The Second War for Independence and the Upsurge of Nationalism · 2018. 11. 19. · 12 The Second War for Independence and the Upsurge of Nationalism 1812–1824 The American continents

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The Second War forIndependence and theUpsurge of Nationalism

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1812–1824

The American continents . . . are henceforth not to be considered assubjects for future colonization by any European powers.

PRESIDENT JAMES MONROE, DECEMBER 2, 1823

The War of 1812, largely because of widespreaddisunity, ranks as one of America’s worst-foughtwars. There was no burning national anger, as therehad been in 1807 following the Chesapeake outrage.The supreme lesson of the conflict was the folly ofleading a divided and apathetic people into war.And yet, despite the unimpressive military outcomeand even less decisive negotiated peace, Americanscame out of the war with a renewed sense of nation-hood. For the next dozen years, an awakened spiritof nationalism would inspire activities ranging fromprotecting manufacturing to building roads todefending the authority of the federal governmentover the states.

On to Canada over Land and Lakes

On the eve of the War of 1812, the regular army wasill-trained, ill-disciplined, and widely scattered. Ithad to be supplemented by the even more poorlytrained militia, who were sometimes distinguishedby their speed of foot in leaving the battlefield.Some of the ranking generals were semisenile heir-looms from the Revolutionary War, rusting on theirlaurels and lacking in vigor and vision.

The offensive strategy against Canada was espe-cially poorly conceived. Had the Americans cap-tured Montreal, the center of population and

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transportation, everything to the west might havedied, just as the leaves of a tree wither when thetrunk is girdled. But instead of laying ax to the trunk,the Americans frittered away their strength in thethree-pronged invasion of 1812. The trio of invadingforces that set out from Detroit, Niagara, and LakeChamplain were all beaten back shortly after theyhad crossed the Canadian border.

By contrast, the British and Canadians dis-played energy from the outset. Early in the war, theycaptured the American fort of Michilimackinac,which commanded the upper Great Lakes and theIndian-inhabited area to the south and west. Theirbrilliant defensive operations were led by theinspired British general Isaac Brock and assisted (inthe American camp) by “General Mud’’ and “Gen-eral Confusion.’’

When several American land invasions ofCanada were again hurled back in 1813, Americanslooked for success on water. Man for man and shipfor ship, the American navy did much better thanthe army. In comparison to British ships, Americancraft on the whole were more skillfully handled, hadbetter gunners, and were manned by non-press-gang crews who were burning to avenge numerousindignities. Similarly, the American frigates, notablythe Constitution (“Old Ironsides”), had thicker sides,heavier firepower, and larger crews, of which onesailor in six was a free black.

Control of the Great Lakes was vital, and an ener-getic American naval officer, Oliver Hazard Perry,

managed to build a fleet of green-timbered ships onthe shores of Lake Erie, manned by even greener sea-men. When he captured a British fleet in a furiousengagement on the lake, he reported to his superior,“We have met the enemy and they are ours.’’ Perry’svictory and his slogan infused new life into thedrooping American cause. Forced to withdraw fromDetroit and Fort Malden, the retreating redcoats wereovertaken by General Harrison’s army and beaten atthe Battle of the Thames in October 1813.

Despite these successes, the Americans by late1814, far from invading Canada, were grimly defend-ing their own soil against the invading British. InEurope the diversionary power of Napoleon wasdestroyed in mid-1814, and the dangerous despotwas exiled to the Mediterranean isle of Elba. TheUnited States, which had so brashly provoked warbehind the protective skirts of Napoleon, was nowleft to face the music alone. Thousands of victoriousveteran redcoats began to pour into Canada fromthe Continent.

Assembling some ten thousand crack troops,the British prepared in 1814 for a crushing blow intoNew York along the familiar lake-river route. In theabsence of roads, the invader was forced to bringsupplies over the Lake Champlain waterway. Aweaker American fleet, commanded by the thirty-year-old Thomas Macdonough, challenged theBritish. The ensuing battle was desperately foughtnear Plattsburgh on September 11, 1814, on float-ing slaughterhouses. The American flagship at one

234 CHAPTER 12 The Second War for Independence and the Upsurge of Nationalism, 1812–1824

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U.S. invasions

The Three U.S. Invasions of 1812 Campaigns of 1813

point was in grave trouble. But Macdonough, unex-pectedly turning his ship about with cables, con-fronted the enemy with a fresh broadside andsnatched victory from the fangs of defeat.

The results of this heroic naval battle weremomentous. The invading British army was forced toretreat. Macdonough thus saved at least upper NewYork from conquest, New England from further dis-affection, and the Union from possible dissolution.He also profoundly affected the concurrent negotia-tions of the Anglo-American peace treaty in Europe.

Washington Burned and New Orleans Defended

A second formidable British force, numbering aboutfour thousand, landed in the Chesapeake Bay areain August 1814. Advancing rapidly on Washington, iteasily dispersed some six thousand panicky militiaat Bladensburg (“the Bladensburg races’’). Theinvaders then entered the capital and set fire tomost of the public buildings, including the Capitoland the White House. But while Washington burned,

the Americans at Baltimore held firm. The Britishfleet hammered Fort McHenry with their cannonbut could not capture the city. Francis Scott Key, adetained American anxiously watching the bom-bardment from a British ship, was inspired by thedoughty defenders to write the words of “The Star-Spangled Banner.” Set to the tune of a saucy Englishtavern refrain, the song quickly attained popularity.

Battles on Lakes and Land 235

Andrew Jackson (1767–1845) appealed to thegovernor of Louisiana for help recruiting freeblacks to defend New Orleans in 1814:

“The free men of colour in [your] city areinured to the Southern climate and wouldmake excellent Soldiers. . . . They must be foror against us—distrust them, and you makethem your enemies, place confidence inthem, and you engage them by every dearand honorable tie to the interest of thecountry, who extends to them equal rightsand [privileges] with white men.”

A third British blow of 1814, aimed at NewOrleans, menaced the entire Mississippi Valley. Gauntand hawk-faced Andrew Jackson, fresh from crushingthe southwest Indians at the Battle of HorseshoeBend, was placed in command (see map, p. 252). Hishodgepodge force consisted of seven thousandsailors, regulars, pirates, and Frenchmen, as well asmilitiamen from Louisiana, Kentucky, and Ten-nessee. Among the defenders were two Louisianaregiments of free black volunteers, numbering aboutfour hundred men. The Americans threw up theirentrenchment, and in the words of a popular song,

Behind it stood our little force—None wished it to be greater;For ev’ry man was half a horse,And half an alligator.

The overconfident British, numbering someeight thousand battle-seasoned veterans, blunderedbadly. They made the mistake of launching a frontalassault, on January 8, 1815, on the entrenchedAmerican riflemen and cannoneers. The attackerssuffered the most devastating defeat of the entirewar, losing over two thousand, killed and wounded,

236 CHAPTER 12 The Second War for Independence and the Upsurge of Nationalism, 1812–1824

in half an hour, as compared with some seventy forthe Americans. It was an astonishing victory forJackson and his men.

News of the victory struck the country “like aclap of thunder,” according to one contemporary.Andrew Jackson became a national hero as poetsand politicians lined up to sing the praises of thedefenders of New Orleans. It hardly mattered whenword arrived that a peace treaty had been signed atGhent, Belgium, ending the war two weeks beforethe battle. The United States had fought for honor as much as material gain. The Battle of New Orleans restored that honor, at least in Americaneyes, and unleashed a wave of nationalism and self-confidence.

Its wrath aroused, the Royal Navy had finallyretaliated by throwing a ruinous naval blockadealong America’s coast and by landing raiding partiesalmost at will. American economic life, includingfishing, was crippled. Customs revenues werechoked off, and near the end of the war, the bank-rupt Treasury was unable to meet its maturingobligations.

The Treaty of Ghent

Tsar Alexander I of Russia, feeling hard-pressed byNapoleon’s army and not wanting his British ally tofritter away its strength in America, proposed medi-ation between the clashing Anglo-Saxon cousins in

1812. The tsar’s feeler eventually set in motion themachinery that brought five American peacemakersto the quaint Belgian city of Ghent in 1814. The bick-ering group was headed by early-rising, puritanicalJohn Quincy Adams, son of John Adams, whodeplored the late-hour card playing of his high-living colleague Henry Clay.

Confident after their military successes, theBritish envoys made sweeping demands for a neutralized Indian buffer state in the Great Lakesregion, control of the Great Lakes, and a substantialpart of conquered Maine. The Americans flatlyrejected these terms, and the talks appeared stale-mated. But news of British reverses in upper NewYork and at Baltimore, and increasing war-weari-ness in Britain, made London more willing to com-promise. Preoccupied with redrafting Napoleon’smap of Europe at the Congress of Vienna and eyeingstill-dangerous France, the British lion resigneditself to licking its wounds.

The Treaty of Ghent, signed on Christmas Eve in1814, was essentially an armistice. Both sides simply

The Treaty of Ghent 237

Smarting from wounded pride on the sea, theLondon Times (December 30, 1814) urgedchastisement for Americans:

“The people—naturally vain, boastful, andinsolent—have been filled with an absolutecontempt for our maritime power, and afurious eagerness to beat down our maritimepretensions. Those passions, which havebeen inflamed by success, could only havebeen cooled by what in vulgar and emphaticlanguage has been termed ‘a soundflogging.’”

Presidential Election of 1812 (with electoral vote by state)The Federalists showed impressive strength in the North, andtheir presidential candidate, DeWitt Clinton, the future “Fatherof the Erie Canal,” almost won. If the 25 electoral votes ofPennsylvania had gone to the New Yorker, he would havewon, 114 to 103.

MISSOURITERRITORY

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Divided

agreed to stop fighting and to restore conquered ter-ritory. No mention was made of those grievances forwhich America had ostensibly fought: the Indianmenace, search and seizure, Orders in Council,impressment, and confiscations. These discreetomissions have often been cited as further evidenceof the insincerity of the war hawks. Rather, they areproof that the Americans had not managed todefeat the British. With neither side able to imposeits will, the treaty negotiations—like the war itself—ended as a virtual draw. Relieved Americans boasted“Not One Inch of Territory Ceded or Lost”—a phrasethat contrasted strangely with the “On to Canada”rallying cry of the war’s outset.

Federalist Grievancesand the Hartford Convention

Defiant New England remained a problem. It pros-pered during the conflict, owing largely to illicittrade with the enemy in Canada and to the absenceof a British blockade until 1814. But the embitteredopposition of the Federalists to the war continuedunabated.

As the war dragged on, New England extremistsbecame more vocal. A small minority of them pro-posed secession from the Union, or at least a sep-arate peace with Britain. Ugly rumors were afloat

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about “Blue Light’’ Federalists—treacherous NewEnglanders who supposedly flashed lanterns on theshore so that blockading British cruisers would bealerted to the attempted escape of American ships.

The most spectacular manifestation of Federal-ist discontent was the ill-omened Hartford Conven-tion. Late in 1814, when the capture of New Orleansseemed imminent, Massachusetts issued a call for aconvention at Hartford, Connecticut. The states ofMassachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island dis-patched full delegations; neighboring New Hamp-shire and Vermont sent partial representation. Thisgroup of prominent men, twenty-six in all, met incomplete secrecy for about three weeks—December15, 1814, to January 5, 1815—to discuss their griev-ances and to seek redress for their wrongs.

In truth, the Hartford Convention was actuallyless radical than the alarmists supposed. Though a minority of delegates gave vent to wild talk of se-cession, the convention’s final report was quitemoderate. It demanded, financial assistance fromWashington to compensate for lost trade and pro-posed constitutional amendments requiring a two-thirds vote in Congress before an embargo could beimposed, new states admitted, or war declared.Most of the demands reflected Federalist fears that aonce-proud New England was falling subservient toan agrarian South and West. Delegates sought toabolish the three-fifths clause in the Constitution(which allowed the South to count a portion of itsslaves in calculating proportional representation),to limit presidents to a single term, and to prohibitthe election of two successive presidents from thesame state. This last clause was aimed at the much-resented “Virginia Dynasty”—by 1814 a Virginianhad been president for all but four years in theRepublic’s quarter-century of life.

Three special envoys from Massachusetts car-ried these demands to the burned-out capital ofWashington. The trio arrived just in time to be over-whelmed by the glorious news from New Orleans,followed by that from Ghent. As the rest of thenation congratulated itself on a glorious victory,New England’s wartime complaints seemed petty atbest and treasonous at worst. Pursued by the sneersand jeers of the press, the envoys sank away in dis-grace and into obscurity.

The Hartford resolutions, as it turned out, werethe death dirge of the Federalist party. In 1816 theFederalists nominated their last presidential candi-

date. He was handily trounced by James Monroe, yetanother Virginian.

Federalist doctrines of disunity, which long sur-vived the party, blazed a fateful trail. Until 1815 therewas far more talk of nullification and secession inNew England than in any other section, includingthe South. The outright flouting of the Jeffersonianembargo and the later crippling of the war effortwere the two most damaging acts of nullification inAmerica prior to the events leading to the Civil War.

The Second Warfor American Independence

The War of 1812 was a small war, involving about6,000 Americans killed or wounded. It was but afootnote to the mighty European conflagration. In1812, when Napoleon invaded Russia with about500,000 men, Madison tried to invade Canada withabout 5,000 men. But if the American conflict wasglobally unimportant, it had huge consequences forthe United States.

The Republic had shown that it would resist,sword in hand, what it regarded as grievous wrongs.Other nations developed a new respect for Amer-ica’s fighting prowess. Naval officers like Perry andMacdonough were the most effective type of nego-tiators; the hot breath of their broadsides spoke the most eloquent diplomatic language. America’semissaries abroad were henceforth treated with less

The War of 1812 239

The War of 1812 won a new respect forAmerica among many Britons. Michael Scott,a young lieutenant in the British navy, wrote,

“I don’t like Americans; I never did, and nevershall like them. . . . I have no wish to eat withthem, drink with them, deal with, or consortwith them in any way; but let me tell thewhole truth, nor fight with them, were it notfor the laurels to be acquired, by overcomingan enemy so brave, determined, and alert,and in every way so worthy of one’s steel, as they have always proved.”

scorn. In a diplomatic sense, if not in a militarysense, the conflict could be called the Second Warfor American Independence.

A new nation, moreover, was welded in the fieryfurnace of armed conflict. Sectionalism, now identi-fied with discredited New England Federalists, wasdealt a black eye. The painful events of the war glar-ingly revealed, as perhaps nothing else could havedone, the folly of sectional disunity. In a sense themost conspicuous casualty of the war was the Federalist party.

War heroes emerged, especially the two Indian-fighters Andrew Jackson and William Henry Harri-son. Both of them were to become president. Left inthe lurch by their British friends at Ghent, the Indi-ans were forced to make such terms as they could.They reluctantly consented, in a series of treaties, torelinquish vast areas of forested land north of theOhio River.

Manufacturing prospered behind the fierywooden wall of the British blockade. In an eco-nomic sense, as well as in a diplomatic sense, theWar of 1812 may be regarded as the Second War forAmerican Independence. The industries that werethus stimulated by the fighting rendered Americaless dependent on Europe’s workshops.

Canadian patriotism and nationalism alsoreceived a powerful stimulus from the clash. ManyCanadians felt betrayed by the Treaty of Ghent. Theywere especially aggrieved by the failure to secure anIndian buffer state or even mastery of the GreatLakes. Canadians fully expected the frustrated Yan-kees to return, and for a time the Americans andBritish engaged in a floating arms race on the GreatLakes. But in 1817 the Rush-Bagot agreementbetween Britain and the United States severely lim-ited naval armament on the lakes. Better relationsbrought the last border fortifications down in the1870s, with the happy result that the United Statesand Canada came to share the world’s longestunfortified boundary—5,527 miles long.

After Napoleon’s final defeat at Waterloo in1815, Europe slumped into a peace of exhaustion.Deposed monarchs returned to battered thrones, asthe Old World took the rutted road back to conser-vatism, illiberalism, and reaction. But the Americanpeople were largely unaffected by these Europeandevelopments. Turning their backs on the OldWorld, they faced resolutely toward the untamedWest—and toward the task of building their democracy.

Nascent Nationalism

The most impressive by-product of the War of 1812was a heightened nationalism—the spirit of nation-consciousness or national oneness. America maynot have fought the war as one nation, but itemerged as one nation.

The changed mood even manifested itself in thebirth of a distinctively national literature. Washing-ton Irving and James Fenimore Cooper attainedinternational recognition in the 1820s, significantlyas the nation’s first writers of importance to useAmerican scenes and themes. School textbooks,often British in an earlier era, were now being writ-ten by Americans for Americans. In the world ofmagazines, the highly intellectual North AmericanReview began publication in 1815—the year of thetriumph at New Orleans. Even American paintersincreasingly celebrated their native landscapes ontheir canvases.

A fresh nationalistic spirit could be recognizedin many other areas as well. The rising tide ofnation-consciousness even touched finance. Arevived Bank of the United States was voted by Con-gress in 1816. A more handsome national capitalbegan to rise from the ashes of Washington. Thearmy was expanded to ten thousand men. The navyfurther covered itself with glory in 1815 when itadministered a thorough beating to the piraticalplunderers of North Africa. Stephen Decatur, navalhero of the War of 1812 and of the Barbary Coastexpeditions, pungently captured the country’snationalist mood in a famous toast made on hisreturn from the Mediterranean campaigns: “Ourcountry! In her intercourse with foreign nationsmay she always be in the right; but our country,right or wrong!’’

“The American System’’

Nationalism likewise manifested itself in manufac-turing. Patriotic Americans took pride in the facto-ries that had recently mushroomed forth, largely asa result of the self-imposed embargoes and the war.

When hostilities ended in 1815, British com-petitors undertook to recover lost ground. Theybegan to dump the contents of their bulging ware-houses on the United States, often cutting their

240 CHAPTER 12 The Second War for Independence and the Upsurge of Nationalism, 1812–1824

prices below cost in an effort to strangle the Ameri-can war-baby factories in the cradle. The infantindustries bawled lustily for protection. To manyred-blooded Americans, it seemed as though theBritish, having failed to crush Yankee fighters on thebattlefield, were now seeking to crush Yankee facto-ries in the marketplace.

A nationalist Congress, out-Federalizing the oldFederalists, responded by passing the path-breakingTariff of 1816—the first tariff in American historyinstituted primarily for protection, not revenue. Itsrates—roughly 20 to 25 percent on the value ofdutiable imports—were not high enough to providecompletely adequate safeguards, but the law was abold beginning. A strongly protective trend wasstarted that stimulated the appetites of the pro-tected for more protection.

Nationalism was further highlighted by agrandiose plan of Henry Clay for developing a prof-itable home market. Still radiating the nationalismof war-hawk days, he threw himself behind an elab-orate scheme known by 1824 as the American Sys-

tem. This system had three main parts. It began witha strong banking system, which would provide easyand abundant credit. Clay also advocated a protec-tive tariff, behind which eastern manufacturingwould flourish. Revenues gushing from the tariffwould provide funds for the third component of theAmerican system—a network of roads and canals,especially in the burgeoning Ohio Valley. Throughthese new arteries of transportation would flowfoodstuffs and raw materials from the South andWest to the North and East. In exchange, a stream ofmanufactured goods would flow in the return direc-tion, knitting the country together economicallyand politically.

Persistent and eloquent demands by Henry Clayand others for better transportation struck aresponsive chord with the public. The recentattempts to invade Canada had all failed partlybecause of oath-provoking roads—or no roads atall. People who have dug wagons out of hub-deepmud do not quickly forget their blisters and back-aches. An outcry for better transportation, rising

Economic Nationalism 241

most noisily in the road-poor West, was one of themost striking aspects of the nationalism inspired bythe War of 1812.

But attempts to secure federal funding for roadsand canals stumbled on Republican constitutionalscruples. Congress voted in 1817 to distribute $1.5million to the states for internal improvements. ButPresident Madison sternly vetoed this handoutmeasure as unconstitutional. The individual stateswere thus forced to venture ahead with construc-tion programs of their own, including the ErieCanal, triumphantly completed by New York in1825. Jeffersonian Republicans, who had gulpeddown Hamiltonian loose constructionism on other

important problems, choked on the idea of directfederal support of intrastate internal improvements.New England, in particular, strongly opposed feder-ally constructed roads and canals, because suchoutlets would further drain away population andcreate competing states beyond the mountains.

The So-Called Era of Good Feelings

James Monroe—six feet tall, somewhat stooped,courtly, and mild-mannered—was nominated forthe presidency in 1816 by the Republicans. Theythus undertook to continue the so-called Virginiadynasty of Washington, Jefferson, and Madison. The

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fading Federalists ran a candidate for the last timein their checkered history, and he was crushed by183 electoral votes to 34. The vanquished Federalistparty was gasping its dying breaths, leaving the fieldto the triumphant Republicans and one-party rule.

In James Monroe, the man and the times auspi-ciously met. As the last president to wear an old-stylecocked hat, he straddled two generations: thebygone age of the Founding Fathers and the emer-gent age of nationalism. Never brilliant, and perhapsnot great, the serene Virginian with gray-blue eyeswas in intellect and personal force the least distin-guished of the first eight presidents. But the timescalled for sober administration, not dashing heroics.And Monroe was an experienced, levelheaded exec-utive, with an ear-to-the-ground talent for interpret-ing popular rumblings.

Emerging nationalism was further cemented bya goodwill tour Monroe undertook early in 1817,ostensibly to inspect military defenses. He pushednorthward deep into New England and then west-ward to Detroit, viewing en route Niagara Falls. Evenin Federalist New England, “the enemy’s country,’’he received a heartwarming welcome; a Bostonnewspaper was so far carried away as to announcethat an “Era of Good Feelings’’ had been ushered in.This happy phrase has been commonly used sincethen to describe the administrations of Monroe.

The Era of Good Feelings, unfortunately, wassomething of a misnomer. Considerable tranquilityand prosperity did in fact smile upon the early yearsof Monroe, but the period was a troubled one. Theacute issues of the tariff, the bank, internal improve-ments, and the sale of public lands were being hotly

contested. Sectionalism was crystallizing, and theconflict over slavery was beginning to raise itshideous head.

The Panic of 1819and the Curse of Hard Times

Much of the goodness went out of the good feelings in 1819, when a paralyzing economic panic descended. It brought deflation, depression,bankruptcies, bank failures, unemployment, soupkitchens, and overcrowded pesthouses known asdebtors’ prisons.

This was the first national financial panic sincePresident Washington took office. Many factors con-tributed to the catastrophe of 1819, but loominglarge was overspeculation in frontier lands. TheBank of the United States, through its westernbranches, had become deeply involved in this pop-ular type of outdoor gambling.

Financial paralysis from the panic, which lastedin some degree for several years, gave a rude setbackto the nationalistic ardor. The West was especiallyhard hit. When the pinch came, the Bank of theUnited States forced the speculative (“wildcat’’)western banks to the wall and foreclosed mortgageson countless farms. All this was technically legal butpolitically unwise. In the eyes of the western debtor,the nationalist Bank of the United States soonbecame a kind of financial devil.

The panic of 1819 also created backwashes inthe political and social world. The poorer classes—the one-suspender men and their families—wereseverely strapped, and in their troubles was sownthe seed of Jacksonian democracy. Hard times alsodirected attention to the inhumanity of imprisoningdebtors. In extreme cases, often overplayed, moth-ers were torn from their infants for owing a few dol-lars. Mounting agitation against imprisonment fordebt bore fruit in remedial legislation in an increas-ing number of states.

Growing Pains of the West

The onward march of the West continued; nine fron-tier states had joined the original thirteen between1791 and 1819. With an eye to preserving the North-

Economic Strains 243

Boston’s Columbian Centinel was not theonly newspaper to regard President Monroe’searly months as the Era of Good Feelings.Washington’s National Intelligencer observedin July 1817,

“Never before, perhaps, since the institutionof civil government, did the same harmony,the same absence of party spirit, the samenational feeling, pervade a community. Theresult is too consoling to dispute too nicelyabout the cause.”

South sectional balance, most of these common-wealths had been admitted alternately, free or slave.(See Admission of States in the Appendix.)

Why this explosive expansion? In part it wassimply a continuation of the generations-old west-ward movement, which had been going on sinceearly colonial days. In addition, the siren song ofcheap land—“the Ohio fever’’—had a special appealto European immigrants. Eager newcomers fromabroad were beginning to stream down the gang-planks in impressive numbers, especially after thewar of boycotts and bullets. Land exhaustion in theolder tobacco states, where the soil was “mined’’rather than cultivated, likewise drove people west-ward. Glib speculators accepted small down pay-ments, making it easier to buy new holdings.

The western boom was stimulated by additionaldevelopments. Acute economic distress during theembargo years turned many pinched faces towardthe setting sun. The crushing of the Indians in theNorthwest and South by Generals Harrison andJackson pacified the frontier and opened up vastvirgin tracts of land. The building of highwaysimproved the land routes to the Ohio Valley. Note-worthy was the Cumberland Road, begun in 1811,which ran ultimately from western Maryland to Illi-nois. The use of the first steamboat on western

waters, also in 1811, heralded a new era of upstreamnavigation.

But the West, despite the inflow of settlers, wasstill weak in population and influence. Not potentenough politically to make its voice heard, it wasforced to ally itself with other sections. Thusstrengthened, it demanded cheap acreage and par-tially achieved its goal in the Land Act of 1820,which authorized a buyer to purchase 80 virginacres at a minimum of $1.25 an acre in cash. TheWest also demanded cheap transportation andslowly got it, despite the constitutional qualms ofthe presidents and the hostility of easterners.Finally, the West demanded cheap money, issued byits own “wildcat’’ banks, and fought the powerfulBank of the United States to attain its goal (see“Makers of America: Settlers of the Old Northwest,”pp. 248–249).

Slavery and the Sectional Balance

Sectional tensions, involving rivalry between theslave South and the free North over control of thevirgin West, were stunningly revealed in 1819. Inthat year the territory of Missouri knocked on the

244 CHAPTER 12 The Second War for Independence and the Upsurge of Nationalism, 1812–1824

doors of Congress for admission as a slave state.This fertile and well-watered area contained suffi-cient population to warrant statehood. But theHouse of Representatives stymied the plans of theMissourians by passing the incendiary Tallmadgeamendment. It stipulated that no more slavesshould be brought into Missouri and also providedfor the gradual emancipation of children born toslave parents already there. A roar of anger burstfrom slave-holding southerners. They were joinedby many depression-cursed pioneers who favoredunhampered expansion of the West and by manynortherners, especially diehard Federalists, whowere eager to use the issue to break the back of the“Virginia dynasty.’’

Southerners saw in the Tallmadge amendment,which they eventually managed to defeat in theSenate, an ominous threat to sectional balance.When the Constitution was adopted in 1788, theNorth and South were running neck and neck inwealth and population. But with every passingdecade, the North was becoming wealthier and alsomore thickly settled—an advantage reflected in anincreasing northern majority in the House of Repre-sentatives. Yet in the Senate, each state had twovotes, regardless of size. With eleven states free andeleven slave, the southerners had maintainedequality. They were therefore in a good position tothwart any northern effort to interfere with the

expansion of slavery, and they did not want to losethis veto.

The future of the slave system caused southern-ers profound concern. Missouri was the first stateentirely west of the Mississippi River to be carvedout of the Louisiana Purchase, and the Missouriemancipation amendment might set a damagingprecedent for all the rest of the area. Even more dis-quieting was another possibility. If Congress couldabolish the “peculiar institution’’ in Missouri, mightit not attempt to do likewise in the older states of theSouth? The wounds of the Constitutional Conven-tion of 1787 were once more ripped open.

Burning moral questions also protruded, eventhough the main issue was political and economicbalance. A small but growing group of antislaveryagitators in the North seized the occasion to raise anoutcry against the evils of slavery. They were deter-mined that the plague of human bondage shouldnot spread further into the virgin territories.

The Uneasy Missouri Compromise

Deadlock in Washington was at length broken in1820 by the time-honored American solution ofcompromise—actually a bundle of three compro-mises. Courtly Henry Clay of Kentucky, gifted con-ciliator, played a leading role. Congress, despiteabolitionist pleas, agreed to admit Missouri as aslave state. But at the same time, free-soil Maine,which until then had been a part of Massachusetts,was admitted as a separate state. The balancebetween North and South was thus kept at twelvestates each and remained there for fifteen years.Although Missouri was permitted to retain slaves,all future bondage was prohibited in the remainderof the Louisiana Purchase north of the line of 36°30'—the southern boundary of Missouri.

This horse-trading adjustment was politicallyevenhanded, though denounced by extremists oneach side as a “dirty bargain.’’ Both North and Southyielded something; both gained something. TheSouth won the prize of Missouri as an unrestrictedslave state. The North won the concession that Con-gress could forbid slavery in the remaining territo-ries. More gratifying to many northerners was thefact that the immense area north of 36° 30', exceptMissouri, was forever closed to the blight of slavery.

The Missouri Compromise 245

Yet the restriction on future slavery in the territorieswas not unduly offensive to the slaveowners, partlybecause the northern prairie land did not seemsuited to slave labor. Even so, a majority of southern congressmen still voted against the compromise.

Neither North nor South was acutely dis-pleased, although neither was completely happy.The Missouri Compromise lasted thirty-fouryears—a vital formative period in the life of theyoung Republic—and during that time it preservedthe shaky compact of the states. Yet the embittereddispute over slavery heralded the future breakup ofthe Union. Ever after, the morality of the South’s“peculiar institution’’ was an issue that could not beswept under the rug. The Missouri Compromiseonly ducked the question—it did not resolve it.Sooner or later, Thomas Jefferson predicted, it will“burst on us as a tornado.’’

The Missouri Compromise and the concurrentpanic of 1819 should have dimmed the political starof President Monroe. Certainly both unhappyevents had a dampening effect on the Era of GoodFeelings. But smooth-spoken James Monroe was sopopular, and the Federalist opposition so weak, thatin the presidential election of 1820, he received

every electoral vote except one. Unanimity was anhonor reserved for George Washington. Monroe, as

246 CHAPTER 12 The Second War for Independence and the Upsurge of Nationalism, 1812–1824

The Missouri Compromise and Slavery,1820–1821 Note the 36° 30’ line. In the1780s Thomas Jefferson had written ofslavery in America, “Indeed I tremble formy country when I reflect that God is just;that his justice cannot sleep forever; that . . . the Almighty has no attribute which cantake side with us in such a contest.” Now,at the time of the Missouri Compromise,Jefferson feared that his worst forebodingswere coming to pass. “I considered it atonce,” he said of the Missouri question, “as the knell of the Union.”

OREGON�COUNTRY

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IND.��

KY.��

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MASS.

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1821)

Free

Slave

Missouri Compromise line

Spanish-United States treaty line, 1819

While the debate over Missouri was raging,Thomas Jefferson (1743–1826) wrote to acorrespondent,

“The Missouri question . . . is the mostportentous one which ever yet threatenedour Union. In the gloomiest moment of therevolutionary war I never had anyapprehensions equal to what I feel from thissource. . . . [The] question, like a firebell inthe night, awakened and filled me withterror. . . . [With slavery] we have a wolf bythe ears, and we can neither hold him norsafely let him go.”

John Quincy Adams confided to his diary,

“I take it for granted that the presentquestion is a mere preamble—a title-page toa great, tragic volume.”

it turned out, was the only president in Americanhistory to be reelected after a term in which a majorfinancial panic began.

John Marshall andJudicial Nationalism

The upsurging nationalism of the post-Ghent years,despite the ominous setbacks concerning slavery,was further reflected and reinforced by the SupremeCourt. The high tribunal continued to be dominatedby the tall, thin, and aggressive Chief Justice JohnMarshall. One group of his decisions—perhaps themost famous—bolstered the power of the federalgovernment at the expense of the states. A notablecase in this category was McCulloch v. Maryland(1819). The suit involved an attempt by the state ofMaryland to destroy a branch of the Bank of theUnited States by imposing a tax on its notes. JohnMarshall, speaking for the Court, declared the bankconstitutional by invoking the Hamiltonian doc-trine of implied powers (see p. 195). At the sametime, he strengthened federal authority and slappedat state infringements when he denied the right ofMaryland to tax the bank. With ringing emphasis, heaffirmed “that the power to tax involves the power todestroy” and “that a power to create implies a powerto preserve.”

Marshall’s ruling in this case gave the doctrine of“loose construction” its most famous formulation.The Constitution, he said, derived from the consentof the people and thus permitted the government toact for their benefit. He further argued that the Con-stitution was “intended to endure for ages to comeand, consequently, to be adapted to the variouscrises of human affairs.” Finally, he declared, “Let theend be legitimate, let it be within the scope of theConstitution, and all means which are appropriate,which are plainly adapted to that end, which are notprohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit ofthe Constitution, are constitutional.”

Two years later (1821) the case of Cohens v. Vir-ginia gave Marshall one of his greatest opportuni-ties to defend the federal power. The Cohens, foundguilty by the Virginia courts of illegally selling lotterytickets, appealed to the highest tribunal. Virginia“won,” in the sense that the conviction of theCohens was upheld. But in fact Virginia and all the

individual states lost, because Marshall resound-ingly asserted the right of the Supreme Court toreview the decisions of the state supreme courts inall questions involving powers of the federal govern-ment. The states’ rights proponents were aghast.

Hardly less significant was the celebrated“steamboat case,’’ Gibbons v. Ogden (1824). The suitgrew out of an attempt by the state of New York togrant to a private concern a monopoly of water-borne commerce between New York and New Jersey.Marshall sternly reminded the upstart state that theConstitution conferred on Congress alone the con-trol of interstate commerce (see Art. I, Sec. VIII,para. 3). He thus struck with one hand another blowat states’ rights, while upholding with the other thesovereign powers of the federal government. Inter-state streams were cleared of this judicial snag; the departed spirit of Hamilton may well haveapplauded.

The Marshall Supreme Court 247

Settlers of the Old Northwest

The Old Northwest beckoned to settlers after theWar of 1812. The withdrawal of the British protec-tor weakened the Indians’ grip on the territory. Thenthe transportation boom of the 1820s—steamboatson the Ohio, the National Highway stretching fromPennsylvania, the Erie Canal—opened broad arter-ies along which the westward movement flowed.

The first wave of newcomers came mainly fromKentucky, Tennessee, and the upland regions of Vir-ginia and the Carolinas. Most migrants were rough-hewn white farmers who had been pushed fromgood land to bad by an expanding plantation econ-omy. Like Joseph Cress of North Carolina, they wererelieved to relinquish “them old red filds” where you“get nothing,” in return for acres of new soil that “isas black and rich you wold want it.” Some settlersacquired land for the first time. John Palmer, whosefamily left Kentucky for Illinois in 1831, recalled hisfather telling him “of land so cheap that we could all be landholders, where men were all equal.”Migrants from the South settled mainly in thesouthern portions of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois.

As Palmer testified, the Old Northwest offeredsouthern farmers an escape from the lowly socialposition they had endured as nonslaveholders in aslave society. Not that they objected to slavery orsympathized with blacks. Far from it: by enactingBlack Codes in their new territories, they tried toprevent blacks from following them to paradise.They wanted their own democratic community, freeof rich planters and African-Americans alike.

If southern “Butternuts,” as these settlers werecalled, dominated settlement in the 1820s, the nextdecade brought Yankees from the Northeast. Theywere as land-starved as their southern counterparts.A growing population had gobbled up most of thegood land east of the Appalachians. Yankee settlerscame to the Old Northwest, especially to the north-ern parts of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, eager tomake the region a profitable breadbasket for theAtlantic seaboard. Unlike Butternuts who wanted toquit forever the imposing framework of southernsociety, northerners hoped to re-create the worldthey had left behind.

248

Conflict soon emerged between Yankees andsoutherners. As self-sufficient farmers with littleinterest in producing for the market, the southernersviewed the northern newcomers as inhospitable,greedy, and excessively ambitious. “Yankee” becamea term of reproach; a person who was cheated wassaid to have been “Yankeed.” Northerners, in turn,viewed the southerners as uncivilized, a “coon dogand butcher knife tribe” with no interest in educa-tion, self-improvement, or agricultural innovation.Yankees, eager to tame both the land and its people,wanted to establish public schools and build roads,canals, and railroads—and they advocated taxes to fund such progress. Southerners opposed all thesereforms, especially public schooling, which theyregarded as an attempt to northernize their children.

Religion divided settlers as well. Northerners,typically Congregationalists and Presbyterians,wanted their ministers to be educated in seminaries.Southerners embraced the more revivalist Baptistand Methodist denominations. They preferred poor,humble preacher-farmers to professionally trainedpreachers whom they viewed as too distant from theLord and the people. As the Baptist preacher Alexan-der Campbell put it, “The scheme of a learned priest-hood . . . has long since proved itself to be a granddevice to keep men in ignorance and bondage.”

Not everyone, of course, fitted neatly into thesemolds. Abraham Lincoln, with roots in Kentucky,

came to adopt views more akin to those of the Yankees than the southerners, whereas his NewEngland–born archrival, Stephen Douglas, carefullycultivated the Butternut vote for the Illinois Demo-cratic party.

As the population swelled and the regionacquired its own character, the stark contrastsbetween northerners and southerners started tofade. By the 1850s northerners dominated numeri-cally, and they succeeded in establishing publicschools and fashioning internal improvements.Railroads and Great Lakes shipping tied the regionever more tightly to the northeast. Yankees andsoutherners sometimes allied as new kinds of cleav-ages emerged—between rich and poor, betweencity dwellers and farmers, and, once Irish and Ger-man immigrants started pouring into the region,between native Protestants and newcomer Cath-olics. Still, echoes of the clash between Yankees andButternuts persisted. During the Civil War, thesouthern counties of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois,where southerners had first settled, harbored sym-pathizers with the South and served as a key area forConfederate military infiltration into the North.Decades later these same counties became a strong-hold of the Ku Klux Klan. The Old Northwest mayhave become firmly anchored economically to theNortheast, but vestiges of its early dual personalitypersisted.

249

Judicial Dikes AgainstDemocratic Excesses

Another sheaf of Marshall’s decisions bolsteredjudicial barriers against democratic or demagogicattacks on property rights.

The notorious case of Fletcher v. Peck (1810)arose when a Georgia legislature, swayed by bribery,granted 35 million acres in the Yazoo River country(Mississippi) to private speculators. The next legis-lature, yielding to an angry public outcry, canceledthe crooked transaction. But the Supreme Court,with Marshall presiding, decreed that the legislativegrant was a contract (even though fraudulentlysecured) and that the Constitution forbids statelaws “impairing’’ contracts (Art. I, Sec. X, para. 1).The decision was perhaps most noteworthy as fur-ther protecting property rights against popularpressures. It was also one of the earliest clear asser-tions of the right of the Supreme Court to invalidatestate laws conflicting with the federal Constitution.

A similar principle was upheld in the case ofDartmouth College v. Woodward (1819), perhaps thebest remembered of Marshall’s decisions. The col-lege had been granted a charter by King George IIIin 1769, but the democratic New Hampshire statelegislature had seen fit to change it. Dartmouthappealed the case, employing as counsel its mostdistinguished alumnus, Daniel Webster (’01). The“Godlike Daniel’’ reportedly pulled out all the stopsof his tear-inducing eloquence when he declaimed,“It is, sir, as I have said, a small college. And yet thereare those who love it.’’

Marshall needed no dramatics in the Dart-mouth case. He put the states firmly in their placewhen he ruled that the original charter must stand.It was a contract—and the Constitution protectedcontracts against state encroachments. The Dart-mouth decision had the fortunate effect of safe-guarding business enterprise from domination bythe states’ governments. But it had the unfortunateeffect of creating a precedent that enabled char-tered corporations, in later years, to escape thehandcuffs of needed public control.

If John Marshall was a Molding Father of theConstitution, Daniel Webster was an ExpoundingFather. Time and again he left his seat in the Senate,stepped downstairs to the Supreme Court chamber(then located in the Capitol building), and thereexpounded his Federalistic and nationalistic philos-

ophy before the supreme bench. The eminent chiefjustice, so Webster reported, approvingly drank inthe familiar arguments as a baby sucks in itsmother’s milk. The two men dovetailed strikinglywith each other. Webster’s classic speeches in theSenate, challenging states’ rights and nullification,were largely repetitious of the arguments that hehad earlier presented before a sympatheticSupreme Court.

250 CHAPTER 12 The Second War for Independence and the Upsurge of Nationalism, 1812–1824

When Supreme Court chief justice JohnMarshall died, a New York newspaperrejoiced:

“The chief place in the supreme tribunal ofthe Union will no longer be filled by a manwhose political doctrines led him always . . .to strengthen government at the expense ofthe people.”

Marshall’s decisions are felt even today. In thissense his nationalism was the most tenaciouslyenduring of the era. He buttressed the federal Unionand helped to create a stable, nationally uniformenvironment for business. At the same time, Mar-shall checked the excesses of popularly elected statelegislatures. In an age when white manhood suf-frage was flowering and America was veering towardstronger popular control, Marshall almost single-handedly shaped the Constitution along conserva-tive, centralizing lines that ran somewhat counter tothe dominant spirit of the new country. Throughhim the conservative Hamiltonians partly tri-umphed from the tomb.

Sharing Oregon and Acquiring Florida

The robust nationalism of the years after the War of1812 was likewise reflected in the shaping of foreignpolicy. To this end, the nationalistic President Mon-roe teamed with his nationalistic secretary of state,John Quincy Adams, the cold and scholarly son ofthe frosty and bookish ex-president. The youngerAdams, a statesman of the first rank, happily roseabove the ingrown Federalist sectionalism of hisnative New England and proved to be one of thegreat secretaries of state.

To its credit, the Monroe administration negoti-ated the much-underrated Treaty of 1818 withBritain. This pact permitted Americans to share thecoveted Newfoundland fisheries with their Cana-

dian cousins. This multisided agreement also fixedthe vague northern limits of Louisiana along theforty-ninth parallel from the Lake of the Woods(Minnesota) to the Rocky Mountains (see the mapbelow). The treaty further provided for a ten-yearjoint occupation of the untamed Oregon Country,without a surrender of the rights or claims of eitherAmerica or Britain.

To the south lay semitropical Spanish Florida,which many Americans believed geography andprovidence had destined to become part of theUnited States. Americans already claimed WestFlorida, where uninvited American settlers had torndown the hated Spanish flag in 1810. Congress rati-fied this grab in 1812, and during the War of 1812against Spain’s ally, Britain, a small American armyseized the Mobile region. But the bulk of Floridaremained, tauntingly, under Spanish rule.

When an epidemic of revolutions broke out in South America, notably in Argentina (1816),Venezuela (1817), and Chile (1818), Spain wasforced to denude Florida of troops to fight therebels. General Andrew Jackson, idol of the West andscourge of the Indians, saw opportunity in theundefended swamplands. On the pretext that hos-tile Seminole Indians and fugitive slaves were usingFlorida as a refuge, Jackson secured a commissionto enter Spanish territory, punish the Indians, andrecapture the runaways. But he was to respect allposts under the Spanish flag.

Early in 1818 Jackson swept across the Floridaborder with all the fury of an avenging angel. Hehanged two Indian chiefs without ceremony and,

Oregon and Florida 251

Columbia R.

Missouri R.

Lake ofthe Woods

Mississippi R.SnakeR.

Fra

ser

R.

Platte R.

CANADA

UNITED STATES

OREGONCOUNTRY(10-year joint

occupation, renewable) 49°

Rocky

Mountains

Natural boundary of Louisiana TerritoryTreaty boundary

U.S.-British Boundary Settlement,1818 Note that the United Statesgained considerable territory bysecuring a treaty boundary ratherthan the natural boundary of theMissouri River watershed. The lineof 49° was extended westward tothe Pacific Ocean under the Treatyof 1846 with Britain (see p. 380).

after hasty military trials, executed two British sub-jects for assisting the Indians. He also seized the twomost important Spanish posts in the area, St. Marksand then Pensacola, where he deposed the Spanishgovernor, who was lucky enough to escape Jackson’sjerking noose.

Jackson had clearly exceeded his instructionsfrom Washington. Alarmed, President Monroe con-sulted his cabinet. Its members were for disavowingor disciplining the overzealous Jackson—all exceptthe lone wolf John Quincy Adams, who refused tohowl with the pack. An ardent patriot and national-ist, the flinty New Englander took the offensive anddemanded huge concessions from Spain.

In the mislabeled Florida Purchase Treaty of1819, Spain ceded Florida, as well as shadowy Span-ish claims to Oregon, in exchange for America’sabandonment of equally murky claims to Texas,soon to become part of independent Mexico. The

hitherto vague western boundary of Louisiana wasmade to run zigzag along the Rockies to the forty-second parallel and then to turn due west to thePacific, dividing Oregon from Spanish holdings.

The Menace of Monarchy in America

After the Napoleonic nightmare, the rethronedautocrats of Europe banded together in a kind ofmonarchical protective association. Determined torestore the good old days, they undertook to stampout the democratic tendencies that had sproutedfrom soil they considered richly manured by theideals of the French Revolution. The world must bemade safe from democracy.

The crowned despots acted promptly. Withcomplete ruthlessness they smothered the embersof rebellion in Italy (1821) and in Spain (1823).According to the European rumor factory, they werealso gazing across the Atlantic. Russia, Austria, Prus-sia, and France, acting in partnership, would pre-sumably send powerful fleets and armies to therevolted colonies of Spanish America and thererestore the autocratic Spanish king to his ancestraldomains.

Many Americans were alarmed. Sympathetic to democratic revolutions everywhere, they had

252 CHAPTER 12 The Second War for Independence and the Upsurge of Nationalism, 1812–1824

Battle of Horseshoe Bend(March 1814)

Battle of NewOrleans (Jan. 1815)

Mississippi R.

BatonRouge

Mobile

Pensacola St. Marks

MISSISSIPPI TERR.

WEST FLORIDA

GEORGIALA.

EAST�FLORIDA

S.C.

To U.S. 1810

To U.S. 1812–1813

To U.S. 1819

Jackson's route, 1814

Jackson's route, 1818

The Southeast, 1810–1819

cheered when the Latin American republics rosefrom the ruins of monarchy. Americans feared thatif the European powers intervened in the NewWorld, the cause of republicanism would sufferirreparable harm. The physical security of theUnited States—the mother lode of democracy—would be endangered by the proximity of powerfuland unfriendly forces.

The southward push of the Russian bear, fromthe chill region now known as Alaska, had alreadypublicized the menace of monarchy to North Amer-ica. In 1821 the tsar of Russia issued a decreeextending Russian jurisdiction over one hundredmiles of the open sea down to the line of 51°, an area that embraced most of the coast of present-day British Columbia. The energetic Russians hadalready established trading posts almost as far southas the entrance to San Francisco Bay, and the fearprevailed in the United States that they were plan-ning to cut the Republic off from California, itsprospective window on the Pacific.

Great Britain, still Mistress of the Seas, was nowbeginning to play a lone-hand role on the compli-cated international stage. In particular, it recoiledfrom joining hands with the continental Europeanpowers in crushing the newly won liberties of the Spanish-Americans. These revolutionists hadthrown open their monopoly-bound ports to out-side trade, and British shippers, as well as Ameri-cans, had found the profits sweet.

Accordingly, in August 1823, George Canning,the haughty British foreign secretary, approachedthe American minister in London with a startlingproposition. Would not the United States combinewith Britain in a joint declaration renouncing anyinterest in acquiring Latin American territory, andspecifically warning the European despots to keeptheir harsh hands off the Latin American republics?The American minister, lacking instructions,referred this fateful scheme to his superiors inWashington.

Monroe and His Doctrine

The tenacious nationalist, Secretary Adams, washardheaded enough to be wary of Britons bearinggifts. Why should the lordly British, with the mighti-est navy afloat, need America as an ally—an Amer-

ica that had neither naval nor military strength?Such a union, argued Adams, was undignified—likea tiny American “cockboat” sailing “in the wake ofthe British man-of-war.”

Adams, ever alert, thought that he detected thejoker in the Canning proposal. The British fearedthat the aggressive Yankees would one day seizeSpanish territory in the Americas—perhaps Cuba—which would jeopardize Britain’s possessions in theCaribbean. If Canning could seduce the UnitedStates into joining with him in support of the terri-torial integrity of the New World, America’s ownhands would be morally tied.

A self-denying alliance with Britain would notonly hamper American expansion, concludedAdams, but it was unnecessary. He suspected—cor-rectly—that the European powers had not hatchedany definite plans for invading the Americas. In anyevent the British navy would prevent the approachof hostile fleets because the South American mar-kets had to be kept open at all costs for British mer-chants. It was presumably safe for Uncle Sam,behind the protective wooden petticoats of theBritish navy, to blow a defiant, nationalistic blast atall of Europe. The distresses of the Old World set thestage once again for an American diplomatic coup.

The Monroe Doctrine was born late in 1823,when the nationalistic Adams won the nationalisticMonroe over to his way of thinking. The president,in his regular annual message to Congress onDecember 2, 1823, incorporated a stern warning tothe European powers. Its two basic features were (1) noncolonization and (2) nonintervention.

Monroe first directed his verbal volley primarilyat the lumbering Russian bear in the Northwest. Heproclaimed, in effect, that the era of colonization inthe Americas had ended and that henceforth thehunting season was permanently closed. What thegreat powers had they might keep, but neither theynor any other Old World governments could seize orotherwise acquire more.

At the same time, Monroe trumpeted a warningagainst foreign intervention. He was clearly con-cerned with regions to the south, where fears were feltfor the fledgling Spanish-American republics. Mon-roe bluntly directed the crowned heads of Europe tokeep their hated monarchical systems out of thishemisphere. For its part the United States would notintervene in the war that the Greeks were then fight-ing against the Turks for their independence.

The Monroe Doctrine 253

Monroe’s Doctrine Appraised

The ermined monarchs of Europe were angered atMonroe’s doctrine. Having resented the incendiaryAmerican experiment from the beginning, they werenow deeply offended by Monroe’s high-flown pro-nouncement—all the more so because of the gulfbetween America’s loud pretensions and its soft mili-tary strength. But though offended by the upstartYankees, the European powers found their handstied, and their frustration increased their annoyance.Even if they had worked out plans for invading theAmericas, they would have been helpless before thebooming broadsides of the British navy.

Monroe’s solemn warning, when issued, madelittle splash in the newborn republics to the south.Anyone could see that Uncle Sam was only secon-darily concerned about his neighbors, because hewas primarily concerned about defending himselfagainst future invasion. Only a relatively few edu-cated Latin Americans knew of the message, andthey generally recognized that the British navy—notthe paper pronouncement of James Monroe—stoodbetween them and a hostile Europe.

In truth, Monroe’s message did not have muchcontemporary significance. Americans applauded itand then forgot it. Not until 1845 did President Polkrevive it, and not until midcentury did it become animportant national dogma.

Even before Monroe’s stiff message, the tsar haddecided to retreat. This he formally did in the Russo-American Treaty of 1824, which fixed his southern-most limits at the line of 54° 40'—the presentsouthern tip of the Alaska panhandle.

The Monroe Doctrine might more accuratelyhave been called the Self-Defense Doctrine. Presi-dent Monroe was concerned basically with thesecurity of his own country—not of Latin America.The United States has never willingly permitted apowerful foreign nation to secure a foothold near itsstrategic Caribbean vitals. Yet in the absence of theBritish navy or other allies, the strength of the Mon-roe Doctrine has never been greater than America’spower to eject the trespasser. The doctrine, as oftennoted, was just as big as the nation’s armed forces—and no bigger.

The Monroe Doctrine has had a long career ofups and downs. It was never law—domestic orinternational. It was not, technically speaking, a

254 CHAPTER 12 The Second War for Independence and the Upsurge of Nationalism, 1812–1824

The West and Northwest,1819–1824 The British Hudson’sBay Company moved to secure itsclaim to the Oregon Country in1824, when it sent a heavily armedexpedition led by Peter SkeneOgden into the Snake River country.In May 1825 Ogden’s partydescended the Bear River “andfound it discharged into a largeLake of 100 miles in length”—oneof the first documented sightings bywhite explorers of Great Salt Lake.(The mountain man Jim Bridger isusually credited with being the firstwhite man to see the lake.)

pledge or an agreement. It was merely a simple, per-sonalized statement of the policy of President Mon-roe. What one president says, another may unsay.And Monroe’s successors have ignored, revived, dis-torted, or expanded the original version, chiefly byadding interpretations. Like ivy on a tree, it hasgrown with America’s growth.

But the Monroe Doctrine in 1823 was largely anexpression of the post-1812 nationalism energizingthe United States. Although directed at a specific

menace in 1823, and hence a kind of period piece,the doctrine proved to be the most famous of all thelong-lived offspring of that nationalism. While giv-ing voice to a spirit of patriotism, it simultaneouslydeepened the illusion of isolationism. Many Ameri-cans falsely concluded, then and later, that theRepublic was in fact insulated from European dan-gers simply because it wanted to be and because, ina nationalistic outburst, Monroe had publiclywarned the Old World powers to stay away.

Chronology 255

Chronology

1810 Fletcher v. Peck ruling asserts right of theSupreme Court to invalidate state lawsdeemed unconstitutional

1812 United States declares war on BritainMadison reelected president

1812-1813 American invasions of Canada fail

1813 Battle of the ThamesBattle of Lake Erie

1814 Battle of PlattsburghBritish burn WashingtonBattle of Horseshoe BendTreaty of Ghent signed

1814-1815 Hartford Convention

1815 Battle of New Orleans

1816 Second Bank of the United States foundedProtectionist Tariff of 1816Monroe elected president

1817 Madison vetoes Calhoun’s Bonus BillRush-Bagot agreement limits naval armament

on Great Lakes

1818 Treaty of 1818 with BritainJackson invades Florida

1819 Panic of 1819Spain cedes Florida to United StatesMcCulloch v. Maryland caseDartmouth College v. Woodward case

1820 Missouri CompromiseMissouri and Maine admitted to UnionLand Act of 1820Monroe reelected

1821 Cohens v. Virginia case

1823 Secretary Adams proposes Monroe Doctrine

1824 Russo-American Treaty of 1824Gibbons v. Ogden case

1825 Erie Canal completed

For further reading, see page A8 of the Appendix. For web resources, go to http://college.hmco.com.

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