The Syrian-Israeli Peace Process and The United States ... · 9 and agreed to bilateral talks with the Israelis. The United States had a significant role in convincing Syria to attend

FACULTEIT POLITIEKE EN SOCIALE WETENSCHAPPEN

VAKGROEP STUDIE VAN DE DERDE WERELD

The Syrian-Israeli Peace Process and The United States

From Hope to Impasse

1991-2000

Ahmad Soltani Nejad

June 2004

Dissertation submitted for the degree of doctoral in political Science

Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Ruddy Doom

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Table of contents

Acknowledgements 3

Maps 4

1. Introduction 7

2. Theoretical Framework 21

3. U.S.-Syrian relations 41

4. The Madrid Peace Conference 67

5. The Oslo Peace Process 90

6. Slow Progress After Oslo Accords (1993-1994) 108

7. Progress on the Syrian-Israeli track (1994- 1996) 124

8. Deadlock in the Syrian-Israeli negotiations (1996- 1999) 138

9. Shepherdstown Talks (January 2000) 155

10. Syrian perspectives on the main issues of the peace process 173

11. Conclusions 193

Documents 211

Bibliography 214

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Acknowledgements

I am greatly indebted to several people and institutions for their assistance in the

formation and completion of this study. I am grateful to my supervisor Prof. Ruddy

Doom who has always been helpful throughout the conduct of this research. With his

generous support I was able to come to the University of Ghent and later on pursue my

research at the University of Arizona as an Exchange Visiting Scholar. The Center for

Middle Eastern Studies there provided the opportunity for me to pursue my research with

specialists at the University and to access the resources that I needed to conduct this

research. I am grateful particularly to Prof. Mark Tessler, former Director of the Center,

Prof. Michael Bonine, Head of the Department of Near Eastern Studies, Dr. Anne

Betteridge, Director of the Center and Dr. Anne Bennett, former Assistant Director of the

Center. I am also grateful to Ambassador David Dunford who read this work and offered

constructive criticism. Ms. Deborah Beaumont deserves special gratitude for her

generous help. She spent many hours reading and editing this work. Her encouragement,

support, and enthusiasm never failed.

This study was funded in part by a scholarship from the Iranian Ministry of

Higher Education. Special thanks to the University of Tarbiat Modares that provided me

this opportunity to study abroad.

Finally, my special thanks goes to my wife, Hamideh Alamdari, and my children

Faezeh, Farideh, and Farimah who through their support, patience and encouragement I

was able to continue my studies and to complete this work.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

In the early 1990s, there were a number of developments at the international and

regional levels that created a unique opportunity for the Arabs and Israelis to end their

decades long animosity. Many of the circumstances that prevented the Arabs and Israelis

from negotiating a peaceful resolution to their disputes had changed. The disintegration

of the Eastern European regimes in the late 1980s and the collapse of the Soviet Union

precipitated dramatic changes in Middle East politics. Along with these changes in the

international arena, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the consequent Operation Desert

Storm provided an opportunity for the United States to bring the Arabs and Israelis to

peace negotiations.

In the aftermath of the liberation of Kuwait in 1991, then U.S. President George

H. W. Bush raised the hope for reconciliation of the Arab-Israeli conflict. He declared the

resolution of this conflict one of the most important U.S. Middle East objectives.1 The

establishment of security arrangements in the Persian Gulf, regional arms control of

weapons of mass destruction, and promotion of economic development in the region

were among other U.S. objectives in the Middle East. The United States, therefore,

proposed a peace plan based upon a land for peace formula and the principles of the

United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.2 Thus, the U.S. in cooperation

1. “Transcript of President Bush’s Address on End of the Gulf War,” The New York Times, March 7, 1991, p. A8. 2. In his speech to a joint session of the Congress in March 1991, President Bush said, “a comprehensive peace must be grounded in the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle of territory for peace. This principle must be elaborated to provide for Israel’s security and recognition, and

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with the Soviets invited Israel and its immediate neighbors, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan—

in a joint delegation with the Palestinians—to a peace conference in Madrid. Syria, which

had long sought an international conference under the United Nations’ auspices based

upon these UN resolutions, accepted the invitation and the Madrid peace conference was

convened in November 1991.

Hafiz al-Asad had accepted a land for peace formula since the early 1970s when

he took power in Syria. But throughout the 1980s, Asad opposed negotiations with Israel

because he believed that the Arabs were in a position of weakness, and therefore, they

could not reach an honorable peace settlement with the Israelis. From Asad's point of

view, the strategic imbalance in Israel’s favor was one of the main obstacles for the stable

and lasting peace in the Middle East. Syria’s policy in the 1980s was to obstruct any

peace initiatives that were based on separate peace plans between Israel and its Arab

neighbors. During this decade, Syria insisted on an international conference for peace in

the Middle East with a Soviet-American role. Syria wanted UN Resolutions 242 and 338

to be the basis of any peace negotiations and for the United Nations to play an important

sponsorship role. Syria also long insisted on a united Arab delegation to demonstrate a

common Arab position in dealing with Israeli demands. Moreover, Syria required Israeli

commitment to full withdrawal before negotiations could begin, and sought to resist any

attempts to exclude Syria from the peace process.

However, the Madrid peace conference was the beginning of new peace

initiatives, aiming to bring the Arabs and Israelis to both bilateral and multilateral

negotiations for comprehensive solutions to their conflicts. The conference was designed

to encourage bilateral talks between Israel and its Arab neighbors. It also promoted

multilateral negotiations on regional issues with participation of the European Union and

the United Nations in order to strengthen confidence-building measures between the

parties at the regional level. Although it opposed negotiating regional issues before Israel

conceded to the principle of withdrawal from Arab lands, Syria attended the conference

at the same time for legitimate Palestinian political rights.” (“Transcript of President Bush’s Address on End of the Gulf War,” The New York Times, March 7, 1991, p. A8.)

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and agreed to bilateral talks with the Israelis. The United States had a significant role in

convincing Syria to attend the conference.

In the early 1990s, Hafiz al-Asad made what he called a ‘strategic decision’ to

join the Middle East peace process in Madrid. Following the collapse of the East Bloc

and disintegration of the Soviet Union, Syria lost its main benefactors3, and therefore,

could not credibly be a serious threat to Israeli security. Syria also was not able to protect

its own national interests in such an unacceptable imbalance of power that might come in

the aftermath of radical changes in the Middle East. Hence, Syria’s options were highly

limited: continuing the 1980s policy of rejectionism or adopting a new policy of

integration into the new Middle East after the end of the cold war.

The second Gulf crisis—the aftermath of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait—provided

Asad with an opportunity to make a strategic decision and at the same time forced him to

make an important concession. Hafiz al-Asad decided to join the U.S.-led coalition to

fight the Iraqi invasion, and also to participate to the U.S.-Soviet sponsored peace process

after the Gulf war in October 1991. These two decisions marked a significant, radical

change in Syria’s strategy toward peace in the Middle East. At the same time, it signified

the effect of the power imbalance after the collapse of the East Bloc on Syria’s foreign

policy: Syria conceded to participate in direct, unconditional, bilateral negotiations with

Israel without any Israeli commitment for full withdrawal from the occupied lands. Syria

was also forced to accept that Israel would not explicitly accept UN Resolutions 242 and

338 requiring Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied territories.

However, Asad's decision was not to abandon Syria’s goal of a just, honorable,

and comprehensive peace, but rather to revise his strategy to accept new conditions of

non-zero sum games in the Middle East. With the U.S. emphasis on the land for peace

formula, and on UN Resolutions 242 and 338 as the legal basis of peace negotiations,

Asad believed that he could reach his goals through negotiations. Asad regarded the

3. Helena Cobban, The Superpowers and the Syrian-Israeli Conflict (New York: Praeger Publisher, 1991), pp. 112-138.

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letters of invitation from the United States and the Soviet Union to participate in the

Madrid peace conference as assurance that the UN Resolutions 242 and 338 would be the

legal basis of the peace process. In the letters, the United States and the Soviet Union

announced they were “prepared to assist the parties to achieve a just, lasting and

comprehensive peace settlement, through direct negotiations along two tracks, between

Israel and the Arab states, and between Israel and the Palestinians, based on United

Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.”4 However, neither the United States

nor the Soviet Union promised explicitly that Israel would withdraw from all the

occupied lands.

In general, Asad's initial strategy was to end Syria’s isolation, to resituate Syria at

the Arab center and to explore if he could regain the lost territories through an acceptable

agreement. Meanwhile, Syria believes that they have the option to refuse any deal that

ignores Syria’s rights for full Israeli withdrawal from the Golan.

Moreover, Syria has long sought a direct and active American role as full

participant in the negotiations with the Israelis. Among reasons is that Syria maintained

that, because of its strategic relations with Israel, only the U.S. could strengthen

confidence-building measures between Syria and Israel and pressure Israel to make the

necessary compromises. The U.S. also could provide basic needs to address Israeli

concerns about its national security through playing a key role among international

peacekeeping forces and by providing Israel with sophisticated military equipment to

maintain Israel’s superiority in the region.

In addition, the Syrian-Israeli talks were basically different from other Middle

East peace talks. These two countries had been in either a state of war, or no peace, no

war status since Israel’s creation. Therefore, the need for a third party to facilitate the

communication between the two countries, and to propose initiatives to overcome

impasses had long been a crucial factor for the achievement of a peace treaty between

4. U.S. Department of State, “Invitation to the Madrid Middle East Peace Conference,” Department of State Dispatch, (November 25, 1991).

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Syria and Israel. Given these considerations, Syria had long insisted that the United

States should play an effective and central role in the Syrian-Israeli peace talks.5

Moreover, maintaining Syria's need to restore its relations with the United States,

Hafiz al-Asad appeared to use its participation in the peace process as a mechanism to

advance Syria's relations with the United States. After Syria lost its main patron, the

Soviet Union, the Syrians concluded that they desperately needed to have better, normal

relations with the United States. Asad’s desire to improve relations with the U.S. was a

major incentive for the Syrians to participate in the peace process.6 Better relations with

the United States would also allow removal of Syria's name from the U.S. Department of

State’s terrorist list, and thereby make Syria eligible for U.S. economic aid.

In addition to Syria's need for improving its relations with the United States, the

United States made clear to the Syrians that only through the achievement of a peace

treaty with Israel could Syria hope for having better relations with the United States. The

United States made improvement of its relations with Syria contingent on progress in the

Syrian-Israeli track. The United States, therefore, exploited Syria's need for better

relations to force Syria to limit its strategic relations with all other parties that oppose the

peace process in the Middle East, such as Palestinian rejectionist groups, Hizbollah, and

Iran. It was unacceptable to the Americans that Syria participates in the peace process

while harboring Palestinian rejectionist groups, and maintaining strategic relations with

Hizbollah.

However, Syria wanted to be an effective player in the Middle East peace process

while maintaining its special relations with these groups. So it remained unclear that to

what extent Syria would limit its strategic relations with the above peace opponents.

Syria, however, was aware of the need to make more concessions on procedural matters

in order to reach its goals. Therefore, throughout the various negotiations in the 1990s, 5. In contrast, the Israelis traditionally discouraged Americans from playing such a central role and pursued direct talks with the Arabs. They wanted the United States’ role to be as minimal as possible in order to prevent the Americans from pressuring Israel to make major concessions. 6. Andrew Bacevich, Michael Eisenstadt, and Carl Ford, Supporting Peace: America’s Role in an Israel-Syria peace agreement (Washington D.C., The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1994), pp. 42-43.

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Syria agreed to major concessions—such as normalization of relations, scope of

demilitarized zones, and presence of foreign forces on the Golan Heights—although it

appeared unlikely to compromise on territorial issues.

At the same time, the United States policy toward Syrian-Israeli negotiations

appeared to be based upon the idea that in order to reach a comprehensive peace between

Syria and Israel, the U.S. must be engaged in the process as full partner. Due to the

mistrustful nature of Syrian-Israeli relations, U.S. officials concluded that only through

an active U.S. participation could they achieve a peace treaty between Syria and Israel.

The process also could create an opportunity for the United States to advance its regional

national interests in the Middle East through achievement of a comprehensive peace

between Syria and Israel.

Therefore, tremendous diplomatic efforts took place by different U.S.

administrations to bring Syria and Israel to the negotiating table during the 1990s. Several

rounds of talks were convened by the United States in order to help the parties reach a

meaningful understanding of basic needs to make a comprehensive peace. But in the end,

it appeared to damage the U.S. position as full, active participant, and only mediator in

the Syrian-Israeli peace talks because it could not convince both sides to make the

necessary concessions toward the achievement of a durable and comprehensive peace.

The disputes between Syria and Israel over the nature of peace and the extent of Israeli

withdrawal from the Golan Heights, on one hand, and both the Israeli and Syrian rigidity,

on the other, caused the Syrian-Israeli peace talks to be complicated and tense.

The Syrian-Israeli track

In October 1991, Israel, Syria and Israel’s other neighbors, Lebanon, and Jordan

in a joint delegation with the Palestinians, attended a peace conference in Madrid, aiming

to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. Syria was engaged in bilateral peace negotiations

with Israel since the Madrid peace conference. But there was no progress in the early

months after the conference. Israel’s Likud-led government’s refusal of territorial

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concessions to the Syrians made any progress in bilateral Syrian-Israeli negotiations

impossible.

Only after the new Israeli administration came to power in June 1992 was there

some hope for substantive progress in the Syrian-Israeli track. In contrast to the Likud

government’s rigid policy on retaining the Golan Heights, the Labor government of

Yitzhak Rabin agreed to the “land for peace” formula and the possibility of peace with

Syria based upon UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

However, the negotiations did not resume until the Israelis concluded an interim

agreement with the Palestinians in September 1993 regarding the Declaration of

Principle. In addition, the Israeli negotiations with the Jordanians, which led to an Israel-

Jordan peace treaty in October 1994, created yet another pause to the Syrian-Israeli

negotiations. Therefore, during the three years after the Madrid conference, there was no

remarkable progress in the Syrian-Israeli track. The Israelis preferred to negotiate the

tracks that would contain fewer or no territorial concessions, and therefore, postponed

negotiating with the Syrians because Syria would not conclude a peace agreement with

Israel without Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights.

But Syria's position in the Middle East peace process was an important factor for

Israeli integration into the Middle East. The stalemate in the Syrian-Israeli track would

create uncertainties for the future of the peace process in the region, and interfere with

Israel’s relations with other Arab countries. This is why American’s role in keeping the

Syrian-Israeli peace process on track was so important. President Clinton’s meeting with

Hafiz al-Asad in Geneva in January 1994 and his first visit to Damascus in October that

year emphasized Syria's crucial role in the peace process.

Following the Geneva meeting, both Syria and Israel decided to engage in

substantive negotiations on various issues, particularly a description of security

arrangements. The meetings between the chiefs of staff of both Syria and Israel during

December 1994 and June 1995 resulted in remarkable progress. These meetings—with

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Americans in an active mediation role—led to a formal conclusion and a written

agreement titled “The Aims and Principles of the Security Arrangements.”

Although they reached important progress on the security arrangements during the

last months of Rabin’s government, Syria and Israel still had significant disagreements on

a variety of issues. Rabin was assassinated in November 1995, but his assassination did

not bring a stalemate to the peace talks between Syria and Israel. He was succeeded by

Shimon Peres who quickly renewed the Syrian-Israeli talks, aiming to reach a successful

conclusion within the short period of time before the election, which was to be held in

October 1996. The election was held earlier in May that year.

With full American participation in the talks, both Syrian and Israeli negotiating

teams held substantive negotiations on a variety of issues at Wye Plantation in Maryland

between December 1995 and March 1996. For the first time, it seemed that both sides

were close to reaching a meaningful conclusion. But the negotiations were again derailed

because of Peres’s decision in February 1996 to hold an early election and most

importantly because of a series of terrorist attacks in Israel in early 1996 by Palestinian

opponents of the peace process. Consequently, Prime Minister Peres suspended the talks

in March 4, 1996, the whole peace process came to a complete standstill, and relations

between the two parties deteriorated.

In the election of May 1996, Peres was defeated by the Likud party nominee,

Binyamin Netanyahu. The new prime minister then not only refused to resume the

negotiations at the point they were suspended by Peres, but also tried to reverse the

achievement of the several rounds of talks that took place before he took office. At the

same time, Syria also refused to resume the negotiations on a new basis, without any

preconditions. Syria maintained such a policy would undermine the achievement of the

previous talks. Consequently, the Syrian-Israeli talks did not resume during Netanyahu’s

premiership and were stalled for almost four years.

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Only after Ehud Barak was elected prime minister in May 1999 did the Israelis

announce that they would restart the stalled negotiations with both the Palestinians and

Syrians simultaneously. This brought new optimism for the Syrian-Israeli peace process

in the expectation that the two parties, with American participation, would resume their

negotiations from the point at which Peres had suspended them four years earlier. But

there was no agreement on where that point was. It was several months before the United

States could convince the parties to resume their negotiations. Finally both sides agreed

to resume their talks from the point where they left off in March 1996, with the provision

that each side have their own interpretation on what the point was. A two-day joint

meeting convened in Washington in December 1999 between President Clinton and

Syrian and Israeli officials for the purpose of discussing procedural matters of the Syrian-

Israeli talks. For the first time, both sides agreed to negotiate their differences with the

highest ranking participants ever, Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Foreign Minister Faroq

al-Shara’.

The Syrian-Israeli talks were resumed in Shepherdstown in January 2000 after a

nearly four-year hiatus. The Shepherdstown talks were the last Syrian-Israeli negotiations

at this writing. The talks focused on procedural matters, but finally stalled because of

enormous disagreements over which issues should take priority in the negotiations. The

Israelis wanted security arrangements to be addressed first, while the Syrians insisted that

Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights should take priority. Mutual mistrust and

inflexibility on both sides were significant obstacles in these talks. Even an American

proposal to convene technical committees to simultaneously discuss the main issues of

contention could not bring a breakthrough. The talks were suspended but the parties

agreed to resume their negotiations in 10 days. Syria later refused to participate in the

negotiations unless Israel agreed to commit in principle to an unconditional withdrawal

from the entire Golan Heights.

Consequently, the Syrian-Israeli talks were deadlocked over the fact that Israel

did not want to negotiate its withdrawal from the Golan Heights prior to concluding

security arrangements and normalization of relations with the Syrians. The Syrians

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argued it would be pointless to negotiate the future of relations with the Israelis while

they did not know whether Israel would be willing to withdraw from the Golan Heights.

The only hope for resumption of the talks was the Geneva summit (March 2000) between

Presidents Clinton and Hafiz al-Asad. The Syrians hoped the presidential summit would

bring a breakthrough to the stalled Syrian-Israeli track. But President Clinton failed to

convince Hafiz al- Asad to resume the peace talks with the Israelis. The summit was the

last chance for resumption of the Syrian-Israeli track under Clinton’s auspices. Hafiz al-

Asad died later in June 2000.

Main questions and hypotheses

Before the 1990s, The United States Middle East policy toward Syria was based

on the perception of Syria as the surrogate of the Soviet Union in the Middle East, as a

state sponsoring international terrorism, and as an opponent of the peace process in the

Middle East.7 During this period, the United States policy toward Syria was designed to

prevent escalation of conflict between Syria and Israel, to consolidate the Camp David

Peace Accord, and to prevent Syria from sabotaging U.S. interests in the region.

Consequently, Syria faced economic sanctions, diplomatic pressure, and was named by

the U.S. administrations a pariah and rogue state.

But in the early 1990s, a considerable shift in the U.S.-Syria relationship occurred

because of drastic changes in international and regional affairs in the aftermath of the

collapse of the Soviet Union. In addition to this, American hegemony in the Middle East,

which was the immediate consequence of the U.S.-led coalition victory over Iraq,

precipitated new changes in the United States’ relations with Syria. Syria's crucial

decision to join the U.S.-led coalition against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait provided

common interests between the United States and Syria8 and, eased U.S.-Syria relations.9

7. Meredith R. Sarkees and Stephen Zunes, “Disenchantment With the New World Order: Syria's Relations With the United States,” International Journal Vol. XLIX, (spring 1994): p. 355. 8. Syria and Iraq had long been bitter enemies. Rivalry between the two ruling Ba’th parties had been tense during the 1980s when Syria backed Iran after the Iraqi invasion of Iran in 1980. Disagreement on various regional issues intensified personal animosity between Hafiz al-Asad and Saddam Hussein. The rivalry

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Syria's participation in the 1991 Madrid peace conference signified this new phase and

increased the possible role that the U.S. could play in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Thereafter, the United States convened several rounds of talks between the Syrians and

Israelis, aimed at resolving the huge differences between the two countries, such as

withdrawal of Israeli settlements from the Golan Heights, normalization of relations, and

security arrangements.

During the same time, Syria's role in the Arab-Israeli conflict had been crucial.

The United States acknowledged on several occasions “a Syrian-Israeli agreement is key

to achieving a comprehensive peace. Given Syria's important regional role, it will

inevitably broaden the circle of Arab states willing to embrace peace. And it will build

confidence throughout the area that peace will endure.”10 Syria has long been a key

regional player in the Middle East and its role in the Arab-Israeli conflict cannot be

ignored.11 According to an analysis, “Syria still retains considerable leverage in Middle

East peace diplomacy. Without Syria's imprimatur no Arab-Israeli peace can arguably be

legitimate and hence durable. If its interests are not satisfied, Syria can obstruct Israel's

full incorporation into the Middle East.”12 Therefore, Syria's participation in the Middle

East peace talks was essential for the achievement of a reliable and comprehensive peace

between the Arabs and the Israelis.

between the two countries was so tense that Syria took the opportunity to join the U.S.-led coalition, fighting against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in the early 1990s. 9. Meredith R. Sarkees and Stephen Zunes, p. 355. 10. U.S. Department of State, “Progress Toward Achieving A Common Goal Of Peace In The Middle East,” Department of State Dispatch Vol. 5, Issue 10, (November 1994): p. 16. 11. Talcott W. Seelye, “The Syrian Perspective on the Peace Process” American-Arab Affairs No. 17, (Summer 1986): p. 61. 12. In their discussion regarding Syria's role and position in the peace process, Ehteshami and Hinnebusch argue, “a peace agreement with Syria offers the most practical opportunity to neutralize the main military threat Israel faces. The threats of Islamic fundamentalism and Israel's vulnerability to chemically or biologically armed missiles could also be much reduced by a Syrian peace. If Syria remains excluded from a settlement, it can continue to threaten Israeli security in small but bothersome ways. Asad could encourage Hizbollah pressure on Israel's security zone in Lebanon. He could attempt to mobilize the significant numbers of Diaspora Palestinians abandoned and embittered by the Oslo agreement. Anti-Oslo groups like HAMAS and Ahmad Jebril's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command (PFLP- GC) can pull off spectacular anti-Israeli operations.” (Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Raymond Hinnebusch, Syria and Iran: Middle Power in a Penetrated Regional System (Routledge, February 1997), p. 174.)

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The central theme of this research is to examine the United States’ role in the

Syrian-Israeli peace process from the Madrid peace conference in November 1991 until

the death of Hafiz al-Asad in June 2000. The main question is:

What was the American role in the Syrian-Israeli peace process during the

1990s? Did or did not the United States play a pivotal, constructive role in the

search for a comprehensive peace between Syria and Israel?

This research will address the U.S. role in the Middle East peace process within

the context of the Syrian-Israeli negotiations during the 1990s. It will also examine the

process to see if there is any continuity, similarity, or difference in the U.S. role of

mediator in the Syrian-Israeli peace process during the successive U.S. presidencies of

the 1990s. The main hypotheses below will provide an analytical framework to address

the questions above.

Although the United States had been an active participant in the negotiations for

a comprehensive peace between Syria and Israel during the 1990s, it failed to bring an

end to the Syrian-Israeli conflict. The strong U.S. interest in Israel, driven mostly by

domestic politics, made it unwilling to pressure Israel to make the necessary concessions.

Syrian inflexibility and Israeli unwillingness to compromise were also crucial factors.

Therefore,

The less willing the United States was to pressure Israel to make compromises,

the more determined Syria became to resist making concessions to Israeli demands.

The less ready Syria was to make the necessary concessions, the more the United

States ignored Syria's core demand for full Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights as

the basis for a comprehensive peace.

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The less attention the United States paid to Syria's demands, the more Syria

resisted and defied American peace initiatives. This scenario brought the whole peace

process to several stalemates although Syria avoided sabotaging the initiatives. This was

because Syria wanted to moderate its positions as accommodation to the new changes in

the international and regional political systems, on one hand, and their need to better

their relationship with the United States in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet

Union, on the other.

There are few scholarly and systematic works on this subject. But the aim of this

research is to evaluate the U.S. role in the Middle East peace process with specific focus

on Syrian-Israeli talks. As mentioned, negotiations between the Syrians and Israelis in the

1990s had been complicated and tense, rarely reaching a written agreement, and were

suspended several times because of enormous differences on procedural matters. The

Americans had tried to keep the talks on track, but due to the tentative nature of these

talks, the Syrian-Israeli negotiations were derailed most times before the sides reached a

conceptual framework for conducting the negotiations.

The U.S. was not an impartial mediator. It has had strategic relations with Israel,

and refused to improve its relations with Syria. The contribution of this research is to

examine the American role in the negotiations between Syria and Israel, aiming to

provide a better understanding of the patterns of influence by which the U.S. tried to

affect Syria's position in the peace process. For example, although the U.S.

acknowledged Syria has not been engaged in the international terrorism since 1986, the

United States refused to remove Syria's name from the list. The United States also

continued to impose sanctions on Syria, aiming to influence on Syria's domestic and

foreign policy. The U.S. administrations implicitly made the improvement of their

relations with Syria contingent on progress on the Syrian-Israeli track.

This research will show how changes in the regional and international political

systems after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait have

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affected Syria's position in the Middle East and consequently facilitated the Syrian

participation in the peace process.

This research is organized into eleven chapters. Chapter one contains a discussion

of the main questions and hypotheses. The second chapter is a brief discussion about the

theoretical foundation of this research. Third chapter is an introduction to U.S.-Syrian

relations. The next chapter describes early phases of the Middle East peace process that

began in Madrid, Spain in November 1991. The reasons that led the Syrians to attend this

conference will be discussed briefly in this chapter. The next chapter contains a

discussion of the Oslo peace process and its impact on the Syrian-Israeli track. The

ramification of this process for Syria and Syria's reaction to this accord will be discussed

here. The sixth chapter addresses the slow progress in the Syrian-Israeli track during

1993-1994. The events that caused yet another break in the Syrian-Israeli peace

negotiations will be discussed in this chapter. The next chapter contains a discussion of

an important phase of the Syrian-Israeli peace talks, one which includes negotiations on

security arrangements between the Israeli and Syrian chiefs of staff. These negotiations

occurred under American auspices during 1994 and 1995 in Washington, DC. Progress

on the Syrian-Israeli track during Peres’s premiership will be addressed in the eighth

chapter. The ninth chapter contains a discussion of the grounds that led to the longest

stalemate yet in the Syrian-Israeli peace talks that occurred during Netanyahu’s

government 1996-1999. The next chapter will address the resumption of talks between

Syria and Israel in Shepherdstown in January 2000. This chapter also elucidates

differences that prevented the Israelis and Syrians from reaching an agreement. These

differences over procedural matters brought the whole peace process between Syria and

Israel to a complete standstill. There has been no progress in the Syrian-Israeli track

since. The last chapter contains general discussion and prospects for the Syrian-Israeli

peace talks.

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Chapter 2

Theoretical framework

Introduction

The realist and neo-realist approaches of international politics will provide a

theoretical foundation for this study. The U.S. role in the negotiations for the

reconciliation of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Syria’s participation in the Middle East peace

process and also Israeli position in regard to the negotiations could also best be explained

through the prism of realist and neo-realist approaches of international politics. However,

this work is not a theoretical work and because of that it will not include a

comprehensive, critical examination of theories of international relations to see what

theory could best be applicable to this study, if there is such a theory!

Since each of the participants in the negotiations (the United States, Syria and

Israel) carefully made a strategic decision in order to take part in the talks, the theory of

decision-making process could provide a conceptual framework for a critical examination

of U.S. peace initiatives, upon which the United States proposed the settlement of the

Arab-Israeli conflict through mechanism of simultaneous, bilateral and multilateral

negotiations in the early 1990s. It also would be applicable to Syria’s willingness and

Israeli’s reluctant position to join the Madrid peace conference.

It was obvious that it is not going to be any peace between Syria and Israel while

the latter continues its occupation of Syria’s territory. What did really lead the United

States to propose a peace plan at the time that it was not clear whether its strategic ally,

Israel, would agree to withdraw from the occupied Arab lands? There was a complex

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ambiguity that the Israelis compromise their national interests by withdrawing from the

strategic Golan Heights. What forces led the Syrians to make such a strategic decision to

attend the Madrid peace conference while they knew that it was unlikely that Israel

concede from its position? Why did Israel demonstrate its reluctance to participate to

such a conference, and how the United States convinced both Syria and Israel to attend

the conference?

There is variety of factors that led to the arrangement of the Madrid peace

conference. But what really made that decision is extremely difficult to answer. We could

recognize different variables that somehow formulated this policy. There are a great

variety of possible causes that affect the making of foreign policy. These variables were

organized by different scholars into conceptual frameworks, such as the scientific work

of James Rosenau.13 Therefore, it would be helpful to use his framework to encompass

different variables that led to the establishment of peace process between the Arabs and

Israelis in the early 1990s. However, the “power elite” and its significant role in the

formation of U.S. foreign policy are not deniable. Therefore, a revisionist critique of

decision-making process, in which scholars with a socialist orientation criticized the

scientific study of foreign policy, would provide a theoretical alternative for this study.

Particularly, the works of Gabriel Kolko is a great contribution to this approach.14 There

will be a brief discussion at the end of this chapter.

The peace negotiations between Syria and Israel began with Syria’s acceptance to

participate in the Madrid peace conference in November 1991 and were ended in March

2000, when the Americans frustratingly failed to bring practical initiatives to overcome

the intractable stalemates in the Syrian-Israeli tracks. This research is mostly a case study

to critically examine the ineffective role of the United States as a mediator and facilitator

13- James Rosenau, The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy, (New York: Nichols Publishing Company, 1971). 14- Theodore A. Couloumbis and James H. Wolfe, Introduction to International Relations: power and Justice, (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1978), p. 106-107. for more information see Kolko’s Roots of American Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Power and Purpose (Boston: beacon Press, 1969); The Politics of War: The World and The United States Foreign Policy (New York: Random House, 1968); see also Joyce Kolko and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and The United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954 (New York: Harper and Row, 1972).

23

in the Syrian-Israeli peace negotiations. However, in order to provide a better

understanding, there will be a discussion, in brief, about the theories of international

relations, realism and neo-realism approaches, and the making of foreign policies.

Theories of international relations

Theories of international relations, like other theories, is a reflection to the time,

problems and difficulties that both scholars and policy-makers has had to analyzing

important events of international relations. Stanley Hoffmann, a scholar of the

traditionalist school, had defined contemporary theory of international relations as “a

systematic study of observable phenomena that tries to discover the principle variables, to

explain behavior, and to reveal the characteristic types of relations among national

units.”15 David Singer defined theory of international relations as “a body of internally

consistent empirical generalization of descriptive, predictive, and explanatory power.”16

Following, there is a discussion, in brief, regarding the evolution of theories of

international relations, Level of analysis, the complexity of explanation, and the utility of

theory in international relations. It follows a brief discussion about the realism and neo-

realism approaches of international relations, and Roseau’s conceptual framework for the

scientific study of foreign policy and Gabriel Kolko’s alternative approach. At the end

there is a discussion about the realism in Syrian foreign policy.

The evolution of theories of international relations

In general, one could recognize different paradigms in the study of international

relations, which include idealism, realism, radicalism (Marxism) and modernism.17 The

different approaches of the study of international relation could also be simply

categorized to traditionalist and scientific. The traditional approach includes both 15- Theodore A. Couloumbis and James H. Wolfe, p. 25 Quoted from Stanley Hoffmann, Theory and International Relations, in International Politics and Foreign Policy, 2ed ed. Rev., ed. James N. Rosenau (New York: Free Press, 1969), p. 30. 16- Theodore A. Couloumbis and James H. Wolfe, p. 25. 17- For a comprehensive review of theoretical Approaches to international relations see James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories of International Relations, (Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers Inc. 1997), pp. 1-45.

24

idealists and realists. The idealism and realism were dominant approach in the study of

international politics between 1920s-1930s and 1940s-1950s respectively. The scientific

approaches of international politics, which was the achievement of modernism, consist

from behaviorism (1950s-1960s) and post-behaviorism (after 1970). Each approach

provides key concepts and framework for analysis, prediction and better understanding of

international politics, while demonstrates the most important issues that had been the

main concern of the great philosophers and thinkers of political science and international

relations.

There are some issues that have always been important for both politicians and

scholars alike. Issues such as peace, war, conflict, cooperation, sovereignty, anarchy,

power, and etc. have been remained significant. But the level of importance, analysis and

understanding of these issues has been subject to different interpretations and

descriptions, depending on using different approaches. For example, while power is the

main focus of and central to the realism in international politics, the idealists place more

weight to peace, and cooperation.

The evolution of international relations passed through serious debates between

philosophers and scholars of international politics. The first debate was in the aftermath

of World War I, when idealists failed to predict and prevent the catastrophic War. The

debate was between the idealists and realists. The realists then could provide a better

understanding of power politics at the international level, and therefore, became a

dominant approach of the study of international relations in the period between the late

1930s and 1950s.

The enormous empirical progress in the 1950s in social sciences, economy,

psychology and other disciplines, on one hand, and the inadequacy and inability of realist

approach to explain the most important events of the current international relations (the

events that led to disastrous World War II), on the other, brought an inevitable challenge

to realist school of thought in international politics. The challenge was an attempt to

expand the new achievement of other disciplines to the study of international politics, and

25

it was mostly methodological, taking to the account the rise of new elements in the

formation of the study of international relations. This debate was between traditionalists

and behaviorists. This approach named behaviorism, which preoccupied the study of

international relations in the 1950s and 1960s.

The third stage of evolution was when scholars of international politics realized

the difficulties and inadequacy of behaviorism in the study of international relations.

They tried to use every possible means, including traditional and new approaches, to

provide a better understanding and prediction in the study of world politics. The debate

was between idealism, realism, liberalism, radicalism and behaviorism. The result was

led to focusing more on middle-range theory to explain specific issues of international

relations, within new approaches such as post-behaviorism, neo-realism (structural

realism), neo-liberalist institutionalism, dependency and interdependency, and etc.

The disintegration of the Eastern European regimes, the collapse of the Soviet

Union and the end of the Cold War brought enormous challenges to the theories of

international relations. The fact that none of these theories could explain beforehand the

possibility of such drastic changes at this level was a total and complex failure.18 The

theoreticians and scholars of international politics, therefore, tried to explain the reasons

that led to this failure and, at the same time, had to reappraise the theories of international

relations in such a way that they could provide a better interpretation of contemporary

international politics and its complexities.

Level of analysis

Generally, there are three level of analysis: 1) Individual level, which usually

refers to personal characters of policy makers, and their impact on the making of foreign

policy. 2) Nation-state level that consist of various departments and bureaucracies that

influence both on the process of decision-making and on the policy-makers. 3)

18- Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen, eds. International Relations Theory and the End of Cold War, (New York: Columbia university Press, 1995) pp. 1-17.

26

International political system that provides the structural frameworks for the interaction

between its members. Both traditionalists and scientists have tried to analyze the impact

of the structure of international relations on the formation of foreign policy.19

The complexity of explanation in international relations

There is variety of different approaches for the study of international relations.

The diversity of these approaches came at different times, mostly in reaction to

inadequacy of then current approaches. However, the impact of the achievement of other

field of studies, particularly social science, economy, psychology, technology and etc.

had also been important in the formation of the study of international relations. The field

of International relations is an interdisciplinary field; and, the impact of the other

disciplines on the study of international relations would be inevitable.

In addition to unmanageable complexities of issues in international relations, the

impact of other disciplines had significantly increased the level of complexity, although it

provides a better framework for the explanation and analysis of various patterns of

continuity, similarity and changes in international politics. But the problem of having

many theoretical frameworks would definitely lead to contradictory explanations, at least

in some cases.20 This complication, however, might prevent us from achieving to a

meaningful explanation. Therefore, while we are using a theory in order to explain and

analyze a case study, we have to be aware of the fact that such a theory might make a

structural dilemma, making us to view the problem only through prism of that theory.

Therefore, one should search for a set of alternatives; using theories to the extent that

they could provide variety of variables that might have an impact on the making of

foreign policy.

19- There are interesting works by Hans Morgenthau, Raymond Aron (classical realist) and Karl Deutsch and Morton Kaplan (behaviorist). 20- See G. John Ikenberry, American Foreign Policy: Theoritical Essays (Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers Inc., 1999) pp. 7-10.

27

The utility of theory in international relations

A conceptual framework could provide a better explanation and interpretation of

past and contemporary international relations. International relations is a dynamic field;

variety of factors and elements influence on its formation. And because of that, there are

variety of different theories and approaches, with different key concepts, and different

contributions to the study of international relations. There have been remarkable

theoretical debates between different approaches in explaining important issues of world

politics.

The applicability of one theory to another in the study of international relations

would defiantly depend on the consistency of a theory, on one hand, and on the issues of

case study, on the other. The perception of researcher both in regard to the theory and to

the case study also is a significant factor. We, however, do need some standards to

evaluate the adequacy and applicability of a theory, and to see if a theory could provide a

meaningful explanation of contemporary world politics.

The utility of a theory is that if it could provide the variety of variables, specially

the interaction between the variables that shape the international relations. A theory of

international relations should also minimize, if it is even possible, the impact of

parameters, such as personal belief, perception, etc. that might influence on the

explanation of international relations.

Realism

Realism and neo-realism approaches of the study of international relations are the

basis for a pragmatic study of international politics. Realism emerged as a reaction to the

failure of idealism to provide a meaningful understanding of the international politics in

the aftermath of the World War I. It, however, evolved through serious debates between

realists and the opponents of this approach. The key concepts for realism are power,

28

national interest, and the struggle for power at the international level.21 Political realism

maintains a negative view of human nature and the fact that human being are essentially

self-interested. Hans J. Morgenthau who was proponent of the classic realist approach

stated the principles of political realism as follow:

1- “Political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by

objective law that have their roots in human nature.”

2- “The main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the

landscape on international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of

power.”

3- “The key concept of interest defined as power is an objective category which is

universally valid.”

4- “Political realism is aware of the moral significance of political

action…Realism maintains that universal moral principles cannot be applied to

the actions of states…”22

In general, the realist tradition emphasizes on power as the means (capabilities)

and, at the same time, as the ends in international system; the system itself is

characterized by anarchy. National interest is the basis for power, and the states are the

primary actors in international relations. Since national interest is the core motivation for

the struggle of power in international politics, it assumed that the states are rational actors

that they are doing their best, using every possible means regardless of morality and

values, to maximize their power in order to protect their national interest, which is mostly

the increase of power in order to protect national security.

Neo-realism23

The complexity of international relations, the ambiguities of international and

regional issues, and the rise of many other non-state actors to the international relations 21- See James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, p. 58. 22- Phil Williams, Donald Goldstein and Jay Shafritz, Classic Reading of International Relations, 2ed ed. (Harcourt Brace College Publisher, 1999), pp. 43-47. 23- See James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, pp. 80-89.

29

brought enormous challenges to the approach of realist tradition. The challenges came

also from other traditions that fundamentally disagree either with the principles or

methodology of realism in the study of international relations. Therefore, the need for

change was inevitable. A new approach, within the basic conceptual framework of

realism, emerged to accommodate to the new changes in the contemporary world politics.

Neo-realism that also called structural realism was an attempt to bring a new

understanding to the international politics, looking to the issues of international relations

from a new perspective, using both adequate elements of other theories and the

achievements of other disciplines to provide a meaningful interpretation to the

contemporary international relations. This approach identified with the work of Kenneth

Waltz in “Theory of international politics”24 in the late 1970s. There are also other

scholarly contributions that study international relations through different perspective of

neo-realism.25

According to James Dougherty and Robert Pfaltzgraff, “Neo-realism purports to

refine and reinvigorate classical realism by developing propositions based on the

disaggregation of independent and dependent variables, and by integrating what is termed

classical realist theory into contemporary framework based on comparative analysis.”26

Neo-realism emphasizes on the structure of international system and on the fact that this

structure shapes the relationship between its actors.27 There is a distinct difference

between international system and domestic politics by reference to the fact that in

international system there is no authority while there is a central, hierarchical authority in

domestic politics. The structure of international system, therefore, is anarchy that defined

by “the distribution of capabilities among the units…. The structure of the system,

24- Kenneth Waltz, Theory of international politics, (Reading MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979). 25-James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, pp. 80-89. 26-James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, p. 80. 27- For more information about the international system see Phil Williams, Donald Goldstein and Jay Shafritz, Classic Reading of International Relations, 2ed ed. (Harcourt Brace College Publisher, 1999), p. 71-87.

30

notably the number of actors and their respective capabilities, shapes the pattern of

interaction that will take place.”28

Foreign policy decision-making process

Who or what makes foreign policies has long been an important question both for

scholars and politicians alike. There is variety of academic works for theorization of

foreign policy. Because there are enormous uncertainties in regards to the number of

variables and the way that they influence on the making of foreign policies, making

theory in order to generalize the outcomes to other cases is extremely difficult. These

variables include, in fact, the variety of domestic, regional and international issues. It is

also accurate to say that finally the individuals that make decisions, either in the name of

a nation-state, organization or a group, have great impact on decision making, taking to

the account their perceptions that could have considerable impacts on the making of

foreign policy, regardless of our inability to measure them. In addition to these

uncertainties, there are extensive ambiguities about the process that within which these

variables interact and influence on the decisions making.

A simple explanation of foreign policy would be that it consists of the ends and

the means and the interaction between these elements, taking to the account the variety of

other elements that shapes the ends and makes the means. “Foreign policy consists of two

elements: national objectives to be achieved and the resources for achieving them. The

interaction between national goals and the resources for attaining them is the perennial

subject of statecraft. In its ingredients the foreign policy of all nations, great and small, is

the same.”29

The purpose of this study is not discussion about the elements that somehow

influence on the decisions making process. It is, however, to introduce that to some

28- James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, p.82. 29- Theodore A. Couloumbis and James H. Wolfe, p. 89 quoted from Cecil V. Crabb, American Foreign policy in the Nuclear Age, 3rd ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), p. 1.

31

extent the scientific work of James Rosenau, particularly his linkage theory, provides a

good theoretical framework for this study. Rosenau categorized the variables that might

influence on shaping foreign policy into five major groups: idiosyncratic, role,

bureaucracy, national and systemic variables.

Idiosyncratic variables

The idiosyncratic variables refer to the very special and personal characteristic of

individuals that has an important role in the decision making process. Ultimately, the

decisions are made and implemented by the individuals that have a role in foreign policy.

As Richard Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin stated, “It is one of our basic

methodological choice to define the state as its official decision-maker…State action is

the action taking by those acting in the name of state.”30 Therefore, the perception of

these individuals both in regard to the subject and to the implementation of the policy is

an important factor. Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff emphasize, “Perception is assigned a

central place in decision-making theory. When dealing with the definition of the

situation, most decision-making theorists regard the world as viewed by decision makers

to be more important than objective reality.”31 The personality, education, the quality of

life has great impact on people’s perception, and their perception in regards to human

being, society, and of course in regard to the subject of decision itself, has deniable

effects. However, the problem in this regard is that these characters are very personal and

it is extremely difficult to examine and generalize to other cases.

Role variables

The second set of parameters is the role variables that usually “defined as job

description or as expected rules of behavior for president, cabinet officers, high-level

30- James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, p. 458, quoted from “Decision-Making as an Approach to the study of International Politics,” in Richard Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin, eds., Foreign Policy Decision-Making (New York: Free Press, 1963), p. 65 and pp. 85-86. 31- James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, p. 458.

32

bureaucrats…and other elites who affect, formulate and implement foreign policies.”32

The importance of these variables is that people might change their view based on the

position that they have or in another word the position could change people’s mind, and

therefore their decisions as well.33

Bureaucratic variables

The third category is the bureaucracy variables, which include the structure,

processes and procedures within which policy makers make the decisions. The

importance of bureaucracy is that, due to the complexity of issues and their

interdependency to variety of other issues, decisions usually make by various

departments and bureaucratic structures that according to Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff “find

themselves in competition for the allocation of scarce resources.”34 However, according

to Francis Rourke in Bureaucracy and Foreign Policy35

“While they [bureaucracies] can shape the view of political leaders and the public

on foreign-policy issues, and often possess technical capabilities that enable them

to influence the flow of events, nevertheless bureaucratic agencies compose only

one part of a democratic political system. Their power ultimately depends on the

willingness of others—for example, Congress and the president—to support them,

accept their advice, or legitimize their activities by going along with them.”36

National variables

The fourth set of variables is about national and domestic parameters. According

to Rosenau, national variables include variety of issues such as political and economic

system, geo-political position of a country, population, natural resources and many other 32- Theodore A. Couloumbis and James H. Wolfe, p. 92. 33- James Rosenau, pp. 177-184. 34- James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, p. 460. 35- Francis Rourke, Bureaucracy and Foreign Policy, (Baltimore: MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1972), pp. 49-50. 36- James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, p. 461, quoted from Francis Rourke, Bureaucracy and Foreign Policy, (Baltimore: MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1972), pp. 62-65.

33

issues that related to “tangible and intangible elements of power.” The impact of political

system, and the fact that how does a democratic or non-democratic political system

influence on the making of foreign policy discuss under this category. It does also include

gross national products and the impact of industrial, and the level of social and economic

development on decision-making in foreign policy. Diversity, culture, integrity and the

state of ethnic and religious similarities or conflict, and the military capability have

important effects on the making of foreign policy.37 However, as Theodore A.

Couloumbis and James H. Wolfe put it, “These variables are numerous, and one should

be conscious of their existence. In doing so, however, one should not try to reduce

foreign-policy phenomena to simple cause-effect relationships.”38

Systemic variables

The last category is the systemic variables, which include external elements of

foreign policies. The impact of structure of international system on the making of foreign

policy is inevitable. To some extent, neo-realist approach was an answer and reaction to

the importance of these variables on international politics. James Rosenau discusses in

details the external environment as a significant variable in foreign policy analysis.39 He

then links these variables to the national parameters in order to provide a conceptual

framework for the linkage theory. According to Theodore A. Couloumbis and James H.

Wolfe, “systemic variables (such as structure of the international system, international

law, international organizations and alliances, dependencies and interdependencies, and

the actions and interactions of other states) affect a state’s foreign-policy

formulation…systemic variables provide constraints and opportunities that outline the

general directions of foreign policies.”40

37- for more information see: Theodore A. Couloumbis and James H. Wolfe, pp. 94-97. 38- for more information see: Theodore A. Couloumbis and James H. Wolfe, p. 97. 39- James Rosenau, pp. 317-338. 40- for more information see: Theodore A. Couloumbis and James H. Wolfe, p. 99.

34

Linkage Theory

Emphasizing on the fact that “Modern science and technology have collapsed

space and time in the physical world and thereby heightened interdependence in the

political world”41, James Rosenau stated the need for the development of theoretical

constructs for explaining the relations between the units and their environments. He,

therefore, emphasizes on the fact that there is a great extent of interdependency between

domestic and international politics.42 As Theodore A. Couloumbis and James H. Wolfe

put it “That is, no foreign policies are made without regard to their domestic

consequences, and vice versa. Indeed foreign and domestic policies are intimately linked;

they can be separated only for the purpose of analysis and at the expense of some

distortion of reality.”43 Therefore, one should consider the importance of interaction

between the making foreign policy and domestic constrains.

Elite Power theory

As Theodore A. Couloumbis and James H. Wolfe stated, Gabriel Kolko’s works

are quite representative of the critical approach of studying decision-making process

through a scientific approach. Accordingly “Kolko has suggested in many of his works

that it is near waste of time to study bureaucratic structures, to trace information flows, or

to conduct social-origin studies in order to arrive at the sources or causes of bureaucratic

decision-making behavior…Kolko believes that there is a “power elite” in the United

States and that this elite is virtually synonymous with big business (specially, the 300

largest corporation in the United States). This capitalist-oriented business elite, according

to Kolko, has been responsible single-handedly for the definition of America’s national

interests. A major premise of Kolko’s is that big-business interests have achieved a near

monopoly in their ability to equate America’s foreign policies with the interests of large

corporation.”44

41- James Rosenau, p. 371. 42- James Rosenau, pp. 370-401. 43- Theodore A. Couloumbis and James H. Wolfe, p. 101. 44- Theodore A. Couloumbis and James H. Wolfe, p. 106.

35

Realism in Syria’s foreign policy

There is variety of main issues that could support the idea that Syria’s foreign

policy, during Hafiz al-Asad era, was formed through prism of realist approach of

international politics. Hafiz al-Asad understood the importance of power politics in the

region and the structure of international political system, and therefore tried to maximize

its gains through playing an important regional role.

For example, following the structural changes in the international political system

in the aftermath of disintegration of Soviet bloc and the end of the Cold War, Syria made

a strategic decision to better its relation with the United States, the only remaining sole

hegemonic superpower, in order to accommodate to the new changes in the Middle East.

Syria, therefore, joined the U.S.-led coalition to fight against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait

and also participated in the Madrid peace conference, hoping these actions would end

Syria’s isolation and lead to resituate Syria as an important regional actor.

Whatever political, economical and social or other forces shaped Syria’s decision

to adjust its foreign policy and to accommodate to the new changes in the Middle East

after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the main assumption of this research is that Syria

made its decision based upon a prudent, rational calculation of its objectives and

capabilities. Even though Syria had no better option but to moderate its foreign policy,

Syria’s decision was based upon a rational, realist approach and therefore this decision

could best be explained through the realism and particularly neo-realism approach of

international relations.

Roots of realism in Syria’s foreign policy during Hafiz al-Asad’s era

The Socialist Ba’th party, which Hafiz al-Asad belonged to them, took power in

Syria in 1963. At the time, Syria’s foreign policy was preoccupied by both the political

36

instability and the enormous threat from Israel. The Ba’th party was dominated by the

radicals and formulated by anti-Zionism, anti-imperialism and pan-Arab attitudes.

Accordingly, the main goals of Syria’s foreign policy were the liberation of Palestine and

destruction of Israel. The defeat of 1967 war, and the fact that Arabs could not do

anything from the position of weakness, provided an opportunity for a moderate and

pragmatic member of the Ba’th party to take control of government of Syria in the early

1970s.

When Hafiz a-Asad came to power in 1970, he tried to balance between Syria's

objectives and capabilities. His main goal was to downgrade the objectives of Syria's

foreign policy from the liberation of whole Palestine to the recovery of the Arab lands

that were occupied by Israel in the aftermath of the 1967 War, and finally to the recovery

of only Syria's Golan Heights, which he lost when he was defense minister in 1967. Hafiz

al-Asad also, at he same time, tried to upgrade Syria's capabilities through strengthening

Syria's military power and most importantly through playing an important, crucial,

formidable role in regional crises. The interesting point was Asad’s fascinating ability to

use power politic in the region, particularly in Lebanon, as an important mechanism for

the manipulation of power and for making Syria an indispensable regional player that

both the United States and other regional powers could not ignore or bypass Syria's

important role in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Given Syria's tangible and intangible elements of power, and the fact that Syria

was a poor country that neither had the wealth of rich Arab countries, nor the population

and military strength of the others, Hafiz al-Asad adopted a policy upon which

pragmatism and a realist view of regional and international power politics were an

essential element in the formation of Syria's foreign policy.

The study of Syria's foreign policy during Hafiz al-Asad’s presidency demonstrated

variety of pragmatic and realist indications of the making of foreign policy. In discussing

Hafiz al-Asad’s role in the making of Syrian foreign policy, Raymond Hinnebusch well

37

explained his characters and the implication of Asad’s personality on Syrian political

orientation. He stated

“President Hafiz Al-Asad, a man of strong personality, unique authority within

the elite, and possessed of wide powers of office, is clearly the dominant

decision-maker. Asad is, first of all, an intense nationalist, strongly committed to

the Arab cause, and unprepared to concede major principles…Asad is also a

realist rather than an ideologue…Asad tends to think in the objective strategic

terms of the military professional…He is cautious, never moving without

thorough analysis of the balance of forces, and less ready to expend than to

accumulate power used to influence; He is flexible and will bargain if it can be

done from a position of enough strength to win some advantage…Asad also has a

cool nerve, can recover from setback, and is uneasily panicked… Determined,

intelligent, energetic, able to learn from mistakes…Asad is a shrewd practitioner

of power politics, able to manipulate power balances, proxies, threats, and

subversion, ruthless toward opponents, and a true Machiavellian prepared to use

any means, from the bombardment of civilians to assassinations.45

According to Raymond Hinnebusch the implication of Hafiz al-Asad’s

personality for Syria was the reality that he “contrasted his realism with the theory of the

Ba'th radicals who allowed ideology to dictate policy to the neglect of the calculus of

power… [and] with a keen grasp of international affairs, he has developed into a

statesman of more than local stature. It is he who almost single-handedly has turned Syria

from a pawn of stronger states into a credible actor in the regional power game.”46

There are many other examples that Syria during Hafiz al-Asad’s presidency

approached a realist policy rather than being predominated by the ideology of Ba’thism

(pan-Arabic sentiments). These policies could be summarized as

45- Raymond Hinnebusch, “Revisionist Dreams, Realistic Strategies: The Foreign Policy of Syria,” in Bahgat Korany and Ali al-Din, The Foreign policy of Arab States: The Challenge of Change (Boulder: Westview, 1991), pp. 387-388. 46- Raymond Hinnebusch, pp. 387-388.

38

1- Syria’s intervention in Lebanese Civil War during 1975-1990, and the fact that Syria

first intervened in 1975 to fight against the National Movement that were originally

linked to Syria. Syria, however, adopted its foreign policy to its previous position after

they succeed to make a balance of weakness among the Lebanese and Palestinian

factions.

2- Syria’s policy toward Egypt after president Sadat concluded a peace treaty with the

Israelis in the late 1970s.

3- Syria’s support of Iran during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88). In spite of the fact that

some maintain that this policy was unrealistic, Syria was going to strengthen its position

after Egypt made peace with Israel and at the same time playing a crucial role through

having strategic relation with Iran.

4- Syria’s decision to resume its relation with Egypt in the late 1980 in order to end its

isolation and resituate Syria's position in the Arab politics is another example of Asad’s

pragmatism.

5- Syria's strategic decision to join the American-led coalition to fight against the Iraqi

invasion of Kuwait was a realistic approach to build confidence-building measure with

the Americans and to provide an opportunity to better its relations with Americans at the

time that they were the only hegemonic superpower in the region.

6- Syria's participation in the Arab-Israeli negotiations despite the fact that they were

aware of the American strategic relations with Israel, and the fact that it was unlikely that

the Americans could pressure Israel to concede to the Arab’s demands. The following

chapters would include a detail discussion about Syria's participation in the peace

process.

39

According to neo-realism, the structure of international system determines the

making of foreign policy and the interaction between the actors at state and non-state

level. As we see, in regard to Syria, the change in the international system form bipolarity

to a hegemonic role of the United States in the early 1990s had an important effect on

Syria's decision both to join the U.S.-led coalition and to participate in the peace process.

However, we should not simplify a complex process in which nation-states make their

policy. At the same time, we should not make this process to be more complicated

through using various conceptual frameworks. A good combination of theory and

practical analysis would be useful.

The United States and the peace initiatives

The United States’ initiatives, in the aftermath of the liberation of Kuwait, to

bring the Arabs and Israelis to a conference for the reconciliation of the Arab-Israeli

conflict was a significant decision that also could best be explained through prism of a

neo-realist approach of international politics. The impact of the end of Cold War on the

structure of international system led to an unprecedented hegemonic role of the United

States in the Middle East. This situation convinced the Bush administration that they

could reconcile the Arab-Israeli conflict based upon the land for peace formula and the

principles of United Nation Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The theory of

decision making, particularly Alison’s three model of decision making process,47 could

best explain the difficulties, complexities and lack of integrity in Bush’s initiatives for a

plan to resolve the intractable Arab-Israeli conflict, perhaps within a short period of time.

The assumption of this study is that making decision, in the aftermath of U.S.

victory over Iraq in 1991, in order to provide an opportunity for the Arabs and Israelis to

reconcile their long decades animosity was based upon the principles of a rational foreign

policy. The U.S. was the only superpower in the region with unchallengeable hegemonic

power. So the Bush administration calculated that the time was ripe for the Arabs and

47- Graham T. Allison, “Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis” in G. John Ikenberry, American Foreign Policy: Theoritical Essays (Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers Inc., 1999) pp. 413-452.

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Israeli to compromise their differences and to agree to an honorable, comprehensive

peace plan that recognize the basic rights of both Israelis and Arabs. The hypothesis of

this research is that the strong U.S. interest in Israel, driven mostly by domestic politics,

made the United States unwilling and unable to pressure Israel to make the necessary

concessions that were inevitable for making a comprehensive peace between the Arabs

and Israelis. Therefore, the U.S. administration during the presidency of Gorge Bush in

1991 made a big mistake in proposing such peace initiatives, because the failure of the

Americans to bring peace to the region, and the fact that they took Israeli side in the

negotiations for the peace fundamentally damaged U.S. prestige in the region.

Given Bush was interested in making peace between Israel and its Arab

neighbors, but it was not only he that could make such a decision. The role of “power

elite” in the formation of U.S. foreign policy, the significance of Zionist lobby and their

enormous influence on U.S. executive branch, and the fact that Israel could benefit from

a vast majority support in U.S. Congress, ultimately, made the United States unwilling

and unable to pursue a just, honorable, and comprehensive peace between the Arabs and

Israelis. It demonstrates also that the United States was an ineffective mediator in the

Arab-Israeli negotiations and in the Syrian-Israeli tracks, in particular.

Therefore, Israel not only was reluctant to recognize the Arab’s rights, but also

opposed strongly any territorial concessions. They did not recognize the UN Resolutions

242 and 338 as the basis for peace in the Middle East. Having great support in many U.S.

administrations, and non-state actors in the United States, Israel made a realist decision to

be reluctant in the negotiations for the peace during the 1990s, and to be determined in

conceding to the Arabs.

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Chapter 3

U.S.-Syrian Relations

Introduction

American relations with Syria have been strained by various factors. During

recent decades, the two countries occasionally had good relations, but the relations

usually deteriorated. The United States has generally supported Israel and this policy

affected its relations with Syria. Moreover, Syria has been on the U.S. list of state

sponsoring international terrorism since this list was created in 1979. This was mostly

because Syria supported and provided safe-haven for some Palestinian and Lebanese

groups and other organizations that U.S. administrations considered terrorist groups. This

alleged role in international terrorism has been among the main reasons the United States

has not yet improved its bilateral relations with Syria. The U.S. Congress, therefore,

imposed several sanctions upon Syria, aiming to make this country ineligible to receive

U.S. aid or purchase U.S. military equipment and high tech products. These sanctions

have made improvement of relations between the two countries very difficult and

contingent upon fundamental changes in Syrian foreign and domestic policy.

1) Historical Background

Until 1947 when the United States announced its support for a Jewish state, the

United States had a very positive image in Syria. The image was created mostly by the

activities of American educators, missionaries and administrators who helped to establish

and promoted educational institutions in some parts of Greater Syria, most prominent

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among them, the American University of Beirut48. By the mid-19th century, Syria began

to experience a national movement. According to the Palestinian author, George

Antonius, the American missionaries’ “contribution was all the more productive as it was

governed by ideas as well as by enthusiasm.”49

“The educational activities of the American missionaries in that early period had,

among many virtues, one outstanding merit; they gave the pride of place to

Arabic…with vigor to the task of providing an adequate literature. In that, they

were pioneers; and because of that, the intellectual effervescence which marked

the first stirrings of the Arab revival owes most to their labors.”50

The impact of the educational activities of the Americans in Syria was important

not only because they established some educational institutions, but even more because

of the contributions of their graduates to the Arab awakening. Antonius believes “when

account is taken of its contribution to the diffusion of knowledge, of the impetus it gave

to literature and science, and of the achievement of its graduates, it may justly be said that

its influence on the Arab revival, at any rate in its earlier stage, was greater than that of

any other institution.”51

The impact of Zionism

The creation of the state of Israel in Palestine had strong negative ramifications

for the popular image of the United States in the Middle East. The United States endorsed

the United Nations’ plan to partition Palestine and thereafter supported the new Jewish

state of Israel. The United States became Israel’s chief benefactor and backed Israel in its

conflicts with the Arabs. Consequently, this policy marked a period in which the positive

image of the United States began to change.

48. By the mid-19th century, American had established thirty-three schools in Syria. Approximately one thousand students attended these schools (George Antonius, The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movement (London: Hamilton, 1955), p. 42.) 49. George Antonius, p. 41. 50. George Antonius, p. 43. 51. George Antonius, p. 43.

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Syria was concerned because it perceived Israel as an immediate threat to its

national security. Syria also viewed the creation of Israel in Palestine, historically a part

of Greater Syria, as an “imperialist-created colonial settler state unjustly implanted in the

heart of the Arab world, as well as a security threat and an obstacle to Arab unity.”52

Until World War II, the American presence in the Middle East was presented by

protestant