Training the American Soldier in WWI and WWII

8/13/2019 Training the American Soldier in WWI and WWII

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TRAINING OF THE AMERICAN SOLDIER DURINGWORLD WAR I AND WORLD W A R I1

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U .S . ArmyCommand.,and General Staff College in partialfulfillment of the requirements for thedegreeMASTER OF MILITARY ART A N D SCIENCE

byROGER K. SPICKELMIER, MAJ, USAB.S.B.A,.:University of Missouri, 1971

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas1987

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited


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MASTER OF MI LI TARY ART AND SCI ENCETHESI S APPROVAL PAGE

Name of candi dat e Roqer K. SRi ckel m erTi t l e of t hes i s Tr a i ni nq of t he Ameri can Sol di erdur i nq Wor l d War I and Wor l d War 1 1

, Thesi s Comm t t ee Chai r manLi eut enant Col ons Rober t D. Ramsey, M A.,: -i . / i w g +kd, LMaj or Chr i s J . LeBl anc, M A.$& .d--4 , Member , Gr aduat e Facul t yRa ph W Ekwal l , EdD

, Member , Gr aduat e Facul t y

Accept ed t hi s 5t h day of J une 1987 by:Pr ogr ams 'The opi ni ons and concl usi ons expressed her ei n ar e t hose oft he st udent aut hor and do not necessar i l y r epr esent t hevi ews of t he U.S. Ar my Command and Gener al St af f Col l ege orany ot her gover nment al agency. ( Ref er ences t o t hi s st udyshoul d i nc l ude t he f or eqoi nq st at ement . )

& J R , Di r ect or Gr aduat e Degr ee1


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ABSTRACT

TRAI NI NG OF THE AMERI CAN SOLDI ER DURI NG WORLD WAR I ANDWORLD WAR 11, By Maj or Roger K. Spi c kel m er , USA , 158 pages.Thi s s t udy i s a hi s t or i cal compar i son and anal ys i s ofi ndi vi dual i nf ant r y t r ai ni ng pr ogr am devel opment of t heUni t ed St at es Ar my dur i ng Wor l d War I and Wor l d War 11.Each per i od i s exam ned us i ng avai l abl e hi s t or i cal r ecor dsand by f ocusi ng on t hr ee ar eas of pr ogr am devel opment . Thet hr ee ar eas s t udi ed ar e- - ( l ) f ac t or s af f ec t i ng pr ogr amdevel opment , 2 ) or gani zat i ons r espons i bl e f o r t r ai ni ng,and 3 ) i ndi v i dual t r ai ni ng pr ogr am devel opment andevol ut i on.The s t udv i dent i f i es s i m l ar i t i es and t r ac es t he evol ut i onof t r ai ni ng pr ogr ams f r omt he Uni t ed St at es ' ent r y i n Wor l dWar I t hr ough t he devel opment of t he f i nal ' i ndi vi dualt r ai ni ng pr ogr am af t er v i c t or y i n Eur ope i n Wor l d War 11.The st udy i s usef ul i n pr ovi di ng an exampl e of adapt at i ont o change, as shown i n t he devel opment of t r a i ni ng pr ogr amsof Wor l d War I , and an exampl e of i mpr ovement t o exi s t i ngpr oqr ams, as s hown i n t he devel opment of t r ai ni ng pr ogr amsof Wor l d War 11.The st udy concl udes t hat Wor l d War I 1 i ndi v i dual t r ai ni ngbeneEi t ed f r om t he exper i ence of t he Uni t ed St at es Ar my i nWor l d War I . Lessons l ear ned f r om Wor l d War 1 t r a i ni ngdevel opment wer e i ncorpor at ed i n pl anni ng dur i ng t he per i odbet ween t he Wor l d War s and pr ovi ded t he basi s f or Wor l d WarI 1 i ndi vi dual t r a i ni ng.


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TABLE OF CONTENTSTHESIS APPROVAL PAG E ............................... i iABSTRACT ........................................... i i iTABL E OF CONTENTS .................................. i vCHAPTER1 . BACKGROUND AND ORGANIZATION ................... 1Endnotes ...................................... 142 . THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDIVIDUAL TRAININGPROGRAMS DURING WORLD WAR I................... 17Endnotes ...................................... 593 . TH E DEVELOPMENT OF INDIVIDUAL TRAININGPROGRAMS DURING WORLD WAR I1 .................. 65Endnotes ...................................... 1 1 94 . COMPARISON OF WARTIME TDAINING PROGRAMS ....... 126Endnotes ...................................... 150

BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................... 151INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ......................... 158

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CHAPTER 1BACKGROUND AND ORGANI ZATI ON

I NTRODUCTI ONOf al l t he ci vi l i z ed s t a t es of Chr i st endom we ar eper haps t he l east m l i t ar y , t hough not behi nd t hef or emost as a war l i ke one. 1- Denni s Har t MahanPr ac t i cal l y cons i der ed, t hen, t he nat i on has noar my i n t i me of peace, t hough, when t he cl ar i onvoi ce of war r esounds t hr ough t he l and, t hecount r y t hr oughout i t s vast ext ent becomes, i fnecessar y, one br i st l i ng camp of ar med men. . . . I ti s a c i r cumst ance qui t e uni que i n charact er .... tbel ongs t o t he geni us of t he Amer i can Repybl i c ....- J ohn A. Logan

The Uni t ed St at es ent er ed t he t went i et h cent ur ywi t h a t r adi t i on of i sol at i on f r om Eur opean pol i t i c s andwi t h an ar my t hat was smal l and wi del y scat t er ed atnumer ous f r ont i er post s. Nei t her our domest i c nor f or ei gnpol i cy had, unt i l t hen, r equi r ed a l ar ge per manent m l i t ar yest abl i shment . But by t he t ur n of t he cent ur y t he Uni t edSt at es was begi nni ng t o r eal i ze i t s pot ent i al i n bot hmat er i al r esour ces and popul at i on. By 1890, t he Amer i canf r ont i er was s et t l ed, and t he Uni t ed St at es was among t hel eadi ng i ndust r i al nat i ons of t he wor l d wi t h a popul at i onof 7 6 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 peopl e ( of whi ch 39, 000, 000 wer e mal e) . By1900, t ho Uni t ed St at es had est abl i shed a col oni al empi r e

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i n t he Car i bbean and Paci f i c and had def eat ed a Eur opeancol oni al power . The Spani sh- Amer i can War was an expr essi onof t he count ry' s new r el at i onshi p t o t he ot her nat i ons oft he wor l d and i t s i mpl i c i t r espons i bi l i t y as a new wor l dpower . The Uni t ed St at es, by t he t went i et h cent ur y,possess ed t he weal t h and m l i t ar y pot ent i al t hat d rew i ti nt o i nt er nat i onal pol i t i cal ac t i vi t y, whet her des i r ed ornot . 4t hat t he Uni t ed St at es woul d be dr awn i nt o t he cent ur y' st wo gr eat war s. At t he out set of bot h wor l d war s, andwi t hout a t r adi t i on of a l ar ge m l i t ar y es t abl i shment , t heUni t ed St at es was f aced wi t h t he f or m dabl e t ask ofc r eat i ng a m l i t ar y f or c e capabl e of as s i s t i ng i t s al l i esi n def eat i ng Ger many, consi dered i n bot h war s t o have t hebest ar my i n t he wor l d.

I n i t s pos i t i on as a wor l d power , i t was i nevi t abl e

Cr i t i c al t o t he cr eat i on of an ef f ect i ve m l i t ar yf or ce i s t r ai ni ng. The pr i mar y combat f or ce dur i ng t hewar s of t he t went i et h cent ur y has been i nf ant r y and, assuch, t he bas i c t r ai ni ng of i nf ant r y has been cr i t i cal i nt he c r eat i on of t went i et h cent ur y Amer i can ar m es. Thi sst udy wi l l exam ne the devel opment of i ndi vi dual i nf ant r yt r ai ni ng by t he Uni t ed St at es Ar my dur i ng bot h Wor l d War Iand Wor l d War I 1 i n or der to t r ace t he evol ut i on oft r ai ni ng pr ogr ams dur i ng each war t i me per i od. The pur poseof t hi s s t udy i s to det er m ne i f i ndi vi dual i nf ant r yt r ai ni ng pr act i ces, pr ogr ams, and pr ocedur es of t he Uni t ed

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St at es Ar my dur i ng Wor l d War I 1 i mpr oved as a r esul t of t heexper i ences of Wor l d War I .

HI STORI CAL CONTEXT

The Uni t ed St at es Ar my, pr i or t o i t s ent r y i nt o t heF i r s t Wor l d War , was essent i al l y a const abul ar y f or ce wi t hl i t t l e exper i ence i n l ar ge uni t oper at i ons . The Ar my waskept smal l , nor mal l y l ess t han 50, 000 of f i cer s and men, andwas scat t er ed at smal l out post s t hr oughout t he count r y.I t s pr i mar y pur pose pr i or t o ent r y i nt o t he Fi r s t Wor l d Warwas t o suppor t c i v i l i an aut hor i t i es i n t he mai nt enance ofdomest i c or der and di sast er r el i ef ; guar d t he Mexi canf r ont i er a gai ns t bandi t i ncur s i ons ; and f i ght a

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..Iicount er - i nsur gency war i n t he newl y won col ony of t hePhi l i ppi nes. As a r esul t of t he Spani sh- Amer i can War, anumber of i mpr ovement s had been made i n t he or gani zat i on oft he Ar my, and l i m t ed pl anni ng had begun t o f aci l i t at emobi l i zat i on, but t he Uni t ed St at es was not pr epar ed f ort he F i r s t Wor l d War , espec i al l y i n pr ogr ams t o t r ai ns ol di er s . 6

At t he out set of Wor l d War I , t he Ar my was r equi r edt o c reat e a m l i t ar y f or ce capabl e of f unct i oni ng wi t h t het echnol ogi es and or gani zat i onal concept s of t he t went i et hcent ur y. Whi l e t he Amer i can Ci vi l War was f ought wi t h muchof t he t echnol ogy and t he mass ar m es of l at er war s, i t wasdur i ng Wor l d War I t hat al l of t he basi c weapons sys t ems,

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mobi l i zat i on met hods, and or gani zat i onal pr i nci pl es usedt hr ough Wor l d War I1 unt i l t oday wer e emp l ~y ed . ~ol l owi ngt he Amer i can Ci vi l War , t he Ar my concent r at ed on i mmedi at eoper at i onal r equi r ement s , r educed i n s i ze and f ai l ed t okeep up wi t h t he Eur opean nat i ons i n many t echnol ogi cal andor gani zat i onal i mpr ovement s. Our f ut ur e enemy, Ger many,was consi dered, dur i ng t he per i od af t er t he Franco- Pr ussi anWar , t o be t he best m l i t ar y or gani zat i on i n t he wor l d.Of al l t he nat i ons consi der ed t o be wor l d power s at t hebegi nni ng of t he t went i et h cent ur y, onl y Br i t ai n and theUni t ed St at es had not copi ed t he Ger man syst em oforgani zat i on, manni ng and t r ai ni ng. war t he Ar my number ed onl y 213, 557 of f i cer s and men. bot hRegul ar s and Nat i onal Guar d i n f eder al ser vi ce. To expand

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At t he out set of t he

and t r ai n t hi s ar my i nt o an ef f ect i ve f or ce event ual l ynumber i ng 3,684,474, was a f orm dabl e t ask. 10

Pr i or t o Wor l d War I , t he pr edom nant phi l osophywi t hi n t he Uni t ed St at es Ar my f or cr eat i ng a l ar ge m l i t ar yf or ce was t he expansi bl e ar my concept . Fi r st pr oposed byJ ohn C. Cal houn and l at er r ef i ned by COL Emor y Upt on, t heexpansi bl e ar my concept was based upon a f ul lor gani zat i onal skel et on o f a war t i me f or ce wi t h a f ul lcompl ement of of f i cer s and non- comm ssi oned of f i cer s.Dur i ng war , t he Ar my s enl i st ed st r engt h was t o be f l eshedout by an i nf l ux of new r ecr ui t s and t he r ecal l ofr eser vi st s who had r ecei ved r udi ment ar y t r ai ni ng dur i ngt i me of peace. Recr ui t s and r eser vi st s wer e to be t r ai ned

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..1 1and ass i m l at ed i nt o uni t s by t he l ong t er m Regul ar s .Whi l e pr ovi ng i mpr ac t i cabl e i n t er ms of t he m l i t ar yr equi r ement s of t he l at e ni net eent h cent ur y and i n t erms ofwhat t he nat i on was pr epar ed t o support econom cal l y, t heconcept di d have an e f f ect upon t r ai ni ng. 2t he concept of an expansi bl e ar my was t he desi r e t o t r a i nnew r ec r u i t s t o t he s t andar ds of di s c i pl i ne and s ki l lc har ac t er i s t i c of t he Regul ar r at her t han dependi ng on t heent hus i as t i c , but undi sc i pl i ned and unski l l ed vol unt eer .Equal l y i mpor t ant was t he r el i ance on exper i enced so l di er st o t r ai n t he i nf l ux of r ec r ui t s . Al t hough mobi l i z at i onpr ogr ams dur i ng each Worl d War di d not pr ovi de t he skel et alor gani zat i ons advocat ed i n t he expansi bl e ar my concept ,t hey at t empt ed t o t r ai n t he new r ecr ui t t o t he st andardsexpect ed of t he Regul ars . The t r a i ni ng pr ogr ams of bot hWorl d War s a l so depended on Regul ar s , t r ai ned r eser vi st s ,and exper i enced vet erans t o pr ovi de t he t r ai ni ng.

I nher ent i n

1 3The manpower f or bot h Wor l d War s was pr ovi ded by

t he Sel ec t i ve Ser v i ce sys t em The Sel ec t i ve Ser v i ce Ac t ofMay, 1917, was devel oped af t er car ef ul st udy ofconscr i pt i on dur i ng t he Ci v i l War and pr ovi ded t he br oadout l i nes of t he nat i on s war t i me s t r uc t ur e dur i ng t he Fi r s tWor l d War . Based upon t he di v i s i on st r uct ur e, t here were t obe t hree i ncr ement s: The Regul ar Ar my, r ai sed i mmedi at el yt o a wart i me st r engt h of 2 8 6 , 0 0 0 : t he Nat i onal Guar d,br ought up t o an aut hor i zed st r engt h of 4 0 0 , 0 0 0 ; and anewl y f ormed Nat i onal Ar my, cal l ed t he Vol unt eer Ar my,

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14made up of conscr i pt s enr ol l ed i n 500, 000 man i ncr ement s .Even i n t he begi nni ng, a l most t wo- t hi r ds of t he Regul arand Nat i onal Guar d di vi si ons wer e made up of new r ec r ui t s ,whi l e t he Nat i onal Ar my di v i s i ons wer e pr edom nat el yconscr i pt s. As t he Regul ar Ar my and Nat i onal Guar dappr oached f ul l s t r engt h, enl i s t ment s wer e di scont i nued,and t he Ar my began t o r el y on conscr i pt i on f or t he cr eat i onof new di v i s i ons and t he r epl acement of l os s es i nest abl i shed di v i s i ons. As t he war pr ogr essed and mor er epl acement s j oi ned al l di v i s i ons , di f f er ences among uni t sl essened, r esul t i ng i n o rder s on 7 August 1918 el i m nat i ngt he what had become an ar t i r i c i al di s t i nct i on and f or mal l yi ncor porat i ng al l uni t s i nt o t he Uni t ed St at es Ar my wi t h acommon adm ni s t r at i on and command. 5 Sel ec t i ve Ser vi ce i nWor l d War I made poss i bl e t he expansi on of t he Ar my t o anevent ual enl i s t ed s t r engt h of a l most 3, 470, 000 out of at ot al s t r engt h of 3, 685, 458. 16Model ed on t he May 1' 317 act , t he Sel ect i ve Ser vi ceBi l l of 16 Sept ember 1940, was passed i n r eact i on t o t heevent s i n Eur ope dur i ng 1939 and 1940. The i ni t i al ef f ectof t he 1940 bi l l , r ef er r ed t o as t he " Dr af t , " was t o expandt he Ar my of 172, 000 i nt o a f or ce of 1, 400, 000, of whi ch5 0 0 , 0 0 0 wer e i n t he Regul ar Ar my, 2 7 0 , 0 0 0 i n t he Nat i onalGuar d, and 630, 000 i dent i f i ed a s t he Ar my of t he Uni t edSt at es. Sel ect i . ve Serv i ce i n Wor l d War 1 1 made poss i bl et he expansi on oE t he Ar my t o an event ual enl i st ed st r enyt h


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st rength of 7 , 3 0 0 , 0 0 0 out of a t o t al s t r engt h of of al most8, 300, 000. 1 7

F i nal l y, i t i s necessar y t o under s t and per t i nentdi s s i m l ar i t i es and s i m l ar i t i es bet ween t he t wo war t i meper i ods t hat i ndi r ect l y af f ect ed t he devel opment oft r ai ni ng pr ogr ams. Dur i ng much of t he per i od pr i or t o t heUni t ed St at es ent r y i nt o Worl d War I, Pr es i dent W l sonopposed any act i on whi ch m ght be const r ued as pr epar i ngf or war . *Pres i dent Roosevel t act i vel y sought t o mobi l i ze bot h publ i copi ni on and t he nat i on s m l i t ar y capac i t y. Dur i ng Wor l dWar I t he Ar my began mobi l i zat i on af t er t he decl ar at i on ofwar , but Wor l d War I1 mobi l i zat i on began a year pr i or t ot he nat i on s ent r y. 2 o The Ar my ent er i ng t he Fi r st Worl dWar had onl y t he nucl eus of a Gener al St af f and was f acedwi t h t he pr obl em of mobi l i z i ng and t r ai ni ng anunpr ecedent ed number of men f or a Eur opean war wi t h no

Pr i or t o our ent r y i nt o Wor l d War 11, however ,

The Ar my ent er i ng t helpr ev i ous exper i ence i n ei t her .Second Worl d War had a subst ant i al st af f or gani zat i on,exper i ence f r omt he Fi r s t Wor l d War , and t he benef i t ofst udi es conduct ed dur i ng t he i nt erwar years . 22

A s i gni f i cant d i f f erence bet ween t he t wo Wor l dWar s , yet di f f i c ul t t o quant i f y i n r el at i on t o t r ai ni ngdevel opment , i s t he re l at i onshi p of t he Uni t ed St at es t oi t s al l i es . The Uni t ed St at es was a l at e ar r i val i n bot hwars , but dur i ng t he Fi r st Wor l d War i t was t he al l i es whopr ovi ded t he bul k of t he manpower , equi pment , and

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l eader shi p f or t he t ot al war ef f or t . Even wi t hi n t heAmer i can Expedi t i onary For ces ( AEF) , most of t he equi pmentand suppl i es wer e pr ovi ded by al l i es , and dur i ng cer t a i nphases of t r ai ni ng i t was common f or Amer i can sol di er s anduni t s t o oper at e under a Fr ench or Br i t i sh Di vi s i on o rCor ps headquar t er s. 23War , t he Uni t ed St at es was t he dom nant par t i c i pant amongt he Al l i es on t he West er n Fr ont af t er 1944 and pr ovi ded t hegr eat es t number of so l di er s , t he vast maj or i t y ofar mament s , and, because of our c ont r i but i on i n r es our c es ,t he dom nant voi ce i n pol i c i es and ~t r a t e g i e s . ~~ecauseof t hi s g reat er cont r i but i on, t he Uni t ed St at es was muchl es s s us c ept i bl e, t hough not i mmune, t o c r i t i c i s m f r om t heAl l i es r egar di ng t he qual i t y of our so l di er s and ourt r ai ni ng pr ogr ams.

I n cont r ast , dur i ng t he Second Wor l d

Despi t e t hese di s s i m l ar i t i es , t her e wer e a l so manysi m l ar i t i es bet ween t he t wo wart i me per i ods whi ch pr ov i dea bas i s f or det er m ni ng a l ogi cal evol ut i on bet ween Wor l dWar s.l essons of pr evi ous war s i n bot h per i ods. TheSpani sh- Amer i can War and t he Uni t ed St at es ' i ncur s i on i nt oMexi co pr ov i ded val uabl e exper i ence i n mobi l i zat i on pr i ort o t he Fi r st Wor l d War . The Ar my of t he Second Wor l d Warbenef i t t ed f r om l essons of t he Fi r s t Wor l d War i n meet i ngt he r equi r ement s or mass i ve mobi l i zat i on and t r a i ni ng.Dur i ng t he per i ods pr i or t o the Uni t ed St at es ' ent r y i nt obot h war s , t he Ar my had been r educed i n manpower and had

The Ar my had t he advant age of bui l di ng on t he

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not been pr ovi ded moder n weapons, r esul t i ng i n t he pr obl emof accept i ng and t r ai ni ng l arge numbers of new r ecr ui t swi t hout adequat e cadr e, f ac i l i t i es , or equi pment .The Uni t ed St at es had i nst i t ut ed t he Dr af t and hadbegun l i m t ed mobi l i zat i on pr i or t o t he Second Wor l d War :never t hel ess , t he ext ent of f ul l mobi l i z at i on af t er ent r yi nt o t he War cr eat ed pr obl ems s i m l ar t o t hose of t he Fi r s tWor l d War . Al t hough t he Ar my had t he advant age of " l essonsl ear ned" i n devel opi ng t r ai ni ng pr ogr ams f or Wor l d War 11,t he magni t ude of t he mobi l i zat i on dur i ng t he Second Wor l dWar r esul t ed i n pr obl ems i n accept i ng, equi ppi ng, andas s i m l at i ng new r ec ru i t s as wel l as i n pr ovi di ngr epl acement s f or l osses t o uni t s over seas. And whi l e t heUni t ed St at es, bei ng t he dom nant power among t he al l i es,was mor e conf i dent i n devel opi ng i t s own pr ogr ams, t he Ar mywas s t i l l s ens i t i ve t o c r i t i c i s m by t he al l i es i n r egar d t ot he per f or mance of Amer i can sol di er s .

METHODOLOGY

To begi n t he st udy i t i s necessary t o pr esentassumpt i ons and est abl i sh def i ni t i ons t o ser ve as a basi sof under st andi ng and t o s et par amet er s of what wi l l beexam ned.

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Ass umpt i ons

The pr i mar y assumpt i on of t hi s t hes i s i s t hatt r ai ni ng dur i ng each Wor l d War exper i enced a s i m l art r ai ni ng l i f e c yc l e. Eac h war b egan wi t h an i ni t i alt r ai ni ng concept a i med at pr epar i ng bot h i ndi v i dual s anduni t s f or combat . These i ni t i al concept s wer e t r ans f or medi nt o' i ni t i al t r ai ni ng pl ans . Af t er i mpl ement at i on of t hei ni t i al t r ai ni ng pl ans , di s s at i s f ac t i on and exper i enc e l edt o s i gni f i c ant modi f i c at i ons of t he i ni t i al pr o gr ams . As ar esul t of t hese modi f i cat i ons , f i nal pr ogr ams wer edevel oped.

I t i s al so assumed t hat t he t r ai ni ng of t hei nf ant r yman i s a r el i abl e i ndi c at or of i ndi vi dua1, bas i ct r ai ni ng pr ogr am devel opment . I t i s r eal i z ed t hat ot heri ndi vi dual t r a i ni ng, t hat of of f i c er s or s pec i al i s t s f orexampl e, was c r i t i cal i n t he over al l war ef f or t , but t hei nf ant r yman was t he most numer ous s ol di er and t he pr i mar ycombat ant dur i ng bot h Wor l d War s. The i nf ant r yman was t hecommon denom nat or of each war t i me per i od, and i t wasbel i eved and pr act i ced t hat ever y sol di er was l i abl e f ordut y as an i nf ant r yman. Thi s i s not i nt ended t o det r actf r om i ndi vi dual t r ai ni ng pr ogr ams of ot her sol di er s , manyof whi ch were mor e e f f ect i ve and exper i enced di f f er entpr obl ems t han t hat of t he i nf ant r yman but , r a t her , AS Jmeans of l i m t i ng t he t opi c t o be exam ned.

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Def i ni t i ons

Four t er ms must be under st ood i ni t i al l y f or t hepur pos e of t hi s s tudy: t r ai ni ng, t r ai ner , i ndi vi dualt r ai ni ng and t r ai ni ng l i f e cycl e. Tr ai ni ng i s t hei nst r uct i on and pr act i ce of r equi r ed ski l l s of bot h uni t sand i ndi vi dual s , conduct ed i n the pr epar at i on f or combat . 25The t r ai ner i s t he of f i cer or non- comm ssi oned of f i cer who

pr ovi des t he i ns t r uc t i on. 2 6 I ndi vi dual t r a i ni ng i s t h at. i ns t r uct i on ai med at t he devel opment of i ndi v i dual sol di ersk i l l s and may i nc l ude i nst r uct i on i n smal l t eam or squad

oper at i ons so as t o bet t er devel op t he abi l i t y of t hei ndi vi dual t o wor k as a member of a t eam 2 7t r ai ni ng i s di s t i nc t f r om uni t t r ai ni ng whi ch i s t hatt r ai ni ng conducted spec i f i cal l y t o devel op col l ec t i ve uni ts k i l l s . 2 8t he t hr ee phases of t r ai ni ng pr ogr am devel opment : i ni t i alt r ai ni ng pr ogr am modi f i cat i on, and f i nal t r ai ni ng pr ogr amOt her def i ni t i ons wi l l be pr ovi ded as t hey ar e requi r ed i nsubsequent chapt er s or as t hey per t ai n t o a spec i f i c t opi c .

I ndi vi dual

The t r ai ni ng l i f e cyc l e, as di s cus s ed bef or e, i s

Li m t at i ons and Del i m t at i ons

Thi s s t udy wi l l concent r at e on t he t r ai ni ng of t hei ndi vi dual enl i s t ed i nf ant r yman, cons i s t ent wi t h t heassumpt i on t hat i ndi vi dual i nf ant r y t r ai ni ng i s ani ndi cat or of al l i ndi vi dual t rai ni ng. Thi s s tudy wi l l be

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concer ned wi t h t hat t r ai ni ng conduct ed dur i ng t he t wo Worl dWar s, af t er t he begi nni ng of mobi l i zat i on. Wor l d War Imobi l i zat i on i s cons i der ed t o have begun i n Apr i l 1917 andWor l d War I 1 mobi l i zat i on i n t he f al l of 1940. For p roperunder st andi ng of t he backgr ound speci f i c t o each per i od,t hi s s t udy wi l l br i ef l y exam ne m l i t ar y pol i c i es andt r ai ni ng conduc t ed pr i or t o the Uni t ed St a t es e nt r y i nt oeach war . Thi s s tudy wi l l not e xam ne spec i al i s t t r ai ni ngor of f i cer t r ai ni ng, except as t hey may r el at e t oi ndi vi dual enl i s t ed s ol di er t r ai ni ng.

ORGANI ZATI ON

The s t udy wi l l exam ne t he t r ai ni ng of i ndi vi duali nf ant r y so l di er s i n Wor l d War I and 11. Chapt er s t wo andt hr ee wi l l exam ne f ac t or s af f ec t i ng t he devel opment oft r ai ni ng pr ogr ams , or gani z at i onal r es pons i bi l i t y f ort r a i ni ng, and pr ogr am devel opment t hr ough t he t r ai ni ng l i f ecycl e f or each war t i me per i od. Af t er havi ng est abl i shed anunder st andi ng of each per i od s t r ai ni ng pr ogr ams , i t wi l lbe demonst r at ed i n Chapt er t hr ee, t hat a l ogi cal evol ut i onof t r a i ni ng f r omWor l d War I t o Wor l d War I 1 i s evi dent .The s t udy , f ur t her mor e, wi l l demons t r at e t hat t r ai ni ng i nWor l d War I 1 i mpr oved as a r esul t of t he exper i ences oEWor l d War I .

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SI GNI FI CANCE

Wor l d War I was t he f i r s t of t hi s nat i on st went i et h cent ur y war s and est abl i shed many of t hepr ocedur es used t hr oughout subsequent war s. Whi l et echnol ogy and tact i cal doct r i ne change, cer t a i n t r ai ni ngpr ocedur es and pol i c i es r emai n const ant , or di spl ay al ogi cal evol ut i on. A knowl edge of t hi s evol ut i on and i t si nher ent i mpr ovement pr ovi des bet t er under st andi ng of t het r ai ni ng phi l osophi es of t oday and may be usef ul i ndevel opi ng f ut ur e t r ai ni ng.

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CHAPTER ONE ENDNOTES1. Quot ed i n Russe l l F. Wei gl ey , Hi s t or y of t heUni t ed St at es Ar my ( 1967) , p. 95, f r om Denni s Har t Mahan,An El ement ary Tr eat i se on Advanced Guar d, Out pos t , andDet achment Ser vi ce of Troops... Rev. ed. , 1864) , p. 36.2. Quot ed i n Wei gl ey , p. 197, f r om J ohn A. Logan, TheVol unt eer Sol di er of Amer i ca ( 1887) , p. 464.3 . Davi d Woodwar d, Ar m es of t he Wor l d, 1854- 1914( 19781, p. 148.4. Wei gl ey, pp. 313- 314.5. Rober t M Ut l ey , Fr ont i er Requl ar ; - Uni tedSt at es Ar my and t he I ndi an, 1866- 1891 ( 1973) , pp. 1- 9.6. W l l i am A. Ganoe, &Hi st ory of t he Uni t ed St at esArmy ( 1964) , pp. 397- 438; and Wei gl ey, pp. 265- 295.

War I as t he begi nni ng of moder n war of t he t went i et hcent ur y see Ri char d A. Pr est on and Si dney F. W se, Nen i nAr ms: A Hi s t or y of War f ar e and =I nt er r el at i onshi p wi t hWest er n Soci et y ( 4t h ed. , 1979) , pp. 259- 277; Maur i ceMat l of f , Amer i can Mi l i t ar y Hi s t or y ( 19691, pp. 362- 363;Wal t er Mi l l i s , Ar ms and Men: A St udy of Amer i can Mi l i t ar yHi st or y ( 1956) , pp. 189- 191; and Qui ncy Wr i ght , A St udy ofar ( 1942) , I , pp. 294- 300. Prof essor Wr i ght di v i des t hehi s t o r y of moder n war f are i nt o f our per i ods: t he adapt i onof f i r e ar ms ( 1450- 1648) ; t he per i od of pr of es s i onal ar m esand dynast i c war s ( 1648- 1789) ; t he capi t a l i za t i on of war( 1789- 1914) ; and t he t ot al i t ar i ani z at i on of war( 1914- 1942) . Wr i ght made hi s c l ass i f i cat i on i n 1942. Forpur poses of t hi s st udy t he f i na l per i od has been ext endedt o i nc l ude al l t went i et h c ent ur y war f ar e t o pr e sent . I t i sr ecogni zed t hat t he per i od si nce t he Second Worl d War coul dal so be c l ass f i ed as t he Nuc l ear o r At om c Age, but war ss i nce t he Second Wor l d War have been conduct ed wi t hconvent i onal weapons , s i m l ar i n bas i c pr i nc i pl es as t hoseof Wor l d War I .

7. For f ur t her ar gument s and cons i der at i ons of Wor l d

8. Theodor e Ropp, War i n t he Moder n Wor l d ( 1959) pp.195- 200; and Woodwar d, pp. 21- 29.9 . Ropp, p. 195.

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10. Mar vi n A. Kr ei dber g and Mer t on G. Henr y, Hi st or yof Mi l i t ar y Mobi l i z at i on i n t he Uni t ed St at es Army,1775- 1945 ( 1955) , pp. 262- 267; and Char l es A. W l l oughby,The Econom c and Mi l i t ar y Par t i c i pat i on of t he Uni t edSt at es i n t he Wor l d War ( 1931) , pp. 2- 8, 34- 38.11. St ephen E. Ambr ose, Upt on and t he Ar my ( 1964) , pp.57- 75; and W egl ey, p 277- 281.12. W egl ey, pp. 280- 281.13. Ambr ose, pp. 57- 75; and Wei gl ey, pp. 357- 313.14. Mat l o f f , p. 374.15. Mat l of f , p. 374; and W egl ey , p. 387.16. Davi d M Kennedy, -Here: The Fi r st Wor l d Warand Amer i can Soci et y ( 19801, pp 150- 169; Mat l of f , p. 374.17. Ganoe, pp. 515- 525; Robert R. Pal mer , Bel l IW l ey, and W l l i am R. Keast , The Ar my Gr ound For ces: ThePr ocur ement and Tr ai ni nq of Gr ound Combat Tr oops ( 19481,pp. 1- 2.18. Kennedy, p. 45- 49.19. Ganoe, pp. 512- 527.20. Kr ei dber g and Henr y, pp. 214 and 541.21. Kr ei dber g and Henr y, pp. 215- 220.22. Kr ei dber g and Henr y, pp. 377- 380, 424- 425, and541- 543; Fol l owi ng Wor l d War I t her e wer e numer ous s t udi esdone by t he Ar my Gener al St af f and t he St af f Col l ege atFor t Leavenwort h. Of par t i cul ar val ue i s Monosr aoh No. 8 ,Reol acement of Per sonnel i n t he Ameri can Expedi t i bnaryFor ces i n Fr ance ( J anuar y 23, 1926) , whi ch i s a compi l at i onof a number of s t udi es conduct ed by st udent s at CGSCf ol l owi ng t he war .23. Kr ei dber g and Henr y, pp. 317- 322.24. Wei gl ey, pp. 444- 450.25. Ar my Regul at i on 350- 1, Ar my Tr ai ni ng ( 11 Oct ober1985) , r ef er r ed t o her eaf t er as AR 350- 1, p . 3.26. Ar my Fi el d Manual 25- 2, =Trai ni ng Manaqement( Sept ember 1984) , p. 16.27. AR 350- 1, p. 3.

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CHAPTER 2THE DEVELOPMENT OF I NDI VI DUAL TRAI NI NG PROGRAMSDURI NG WORLD WAR I

I NTRODUCTI ON

The pur pose of t hi s chapt er i s t o pr esent t hedevel opment of i ndi v i dual i nf ant r y t r ai ni ng pr ogr ams wi t hi nt he Amer i can Ar my dur i ng Wor l d War I . To accompl i sh t hi st hr ee ar eas wi l l be addr es s ed. F i r s t , f ac t or s af f ec t i ngt he devel opment of i ndi v i dual t r a i ni ng pr ogr ams dur i ng t hewar wi l l be s t udi ed. Next , t he organi zat i on andr espons i bi l i t y wi t hi n t he Ar my f or t he devel opment oft r ai ni ng pr ogr ams wi l l be desc r i bed. F i nal l y , t he ac t ualdevel opment and evol ut i on of i ndi v i dual t r a i ni ng pr ogr amswi l l be exam ned. These t hr ee ar eas wi l l ser ve as a bas i so f compar i son f or i ndi v i dual i nf ant r y t r ai ni ng devel opmentdur i ng Wor l d War 11.

FACTORS AFFECTI NG THE DEVELOPMENT OF I NDI VI DUAL TRAI NI NGPROGRAMS I N WORLD WAR IAl t hough numer ous f act or s af f ect ed t he exper i ence

of t he Uni t ed St at es dur i ng Wor l d War I , s i x were i mport anti n t he devel opment of i ndi vi dual t r ai ni ng. The f i r s t , andmost i mpor t ant f act or was t he Ar my s l ack of pr eparedness.

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The second was t he nat i on s l ack of exper i ence i n cr eat i nga moder n t went i et h cent ur y army. The t hi r d, due t o t heAr my s l ack of exper i ence i n cr eat i ng a moder n m l i t ar yf or ce, was a di sagr eement on how t o pr oduce an ef f ect i ves ol di er , s pec i f i c al l y, t he l engt h of t i me r equi r ed f ort r ai ni ng. The f our t h f act or was t he r equi r ement t o pr ovi deAmer i can t r oops over seas ear l i er t han had at f i r s t beenexpect ed. The f i f t h f act or was di sagr eement over t act i caldoct r i ne, t r ench war f ar e as pr ac t i ced by Amer i ca s a l l i esver sus open war f ar e as espoused by GEN Per shi ng. Andf i nal l y , t he s i x th f ac t or was obs t ac l es t o t he devel opmentand conduct of t r ai ni ng: l ack of hous i ng, l ack ofequi pment , and l ack of oppor t uni t y.

Under l yi ng al l f ac t or s i n t r ai ni ng pr ogr amdevel opment was t he Ar my s unpr epar edness f or war ,especi al l y moder n t went i et h cent ur y war . Whi l e possessi ngt he i ndus t r i al capabi l i t y and t he popul at i on necessar y f orconduct i ng such a war t he War Depar t ment had compl et edl i t t l e pl anni ng, and f ew sys t ems f or mobi l i zat i on wer e i npl ace pr i or t o ent r y i nt o t he war . Pr i or t o t he war , t heAr my s t ot al ac t i ve f eder al ser v i ce s t r engt h was onl y213, 557 of f i cer s and men. The Ar my was basi cal l y aconst abul ar y f or ce wi t h onl y t he r udi ment ar y begi nni ngs ofa gener al s t af f . exper i enced i n di r ec t i ng l ar ge uni t s or di r ec t i ng l ar get r ai ni ng pr ogr ams. To aggr avat e t he pr obl em as t he Ar myi ncr eased i n s i ze, t he l eader s wi t h t he most exper i ence i n

ld

Ther e were no l eader s or s t af f s


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t r a i ni ng so l di ers moved up i n r ank and posi t i on, away f r omt he ac t ual conduc t of i ndi vi dual t r ai ni ng. 2

Sa as not t o over s t at e the case , i t must ber ecogni zed t hat a pr i mar y r eason f or t he Ar my sunpr eparedness was l i t t l e per cei ved t hr eat t o U.S. nat i onali nt er es t s and, t her ef or e, l i t t l e need t o pr epar e. The Ar mydi d possess t he f oundat i on on whi ch t o cr eat e a moder nm l i t ar y f or ce. The pos t - Ci vi l War Army i s bes tchar act er i zed by r educed budget s and l i m t ed , manpower ,i sol at i on of t he Ar my at f r ont i er pos t s , and r ej ec t i on oft he Ar my by soci et y at l ar ge. Dur i ng t hi s peri od t he Ar myt ended t owar d i nt r ospect i on and i nt er nal concer ns . Thi s ,al ong wi t h t he st udy of Eur opean ar m es, f ost er ed t hebegi nni ng of many of t he i nst i t ut i ons and pol i c i es whi chwer e t o benef i t t he Ar my dur i ng t he Fi r st Worl d War ,i nc l udi ng ext ens i ve Ar my r ef or m i n or gani zat i on and

3pr of ess i onal devel opment .The second f act or af f ect i ng t he devel opment of t hei ndi v i dual t r ai ni ng pr ogr am dur i ng Wor l d War I was l ack ofexper i ence. Dur i ng Wor l d War I , a l l of t he basi c weaponssys t ems and m l i t ar y o rgani zat i onal pr i nc i pl es usedt hr oughout Wor l d War I1 unt i l t oday wer e empl oyed. TheUni t ed St at es f ought t he Amer i can Ci v i l War wi t h r i f l edweapons, t he t el egr aph, and r ai l r oads. However , Worl d WarI was t he f i r st war i n whi ch t her e was l ar ge scal e use ofr api d- f i r e , r i f l ed weapons wi t h smokel ess powder ; of wi r eand r adi o communi cat i ons; of t he i nt ernal combust i on engi . nc

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f or bot h gr ound t r anspor t at i on and combat vehi c l es: and ofai r pl anes f or bot h r econnai ss ance and combat . The Uni t edSt at es f ought t he Ci v i l War wi t h mass i ve arm es whi chamount ed t o al most f our m l l i on men f or bot h t he Uni on andConf eder acy dur i ng t he cour se of t he war . =t he Amer i can Ar my i n Wor l d War I number ed al most f ourm l l i on men at i t s peak st r engt h. The Uni t ed St at es Ar myf ought t he Ci vi l War wi t h uni t or gani z at i ons , f r ombat t al i on t hr ough cor ps , t hat wer e s i m l ar t o t hose usedt oday. But , s t af f o r gani zat i ons wer e smal l andundevel oped. A commander s st af f nor mal l y consi st ed ofper sonal ai des and each commander was r equi r ed t o do hi sown pl anni ng and super vi si on. Wor l d War I saw t hedevel opment of s t af f s f r om bat t al i on t hr ough Ar my l evel ,each r esponsi bl e f or p l anni ng and super v i s i on i n t he nameof t he commander , s i m l ar i n f unct i on and or gani zat i on t ot oday.

I n c ont r a st ,

As t he Uni t ed St at es ent ered t he Fi r st Worl d War ,t he Ar my had benef i t ed f r om t he l essons of t heSpani sh- Amer i can War , count er - i nsur gency operat i ons i n t hePhi l i ppi nes, and oper at i ons a l ong and acr oss t he Mexi canbor der . These oper at i ons pr ov i ded val uabl e exper i ence wi t hmobi l i zat i on and l eader shi p of uni t s above bat t al i onl evel . 6f i r s t exper i enced t he Eul l devel opment of a s t a f f i n t hemoder n sense, f r ombat t a l i on t hr ough Ar my l evel : of a mas sar my i n whi ch al l mal e ci t i zens wer e l i abl e f o r s er vi c e:

20

But , i t was i n Wor l d War I t hat t he Uni t ed St at es


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and of t he pr oj ect i on of t hi s mass ar my over seas t o f i ght .The t echnol ogi cal i mpr ovement i n weapons and communi cat i onsmeant an i ncr eased l et hal i t y of t he moder n bat t l ef i el d overt hose of t he past and t he r equi r ement f or a l ar ge ar ny l edt o conscr i pt i on and f orc e cr eat ed new r equi r ement s i nt r ai ni ng. Hence, t he Ar my was r equi r ed t o t r ai n a gr eat ernumber of r ecr ui t s t han ever bef or e i n met hods andt echnol ogi es i n whi ch i t had l i t t l e, i f any , exper i ence.

The t hi r d f act or , because of t he Ar my' s l ack ofexper i ence i n cr eat i ng a moder n m l i t ar y f or ce, wasdi sagr eement over t he l engt h of t i me r equi r ed t o t r ai n asol di er . Exper i ence and convent i onal m l i t ar y t houghti ndi cat ed t hat t he i ncul cat i on of di s c i pl i ne and s ol di ersk i l l s was a l ong t er m pr ocess whi ch r equi r ed at l east t woyear s. Opposi ng t hi s convent i onal t hought , LTG LeonardWood asser t ed t hat he coul d t r ai n a sol di er i n s i x mont hs.

Under pr act i ces f ol l owed by t he Ar my pr i or t o ourent r y i nt o Wor l d War I , t he i ncul cat i on of di sc i pl i ne ands ol di er s ki l l s was a l ong t er m pr oc es s. As s i m l at i on of anew r ecr ui t i nt o a uni t was accompl i shed t hr ough what i sr ef er r ed t o t oday as " on t he j ob t r ai ni ng. " The newsol di er l earned hi s dut i es and sol di er l y ski l l s byper f or mance of a t ask under t he gui dance ofnon- comm ssi oned of f i cer s and by practi ce. 'r ecr ui t woul d r ecei ve f our mont hs of r udi ment ar yi ns t r uc t i on i n bas i c sol di er ski l l s i n " compani es ofi ns t r uct i on" conduct ed at a r ecru i t depot - - Davi d I s l and, NY

I deal l y , a new

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or Col umbus Bar r acks, OH, fo r I nf ant r y- - bef or e j oi ni ng hi suni t .uni t under t he gui dance of company of f i cer s andnon- comm ssi oned of f i cer s .

Trai ni ng woul d be compl et ed af t er ar r i val at h i s9

I n r eal i t y , however , pr obl ems i n r ec r ui t i ng andi mpl ement at i on r esul t ed i n t he i deal syst embei ng t heexcept i on r at her t han t he r ul e. Recr ui t i ng pr obl ems arosepr i mar i l y i n r egul at i ng t he f l ow of r epl acement s . I deal l y,r epl acement s woul d be pr ovi ded t o a uni t t wi ce each year ,enabl i ng a uni t t o devel op a pr ogr am f or accept ance andt r ai ni ng of new sol di er s i n a sys t emat i c f ashi on. I nr eal i t y, t he f l ow of r ec rui t s was not as wel l r egul at ed,and r epl acement s j oi ned a uni t t hr oughout t he year , i nr esponse t o uni t needs and avai l abi l i t y of enl i s t ees ,maki ng t he pl anni ng of uni t i ndi v i dual t r ai ni ngd i f f i c u l t . loi mpl ement at i on wher e f at i gue det ai l , guar d, and normaldut i es, r arel y l ef t enough men or t i me f o r conduct i ng

Actual pr ac t i ce al so bel i ed t heor y i n

L lf or mal t r ai ni ng.I n t he per i od j us t pr i or t o ent r y i nt o t he F i r s t

Worl d War , t he basi c i nst r uct i on per i od was r educed f r omf our mont hs t o 36 wor ki ng days ( appr oxi mat el y 6 weeks) i nt he bel i ef t hat a shor t er t i me at t he rec ru i t depot m ghtenabl e bet t er managment of t he r epl acement f l ow. Gr eat eref f or t s wer e al so made t o pr ovi de r epl acement s t o uni t sever y s i x mont hs.l i m t ed t o bas i c m l i t ar y cour t esy and dr i l l and r el i ed on

Tr ai ni ng at t he r ec r ui t depot was

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t r a i ni ng conduct ed i n the uni t t o devel op more of t hesol di er ' s needed ski l l s . I nspec t or Gener al r epor t si ndi c at e t hat t hi s s ys t em was meet i ng wi t h onl y l i m t edsuccess . 2 W t h t hes, e det r a ct or s t o ef f ec t i ve t r a i ni ng, i ti s under s t andabl e t hat exper i ence pr i or t o ent r y i nt o Wor l dWar I i ndi c at ed t hat t he t r ai ni ng of a n ef f ec t i ve s ol di erwas a l ong- t er m pr ocess . Fur t hermor e , t he pr act i ce of mostEur opean power s r ei nf or ced t hi s bel i ef . 13

Opposi ng t he convent i onal t hought ' of t he 4r xy W R SLTG Leonard Wood, Ar my Chi ef o f St af f f r om 1910 t o 1914,who asser t ed t ha t he coul d t r ai n a sol di er i n s i x mont hs .Whi l e oppos i ng convent i onal t hought as t o i ndi v i dualt r ai ni ng t i me, Wood was i n agr eement wi t h t he m l i t ar yt hought o f hi s t i me i n bel i ev i ng t hat t he nat i on r equi r edt he nucl eus of a war t i me ar my i n t i ne of peace t o pr ov i det he or gani zat i on and t r ai ni ng of t he c i t i z en s ol di er i nt i me o war . Wood bel i eved t hat t he most i mpor t antm l i t ar y pr obl em of t he nat i on was t o devi se a means f ort he pr epar at i on of an ar my of c i t i zen sol di er s i n or der t omeet t he emer gency of a moder n war , and t hat t he t i mer equi r ed f or t r ai ni ng of t h i s " ext empor i zed" f or ce dependedpr i mar i l y on t he pr esence of qual i f i ed i ns t r uc t or s . W t ht r a i ned i nst r uct or s and suf f i c i ent ar ms and equi pment , Woodcont ended t hat an ef f ect i ve army coul d be f or med i n s i xmont hs.

1 4

15To t ake advant age of t he " pr epar edness illovem rt1t"

occur r i ng i n t he t i ni ted St at es :' r ior t o ent r y i nt o t he wa r ,2j


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wood devel oped t he "Pl at t sbur g i dea. " Whi l e Ar my Chi ef ofSt af f , Wood or gani zed summer camps wher e col l ege st udent scoul d r ec ei ve m l i t ar y t r a i ni ng. I n 1915, he expanded t hi si dea by openi ng a camp at P l at t sbur g, New Yor k, f orbusi ness and pr of essi onal men. These camps wer e onl y f ourweeks l ong and wer e pai d f or by pr i vat e f unds. 6pr i mar y pur pose was t o f ost er t he ent hus i asm f orpr epar edness , al t hough t hey had t he col l at er al benef i t ofpr ov i di ng par t i al val i dat i on t o Wood' s pr em se t hat ac i t i z en s ol di er c oul d be t r ai ned i n a r el at i vel y s hor tper i od of t i me. The t r ai ni ng was par t i al i n t hat i tpr ovi ded onl y an exposur e t o t he m l i t ar y and by i t sel f wasnot accept ed, even by Wood, as suf f i c i ent f or moder n war .The t r ai ni ng was val i dat ed i n t hat most of t hose whopar t i c i pat ed i n t he camps r ecei ved comm ss i ons a f t er ent r yi nt o t he war and per f or med i n a ver y cr edi t abl e manner ,bot h i n t he t r ai ni ng and oper at i ons of t he Wor l d War IAr my,

Thei r

17The f our t h f act or i n Wor l d War I t r ai ni ng

devel opment was t he r equi r ement fo r ear l y depl oyment ofm l i t ar y f or ces . Many bel i eved t hat t he Uni t ed St at eswoul d not be r equi r ed t o send any act ual combat ant s at a l l ,and t hose who di d f or esee t he r equi r ement f or: Amer i can

18gr ound f or ces saw i t t ak i ng pl ace i n t he di s t ant f ut ur e.Many Amer i cans agr eed wi t h t he New Yor k Mor ni nq Tel eqr aph,i n Apr i l 1917: " They d o n ~t eed mor e war r i or s , t hey wantmoney and f ood, and muni t i ons of war . " Thi s bel i ef was9

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cons i s t ent wi t h a cabl e sent by Maj or J ames Logan, J r . ,j ust one mont h bef ore ent r y i nt o t he war , i n whi ch hest at ed t hat t he Fr ench Genera l St a f f had no par t i cul ari nt erest i n hav i ng Amer i can Troops i n France. I2Ocons t i t ut i onal cons i der at i ons appear ed t o pr ec l ude t hedepl oyment of t he st at es m l i t i a out s i de t he Uni t edSt at es . 21Amer i can Expedi t i onar y For ce , i t was commonl y hel d t hat t hcAr my woul d r equi r e a t l east a f ul l year , and pr ef er abl yt wo, of pr eparat i on bef ore Amer i can so l di ers coul d bedepl oyed t o France i n any appr eci abl e numbers . 2 2i f a l ar ge number of s ol di er s c oul d be t r ai ned ear l i er , t hel ac k of ava i l abl e shi ppi ng made i t appear i mposs i bl e t osend Amer i can sol di er s over seas i n s i gni f i c ant s t r engt h.

Mor eover,

Of t hose who di d env i s i on t he c r eat i on of an

And even

23However , by J une 1917, t he f i r s t Amer i can di v i s i on

was i n Fr ance. By t he end of 1917 Amer i can st r engt h i nFr ance r eached 175, 000 men and by t he end of t he war , j us tover e i ght een mont hs l at er , t he AEF cont ai ned a l most t wom l l i on men. 24 The ear l y depl oyment of t he 1s t Di v i s i onwas i nt ended t o ra i se t he mora l e of al l i ed so l di e r s who hadbeen at war f or a l most t hr ee year s and had r ecent l ys uf f er ed ext ens i ve c as ual t i es i n t he Fr enc h Ni vel l eOf f ens i ve and t he Br i t i s h of f ens i ves i n Ar r as dur i ng Apr i l1917. 25al l i ed r ever s es dur i ng t he f al l of 1917 at Capor et t o s t i dPass chendal e, , and t he Bol shev i k r evol ut i on, whi ch [ r e e dGerman t r oops f r om t he east f or use al ong t he west er n

Cont i nued Amer i can depl oyment was a r es ul t of

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f r ont . Ac cel er at i on of Amer i can depl oyment was a r esul t oft he Ger man of f ensi ves i n 1 9 1 8 . Al l i ed r ever ses and t he needf or Amer i can t r oops gave ur gency t o t he cr eat i on of anexpanded Amer i can Ar my. The ef f i ci ency of t he Ger manof f ens i ves of 1918 gave i ncent i ve t o t he Br i t i s h t o pr ovi deaddi t i onal s hi ppi ng f or t r ans por t of t he Amer i can Ar my.The r esul t o f ear l y depl oyment was t he r equi r ement t odevel op i ndi v i dual t r ai ni ng pr ogr ams bot h i n t he Uni t edSt at es and Fr ance.

2 6

The f i f t h f ac t or af f ec t i ng t he devel opment of t heWor l d War I t r a i ni ng pr ogr am was di sagr eement over t het ac t i cal doc t r i nes of t r ench ver sus open war f ar e. TheEur opean power s of t he Fi r st Wor l d War had begun wi t h abel i ef i n open, or maneuver war f ar e. But , t he machi ne gunand i mpr oved ar t i l l er y i nc reas ed t he l et hal i t y of t hebat t l ef i el d and c r eat ed a s i t uat i on whi c h t a ct i c al l yf avor ed t he def ense. I ni t i al oper at i ons on t he West er nFr ont had r esul t ed i n a t act i cal s t a l emat e and t he adventof what i s r ef er r ed t o as t r ench war f ar e. Af t er t hr ee year sof war , t he Al l i es had accept ed t r ench war f ar e and t r ai nedaccor di ngl y. GEN Per shi ng bel i eved t hat t he al l i es hadadj ust ed t oo wel l t o what he consi der ed to be t he "abnor mals t abi l i zed war f ar e" of t he t r enches , and asser t ed t hat t hekey t o vi ct or y over Ger many l ay i n dr i v i ng t he enemy out oft hei r t r enches and def eat i ng t hem i n a war of maneuver .Per s hi ng' s of f i c i al i ns t r uc t i ons on t he s ubj ec t ar es i gni f i cant :

2 7

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Tr ench warf are gi ves pr om nence t o t hedef ensi ve as opposed t o t he of f ensi ve. Toguar d agai ns t t hi s , t he bas i s of i ns t r uc t i onshoul d be of f ens i ve, bot h i n spi r i t andpr ac t i ce.... l l i ns t r uct i on must cont empl at et he assumpt i on of a vi gor ous of f ens i ve; t hi spur pose wi l l be emphasi zed i n ever y phase oft r ai ni ng2Mnt i l i t becomes a set t l ed habi t oft hought .Fr om a t act i cal poi nt of vi ew, t he met hod ofcombat i n t r ench war f ar e pr esent s a mar kedcont r ast t o t hat empl oyedt he at t empt by assaul t i ngt r ench war f ar e met hods i ncombal gwi l l be successf ull o s s .

i n open war f ar e, andi nf ant r y t o usean open war f ar eonl y at gr eatSo as t o not over s ta te t hi s conf l i c t , Per s hi ng di d

r ecogni ze t hat bas i c i nst r uct i on i n t r ench war f ar e wasnecessary and di d r ecogni ze t he val ue of Al l i ed exper i ence.Dur i ng t he cour se of t he war Fr ench and Br i t i sh i nst r uct or sassi st ed i n Amer i can t r ai ' ni ng camps and bot h Fr ench andBr i t i sh commander s t ook r espons i bi l i t y or t he i ni t i alt r ai ni ng of Amer i can uni t s . 30of wor l d War I , Per shi ng cont i nued t o emphasi ze hi s bel i efi n open war f ar e as t he key t o vi ct or y and t o pr ess orAmer i can t r a i ni ng, under Amer i can i nst r uct or s.

But , t hr oughout t he t r ai ni ng

31The f i nal f ac t or , obs t acl es t o t r ai ni ng, af f ect ed

t he devel opment , but mor e so t he conduct , of t r ai ni ngpr ogr ams. Rel at ed t o t he' f act or s of unpr epar edness andi nexperi ence, obst acl es t o t r ai ni ng wer e t he combi neddeEi c i enci es i n housi ng, equi pment of war , and t r ai ni ngoppor t uni t y.

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I n m d- Mar ch of 1917, pl anni ng began f or bui l di ngcamps capabl e of housi ng up t o one- m l l i on men. The Ar myhad sel ect ed 32 camps ( 16 Nat i onal Guar d and 16 Nat i onalAr my) f or t r ai ni ng of t he expanded f or ce. The Nat i onalGuar d camps wer e t o have pl at f or ms f or t ent s, and t heNat i onal Ar my camps wer e t o have wooden bar r acks . BySept ember , t wo t hi r ds of t he i ni t i al cons t r uc t i on wascompl et e wi t h space f or 400, 000 men. The pr obl em ar ose i nt he ef f i c i ency of t he sel ec t i ve ser vi ce sys t em whi chpr ovi ded 500, 000 men i n t he f al l of 1917. As t he newr ecr ui t s ar r i ved, t hey f ound t he camps i n var i ous s t ages or eadi ness wi t h cr amped condi t i ons and i ncompl et ebui l di ngs . 3 2s uf f i c i ent t o meet t he needs of t he expandi ng m l i t ar yf or ce. GEN Per shi ng, somewhat unf ai r l y, c r i t i c i zed t heconst r uct i on pr ogr am and bl amed i t f or del ayi ng t r ai ni ng bysi x mont hs.

Over al l , however , cant onment const r uct i on was

3 3The l ack of t he equi pment of war - - i nc l udi ng ar ms,

muni t i ons, cl ot hi ng, and t ent age- - had a gr eat er and mor el ong- t er m ef f ec t o n t r ai ni ng t han t he sl ow s t ar t i nconst r uct i on. The mobi l i zat i on and depl oyment of t heNat i onal Guard a l mg t he Mexi can border pr i or t o t he warhad depl et ed most of t he ex i s t i ng m l i t ar y s t or es of t henat i on. Manuf act ur i ng i n t he Uni t ed St at es t hat waspr oduci ng war mat er i al was of t en t ool ed to f or ei gns pec i f i c at i ons ( i . e. t he Br i t i s h Lee- Enf i el d r i f l e) . Whent he Ar my bur eau chi ef s wer e asked t o pr ovi de an est i mat e as

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t o how l ong i t woul d t ake t o obt a i n suppl i es f or a1, 000, 000 man ar my, t he Quar t er mast er Gener al est i mat ed 9t o 12 mont hs t o pr ocur e t he r equi r ed cl othi ng. The Chi efof Or dnance est i mat ed 12 mont hs f or smal l ar ms but 18mont hs f or machi ne guns and 30 mont hs f or ar t i l l er y. Theot her depar t ment est i mat es r anged f r om 6 t o 12 mont hs.Compoundi ng t he pr obl ems of s uppl y, no or der s wer e pl acedf or t he expanded Ar my unt i l May, 1917. 34

Whi l e t hese est i mat es wer e based upon peacet i mepr ocur ement pr ocedur es, t hey' ar e' i ndi c at i ve of t he suppl ys i t uat i on dur i ng t he t he war . The r esul t was t hat manysol di ers di d not see cr ew served weapons unt i l t hey ar r i vedi n Fr ance. Hand gr enades wer e so s c ar c e t hat o nl y of f i c er s. and non- comm ssi oned of f i cer s at t endi ng t he hand gr enadeschool had t he oppor t uni t y t o t r a i n wi t h l i ve gr enades. Theshor t age of r i f l es made i t necessar y f or many new r ecr ui t st o dr i l l wi t h wooden st akes, and when r i f l es di d becomeavai l abl e, r us h c al l s f or a di vi s i on t o r epor t f ordepl oyment pr event ed r ec rui t s f r om us i ng t hei r r i f l es i npr ac t i c e. 35 Shor t ages i n weapons and ar mament s wer e madeup, i n par t , by us i ng Al l i ed equi pment , but quart ermast ersuppl i es coul d not al ways be f i l l ed as eas i l y. There wereser i ous sh or t ages i n' uni f or m i t ems such as O . D . br eechesand coat s , ql oves , l eggi ngs , shoes , s t ocki ngs , and shel t erhal ves. These shor t ages af f ect ed t he r at e o f mobi l i z at i on,and subs equent l y t he number of r e cr ui t s avai l abl e f ort r ai ni ng. 3 6

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Compoundi ng t he pr obl ems of housi ng and equi ppi ngt he Ar my was t he l ack of oppor t uni t y t o t r ai n caused byweat her and di sease. The wi nt er of 1917 was one of t hehar shes t on r ecor d, and i n conj unc t i on wi t h t he pr i m t i ves t a t e of t he cant onment s, pr event ed or del ayed t he t r ai ni ngof r ec r ui t s . But mor e c r i t i c al t o t r ai ni ng was t h e f i ghtagai ns t di sease . Meas l es , mumps, di ar r hea , t uber cul os i s ,smal l pox , chi cken pox , meni ngi t i s , t yphoi d, di pt her i a andot her di seases r esul t ed i n t he deat hs of bet ween 17, 000 t o19, 000 men dur i ng t he cour se of t he war .Spani sh- Amer i can War and good sani t at i on pr act i ces kept t hedi sease r at e l ow unt i l t he f l u epi dem c, whi ch began dur i ngt he wi nt er of 1917, r eached i t s peak. Dur i ng t he per i odm d- Sept ember t o m d- Oct ober 1918, t he f l u epi dem caf f ect ed over one- quar t er of t he Ar my. By November i t hads t opped al l dr af t c al l s and pr ac t i c al l y hal t ed t r ai ni ng.Whi l e not havi ng a di r ect ef f ect upon oper at i ons i n Eur ope,t he f l u epi dem c di d have an ef f ect upon t he devel opmentand c onduc t of t r ai ni ng. I n t he f i nal t al l y, 31% of t hemen who di ed i n t he Ar my dur i ng t he war , di ed f r om di seasei n t r ai ni ng camps .

Lessons of t he

37Thr oughout U. S. par t i c i pat i on i n Wor l d War I , t her e

was i ncreasi ' ng pr essur e f or what i s t er med amal gamat i on ofAmer i can so l di er s and uni t s i nt o Al l i ed f or mat i ons . Thepr essur e f or amal gamat i on r esul t ed f r om i ncr easi ng Ger manac t i vi t y whi ch t hr eat ened t o def eat t he al l i es bef or eAmer i can uni t s , under Amer i can command, coul d be

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ef f ec t i vel y c omm t t ed. 3 8amal gamat i on may have i ncr eased Al l i ed cr i t i c i sm ofAmer i can t r ai ni ng, and i s a f a c t o r i n Per shi ng' s r esol ve t ohave a di s t i nc t i ve Amer i can Ar my, i t di d not di r ec t l yaf f ec t t he dev el opment of i ndi vi dual t r ai ni ng, and i s notcons i der ed a c r i t i cal f ac t or f or pur poses of t hi s s t udy.

These s i x f act o rs - - unpr epar edness , i nexper i ence,

Whi l e t he pr essur e f or

di sagr eement on t he l engt h of t i me r equi r ed to t r a i n a nef f ec t i ve so l di er , t he r equi r ement f or ear l y depl oyment ,ambi val ance as t o t ac t i cal doct r i ne, and obst ac l es t ot r ai ni ng- - wer e i nt er r e l ated and af f ect ed t he devel opment oft r ai ni ng pr ogr ams. Lack of exper i ence i n t went i eth cent ur ywarf are maee i t di f f i cul t t o be pr oper l y pr epar ed. Lack O Texper i ence and pr epar at i on meant t hat t he Ar my was r equi r edt o devel op i t s t r ai ni ng pr ogr ams a f t er ent r y i nt o t he war .I n devel opi ng t r ai ni ng pr ogr ams, t he Ar my had t o consi dert he ar gument s f or l ong- t er m t r ai ni ng ver sus t her equi r ement s or manpower . Compl i cat i ng t he devel opmnt oTa t r ai ni ng pr ogr am was t he r equi r ement f or ear l y depl oymentof so l di er s over seas . I n t he devel opment of i t s t r ai ni ngpr ogr ams, t he Ar my had t o r econci l e t he r ea l i t i es of t r enchwar f ar e wi t h t he pr edom nant bel i ef t hat open war f ar e wast he met hod necessar y f or v i ct ory . And f i na l l y , t he Ar my hadt o over come the obst ac l es t o t r ai ni ng t hat wer e a r es ul t o four unpr epar edness and i nexper i ence.

I n gener al t er ms, t he Ar my was successt ul i n i t sappr oach t o t hese i ss ues. The Ar my over came i t : ;

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i n e x p e r i e n c e an d l a c k of p r e p a r a t i o n i n t i m e a n dr e c o n c i l e d , u nd e r p r e s s u r e of e a r l y d e pl o ym e n t,d i s ag r e e m en t o v e r t h e l e n g t h o f t i m e n e c e s s a r y f o r t r a i n i n gi n f a v o r o f s h o r t e r term t r a i n i n g . 39f i r s t Am er ica n t r o o p s e n t e r e d t h e t r e n c h e s on 2 0 O c t o b e r1 9 17 , o n l y s i x m o n t h s a f t e r t h e 1 s t D i v i s i o n w a s a c t i v a t e d .By May of 1 9 1 8 , A m e r i c a n u n i t s were t a k i n g a n a c t i v e r o l ei n t h e war a t C a n t i g n y ( 2 8 May 1 9 1 8 , w i t h t h e 1 s t D i v i s i o n )a n d C h a t e a u - T h i e r r y a n d B e l l e a u Wood ( 3 0 May t o 1 7 J u n e1 91 8, w i t h t h e 2d a nd 3d D i v i s i o n s ) .

A s a r e s u l t , t h e

4 0More d i f f i c u l t t o e v a l u a t e i s t h e disagreement o v e r

t a c t i c a l d o c t r i n e . T he A me ri ca ns t r a i n e d i n b o t h t r e n c ha nd o pe n w a r f a r e , w hi ch c r e a t e d c o n f u s i o n i n t h ed e v e l o p m e n t of t h e t r a i n i n g p ro gr am . 4 1 I t i s d i f f i c u l t t od e t e r m i n e w hi ch d o c t r i n e o f w a r f a r e was c o r r e c t . When t h eA m e r i c a n s were t a k i n g t h e i r most a c t i v e r o l e i n t h e w a r a n da t t e m p t i n g t o a p p l y t h e d o c t r i n e of o pe n w a r f a r e , t h eGermans were i n r e t r e a t a n d t h e war was coming t o a n e n d .

O R G A N I Z A T I O N FOR TRAINING

D u r i n g W o r l d War I , t h e r e w a s n o s i n g l eh e a d q ua r te r s r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t r a i n i n g , e i t h e r i n t h ed e v e l o p m e n t o r t h e s u p e r v i s i o n of p r o g r a m s . T h e WarD e p a r tm e n t o v e r s a w t h e t r a i n i n g c on du c t ed i n t h e U n it e dS t a t e s p r i o r t o s h i p m e n t of u n i t s a n d s o l d i e r s o v e r s e as andt h e A E F s u p e r v i s e d t r a i n i n g a f t e r t h e u n i t o r i n d i v i d u a l

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arr i ved i n Fr ance. Thi s was due t o l ack of exper i ence andt he r equi r ement f or ear l y depl oyment of f or ces over seas.I nexper i ence and unpr epar edness wer e mani f est i n t he Ar my' sl ack of a subst ant i al gener al s t af f and t he l ack ofcompr ehensi ve mobi l i zat i on pl ans addr essi ng t he r equi r ementt o t r ai n a l ar ge i nf l ux of new sol di er s . The r equi r ementf or ear l y depl oyment of so l di ers over seas di sr upt ed anyorder l y , l ong- t er mprepar at i on i n the Uni t ed St at es andr esul t ed i n t he devel opment of pr ogr ams over seas desi gnedt o meet t he i mmedi at e needs f or bot h i ndi v i dual and uni tt r ai ni ng.

A maj or por t i on of t he Gener al St af f , pr i or t oWor l d War I , was i n r eal i t y t he Ar my War Col l ege. The WarCol l ege was , i n f ac t , t he pl anni ng s t a f f f or t he r ecent l yc reat ed of f i ce of Chi ef of St af f o f t he Ar my ( 1903) ;however , i t was kept smal l , onl y n i net een o f f i cer s , and hadnei t her t he i nf l uence nor scope of operat i ons nor mal l yaf f or ded a moder n Gener al St af f . 4 2t he War Col l ege had t o cont end wi t h t he cont i nui ng powerand i nf l uence of t he bur eau or depar t ment ch i ef s , who st i l lexert ed pol i t i cal and bur eaucr at i c power . Smal l , and wi t hl i m t ed i nf l uenc e, t he' war Col l ege had di f f i c ul t yaccompl i shi ng t he coor di nat i on wi t h and among t he var i ousdepar t ment s necessar y f or compr ehensi ve pl anni ng.

As wel l as bei ng smal l ,

4 3Thc r equi r ement or ear l y depl oyment r esul t ed i n

t he ar r i val o f GEN Per shi ng and t he begi nni ngs of t he AEFs t a f f i n F rance i n May, 1917. f ol l owed i n J une by t he 1st

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Di vi si on. GEN Per shi ng had been gi ven unpr ecedent edaut hor i t y by t he Pr es i dent . I n t he absence of spec i f i ci ns t r uct i ons f r om t he War Depar t ment or Gener al St af f ,Per shi ng se t about devel opi ng t he or gani zat i on and t r ai ni ngpr ogr ams f or pr epar at i on of t he AEF f or e m~l o y me n t . ~~s i ngt he Fr ench syst em as a model , he devel oped t he GeneralHeadquar t er s, Ameri can Expedi t i onar y For ces ( GHQ, AEF) whi chwoul d be cr i t i cal i n t he devel opment and super v i s i on oEt r ai ni ng. 4 5met hods and pr ocedur es t hat woul d become t he basi s f or al l

Moreover , us i ng t he 1st Di v i s i on, he devel oped

46AEF t r ai ni ng.Bot h t he War Depar t ment , t hr ough t he General St af f ,

and GHQ, AEF made i mpr ovement s i n or gani zat i on as t he warpr ogr essed and exper i ence i ncr eased. I n t he Uni t ed St at est he Chi ef of St af f , GEN Peyt on Mar ch, was abl e i n May 1918t o est abl i sh aut hor i t y over t he bur eau chi ef s and expandand re or gani z e t he Gener al St af f i nt o f our di vi s i ons :Oper at i ons ; I nt el l i genc e; Pur c has e, St or age, and Tr af f i c ;and War Pl ans. 47Col l ege Di v i s i on had been concerned wi t h war pl ans,t r ai ni ng, and oper at i ons . W t hi n t he Gener al St af f ,Oper at i ons and War P l ans shar ed t he f unct i ons of t he ol dWar Col l ege Di v i s i on wi t h Operat i ons assum ngr es pons i bi l i t y f or t r ai ni ng. 8had i . ni . t i al l y or gani z ed hi s s t af f s i m l ar t o t he Fr enchwi t h f our di vi s i ons : G1, Per s onnel ; G2, I nt el l i genc e; G 3 ,Operat i ons and Tr a i ni ng; and G 4 , L ogi s t i c s . Per s hi ng l at er

P r i or t o t he reor gani zat i on t he War

I n Fr ance, Gener al Per shi ng

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ex pa nd ed t h e GHQ,AEF t o i n c l u d e a f i f t h d i v i s i o n , G5,4 9r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t r a i n i n g .

By t r a d i t i o n , t h e War D e pa r tm e n t r a i s e d a n dequ i pp ed a n a rmy and t h e Commanding Ge ner a l becamer e s p o n s i b l e f o r i t s o r g a n i z a t i o n , t r a i n i n g a nd , when r e a d y ,i t s e m p lo y m en t . C o n c e p t u a l l y , W or ld War I t r a i n i n g d i d n o td e p a r t Erom t r a d i t i o n . T he War D e p a r t m e n t was t o r a i s e ,o r y a n i z e a n d e q u i p t h e e xp an de d wart ime a rm y a n d p r o v i d er u d im e n ta r y i n d i v i d u a l t r a i n i n g i n t h e t in i te d S t a t e s . Thearmy t h e n w ou ld b e s h i p p e d o v e r s e a s f o r c o m p le t io n of i t st r a i n i n g under t h e g u i d an c e of t h e commanding Genera l oft h e AEF, GEN P e r sh i ng . I n p r a c t i c e , t h e c o mp l e t i on ote ve n r u d im e n t ar y t r a i n i n g w a s n o t a l wa y p o s s i b l e b e Eo r ed e p l o y m e n t a n d , G E N Pershing and GIIQ,AEF were r e q u i r e d t od e v e l o p t r a i n i n g p r o gr am s f o r i n s t r u c t i o n i n b a s i ci n d i v i d u a l s k i l l s . A l t ho u g h i n f l u e n c i n g a l l t r a i n i n g byv i r t u e o f h i s p o s i t i o n , P e rs h in g d i d n o t h av e d i r e c tc o n t r o l o v e r t h e p r og ra m s co n d uc t e d i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s .T he r e s u l t was a d i v i s i o n o f e f f o r t w i t h t h e War D e p a r t m e n tr e s p o n s i b l e f o r i n d i v i d u a l t r a i n i n g w i t h i n t h e Un it edS t a t e s a n d GHQ,AEF t h e a g e n c y or b o t h i n d i v i d u a l a nd u n i tt r a i n i n g i n F ra nc e .

The d i v i s i o n of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y b etw ee n t w oh e a dq u a r t e r s , a l t h o u g h n o t e f f i c i e n t , was e f f e c t i v e f o r t w oi m p o r t a n t r e a s o n s . F i r s t , a1 tho ug h t h e Army Chic : oi S t n f uwas t e c h n i c a l l y s u p e r i o r i n r a n k t o P e r sh i ng , t h e wartiinec h i e f s c o ns i de r e d i t t h e i r d u t y t o p r o v i d c a l l t h e s u l p y o r t

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p o s s i b l e t o P e r s h i n g a nd t o a l l ow P e r s h i n g t o d e t e rm i n e t h et r a i n i n g r e q u i r e m e n t s . S ec on d, t h e c o u n t r y was o n l yf i g h t i n g i n one major t h e a t e r o f w a r , a n d a l l e f f o r t s c o u l db e aimed a nd t a i l o r e d t o s u p p o r t t h e n e ed s o f t h a tt h e a t e r . 52

DEVELOPMENT A N D EVOLUTION OF WORLD WAR I I N D I V I D U A LINFANTRY T X A I N I N G__T he d ev el op m en t of t h e i n d i v i d u a l t r a i n i n g p ro gr am s

o f W o r l d War I e v o l v ed i n t h r e e ph a s es . T he f i r s t p h a sewas t h e d e ve l op m e nt o f i n i t i a l t r a i n i n g programs, b o t h i nt h e U n i te d S t a t e s a n d F ra n c e . I n i t i a l pr o gr am s were b a s e do n t h e r e c r u i t t r a i n i n g p r a c t i c e s of t h e Army p r i o r t o i t se n t r y i n t o t h e war a n d b or r ow e d f r om t h e l i t e r a t u r e a n dg r a c t i c e s o f F ra n c e a nd B r i t a i n . T he s e co n d p h a s e was t h et r a n s i t i o n f ro m t h e i n i t i a l t r a i n i n g p r o g r a m s t o t h e f i n a lt r a i n i n g p ro gr am s. T h i s t r a n s i t i o n was d u e t o t h r e ef a c t o r s : d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h t h e c o n t e n t a n d q u a l i t y 01:t h e i n i t i a l p r o g r a m s; l e s s o n s l e a r n e d i n t r a i n i n g a ndc o m ba t ; a n d t h e n e e d t o p r o v i d e i n d i v i d u a l r e p l a c em e n t s f o rc o m b a t l o s s e s . T he t h i r d p h a s e was t h e d e ve lo pm e nt o f t h ef i n a l p ro gr am . T h i s l a s t p h a se i n c l u d e d t h e f i n a li n d i v i d u a l t r a i n i n g p r o g r a m t o b e c o n d uc t e d u n de r t h ec o n t r o l o f a d i v i s i o n a n d t h e p ro gr am t o b e c on d uc t ed i nr e pl a ce m en t t r a i n i n g c e n t e r s . T h e r e a r e no d i s t i n c t d ; l t c st o i d e n t i f y t he begin n.i .ng ancl en d of e a c h phiise. I n i r i a lp r o g r a m s were s t i .11 b e i n g d e v c lo p e d when d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n

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w a s v o ic e d o v e r t h e q u a l i t y of t r a i n i n g , an d m o d i f i c a t i on swere s t i l l b e i n g made i n t h e i n i t i a l p ro gr am s when t h e w a re n d e d .

I n i t i a l T r a i n i n g P r o g r a m s

Th e i n d i v i d u a l t r a i n i n g pr ogr ams of World War Iwere d e v e l o p e d b y t h e War Depa r tment i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e sa nd by t h e AEF i n F r a n c e . T he p r og ra m s were s i m i l a r i nseve ra l r e s p e c t s . B ot h p r og r am s : ( 1 ) dr ew, i n p a r t , o n p a s te x p e r i e n c e i n r e c r u i t t r a i n i n g ; 2 ) b o rr o we d f r e e l y f r omt r a i n i n g l i t e r a t u r e a n d ex p e r i e n c e o f t h e F re nc h a ndB r i t i s h ; 3 ) d ep en d ed i n i t i a l l y o n a s s i s t a n c e f ro m F r en c hand B r i t i s h i n s t r u c t o r s : ( 4 ) . w e r e i m p e r f e c t l y c o o r d i n a t e d ;and ( 5 ) were s u g g e s t i v e a s o p p o s e d t o d i r e c t i v e ( c o n s i s t e n tw i t h t h e i d e a t h a t t h e d i v i s i o n c ommander was r e s p o n s i b l ef o r t h e t r a i n i n g o f h i s u n i t ) . I n a d d i t i o n , t h e p ro gr amd e v e l o p m e n t i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s was i n f l u e n c e d by t h eexpe r i ences of t h e AEF a nd t h e d e s i r e s o f GEN P e r s h i n g . 5 3

B ot h p a s t e x p e r i e n c e i n r e c r u i t t r a i n i n q a nda v a i l a b l e t r a i n i n g l i t e r a t u r e were i n a d e q u a t e t o meet t h edemands of t r a i n i n g a modern army. W h i l e a p r o g r a m f o rt r a i n i n g i n f un da me nt al s k i l l s was c o n d u c t e d a t r e c r u i td e p o t s , t h i s t r a i n i n g had n o t b e e n p r a c t i c e d on a l a r g es c a l e a nd was n o t e v en l y a p p l i e d . P r i o r t o e n t r y i n t o t h owar , t h e n or ma l y e a r l y r e q u i r e m e n t was f o r t h e t r a i n i n g ofo n l y 4, 00 0 r e c r u i t s a t n i n e d e p o t s . 5 4 AS p r e v i o u s l y

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ment i oned, r ecr ui t s di d not al ways r ecei ve t hi s bas i ct r ai ni ng bec aus e of di f f i c ul t i es i n r epl ac ement f l ow.Fur t her more , t her e wer e f ew of f i cers or non- comm ssi onedof f i c er s wi t h exper i enc e i n t he r ec r u i t t r ai ni ng pr ogr am

Rel at ed t o t hi s l ack of exper i ence was a shor t age

55

of s t andar di z ed t r ai ni ng l i t er at ur e. Pr i or t o Wor l d War It her e had been a m ni mal amount of ac t i vi t y i n t hedevel opment of t r ai ni ng l i t er at ur e. Dr i l l r egul at i ons wer epubl i s hed at i r r egul ar i nt er val s wi t h i nf r equentr evi s i ons . 5 6l at es t r evi s i on of I nf ant r y Dr i l l Requl at i ons was publ i s hedi n 1911, and updat i ng di d not occur unt i l 1918. Mor eover ,

When t he Uni t ed St at es ent er ed t he war , t he

. t he f i el d s er vi c e and dr i l l r egul at i ons gave gui dance onwhat was t o be accompl i shed but di d not addr ess speci f i csof set t i ng up a pr ogr am or conduc t i ng t he t r ai ni ng.Compoundi ng an over al l l ack of devel opment i n t r ai ni ngl i t er at ur e was a l ack of st andar di zat i on. Al t hough t he WarDepar t ment was t he agency r esponsi bl e f or a l l t r ai ni ngl i t er at ur e, pr i vat e publ i sher s wer e not di s cour aged f r ompr ovi di ng t r ai ni nq l i t er at ur e, wi t h t he onl y r equi r ementbei ng t hat t hey general l y f o l l owed War Depart ment pol i cy.

Lacki ng exper i ence i n t he devel opment and conduct51

of t r ai ni ng f or a l ar ge army and s i m l ar l y unpr epar ed i npr ovi di ng t he r e qui r ed t r ai ni ng l i t er at ur e, t he Ar myaccept ed t he Al l i ed of f er of ass i s t ance. I l ur i ng t he cour seof t he war , 2 8 6 Fr ench and 4 8 7 Br i t i s h i ns t r uc t or s as s i s t edi n Amer i can t r ai ni ng. They were act i ve i n t r ai ni ng camps,

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i n school s , and on s t af f s ass i s t i ng i n t he des i gn anddevel opment of t r ai ni ng pr ogr ams. I n Fr ance, French andBr i t i sh di v i s i ons became sponsors o f Amer i can di v i s i ons t.oassi st i n t he devel opment and conduct of t he di v i s i ont r ai ni ng pr ogr ams. *Depar t ment and t he AEF, bor r owed f r eel y f r om Al l i edt r ai ni ng and t act i c al l i t er a t ur e , and 55 t r ai ni ng manual sof Wor l d War I a re copi es , o r modi f i cat i ons of t hoseal r eady bei ng used by ei t her t he Fr ench or Br i t i sh.

The i ni t i al pr ogr am f or i ndi vi dual i nf ant r y

The Amer i cans, t hr ough bot h t he War

5 9

t r ai ni ng i n t he Uni t ed St at es pr i or t o shi pment over seaswas pr epar ed and publ i shed by t he Ar my War Col l ege i nAugust , 1917, under t he t i t l e, " I nEant r y Tr ai ni ng. , t 60 ' thepur pose of t hi s pamphl et was t o pr ovi de i nst r uct i onsper t ai ni ng t o t he t r ai ni ng of an i nf ant r y di v i s i on and theest abl i shment of di vi s i on s chool s . I t pr o vi ded a det ai l edt r ai ni ng pr ogr am f or t he i ndi vi dual s ol di er but c ont ai nedt he c aveat t hat " t he r es pons i bi l i t y f or t r ai ni ng t hedi v i s i on r est ed sol el y wi t h t he di v i s i on commander ;t heref or e, t he pr ogr am was suggest i ve and adv i sor y i nc har ac t er , t o be adapt ed at t he di scr et i on of t he di v i s i oncommander . " Nevert hel ess, i t cont i nual l y st r esseds t andar di zat i on i n pr ac t i ce and appl i cat i on. 61t hi s pr ogr am wi l l be used as a bas i s f or compar i son of ?. hepr ogr am devel oped i n Fr ance and subsequent modi f i cat i ons,i t i s necessar y t o desc r i be per t i nent aspcc ts of t hepr ogr am i n some det ai l .

Because

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The 1 9 1 7 pr ogr am cover ed si xt een weeks andspeci f i ed pl anned t r ai ni ng of at l east 36 hour s each week,exc l us i ve of addi t i onal t r ai ni ng r equi r ed f or of f i c er s ' ancnon- comm ssi oned of f i cer s ' school s and pr eparat i on. Sundayswer e non- t r ai ni ng days and Wednes day and Sat ur dayaf t er noons wer e nor mal l y kept open f or r ecr eat i on andat hl et i c s but avai l abl e f or make- up t r ai ni ng or r et r ai ni ngas needed. The pr ogr am was desi gned t o be pr ogr ess i ve soas t o avoi d unnecessary r epet i t i on yet condi t i on t hes ol di er t o per f or m aut omat i c al l y, " o ut of habi t . ,,62

The pr ogr am63 r ecogni zed t hat t he t r a i ni ng cycl em ght be i nt er r upt ed and l i s t ed t he f ol l owi ng ar eas , i norder of pr i or i t y, a s t he m ni mum es s ent i al t r a i ni ng:

1.2.3.4.5 .6 .7 .8 .9 .10.

Di s ci pl i ne.Phys i c ai ef f i c i enc y, i nc l udi ng mar c hi ng.Combat ef f i c i ency, bayonet , r i f l e, and musket r y.Devel opment of l eader shi p.Devel opment of cohes i ve act i on, maneuver , l i a i son,et c .Tr ai ni ng i n s pec i al t i es .Tact i cs i n open war f ar e ( pl at oon t hr u br i gade) .Per sonal hygi ene.Ent r enchi ng.El ement ar y pr i nc i pl es of t r ench war f ar e.

I ndi v i dual t r ai ni ng64 was f ur t her br oken down i nt o f ourl evel s of i ns t r uc t i on:1. Rec r ui t i ns t r uc t i on:

a ) Ar t i c l es o f war .b) Mi l i t ar y di s c i pl i ne and c our t es y.c ) Ar ms, uni f or ms, and equi pment .d ) Per sonal hygi ene and cgf e of f eet .e ) School of t he s ol di ef ) School of t he squad.g ) Set t i ng up exer c i s es , r ec r ui t i ns t r uc t i onh ) Or der s f or s ent i nel s .

6 6

40

, . 7


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2. Squad i nst r uct i on:i n r ecr ui t i ns t r uct i on.a) Test i ng by t he squad l eader on t he subj ect s t aught .b ) Set t i ng up exer c i ses , t r ai ned sol di er i ns t r uc t i on.c) School of t he squad.d ) Tent pi t chi ng.e) Bayonet exer ci ses and bayonet combat .f ) Whi s t l e and ar m s i gnal s .g ) Col or sent i nel s , count er s i gns and par ol es ,compl ement s f r omguar ds, guar di ng pr i soners and f l ags.h) Si ght i ng dr i l l s .i ) Pos i t i on and ai m ng dr i l l s .j Maki ng t r i angl es .k ) Tar get pr ac t i ce.1 ) Musket r y dut i es of t he squad, i nvol v i ng t ar getdes i gnat i on, f i r e di s t r i but i on, f i r e di s ci pl i ne, f i r edi r ec t i on, and f i r e c ont r ol .

6 8

m) Fi r st ai d t o t he wounded.n) Gas war f are: met hods of empl oyment , ef f ect s of gas ,use and car e of pr ot ect i ve mask.3. Pl at oon i ns t r uc t i on:

a) Test s by pl at oon l eader on subj ect s t aught by t heb) Cl os e or der dr i l l .c ) Dr i l l i n t r ench and open war f ar e.d ) Mus ket r y dut i es s i m l ar t o t hose of squad t o i ncl udee) Ent r enchi ng.f ) I ndi vi dual cooki ng.g ) Gas war f ar e: mar chi ng, f i ght i ng, and f i r i ng whi l e i n

squad l eader.

r ange f i ndi ng and communi cat i ons.

pr ot ect i ve mask: pr event i on of damage t o weapons andequi pment due t o gas: and use of spr ayer s and f ans f orc l ear i ng gas .4. Company i nst r uct i on:l evel .a) Test s on t hose subj ect s t aught at squad and pl at oonb) School of t he company , c l ose or der dr i l l .c ) Fur t her t r ai ni ng i n t r ench war f ar e.d ) I ns pec t i ons .e) Guar d dut y, dut i es of commander , ser geant , andcorpor al of t he guard. Mount i ng t he guar d.

f ) Physi cal Trai ni ng and swi mm ng.g) Musket r y at company l evel , i nc l udi ny al l of t r a i ni ngh) Fi el d s er vi c e.i ) Marchi ng and campi ng.j ) Tar get pr act i ce.

at pl at oon and squad l evel .


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A l s o i n c l u d ed i n t h e i n s t r u c t i o n w a s t r a i n i n g f o ri n f a n t r y s p e c i a l i s t s - - s n i p e r s , m es se ng er s, s c o u t s ,

g r e n a d i e r s , and l i a i s o n p a t r o l s . I n f a n t r y s p e c i a l i s t s weres e l e c t e d f r om t h e r i f l e c om p an ie s a nd r e c e i v e d a d d i t i o n a ls p e c i f i c t r a i n i n g as oppos ed t o o t h e r s p e c i a l t y arms s u c ha s c oo ks , s i g n a l l e r s , c l e r k s , e t c . 69t a r g e t p r a c t i c e t i m e was r e s t r i c t e d d ue t o r a n g e andi n s t r u c t o r a v a i l a b i l i t y , s o i t was n o t p o s s i b l e f o re v e r y o n e t o f i r e a t a n y r a n g e a t one t ime. F i r i n g wasc o n d u c t e d by p l a t o o n , w i t h n o n - f i r i n g p l a t o o n s u n de r go i ngw ha t i s r e f e r r e d t o t o d a y a s c o n c u r re n t t r a i n i n g .Concur ren t t r a i n i n g s t r e s s e d r e l a t e d m u s ke tr y s k i l l s ,t r e n c h w a r f a r e , g a s w a r f a r e , and r e l a t e d i n f a n t r ys p e c i a l i s t s k i l l s . B eg in ni ng i n t h e s ev e nt h week . n i n h tt r a i n i n g was t o b e i n c o r p o r a t e d w i t h o t h e r s c he di i l edi n s t r u c t i o n . T r a in i ng was t o b e c o n du c t e d i n a c c o r d a n c ew i t h t h e a p p r o p r i a t e d r i l l manual f o r t h e s u b j e c t b e i n gt a u g h t . I n i t i a l l y , t h e d r i l l manua l s f rom 1 9 1 1 were usedb u t were s u p e r s e d e d a s new m a n u a l s , o f t e n c o p i e d f ro m t h eA l l i e s , be ca me a v a i l a b l e .

Range f i r i n g a n d

7 0The q u a l i t y o f t r a i n i n g was a r e f l e c t i o n o f t h e

i n s t r u c t o r s a nd most i n s t r u c t o r s were n o t much morek no wl ed ge ab le t h a n t h e s o l d i e r s t h e y were t e a c h i n g .E x p e r i e n c e d o f f i c e r s a n d n on -c om mi ss io ne d o f f i c e r s weret h i n l y s p r e a d a c r o s s t h e A r m y , a n d n e wl y a p p o i n t e d o f f i c c r sa n d n on -c om mi ss io ne d o f f i c e r s ha d r e c e i v e d o n l y l i m i t e dt r a i n i n g p r i o r t o t h e i r a s s i g n m e n t s w i t h t h e i n c o m i n g

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r e c r u i t s . T o a s s i s t i n p r ep a r i n g i n s t r u c t o r s , r e f r e s h e rc l a s s e s were c o n d u c t ed e a c h e v e n i n g a s was t h e p l a n n i n g anc

I.r e h e a r s a l o f company i n s t r u c t i o n f o r t h e n e x t d a y.T h e s i x t e e n week p r o g r a m was r e s t r i c t e d t o

i n d i v i d u a l , s q u ad , p l a t o o n , and company t r a i n i n q , e x c e p tf o r t w o s h o r t p e r i o d s o f b a t t a l i o n t r a i n i n g i n t h ef i f t e e n t h a n d s i x t e e n t h weeks. 7 2s t u d y , t h e s i x t e e n weeks of i n d i v i d u a l t h r o u g h companyl e v e l t r a i n i n g w i l l be c o n s i d e r e d t o b e p r e d o m i n a t e l yi n d i v i d u a l t r a i n i n g . The breakdown of h o u r s t a u g h t , bys u b j e c t , i s a s f o l l o w s :

F o r t h e p ur p o s e of t h i s

- U ~ ~ ~R e c r u i t i n s t r u c t i o n ...........................D i s c i p l i n e t r a i n i n g ( s c h o o l of. t h es q u a d ' t h r o u g h c om pa ny ) ....................P h ys i ca l t r a i n i n g .............................B a y o n e t , e x e r c i s e a n d co mb at ..................T h e o r e t i c a l ( g e n e r a l s u b j e c t s ) ................F i r s t a i d a nd h y g ie ne .........................Mar ch ing ......................................Guard d u t i e s ( s e p a r a t e f ro m r e c r u i t t r a i n i n g ) .A u t o - r i f l e , g r e n ad e s and. bombs ................G a s / A n t i - g a s w a r f a r e . .........................T a r g e t p r a c t i c e / M u s k e t r y ( 4 8 h r s ra ng e f i r e ) . .S p e c i a l t y t r a i n i n g (grenadier,messenger,etc)..O p e n w a r f a r e . .................................T r en c h w a r f a r e a n d o b s t a c l e s ..................U n i t m an eu ver ( b a t t a l i o n l e v e l a nd a b o v e ) . ....I n s p e c t i o n s ( n o t i n c l u d e d i n 3 6 h r / w k g u i d e ) . .T e s t i n g .......................................

1 3Hours_2 18 05 Y4 41 5

32 032 91 41 6 44 3113 71 32 03 2

D ev el op me nt o f t h e t r a i n i n g p r o gr am i n F r a n c ec o n t a i n e d t h e p r o bl em s of pr ogr ams i n t h e Un it ed S t a t e s a swell a s p r o b l e m s u n i q u e t o t h e R E F . P r o b l e m s u n i q u e t o t h eA E P stcmincd from t h e r e q u ir e m e n t f o r e a r 1 . y d c p l o y i n e n t . The1 s t D i v i s i o n was t h e f i r s t Amer ican coinbiit u n i t t o , d r r iv c

43


47/161

i n Eur ope. I t s exper i ence was to pr ovi de t he bas i s f ort r ai ni ng of di vi s i ons ar r i vi ng l at er i n Fr a nc e. Whi l el at er uni t s t r ai ned under bot h Fr ench and Br i t i sh t ut el age,i t was t he 1s t Di v i s i on, t r ai ni ng wi t h t he F re nch, whi chwas most i nst r ument al i n t he devel opment of t he AEFt r ai ni ng program 7 4

The 1st Di vi si on was f or med i n May, 1917, andar r i ved i n Fr ance on 2 3 J une. Al t hough a r egul ar di vi s i on,bet ween one- hal f t o t wo- t hi r ds of t he di vi si on was made upof new r ecr ui t s, many havi ng r ecei ved bar el y f undament ali ns t r uct i on whi l e on shi pboard enr out e t o France. 7 5 I ni t i alt r ai ni ng gui dance t o the di vi s i on f r om t he AEF was m ni mal ,and t he member s of t he di v i s i on devel oped t hei r pr el i m nar yt r ai ni ng pl ans dur i ng. t he voyage t o Fr ance. The pr i nc i pl esgui di ng t he i ni t i al pl ans i nc l uded a bel i ef t hat di s c i pl i neand physi cal r eadi ness wer e r equi r ed f or c ombatef f ec t i veness . To devel op di s c i pl i ne and phys i cal f i t ness ,t he i ni t i al pl ans s t r es s ed dr i l l , phys i c al t r ai ni ng, andmar chi ng. Lat er t r ai ni ng memor anda al s o added emphasi s onmar ksmanshi p. These t hr ee t hemes woul d be consi st entt hr oughout t he t r ai ni ng pl ans of t he 1s t Di vi s i on and al lsubsequent di vi s i ons . . 6

The di v i s i on was t r ai ned i n t hr ee phases :pr el i m nar y t r ai ni ng, bas i c uni t t r ai ni ng, and advanceduni t t r ai ni ng. Whi l e a l l phases o di vi s i on t r ai ni ng

Training the American Soldier in WWI and WWII

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