-
THE ROLE OF THE VALUE-JUDGMENT- IN THE CHRISTOLOGY OF ALBRECHT
RITSCBL
A Thesis Presented to
^the Faculty of the Graduate School of Relig The University of
Southern California
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Theology
hyGeorge Myron Raun
June 1944
-
UMI Number: EP65137
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is
dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete
manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also,
if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
DissortsiDft Pubi
UMI EP65137
Published by ProQuest LLC (2014). Copyright in the Dissertation
held by the Author.
Microform Edition ProQuest LLC.All rights reserved. This work is
protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code
ProQuest LLC.789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346
-
This thesis, wr i t ten by
........................... GEQRGE.. MYRQ3L
HAUN.....................
under the direction of Ais. Faculty Committee, and approved by a
l l its members, has been presented to and accepted by the Faculty
of the School of Religion in partia l fu lf i l lm ent of the
requirements fo r the degree of
MASTER OF THEOLOGY
9 ...Dean
Date June...l9.44.......
Faculty Committee
.Chairman
..
-
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER _ 'PAGEI. THE PROBLEM TO BE INVESTIGATED..............
1
Statement of the Problem . . .............. 1 .Scope of the S t
u d y ........................... . . 2Justification of the
discussion of the
problem......................................... 2Organization
of the material of the Thesis . . . 3
II. THE THEOLOGICAL AM) PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUNDOF R I T S C H L
...................................... 5Ritschls Relation to the
Theologians, Baur,
Bernard, Luther, Calvin, and Schleiermacher . . 5Ritschlfs
Relation to the Philosophers, Kant
and L o t z e ...................................... 8Ritschls
Epistemology.......................... 10
III. RITSCHL1 S THEORY OF VALUE-JUDGMENTS............... 28The
Historical Retrospect........ . ............ 28The Distinctions
Between Theoretical Judgments
and Value-judgments, and Between Concomitantand Independent
Value-judgments................ 31
The Ontological Status of Objects Known
ThroughValue-judgments................................ 35
IV. RITSCHLS CONCEPT OF RELIGION AND OF CHRISTIANT H E O L O G Y
............. 43 .Definition of Religion ..........................
44
-
CHAPTER PAGEThe Place of Revelation in Theology........ . .
50Ritschl's Idea of God and the Kingdom of God . . 53
V. THE CONSEQUENCES OF RITSCHL* S PHILOSOPHICAL ANDTHEOLOGICAL
PRESUPPOSITIONS FOR HIS CHRISTOLOGY . 60The Approach to the
Christological Problem . . . 61The Vocation of C h r i s t
........................ 63The Meaning of the Divinity of C h r i s
t ..........70The Relation of the Death of Christ to
the Forgiveness of Sin ..................... 76VI. SUMMARY AND C
O N C L U S I O N ........... .*.................81
Summary..........................................81C o n c l u s
i o n ..................................... 82
BIBLIOGRAPHY .....................................90
-
CHAPTER I
THE PR6BLEM TO BE INVESTIGATED
Albrecht Ritschl's distinctive contribution to theology was a
new method of* approach which he consistently applied'.-*- In the
historical Jesus, as set forth in the pages of the New Testament,
Cod is revealed; and this presentation of God is to be the starting
point of all theological thought. What we are to think about God as
to His Person, His Character and His demands upon us, it is
possible to discover only through Jesus. But the data of theology
are only available to members of the community which Jesus founded;
because revelation is not only to be found in the Scriptures (which
are but the literary deposit of His community) but it (revelation)
is living in His community still. Inasmuch as the revelation of God
is in Jesus Christ, it is only as one shares it as a member of the
community .which He founded, and shares in the "forgiveness of
sins" which is the condition for membership in the community that
one can discover the value
1 Hugh Ross Mackintosh, Types of Modern Theology. (Charles
Scribners Sons, 1939), p. 148. James Orr, The Ritschlian Theology,
p. 53, says this is not a new viewpoint in theology.
-
and significance of Jesus.2 It is only as one stands within the
community of Christ that he can interpret the materials given in
the New Testament. It is from this standpoint that Ritschl
developes his system.
Obviously, the theologian must make an evaluation of the
materials of the New Testament and of the community of Christ in
order to grasp the revelation of Lrod in uhrist.The development of
a theology, then rests upon the valuing activity or value-judgments
of the theologian. Thus we come* by the term "value-theology
The problem of this thesis is to examine in detail the function
of the value-judgment in so far as it has a bearing on Ritsehl*s
Ghristology. We will hope to discover what estimate of the
historical Jesus, Ritschl was able to come to through his approach,
and which of his insights are valid so that they may make a
permanent contribution to Ghristology.
The problem justifies itself in the light of Ritschl*s system.
The core of his system is found in his view of (1), value-judgments
and (2), of the historical revelation of God in Jesus Christ, the
founder of "the c o m m u n i t y T h e r e is no other way,
according to Ritschl, to evaluate Jesus than by
2 Albrecht Ritschl, The Christian Doctrine of Justification and
Reconciliation, Translated by H. R. Mackintosh and A. B. Macaulay
(New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1900), pp. 2ff.
-
means bf the value-judgment, but the value-judgment can give us
no valid insight*unless it can contemplate the revelation of God in
the historical Jesus. The two must always go together according to
Ritschls thought.
The problem is further justified inthat Ritschl *doesnt seem
concerned to give a systematic statement of his
method. Indeed, in the first edition of Justification and
Reconciliation he doesnt even use the term value-judgment The third
edition contains but a few statements, scattered throughout the
entire third volume 'which give a clue to his method. He was
concerned to give the practical results rather than to explain the
method.4 It should, therefore, be important to discover the
relationship between his underlying assumptions and to see the
result for his system of Christology.
A complete exposition of every phase of Ritschls thought cannot
be attempted in*this thesis. Rather, attention must be confined to
only those elements of his thought which bear a direct relationship
to his formulation of Christology on the basis of value-judgments.
Accordingly,
3 Wilfred C.' Keirstead, "Theological Presuppositions of
Ritschl, The American Journal of Theology, 10:434,July, 1906.
4 Albert T. Swing, The Theology of Albrecht Ritschl, (Hew York:
LongmansGreen, and Company, 1901), p. 27.
-
in phapter II the stage is set by a sketch of the theological
and philosophic background and foundations of his system, and
especially of his epistemology. In order to understand how
value-Judgments can have a bearing on Christology, it is necessary
to understand what value-Judgments are. Chapter III meets this
need, and it is devoted to the Ritsehlian view of value-Judgments.
One other phase of Rischls thought must be understood before there
can be an appreciation of his Christology, i.e., his concept of
religion in general and Christianity as the Absolute religion.
Therefore, in chapter TV there is a statement of his definition of
religion; of his view of revelation, God, and the kingdom of God.
Chapter V is the main body of this work. Here all the above
mentioned strands of Ritschl*s thought are woven together to show
their effect on his Christology. Here Ritschl*s concept of the
person and work of Christ is dealt with specifically. The
concluding. chapter, chapter VI, contains a summary and conclusions
in which an attempt is made to formulate Ritschls contributions 450
the Christological problem*
-
CHAPTER II
THE THEOLOGICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUNDOF RITSCHL
Perhaps the "best entrance into Ritschls thought is through the
gateway of his theological and philosophical presuppositions. These
can most easily he set forth in their relation to previous
thinkers.
I. RITSCHL1 S RELATION TO THE THEOLOGIANS, BAUR, BERNARD,
LUTHER, CALVIN, AND SCHLEIERMACHER
Ritschl approached the realm of theological thought through the
study of church history. While a pupil of Ferdinand Christian Baur,
he gradually became aware of how the Hegelian dialectic-al view of
history had led Baur into notions of the origin and date of the New
Testament hooks which did not take into account the "manifoldness
of the historical causes at work in the early history f the
Christian C h u r c h . T h u s Baur failed, Ritschl felt, to
evaluate truly the historic Jesus in the beginnings of
Christianity.
Eugene W. Lyman, ttRitschl,s Theory of Value- Judgments,"
Journal of Religion. Vol. 5, 501, Sept., 1925.
-
6It is significant to note that of all the theologians
of the old church,-Ritschl found Bernard most helpful. A. T.
Swing2 thinks this was so because Bernard laid such emphasis upon
the historical Christ, and did not give too much attention to the
metaphysics of his divinity.
Ritschl finds in Luther his greatest helper. He felt that Luther
had recovered the true approach Jo the historical Jesus. From A. T.
Swing*s3 lengthy discussion of this point can be gleaned the
following ways in which'Ritschl felt he followed Luther: (1) **It
is when we turn from the philosophic to the ethical conception of
God and discover His love to us that we are won to him.** (2) *. .
. the true faithand the assurance of salvation are inseparable.**
(3) **. . .faith is to be no intellectual act but a vital
confidence in the very gospel itself, which is a religious and not
a theoretic proclamation." (4) God is to be known only inChrist,
and to know Christ is to accept grace from Him.tf (5) Christ is
called Christ, not because of his two natures (which have only to
do with a sophistical knowledge of him), but because of his office
and work. (6) The Scriptures are a religious means, not a formal
authority.
The Theology of Albrecht Ritschl. (New York: Longmans, Green,
and Co ., 1901) p . 34.
3 Ibid., pp. 37ff.
-
Ritschl quotes Calvin, only a little less than he doesLuther.
Swing feels that Ritschl has recovered for Moderntheology some of
the real contributions of Calvin. This, hesays* is evident in
. . . Calvins practical employment of the inductive method, of
his* caution in going beyond the substantial content of the
revelation in Jesus Christ, and his emphatic shutting out of
speculative questions concerning that great realm which Cod has not
made known to us.
Swing also points out three elements in Calvin which Ritschl
made fundamental in his system. They are:
First, the turning from the cosmological and metaphysical to the
etjiical and religious. Second, the use of the ethical as the
measure of values. Third, the recognition of the fact that only in
this way can we come to the possession of a religious life.5
The great influence of Schleiermacher on all-modernGerman
theological thought makes him important for Ritschlbecause he
preceded Ritschl by fifty years. D. C. Macintoshthinks Ritschl has
followed Schleiermacher in basing histheology on the religious
consciousness rather than onmetaphysical speculations. He says,*
therefore:
. . the claim, or assumption, of the autonomy of the religious
consciousness; the dependence upon Christian religious feeling as a
basis for dogmatics; the protest against the mingling of
philosophical and religious knowledge; the metaphysical
agnosticism, making the content of theology mainly Christology and
soteriology, rather than theology proper; the consequent anthropo-
centric rather than theocentric character of the system,
4 Ibid., p. 45f.5 Ibid., p . 47.
-
8at least in so far as it claims to be scientific; and finally,
the normative value attached to the consciousness of the religious
community.6
D. C# Macintosh goes on to point out that the chief differences
between the two are:
. . . first, that Ritschl made will as well as feeling basic in
theology, or in other words undertook a* synthesis of Kant and
Schleiermacher; and second, that he proceeded . . . from the gospel
[by this he means the revelation in Christ] instead of from the
religious consciousness.7
II. RITSCHLS RELATION TO THE PHILOSOPHERS,KANT AND LOTZE
In tracing the obligations to the philosophers of Ritschl1s
system, we naturally turn first to Kant in the light of whose
teachings all nineteenth century German thought must be approached.
This is not the place to attempt an exposition of Kant*s system;
and, therefore, it will only be necessary here to suggest the uses
to which Ritschl places Kantian philosophy.6
6 The Problem of Religious Knowledge, (New York:Harper and
Brothers, c1940), p .245.
7'Ibid., p. 244. These suggestions have been taken from James
Orr,
The Ritschlian Theology. (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1897),
pp. 35ff. Orr has made still other suggestions, but no notice is
taken of them because they are questionable.
-
Ritschl agrees thoroughly with Kant that our knowledge of God
rests on the practical, not the theoretic judgment.9 He accepts the
Kantian deduction of the Kingdom of God.l^He felt alsothat Kant
had'laid a sound "basis for Christian theology in his doctrine of
human freedom, with its important hearings on the ideas of guilt
and punishment. He says:
The high importance of Kants contribution to the right
understanding of the Christian idea of reconciliation lies less in
any positive contribution to the structure of doctrine than in the
fact that he establishes critically that is, with scientific
strictness those general presuppositions of the idea of
reconciliation which lie in the consciousness of moral freedom and
moral guilt . H
The relationship of Ritschl to Lotze is so close that one cannot
hope to understand certain phases of Ritschls system unless he
knows something of Lotzes system. It will suffice here to indicate
in a general way the obligations of Ritschl to Lotze. In the
consideration of specific doctrines there is a more complete
exposition of the bearing of Lotge on Ritschl.
^Albrecht Ritschl, The Christian Doctrine of Justification and*
Reconciliation, translated by H. R. Mackintosh and A. B. Macaulay.
(New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1900), p. 280. Unless otherwise
indicated, references will always be in Vol. III.
1 0 > P H ^ Christian Doctrine of Justification and
Reconciliation, Vol. I, p. 408, quoted by James Orr, The
Ritschlian Theology, p. 35.
-
He acknowledges his indebtedness to Lotze for the1 pfollowing:
First, a theory of knowledge. ^ He does not
agree with Kant that the thing in itself is -unknowable because
it is hidden behind phenomena. Rather, he professes to believe with
Lotze that the "thing is known in the phenomena.-" Ritschl agrees
with Kant and. Lotze that the idea of the Good must be placed above
theoretic knowledge, and . . .in seeking the ultimate principle of
the explanation of the world in a Highest-Good Personal,* which he
identifies with Living Love*. Furthermore, Ritschl acceptsLotzes
idea of a faculty by which we "judge according to worth, which
gives our world of values, and which- is higher than the theoretic
faculty by which we arrive at the world of forms.
Ill. RITSCHLS EPISTEMOLOGY
The situation regarding the necessity of an epistem- ology
appears, at first sight, to Joe uncertain for in his Theologie und
Metaphysik Ritschl contends that the theologian must work in
accordance with some theory of knowledge; but six pag*es later he
says that Christianity is neutral as
Albrecht Ritschl, o. cit., pp. 19f.I3 James Orr, o. cit.. p.
40.
-
11regards all theories of knowledge .14 Liberals-*-^ and
conservatives^-6 alike have used these two statements as evidence
that Ritschl was confused in his thinking and thus produced a
system full of contradictions, . W. C. Keirstead^? and A. T. Swingl
think there is no basic contradiction at this point, especially if
Ritschl is read in the light of Lotze whom he, indeed, professed to
follow. Since this is the constructive approach, it will be
followed here.
It was Ritschl1s opinion that correct theological propositions
depend upon epistemology. He says,
The formally correct expression of theological propositions
depends on the method we follow in defining the objects of
cognition, that is the theory of knowledge which we consciously or
unconsciously obey.**-9
In Theologle und Metaphysik he says, every theologian is asa
scientific man
. . under the duty or necessity to proceed according to a
determined theory of knowledge of which he must be
14 pp. 40 and 46, quoted in John K. Mozley, Ritsch- lianism,
(London: James Hisbet and Co# Limited, 1909), p. 14#
15 por example: Pfleiderer, The Development ofTheology,
translated by J. Frederick Smith (New York: TheMacmillan Co.,
1909), pp. 185ff.
"#16 For example: 'James Orr, jop. cit., chap. III.^ W# C.
Keirstead, Metaphysical Presuppositions of
Ritschl, (A Doctoral Dissertation: University of Chicago,1905),
p. 677.
18 A. T. Swing, op. cit.. chap. III.Justification and
Reconciliation, p. 15.
-
12conscious and which he must he prepared to justify.20
While Ritschl regarded Christianity as a religion as indifferent
to any epistemology, yet he felt epistemology to be so important
for theology that the misunderstanding between himself and his
opponents was really over a correct.theory of knowledge.Therefore,
it is important to understand his conception of epistemology and
its function in theology.
In order to grasp Ritschl1s epistemology, it is necessary to
understand his conception of metaphysics. He says:
The theory of knowledge in the sense here intended, is identical
withthe doctrine of the thing or things which forms the first part
of metaphysics . . . Metaphysics deals with the universal ground of
all being. It abstracts from the peculiar nature of natural and
spiritual magnitudes in order to get the conception of a thing
which is common to both.22
It would seem, then, that metaphysical knowledge is a
priori.Metaphysics for Ritschl, Keirstead believes,2* is
divided into two parts, ontology, or the doctrine of things, and
cosmology. In the Theologie und Metaphysik, Ritschl says of
ontology (or the doctrine of things) that it presents
. cit., p. 66 auoted by W. C. Keirstead, p. 6 77. There is no
available Rnglish translation of this, the latest of Ritschls
writings. Consequently, secondary authorities have had to be
depended on entirely for Ritschls viewpoint in this work.
2 - W. C. Keirstead, op. cit., p. 67722 Justification and
Reconciliation, pp. 15f.^ kc. cit. The situation is confusing
because Ritschl
only devotes scattered remarks to his epistemology.
-
13the forms arising in the intelligible spirit of man in which
it proceeds in general to fix the objects of representation above
the currents of sensation and perception. . Thus metaphysical
conceptions include and regulate all other acts of knowledge which
involve the specific peculiarity of nature and spirit.. They
explain how it is that the human mind, having had experimentally
perceptions of different kinds, differentiates them in consequence
into natural things and spiritual beings. But it does not follow
from the position of metaphysics as superordinate to experimental
knowledge that metaphysical conceptions give us a more profound and
valuable knowledge of spiritual existence than can be gained from
psychology and ethics. Compared with psychology and ethics,
metaphysics yields only elementary and merely formal
knowledge.24
In Justification and Beconciliation he saysA theory of things is
employed formally in theology as settling the objects ofknowledge,
and defining the relations between the multiplicity of their
qualities
and the unity of their existence. The rules, which it is
possible to set up here, form the conditions of experience by means
of which the specific nature of things is to be recognized.25
Metaphysics includes also cosmology. In the Theologie und
Metaphysik he says tf. . . the manifold of the perceived and
presented things is ordered to the unity of a world, whether the
world be conceived as limitless or as a w h o l e . ^ 6 Keirstead
interprets Bitschl to mean that this knowledge is also a priori
dealing with the pure forms of intuition
-
14than with the experimentally g i v e n . I n a s m u c h as
cosmology does not take into consideration the distinction between
nature and spirit, its knowledge is elementary and superficial; and
since it "applies the results of ontology to the realm of nature* .
. . ontology is the most important part of metaphysics .**28
Keirstead*s conclusion is that since for Ritschl epistemology
means ontology, and since he equates this with metaphysics
(inasmuch as it is the important part of metaphysics), Ritschl is
not guilty (as'he has been charged) with ruling metaphysics out of
theology.20 Metaphysics gives us real, although elementary
knowledge, confining itself to the universal ground of being. In
the Theologie und Metaphysik he says,
Metaphysical concepts are elementary knowledge in which one
fixes the objects of knowledge as such, that is, as things in
general, in their general relation to each other. For this reason
spiritual magnitudes are only superficially and Imperfectly known
in metaphysics, and not in their characteristic reality.*50
He says also a few pages earlier concerning the doctrine of
God which is an expample of where a metaphysical idea is
presented directly as theological,
27 Rc cit. ^ cit.20 Loc. cit.
Ibid., p. 56, quoted in I. C. Keirstead, op. cit.,p. 680.
-
15The remaining propositions of theologie are of such a
specifically spiritual (Geistiger) character that metaphysics comes
into consideration only as the formal rule for the knowledge of
religious magnitudes and relations.
Metaphysical knowledge, then, deals only with what is commonto
spirit and nature, but theology is concerned with what ispeculiar
to spirit alone. Thus metaphysical knowledge isreally worthless for
theology. Epistemology is valuable forthe theologian because it has
a formal, regulative, andcritical function in theology. This is
important for Ritschlbecause he thinks the proofs for God, the
speculations as tothe pre-existence of Christ and original sin, all
arise from afalse theory of knoi^ledge
Ritschls opponents do not correctly appreciate himbecause they
understand he thinks by metaphysics
. . . not that elementary knowledge of things in general which
ignores their division into nature and spirit, but such a universal
theory as shall be at once elementary and the final and exhaustive
science of all particular orders of existence.33
They do this because they mix metaphysical knowledge with
revelation. The result is that they get an imperfect knowledge of
reality. All this would be corrected by a proper
. P* 40, quoted by Keirstead, loc. cit. W. C. Keirstead, op.
cit., p. 683. Justification and Reconciliation, p . 16.
* %
-
16theory of knowledge, by which we learn that objects are
onlyknown in their relation to us. He says,
If God belongs as an object of knowledge to scientific theology,
then there is no satisfying ground for any claim that one could
know something of God in himself, which would be unknown to us
apart from the revelation which is somehow created by him, but felt
and perceivedby us.
Ritschl*s oppoents make the mistake of speculating about
suchthings as the eternal pre-existent union of Christ with God,or
the metaphysical attributes of God because, he says,
They want the objective bearing of doctrine and not the
interpretation of them as reflected In the subject. But we observe
and explain even the objects of sense-percep- tion, not as they are
in themselves, but as we perceivethem. 35
Three prevelant theories of knowledge are in common use, in the
European thought, of his d a y . 36 They are the Scholas-
tic-Platonic, the Kantian and the Lotzean. According to the first
view
. . . the thing works upon us, indeed, by means of its mutable
qualities, arousing our sensations and ideas, but that it really
_is at rest behind the qualities as a permanently s^lf-equlvaTeht
unity of attributes.37
He thinks that,The simplest example of this view to be found in
Scholastic
Theologle und Metaphysik, p. 59, quoted from W. C. Keirstead,
op.. cit., p. 684.
35 Justification and Reconciliation, p. 34.36 Ibid., pp. 18f .
*37 ibid*, pp. 18f.
-
17dogmatics is the explication given on the one hand of the
essence and attributes of God, and on the other hand of the
operations of God upon the world and for the salvation of
mankind.3
The contradictions of this view are:39 (1) The thing is at rest,
but yet it must be active tobe the cause of its qualities. (2)
There is a temporal and spatial separation between the thing at
rest and its qualities which appear, so they cannot be viewed as
cause and effect. (5) Such a passive thing would be entirely
unknowable.
The second theory of knowledge, Kant's,*. . . limits the
knowledge of the understanding to the world of phenomena, but
declares unknowable the thing or things in themselves, though their
interdependent changes are the ground of the changes in the world
of*phenomena. The latter part of the statement contains a true
criticism of the Scholastic interpretation of a 'thing*. The first
part, however, is too near the Scholastic theory to avoid its
errors. For a world of phenomena can be posited as the object of
knowledge only if we suppose that in them something real to wit,
the thing appears to us or is the cause of our sensation and
perception. Otherwise the phenomena can only be treated as an
illusion. Thus by his use of the conception of phenomenon Kant
contradicts his own principle that real things are
unknowable.49
Ritschl here seems to point out that Kant has discovered
thefallacy of the Scholastic position which has separated
the"thing-in-itself*1 from its effects, but did not give up the
38 Ibid.. p. 1939 W. C. Keirstead, _o. cit., p. 68549 A.
Ritschl, Justification and Reconciliation, p. 19.
-
18knowability of the thing. This Kant did, hut he retained the
Scholastic error of separating the thing* from its effects,
Ritschl claims his own position is that of Lotze, He says of
Lotze,
He holds that in the phenomena which in a definite space exhibit
changes to a limited extent and in a determinate order, we cognise
the thing as the cause of its qualities operating upon us, as the
end which these serve as means, as the law of their constant
change.41
In the Theologie und Metaphysik there is this
furtherexplanation:
In the elementary stage of the formation of the conception of a
thing there is no need to put in two planes, side by side, the
thing, and its attributes which are felt and perceived by us at the
same time, and to put the one behind the other, and to assert the
possibility of the knowledge of the thing behind its attributes or
before the recognition of them. Nor is there need of this when the
conception of a thing is enriched, when the marks are understood as
manifest effects of a cause and as means to an end, when one
recognizes the marks as changing in definite limits, and the whole
as effective in the regular change of its attributes; when,
finally, one supposes a law in the perceived history of a thing.
Rather the thing is caused in its effects and purpose in the
ordered series in its appearing changes.42
These two statements are very revealing for they show that a
thing, for Ritschl, is causality, dynamic, and operative; but it is
all this within certain limits and according
#to its own law. In other words, w . . . *a thing has the
41 i M a . , pp. i9f. 42 Pp. 63f., quoted from W. C. Keirstead,
o_. cit.,
p. 689.
-
19purposive causality of a self/43
Ritschls statements on his epistemology are so "brief that they
can hardly he understood except in the light of a full exposition
of Lotze whose epistemology he admits he borrows. . C. Keirstead44
has worked this out point by point with full quotations from both
Lotze and Ritschl to show just how Ritschl felt he followed Lotze.
Interpretations of Lotze. differ as widely as they do of Ritschl.
Consequently no * account shall be taken here of other viewpoints,
because by this interpretation the viev/point of Ritschl is made
understandable; but by other interpretations of Lotze, Ritschl
becomes as confusing as some of his critics make him out to
be.4^
Ritschl accepts Lotze1s idea of cause that causality is
efficient--, and of change. Lotze says, "The phenomena of a thing
exhibit changes in a definite sphere and to a limited extent.h4
Change indicates transformation of the thing, for he says, "The
essence or substance of a thing is
43 Keirstead, o. cit, p. 690.44- cit. , pp. 690-698.4-8 For
example, Leonhard Stahlin, Kant, Lo'tze and
Ritschl (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1889}, PP. 1^1-176.^
Metaphysics, Vol. I, chap. 2, quoted from W. C. Keirstead, op.
cit.. p . 690.
-
20*that which admits of change,Tt hut in change . . . the
thing
never passes over from one sphere to another.**47In Ritschl* s
definition of the thing as the f,law of
the constant change of the qualities , he is hut followingLotze,
for Lotze declares,
. . that the essence of a thing cannot he expressed in a
quality, hut only in the logical form of a conception, which
expresses the permanently uniform observance of law in the
succession of various states or the combination of various
predicates.^3
Keirstead^9 thinks Ritschl*s ascription of purposivecausality to
things when he defines thing as . the endwhich the qualities serve
as means . . .** indicates he isaccepting Lotze*s view . . . that
things possess a certainselfhood. In support for this he quotes
Lotze*s statementthat
If there he things with the properties we demand of things, they
must he more than things. Only by sharing this characteristic of
spiritual nature can they fulfill the general requirements which
must be fulfilled in order to constitute a thing.50
In the self is the best example of the Lotzean thing, and it
47 koc. cit.48 0j>. cit.. chap. 3, quoted by Keirstead, loc.
cit.49 W. C. Keirstead, op. cit.. p. 691.50 Metaphysics. Yol. I,
ehap. 7, , paragraph 7,^quoted
in Keirstead, loc. cit.
-
is by our whole experience we are best able to understand what
we mean by the thing.
*Our' ideas, feelings, and efforts appear to be in their nature
the states of a being, of the necessary unity of which, as
contrasted with them, we are immediately conscious . * for these
inner events appear to us as states only through the marvelous
nature of mind, which can compare every idea, every feeling, every
passion, with others; and, Just; because of this relating activity
with reference to them all, knows itself as a permanent subject
from which under various conditions they resul.t.51
There is no substance lying behind the self or thing to
whichqualities inhere and which gives them reality, but Lotze
says,
. . . reality is that ideal content which, by means of what it
is, is capable of producing the appearance of a substance lying
within it, to which it belongs as predicate .52
Ritschl further accepts Lotze1s viewpoint that things are in
constant interaction, and that the nature of the interaction is
determined by the natures of the interacting things and by the
relations existing between them. A certain state is not carried
over from one body into another; for when subject and object
interact, states are produced in the former. Iso, ideas are not
copies of things, but are determined ac-
cording to the general law of interaction by the nature of the
subject, object, and the relation existing between them.
Furthermore, since the soul is active, sensation is never a
53- Ibid.. foj. II, p. 633, quoted from Keirstead, loc.cit.
52 Outlines of Metaphysics, paragraph 28, quoted by Keirstead,
op. cit. p. 692.
-
22passive content, but the reaction of the soul upon the
object*53That this is the view*Ritschl has accepted, Keirstead
thinks,is evidenced by the following quotations:
In the theory of things, it is taken for granted that the self
is not of itself the cause of sensation, perceptions, etc., but
that these peculiar activitiesof the soul are stimulated by its
coexistence with things of which the human body is one.^For all
causes which affect the soul work upon it as stimuli of the special
activity with which it is endowed.The relation of the soul to all
the causes which work upon it is not one of simple passivity; all
actions upon it, rather, it takes up in its sensations, as a
reaction in which it manifests itself as an independent
cause.33
Sensations and perceptions are states of a thing orself as a
result of interaction with other things. Therefore,knowledge is
subjective although it may have a transubjectivereference. Here
Ritschl explains the psychological origin ofa concept of a
thing:
The presentation (Vorstellung) .of a .thing arises out of the
different sensations which, in a definite order., fasten themselves
to something that perception fixes in a limited space. We posit the
apple as a round, red, sweet thing, since the sensations of touch,
sight, and taste bunch themselves in the place in which the
corresponding relations of form, color, and taste are perceived.
These same relations which by repeated perceptions meet in a common
spot* we unite in the idea of a thing** which exists in its
relations, which we know only in these relations
53 W. C. Keirstead, op. pit., p. 692.A. Ritschl, Theologle und
Metaphysik. p. 44, quoted
in Keirstead, l.oc. cit.33 Justification and Reconciliation, p.
21.
-
and designate by means of them. The relation of the marks in
question, thus fixed by our sensations, to the thing which we
express in the judgment1, This thing is round, red, and sweet,
signifies that we knotv the subject of this proposition solelyi.
the predicate. Could we leave them out of view, or forget them, the
thing which we had come to know in and by these marks would cease
to be a matter of knowledge.5*The impression that the perceived
thing in the change of its marks is one, arises from the continuity
of the feeling of self in the succession of sensations excited by
the thing, further, the apprehension of the thing as cause and as
its own end arises from the.certainty that I am cause and that I am
end in the activities due to me.. . . The appearances which are
perceived in a limited space in the same position or series, and
their changes in a definite limit and order, are combined by our
faculty of representation to the unity of a thing, after the
analogy of the cognizing soul which, in the change of its
corresponding sensations, feels and remembers itself as a permanent
u n i t y *7
This viewpoint is different from Kants because forKant, Ritschl
thinks, we know phenomena, and phenomena are notrealities, they,
being in the consciousness since the worldof hature is the product
of consciousness and is constructed
mare noth- by themselves of repre- indicate,
by Keirstead,
cit.58 Kant,cri11que of Pure Reason, translated by Max
Muller, quoted by Keirstead, no reference, loc. cit.
by the understanding. Kant tells us: "Phenomena ing but sensuous
representations, which therefore must not be taken for objects
outside the faculty sentation."58 jpor Ritschl, as the passages
above
56 Theologie und Metaphysik, p. 63, quoted op. cit., p. 693.
57 ibid., p. 44, quoted by Keirstead, loc.
-
2 4
as well as for Lotze, the excitation of sensation is caused by
the thing. This is very much like Kant. But Keirstead finds the
difference between Kant and Lotze in their conception of
phenomena.59 por Kant, we know phenomena. But phenomena are mental
constructs. Therefore, for Lotze, what Kant calls phenomena, are
knowledge. Keirstead says,
Kants phenomena are not realities, because they are a knowledge
of reality, and knowledge is subjective. Knowledge is knovrledge
for someone just as truly as it is knowledge of something.
Sensations, perceptions, and conceptions are elements of knowledge,
and are the possession of an individual consciousness.60
Keirstead quotes for confirmation a passage in Lotze to
whichRitschl appeals:
We admit, therefore, the complete subjectivity of our knowledge
with the less ambiguity because we see clearly, moreover, that it
is unavoidable, and that although we may forego the claim to all
knowledge whatever, we can put no other knowledge in the place of
that on which doubt is thrown that would not "be open to the same
reproach . . .But this universal character of subjectivity as
belonging to all knowledge can settle nothing as to its truth or
u'ntruth. And it is a fallacy, on account of the subjectivity of
all the elements out of which it has been formed, to deny its
truth, and to pronounce the outer world to be merely a creation of
our imagination. For the state of things could be no other, were
the things without us or not. Our knowledge in the one case, our
impressions in the other, could -alike consist only in states or
activities of our own being in what we call impressions made on
our
W. C. Keirstead, op. cit. , p. 694.60 Loc. cit.
-
5nature, supposing these to he things, hut on no supposi- _ tion
on anything other than a subjective property of ours.The
demonstration of a thoroughgoing subjectivity of all the elements
of our cognition, sensations, pure intuitions, and pure notions of
the understanding is in no respect decisive against the assumption
of the existence of a world of things outside of ourselves. For it
is clear that this subjectivity of cognition-must in any case be
true, whether things do or do not exist. For, even if things exist,
still our cognition of them cannot consist in their actually
finding an entrance into-us, but only in their exercising an action
upon us. hut the products of this action, as affections of our
being, can receive' their form from our nature alone. And it is
easy to persuade ourselves that, even in case things do actually
exist, all parts of our cognition will have the very same
subjectivity as that from which it might.be hastily concluded that
things do not exist.
For Lotze, the most that we can have is a connected and
consistent system of ideas about the thing. Knowledge that should
exhaust the thing-itself is unintelligible.6^
The Kantian phenomena are for Lotze, knowledge. Sensations,
percepts, concepts^, being processes in the individual
consciousness, unite to form knowledge, but not things.
For Lotze, certain a priori elements in knowledge, being logical
acts have formal and not real significance. He says,
We cannot assent to the distinction between the matter and form
of knowledge as drawn by Kant. The idea is, indeed, perfectly just,
but he formulates it inaccurately
^ Metaphysics, p. 94, quoted from Keirstead, loc. cit.Outlines
of Metaphysics, paragraph 79, quoted from
Keirstead, loc. cit.63 Keirstead here refers to LotzeLs Logic,
paragraph 308.
-
26when he ascribes the entire content to experience, and the
form alone to the innate activity of the mind. Kant was well aware
of the fact that even the simplest sensations which in the
strictest sense furnish the original content of all our perceptions
do not come to us ready made from without, but, on the contrary (if
we are to hold to the concept of an external world), can only be
considered as reactions of our own nature to combinations
of sense and intellect in response to the stimuli coming from
that world.64
For Kant, according to Keirstead1s Exposition, thecontent of
sensation is furnished by an unknowable, and thesoul subsumes this
under its own forms. For Lotze, the soulis stimulated by
interaction of things and reacts in the formof sensation, feeling,
and ideas. We form the concept of athing from its continued
activity. How do you pass from thegenesis of the concept to its
validity? The answer for Lotze,Keirstead thinks, is in intuition.65
Keirstead outlines histhought as follows:
Things exist in interaction. Sensation, ideas and feelings are
the states in a conscious being which arise through this
interaction. They give us knowledge of reality. Appearance has both
a subject to which it appears and an object which appears. Ideas
are not things, th,ey are not copies of things, but they are valid
of things. Every sensation, feeling, or idea * is in itself a bit
of information about reality*; it is the very nature of knowledge
that it gives us information of things beyond immediate experience.
The concept of a thing may arise in the child-mind after repeated
experiences. And the concept conveys to the child information
concerning its own cause. It is in this light that Ritschl is to be
interpreted when he makes real things the cause
64 Ibid.. paragraph 32665 Keirstead, op. cit. , pp. 695ff.
-
27of experience, and yet regards the concept of the thing as the
product of experience
According to Lotze, then, our finiteness limits us to partial
knowledge, or to the formal nature of things. Trulyvaluable
knowledge is found in the laws of science, morals and religion, and
these give content to our formal ontology.
In conclusion, therefore, it can be said, Ritschl rejects the
scholastic conception of substance as the essence of things,
because this is but to transform a logical concept into a
metaphysical entity. He rejects Kantianism, because the Kantian
principle that we know only phenomena,- reduces'knowledge to
illusion. He adheres to LotzTs position, and takes him to mean,
. . . that we have a partial knowledge of reality. Weknow the
formal nature of things by metaphysics. Their real nature is
learned by exp'erience, and induction is the method of procedure.
We can never know things as a
perfect intelligence knows them, but only as they are for us.
Knowledge is subjective. It is the possession of an individual
consciousness, but it has an objective reference .67
66 SB* cit., p. 697^ W. C. Keirstead, op. cit. , p. 698.
-
CHAPTER.Ill
RITSCHL*S THEORY OE VALUE-JUDGMENTS
The theory of value-judgments plays such an Important part in
Ritschl*s system that special consideration must be given to it.
Curiously enough, as we have already point out in chapter I,
Ritschl did not even use the term, value- judgment, in the first
edition of Justificationand Reconciliation. Furthermore, when he
does use the term in the third edition, he seems to presuppose the
term is fully understood, for he only devotes scattered remarks to
the subject. His son, Otto Ritschl, however, has made up for this
in his pamphlet, Ueber Wethurtheile (Concerning
Value-judgments,1895) , which Edghill thinks t1deals with the
question with commendable thoroughness .r,3-
I. THE HISTORICAL RETROSPECT
Otto Ritschl traces back value-judging on its religiousside to
Luther, and on its philosophic side, to Kant. Hequotes this
statement from Luther:
It is not enough that a man believes, that God is, that Christ
has suffered, and such-like; but he must steadfastly believe, that
God is his God for his blessedness,
3-Ernest A. Edghill, Faith and Fact: a study of Ritschlianism
(London: Macmillan and Co., 1910j, P 108.
-
29that Christ suffered for him, died, was crucified, rose again,
that he tore his sins for him.^
Here Luther is obviously insisting on the incomparable interest
of the objects of faith for the religious subject.
Otto Ritschl thinks that Kant paved the way for thetheory of
value-judgments in his distinction bet?/een thepure and the
practical reason.3 But, more than that,Kant distinguished relative
value or price, from "innervalue or worthiness. To illustrate this
distinction, OttoRitschl says:
. . . talent has a commercial price, temperment an emotional
price, character an inner worth, and is raised above all price* . .
. [for) . . . Any man calls agreeable what delights him; beautiful
what simply pleases him; good, what is esteemed, approved, that is,
in which he places an objective value.^
In Herbert there is the distinction, Otto Ritschl says, between
theoretical representation, where the subject is indifferent, and
aesthetic judgments in which is expressed a spontaneous preference
or rejection. Otto Ritschl also says Herbert declares that
. . . religion makes an aesthetic impression in addition to the
moral, and that is so essential to it, that if it did not act at
all aesthetically it could not act at all
2 quoted fom Alfred E. Garvie. The Hitschiian Theology
(Edinburgh,' T. and T. Clark 1899), p. '179.
3 Eric S. Waterhouse, Modern Theories of Religion (New York:
Eaton and Mains, n.d. [ preface," 1910J), p. 117.
4 quoted by A. E. Garvie, op. cit., pp. 179f.
-
30morally. For "behind the moral conceptions there necces-
sarily lie hidden, as the first fundamental presuppositions
aesthetic conceptions.5
yDe Wette is the first to recognize in the process of
valuation a motive to action.$ Otto Ritschl describes histhought
this way:
We recognize, not only the existence of things, we also assign
them a value, and it is this assigning of value that drives us on
to action, inasmuch as the value "becomes our purpose. This judging
of things according to value and purpose is of different kinds and
rises in stages or different feelings of pleasure and impulses from
the sensuous to the spiritual. Only in combination with the highest
and purest feeling of value is faith complete and perfect, and can
be separated from it only by an abstraction.7
Otto Ritschl next acknowledges Rothe who held that . . . we also
know with our feeling, that the function of
*feeling is also a knowledge, . . that is, in regard to . . .
these things without the knowledge of which an existence worthy of
man is not at all possible. Rothe also remarks, according to Otto
Ritschl, . . . that transcendental objects and things of the utmost
importance are for the great majority of men part of their
knowledge through feeling rather than through thinking . . .9
Mozley thinks this remark
5 Xbid., P* 6 E. A. Edghill, op. cit., p. 109.7 Ibid., pp. 180f.
Ibid., p . 181.9 John K. Mozley, Ritschlianism (London: lames
Nisbet and Co., Limited, 1909), p. 98.
-
should be related to Pascals saying that "the heart has its
reasons.
In Lotze, Otto Ritschl recognizes the real source of the
Ritschlian theory. Values do not inhere in things in themselves but
only in the pleasure or pain which the things occasion in the
subject, but in which the things cannot participate themselves. For
according to Lotze, Otto Ritschl says,
In the feeling for the value of things reason possesses a
revelation as seriously intended as it has In the fundamental
propositions of logical Inquiry an indis- pensible instrument of
experience. Accordingly, Lotze finally distinguishes the world of
figures or of forms from the world of values, which he once also
identifies with the world of ends.lu
II. THE DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN THEORETICAL JUDGMENTS AND
VALUE-JUDGMENTS, AND BETWEEN CONCOMITANT AND
INDEPENDENT VALUE-JUDGMENTS
The basic problem for man is how he shall Interpret the world in
which he finds himself. He is challenged both by nature and history
to say whether their difficulties can be solved by an analysis of
their content and on investigation of the causal process manifest
in their progress and decay; or whether the true solution is to be
sought, not within, but without and above. Ritschl1s theory of
value-judgments is
^ Quoted from A. E. Garvie, op. cit., p. 181.
-
his method for discovery of truth and for dealing with the given
phenomena.!!
He begins his theory with a statement of the two-foldY mj in
which the mind appropriates its sensations. He says,
They are determined, according to their value for the Ego, by
the feeling of pleasure or pain. Feeling is the basal function of
the mind, inasmuch as in it the Ego is originally present to
itself. In the feeling of pleasure or pain, the Ego decides whether
a sensation, which touches the feeling of sjslf, serves to highten
or depress it. On the other hand, through an idea the sensation is
judged in respect of its cause, the nature of the latter, and its
connection with other causes: and by means of observation, etc.,
the knowledge of things thus gained is extended until it becomes
scientific.I2
We see, therefore, for Bitschl, that sensations may produce
pleasure or pain by which their value for the Ego is determined .
Or they may be embodied in ideas and judged in thelight of their
causal relationships. Of these two functionsthat of making
value-judgments and causal judgments, the latter of which is often
called trtheoretical judgments11, the former is the more basic for
in feeling the Ego is ft. . . originally present to itself.tf
It must not be thought that these two operations areso distinct
that they never overlap. The fact of the matter
John K. Mozley, o. cit.. p. 93.^ Justification and
Reconciliation, pp. 203f*
-
33is that they frequently occur together; and, in some cases,
the one cannot occur unless the other does. Thus-Ritschl says,
The two functions of spirit mentioned are always in operation
simultaneously, and always also in some degree mutually related,
even though it he in the inverse ratio of prominence. In
particular, it must not he forgotten that all continuous cognition
of the things which excite
. sensation is not only accompanied, hut likewise guided, hy
feeling. For in so far as attention is necessary to attain the end
of knowledge, will, as representing the desire for accurate
cognition, comes in between; the proximate cause of will, however,
is feeling as expressing the consciousness that a thing or an
activity is worth desiring, or that something ought to he put away.
?alue- judgments therefore are determinative in the case of all
connected knowledge of the world, even when carried out even in the
most objective fashion. Attention during scientific observation,
and the impartial examination of the matter observed, always denote
that such knowledge has a value for him who employs it. This fact
makes its presence all the more distinctly felt when knowledge is
guided through a richly diversified field by attention of a
technical or practical kind. 15
In other words, the theoretic and the value-judging
functions%
of the mind always operate simultaneously, bpt the value-
judging is more basic because attention is necessary for accurate
scientific knowledge. This means that the will is : present in
theoretic knowing, and will expresses the feeling that accurate
knowing is valuable.
The fact that value-judging is always present in the theoretic
judgment prompts Ritschl to distinguish between concomitant or
accompanying value-judgments and independent
15 Ifria*, P* 204.-
-
34value-judgments** Of them he says,
The former are operative and necessary in all theoretical
cognition, as in all technical observation and combination* But
independent value judgments are all perceptions of moral ends or
moral hindrances, in so far as they excite moral pleasure or pain,
or, it may be, set in motion the will to appropriate what is good
or repel the opposite* If the other kinds of^knowledge are called
"disinterested " this only means they are without these moral
effects.14
It is apparent, therefore, for Ritschl, that concomitant
value-judgments are operative in all theoretical cognition, but It
would seem that independent value-judgments are untouched by the
theoretic. It Is also apparent, as Lyman has pointed out,3-5 tha.t
in this statement Ritschl has not directly defined independent
value judgments: he has only illustratedthem*
Another group of independent value-judgments have todo with
religious knowledge. .Of them, he says,
Religious knowledge forms another class of independent
value-judgments. That is, it cannot be traced back to the
conditions which mark the knowledge belonging to moral, will, for
there exists religion which goes on without any relation whatever
to the moral conduct of life. Besides in many religions, religious
pleasure is of a purely natural kind, and is independent of those
conditions which lift religions above natural pleasure. For only at
the higher stages do we find religion combined with the ethical
conduct of life. Religious knowledge moves in independent
value-judgments, which relate to man*s attitude toward the world,
and call forth feelings
3-4 Ibid. pp . 04f.3-5 Eugene W. Lyman, "Ritschls Theory of
Value-judg
ments" , The Journal of Religion, 5:504, Sept. 19B5.
-
of pleasure or pain, in which man either enjoys the dominion
over the world vouchsafed him by God, or feels greviously the lack
of Gods help to that e n d . 16
The point is that the religious and ethical value-judgmentsmay
he separated, hut in Christianity they are extremelyclosely
interwoven.17 ,
The above quotations contain all that Ritschl says inhis great
work, Justification and Reconciliation, concerningthe fundamental
principles of his theory of values. Bailliethinks it is important
(so far as the historical perspectiveis concerned) to realize that
in this brief account Ritschlhas gone beyond both Lotze and Kant
who
. .. . had spoken as if a clear-cut and absolute distinction
could be made between the fact and value, the actual and ideal, the
is* and the ought to be*. Hitachi., however, has the signal merit
of having been among the first to see clearly that this is hot the
case.-18
III. THE OlflOLOGICAL STATUS OF OBJECTS KNOWN
THROUGHVALUE-JUDGMENTS
L i b e r a l s 1 ^ and conservatives2^ alike have contended
Justification and Reconciliation, p. 205.1 7^ In Chapter IV
there is a more complete discussion
of the reiationship between scientific knowledge and the
value-judgments of Christian religious knowledge.
18 John Baillie, The Interpretation of Religion (New .York:
Charles Scribners Sons, 1928), p. 285.
.19 otto Pfleiderer, The Development of Theology. translated by
J . Frederick Smith (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1909), p.
186.
2(3 James Orr, The Ritschlian Theology (London: Hadder and
Stoughton: 1897), p. 67.
-
that the above stated principles of Kitschl s theory of values
if followed seriously, would deny objective reality to objects of
religious knowledge such as God* They contend that Ritschl really
in his value-judgments denies objective existence. Stfhlin thinks
this has led Ritschl into subjective idealism in which the world of
faith is relegated to nothing more than illusion.21 Mozley,22
Waterhouse,23 and Robert Mackintosh2^ think such charges are
entirely without foundation when Ritschl is understood. That
Ritschl held value- judging has to do with real existences and not
mere subjective illusions is affirmed by Otto Ritschl. He
ssljs,
To set in opposition to one another value-judgments and so
called existence judgments as though the value-judgments expressed
a non-existence, is a quite senseless misunderstanding of the
thought-operations which take place in reality. For in
value-judgments it is the persons intention to express, just as in
theoretical judgments, only a matter of fact that is considered
true.23
This opinion seems to be borne out by Ritschls own statement
that
The two functions of spirit mentioned are always in
^1 'Leonhard Sthhlin, Kant, Lotze and Ritschl (Edinburgh: T. and
T. Clark, 1889), p. 176
22 Lohn K. Mozley, o jd . cit., p. 99.23 Eric S. Waterhouse, op.
cit., p . 120.2-1 Robert Mackintosh; Albrecht Ritschl (London:
Chapman and Hall, 1915), p. 277.^ ffeber Werthurtheile, p. 22,
quoted from.John K.
Mozley, ov. cit., pp. 105f.
-
3?operation simultaneously, and always alsp in some degree
mutually related, even though it be in the inverse ratio of
prominence.^
Furthermore, Waterhouse thinks,27 Ritschl has made it plain
that
. . . value judgments do not merely accompany theoretical
judgments, they give rise to them: for it is inconceivable that any
theoretical judgment should be made without interest or motive, in
other words apart from value.
Waterhouse further contends that for Ritschl the two are
soclosely connected in thought that they cannot be
separatedpsychologically. The only way to separate them is
throughabstraction. He interprets Ritschl as holding that
thetheoretical judgments were originally value judgments, but inthe
course of time they seem to have become more objectivebecause of
their wide acceptance. However, we* should notlose sight of the
fact that the theoretical judgment is basic-all3^ a value-judgment.
Thus, Waterhouse thinks that forRitschl the theoretical
judgment
. . . arises from the habit of predicting the truth or falsity,
goodness or badness, pleasantness or unpleasant-
* ness, of things. Such judgments are value-judgments, but * in
course of time, and by reason of social intercourse
and comparison with other valuations, they assume the character
of definite and objective predictions; . . .Upon such facts are
established systems of explanation, and hence theoretical
judgments, judgments of facts as such apart from their values.
Evidently, therefore, the theoretical judgment is concerned with
the material
Justification and Reconciliation, p. 204.27 OH* cit* P* 123.
-
38m
provided by valuation, with the consolidated and accepted
value-judgments which are known as facts. Upon such theoretical
judgments, in their turn, fresh value-judgments may depend; but if
their account of the matter be correct it follows that the
original* source of all judgments is in value-judgments, and fresh
proof of the unity of fact and value is afforded.28
+Mozley agrees with this interpretation of Ritschl, and
he reminds us. . . that everything is not given in the same way.
The conception of the existence of God, for instance, cannot be
reasoned about as a given fact in the same way in which we can
reason about some phenomenon which confronts -our senses in the
world. Therefore for Ritschl the value- judgments, besides being
judgments which can be applied to existent things, are also
judgments by means of which, starting from some given fact, we
infer the real existence of some other fact.^9. All this leads us
to the conclusion that, for Ritschl,
value-judging is a method of arriving at truth, just as
metaphysical speculation is. But for Ritschl the value-judging
method can lead us to. Vhlid conclusions, whereas the speculative
method cannot.
Ritschl comes to these conclusions because the object of a
value-judgment is related to our feeling and willing rather than to
the intellectual side of our personalities.This aspect of Ritschl*s
theory of values cannot be understood, both S w i n g ^ O an^
Keirstead^l think, except in the light
28 .2R* P* 12 5
29 John K. Mozley, op. cit.. p. 93.^ Albert T. Swing, The
Theology of Albrecht Ritschl
(London: Longman^ G-reen, and Co., 1901) , p. 71.^ W. C.
Keirstead, "The Theological Presuppositions of
Ritschl , The American Journal of Theology. 10:443, July,
1906.
-
of Lotze whose ontology Ritschl borrowed.339
According to Lotze the true beginning of metaphysics.lies in
ethics. "We are to seek in that which should be,the ground of that
which is."^3 Thus only can we arrive atthe meaning and order of the
world. He says
There can be no body of facts, no arrangment of things, no
course of destiny apart from .the end and meaning of the whole from
which every part has received not only existence but also the
active nature in which it glories.. . . After all, what
satisfaction could the theory (of the unbroken causal chain of
mechanism) afford if it were unable t.o unite the two great
contrasting parts that together make up the world-nature and the
sphere of ethics? . . . If we will not . . . either externally
ground the moral world oif a nature originally given or assume that
the two separate roots (of nature and ethics) coexist without any
bond in a supreme Being that we call One, no other choice rema.ins
than to include the good in the cycle of natural phenomena, or
Nature in the accomplishment of theGood. I cannot for a moment
doubt that- the latter alternative is-alone permissible. That is,
to conceive of Nature in the accomplishment of erood. All beings,
all that call mode and form, thing and content, the whole sum of
Nature, can be nothing else than the condition for the realization
of good, can be as it is only because thus in it the infinite worth
of the Good manifested i t s e l f .34
For Lotze, therefore, nature only becomes truly understandable
in the light of its worth-meanings. Things exist to produce
values.
32 Supra. Chapter II, Part III.33 Quoted from Keirstead, oj>.
cit.. p. 444.
Mic.; I. p. 396, quoted from Albert T. Swing, op. cit., pp. 72f.
Swing points out that in this same work, pp. 244-250, Lotze holds
that even in the theoretical Judgments it is the "worth elements
which give the sense of reality."
-
40It is because there are moral beings with feeling,
capable of pleasure or pain, that there can be an
obligatorymoral law. Drop~out the element of feeling in uod and
man,and consider them as pure intellect and volition, and it
isdifficult to find a place for moral obligation. Lotze says,
In our own feelings for the value of things and their relations,
our reason possesses as genuine a revelation as, in the principle
of logical investigation, it has an indispensible instrument of
experience . . . Every real cause of pleasure is indeed only
recognition and enjoyment of a specific worth which has its own
occasioning cause different from the cause of every other pleasure.
There is an ideal according to which we may measure v/orths.
Supreme pleasure is in the satisfaction of conscience itself.
Pleasure in the agreement of any individual pleasure and this
supreme legislation is a standard exempt from fluctuations . . .
That which corresponds to a momentory and accidental condition of
some indivi- dualpeculiarity of the mind which it affects is of
less worth, and that is of more worth which harmonizes ?vTith the
general and normal features 'for organization, by which the mind is
fitted for the fulfilment of its destiny.That would be of supreme
worth which caused satisfaction to an ideal mind in its normal
condition, a mind which had been purified from all tendency to
divert from its proper path of development.35
The following quotations from Lotze throw further light onthe
relation between values, personal spirits, and
objectivereality:
Actions are not good simply as events that occur,.nor their
results simply as facts that have been accomplished --it is only
the will from which the actions proceed that is good . . . u-ood
and good things do not exist as such independent of the feeling,
willing and knowing nind: they have reality only as the living
movements of
rzc Quoted by Keirstead, erg. cit., pp. 444f., from the various
works of Lotze.
-
41such a mind . What is good in itself is some felt bliss: what
we call good things are means to this good . . .The only thing that
is really good is that Living Love which wills the blessedness of
others. And it is just this that is the good-in-itself for which we
are seeking . . . Ho kind of unsubstantial, unrealized and yet
eternally valid necessity, neither a realm of truth nor a realm of
worth, is prior as the initial reality: but that reality which is
Living Love unfolds itself in one movement, which for finite
cognition appears in the three aspects of the good which is its
end, the consecutive impulse by which*this is realized, and the
conformity to law with which this impulse keeps in the path that
leads toward its end. . .
If this eternal sacredness and supreme worth of love were 'not
at the foundation of the world, and if in such a case there could
be a world of which we could think and speak, this world, it seems
to me, would, whatever it were, be left without truth and order . .
. True reality is not matter and is still less idea, but is the
living Personal Spirit of God and the world of personal spirits
which He has c r e a t e d . 36
Here then we have in his own words Lotzefs theory ofvalues,
which is the key*to his whole philosophic system.Here is the way
Keirstead sums up Lotze1s position:
The whole world of forms, the whole mechanism of nature, exists
for*the creation of values. Values then, are not purely subjective
or arbitrary, for Lotze. The desires of men as well as thought may
contain a universal element and-possess objectivity in the sense of
universality. Since.man is a part of reality, he neither thinks nor
values in a purely subjective way. Our valuation conforms to a
perfect valuation as our knowledge conforms to a perfect knowledge.
In both we have an interpretationof reality.37
^ Mic.; II. pp. 720-728, quoted by Albert T. Swing, op. cit.,
pp. 74f.
37 W. C. Keirstead, op. cit. p. 445.
-
The relationship "between Lotze and Ritschl should now "be
rather obvious. As we have seen, Ritschl professes to base his
theology upon the Lotzean epistemology one part of which is his
theory of worth. &o far as the theory*of values is concerned,
Ritsch appears to have borrowed a great deal from Lotze. Here are
some essential elements in value-theory upon which they agree:(1)
Ideation is accompanied by feeling and willing.(2) The worth of an
object is in its capacity to arouse
pleasure and pain.(5) The highest good is blessedness.(4) Our
valuation gives us a true valuation of reality.(5) Values are not
arbitrary, but feeling as well as thought
may possess a universal element.*The conclusion, then, that
these facts bring us to is
that Ritschl cannot be guilty of denying.(by his principles)
ontological reality to objects a knowledge of which we can only
reach through value-judgments.
-
CHAPTER IV
RITSCHL*S CONCEPT OF RELIGION AND OF CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY
In Ritschl*s account of religion, he does not feel he is dealing
with the subject in a formal or scientific manner* He does not
claim to have adequately considered religion philosophically or
comparatively* Rather he tries to discover the common denominator
of all religion. The general conception of religion, thus, is to be
used, not constitutively but regulatively.1 He admits that his
purpose in glancing at other religions is to tf . . . point out the
modifications for the worse which they exhibit when compared with
Christianity *f,2
With these restrictions in mind we can now turn our attention to
Ritschl*s concept of religion and of Christianity. This will
involve a discussion of: first, his definition of religion and
religious knowledge; second, his view of revelation; third, the
result for.his conception of God and the Kingdom of God.**
1 Justification and Reconciliation. p. 196.2 Ibid *, p .
198.
-
44 I. DEFINITION OF RELIGION
Ritschl is famous for his analysis of religion whichhe regarded
as springing from a two-fold root.3 Religion isdue on the one hand
to mans position as a helpless part ofnature, and on the other hand
to his irrepressible moralclaim. He says,
In every religion what is sought, with the help of the super
human spiritual power reverenced by man, is a solution of the
contradiction in which man finds himself, as both a part of the
world of nature and a spiritual personality claiming to dominate
nature. For in the former role he is a part of nature, dependent
upon her, subject to and confined by other things; but as a spirit
he is moved by the impulse to maintain his independence against
them. In this juncture, religion springs up as faith in superhuman
spiritual powers, by whose help the power which man possesses of
himself is in some way supplemented, and elevated into a unity of
its own kind which is a match for the pressure of the natural
world.4
He also says,But the religious view of the world, in all its
species, rests on the fact that man in some degree distinguishes
himself in worth from the phenomena which surround him and from the
influences of nature which press upon him.All religion is
equivalent to an explanation of the course of the world to whatever
extent it may be known in the sense that the sublime spiritual
powers (or the spiritual power) which rule in or over it, conserve
and confirm to the personal spirit its claims and independence
over- against the restrictions of nature and the natural effects of
human, society.3
3 Robert Mackintosh, Albrecht Ritschl (London: Chapman and Hall,
1915), p. 158.
4 cit., p. 1995 I b i d .* P. 1?
-
It will be seen that this definition of religion makes Bitschls
conception of it, practical, rather than, specula- * tive. He tells
us that it arises out of an acute practical distress of man; and it
offers us, not speculative knowledge of Creator and creation but
the assurance man needs to consolidate, enrich, and secure his
life. This conclusion is confirmed by the following statements of
Ritschl:
Now we have no difficulty in ascertaining by an examination of
all other religions, that the secular knowledge they involve is not
disinterestedly theoretical, but guided by practical ends.6
..............................The various historical religions are
always of a social character, belonging to a multitude of persons7
. . . . .
* . *. . the historical religions claim service from all the
functions of spirit knowledge, for the doctrinal tradition, i.e.
for a particular view of the world; will, for the common worship;
feeling, for the alternation of satisfaction and dissatisfaction,
moods by which religious life is removed from the ordinary level of
existence. No religion is correctly or completely conceived when
one element o.f this succession is regarded as more important or
more fundamental than the others.8
It is because Christianity solves this practical problem of the
conflict of "nature"- and "spirit" in man, that Ritschl regards it
to be the absolute religion.9 He defines
6 Ibid., p. 195.7 Ibid., p. 198. Ibid., p . 199.9 Eugene W.
Lyman, Ritschls Theory of Value-Judg
ments The ihnerican j ournal of Theology, 5:508, Sept. 1925.
-
46the Christian Religion as
. . . the monotheistic, completely spiritual, and ethical
religion, which based on the life of its Author as Redeemer and as
Founder of the Kingdom of God, consists in the freedom of the
children of God, involves the impulse to conduct from the motive of
love, aims at the moral organization of mankind, and grounds
blessedness on the relation of sonship to God, as well as on the
Kingdom of God.iO
The distinction here referred to as the world of natureand the
realm of personality, should remind us of Lotzesdistinction between
the world of forms and the world ofvalues,11 This will also have
to.be understood in the lightof Ritschl's distinction between
theoretical judgments andvalue-judgments,12 for he tells us
that
*In Christianity, religious knowledge consists in independent
value-judgments, inasmuch as it deals with the relation between the
blessedness which is assurred by God and sought by man, and the
whole of the world which God has created and rules in harmony with
His final end.^
One other element must be taken into considerationalso before an
adequate concept of Ritschls view of religioncan be obtained, i.e.,
his epistemology.14 Metaphysicalspeculation is to be left out of
theology, for theology relies
10 J2E* c^ * P*Supra, Chapter III, Part III.
12 Supra. Chapter III, Part III.
-*3 Ojd cit.. p. 207.14 Supra, Chapter II, Part III.
-
47for its content upon a different source of truth. By
metaphysics, in'this sense he means the attempt to extend the
method of natural science so that it yields reliable knowledge,
about the world as a. whole. He says,
Theology has performed its task when, guided by the Christian
idea of God and the conception of mens blessedness in the Kingdom
of God, it exhibits completely and clearly, both as a whole and in
particular, the Christian view 6f the world and of human life,
together with the necessity which belongs to the interdependent
relations between its component elements. It is incompetent for it
to enter upon either a direct or an indirect proof of the truth of
the Christian Revelation by seeking to show that it agrees with
some philosophical or juridical view of the world; for to such
-Christianity simply standsopposed. And as often as systems, even
of monistic Idealism have asserted their agreement with
Christianity, and its leading ideas have been worked up into a
general philosophic view, the result has only been to demonstrate
over again the opposition between even such systems and
Christianity
He goes on to say that he who would have proof forChristianity
must be, as Spener pointed out, by he whoM . . . willeth to do the
will of God . . . he shall know thedoctrine of Christ is true. Thus
for Ritschl, Christianity finds its proof where the knowledge of it
is put on a different level from nature and her lav/s. He says.
To subordinate the ethical to the idea of the cosmical is always
characteristic of a heathen view of the world, and to its
jurisdiction Christianity is not amenable; before it Christianity
will 3^ever succeed in justifying itself. Even when such an
explanation of the world starts
15 QP cit., p . 24.
-
48from an idea of God, it offers no guarantee that it can prove
the truth of Christianity. Christianity includes as one of its
elements the distinction of the ethical, from the world of nature
in respect of worth, inasmuch as it attaches blessedness for man,
as the highest and all-dominating notion of worth, to participation
in theft ingdom of God and lordship over the world. The theological
exposition of Christianity, therefore, is complete when it has been
demonstrated that the Christian ideal of life, and no other,
satisfies the claims of the human spirit to knowledge of things u n
i v e r s a l l y .1C
*
While he will admit that metaphysical conceptions do aid us in
the classification of knowledge, yet he contends that we cannot by
metaphysical inquiry secure knowledge which is more valuable than
we can through ethical judgments. The metaphysical determinations
of a spiritual force cannot distinguish it from a natural force,
'therefore such knowledge is not significant for theology.
Metaphysics cannot help us in the study of God because it can
never give us knowledge of God as a conscious personality. Ritschl
says,
The proofs for the existence of God conducted by the purely
metaphysical method do not lead to the forces whose representation
is given in Christianity, but merely to conceptions of world-unity,
which conceptions are neutral as regards all religion. This
application of metaphysics must therefore be excluded from theology
if its positive and peculiar nature is to be maintained.1,7
16 Ibid., p. 25.17 Ibid.. p. 17.
-
49Religious knowledge, being thus cut loose from science
and philosophy, is yet just as valid as these because itbuilds
on religious value-judgments. Scientific knowledge
0 can never be knowledge of the whole because it advancesthrough
experiences only to laws. But in religious value,knowledge finds
the key to ultimate reality. ^Whenever thephilosophers have arrived
at a "supreme universal law" bywhich everything can be explained,
they have become religion-.ists, for science can never give a view
of the whole.Thus, it is through value-judgments that religious
knowledgefinds a peculiar and appropriate sphere independent
oftheoretical knowledge. Ritschl says,
In Christianity, religious knowledge consists in independent
value-judgments, inasmuch as it deals with the relation between the
blessedness which is assured by God and sought by man, and the
whole of the world which God has created and rules in harmony with
His final end.19
Ritschl rejects, likewise, natural theology because natural
theology takes the approach of the natural scientist, i.e., the
objective approach. But this would leave out of the Christian
religion all that is significantbecause the data of religion are
personal and subjective and require personal
rbid., p. 207.19 Xoc cit.
-
conviction so that they cannqt be handled by the method of
natural science.
II. THE PLACE OF. REVELATION IN THEOLOGY
Religious value-judgments indicate only the knowers* side of
religious knowledge, and have to do with his method of
appropriating religious truth* True, the basic value- judgment of
the worth of the human personality compared to physical nature
gives us the basis for an insight into the nature of the universe.
But the objective content of religious knowledge is grounded in
Revelation. The important fact of Revelation is that it is not
outside of history but within it, so that the facts of revelation
actually exist independent of the wishes of the individual
believer* What the believer does, as Garvie says, . . . is to claim
for his own need and trial the help and the comfort that are
offered to him in the revelation presented in these facts.20 Thus
it is that faith (value-judgment) and Revelation are correlative
for Ritschl.
Theology is an inductive science because its starting
20 Alfred Garvie, The Ritschlian Theology (Edinburgh: T. and T.
Clark, 1899/, p. 194.
-
51point is in historical Revelation whose content is deterialned
by the experiences of the Christian community. Mystical theology of
the Catholic type Ritschl will not allow because it tends to become
independent of historical revelation. Mysticism is so closely
connected with Neo-platonic metaphysical speculations that both
must be rejected if theology is to be saved from subjective
illusions.
The source-point in the historical Revelation from which
theology must proceed is the New Testament. .He says,
m-The theology which is to set forth the authentic content of
the Christian religion in a positive form has to obtain the same
from the books of the New Testament and from no other source.21
He furthermore says that authentic knowledge for theology. . .
can only be obtained from original documents which stand near the
foundation epoch of the Christian Church.22
The foundation epoch consists of . . . not only the personal
work of Christ, but also the fir^t generation of His community. 11
The books of the New Testament are the original documents of the
revelation,
, . . for the reason that the oral tradition of Christ and His
Apostles is either laid down in the Gospels and stands in accord
with the Epistles, or we should have to
) *
PI Justification Q-nd Reconciliation, Vol. II, p. 18, quoted by
Albert T. Swing, The Theology of Albrecht Ritschl (New York:
Longmans, Green, and Co., 19011, pp. 86f.
^ Loc. cit.
-
52^regard it as having died away and been lost . . . The
exclusive validity of these hooks as authentic documents of the
Christian religion might have been established by the very fact
that the first authors of the following generation actually and
fundamentally recognized the standard authority of the books of the
New Testament by the reproduction- of ideas of Apostolic origin,
and that succeeding .theology cannot do otherwise.
The Old Testament is important for Ritschl because it is
necessary to an understanding of the New Testament. The Pharisaic
legalism of the New Testament period which Jesus combats in favor
of a return to prophetical religion, certainly cannot be understood
without a knowledge of the Old Testament.
Ritschl1s use of the Scripture is a little more critical than
one would be inclined to expect. He does not think Revelation
includes all the convictions of the early church or their social
arrangments as set forth in the New Testament. He says,
All the necessary doctrines of salvation must be grounded in the
Holy Scriptures as regards their material, but that not all the
original Christian hopes and social forms are to be considered as
necessary parts of Christian theology
Therefore, Ritschl evades the difficulties of a literalistic
*
Loc. cit.
^ Justification and Reconciliation, Vol. 'II, p . 19f., quoted
from A. T. Swing, op. cit., p. 90.
-
53theory of the scriptures. Concerning an infallible principle
of interpretation, Ritschl says,
Neither for such a principle nor its application can we be
assured of infallibility, inasmuch as these are sought, or supposed
to be found, by weak human beings. Since the exposition of Holy
Scripture according to the positive standard of church tradition is
not accepted within the church since the reformation, there is no
appeal left which can claim even an illusion of an infallible
understanding of the Scripture . . . Therefore,' I pay no attention
to those who are not clear-sighted enough to perceive where alone
the thirst for an infallible exposition of Scripture, or an
errorless decision of doctrine, can be satisfied . . . For the
evangelical theologian it is merely a question of the exposition of
Scripture from its own context and the approximate consummation of
thetask.25
Ritschl*s view of the Scriptures is, therefore / that they are
the divinely appointed human means through which God has given the
Revelation and consequently they are to be interpreted
historically
III. RITSCHL*S IDEA OF GOD AND OF THE* KINGDOM OF GOD
Having maintained that the contents of the Christian religion
are found in Revelation, Ritschl further insists upon the necessity
of a systematic expositions of the value- Judgments of religion so
as to demonstrate their organic unity. For this study, only two
need consideration, i.e.,* the idea of God and the idea of the
Kingdom of God,. There
Justification and Reconciliation, Yol. Ill, pp. 20f. quoted from
A. T. Swing, op. cit., pp. 91f.
^ Albert T. Swing, op. cit*., p. 95.
-
54will be no attempt here to develop a complete statement of
Ritschls position on either of these doctrines. Only those aspects
which have a specific bearing upon Rits-chl* s Christ- ology need
consideration.
Of course, the theoretical proofs of God are rejectedinasmuch as
they merely prove the necessity of his existencefor theoretic
reason, but they are incapable of proving Hisobjective existence.
He seems to believe that our knowledgeof God arises from a
revelation of Him which is conditionedby our active trust in him.
He says, for example,
For religious cognition the existence of God is beyond
question,mfor the activity of uod becomes to us a matter of
conviction through the attitude we take up to the worM as religious
men.2*7
This is of course to be understood in the light of hisLotzean
epistemology, for he says in the first edition thatthe Christian
experience n . . . validates the actuality ofGod inasmuch as it
convinces of the activity of God.2 Andelsewhere he says, TfWhen one
thinks effects rightly, onethinks the cause in the effects.tt2S
Furthermore, while Ritschl accepted the moral argument of Kant,
yet he criticised Kant for limiting the argument to
^ Justification and Reconciliation, p. 218.^ rbifl., p .
185.
*PQ Theologie und Metaphysik, Part II, p. 49, quoted by Eugene
W. Lyman, o. cit., p. 513.
-
55 . *practical validity but not including theoretic validity.
But on the basis of his own epistemology " . . . it is the duty of
theology to conserve the special characteristics of the conception
of Bod, namely, that it can be represented in value-judgments
.30
Theology as a science by this method and by . . . urging, the
Christian view of God and the world . . . makes it possible for us
to . . unify our knowledge of nature and the spiritual life of man
in a way which otherwise is impossible.31 But, as we have seen,32
since the chief problem in securing a unified view of the world is
created by the antithesis 'between nature and spirit, and since
thisproblem is empirically solved through the Christian faith
in
God, Ritschl holds that the Christian idea of God unifies
ourview of the world as nothing else does.33 Even the scientists
and the philosophers when they, attempt a unified view of the
world, do so through an impulse of a religious nature in which the
intuitive imagination or synthetic imagination plays a
30 Justification and Reconciliation, p. 225.31 Ibld. p. 225f.32
Supra. Chapter XV, Part I.33 Justification and Reconciliation, p.
222.
-
56chief part. He says,
In all philosophic systems the affirmation of a supreme law of
existence . . is a departure from the strict application of the
philosophic method, and betrays itself as being quite as much an
object of the intuitive imagi- , nation, as God and the world are
for religious thought.34
The two characteristics of God which have importancefor this
study are His spiritual personality and His goodwill
or love. Ritschl insists on the personality of God in
op-position to the pantheism of Strauss and to the Absolute
ofiFrank. Personality in-God can be compared and contrastedw i t h
p e r s o n a l i t y i n m a n . T h e c o m p a r i s o n i s t h
a t e x p e r i e n c e
proves that personalitjr consists In power to control
theportions of the environment appropriated in order to make it
*a n s w e r o u r n e e d s a n d s u i t o u r p u r p o s e s
. T h e c o n t r a s t i s t h a t
human personality is always in a state of becoming, but InGod
there is the absence of all those restraints that limitpersonality.
Consequently human personalities are alwaysdeveloping toward that
full personality for which they aredesigned. He* says,
The truth of the idea of personality of God rather is verified
just by our finding in it the standard which determines whether and
how far the same predicate is to be ascribed to us.^5
34 Ibid- > P* 223 55 Ibid.. p. 23&.
-
57From this position Ritschl draws an important con-
* .elusion: "It follows as a settled result that God is realonly
in the form of w ill."36 This ascribes a relation towardm a n k i n
d . I n C h r i s t i a n i t y t h i s r e l a t i o n i s r e v e
a l e d a s 1 l o v e .Here, in the attribute of love, is the real
significance ofthe Christian conception of God. He says,
Theology, in deliniating the moral order of the world, must take
as its starting-point that conception of God in which the relation
of God to His Son, our Lord, is expressed, a relation which by
Christs mediation is extended to His community.37
Love, or good will, as the order of the universe he defines as ,
. the steadfast will to further another rational
. being, of like nature with oneself, in the attainment of his
purpose in such manner that he one who loves follows in so doing
his own self-end. Love adopts the ends of others as its own, and in
so doing realizes its own ideal. We must see then first &odr*s
purpose toward His Son: and then, through our union with the
&on, learn tosee in that purpose the Love of G-od towards
ourselves.
In a very famous passage Ritschl speaks of Christianityas tT. .
. a n ellipse which is determined by two foci. "39These two foci
seem to have to do with the moral and thereligious ideals in
Christianity, and between these two a fairbalance must be held. The
moral has to do with the kingdom of
56 Ibid., p. 224.57 Ihid., pp. 287f.^ Unterricht, p. 9, quoted
by E. A*. Edghill, op. cit.,
p. 137