Torts and damages Cases

1. G.R. No. 173180 August 24, 2011ALBERT TISONvs.SPS. GREGORIO POMASIN PEREZ, J.:

FACTS: A tractor-trailer and a jitney collided along Maharlika Highway in Albay. LaarniPomasin was the driver ofthe jitney while the tractor was driven by Claudio Jabon. Multiple death and injuries to those in the jitney resulted. Albert Tison, the owner of the truck, extended financialassistance to respondents and P200,000.00 to Cynthia Pomasin, sister of Laarni. Cynthia, in turn, executed an Affidavit of Desistance.

Still, respondents filed a complaint for damages before the RTC of Antipolo. They alleged that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence, imprudence and carelessness of petitioners. In their Answer, petitioners countered that it was Laarnis negligence which proximately caused the accident. They further claimed that Cynthia was authorized by Spouses Pomasin to enterinto an amicable settlement by executing an Affidavit of Desistance. 

Petitioners subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the complaint in view of the Affidavit of Desistance executed by Cynthia. However, the motion was denied. The trial court

ruled in favor Tison giving more credence to the testimony of Jabon. The CA disagreed with the trial court and ruled that the reckless driving ofJabon caused the vehicular collision based on the gravity of the damage caused to the jitney. Also, it was noted that the restriction in Jabon’s driver’s license was violated, thus, giving rise to the presumption that hewas negligent at the time of the accident. Tison was also held liable for damages for his failure to prove due diligence in supervising Jabon after he was hired as driver of the truck. 

ISSUE: Whether CA is correct in its findings.

RULING: NO. Petitioners are not negligent. According to Article 2176 of the Civil Code, whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Tosustain a claim based on quasi-delict, the following requisites must concur: (a) damage suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of defendant; and (c) connection of cause and effectbetween the fault or negligence of defendant and the damage incurred by the plaintiff. These requisites must be proved by a preponderance of evidence. The claimants, respondents in this case, must, therefore, establish their claim or cause of

action by preponderance of evidence, evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing than that which is offered in opposition to it. 

Driving without a proper license is a violation of traffic regulation. UnderArticle 2185 of the Civil Code, the legal presumption of negligence arisesif at the time of the mishap, a personwas violating any traffic regulation. However, inSanitary Steam Laundry, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the court held that a causal connection must exist between the injury received and the violation of the traffic regulation. It must be proven that the violation of the traffic regulation was the proximate or legal cause of the injury or that it substantially contributed thereto. Negligence, consisting in whole or in part, of violation of law, like any other negligence, is without legal consequence unless it is a contributing cause of the injury. Likewise controlling is our ruling in Añonuevo v. Court of Appeals where we reiterated that negligence per se, arising from the mere violation of a traffic statute, need not be sufficient in itself in establishing liability for damages. In said case, Añonuevo, who was driving a car,did not attempt “to establish a causalconnection between the safety violations imputed to the injured cyclist, and the accident itself. Instead, he relied on a putative

presumption that these violations in themselves sufficiently established negligence appreciable against the cyclist. Since the onus on Añonuevo isto conclusively prove the link betweenthe violations and the accident, we can deem him as having failed to discharge his necessary burden of proving the cyclist’s own liability.”

The rule on negligence per se must admit qualifications that may arise from the logical consequences of the facts leading to the mishap. The doctrine (and Article 2185, for that matter) is undeniably useful as a judicial guide in adjudging liability,for it seeks to impute culpability arising from the failure of the actor to perform up to a standard established by a legal fiat. But the doctrine should not be rendered inflexible so as to deny relief when in fact there is no causal relation between the statutory violation and the injury sustained. Presumptions in law, while convenient, are not intractable so as to forbid rebuttal rooted in fact. After all, tort law isremunerative in spirit, aiming to provide compensation for the harm suffered by those whose interests havebeen invaded owing to the conduct of other.

In the instant case, no causal connection was established between thetractor-trailer driver’s restrictions

on his license to the vehicular collision. Furthermore, Jabon was ableto sufficiently explain that the Land Transportation Office merely erred in not including restriction code 8 in his license.

#2 JONAS AONUEVO, petitioner vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and JEROME VILLAGRACIA, respondent [G.R. No. 130003. October 20, 2004]

Facts: At the intersection of Boni Avenue and Barangka Drive in Mandaluyong (now a city). Villagracia was traveling along Boni Avenue on hisbicycle, while Aonuevo, traversing theopposite lane was driving his Lancer car with plate number PJJ 359. The carwas owned by Procter and Gamble Inc., the employer of Aonuevos brother, Jonathan. Aonuevo was in the course ofmaking a left turn towards Libertad Street when the collision occurred. Villagracia sustained serious injuriesas a result, which necessitated his hospitalization several times in 1989,and forced him to undergo four (4) operations.

Villagracia instituted an action for damages against Procter and Gamble Phils., Inc. and Aonuevo before the RTC.. Trial on the civil action ensued, and in a Decision dated 9

March 1990, the RTC rendered judgment against Procter and Gamble and Aonuevo, ordering them to pay Villagracia.

The Court of Appeals Fourth Division affirmed the RTC Decision in toto.Aonuevo points out that Villagracias bicycle had no safety gadgets such as a horn or bell, or headlights, as invoked by a 1948 municipal ordinance.[ Nor was it duly registered with the Office of the Municipal Treasurer, as required by the same ordinance. Finally, as admitted by Villagracia, his bicycle did not have foot brakes.

Issue:Whether Article 2185 of the New Civil Code, which presumes the driver of a motor vehicle negligent if he wasviolating a traffic regulation at the time of the mishap, should apply by analogy to non-motorized vehicles.

Ruling: A motorized vehicle operates by reason of a motor engine unlike a non-motorized vehicle, which runs as aresult of a direct exertion by man or beast of burden of direct physical force. A motorized vehicle, unimpeded by the limitations in physical exertion.is capable of greater speeds and acceleration than non-motorized

vehicles. At the same time, motorized vehicles are more capable in inflicting greater injury or damage inthe event of an accident or collision.This is due to a combination of factors peculiar to the motor vehicle,such as the greater speed, its relative greater bulk of mass, and greater combustability due to the fuels that they use.

There long has been judicial recognition of the peculiar dangers posed by the motor vehicle.

The Code Commission was cognizant of the difference in the natures and attached responsibilities of motorizedand non-motorized vehicles. Art. 2185 was not formulated to compel or ensureobeisance by all to traffic rules and regulations. If such were indeed the evil sought to be remedied or guarded against, then the framers of the Code would have expanded the provision to include non-motorized vehicles or for that matter, pedestrians. Yet, that was not the case; thus the need arisesto ascertain the peculiarities attaching to a motorized vehicle within the dynamics of road travel. The fact that there has long existed ahigher degree of diligence and care imposed on motorized vehicles, arising

from the special nature of motor vehicle, leads to the inescapable conclusion that the qualification under Article 2185 exists precisely torecognize such higher standard. Simplyput, the standards applicable to motorvehicle are not on equal footing with other types of vehicles.

Thus, we cannot sustain the contentionthat Art. 2185 should apply to non-motorized vehicles, even if by analogy.

3. Professional Services v. AganaGR no. 126297 January 31, 2007

Facts: Natividad Agana was rushed tothe Medical City General Hospital(Medical City Hospital) because ofdifficulty of bowel movement andbloody anal discharge. After a seriesof medical examinations, Dr. MiguelAmpil diagnosed her to be sufferingfrom "cancer of the sigmoid." Anoperation was conducted by Dr. Fuentesof the same hospital- a procedurecalled Hysterectomy. However, aNurse’s record confirmed that theoperation was flawed. Natividadsuffered pains but was advised by bothdoctors that those were only theresult of the surgery. The spouseswent to the U.S for further treatmentand was told that she was free ofcancer. Upon returning to thePhilippines, she suffered even greater

pain. Her daughter found a piece ofgauze protruding from her vagina. Theycontacted Dr. Ampil to remove the saidcloth. The doctor did so but then itwas found out that a piece of gauzestill remained from her vagina whichcaused the excretion of stool in thesaid region. The Spouses filed acomplaint against the Hospital and thedoctors Ampil and Fuentes. Pending thecase, Natividad died.

Issue: Whether the said doctors areguilty of Gross Negligence.

Ruling: Yes. Both acted withnegligence.

Dr. Fuentes’ Liability: (Res IpsaLoquitur)

Literally, res ipsa loquitur means"the thing speaks for itself." It isthe rule that the fact of theoccurrence of an injury, taken withthe surrounding circumstances, maypermit an inference or raise apresumption of negligence, or make outa plaintiff’s prima facie case, andpresent a question of fact fordefendant to meet with anexplanation. Stated differently, wherethe thing which caused the injury,without the fault of the injured, isunder the exclusive control of thedefendant and the injury is such thatit should not have occurred if he,having such control used proper care,

it affords reasonable evidence, in theabsence of explanation that the injuryarose from the defendant’s want ofcare, and the burden of proof isshifted to him to establish that hehas observed due care and diligence.

From the foregoing statements of therule, the requisites for theapplicability of the doctrine of resipsa loquitur are: (1) the occurrenceof an injury; (2) the thing whichcaused the injury was under thecontrol and management of thedefendant; (3) the occurrence was suchthat in the ordinary course of things,would not have happened if those whohad control or management used propercare; and (4) the absence ofexplanation by the defendant. Of theforegoing requisites, the mostinstrumental is the "control andmanagement of the thing which causedthe injury."

We find the element of "control andmanagement of the thing which causedthe injury" to be wanting. Hence, thedoctrine of res ipsa loquitur will notlie.

Under the "Captain of the Ship" rule,the operating surgeon is the person incomplete charge of the surgery roomand all personnel connected with theoperation. Their duty is to obey hisorders. As stated before, Dr. Ampilwas the lead surgeon. In other words,

he was the "Captain of the Ship." Thathe discharged such role is evidentfrom his following conduct: (1)calling Dr. Fuentes to perform ahysterectomy; (2) examining the workof Dr. Fuentes and finding it inorder; (3) granting Dr. Fuentes’permission to leave; and (4) orderingthe closure of the incision. To ourmind, it was this act of ordering theclosure of the incisionnotwithstanding that two pieces ofgauze remained unaccounted for, thatcaused injury to Natividad’s body.Clearly, the control and management ofthe thing which caused the injury wasin the hands of Dr. Ampil, not Dr.Fuentes.

In this jurisdiction, res ipsaloquitur is not a rule of substantivelaw, hence, does not per se create orconstitute an independent or separateground of liability, being a mereevidentiary rule.In other words, mereinvocation and application of thedoctrine does not dispense with therequirement of proof of negligence.Here, the negligence was proven tohave been committed by Dr. Ampil andnot by Dr. Fuentes.

(Note: May liability din po si Dr.Ampil. Di ko lang nilagay kasi masimportnte sa theme of discussion ungkay Dr. Fuentes. Pa- refer na lang posa Original)

4. G.R. No. 73998 November 14, 1988

PEDRO T. LAYUGAN, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, GODOFREDO ISIDRO, andTRAVELLERS MULTI-INDEMNITY CORPORATION,

SARMIENTO, J.:

FACTS: on May 15, 1979 while at Baretbet, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya, the Plaintiff and a companion were repairing the tire of their cargo truck with Plate No. SU-730 which was parked along the right side of the National Highway; that defendant's truckdriven recklessly by Daniel Serrano bumped the plaintiff, that as a result, plaintiff was injured and hospitalized at Dr. Paulino J. Garcia Research and Medical Center and the Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital; that he spent TEN THOUSAND PESOS (Pl0,000.00) and will incur more expenses as he recuperates from said injuries; that because of said injuries he would be deprived of a lifetime income in the sum of SEVENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P70,000.00); and that he agreed to pay his lawyer the sum of TEN THOUSANDPESOS

Defendant countered that the plaintiff was merely a bystander, not a truck helper being a brother-in-law

law of the driver of said truck; that the truck allegedly being repaired wasparked, occupying almost half of the right lane towards Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, right after the curve; that the proximate cause of the incident was the failure of the driver of the parked truck in installing the early warning device, hence the driver of the parked car should be liable for damages sustained by the truck

On May 29, 1981, a third-party complaint was filed by the defendant against his insurer,

amply supported by the evidence on record, the trial court rendered its decision and ordered defendat to pay damages

Intermediate Appellate Court as earlier stated reversed the decision of the trial court and dismissed the complaint, the third-party complaint, and the counter- claims of both appellants.

ISSUE: WON CA CORRECT? WHO WAS NEGLIGENT? CA wrong isidro was negligent

HELD: The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as

follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standardsupposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law

ISIDROS CLAIM: Respondent Isidro posits that any immobile object along the highway, like a parked truck, poses serious danger to a moving vehicle which has the right to be on the highway. He argues that since the parked cargo truck in this case was a threat to life and limb and property, it was incumbent upon the driver as well as the petitioner, who claims to be a helper of the truck driver, to exercise extreme care so that the motorist negotiating the road would beproperly forewarned of the peril of a parked vehicle. Isidro submits that the burden of proving that care and diligence were observed is shifted to the petitioner, for, as previously claimed, his (Isidro's) Isuzu truck had a right to be on the road, while the immobile cargo truck had no business, so to speak, to be there.

Likewise, Isidro proffers that the petitioner must show to the satisfaction of a reasonable mind thatthe driver and he (petitioner) himself, provided an early warning device, like that required by law, or,by some other adequate means that would properly forewarn vehicles of the impending danger that the parked vehicle posed considering the time, place, and other peculiar circumstances of the occasion. Absent such proof of care, as in the case at bar, Isidro concludes, would, under the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur, evoke the presumption of negligence onthe part of the driver of the parked cargo truck as well as his helper, thepetitioner herein, who was fixing the flat tire of the said truck.

COURTS ANSWER: The evidence on record discloses that three or four meters from the rear of the parked truck, a lighted kerosene lamp was placed and Whether the cargo truck was parked along the road or on half the shoulderof the right side of the road would beof no moment taking into account the warning device consisting of the lighted kerosene lamp placed three or four meters from the back of the truck.

IAC WRONG:From its finding that the parked truck was loaded with ten (10) big round logs the Court of Appeals inferred that because of its weight the truck could not have been driven to the shoulder of the road and concluded that the same was parked on a portion of the road at the time of the accident. Consequently, the respondent court inferred that the mishap was due to the negligence of the driver of the parked truck. The inference or conclusion is manifestly erroneous. In a large measure, it is grounded on speculation, surmise, or conjecture. How the respondent court could have reversed the finding of thetrial court that a warning device was installed (res ipsaliquitor not applicable ca was applying it. It merely determines and regulates what shall be prima facie evidence thereof and facilitates the burden of plaintiff of proving a breach of the duty of due care) once the actual cause of injury is established beyond controversy, whether by the plaintiff or by the defendant, no presumptions will be involved and the doctrine becomes inapplicable when the circumstances have been so completely eludicated that no inference of defendant's liability can reasonably

be made, whatever the source of the evidence,

ISIDROS driver’s claim while driving Isuzu truck at Baretbet, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya and at KM 285, I met another vehicle who (sic) did not dim his (sic) lights which cause (sic) me to be blinded with intense glare of the light that's why I did not notice a parked truck who (sic) was repairinga front flat tire. When I was a few meters away, I saw the truck which wasloaded with round logs. I step (sic) on my foot brakes but it did not function with my many attempts. I have(sic) found out later that the fluid pipe on the rear right was cut that's why the breaks did not function.

The private respondent or his mechanic, who must be competent, should have conducted a thorough inspection of his vehicle before allowing his driver to drive it. In the light of the circumstances obtaining in the case, we hold that Isidro failed to prove that the diligence of a good father of a familyin the supervision of his employees which would exculpate him from solidary liability with his driver to the petitioner. RTC reinstated

5. Luz Tan vs Jam Transit

Facts:Luz Palanca Tan (Tan) alleged that she was the owner of a passenger-type jitney with plate number DKF-168.On March 14, 1997, at around 5:00 a.m., the said jitney figured in an accident at an intersection along Maharlika Highway, Barangay Bangyas, Calauan, Laguna, as it collided with aJAM Transit passenger bus bound for Manila, bearing plate number DVG-557 and body number 8030.The bus was driven by Eddie Dimayuga (Dimayuga).Atthe time of the collision, Tans jitneywas loaded with quail eggs and duck eggs (balot and salted eggs).It was driven by Alexander M. Ramirez (Ramirez).Tan alleged that Dimayuga was reckless, negligent, imprudent, and not observing traffic rules and regulations, causing the bus to collide with the jitney which was then, with care and proper light direction signals, about to negotiate a left turn towards the feeder or barangay road of Barangay Bangyas, Calauan, Laguna going to the Poblacion.The jeepney turned turtle along the shoulder of the road and thecargo of eggs was destroyed.Ramirez and his helper were injured and hospitalized, incurring expenses for

medical treatment at thePagamutang Pangmasain Bay, Laguna.Tan prayed for damages in the amount of P400,000.00 for the damaged jitney,P142,210.00 forthe destroyed shipment,P20,000.00 for moral damages, attorneys fees of P20,000.00 plus P1,000.00 per court appearance of counsel, and other reliefs warranted under the premises.In its Answer with Counterclaim, respondent JAM Transit, Inc. (JAM) admitted ownership of the subject passenger bus and that Dimayuga was under its employ.However,it denied the allegations in the Complaint, and claimed that the accident occurred due to the gross negligence of Ramirez.As counterclaim,JAM sought payment of P100,000.00 for the damages sustained by the bus,P100,000.00 for loss of income, and P50,000.00 as attorneys fees plusP3,000.00 per court appearance of counsel. The RTC ruled in favor of Tanand the CA ruled in favor of JAM Transit,There was no evidence as to who between Ramirez and Dimayuga was negligent in connection with the vehicular accident.The CA held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can only be invoked when direct evidence is nonexistent or not accessible.

Issue:Whether direct evidence is needed to prove the omission or negligence of Jam Transit.Holding:No,Verily, although there was no direct evidence that the JAM passenger bus was overtaking the vehicles running along the right lane of the highway from the left lane, theavailable evidence readily points to such fact.There were two continuous yellow lines at the center of the highway, which meant that no vehicle in the said area should overtake another on either side of the road.Thedouble yellow center lines regulation,which this Court takes judicial noticeof as an internationally recognized pavement regulation, was precisely intended to avoid accidents along highways, such as what happened in this case.This prohibition finds support in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4136 (Land Transportation and Traffic Code), Section 41(e).Furthermore, it is observed that the area of collisionwas an intersection.Section 41(c) of R.A. No. 4136, likewise, prohibits overtaking or passing any other vehicle proceeding in the same direction at any intersection of highways, among others.Thus, by overtaking on the left lane, Dimayuga was not only violating the double yellow center lines regulation, but also the prohibition on overtaking at highway intersections.Consequently, negligence can be attributed only to him, which negligence was the

proximate cause of the injury sustained by petitioner.This prima facie finding of negligence was not sufficiently rebutted or contradicted by Dimayuga. Therefore, a finding thathe is liable for damages to petitioneris warranted.Whenever an employees negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly arises a presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimipatris families in the section (culpa in eligiendo) or supervision (culpa in vigilando)of its employees.To avoid liability for a quasi-delict committedby its employee, an employer must overcome the presumption, by presenting convincing proof that he exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee.To warrant an award of actualor compensatory damages for repair to damage sustained, the best evidence should be the receipts or other documentary proofs of the actual amount expended.However, considering that it was duly proven that the jitney was damaged and had to be repaired, as it was repaired, and thatthe cargo of eggs was indeed destroyed, but the actual amounts expended or lost were not proven, we deem it appropriate to award P250,000.00 by way of temperate damages.Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code,temperate damages may be recovered when pecuniary loss has been

suffered but its amount cannot be proved with certainty. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.The Decision datedJune 2, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 89046 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.The Decision dated December 20, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Sta. Cruz, Laguna in Civil Case No. SC-3838 is REINSTATED with the MODIFICATION.

6. COLLEGE ASSURANCE V. BELFRANIT CASEDIGEST

FACTS:Belfrant Development Inc. (BDI)was the owner of Belfrant building inAngeles City, Pampanga. It leased toCollege Assurance Plan Phil andComprehensive Annuity Plans andPension Corporation (Petitioners)several units on the 2nd and 3rd floorsof the building. Fire destroyedportions of the building, includingthe 3rd floor units being occupied bythe petitioners. A field investigationreport by an unnamed arsoninvestigator assigned to the casedisclosed:

Origin of the fire: store room occupied bythe CAP located at the 3rd floor

Cause of fire: accidental (overheated coffeepercolator)

These findings were reiterated in thecertification, which the BFP City FireMarshal, Insp. issued to petitionersas a supporting document for thelatter’s insurance claim. BDI sent topetitioners a Notice to Vacate theleased premises to make way forrepairs and to pay reparationestimated at 1.5million.

Petitioners vacated the premisesincluding the units in the 2nd floorbut they did not act on the demand forreparation. After succeeding demandswent unheeded, BDI filed a complaintfor damages.Both trial and appellatecourt ruled against the petitioner

ISSUE:whether the petitioners areliable for damages

RULING: Yes. The Court applied thedoctrine of res ipsaloquitor in thiscase, even if there were documentsemanating from the BFP that werepresented as evidence as to the causeof fire.

The court ruled that  The CA correctlyapplied the doctrineof res ipsa loquitur under which experttestimony may be dispensed with[35] tosustain an allegation of negligence ifthe following requisitesobtain: a) the accident is of a kind

which does not ordinarily occur unlesssomeone is negligent; b) the cause ofthe injury was under the exclusivecontrol of the person in charge and c)the injury suffered must not have beendue to any voluntary action orcontribution on the part of the personinjured.

The fire that damaged Belfranlt Building was not a spontaneous natural occurrence but theoutcome of a human act or omission. Itoriginated in the store room which petitioners had possession and controlof. Respondent had no hand in the incident. Hence, the convergence of these facts and circumstances speaks for itself: petitioners alone having knowledge of the cause of the fire or the best opportunity to ascertain it, and respondent having no means to findout for itself, it is sufficient for the latter to merely allege that the cause of the fire was the negligence of the former and to rely on the occurrence of the fire as proof of such negligence.[37] It was all up to petitioners to dispel such inference of negligence, but their bare denial only left the matter unanswered.

7. GR No. 137873 April 20, 2001

Consunji vs. Court of Appeals

JUSTIFICATION FOR THE RULE (RES IPSA LOQUITUR)

FACTS: Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death. . Juego together with Jessie Jaluag and Delso Destajo [were] performing their work as carpenter[s] at the elevator core of the 14th floor of the Tower D, Renaissance Tower Building on board a [p]latform made of channel beam (steel) measuring 4.8 meters by 2 meters wide with pinulid plywood flooring and cable wires attached to its four corners and hooked at the 5 ton chain block, when suddenly, the bolt or pin which was merely inserted to connect the chain block with the [p]latform, got loose xxx causing the whole [p]latform assembly and the victim to fall down to the basement ofthe elevator core, Tower D of the building under construction thereby crushing the victim of death, save histwo (2) companions who luckily jumped out for safety. Juego’s widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a complaint for damagesagainst the deceased’s employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc.

Res ipsa loquitur became an issue in relation to DM Consunji’s objection toPO3 Villanueva’s testimony. What Consunji took particular exception to

is PO3 Villanueva’s testimony that thecause of the fall of the platform was the loosening of the bolt from the chain block. Petitioner claimed that such portion of the testimony is mere opinion. Subject to certain exceptions,18 the opinion of a witness is generally not admissible.

Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the requisites for the application of res ipsa loquitur, but argues that the presumption or inference that it was negligent did not arise since it "proved that it exercised due care to avoid the accident which befell respondent’s husband."

ISSUE: WON CA erred in holding that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor [sic] is applicable to prove negligence on the part of petitioner.

HELD: The concept of res ipsa loquitur has been explained in this wise:

While negligence is not ordinarily inferred or presumed, and while the mere happening of an accident or injury will not generally give rise toan inference or presumption that it was due to negligence on defendant’s part, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which means, literally, the thing or transaction speaks for itself, or in one jurisdiction, that the thing or instrumentality speaks for itself, the facts or circumstances

accompanying an injury may be such as to raise a presumption, or at least permit an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant, or some other person who is charged with negligence.

x x x where it is shown that the thingor instrumentality which caused the injury complained of was under the control or management of the defendant, and that the occurrence resulting in the injury was such as inthe ordinary course of things would not happen if those who had its control or management used proper care, there is sufficient evidence, or, as sometimes stated, reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that theinjury arose from or was caused by thedefendant’s want of care.21

One of the theoretical based for the doctrine is its necessity, i.e., that necessary evidence is absent or not available.22

The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is based in part upon the theory that thedefendant in charge of the instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it and that the plaintiff has no such knowledge, and therefore is compelled to allege negligence in general terms and to rely upon the proof of the happening

of the accident in order to establish negligence. The inference which the doctrine permits is grounded upon the fact that the chief evidence of the true cause, whether culpable or innocent, is practically accessible tothe defendant but inaccessible to the injured person.

It has been said that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur furnishes a bridge by which a plaintiff, without knowledge of the cause, reaches over to defendant who knows or should know the cause, for any explanation of careexercised by the defendant in respect of the matter of which the plaintiff complains. The res ipsa loquitur doctrine, another court has said, is arule of necessity, in that it proceedson the theory that under the peculiar circumstances in which the doctrine isapplicable, it is within the power of the defendant to show that there was no negligence on his part, and direct proof of defendant’s negligence is beyond plaintiff’s power. Accordingly,some court add to the three prerequisites for the application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine the further requirement that for the res ipsa loquitur doctrine to apply, it must appear that the injured party hadno knowledge or means of knowledge as to the cause of the accident, or that the party to be charged with negligence has superior knowledge or

opportunity for explanation of the accident.

Petitioner apparently misapprehends the procedural effect of the doctrine.As stated earlier, the defendant’s negligence is presumed or inferred25 when the plaintiff establishes the requisites for the application of res ipsa loquitur. Once the plaintiff makes out a prima facie caseof all the elements, the burden then shifts to defendant to explain.26 The presumption or inference may be rebutted or overcome by other evidenceand, under appropriate circumstances disputable presumption, such as that of due care or innocence, may outweighthe inference.27 It is not for the defendant to explain or prove its defense to prevent the presumption or inference from arising. Evidence by the defendant of say, due care, comes into play only after the circumstancesfor the application of the doctrine has been established.1âwphi1.nêt

Petitioner is correct. Fabro’s sworn statement is hearsay and inadmissible.Affidavits are inadmissible as evidence under the hearsay rule, unless the affiant is placed on the witness stand to testify thereon.28 Theinadmissibility of this sort of evidence is based not only on the lackof opportunity on the part of the adverse party to cross-examine the affiant, but also on the commonly known fact that, generally, an

affidavit is not prepared by the affiant himself but by another who uses his own language in writing the affiant’s statements which may either be omitted or misunderstood by the onewriting them.29 Petitioner, therefore, cannot use said statement as proof of its due care any more than private respondent can use it to prove the cause of her husband’s death. Regrettably, petitioner does not cite any other evidence to rebut the inference or presumption of negligencearising from the application of res ipsa loquitur, or to establish any defense relating to the incident.

8. DR. NINEVETCH CRUZ, petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and LYDIA UMALI,respondents.

FACTS: dr. Ninevetchcruz wasaanaesthesiologist and surgeon in inperpetual C Help Clinic and GeneralHospital. LYDIA Umali, deceasedrespondent, was her patient who wasaccompanied by respondent daughterumali. She was examined by dr. Cruzand found a " myoma" in her uterus andwas thereafter scheduled forhysterectomy operation. Rowena and hermother slept in the clinic and noticedthe untidiness if the clinic. Rowenatried to pursuade her mother topostponed the operation. When Lydiaasked Dr. Cruz, the latter ingormed

that she had must be operated.Thereafter, the operation proceededwhile the relatives of Lydia wherewaiting, Dr. Ercilla instructed themto buy a blood for Lydia. After lapseof hours, they were informed that theoperation was finished. But againinstructed to buy a blood,unfortunately there were no blood A inthe blood bank of the clinic. Rowenanoticed that her mother was attachedto an oxygen tank, gasping for breath.Apparently the oxygen run out ofsupply and Rowena had to go to anotherhospital to gerkxgen.

Lydia was given fresh supply ofoxygen but later she went into shockhad unstable vondition whichnecessitated her to transfer to SanPablo District Hospital. Such waswithout prior consent of rowena nor ofother relatives. Thereafter, she wasreoperated but Dr. Angeles, Head ofObstetrics and Gynecology Departmentinformed them that there was nothinghe can do as Lydia ws already in shockas her blood pressure was 0/0. MTCCfound dr. Cruzand Dr. Ercilla guiltyof negligence. The RTC reiterated theabovementioned findings of the MTCCand upheld the latter's declaration of"incompetency, negligence and lack of

foresight and skill of appellant(herein petitioner) in handling thesubject patient before and after theoperation."[24] And likewise affirmingthe petitioner's conviction, the Courtof Appeals echoed similarobservations.hence, this case.

ISSUE: Whether or not a physician hascommitted an "inexcusable lack ofprecaution" in the treatment of hispatient is to be determined accordingto the standard of care observed byother members of the profession ingood standing[ under similarcircumstances bearing in mind theadvanced state of the profession atthe time of treatment or the presentstate of medical science.]

RULING NO. In the recent case ofLeonila Garcia-Rueda v. Wilfred L.Pacasio, et. al.,[27] this Courtstated that in accepting a case, adoctor in effect represents that,having the needed training and skillpossessed by physicians and surgeonspracticing in the same field, he willemploy such training, care and skillin the treatment of his patients. Hetherefore has a duty to use at leastthe same level of care that any otherreasonably competent doctor would useto treat a condition under the same

circumstances. It is in this aspect ofmedical malpractice that experttestimony is essential to establishnot only the standard of care of theprofession but also that thephysician's conduct in the treatmentand care falls below such standard.[28] Further, inasmuch as the causesof the injuries involved inmalpractice actions are determinableonly in the light of scientificknowledge, it has been recognized thatexpert testimony is usually necessaryto support the conclusion as tocausation.[29] Immediate

For whether a physician or surgeon has exercisedthe requisite degree of skill and care in thetreatment of his patient is, in the generality ofcases, a matter of expert opinion.[30] Thedeference of courts to the expert opinion ofqualified physicians stems from its realization thatthe latter possess unusual technical skills whichlaymen in most instances are incapable ofintelligently evaluating.[31] Experttestimony should have been offered toprove that the circumstances cited bythe courts below are constitutive ofconduct falling below the standard ofcare employed by other physicians ingood standing when performing the sameoperation

In litigations involving medicalnegligence, the plaintiff has theburden of establishing appellant'snegligence and for a reasonableconclusion of negligence, there mustbe proof of breach of duty on the partof the surgeon as well as a casualconnection of such breach and theresulting death of his patient.[33] InChan Lugay v. St Luke's Hospital,Inc.,[34] where the attendingphysician was absolved of liabilityfor the death of the complainant'swife and newborn baby, this court heldthat: "In order that there may be arecovery for an injury, however, itmust be shown that the 'injury forwhich recovery is sought must be thelegitimate consequence of the wrongdone; the connection between thenegligence and the injury must be adirect and natural sequence of events,unbroken by intervening efficientcauses.' In other words, thenegligence must be the proximate causeof the injury. For, 'negligence, nomatter in what it consists, cannotcreate a right of action unless it isthe proximate cause of the injurycomplained of.' And 'the proximatecause of an injury is that cause,which, in natural and continuoussequence, unbroken by any efficient

intervening cause, produces theinjury, and without which the resultwould not have occurred.''

9. Cayao-Lasam vs. Sps. Ramolete

FACTS: On July 28, 1994, respondent,three months pregnant Editha Ramolete(Editha) was brought to the LormaMedical Center (LMC) in San Fernando,La Union due to vaginal bleeding. Uponadvice of petitioner relayedvia telephone, Editha was admitted tothe LMC on the same day. A pelvicsonogram was then conducted on Editharevealing the fetus’ weak cardiacpulsation. The following day, Editha’srepeat pelvic sonogram showed thataside from the fetus’ weak cardiacpulsation, no fetal movement was alsoappreciated. Due to persistent andprofuse vaginal bleeding, petitioneradvised Editha to undergo a Dilatationand Curettage Procedure (D&C) or"raspa." The procedure was performedby the petitioner and Editha wasdischarged the next day. On September16, 1994, Editha was once againbrought at the LMC, as she wassuffering from vomiting and severeabdominal pains. She was found to havea massive intra-abdominal hemorrhageand a ruptured uterus. Thus, Edithahad to undergo a procedure for

hysterectomy and as a result, she hasno more chance to bear a child.Respondents: first, petitioner’sfailure to check up, visitor administer medication on Edithaduring her first day of confinement atthe LMC; second, petitionerrecommended that a D&C procedure beperformed on Editha without conductingany internal examination prior to theprocedure; third, petitionerimmediately suggested a D&C procedureinstead of closely monitoring thestate of pregnancy of Editha.Petitioner: it was Editha’s grossnegligence and/or omission ininsisting to be discharged againstdoctor’s advice and her unjustifiedfailure to return for check-up asdirected by petitioner thatcontributed to her life-threateningcondition on; that Editha’shysterectomy was brought about by hervery abnormal pregnancy knownas placenta increta, which was anextremely rare and very unusual caseof abdominal placental implantation;that whether or not a D&C procedurewas done by her or any other doctor,there would be no difference at allbecause at any stage of gestationbefore term, the uterus would rupturejust the same.

RULING: Medical malpractice is aparticular form of negligence whichconsists in the failure of a physicianor surgeon to apply to his practice ofmedicine that degree of care and skillwhich is ordinarily employed by theprofession generally, under similarconditions, and in like surroundingcircumstances. There are four elementsinvolved in medical negligence cases:duty, breach, injury and proximatecausation. In the present case,respondents did not present any experttestimony to support their claim thatpetitioner failed to do somethingwhich a reasonably prudent physicianor surgeon would have done.Petitioner, on the other hand,presented the testimony of Dr. AugustoM. Manalo, who was clearly an experton the subject. He testified that therupture occurred minutes prior to thehysterectomy or right upon admissionon September 15, 1994 which is about 1½ months after the patient wasdischarged, after the D&C wasconducted. It is evident that the D&Cprocedure was not the proximate causeof the rupture of Editha’s uterus. Thedefenses in an action for damages,provided for under Article 2179 of theCivil Code are:

Art. 2179. When the plaintiff’s ownnegligence was the immediate andproximate cause of his injury hecannot recover damages. But if hisnegligence was only contributory, theimmediate and proximate cause of theinjury being the defendant’s lack ofdue care, the plaintiff may recoverdamages, but the courts shall mitigatethe damages to be awarded. Proximatecause has been defined as that which,in natural and continuous sequence,unbroken by any efficient interveningcause, produces injury, and withoutwhich the result would not haveoccurred. An injury or damage isproximately caused by an act or afailure to act, whenever it appearsfrom the evidence in the case that theact or omission played a substantialpart in bringing about or actuallycausing the injury or damage; and thatthe injury or damage was either adirect result or a reasonably probableconsequence of the act or omission.The Court notes the findings of theBoard of Medicine: When complainantwas discharged on July 31,1994, hereinrespondent advised her to return onAugust 4, 1994 or four (4) days afterthe D&C. This advise was clear in

complainant’s Discharge Sheet.However, complainant failed to do so.This being the case, the chain ofcontinuity as required in order thatthe doctrine of proximate cause can bevalidly invoked was interrupted. Hadshe returned, the respondent couldhave examined her thoroughly.Contributory negligence is the act oromission amounting to want of ordinarycare on the part of the personinjured, which, concurring with thedefendant’s negligence, is theproximate cause of the injury.Difficulty seems to be apprehended indeciding which acts of the injuredparty shall be considered immediatecauses of the accident. Where theimmediate cause of an accidentresulting in an injury is theplaintiff’s own act, which contributedto the principal occurrence as one ofits determining factors, he cannotrecover damages for the injury.

10. PETER PAUL PATRICK LUCAS, FATIMAGLADYS LUCAS, ABBEYGAIL LUCAS ANDGILLIAN LUCAS, Petitioners, v. DR.PROSPERO MA. C. TUAÑO, Respondent.Lucas v. Tuaño, G.R. No. 178763, April21, 2009 Facts: The petitioners, Peter Lucasand his family, is suingrespondent,Dr. Prospero Ma. C.Tuaño,

for damages due to medical malpracticeon the grounds thatTuaño was negligentintreating Lucas’ conjunctivitis or“sore eyes” which led to glaucomawhich in turn made himirritable andunable to support his family. LucasconsultedTuaño when he had severepainin his right eye to which therespondent performed an ocular routineexamination where hediagnosed Lucas tobe suffering conjunctivitis or “soreeyes” which developed EpidemicKeratoConjunctivitis (EKC), a viralinfection to whichTuañoprescribed asteroid-basedeye drop called Maxitrolwhich Lucas was using before. Lucascouldn’t get a hold ofMaxitrolsoTuañosuggested Blephamide insteadwhich was also steroid-based andLucaslater used Maxitrol when itbecame available. Later on, FatimaLucas, the wife, found outfrom theaccompanying literature of themedicine that prolonged use ofsteroid-basedmedication can result toglaucoma. Lucas’s right eye painreduced for a while but lateronreturned and it became severethatTuaño referred him to anotherophthalmologist, Dr.Manuel B. Agulto,for a second opinion to which Dr.ManielAgulto wrote a lettertoTuañostating the Lucas sustainedsignificant glaucoma damage.TheRegional Trial Court denied thepetitioners’ claim for damages duetoinsufficient evidence provingTuaño’smedical malpractice in treating Lucas

because theyfailed to present amedical expert that could supporttheir claim that whatTuañodidwasindeed medical malpractice.Petitioners appealed to the Court ofAppeals to which the courtaffirmed theRegional Trial Court’s decision.Hence, the petitioners appealed to theSupremeCourt.  Issue:Whether respondent Dr. ProsperoMa. C. Tuaño is guilty ofmedicalmalpractice.

Ruling:The Supreme Court ruled thatrespondent,Dr. Prospero Ma. C. Tuaño,is not guiltyof medical malpractice.The Supreme Court emphasizes that inorder for medical malpractice to beproven, amedical expert should be awitness to attest to the accused’smedical malpractice.Petitioners’complaint for damages is merely basedon a statement in the literatureofMaxitrol identifying the risks ofits use and Dr. Agulto’s comment.In this type of suit, the patient orhis heirs, in order to prevail,is required to prove by preponderanceof evidence that the physicianfailed to exercise that degreeof skill, care, and learning possessedby other persons in the sameprofession; and that as a proximateresult of such failure, the patient orhis heirs suffered damages. Just aswith the elements of duty and breachof the same, in order to establish the

proximate cause [of the injury] bya preponderance of the evidence ina medical malpractice action,the patient must similarly use experttestimony, because the question ofwhether the alleged professionalnegligence caused the patient‘s injuryis generally one for specializedexpert knowledge beyond the knowledgeof the average layperson; using thespecialized knowledge and training ofhis field, theexpert‘s role is topresent to the court a realisticassessment of the likelihood that thephysician‘s alleged negligence causedthe patient‘s injury.The medicalexpert setsa standard and when thereis failure to present one, the courtshave no standard by which togauge thebasic issue of breach thereof by thephysician or surgeon.  The deference of courts to the expertopinion of qualified physicians orsurgeons stems from the former‘srealization that the latter possessunusual technical skills which laymenin most instances are incapable ofintelligently evaluating; hence, theindispensability of experttestimonies.

The qualifications of a physician aretaken into account and there isinevitable presumption that he takes the necessary precaution and employs the best of his knowledgeand skill inattending to his clients, unless the

contrary is sufficiently established.Therefore,a medical expert as awitness in essential in medicalmalpractice cases to give light totheerrors of the accused. Also, itserves as a reminder for people in themedical field to becautious and takethe necessary precautions whenattending to their clients to avoidmedicalmalpractice.

11. G.R. No. 124354. December 29, 1999ROGELIO E. RAMOS and ERLINDA RAMOSvs.COURT OF APPEALSKAPUNAN, J.:

FACTS: Erlinda Ramos, 47-year old robust woman underwent on an operationto the stone at her gall bladder removed after being tested that she was fit for "cholecystectomy” operation performed by Dr. OrlinoHozaka.  Dr. Hosaka charged a fee of P16,000.00, which was to include the anesthesiologist's fee andwhich was to be paid after the operation.  He assured Rogelio E. Ramos, husband that he will get a good anesthesiologist who was Dra. Perfecta Gutierrez.  Erlinda's hand was held by Herminda Cruz, her sister -in-law who was the Dean of the College of Nursing at the Capitol Medical Center together with her husband went down with her to the operating room. 

Instead of 9:30 am, Dr. Hosaka arrivedat about 12:15 P.M.Herminda noticing what Dra. Perfecta Gutierrez was doing, saw the nailbed of Erlinda becoming bluish and Dr. Hosaka called for another anesthesiologist  Dr. Calderon.  

She went out of the operating room to tell Rogelio that something is wrong. When she went back she saw Erlinda in a trendelenburg position and at 3 p.m.she was taken to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU) where she stayed for a month due to bronchospasm incurring P93,542.25 and she was sincethen comatosed. 

She suffered brain damage as a result of the absence of oxygen in her brain for four to five minutes. 

She was also diagnosed to be sufferingfrom "diffuse cerebral parenchymal damage" Monthly expenses ranged from P8,000 toP10,000. Spouses Ramos and their minors filed against Dr. Hosaka and Dra. Perfecta Gutierrez.

The trial court favored the Ramos' awarding P8,000 as actual monthly expenses totalling to P632,000 as of April 15, 1992, P100,000 atty. fees, P800,000 moral damages,P200,000 exemplary damages and cost of suit. The appellate court reversed ordering the Ramos' to

pay their unpaid bills of P93,542.25 plus interest.

ISSUE: Whether respondents were negligent and liable.

RULING: YES. Private respondents were all negligent and are solidarily liable for the damages.

Res ipsa loquitur – a procedural or evidentiary rule which means “the thing or the transaction speaks for itself.” It is a maxim for the rule that the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding circumstances, may permit an inferenceor raise a presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiff’s prima facie case, and present a question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation, where ordinarily in a medical malpractice case, the complaining party must present expert testimony to prove that the attending physician was negligent.

This doctrine finds application in this case. On the day of the operation, Erlinda Ramos already surrendered her person to the private respondents who had complete and exclusive control over her. Apart fromthe gallstone problem, she was neurologically sound and fit. Then, after the procedure, she was comatose and brain damaged—res ipsa loquitur—the thing speaks for itself!

Negligence – Private respondents were not able to disprove the presumption of negligence on their part in the care of Erlinda and their negligence was the proximate cause of her condition. One need not be an anesthesiologist in order to tell whether or not the intubation was a success. [resipsa loquitur applies here]. The Supreme Court also found that the anesthesiologist only saw Erlinda for the first time on the day of the operation which indicates unfamiliarity with the patient and which is an act of negligence and irresponsibility.

The head surgeon, Dr. Hosaka was also negligent. He failed to exercise the proper authority as the “captain of the ship” in determining if the anesthesiologist observed the proper protocols. Also, because he was late, he did not have time to confer with the anesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia delivery.

The hospital failed to adduce evidenceshowing that it exercised the diligence of a good father of the family in hiring and supervision of its doctors (Art. 2180). The hospital was negligent since they are the one in control of the hiring and firing oftheir “consultants”. While these consultants are not employees, hospitals still exert significant

controls on the selection and termination of doctors who work there which is one of the hallmarks of an employer-employee reationship. Thus, the hospital was allocated a share in the liability.

#12 December 23, 1914 JUAN BERNARDO, plaintiff-appellant, vs. M. B. LEGASPI, defendant-appellee G.R. No. L-9308

Facts:This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila dismissing the complaint on the meritsfiled in an action to recover damages for injuries sustained by plaintiff's automobile by reason of defendant's negligence in causing a collision between his automobile and that of plaintiff. The court in its judgment also dismissed a cross-complaint filedby the defendant, praying for damages against the plaintiff on the ground that the injuries sustained by the defendant's automobile in the collision referred to, as well as those to plaintiff's machine, were caused by the negligence of the plaintiff in handling his automobile.

Issue:Whether the negligence of the plaintiff extinguishes the charge against the defendant.

Ruling :The court found upon the evidence that both the plaintiff and the defendant were negligent in handling their automobiles and that said negligence was of such a character and extent on the part of both as to prevent either from recovering.

The law applicable to the facts also requires an affirmance of the judgmentappealed from. Where the plaintiff in a negligence action, by his own carelessness contributes to the principal occurrence, that is, to the accident, as one of the determining causes thereof, he cannot recover. This is equally true of the defendant;and as both of them, by their negligent acts, contributed to the determining cause of the accident, neither can recover.

13. PLDT v. CA GR. no. 57079September 29, 1989

Facts: This case had its inception inan action for damages instituted inthe former Court of First Instance ofNegros Occidental  by privaterespondent spouses against petitioner

Philippine Long Distance TelephoneCompany (PLDT, for brevity) for theinjuries they sustained in the eveningof July 30, 1968 when their jeep ranover a mound of earth and fell into anopen trench, an excavation allegedlyundertaken by PLDT for theinstallation of its undergroundconduit system. The complaint allegedthat respondent Antonio Esteban failedto notice the open trench which wasleft uncovered because of the creepingdarkness and the lack of any warninglight or signs. As a result of theaccident, respondent Gloria Estebanallegedly sustained injuries on herarms, legs and face, leaving apermanent scar on her cheek, while therespondent husband suffered cut lips.In addition, the windshield of thejeep was shattered. It was found thatthe plaintif husband drived withdimmed lights despite the drizzle andhe also ran quite fast as suggested bythe tiremarks.

Issue: Whether or not PLDT acted withnegligence, to the injury of theSpouses Esteban.

Ruling: No. The above findings clearlyshow that the negligence of respondentAntonio Esteban was not onlycontributory to his injuries and thoseof his wife but goes to the very causeof the occurrence of the accident, asone of its determining factors, andthereby precludes their right to

recover damages. The perils of theroad were known to, hence appreciatedand assumed by, private respondents.By exercising reasonable care andprudence, respondent Antonio Estebancould have avoided the injuriousconsequences of his act, evenassuming arguendo that there was somealleged negligence on the part ofpetitioner.

 It is basic that private respondentscannot charge PLDT for their injurieswhere their own failure to exercisedue and reasonable care was the causethereof. It is both a societal normand necessity that one should exercisea reasonable degree of caution for hisown protection. Furthermore,respondent Antonio Esteban had thelast clear chance or opportunity toavoid the accident, notwithstandingthe negligence he imputes topetitioner PLDT. As a resident ofLacson Street, he passed on thatstreet almost everyday and hadknowledge of the presence and locationof the excavations there. It was hisnegligence that exposed him and hiswife to danger; hence he is solelyresponsible for the consequences ofhis imprudence.

A person claiming damages for thenegligence of another has the burdenof proving the existence of such faultor negligence causative thereof. Thefacts constitutive of negligence must

be affirmatively established bycompetent evidence.  Whosoever relieson negligence for his cause of actionhas the burden in the first instanceof proving the existence of the sameif contested, otherwise his actionmust fail.

14.EN BANC

[G.R. No.L-8328. May 18, 1956.]

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, Petitioner, vs. SOTERO REMOQUILLO, in his own behalf and as guardian of the minors MANUEL, BENJAMIN, NESTOR, MILAGROS, CORAZON, CLEMENTE and AURORA, all surnamed MAGNO, SALUD MAGNO, and the COURT OF APPEALS (Second Division), Respondents.

Montemayor J.

FACTS: On August 22, 1950, Efren Magnowent to the 3-story house of Antonio Peñaloza, his stepbrother, located on Rodriguez Lanuza Street, Manila, to repair a “media agua” said to be in a leaking condition. The “media agua” was just below the window of the thirdstory. Standing on said “media agua”, Magno received from his son thru that window a 3’ X 6’ galvanized iron sheetto cover the leaking portion, turned around and in doing so the lower end of the iron sheet came into contact with the electric wire of the Manila

Electric Company (later referred to asthe Company) strung parallel to the edge of the “media agua” and 2 1/2 feet from it, causing his death by electrocution. His widow and children fled suit to recover damages from the company.

trial court rendered judgment in theirfavor CA affirmed:(MANILA electric lost)

ISSUE: WON CA CORRECT? NO company absolved

HELD: the death of Magno was primarilycaused by his own negligence and in some measure by the too close proximity of the “media agua” or rather its edge to the electric wire of the company by reason of the violation of the original permit givenby the city and the subsequent approval of said illegal construction of the “media agua”.

the house owner disregarding the permit, exceeded the one meter fixed by the same by 17 3/8 inches and leaving only a distance of 2 1/2 feet between the (3 feet was the distance provided by the ordinance) “Media agua” as illegally constructed and theelectric wires.

added to this violation of the permit by the house owner, was its approval

by the city through its agent, possibly an inspector.

Consequently, we may not hold said company as guilty of negligence or wanting in due diligence in failing toinsulate said wires. As to their proximity to the house it is to be supposed that distance of 3 feet was considered sufficiently safe by the technical men of the city such as its electrician or engineer.

Plaintiff’s own act was the proximate andprincipal cause of the accident which inflicted the injury in turning around and swinging the galvanized iron sheet without taking any precaution, such as looking back toward the street and at the wire to avoid its contacting said iron sheet, considering the latter’s length of 6 feet.“A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause andthe injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, suchcondition was not the proximate cause.

And if an independent negligent act ordefective condition sets into operation the circumstances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause.

the City of Manila authorities and theelectric company could get together and devise means of minimizing this danger to the public. Just as the establishment of pedestrian lanes in city thoroughfares may greatly minimize danger to pedestrians becausedrivers of motor vehicles may expect danger and slow down or even stop and take other necessary precaution upon approaching said lanes, so, a similar way may possibly be found. Since thesehigh voltage wires cannot be properly insulated and at reasonable cost, theymight perhaps be strung only up to theoutskirts of the city where there are few houses and few pedestrians and there step-down to a voltage where thewires carrying the same to the city could be properly insulated for the better protection of the public.

15. M.H. Rakes vs The Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Company

Facts:The plaintiff, one of a gang of eight negro laborers in the employmentof the defendant, was at work transporting iron rails from a barge

in the harbor to the company's yard near the malecon in Manila. Plaintiff claims that but one hand car was used in this work. The defendant has provedthat there were two immediately following one another, upon which werepiled lengthwise seven rails, each weighing 560 pounds, so that the ends of the rails lay upon two crosspieces or sills secured to the cars, but without side pieces or guards to prevent them from slipping off. According to the testimony of the plaintiff, the men were either in the rear of the car or at its sides. According to that defendant, some of them were also in front, hauling by a rope. At a certain spot at or near thewater's edge the track sagged, the tiebroke, the car either canted or upset,the rails slid off and caught the plaintiff, breaking his leg, which wasafterwards amputated at about the knee.This first point for the plaintiff to establish was that the accident happened through the negligence of the defendant. The detailed description by the defendant's witnesses of the construction and quality of the track proves that if was up to the general stranded of tramways of that character, the foundation consisting

on land of blocks or crosspieces of wood, by 8 inches thick and from 8 to 10 feet long laid, on the surface of the ground, upon which at a right angle rested stringers of the same thickness, but from 24 to 30 feet in length. On the across the stringers the parallel with the blocks were the ties to which the tracks were fastened. After the road reached the water's edge, the blocks or crosspieces were replaced with pilling, capped by timbers extending from one side to the other. The trackswere each about 2 feet wide and the two inside rails of the parallel tracks about 18 inches apart. It was admitted that there were no side pieces or guards on the car; that where no ends of the rails of the track met each other and also where the stringers joined, there were no fish plates. the defendant has not effectually overcome the plaintiff's proof that the joints between the rails were immediately above the joints between the underlying stringers.

Issue:Whether MH Rakes contributory negligence will bar the action .

Holding:No, contributory negligence ofthe party injured will not defeat the

action if it be shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the consequences of the injured party's negligence.There are may cases in the supreme court of Spain in which the defendant was exonerated, but when analyzed they prove to have been decided either uponthe point that he was not negligent orthat the negligence of the plaintiff was the immediate cause of the casualty or that the accident was due to casus fortuitus. Of the first class in the decision of January 26, 1887 (38Jurisprudencia Criminal, No. 70), in which a railway employee, standing on a car, was thrown therefrom and killed by the shock following the backing up of the engine. It was held that the management of the train and engine being in conformity with properrules of the company, showed no fault on its part.Of the second class are the decision of the 15th of January, the 19th of February, and the 7th of March, 1902, stated in Alcubilla's Index of that year; and of the third class the decision of the 4th of June,1888 (64Jurisprudencia Civil, No. 1), in which the breaking down of plaintiff's dam by the logs of the defendant impelled against it by the

Tajo River, was held due to a freshet as a fortuitous cause.The decision of the 7th of March, 1902, on which stress has been laid, rested on two bases, one, that the defendant was notnegligent, because expressly relieved by royal order from the common obligation imposed by the police law of maintaining a guard at the road crossing; the other, because the act of the deceased in driving over level ground with unobstructed view in frontof a train running at speed, with the engine whistle blowing was the determining cause of the accident. It is plain that the train was doing nothing but what it had a right to do and that the only fault lay with the injured man. His negligence was not contributory, it was sole, and was of such an efficient nature that without it no catastrophe could have happened.Article 568 of the latter code provides:

He who shall execute through reckless negligence an act that if done with malice would constitute a grave crime,shall be punished.And article 590 provides that the following shall be punished:Those who by simple imprudence or negligence, without committing any infraction of regulations, shall cause

an injury which, had malice intervened, would have constituted a crime or misdemeanor.The cour de cassation held that the carelessness of the victim did not civilly relieve the person without whose fault the accident could not have happened, but that the contributory negligence of the injuredman had the effect only of reducing the damages. Austrian Code provides that the victimwho is partly changeable with the accident shall stand his damages in proportion to his fault, but when thatproportion is incapable of ascertainment, he shall share the liability equally with the person principally responsible.And finally byarticles 19 and 20, the liability of owners and employers for the faults oftheir servants and representatives is declared to be civil and subsidiary inits character.he contributory negligence of the injured man had the effect only of reducing the damages. The French law, held that contributorynegligence did not exonerate the defendants whose fault had been the immediate cause of the accident, but entitled him to a reduction of damages. Other similar cases in the provincial courts have been overruled by appellate tribunals made up of common law judges drawn from other provinces, who have preferred to impose uniformally throughout the

Dominion the English theory of contributory negligence.the judgment of the trial court, Court ruled in Favor of MH Rakes but modified the award.

16. MAO-AO SUGAR V. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Julio Famoso was riding with a co-employee with the caboose or “carbonera” of Ply-mouth No. 12, a cargo train of Mao-ao Sugar Central Co., Inc. when the locomotive was suddenly derailed. Famoso and his companion jumped off to escape injury,but the train fell on its side, caughthis legs by its wheels, pinned him down and he died. Because claims for death and other benefits were denied by Mao-ao, HerminiaFamoso field a suit. The trial court ruled in her favor but deducted 25% from the total damages awarded because of Julio’s contributory negligence. This was sustained by the appellate court except as to the contributory negligence of the deceased and disallowed the deduction.

ISSUE: whether Julio was guilty of contributory negligence

RULING: No. Contributory negligence has been defined as "the act or

omission amounting to want of ordinarycare on the part of the person injuredwhich, concurring with the defendant'snegligence, is the proximate cause of the injury." It has been held that "to hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he performed an act thatbrought about his injuries in disregard of warnings or signs of an impending danger to health and body." There is no showing that the caboose where Famoso was riding was a dangerous place and that he recklesslydared to stay there despite warnings or signs of impending danger.

17. [G.R. No. 130003. October 20, 2004]

JONAS ANONUEVO, petitioner vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and JEROME VILLAGRACIA, respondent

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE

FACTS: The present petition seeks to bar recovery by an injured cyclist of damages from the driver of the car which had struck him.

The accident in question occurred at the intersection of Boni Avenue and Barangka Drive in Mandaluyong. Villagracia was traveling along Boni Avenue on his bicycle, while Aonuevo,

traversing the opposite lane was driving his Lancer car with plate number PJJ 359. The car was owned by Procter and Gamble Inc., the employer of Aonuevos brother, Jonathan. Aonuevowas in the course of making a left turn towards Libertad Street when the collision occurred. Villagracia sustained serious injuries as a result, which necessitated his hospitalization several times in 1989,and forced him to undergo four (4) operations.

Villagracia instituted an action for damages against Procter and Gamble Phils., Inc. and Aonuevo before the RTC. He had also filed a criminal complaint against Aonuevo before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong, but the latter was subsequently acquitted of the criminalcharge.

Anonuevo insisted that Villagracia’s own fault and negligence served to absolve the former of any liability for damages. Anonuevo pointed out thatVillagracia’s bicycle had no safety gadgets such as a horn or bell, or headlights, as required by a 1984 municipal ordinance, nor was it duly registered with the Office of the Municipal Treasurer, as required by the same ordinance. Furthermore, as admitted by Villagracia, his bicycle did not have foot brakes. Villagracia did not dispute these allegations but directed the Court’s attention to the

findings of Anonuevo’s own negligence.Villagracia contended that, assuming there was contributory negligence on his part, such would not exonerate Anonuevo from payment of damages.

ISSUE:WON Villagracias own fault and negligence serves to absolve the Anonuevo of any liability for damages.

HELD:The court held that Villagracia was not guilty of contributory negligence. Itexplained:

To hold a person as having contributedto his injuries, it must be shown thathe performed an act that brought abouthis injuries in disregard of warnings or signs of an impending danger to health and body.[60] To prove contributory negligence, it is still necessary to establish a causal link, although not proximate, between the negligence of the party and the succeeding injury. In a legal sense, negligence is contributory only when it contributes proximately to the injury, and not simply a condition forits occurrence.[61]

18. G.R. No. 165969November 27, 2008 NATIONAL POWERCORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HEIRSOF NOBLE CASIONAN, respondents.

FACTS: NkbleCasionan worked as apocket miner in Dalicno, Ampucao,Itogon, Benguet.

Sometime in the1970’s, petitioner NPC installedhightension electrical transmissionlines of 69 kilovolts (KV)traversing the trail. Eventually,some of the transmission linessagged and dangled reducing theirdistance from the ground to onlyabout eight to ten feet. Thisposed a great threat to passersbywho were exposed to the danger ofelectrocution especially during thewet season. The danger it may causewas called for by the Mayor though aletter sent to NPC.

On June 27, 1995,Noble and his co-pocket miner,Melchor Jimenez, were at Dalicno.They cut two bamboo poles fortheir pocket mining. Noble carriedthe shorter pole while Melchorcarried the longer pole. Noblewalked ahead as both passedthrough the trail underneath theNPC high tension transmissionlines on their way to their workplace. As Noble was going uphilland turning left on a curve, thetip of the bamboo pole he was

carrying touched one of thedangling high tension wires.Melchor, who was walking behindhim, narrated that he heard abuzzing sound when the tip ofNoble’s pole touched the wire foronly about one or two seconds.Thereafter, he saw Noble fall tothe ground. Melchor rushed toNoble and shook him but thelatter was already dead. As suchparents of Noble filed a complaintagainst NPC.

NPC denied being negligent inmaintaining the safety of thehigh tension transmission lines.

RTC favored heirs of casionan. Onappeal, ca sustained its decision.Hence, this petition.

Petitioner contends that the merepresence of the high tensionwires above the trail did notcause the victim’s death. Instead,it was Noble’s negligent carryingof the bamboo pole that causedhis death. It insists that Noblewas negligent when he allowed thebamboo pole he was carrying totouch the high tension wires.This is especially true becauseother people traversing the trail

have not been similarlyelectrocuted.

ISSUE: Whether Noble is guilty ofcontributory negligence as such damageshould be deleted?

RULING: NO. Negligence is thefailure to observe, for theprotection of the interest ofanother person, that degree ofcare, precaution, and vigilancewhich the circumstances justlydemand, whereby such other personsuffers injury.11 On the otherhand, contributory negligence isconduct on the part of the injuredparty, contributing as a legalcause to the harm he hassuffered, which falls below thestandard which he is required toconform for his own protection.12There is contributory negligencewhen the party’s act showed lackof ordinary care and foresightthat such act could cause himharm or put his life in danger.

If indeed there was contributorynegligence on the part of thevictim, then it is proper toreduce the award for damages. Thisis in consonance with the CivilCode provision that liability will

be mitigated in consideration ofthe contributory negligence of theinjured party. Article 2179 of theCivil Code

In Ma-ao Sugar Central, it washeld that to hold a person ashaving contributed to his injuries,it must be shown that heperformed an act that broughtabout his injuries in disregard ofwarnings or signs on an impendingdanger to health and body. ThisCourt held then that the victimwas not guilty of contributorynegligence as there was no showingthat the caboose where he wasriding was a dangerous place andthat he recklessly dared to staythere despite warnings or signs ofimpending danger.16 In this case,the trail where Noble waselectrocuted was regularly used bymembers of the community. Therewere no warning signs to informpassersby of the impending dangerto their lives should theyaccidentally touch the hightension wires. Also, the trail wasthe only viable way from Daliconto Itogon. Hence, Noble shouldnot be faulted for simply doing

what was ordinary routine toother workers in the area.

19. M.H. Rakes vs. The Atlantic Gulf

7 Phil. 359 – Civil Law – Torts and Damages –Kinds of Fault

M.H. Rakes was a black man working asa laborer for Atlantic Gulf in theearly 1900s. One day, they wereworking in the company’s yard and theywere transporting heavy rails usingtwo cars (karitons?); each car carryingthe opposite ends of the rails. Thecars were pulled by rope from thefront and other workers are pushingthe cars from behind. There were noside guards installed on the sides ofthe cars but the rails were secured byropes. The track where the cars movewere also weakened by a previoustyphoon. It was alleged thatAtlantic’s foreman was notified ofsaid damage in the tracks but the samewere left unrepaired. While the carswere being moved and when it reachedthe depressed portion of the track,and while Rakes was beside one of thecars, the ropes gave in and the railsslipped thereby crushing his leg andcausing it to be amputated. Rakes suedAtlantic Gulf and he won; he was

awarded 5,000 pesos for damages($2,500).

Atlantic assailed the decision of thelower court alleging that theyspecifically ordered their workers tobe walking only before or after thecars and not on the side of the carsbecause the cars have no side guardsto protect them in case the railswould slip. Atlantic also alleged thatRakes should be suing the foreman asit was him who neglected to have thetracks repaired; that Rakes himselfwas negligent for having known of thedepression on the track yet hecontinued to work.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atlantic iscivilly liable.

HELD: Yes. Rakes as per the evidencecould not have  known of the damage inthe track as it was another employeewho swore he notified the foremanabout said damage. Further, his lackof caution in continuing to work isnot of a gross nature as to constitutenegligence on his part. On the otherhand though, Rakes contributorynegligence can be inferred from thefact that he was on the side of thecars when in fact there were ordersfrom the company barring workers from

standing near the side of the cars.His disobedient to this order does notbar his recovery of damages though;the Supreme Court instead reduced theaward of damages from 5,000 pesos to2,500 pesos.

In this case, the SC also elucidatedthe two kinds of culpa which are:

1. Culpa as substantive and independent,which on account of its originarises in an obligation betweentwo persons not formerly boundby any other obligation; may bealso considered as a real sourceof an independent obligation(extra-contractual or culpaaquiliana).

2. Culpa as an incident in the performanceof an obligation which cannot bepresumed to exist without theother, and which increases theliability arising from thealready existing obligation(contractual or culpacontractual).

20. [G.R. NO. 160709 : February 23,2005]

NELEN LAMBERT, assisted by herhusband, GLENROY ALOYSUIS LAMBERT,Petitioners, v. HEIRS OF RAYCASTILLON, Represented by MARILOU T.CASTILLON and SERGIO LABANG,Respondents.

Facts:In the evening of January13, 1991, Ray Castillon visited thehouse of his brother Joel Castillon atTambo,Iligan City and borrowed hismotorcycle. He then invited hisfriend, Sergio Labang, to roamaroundIligan City. Ray drovethe motorcycle with Sergio as thebackrider.At around past 10:00 p.m.,after eating supper at Hona’sRestaurant and imbibing a bottle ofbeer, theytraversed the highwaytowards Tambo at a high speed. Uponreaching Brgy.Sto. Rosario, theyfiguredin an accident with aTamarawjeepney, owned by petitionerNelen Lambert and driven byReynaldoGamot, which was travelingon the same direction but made asudden left turn. The incidentresulted inthe instantaneous death ofRay and injuries toSergio.Respondents, the heirs of RayCastillon, thus filed an action fordamages with prayer forpreliminaryattachment against thepetitioner Nelen Lambert. Thecomplaint was subsequently amended toincludethe claim by Joel Castillon forthe damages caused to themotorcycle.On June 29, 1993, after afull-blown trial, the courtaquorendered a decision in favor of theCastillonheirs but reduced Lambert’sliability by 20% in view ofthe contributory negligence of Ray. Onthe claimof Joel Castillon, theevidence shows that he is not the real

owner of the motorcycle. He is not therealparty in interest. Accordingly,his complaint is dismissed.The Courtof Appeals affirmed the decision ofthe trial court.

Issue:Does the act of tailgating merely constitute contributory negligence?(Lambert insists that the negligence ofRay Castillon was the proximate causeof his unfortunate deathand thereforeshe is not liable for damages.)

Held:Yes.The SC found it equitable toincrease the ratio of apportionment ofdamages on account of thevictim’snegligence. Article 2179 reads as follows:When the plaintiff’s negligence wasthe immediate and proximate cause ofhis injury, he cannotrecoverdamages. But if his negligencewas only contributory, the immediateand proximate cause of the injurybeingthe defendant’s lack of due care, theplaintiff may recover damages, but thecourts shall mitigatethe damages to beawarded.The underlying precept oncontributory negligence is that aplaintiff who is partly responsiblefor hisown injury should not beentitled to recover damages in fullbut must bear the consequences of hisownnegligence. The defendant must thusbe held liable only for the damagesactually caused by hisnegligence.

The determination of the mitigation ofthe defendant’s liability variesdepending on thecircumstances of eachcase. In the case at bar, itwas established that Ray, at the timeof the mishap: (1)was driving themotorcycle at a high speed; (2) wastailgating the Tamarawjeepney; (3)has imbibed oneor two bottles ofbeer; and (4) was not wearing aprotective helmet.

These circumstances, althoughnotconstituting the proximate cause ofhis demise and injury to Sergio,contributed to the sameresult. Thecontribution of these circumstancesare all considered and determined interms ofpercentages of the totalcause. Hence, pursuant toRakes v. AG &P, the heirs of Ray Castillonshallrecover damages only up to 50% ofthe award. In other words, 50% of thedamage shall be borne by theprivaterespondents; the remaining 50% shallbe paid by the petitioner.

21. G.R. No. 169891             November 2, 2006PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYSvs.ETHEL BRUNTY and JUAN MANUEL M. GARCIACALLEJO, SR., J.:

FACTS: RhondaBrunty, daughter of respondent Ethel Brunty and an American citizen, came to the

Philippines for a visit sometime in January 1980. Prior to her departure, she, together with her Filipino host Juan Manuel M. Garcia, traveled to Baguio City on board a Mercedes Benz sedan with plate number FU 799, drivenby Rodolfo L. Mercelita. It was about 12:00 midnight, January 25, 1980. By then, PNR Train No. T-71, driven by Alfonso Reyes, was on its way to Tutuban, Metro Manila as it had left the La Union station at 11:00 p.m., January 24, 1980.

By 2:00 a.m., Rhonda Brunty, Garcia and Mercelita were already approachingthe railroad crossing at Barangay Rizal, Moncada, Tarlac. Mercelita, driving at approximately 70 km/hr, drove past a vehicle, unaware of the railroad track up ahead and that they were about to collide with PNR Train No. T-71. Mercelita was instantly killed when the Mercedes Benz smashed into the train; the two other passengers suffered serious physical injuries. A certain James Harrow brought Rhonda Brunty to the Central Luzon Doctor’s Hospital in Tarlac, where she was pronounced dead after ten minutes from arrival. Garcia, who had suffered severe head injuries, wasbrought via ambulance to the same hospital. He was transferred to the Manila Doctor’s Hospital, and later tothe Makati Medical Center for further treatment.

Ethel Brunty filed a complaint for damages against the PNR before the RTCof Manila. The case was raffled to Branch 20 and was docketed as Civil Case No. 83-18645. They alleged that the death of Mercelita and Rhonda Brunty, as well as the physical injuries suffered by Garcia, were the direct and proximate result of the gross and reckless negligence of PNR in not providing the necessary equipment at the railroad crossing in Barangay Rizal, Municipality of Moncada, Tarlac. They pointed out thatthere was no flagbar or red light signal to warn motorists who were about to cross the railroad track, andthat the flagman or switchman was onlyequipped with a hand flashlight. The Court of Manila ruled in favor of Brunty and the CA affirmed the ruling of the court of first instance, hence this petition for review.

ISSUE: Whether Brunty and Mercelita has contributory negligence barring them for claiming damages.

RULING:No.Considering the circumstances prevailing at the time of the fatal accident, it ruled that the alleged safety measures installed by the PNR at the railroad crossing were not merely inadequate – they did not satisfy the well-settled safety standards in transportation. However, we do not agree with the RTC’s findings on the contributory negligence of Mercelita, the driver of

the Mercedes Benz. It held that Mercelita could not have foreseen the harm that would befall him and the twoother passengers under the prevailing circumstances, thus, could not be considered guilty of contributory negligence.

Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do.In Corlissv. Manila Railroad Company,this Court held that negligence is want of the care required by the circumstances. Itis a relative or comparative, not an absolute, term and its application depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require.In determining whether or not there is negligence on the part of the parties in a given situation, jurisprudence has laid downthe following test: Did defendant, in doing the alleged negligent act, use that reasonable care and caution whichan ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, the person is guilty of negligence. The law, in effect, adoptsthe standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet pater familias of the Roman law.

Article 2176. Whoever, by act or omission, causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

In a long line of cases, the Court held that in order to sustain a claim based on quasi-delict, the following requisites must concur: (1) damage to plaintiff; (2) negligence, by act or omission, of which defendant, or some person for whose acts he must respond was guilty; and (3) connection of cause and effect between such negligence and damage.

#22 GREGORIO GENOBIAGON, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES, respondents G.R. No. L-40452 October 12, 1989

Facts:A rig driven by appellant bumpedan old woman who was crossing T. Padilla St., Cebu City, at the right side of T. Padilla Market. The appellant's rig was following another at a distance of two meters. The old woman started to cross when the first rig was approaching her, but as appellant's vehicle was going so fast not only because of the steep down-grade of the road, but also because he

was trying to overtake the rig ahead of him, the appellant's rig bumped theold woman, who as a consequence, fell at the middle of the road. The appellant continued to drive on, but aby-stander, one Vicente Mangyao, who just closed his store in market in order to celebrate the coming of the New Year, and who saw the incident right before him, shouted at the appellant to stop. He ran after appellant when the latter refused to stop. Overtaking the appellant, Mangyao asked him why he bumped the old woman and his answer was, 'it was the old woman that bumped him.' The appellant went back to the place wherethe old woman was struck by his rig. The old woman was unconscious, and thefood and viands she was carrying were scattered on her body. The victim was then loaded in a jeep and brought to the hospital where she died three hours later. ). The trial court found petitioner guilty of the felony charged.

Issue:Whether the reckless negligence of the victim was the proximate cause of the accident which led to her death.

Ruling:The alleged contributory negligence of the victim, if any, does

not exonerate the accused. "The defense of contributory negligence does not apply in criminal cases committed through reckless imprudence,since one cannot allege the negligenceof another to evade the effects of hisown negligence.

23. Sicam v. Jorge GR no 159617August 8, 2007

Facts: Lulu V. Jorge (respondent Lulu)pawned several pieces of jewelrywith Agencia de R. C. Sicam. However,two armed men entered the pawnshop andtook away whatever cash and jewelrywere found inside the pawnshop vault.Petitioner Sicam sent respondent Lulua letter dated October 19, 1987informing her of the loss of herjewelry due to the robbery incident inthe pawnshop. Respondent Lulu thenwrote a letter to petitioner Sicamexpressing disbelief stating that whenthe robbery happened, all jewelrypawned were deposited with Far EastBank near the pawnshop since it hadbeen the practice that before theycould withdraw, advance notice must begiven to the pawnshop so it couldwithdraw the jewelry from the bank.Respondent Lulu then requestedpetitioner Sicam to prepare the pawnedjewelry for withdrawal but petitioner

Sicam failed to return the jewelry.Lulu filed a complaint against Sicambut Sicam cuntered that they exerciseddue diligence in protecting thejewelries. They contended that theRobbery cannot be foreseen.

Issue: Whether Sicam acted negligentlyto the injury of Jorge.

Ruling: Yes.Fortuitous events bydefinition are extraordinary eventsnot foreseeable or avoidable. It istherefore, not enough that the eventshould not have been foreseen oranticipated, as is commonly believedbut it must be one impossible toforesee or to avoid. The meredifficulty to foresee the happening isnot impossibility to foresee the same.

To constitute a fortuitous event, thefollowing elements must concur: (a)the cause of the unforeseen andunexpected occurrence or of thefailure of the debtor to comply withobligations must be independent ofhuman will; (b) it must be impossibleto foresee the event that constitutesthe caso fortuito or, if it can beforeseen, it must be impossible toavoid; (c) the occurrence must be suchas to render it impossible for thedebtor to fulfill obligations in anormal manner; and, (d) the obligormust be free from any participation in

the aggravation of the injury orloss. 

The burden of proving that the losswas due to a fortuitous event rests onhim who invokes it.And, in order for afortuitous event to exempt one fromliability, it is necessary that onehas committed no negligence ormisconduct that may have occasionedthe loss.

It has been held that an act of Godcannot be invoked to protect a personwho has failed to take steps toforestall the possible adverseconsequences of such a loss. One'snegligence may have concurred with anact of God in producing damage andinjury to another; nonetheless,showing that the immediate orproximate cause of the damage orinjury was a fortuitous event wouldnot exempt one from liability. Whenthe effect is found to be partly theresult of a person's participation --whether by active intervention,neglect or failure to act -- the wholeoccurrence is humanized and removedfrom the rules applicable to acts ofGod. 

. The very measures which petitionershad allegedly adopted show that tothem the possibility of robbery wasnot only foreseeable, but actuallyforeseen and anticipated. PetitionerSicam’s testimony, in effect,

contradicts petitioners’ defense offortuitous event.

Robbery per se, just like carnapping,is not a fortuitous event. It does notforeclose the possibility ofnegligence on the part of hereinpetitioners. The fact that a thing wasunlawfully and forcefully taken fromanother's rightful possession, as incases of carnapping, does notautomatically give rise to afortuitous event. To be considered assuch, carnapping entails more than themere forceful taking of another'sproperty. It must be proved andestablished that the event was an actof God or was done solely by thirdparties and that neither the claimantnor the person alleged to be negligenthas any participation. In accordancewith the Rules of Evidence, the burdenof proving that the loss was due to afortuitous event rests on him whoinvokes it — which in this case is theprivate respondent. 

24. G.R. No. L-45637 May 31, 1985

ROBERTO JUNTILLA, petitioner,

vs.

CLEMENTE FONTANAR, FERNANDO BANZON andBERFOL CAMORO, respondents.

Valentin A. Zozobrado for petitioner.

Ruperto N. Alfarara for respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

FACTS: the plaintiff was a passenger of the public utility jeepney on the course of the trip from Danao City to Cebu City. The jeepney was driven by defendant BerfolCamoro. It was registered under the franchise of defendant Clemente Fontanar but was actually owned by defendant Fernando Banzon. When the jeepney reached Mandaue City, the right rear tire exploded causing the vehicle to turn turtle. In the process, the plaintiff who was sitting at the front seat was thrown out of the vehicle. Upon landing on the ground, the plaintiff momentarily lost consciousness. When he came to his senses, he found that he had a lacerated wound on his right palm. Aside from this, he suffered injuries on his left arm, right thigh and on his back. (Exh. "D"). Because of his shock and injuries, he went back to Danao City but on the way, he discovered that his "Omega" wrist watch was lost. Upon his arrival in Danao City, he immediately entered theDanao City Hospital to attend to his injuries, and also requested his

father-in-law to proceed immediately to the place of the accident and look for the watch. In spite of the effortsof his father-in-law, the wrist watch,which he bought for P 852.70 could no longer be found.

Petitioner Roberto Juntilla filed breach of contract against Clemente Fontanar, Fernando Banzon and BerfolCamoro in city court of cebu. Respondent said such was beyond the control of the respondents taking intoaccount that the tire that exploded was newly bought and was only slightlyused at the time it blew up. Civil Court of Cebu rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner and against the respondents. Judge Leonardo B. Canares court of first instance cebureversed the judgment of the City Court of Cebu upon a finding that the accident in question was due to a fortuitous event.

ISSUE: WON it was FORTITOUS? NO

HELD: The records show that the passenger jeepney turned turtle and jumped into a ditch immediately after its right rear tire exploded. The evidence shows that the passenger jeepney was running at a very fast

speed before the accident. We agree with the observation of the petitionerthat a public utility jeep running at a regular and safe speed will not jumpinto a ditch when its right rear tire blows up. There is also evidence to show that the passenger jeepney was overloaded at the time of the accident. The petitioner stated that there were three (3) passengers in thefront seat and fourteen (14) passengers in the rear.

While it may be true that the tire that blew-up was still good because the grooves of the tire were still visible, this fact alone does not makethe explosion of the tire a fortuitousevent. No evidence was presented to show that the accident was due to adverse road conditions or that precautions were taken by the jeepney driver to compensate for any conditions liable to cause accidents. The sudden blowing-up, therefore, could have been caused by too much airpressure injected into the tire coupled by the fact that the jeepney was overloaded and speeding at the time of the accident. the cause of theunforeseen and unexpected occurrence was not independent of the human will.The accident was caused either through

the negligence of the driver or because of mechanical defects in the tire. Common carriers should teach their drivers not to overload their vehicles, not to exceed safe and legalspeed limits, and to know the correct measures to take when a tire blows up thus insuring the safety of passengersat all times. Relative to the contingency of mechanical defects.

25. Southern College vs C.A.

Facts:Private respondents are owners of a house at 326 College Road, Pasay City, while petitioner owns a four-storey school building along the same College Road.On October 11, 1989, at about 6:30 in the morning, a powerful typhoon Saling hit Metro Manila.Buffeted by very strong winds, the roof of petitioners building was partly ripped off and blown away, landing on and destroying portions of the roofing of private respondents house.After the typhoon had passed, anocular inspection of the destroyed buildings was conducted by a team of engineers headed by the city building official, Engr. Jesus L. Reyna.Pertinent aspects of the lattersReport dated October 18, 1989 stated, as follows:One of the factors that may have led to this calamitous event is the formation of the buildings in the area

and the general direction of the wind.Situated in the peripheral lot isan almost U-shaped formation of 4-storey building. Thus, with the strongwinds having a westerly direction, thegeneral formation of the buildings becomes a big funnel-like structure, the one situated along College Road, receiving the heaviest impact of the strong winds. Hence, there are portions of the roofing, those locatedon both ends of the building, which remained intact after the storm.Another factor and perhaps the most likely reason for the dislodging of the roofings structural trusses is the improper anchorage of the said trusses to the roof beams. The 1/2 diameter steel bars embedded on the concrete roof beams which serve as truss anchorage are not bolted nor nailed to the trusses.Still, there areother steel bars which were not even bent to the trusses, thus, those trusses are not anchored at all to theroof beams.It then recommended that to avoid any further loss and damage to lives, limbs and property of persons living in the vicinity, the fourth floor of subject school building be declared asa structural hazard.

Issue: Whether Southern College can use Article 1174 of the civil code asa defense against damages.

Holding: No,The antecedent of fortuitous event or caso fortuito is foundin the Partidas which defines it as anevent which takes place by accident and could not have been foreseen.Escriche elaborates it as an unexpected event or act of God which could neither be foreseen nor resisted.Civilist Arturo M. Tolentino adds that Fortuitous events may be produced by two general causes: (1)by nature, such as earthquakes, storms, floods, epidemics, fires, etc. and(2)by the act of man, such as an armed invasion, attack by bandits, governmental prohibitions, robbery, etc.In order that a fortuitous event may exempt a person from liability, itis necessary that he be free from any previous negligence or misconduct by reason of which the loss may have beenoccasioned.An act of God cannot be invoked for the protection of a personwho has been guilty of gross negligence in not trying to forestall its possible adverse consequences.Whena persons negligence concurs with an act of God in producing damage or injury to another, such person is not exempt from liability by showing that the immediate or proximate cause of the damage or injury was a fortuitous event.When the effect is found to be partly the result of the participationof man whether it be from active intervention, or neglect, or failure to act the whole occurrence is hereby humanized, and removed from the rules

applicable to acts of God.In the case under consideration, the lower court accorded full credence to the finding of the investigating team that subjectschool buildings roofing had no sufficient anchorage to hold it in position especially when battered by strong winds.Based on such finding, the trial court imputed negligence to petitioner and adjudged it liable for damages to private respondents.After athorough study and evaluation of the evidence on record, this Court believes otherwise, notwithstanding the general rule that factual findingsby the trial court, especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are binding and conclusive upon this Court.After a careful scrutiny of the records and the pleadings submitted bythe parties, we find exception to thisrule and hold that the lower courts misappreciated the evidence proffered.There is no question that a typhoon or storm is a fortuitous event, a natural occurrence which may be foreseen but is unavoidable despiteany amount of foresight, diligence or care.In order to be exempt from liability arising from any adverse consequence engendered thereby, there should have been no human participation amounting to a negligentact.In other words, the person seekingexoneration from liability must not beguilty of negligence.Negligence, as commonly understood, is conduct which naturally or reasonably creates undue

risk or harm to others.It may be the failure to observe that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand,or theomission to do something which a prudent and reasonable man, guided by considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs.WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the challenged Decision isREVERSED.The complaint of private respondents in Civil Case No. 7314 before the trial court a quo is ordered DISMISSED and the writ of execution issued on April 1, 1993 in said case is SET ASIDE.Accordingly, private respondents are ORDERED to return to petitioner any amount or property received by them by virtue ofsaid writ.

26. AFIALDA v. HISOLE CASE DIGEST

FACTS: Loreto Afialda was employed bythe defendant spouses Hisole ascaretaker of their carabaos at a fixedcompensation. While tending theanimals, he was gored by one of themand later died as a consequence of hisinjuries.

Plaintiff (elder sister of deceased)seeks to hold defendants liable underarticle 1905 of the Civil Code, whichreads:

The possessor of an animal, or the one who usesthe same, is liable for any damages it may cause,even if such animal should escape from him orstray away.

This liability shall cease only in case, the damageshould arise from force majeure or from the faultof the person who may have suffered it.

ISSUE: whether the owner of the animalis liable when damage is caused to itscaretaker.

RULING: No.  The animal was in custodyand under the control of thecaretaker, who was paid for his workas such. Obviously, it was thecaretaker's business to try to preventthe animal from causing injury ordamage to anyone, including himself.And being injured by the animal underthose circumstances, was one of therisks of the occupation which he hadvoluntarily assumed and for which hemust take the consequences.

27. G.R. No. L-53401 November 6, 1989

THE ILOCOS NORTE ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner, vs.HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, (First Division) LILIAN JUAN LUIS, JANE JUAN

YABES, VIRGINIA JUAN CID, GLORIA JUAN CARAG, and PURISIMA JUAN, respondents.

PLAINTIFF’s ASSUMPTION OF RISK

FACTS:The Court had occasion to rule when the doctrine of assumption of risk was not available against a person who braved a typhoon to save her property. a strong typhoon by the code name "Gening" buffeted the province of Ilocos Norte, bringing heavy rains and consequent flooding inits wake.After the typhoon had abated and when the floodwaters were beginning to recede the deceased Isabel Lao Juan, fondly called Nana Belen, ventured out of the house of her son-in-law, Antonio Yabes, and proceeded northward towards the direction of the Five Sisters Emporium, of which she was the owner and proprietress, to look after the merchandise therein that might have been damaged. Wading in waist-deep flood on Guerrero, the deceased was followed by Aida Bulong, a Salesgirl at the Five Sisters Grocery, also owned by the deceased, and by Linda Alonzo Estavillo, a ticket seller at the YJ Cinema, which was partly owned by the deceased. Aida and Linda walkedside by side at a distance of between 5 and 6 meters behind the deceased, Suddenly, the deceased screamed "Ay" and quickly sank into the water. The two girls attempted to help, but fear dissuaded them from doing so because on the spot where the deceased sank

they saw an electric wire dangling from a post and moving in snake-like fashion in the water. Upon their shouts for help, Ernesto dela Cruz came out of the house of Antonio Yabes. Ernesto tried to go to the deceased, but at four meters away fromher he turned back shouting that the water was grounded.

The heirs of the deceased filed an action for damages against petitioner.

ISSUE:WON assumption of risk will apply in this case?

HELD:NO. The maxim "volenti non fit injuria" relied upon by petitioner finds no application in the case at bar. It is imperative to note the surrounding circumstances which impelled the deceased to leave the comforts of a roof and brave the subsiding typhoon. As such, shall We punish her for exercising her right toprotect her property from the floods by imputing upon her the unfavorable presumption that she assumed the risk of personal injury? Definitely not. For it has been held that a person is excused from the force of the rule, that when he voluntarily assents to a known danger he must abide by the consequences, if an emergency is foundto exist or if the life or property ofanother is in peril (65A C.S.C. Negligence(174(5), p. 301), or when heseeks to rescue his endangered property (Harper and James, "The Law

of Torts." Little, Brown and Co., 1956, v. 2, p. 1167). Clearly, an emergency was at hand as the deceased's property, a source of her livelihood, was faced with an impending loss. Furthermore, the deceased, at the time the fatal incident occurred, was at a place where she had a right to be without regard to petitioner's consent as she was on her way to protect her merchandise. Hence, private respondents, as heirs, may not be barred from recovering damages as a result of the death caused by petitioner's negligence

28. VICENTE CALALAS, petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS, ELIZA JUJEURCHESUNGA and FRANCISCO SALVA, respondents

FACTS:Respondent Eliza Sunga was acollege student at Siliman University.She boarded a jeep driven byPetitioner Vicente Calalas. That timethe jeep was already full yet she wasgiven an extension seat, a woodenstool at the back of the doorat the rear end of the vehicle.As she was seated at the rearof the vehicle, Sunga gave wayto the outgoing passenger. Just asshe was doing so, an Isuzu truckdriven by IglecerioVerena and ownedby Francisco Salva bumped theleft rear portion of the jeepney.

As a result, Sunga was injured.Causing her onfinement in thehospital lasted from August 23 toSeptember 7, 1989. as a result shefiled a complaint against Calalas fordamages, alleging violation of thecontract of carriage by theformer in failing to exercise thediligence required of him as acommon carrier. Calalas, on theother hand, filed a third-partycomplaint against Francisco Salva,the owner of the Isuzu truck.

The lower court rendered judgmentagainst Salva as third-partydefendant and absolved Calalas ofliability, holding that it wasthe driver of the Isuzu truckwho was responsible for theaccident. On appeal to the Courtof Appeals, the ruling of thelower court was reversed on theground that Sunga's cause ofaction was based on a contractof carriage, not quasidelict, andthat the common carrier failed toexercise the diligence requiredunder the Civil Code. Theappellate court dismissed thethird-party complaint against Salvaand adjudged Calalas liable for

damages to Sunga. Hence, thispetition.

Petitioner contends that theruling in Civil Case No. 3490that the negligence of Verena wasthe proximate cause of theaccident negates his liability andthat to rule otherwise would beto make the common carrier aninsurer of the safety of itspassengers. He contends that thebumping of the jeepney by thetruck owned by Salva was acasofortuito.

ISSUE: (1) whether petitioner isnegilent as such he is liable onhis contract of carriage.

(2)Whether the driver of jeepneycarry Sunga "safely as far ashuman care and foresight couldprovide, using the utmostdiligence of very cautiouspersons, with due regard for allthe circumstances" as required byArt. 1755?

RULING: (1) yes.in quasi-delict, thenegligence or fault should beclearly established because it isthe basis of the action, whereas

in breach of contract, the actioncan be prosecuted merely byproving the existence of thecontract and the fact that theobligor, in this case the commoncarrier, failed to transport hispassenger safely to hisdestination.2 In case of death orinjuries to passengers, Art. 1756of the Civil Code provides thatcommon carriers are presumed tohave been at fault or to haveacted negligently unless they provethat they observed extraordinarydiligence as defined in Arts. 1733and 1755 of the Code. Thisprovision necessarily shifts to thecommon carrier the burden ofproof. There is, thus, no basisfor the contention that theruling in Civil Case No. 3490,finding Salva and his driverVerena liable for the damage topetitioner's jeepney, should bebinding on Sunga. It isimmaterial that theproximate causeof the collision between thejeepney and the truck was thenegligence of the truck driver.The doctrine of proximate cause isapplicable only in actions forquasi-delict, not in actionsinvolving breach of contract. The

doctrine is a device for imputingliability to a person where thereis no relation between him andanother party. In such a case,the obligation is created by lawitself. But, where there is apre-existing contractual relationbetween the parties, it is theparties themselves who create theobligation, and the function ofthe law is merely to regulate therelation thus created. Insofar ascontracts of carriage areconcerned, some aspects regulatedby the Civil Code are thoserespecting the diligence requiredof common carriers with regard tothe safety of passengers as wellas the presumption of negligencein cases of death or injury topassengers.

In the case at bar, upon the happening ofthe accident, the presumption of negligenceat once arose, and it became the duty ofpetitioner to prove that he had to observeextraordinary diligence in the care of hispassengers.

(2) no.Several factors militateagainst petitioner's contention.

First, as found by the Court ofAppeals, the jeepney was notproperly parked, its rear portionbeing exposed about two metersfrom the broad shoulders of thehighway, and facing the middle ofthe highway in a diagonalangle.This is a violation of theR.A. No. 4136, as amended, or theLand Transportation and TrafficCode,

Second, it is undisputed thatpetitioner's driver took in morepassengers than the allowed seatingcapacity of the jeepney, aviolation of §32(a) of the samelaw.

The fact that Sunga was seatedin an "extension seat" placed herin a peril greater than that towhich the other passengers wereexposed. Therefore, not only waspetitioner unable to overcome thepresumption of negligence imposedon him for the injury sustainedby Sunga, but also, the evidenceshows he was actually negligentin transporting passengers.

We find it hard to give serious thought topetitioner's contention that Sunga's takingan "extension seat" amounted to an impliedassumption of risk. It is akin toarguing that the injuries to themany victims of the tragedies inour seas should not becompensated merely because thosepassengers assumed a greater riskof drowning by boarding anoverloaded ferry. This is alsotrue of petitioner's contentionthat the jeepney being bumpedwhile it was improperly parkedconstitutes casofortuito. Acasofortuito is an event whichcould not be foreseen, or which,though foreseen, was inevitable.3xxx Petitioner should have foreseenthe danger of parking his jeepneywith its body protruding twometers into the highway.

29. Nikko Hotel vs. Reyes

FACTS: Petitioners Nikko Hotel Manilaand Ruby Lim assailed the decision ofthe Court of Appeals in reversing thedecision of RTC of Quezon City.  CAheld petitioner liable for damages toRoberto Reyes aka “Amang Bisaya”, anentertainment artist.

There are two versions of the story:

Mr. Reyes: On the eve of October 13,1994, Mr. Reyes while having coffee atthe lobby of Nikko Hotel wasapproached by Dr. Violet Filart, afriend several years back.  Accordingto Mr. Reyes, Dr. Filart invited himto join a birthday party at thepenthouse for the hotel’s formerGeneral Manager, Mr. Tsuruoka. Plaintiff agreed as Dr. Filart agreedto vouch for him and carried a basketof fruits, the latter’s gift.  He Helined up at the buffet table as soonas it was ready but to his greatshock, shame and embarrassment, RubyLim, Hotel’s Executive Secretary,asked him to leave in a loud voiceenough to be heard by the peoplearound them.  He was asked to leavethe party and a Makati policemanaccompanied him to step-out thehotel.  All these time, Dr Filartignored him adding to his shame andhumiliation.

Ms. Ruby Lim: She admitted asking Mr.Reyes to leave the party but not inthe manner claimed by the plaintiff. Ms. Lim approached several peopleincluding Dr. Filart’s sister, Ms.

Zenaida Fruto, if Dr. Filart didinvite him as the captain waiter toldMs. Lim that Mr. Reyes was with Dr.Filart’s group.  She wasn’t able toask it personally with Dr. Filartsince the latter was talking over thephone and doesn’t want to interrupther.  She asked Mr. Reyes to leavebecause the celebrant specificallyordered that the party should beintimate consisting only of those whopart of the list.  She even askedpolitely with the plaintiff to finishhis food then leave the party.

During the plaintiff’s cross-examination, he was asked how closewas Ms. Lim when she approached him atthe buffet table.  Mr. Reyes answered“very close because we nearly kissedeach other”.  Considering the closeproximity, it was Ms. Lim’s intentionto relay the request only be heard byhim.  It was Mr. Reyes who made ascene causing everybody to know whathappened.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitionersacted abusively in asking Mr. Reyes toleave the party.

HELD: Supreme Court held thatpetitioners did not act abusively inasking Mr. Reyes to leave the party. 

Plaintiff failed to establish anyproof of ill-motive on the part of Ms.Lim who did all the necessaryprecautions to ensure that Mr. Reyeswill not be humiliated in requestinghim to leave the party.  Consideringalmost 20 years of experience in thehotel industry, Ms. Lim is experiencedenough to know how to handle suchmatters.   Hence, petitioners will notbe held liable for damages broughtunder Article 19 and 20 of the CivilCode.

30. POLO S. PANTALEON, PETITIONER,VS.AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL,INC., RESPONDENT.

FACTS:The petitioner, lawyer Polo Pantaleon,his wife, daughter and son joinedan escortedtour of Western Europe inOctober of 1991. The tour grouparrived in Amsterdam in the afternoonof 25 October 1991, thesecond to thelast day of the tour. As the group hadarrived late in the city, theyfailedto engage in any sight-seeing so theyagreed that they would start earlythenext day to see the entire citybefore ending the tour.The followingday, the last day of the tour, thegroup arrived at the CosterDiamondHouse. The group had agreedthat the visit to Coster should end by

9:30 a.m. toallow enough time to takein a guided city tour of Amsterdam.

While at Coster, Mrs. Pantaleondecided to purchase some diamondpieces worth a total of US$13,826.00.Pantaleon presented his AmericanExpress credit card to the sales clerkto pay for this purchase. He did thisat around 9:15 a.m. The sales clerkswiped the credit card and askedPantaleon to sign the charge slip,which was then electronically referredto AMEX's Amsterdam office at 9:20a.m. The clearance took too long andat 9:40am, Pantaleon asked the storeclerk to cancel thesale to avoidfurther delaying and inconveniencingthe tour group. At around 10:00a.m, 30minutes after the tour group wassupposed to have left the store,Costerdecided to release the itemseven without respondent’s approval ofthe purchase. Due to the delay,however, the city tour of Amsterdamwas to be canceled due to lackof remaining time. The spousesPantaleon allegedly offered theirapologies but weremet by theirtourmates with stony silenceand visible irritation. Mrs. Pantaleonendedup weeping, while her husband hadto take a tranquilizer to calm his

nerves. Two more instances similar tothe Castor incident happened when theyproceeded to the United States afterthe trip to Europe. Again, Pantaleonexperienced delay in securing approvalfor purchases using his AmericanExpress credit card when he wanted topurchase golf equipment in the amountof US$1,475.00 at the Richard MetzGolf Studio in New York on October 30,1991. Another delay occurred when hewanted to purchase children's shoesworth US$87.00 at the Quiency Marketin Boston.

After coming back to Manila,Pantaleonsent a letterdemanding anapology for the"inconvenience,humiliation and embarrassment heand his family thereby suffered"forrespondent’s refusal to provide creditauthorization for theaforementionedpurchases.Respondentrefused to give an apology,sent a letter stating among othersthat thedelay in authorizingthe purchase from Coster wasattributable to the circumstancethatthe charged purchase of US $13,826.00"was out of the usual chargepurchasepattern established."Dissatisfied with this explanation,Pantaleon filed an action for damagesagainst the credit card company withthe Makati City RTC which he won. TheCA however reversed the award of

damages in favor of Pantaleon, holdingthat respondenthad not breached itsobligations to petitioner for thedelay was not attended by bad faith,malice, or gross negligence.Respondent "had exercised diligentefforts to effect the approval" ofthepurchases, which were "not inaccordance with the charge pattern"petitionerhad established forhimself. 

ISSUE:Whether respondent AMEX hascommitted a breach of its obligationsand is liable for damages.

RULING:Yes. The popular notion thatcredit card purchases are approved“within seconds,” there really is nostrict, legally determinative point ofdemarcation on how long must it takefor a credit card company to approveor disapprove a customer’s purchase,much less one specifically contractedupon by the parties. One hour appearsto be patently unreasonable length oftime to approve or disapprove a creditcard purchase.

The culpable failure of AmEx herein isnot the failure to timely approvepetitioner’s purchase, but the moreelemental failure to timely act on thesame, whether favorably orunfavorably. Even assuming that AmEx’scredit authorizers did not havesufficient basis on hand to make a

judgment, we see no reason why itcould not have promptly informedPantaleon the reason for the delay,and duly advised him that resolvingthe same could take some time.

The reason why Pantaleon is entitledto damages is not simply because AmExincurred delay, but because the delay,for which culpability lies underArticle 1170, led to the particularinjuries under Article 2217 of theCivil Code for which moral damages areremunerative. The somewhat unusualattending circumstances to thepurchase at Coster – that there was adeadline for the completion of thatpurchase by petitioner before anydelay would redound to the injury ofhis several traveling companions –gave rise to the moral shock, mentalanguish, serious anxiety, woundedfeelings and social humiliationsustained by Pantaleon, as concludedby the RTC. 

31. G.R. No. L-83524 October 13, 1989ERNESTO KRAMER, JR. and MARIA KRAMERvs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS and TRANS-ASIA SHIPPING LINES, INC.GANCAYCO, J.:

FACTS:On April 8, 1976, F/B Marjolea, a fishing boat owned by petitioners Ernest Kramer, Jr. and Marta Kramer was navigating its way from Marinduque

to Manila. Somewhere near the Maricabon Island and Cape Santiago, the boat figured in a collision with an inter-island vessel (M/V Asia Philippines) owned by Trans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc. Due to the collision, F/B Marjolea sank, taking along its fish catch. The captains of both vessels filed a protest with the Board of Marine Inquiry of the Philippine Coast Guard for the purposeof determining the proximate cuase of the maritime collision. On October 19,1981, the Board concluded that the collision was due to the negligence ofthe employees of private respondent (Trans-Asia). On the basis of such decision, the Philippine Coast Guard, on April 29, 1982, suspended M/V Asia Philippines from pursuing his profession as a marine officer. On May30,1985, petitioners filed a complaintfor damages in the RTC, Pasay City. Private respondent filed a MTD on the ground of prescription based on Art. 1146 of the Civil Code which provides,‘An action based upon quasi-delict must be instituted within 4 years fromthe day the quasi-delcit was committed. The RTC denied the MTD on the basis of the Board’s resolution that there was a need to rely on highly technical aspects attendant to such collision, hence, the prescriptive period under the law should begin to run only from April 29, 1982, the date when the negligenceof the crew of M/V Asia Philippines

had been finally ascertained. On appeal to the CA, the said court reversed the RTC’s decision and granted the MTD, hence the present petition for certiorari and prohibition.

ISSUE:Whether a complaint for damages instituted by the petitioners against the private respondent arising from a marine collision is barred by the statute of limitations.

RULING:Yes. QUASI-DELICT; CAUSE OF ACTION; ACCRUAL THEREOF TOLLED UPON OCCURRENCE OF THE LAST ELEMENT OF CAUSE OF ACTION. — In Español vs. Chairman, Philippine Veterans Administration, his Court held "The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of action, which consists of 3 elements, namely:a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; b) an obligation on the part of defendant to respect such right; andc) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff . . . It is only whenthe last element occurs or takes placethat it can be said in law that a cause of action has arisen . . ." It is clear that the prescriptive period must be counted when the last element occurs or takes place, that is, the time of the commission of an act or

omission violative of the right of theplaintiff, which is the time when the cause of action arises. 

TORTS AND DAMAGES; ACTION BASED UPON AQUASI-DELICT PRESCRIBES IN FOUR (4) YEARS. — Under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, an action based upon a quasi-delict must be instituted withinfour (4) years. The prescriptive period begins from the day the quasi-delict is committed. In Paulan vs. Sarabia, this Court ruled that in an action for damages arising from the collision of two (2) trucks, the action being based on a quasi-delict, the four (4) year prescriptive period must be counted from the day of the collision. 

ACTION FOR DAMAGES ARISING FROM COLLISION OF TWO VESSELS; PRESCRIPTIVEPERIOD COUNTED FROM DAY OF COLLISION NOT FROM THE DATE OF DETERMINATION BY AN ADMINISTRATIVE BODY. — In this action for damages arising from the collision of two (2) vessels the four (4) year prescriptive period must be counted from the day of the collision.The aggrieved party need not wait for a determination by an administrative body like a Board of Marine Inquiry, that the collision was caused by the fault or negligence of the other partybefore he can file an action for damages. The ruling in Vasquez does not apply in this case. Immediately after the collision the aggrieved

party can seek relief from the courts by alleging such negligence or fault of the owners, agents or personnel of the other vessel. Thus, the respondentcourt correctly found that the action of petitioner has prescribed. The collision occurred on April 8, 1976. The complaint for damages was filed incourt only on May 30, 1985, was beyondthe four (4) year prescriptive period. 

#32 Bataclan v. Medina G.R. No. L-10126

FACTS:On September 13, 1952 bus no.30 of the Medina Transportation,operated by its owner defendantMariano Medina, left the town ofAmadeo, Cavite, on its way to PasayCity, driven by its regular chauffeur,ConradoSaylon. There were abouteighteen passengers, including thedriver and conductor. While the buswas running within the jurisdiction ofImus, Cavite, one of the front tiresburst and the vehicle began to zig-zaguntil it fell into a canal or ditch onthe right side of the road and turnedturtle. Some of the passengers managedto leave, others had to be helped orpulled out, while the three passengersseated beside the driver, namedBataclan, Lara and the Visayan and thewoman behind them named NataliaVillanueva, could not get out of the

overturned bus. Some of thepassengers, after they had clamberedup to the road, heard groans and moansfrom inside the bus, particularly,shouts for help from Bataclan andLara, who said they could not get outof the bus.

After half an hour, came about tenmen, one of them carrying a lightedtorch made of bamboo with a wick onone end, evidently fueled withpetroleum. These men presumablyapproach the overturned bus, andalmost immediately, a fierce firestarted, burning and all but consumingthe bus, including the four passengerstrapped inside it. It would appearthat as the bus overturned, gasolinebegan to leak and escape from thegasoline tank on the side of thechassis, spreading over and permeatingthe body of the bus and the groundunder and around it, and that thelighted torch brought by one of themen who answered the call for help setit on fire.

By reason of his death, his widow,Salud Villanueva, in her name and inbehalf of her five minor children,brought the present suit to recoverfrom Mariano Medina compensatory,moral, and exemplary damages andattorney's fees in the total amount ofP87,150. After trial, the Court ofFirst Instance of Cavite awardedP1,000 to the plaintiffs plus P600 as

attorney's fee, plus P100, the valueof the merchandise being carried byBataclan to Pasay City for sale andwhich was lost in the fire. Theplaintiffs and the defendants appealedthe decision to the Court of Appeals,but the latter endorsed the appeal toSC because of the value involved inthe claim in the complaint.

ISSUE:Whether or not the defendantcarrier is liable for the death ofSalud Villanueva and his wife.

HELD:YES. The only question is to whatdegree. The trial court was of theopinion that the proximate cause ofthe death of Bataclan was not theoverturning of the bus, but rather,the fire that burned the bus,including himself and his co-passengers who were unable to leaveit; that at the time the fire started,Bataclan, though he must have sufferedphysical injuries, perhaps serious,was still alive, and so damages wereawarded, not for his death, but forthe physical injuries suffered byhim. 

The Court disagree. The Court citedAmerican jurisprudence, cited byplaintiffs-appellants in their brief.It is as follows:

. . . 'that cause, which, innatural and continuous sequence,unbroken by any efficient

intervening cause, produces theinjury, and without which theresult would not haveoccurred.' 

Again citing American Jurisprudence,the Court provide the definition ofproximate cause

'the proximate legal cause isthat acting first and producing theinjury, either immediately or bysetting other events in motion, allconstituting a natural and continuouschain of events, each having a closecausal connection with its immediatepredecessor, the final event in thechain immediately effecting the injuryas a natural and probable result ofthe cause which first acted, undersuch circumstances that the personresponsible for the first eventshould, as an ordinary prudent andintelligent person, have reasonableground to expect at the moment of hisact or default that an injury to someperson might probably resulttherefrom.

Hence, the Court modified the damagesawarded by the trial court byincreasing it from ONE THOUSAND(P1,000) PESOS TO SIX THOUSAND(P6,000) PESOS, and from SIX HUNDREDPESOS TO EIGHT HUNDRED (P800) PESOS,for the death of Bataclan and for theattorney's fees.

#33 MERCURY DRUG VS BAKING, GR NO.156037, 25 May 2007

FACTS: Sebastian M. Baking,respondent, went to the clinic of Dr.Cesar Sy for a medical check-up. Onthe following day, after undergoing anECG, blood, and hematologyexaminations and urinalysis, Dr. Syfound that respondents blood sugar andtriglyceride were above normallevels. Dr. Sy then gave respondenttwo medical prescriptions Diamicronfor his blood sugar and Benalizetablets for his triglyceride.

Respondent then proceededto petitioner Mercury Drug Corporation(Alabang Branch) to buy the prescribedmedicines. However, the salesladymisread the prescriptionforDiamicron as a prescriptionfor Dormicum. Thus, what was sold torespondent was Dormicum, a potentsleeping tablet.

On November 8 or on the third day hetook the medicine, respondent figuredin a vehicular accident. The car hewas driving collided with the car ofone Josie Peralta.Respondent fellasleep while driving. He could notremember anything about the collisionnor felt its impact.Suspecting that the tablet he took mayhave a bearing on his physical andmental state at the time of the

collision, respondent returned to Dr.Sys clinic. Upon being shown themedicine, Dr. Sy was shocked to findthat what was sold to respondent wasDormicum, instead of the prescribedDiamicron.

Thus, the respondent filed with theRegional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 80of Quezon City a complaint for damagesagainst petitioner which was decidedin his favor.

Both the appeal and reconsiderationfiled by the petitioner were dismissedby the CA. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner wasnegligent, and if so, whether suchnegligence was the proximate cause ofrespondents accident

HELD:The Court disagreed with thepetitioner’s contention that theproximate cause of the accident wasrespondents negligence in driving hiscar.

It further proceeded to defineProximate cause, as any cause thatproduces injury in a natural andcontinuous sequence, unbroken by anyefficient intervening cause, such thatthe result would not have occurredotherwise. Proximate cause isdetermined from the facts of eachcase, upon a combined consideration of

logic, common sense, policy, andprecedent.

Here, the vehicular accident could nothave occurred had petitioners employeebeen careful in reading Dr. Sysprescription. Without the potenteffects of Dormicum, a sleepingtablet, it was unlikely thatrespondent would fall asleep whiledriving his car, resulting in acollision.

# 34 Pilipinas Bank v. CA G. R. No.105410

FACTSAs payments for the purchased shoematerials and rubber shoes, FlorencioReyes issued postdated checks toWinner Industrial Corporation forP20,927.00 and Vicente Tui, forP11,419.50, with due dates on October10 and 12, 1979, respectively.

To cover the face value of the checks,plaintiff, requested PCIB MoneyShop's manager Mike Potenciano toeffect the withdrawal of P32,000.00from his savings account therein andhave it deposited with his currentaccount with Pilipinas Bank (thenFilman Bank), Biñan Branch. RobertoSantos was requested to make thedeposit.

In depositing in the name of FLORENCIOREYES, he inquired from the teller thecurrent account number of FlorencioReyes to complete the deposit slip hewas accomplishing. He was informedthat it was "815" and so this was thesame current account number he placedon the deposit slip below thedepositor's name FLORENCIO REYES.

Nothing that the account numbercoincided with the name Florencio,EfrenAlagasi, then Current AccountBookkeeper of Pilipinas Bank, thoughtit was for Florencio Amador who ownedthe listed account number. He, thus,posted and deposited in the latter'saccount not noticing that thedepositor's surname in the depositslip was REYES.

When the check in favor of WinnerIndustrial Corporation was presentedfor payment, it was dishonored and thepayee was advised to try it for nextclearing, but it was again dishonored.Hence, the payee returned the same toFlorencio Reyes and demanded a cashpayment of its face value which he didif only to save his name.

Upon verification, the bank noticedthe error. The P32,000.00 depositposted in the account of FlorencioAmador was immediately transferred tothe account of Reyes upon beingcleared by Florencio Amador that he

did not effect a deposit in the amountof P32,000.00.

On the basis of these facts, the trialcourt ordered petitioner to pay to theprivate respondent: (1) P200,000.00 ascompensatory damages; (2) P100,000.00as moral damages; (3) P25,000.00 asattorney's fees, and (4) the costs ofsuit. On appeal to the respondentcourt, the judgment was modified asaforestated. In his petition, thepetitioner argued that the Court ofAppeals erred in not applying thefirst sentence of Article 2179, NewCivil Code, in view of its own findingthat respondent Reyes' ownrepresentative committed the mistakein writing down the correct accountnumber.

HELD: The Court finds no merit in thepetition

First. For Article 2179 3 of the CivilCode to apply, it must be establishedthat private respondent's ownnegligence was the immediate andproximate cause of his injury. Theconcept of proximate cause is welldefined in our corpus of jurisprudenceas "any cause which, in natural andcontinuous sequence, unbroken by anyefficient intervening cause, producesthe result complained of and withoutwhich would not have occurred and fromwhich it ought to have been forseen orreasonably anticipated by a person of

ordinary case that the injurycomplained of or some similar injury,would result therefrom as a naturaland probable consequence." In the caseat bench, the proximate cause of theinjury is the negligence ofpetitioner's employee in erroneouslyposting the cash deposit of privaterespondent in the name of anotherdepositor who had a similar firstname.

35. Far Eastern Shipping Company vs C.A.Facts: On June 20, 1980, the M/V PAVLODAR, flying under the flagship ofthe USSR, owned and operated by the Far Eastern Shipping Company (FESC forbrevity's sake), arrived at the Port of Manila from Vancouver, British Columbia at about 7:00 o'clock in the morning. The vessel was assigned Berth4 of the Manila International Port, asits berthing space. Captain Roberto Abellana was tasked by the Philippine Port Authority to supervise the berthing of the vessel. Appellant Senen Gavino was assigned by the Appellant Manila Pilots' Association (MPA for brevity's sake) to conduct docking maneuvers for the safe berthing of the vessel to Berth No. 4.Gavino boarded the vessel at the quarantine anchorage and stationed himself in the bridge, with the master

of the vessel, Victor Kavankov, besidehim. After a briefing of Gavino by Kavankov of the particulars of the vessel and its cargo, the vessel lifted anchor from the quarantine anchorage and proceeded to the Manila International Port. The sea was calm and the wind was ideal for docking maneuvers.When the vessel reached the landmark (the big church by the Tondo North Harbor) one-half mile from the pier, Gavino ordered the engine stopped. When the vessel was already about 2,000 feet from the pier, Gavinoordered the anchor dropped. Kavankov relayed the orders to the crew of the vessel on the bow. The left anchor, with two (2) shackles, were dropped. However, the anchor did not take hold as expected. The speed of the vessel did not slacken. A commotion ensued between the crew members. A brief conference ensued between Kavankov andthe crew members. When Gavino inquiredwhat was all the commotion about, Kavankov assured Gavino that there wasnothing to it.After Gavino noticed that the anchor did not take hold, he ordered the engines half-astern. Abellana, who was then on the pier apron, noticed that the vessel was approaching the pier fast. Kavankov likewise noticed that the anchor did not take hold. Gavino thereafter gave the "full-astern" code. Before the right anchor and additional shackles could be dropped, the bow of the vessel rammed into the apron of the

pier causing considerable damage to the pier. The vessel sustained damage too, . Kavankov filed his sea protest . Gavino submitted his report to the Chief Pilot who referred the report to the Philippine Ports Authority. Abellana likewise submittedhis report of the incident Per contract and supplemental contract of the Philippine Ports Authority and thecontractor for the rehabilitation of the damaged pier, the same cost the Philippine Ports Authority the amount of P1,126,132.25. The RTC ruled in favor of Philippine Ports Authority against Far Eastern and Capt. Gavino liable and the CA affirmed the trial courts decision.Issue:Whether Capt. Gavino and Far Eastern Company's concurrent negligence was the proximate cause thus making them liable for damages.Holding:Yes,the concurrent negligence of Capt.Gavino, the harbor pilot, and Capt. Viktor Kabankov,shipmaster of MV Pavlodar, as the basis of their solidary liability for damages sustained by PPA. It posits that the vessel was being piloted by Capt. Gavino with Capt. Kabankov beside him all the while on the bridge of the vessel, as the former took over the helm of MV Pavlodar when it rammed anddamaged the apron of the pier of Berth

No. 4 of the Manila International Port. Their concurrent negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of the collision between the vessel and the pier — Capt. Gavino, for his negligence in the conduct of docking maneuvers for the safe berthing of thevessel; and Capt. Kabankov, for failing to countermand the orders of the harbor pilot and to take over and steer the vessel himself in the face of imminent danger, as well as for merely relying on Capt. Gavino during the berthing procedure. The vessel to be concurrently negligent and thus share the blame for the resulting damage as joint tortfeasors,but only under the circumstances obtaining in and demonstrated by the instant petitions.It may be said, as a generalrule, that negligence in order to render a person liable need not be thesole cause of an injury. It is sufficient that his negligence, concurring with one or more efficient causes other than piaintiff's, is the proximate cause of the injury. Accordingly, where several causes combine to produce injuries, a person is not relieved from liability becausehe is responsible for only one of them, it being sufficient that the negligence of the person charged with injury is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have resulted to as great an extent, and that such cause is not attributable tothe person injured. It is no defense

to one of the concurrent tortfeasors that the injury would not have resulted from his negligence alone, without the negligence or wrongful acts of the other concurrent rortfeasor.Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent andeach is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have happened, the injury may be attributedto all or any of the causes and recovery may be had against any or allof the responsible persons although under the circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of them was more culpable, and that the duty owed by them to the injured person was not the same. No actor's negligence ceasesto be a proximate cause merely becauseit does not exceed the negligence of other actors. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause of the injury.There is no contribution between joint tortfeasorswhose liability is solidary since bothof them are liable for the total damage. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissionsof two or more persons, although acting independently, are in combination the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed tothe injury and either of them is responsible for the whole injury. Where their concurring negligence

resulted in injury or damage to a third party, they become joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for the resulting damage under Article2194 of the Civil Code.Art. 1207 of the Civil Code provides that there is solidary liability only when the obligation expressly so states, or when the law or the nature of the obligation requires solidarity. Plainly, Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65, which as an implementing rule has the force and effect of law, can validly provide for solidary liability. WHEREFORE, in view of all of the foregoing, the consolidated petitions for review are DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED Counsel for FESC, the law firm of Del Rosario and Del Rosario, specifically its associate, Atty. Herbert A. Tria, is REPRIMANDED and WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts of heedless disregard of its undertakings under the Rules shall be dealt with more severely.

36. Manila Electric vs. Remoquillo, GRNo. L-8328, May 18, 1956

Facts:

Efren Magno went to the 3-storyhouse of Antonio Peñaloza, hisstepbrother to repair a “media agua”said to be in a leaking condition. The

“media agua” was just below the windowof the third story. Standing on said“media agua”, Magno received from hisson thru that window a 3’ X 6’galvanized iron sheet to cover theleaking portion, turned around and indoing so the lower end of the ironsheet came into contact with theelectric wire of the Manila ElectricCompany strung parallel to the edge ofthe “media agua” and 2 1/2 feet fromit, causing his death byelectrocution. His widow and childrenfiled suit to recover damages from thecompany. After hearing, the trialcourt rendered judgment in theirfavor. On appeal to the Court ofAppeals, the latter affirmed thejudgment. The electric company hasappealed said decision to us.

Issue: Whether or not Manila ElectricCompany should be held guilty fornegligence

Ruling: No. We are inclined to agreeto the contention of Petitioner Companythat the death of Magno was primarilycaused by his own negligence and insome measure by the too closeproximity of the “media agua” orrather its edge to the electric wireof the company by reason of theviolation of the original permit givenby the city and the subsequentapproval of said illegal constructionof the “media agua”. We fail to seehow the Company could be held guilty

of negligence or as lacking in duediligence. The Company cannot beexpected to be always on the lookoutfor any illegal construction whichreduces the distance between its wiresand said construction, and afterfinding that said distance of 3 feethad been reduced, to change thestringing or installation of its wiresso as to preserve said distance. Ofcourse, in the present case, theviolation of the permit for theconstruction of the “media agua” wasnot the direct cause of the accident.It merely contributed to it. Had said“media agua” been only one meter wideas allowed by the permit, Magnostanding on it, would instinctivelyhave stayed closer to or hugged theside of the house in order to keep asafe margin between the edge of the“media agua” and the yawning 2-storydistance or height from the ground,and possibly if not probably avoidedthe fatal contact between the lowerend of the iron sheet and the wires.It is clear that the principal andproximate cause of the electrocutionwas not the electric wire, evidently aremote cause, but rather the recklessand negligent act of Magno in turningaround and swinging the galvanizediron sheet without taking anyprecaution, such as looking backtoward the street and at the wire toavoid its contacting said iron sheet,considering the latter’s length of 6feet.

DOCTRINE:“A prior and remote cause cannot

be made the basis of an action if suchremote cause did nothing more thanfurnish the condition or give rise tothe occasion by which the injury wasmade possible, if there intervenedbetween such prior or remote cause andthe injury a distinct, successive,unrelated, and efficient cause of theinjury, even though such injury wouldnot have happened but for suchcondition or occasion. If no dangerexisted in the condition exceptbecause of the independent cause, suchcondition was not the proximate cause.And if an independent negligent act ordefective condition sets intooperation the circumstances whichresult in injury because of the priordefective condition, such subsequentact or condition is the proximatecause.”

37. Gabeto vs. Araneta, GR No. 15674,October 17, 1921

Facts: Ilano and Gayetano took acarromata to go to a cockpit. When thedriver of the carromata had turned hishorse and started in the directionindicated, Araneta, stepped out intothe street, and laying his hands onthe reins, stopped the horse, at the

same time protesting to the driverthat he himself had called thiscarromata first. Pagnaya, the driver,replied to the effect that he had notheard or seen the call of Araneta, andthat he had taken up the twopassengers then in the carromata asthe first who had offered employment.At or about the same time Pagnayapulled on the reins of the bridle tofree the horse from the control ofAraneta, in order that the vehiclemight pass on. Owing, however, to thelooseness of the bridle on the horse'shead or to the rottenness of thematerial of which it was made, the bitcame out of the horse's mouth; and itbecame necessary for the driver to getout, which he did, in order to findthe bridle. The horse was then pulledover to near the curb, by one or theother — it makes no difference which —and Pagnaya tried to fix the bridle.While he was thus engaged, the horse,being free from the control of thebit, became disturbed and movedforward, in doing which he pulled oneof the wheels of the carromata up onthe sidewalk and pushed Pagnaya overand bumping a telephone box whichcrashed. Frightened, the horse ran atfull speed. Meanwhile one of thepassengers, Ilano, had alighted whilethe carromata was as yet alongside thesidewalk; but the other, Gayetano, hadunfortunately retained his seat, andafter the runaway horse had proceededup the street to a point in front of

the Mission Hospital, the saidGayetano jumped or fell from the rig,and in so doing received injuries fromwhich he soon died.

Issue: Whether or not Araneta can beheld liable for the death of Gayetano

Ruling: No. We are of the opinion thatthe mere fact that the defendantinterfered with the carromata bystopping the horse in the mannerstated would not make him liable forthe death of Gayetano; because it isadmitted by Julio Pagnaya that heafterwards got out of the carromataand went to the horse's head to fixthe bridle. The evidence isfurthermore convincing to the effectthat, after Pagnaya alighted, thehorse was conducted to the curb andthat an appreciable interval of timeelapsed — same witnesses say severalminutes — before the horse started onhis career up the street. It istherefore evident that the stopping ofthe rig by Araneta in the middle ofthe street was too remote from theaccident that presently ensued to beconsidered the legal or proximatecause thereof. Moreover, by gettingout and taking his post at the head ofthe horse, the driver was the personprimarily responsible for the controlof the animal, and the defendantcannot be charged with liability forthe accident resulting from the actionof the horse thereafter.

DOCTRINE:“The chronology of the events

may be considered to determine theproximate cause. A cause too remotefrom the accident cannot be considereda proximate cause.”

38. Phoenix Construction vs. IAC, GRNo. L-65295, March 10, 1987

Facts: Dionisio was on his way homefrom a cocktails-and-dinner meetingwith his boss, the general manager ofa marketing corporation. During thecocktails phase of the evening,Dionisio had taken "a shot or two" ofliquor. Dionisio was driving hisVolkswagen car and had just crossedthe intersection of General Lacuna andGeneral Santos Streets at Bangkal,Makati, when his car headlightssuddenly failed. He switched hisheadlights on "bright" and thereuponhe saw a Ford dump truck looming some2-1/2 meters away from his car. Thedump truck, owned by and registered inthe name of Phoenix Construction Inc.was parked on the right hand side ofGeneral Lacuna Street facing theoncoming traffic. The dump truck wasparked askew (not parallel to thestreet curb) in such a manner as tostick out onto the street, partlyblocking the way of oncoming traffic.

There were no lights nor any so-called"early warning" reflector devices setanywhere near the dump truck, front orrear. The dump truck had earlier thatevening been driven home by Carbonel,its regular driver, with thepermission of his employer Phoenix, inview of work scheduled to be carriedout early the following morning,Dionisio claimed that he tried toavoid a collision by swerving his carto the left but it was too late andhis car smashed into the dump truck.As a result of the collision, Dionisiosuffered some physical injuriesincluding some permanent facial scars,a "nervous breakdown" and loss of twogold bridge dentures.

Dionisio commenced an action fordamages in the Court of First Instanceof Pampanga basically claiming thatthe legal and proximate cause of hisinjuries was the negligent manner inwhich Carbonel had parked the dumptruck entrusted to him by his employerPhoenix. Phoenix and Carbonel, on theother hand, countered that theproximate cause of Dionisio's injurieswas his own recklessness in drivingfast at the time of the accident,while under the influence of liquor,without his headlights on and withouta curfew pass. Phoenix also sought toestablish that it had exercised duerare in the selection and supervisionof the dump truck driver.

Issue: Whether or not the truck drivercan be held liable for the injuriessustained by Dionisio

Ruling: We agree with the Court ofFirst Instance and the IntermediateAppellate Court that the legal andproximate cause of the accident and ofDionisio's injuries was the wrongful —or negligent manner in which the dumptruck was parked in other words, thenegligence of petitioner Carbonel.That there was a reasonablerelationship between petitionerCarbonel's negligence on the one handand the accident and respondent'sinjuries on the other hand, is quiteclear. Put in a slightly differentmanner, the collision of Dionisio'scar with the dump truck was a naturaland foreseeable consequence of thetruck driver's negligence. We holdthat Dionisio's negligence was "onlycontributory," one which was not anefficient intervening cause and thatthe "immediate and proximate cause" ofthe injury remained the truck driver's"lack of due care" and negligence inparking and that consequentlyrespondent Dionisio may recoverdamages though such damages aresubject to mitigation by the courts(Article 2179, Civil Code of thePhilippines).