high)45 http://ekurd.net/tender-kurdistan-gas-pipeline-2015-12-29 (high)46https://www.academia.edu/5604883/Turkey_An_Emerging_Energy_Transit_State_and_Possible_Energy_Hub (high)47 http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/02/turkey-refugee-crisis-time-europe-action-160210115931274.html (high)48 http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/02/turkey-refugee-crisis-time-europe-action-160210115931274.html (high)49 http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/02/turkey-refugee-crisis-time-europe-action-160210115931274.html (high)50 http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/02/turkey-refugee-crisis-time-europe-action-160210115931274.html (high)51 http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/02/turkey-refugee-crisis-time-europe-action-160210115931274.html (high)52 http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/10/turkey-isis-russia-pkk/408988/ (high)53 https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/energy-strategy (high)54http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/european_energy_policy/turkeys_energy_strategy_en.pdf (high)55 http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/12/9/turkey-russian-relationship-felled-by-more-than-a-downed-jet.html (high) 56http://studies.aljazeera.net/ResourceGallery/media/Documents/2015/12/3/20151237323944734Turkey%20Russia %20Relations.pdf (high) 57 http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/12/9/turkey-russian-relationship-felled-by-more-than-a-downed-jet.html (high)58 http://www.dailysabah.com/energy/2016/02/18/russian-natural-gas-imports-to-turkey-decline-in-2015(medium)59 http://www.dailysabah.com/energy/2016/02/18/russian-natural-gas-imports-to-turkey-decline-in-2015(medium)60 http://www.dailysabah.com/energy/2016/02/18/russian-natural-gas-imports-to-turkey-decline-in-2015(medium)61 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-28147263 (high) 62 http://www.voanews.com/content/iraqi-kurd-leader-visits-ankara/3093878.html (low) 63 http://www.dailysabah.com/politics/2014/12/20/turkey-and-krg-foster-relationship-with-pm-barzanis-visit (medium) 64 https://www.stratfor.com/sample/analysis/capitalizing-kurds (high) 65 http://www.dailysabah.com/politics/2014/12/20/turkey-and-krg-foster-relationship-with-pm-barzanis-visit (medium) 66 http://www.todayszaman.com/business_turkey-sets-date-for-tender-of-gas-pipeline-from-iraqi-kurdistan_408238.html (medium)67 http://www.dailysabah.com/politics/2014/12/20/turkey-and-krg-foster-relationship-with-pm-barzanis-visit (medium) 68 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-12-03/turkey-turns-to-iraq-s-kurds-for-gas-amid-pressure-from-putin (high)69 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/12/kurdish-peshmerga-kirkuk-iraq-maliki (high)70 http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/56d7e97e-35de-11e5-b05b-b01debd57852.html#axzz40xT9pF8E (high)71 http://rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iraq/120620142 (high) 72 http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/future-impact-of-pipeline-attacks-may-be-devastating-for-turkey.aspx?pageID=449&nID=86801&NewsCatID=540 (medium) 73 http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/56d7e97e-35de-11e5-b05b-b01debd57852.html#axzz40xT9pF8E (medium) 74 http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/business/2013/11/turkey-azerbaijan-ties-energy-agreements-oil.html#ixzz40q5w6U8o (medium)75 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/turkey-and-israel-poised-to-restore-diplomatic-ties-after-secret-talks-a6779031.html (medium) 76 http://www.peruviantimes.com/19/the-israeli-turkish-thaw-a-marriage-of-convenience-not-love/26176/ (medium)77 http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/12/18/a-gas-powered-rapprochement-between-turkey-and-israel/(very high)78 http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/12/18/a-gas-powered-rapprochement-between-turkey-and-israel/(very high)79 http://www.kallanishenergy.com/2016/02/10/7899/(medium)80 http://www.kallanishenergy.com/2016/02/10/7899/(medium)81 http://www.peruviantimes.com/19/the-israeli-turkish-thaw-a-marriage-of-convenience-not-love/26176/ (medium)82 http://aijac.org.au/news/article/israel-s-relationship-with-greece-cyprus-and-its(medium)83 http://aijac.org.au/news/article/israel-s-relationship-with-greece-cyprus-and-its(medium)84 http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/ambassador-bryza-reconciliation-israel-turkey-economic-interests-27316(high)85 https://www.iea.org/Textbase/npsum/MTGMR2015SUM.pdf(high)

86 https://www.iea.org/Textbase/npsum/MTGMR2015SUM.pdf(high)87 http://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/031215/how-russiaukraine-gas-dispute-affects-eu.asp (high)88 http://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/031215/how-russiaukraine-gas-dispute-affects-eu.asp (high)89 http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=badcf392-c220-4e26-8063-d16085440e22 (medium)90 https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/imports-and-secure-supplies (high) 91 http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=badcf392-c220-4e26-8063-d16085440e22(medium)92 http://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/031215/how-russiaukraine-gas-dispute-affects-eu.asp93 https://www.iea.org/Textbase/npsum/MTGMR2015SUM.pdf ( high) 94 https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=TUR (high)95 https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=TUR (high) 96 https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=TUR (high) 97 https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=TUR (high)98 https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=TUR (high)99 http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=347ca772-9ff5-445b-9a39-bd150d4f12c3 (medium)100 https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis_includes/countries_long/Turkey/turkey.pdf (high)101 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kirkuk–Ceyhan_Oil_Pipeline (medium) 102http://www.mondaq.com/turkey/x/395770/Oil+Gas+Electricity/Turkish+Energy+Market+205 (high)103 https://www.stratfor.com (high)104 https://www.stratfor.com/sample/analysis/capitalizing-kurds (high)105 https://www.stratfor.com/sample/analysis/capitalizing-kurds (high)106 https://www.stratfor.com/sample/analysis/capitalizing-kurds (high)107 https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=TUR (high)108 http://www.mondaq.com/turkey/x/395770/Oil+Gas+Electricity/Turkish+Energy+Market+2015 (high)109 http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkeys-energy-strategy.en.mfa (high)110 https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=TUR (high)111 https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=TUR (high)112 http://www.forbes.com/sites/judeclemente/2016/02/07/turkeys-rising-natural-gas-demand-needs-u-s-lng/#42fb0a8c2ac7 (medium)113 https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=TUR (high)114 http://www.forbes.com/sites/judeclemente/2016/02/07/turkeys-rising-natural-gas-demand-needs-u-s-lng/#113cf9612ac7 (high)115 http://www.forbes.com/sites/judeclemente/2016/02/07/turkeys-rising-natural-gas-demand-needs-u-s-lng/#113cf9612ac7 (high116https://www.academia.edu/5604883/Turkey_An_Emerging_Energy_Transit_State_and_Possible_Energy_Hub (high)117 http://www.forbes.com/sites/judeclemente/2016/02/07/turkeys-rising-natural-gas-demand-needs-u-s-lng/#42fb0a8c2ac7 (medium)118 http://www.forbes.com/sites/judeclemente/2016/02/07/turkeys-rising-natural-gas-demand-needs-u-s-lng/#42fb0a8c2ac7 (high)119http://www.mondaq.com/turkey/x/395770/Oil+Gas+Electricity/Turkish+Energy+Market+205 (high) 120 http://www.forbes.com/sites/judeclemente/2016/02/07/turkeys-rising-natural-gas-demand-needs-u-s-lng/#6a0f736b2ac7 (high)121 http://www.todayszaman.com/business_turkey-sets-date-for-tender-of-gas-pipeline-from-iraqi-kurdistan_408238.html (medium)122 http://nationalinterest.org/feature/dont-fear-turkeys-energy-power-play-11947 (medium)123 http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/tender-for-pipeline-carrying-northern-iraqi-gas-to-turkey-to-be-held-february-2016.aspx?pageID=238&nID=93155&NewsCatID=348 (medium)124 http://www.todayszaman.com/business_turkey-sets-date-for-tender-of-gas-pipeline-from-iraqi-kurdistan_408238.html (medium) 125 http://sustainablerace.com/turkey-country-analysis-eia/ (very high)126 http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkeys-energy-strategy.en.mfa (very high)127 https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis_includes/countries_long/Turkey/turkey.pdf (very high)

128 http://mnr.krg.org/index.php/en/gas/gas-pipeline (high) 129 http://www.todayszaman.com/business_turkey-sets-date-for-tender-of-gas-pipeline-from-iraqi-kurdistan_408238.html (medium)130 http://www.todayszaman.com/business_turkey-sets-date-for-tender-of-gas-pipeline-from-iraqi-kurdistan_408238.html (medium) 131 http://rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/16012016 (high)132 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-13/cash-strapped-iraqi-kurds-to-start-gas-exports-to-turkey-in-2016 (high)133 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-13/cash-strapped-iraqi-kurds-to-start-gas-exports-to-turkey-in-2016 (high)134 http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/turkey-and-the-krg-an-undeclared-economic-commonwealth (very high)135 http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ar/originals/2013/11/iraqi-kurdish-pipeline-turkey-oil-policy-export.html (high)136 http://www.ibtimes.com/international-oil-companies-begin-receive-payments-kurdish-government-2257313 (medium)137 http://www.ibtimes.com/international-oil-companies-begin-receive-payments-kurdish-government-2257313 (medium)138 http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkeys-energy-strategy.en.mf (high)139 http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkeys-energy-strategy.en.mfa (high)140 https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis_includes/countries_long/Turkey/turkey.pdf (high)141https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis_includes/countries_long/Turkey/turkey.pdf (high)142https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis_includes/countries_long/Turkey/turkey.pdf (high)143 http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/turkey-and-the-krg-an-undeclared-economic-commonwealth (very high) 144 http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/turkey-and-the-krg-an-undeclared-economic-commonwealth (very high)145 http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21568760-governments-turkey-iraq-and-iraqi-kurdistan-play-dangerous-game (medium)146 http://seekingalpha.com/article/2303695-isis-iraq-kurdistan-and-the-control-of-oil (medium)147 http://cabinet.gov.krd/?l=12 (high)148 http://cabinet.gov.krd/?l=12 (high)149 http://cabinet.gov.krd/?l=12(high)150 http://cabinet.gov.krd/?l=12 (high)151 http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/56d7e97e-35de-11e5-b05b-b01debd57852.html#axzz3ysyMP8hx(medium) 152 http://cabinet.gov.krd/?l=12 (high)153 http://www.platts.com/latest-news/oil/middle-east/iraqi-kurdistan-oil-producers-say-get-4th-monthly-26330109 (very high)154 https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/why-iraqi-kurdistan-struggling-pay-its-bills (high) 155 http://www.platts.com/latest-news/oil/middle-east/iraqi-kurdistan-oil-producers-say-get-4th-monthly-26330109 (very high)156 http://www.platts.com/latest-news/oil/middle-east/iraqi-kurdistan-oil-producers-say-get-4th-monthly-26330109 (very high)157 http://rudaw.net/english/middleeast/turkey/290720153 (medium)158 http://rudaw.net/english/middleeast/turkey/290720153(medium) 159 http://rudaw.net/english/middleeast/turkey/290720153(medium)160 http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/middle-east/Low-oil-prices-could-affect-war-against-Islamic- State-says-Kurdish-leader/articleshow/50603752.cms (medium)161 http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/08/turkey-kurds-pkk-syria/401624/ (high) 162 http://www.newsweek.com/why-kurds-have-already-carved-their-own-state-iraq-411674 (medium)163 http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/energy-dependence-to-grow-in-turkey.aspx?pageID=238&nid=40585(high)164 https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=TUR (high)

165 http://www.eurasianbusinessbriefing.com/pipeline-politics-favour-azerbaijan-and-turkey-in-new-round-of-old-game/ (high) 166 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-12-23/erdogan-aide-says-new-turkey-story-needs-pipelines-and-ports (high)167 http://news.yahoo.com/turkey-alternatives-russian-oil-gas-erdogan-133646052.html (medium)168 http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/russian-crisis-an-opportunity-to-mend-turkey-israel-ties--.aspx?pageID=449&nID=92090&NewsCatID=429 (high)169 http://dohanews.co/five-things-to-know-about-the-turkish-presidents-visit-to-qatar/(medium)170 http://www.eurasianbusinessbriefing.com/pipeline-politics-favour-azerbaijan-and-turkey-in-new-round-of-old-game/ (high)171 http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21568760-governments-turkey-iraq-and-iraqi-kurdistan-play-dangerous-game (high)172 http://www.forbes.com/sites/christophercoats/2015/04/30/offshore-potential-drives-eastern-mediterranean-to-lay-down-maritime-borders/ (medium) 173 http://www.bmiresearch.com/news-and-views/shah-deniz-a-step-closer-to-relieving-eastern-europe (high) 174 http://en.trend.az/azerbaijan/politics/2494784.html (high) 175 http://en.trend.az/azerbaijan/politics/2494784.html (high)176 http://www.eurasianbusinessbriefing.com/pipeline-politics-favour-azerbaijan-and-turkey-in-new-round-of-old-game/ (medium) 177 http://www.tap-ag.com/the-pipeline/the-big-picture/southern-gas-corridor (high)178 http://www.forbes.com/sites/judeclemente/2016/02/07/turkeys-rising-natural-gas-demand-needs-u-s-lng/#113cf9612ac7 (high) 179 http://www.forbes.com/sites/judeclemente/2016/02/07/turkeys-rising-natural-gas-demand-needs-u-s-lng/#113cf9612ac7 (high)180 http://www.eurasianbusinessbriefing.com/pipeline-politics-favour-azerbaijan-and-turkey-in-new-round-of-old-game/ (medium)181 http://www.eurasianbusinessbriefing.com/pipeline-politics-favour-azerbaijan-and-turkey-in-new-round-of-old-game/ (medium)