GENERAL INFORMATION March 1999 (rev’d December 2000) 1 OF 29 The Life Cycle of Labor and Management Relations F or the past 10 years the OSBA has been collecting information about the types of bargaining relationships Oregon school districts have with their union counterparts. In looking at the data, we've noticed that labor-management relation- ships tend to cycle back and forth between adversarial and cooperative styles of bargaining. Early in the past decade, we saw a dramatic increase in the use of alternative/collaborative models. This trend has been followed by a period of relative stability in the dif- ferential use of traditional/adversarial and alternative/ collaborative models. We believe traditional and alternative bargaining techniques lie along a single continuum, with any number of hybrid models between the two extremes. (A hybrid model is not purely collaborative nor purely adversarial, but a deliberate mixture of the two techniques.) It's important to note that the traditional/ adversarial and alternative/collaborative techniques are not totally separate techniques: there are adversarial/ distributive elements in collaborative techniques as well as collaborative/integrative techniques in adver- sarial models. (See Figure 1.) In mature adversarial bargaining (usually after the parties have found that simply taking positions will not yield a settlement), some accommodation or problem solving may occur. Similarly, in collaborative bargaining, some distributive bargaining over econom- ic issues (e.g., salary, insurance) may occur. On a practical level there may be no pure traditional or collaborative technique, but only mixtures of both with one technique predominating. There are some “hybrid models” that deliberately take elements from both techniques and attempt to mold them together. Let's take a closer look at some of these negotiations techniques. Figure 1 The Traditional Model The traditional model of negotiations assumes that management and labor have clearly defined sets of opposing tasks and interests and that every gain is offset by a loss. This is called "zero-sum" bargaining: + gain - loss = zero The goal of “zero-sum” bargaining is to distribute resources. Distributive bargaining is most useful if there is a fixed resource, a single issue, or the outcome or content of the negotiations outweighs relationship issues. Traditional negotiations involve a highly
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GENERAL INFORMATION March 1999 (rev’d December 2000) 1 OF 29
The Life Cycle of Labor and Management Relations
For the past 10 years the OSBA has beencollecting information about the types ofbargaining relationships Oregon school districts
have with their union counterparts. In looking at thedata, we've noticed that labor-management relation-ships tend to cycle back and forth between adversarialand cooperative styles of bargaining. Early in the pastdecade, we saw a dramatic increase in the use ofalternative/collaborative models. This trend has beenfollowed by a period of relative stability in the dif-ferential use of traditional/adversarial and alternative/collaborative models.
We believe traditional and alternative bargainingtechniques lie along a single continuum, with anynumber of hybrid models between the two extremes.(A hybrid model is not purely collaborative nor purelyadversarial, but a deliberate mixture of the twotechniques.) It's important to note that the traditional/adversarial and alternative/collaborative techniques arenot totally separate techniques: there are adversarial/distributive elements in collaborative techniques aswell as collaborative/integrative techniques in adver-sarial models. (See Figure 1.)
In mature adversarial bargaining (usually after theparties have found that simply taking positions will notyield a settlement), some accommodation or problemsolving may occur. Similarly, in collaborativebargaining, some distributive bargaining over econom-ic issues (e.g., salary, insurance) may occur. On apractical level there may be no pure traditional orcollaborative technique, but only mixtures of both withone technique predominating. There are some “hybridmodels” that deliberately take elements from both
techniques and attempt to mold them together. Let'stake a closer look at some of these negotiationstechniques.
Figure 1
The Traditional ModelThe traditional model of negotiations assumes that
management and labor have clearly defined sets ofopposing tasks and interests and that every gain isoffset by a loss. This is called "zero-sum" bargaining:+ gain - loss = zero
The goal of “zero-sum” bargaining is to distributeresources. Distributive bargaining is most useful ifthere is a fixed resource, a single issue, or the outcomeor content of the negotiations outweighs relationshipissues.
Traditional negotiations involve a highly
GENERAL INFORMATION March 1999 (rev’d December 2000) 2 OF 29
structured process, with each party exchanging writtenproposals and counterproposals. The proposals ofteninclude position statements that rationalize and justifypositions taken by the parties. Each party demandsconcessions and pressures the other party to agree tothose demands. Proposals are often packaged andissues are traded off. Both parties strive to maximizegains and minimize losses.
At the end of bargaining, the parties establish aformal contract to regulate the impact of managementdecisions and the rights of employees. Conflicts areresolved by uniform application of work rules andpractices, and contract language is interpreted in alegislative fashion.
There are many different models of traditionalbargaining, but four are used by Oregon school dis-tricts. (See Appendix A-1.)
R Adversarial negotiations are characterized bycompeting interests. The chief spokesperson typicallyis a professional negotiator. Written proposals andcounterproposals are used. Concessions are made in-frequently and many issues are linked together tomake concessions more palatable.
R Process-oriented adversarial negotiations arecharacterized by the use of the collective bargainingprocess itself to focus on a narrow number of issues,usually economics. Mediation and the cooling-offperiod are used to gain strategic advantage to pressurethe opposing party into concessions. Bargaining oftenis characterized by marathon sessions, or the use ofbrinkmanship bargaining during mediation or the 30-day cooling-off period.
R Informal adversarial negotiations usually do notinvolve a professional negotiator, but typically involveunion presidents and superintendents engaging in in-formal discussions of bottom-line positions. Both par-ties apply gentle pressure and there usually is sometype of gradual concession or movement. Issues arepackaged early in the discussions. Written proposalsusually are made only after considerable discussion.Sessions usually are of short duration and relativelylow frequency.
R Expedited traditional negotiations typically
involve a limited number of issues discussed by bothparties in a marathon bargaining session. The super-intendent or board representative usually serves as thesole spokesperson. A professional negotiator often isnot present but may be advising behind the scenes.
Collaborative BargainingAt the other end of the continuum is collaborative
bargaining. Collaborative bargaining is a generic termthat describes a variety of bargaining methods: win-win bargaining, collegial bargaining, consensusbargaining, cooperative bargaining, integrative barg-aining, mutual gains bargaining, collective gaining,and interest-based negotiations.1 Collaborativebargaining involves a two-way discussion aimed at:
R increasing the quality and quantity of communi-cation between the parties;
R focusing on joint resolution of problems;R resolving issues with respect and dignity;R improving working relationships between the
parties; andR enhancing the probability of successful
negotiations.Collaborative bargaining models place high value
on individual participation and cooperation in theprocess. Instead of a competitive bargaining method-ology, a joint problem-solving strategy is used for re-solving conflicts between the parties. The structuresand procedures are flexible, as opposed to the highlystylized conversations and debates in traditional mo-dels.
Continual communication problem solving andconsultation characterize the atmosphere. Trust is es-tablished throughout the participatory process, withless reliance on specific contractual obligations andduties. Collaborative/integrative bargaining establish-es comprehensive ongoing communications and prob-lem-solving forums characterized by:
R consulting the other party before proceeding;R understanding and being understood;R being co-partners; and
1“Interest-Based Bargaining” (IBB) or “Interest-Based Strategy”(IBS) appears to be the most popular terms in the late 1990s.
GENERAL INFORMATION March 1999 (rev’d December 2000) 3 OF 29
R developing a relationship that survives thedifferences between the parties.
There are four collaborative bargaining modelsused by Oregon school districts. (See Appendix A-2.)
1. Informal collaborative/cooperative bargainingis an informal style of bargaining similar to theinformal adversarial model used in traditional barg-aining. Typically, there are no extensive teams of in-dividuals from either party. Negotiations are looselystructured, of short duration, with few meetings. Rep-resentation is by a union president and the superin-tendent or board chairperson. Issues tend to be limitedand focused on solving problems rather than takingpositions.
Differences between informal collaborative/cooperative negotiations and the informal adversarialnegotiations are found in the:
R attitudes of the participants;R working relationships of the parties;R amount of trust between the parties;R number of issues raised during the negotiations;R participants' personalities;R balance and nature of the contract;R ability to continue informal communications;
andR relative stability of the district's environment.2. Formal collaborative bargaining involves
some actual training in the interest-based process butdoes not require the presence of facilitators. Districtsuse a number of specific procedures geared to theirown cultures. Districts feel considerable ownershipover the extent and nature of the process. Writtenproposals and counterproposals may be used, butconsiderable time is spent identifying issues, clarify-ing mutual interests, and using some type of problem-solving technique. Typically, there is a mini-malmeeting structure. Marathon negotiation sessions,however, are common.
The Employment Relations Board's State Concilia-tion Service (ERB) uses a formal collaborative model,which includes a two-day joint training workshop ininterest-based bargaining. The training includes anintroduction to the principles of interest-based problem
solving using materials from Getting to Yes2 as well astraining on consensus decision-making. Duringtraining the parties develop written ground rules, andthe ERB offers a facilitation option during actualnegotiations. The ERB offers an interest-basedmediation service if the parties request mediationunder PECBA.
3. U.S. Department of Labor interest-basednegotiations program. This model is a joint problem-solving process based on the parties' interest and amutual stake in the future. The model requires anexpedited procedure with one- to two-day marathonsessions and completion of the entire bargainingprocess within 30 days.
This program requires the parties to participate ina two-day training program. The training includesinstruction on how the parties can self-facilitate thenegotiations and if they agree, advocates from bothsides may double as facilitators. The program requiresthe parties to formally identify issues, and emphasizescommunications and clarification of interests. There isa structured problem-solving and brainstorming pro-cess, as well as options to establish written standardsfor judging the options in advance. There are nowritten proposals, and hard issues are tackled first. Theprocess has a defined structure and the short timeframe discourages the parties from raising a largenumber of issues. This model is most often used withclassified employee bargaining units.
4. The OEA-OSBA Collaborative BargainingModel is the most highly structured of thecollaborative bargaining models used in Oregon. Thismodel provides parties with a team of two facilitators,one from the Oregon Education Association and theother from the Oregon School Boards Association.Each facilitator has a background in bargaining andspecific training in this non-traditional process.
Facilitators advocate for the process, not theparties. Advocates (Do you mean facilitators?) some-times are present during negotiations, but their
2Getting to Yes, Roger Risher and William Ury, Penguin Books2nd Edition, 1983.
GENERAL INFORMATION March 1999 (rev’d December 2000) 4 OF 29
presence is optional and controlled by written groundrules. The facilitators conduct an unbiased assessmentwith each party to determine the school district'scircumstances and to determine the parties' chances forsuccess. Facilitators may make recommendationsand/or describe the parties' strengths and weaknessesfor embarking on this style of bargaining.
Typically, the bargaining takes place over a 9–12week period, with an initial two-day (weekend) barg-aining session. The parties then identify topics anddivide into subcommittees to work on specific issuesduring a six- to eight-week period. At the end of thisperiod the parties come together for a final two-day(weekend) session to reach agreement on a totalcontract settlement. The process specifies writtenground rules.
Details on the OEA-OSBA Collaborative Barg-aining Model can be found on pages 15–17 of theNegotiator's Notebook article "Examining Collabora-tive Bargaining Techniques," June 1995. Facilitatorsare present for the first weekend's bargaining sessionand are on call for subcommittee bargaining during thesecond weekend bargaining session. They also conducta two-day training session to familiarize the partieswith each step of the process.
Labor-Management Roles and Relationships
Labor and management take on various roles dur-ing the life of an agreement. The parties may interactin highly adversarial situations but also work to formstrategic partnerships to further the mission of theorganization. Their ability to play different roles,depending on the circumstances, creates inherent ten-sion in the workplace. Specific internal or externalfactors may impact this dynamic tension.
For example, changes to the tenure law in 1997caused increased teacher anxiety, which was then re-flected in labor-management relations. The 1999 FernRidge strike took place because teachers mistakenlybelieved they needed to increase job protections tooffset losses resulting from SB 880. This “externalfactor” (the passage of tenure legislation) impacted thelabor relations of a district that had not dismissed a
teacher in more than a decade.Internal changes can also affect the level of
tension in the workplace. Leadership changes in theunion or the district can impact the relationship be-tween the parties. A particularly contested disciplinaryaction or transfer also can act as a flash point. How theparties react to an event can move them backward orforward along the adversarial-collaborative contin-uum.
For example, at the end of the 1996-97 schoolyear, the Portland School District superintendentannounced the reconstitution (or re-staffing) ofHumbolt Elementary School in an attempt to turnaround disappointing student achievement growth.There was an immediate adversarial response fromteachers who called the controversial decision a "knee-jerk" reaction. Members of the school board expressedtheir support for reconstitution, and even U.S.Secretary of Education Richard Riley got invol-ved,saying, "If a school is bad and can't be changed,reconstitute it or close it down."
The union immediately filed a grievance trying tohalt the action but agreed to an expedited hearing. Afew days before the start of the 1997-98 school year,an arbitrator issued a decision in favor of the district;however, the controversy continued. Two years later,when a new superintendent was hired, he declared hewould not use reconstitution again.
The roles the parties play under an existing agree-ment impact the roles they play during bargaining (andvice-versa). These roles will shape their views ofwhich bargaining model is most useful to support theirinterests.
Appendix B shows some of the roles labor andmanagement may play during the life of a contract.The roles each party plays reflect the relationshipbetween labor and management, but they also may bechosen for their strategic value. For example, it mayserve one of the parties' interests to collaborate onsome issues but remain intractable on others. The keyis whether the parties believe the roles they assumewill help them to achieve their overall goals.
GENERAL INFORMATION March 1999 (rev’d December 2000) 5 OF 29
Stages of Collective Bargaining3
Why is collective bargaining cyclical in nature?Analyzing the process may provide some answers.There are four basic stages in collective bargaining:
R Conflict usually exists at the beginning of thebargaining relationship. It is characterized by the em-ployer trying to maintain control, while the union re-sponds with aggressive action in an effort to be re-cognized and strengthen its position.
R Containment follows, during which theemployer recognizes that a relationship with the unionis necessary. The union also recognizes the need tolearn to live with the employer and begins to moderateits demands and rhetoric. Mutual suspicion and dis-trust from earlier conflicts remains, however.
R Accommodation is reached when both partiesattempt to achieve an agreement through reason andpersuasion, rather than economic warfare. Typically,this stage begins when the parties begin to focus onlocal issues as opposed to regional or statewide issues.The emphasis shifts to building a relationship that re-cognizes both parties' needs.
R Cooperation sees collaborative behavior at itshighest level. The trust level is high and the parties aremotivated to solve problems. Both sides work toprotect and build the relationship. Communication isopen and direct with informal discussions of realproblems.
These stages describe the series of interactionswhen the parties use a traditional bargaining model.When a collaborative model is used, both parties agreeto focus on stage four (cooperation) from the be-ginning. Appendix C represents the nature ofbargaining dynamics.
The Cyclical Nature of Collective Bargaining
Over the course of negotiations, bargainingrelationships may cycle from one model to another.These shifts may occur during a single bargaining ses-sion. Negotiators need to be aware of the models andstages of collective bargaining so they can understandwhy these shifts take place. They may even choose tochange from one model to another. For example, theparties may decide at the outset to use a collaborativemodel throughout the negotiations, but when it comesto a particular issue (e.g., money) traditional elementsmay be used. Appendix D shows a diagram of thecycle between traditional and alternative bargaining.
A number of patterns have emerged from our 10-year study of school district relationships. Some dis-tricts have cultures of collaboration that sustain the useof formal or informal interest-based strategies. Theremay be some positional bargaining, but for the mostpart the relationships are cooperative. Other dis-trictsuse a traditional approach over multiple con-tracts.This approach seems to fit them well and any efforts atcollaboration are placed in a traditional framework.Other districts cycle toward the extremes of thecontinuum. We have identified three patterns:
1. the transition from traditional to collabor-ative;
2. the transition from collaborative to tradition-al; and
3. the impact of a strike or near-strike activity.
The Impetus For Change
OSBA survey data and our experience in collab-orative and traditional bargaining offer some insightsinto why parties cycle between bargaining models.
Adoption of a Collaborative ModelFirst, the survey indicates districts are more
inclined to change from traditional to collaborativebargaining because they believe the parties will reacha better outcome by working together. In many cases,the union initiates this change. Second, the surveyindicates the shift to collaborative bargaining mayresult from prior contentious negotiations. Several re-
3Namit, Chuck, Checking Your Negotiations Style: TheSituational Negotiations Approach to Bargaining, WashingtonSchool Directors’ Association, 1981, pg 8-17. Adapted from:Beavers, Mabry, B., Labor Relations and Collective Bargaining,The Ronald Press Co., 1966, pg. 66-67.
GENERAL INFORMATION March 1999 (rev’d December 2000) 6 OF 29
sponses note that previous negotiations left a bruisedrelationship between the district and the union andstaff.
Third, change is brought on by the hiring of a newsuperintendent or the election of a new associationpresident. Many survey responses indicate that per-sonnel responsible for the negotiations initiate thechange. Some shifts are the result of changes in boardmembership. Fourth, change is brought on by a strikeor a near strike.
Fifth, change is brought on by a change in nego-tiators. In some instances the parties to the agreementeither get rid of their professional negotiators or aban-don the lead negotiator model for a team negotiationmodel.
Finally, change is brought on because financialconstraints require the parties to negotiate collabor-atively. A few respondents to the survey mention thatmutual concerns about PERS made both parties movetoward using the collaborative model.
In summary, the reasons for the adoption of acollaborative approach are:
1. Both parties believe alternative models will bemore successful.
2. Past negotiations have failed to meet theparties' goals.
3. New leadership promotes trust and risk-taking.4. After high-conflict negotiations or a strike, the
parties want labor peace.5. Negotiators have new or different sets of skills.
Adoption of a Traditional ModelThe research and our experience also shed some
light on why parties move from a collaborative to atraditional model. In some instances the parties beginwith a collaborative approach at the outset. Duringnegotiations, however, this approach breaks down andthe parties decide to revert back to a traditional modelof bargaining. In other instances new personnel notfamiliar with collaborative bargaining or suspicious ofthe process choose to switch. In a few instances, achange occurs when some members of either party donot believe the collaborative process is meeting theirneeds and consequently become critical of the process.
Finally, some districts change because of a financial orother crisis in the district, which is used to rationalizethe change. In summary, the reasons for adopting atraditional approach are:
1. The process breaks down through lack oftraining or facilitation.
2. Personnel changes raise power and/or govern-ance issues.
3. Members of either party believe the processdoes not reflect their interests.
4. A crisis, financial or otherwise, disrupts inter-nal power relationships.
Impact of Strike
The impact of strikes or near-strikes on collectivebargaining is of particular interest. Since 1974 Oregonschool districts have been involved in only 18 strikes.As Appendix E shows, school districts have exper-ienced a great deal of labor peace, considering thenumber of contracts negotiated each year. Although astrike or near-strike may bring a shift in the bargainingmodel, typically it is not the major impetus for change.Its collateral effect may be more significant, however.The most common reaction to a strike in anotherdistrict is, "We sure don't want to do that. We need toavoid a strike at all costs!"
The Shift from the Traditional to theCollaborative Model
Each year the OSBA surveys school districts onthe results of their bargaining, including whether theyuse a collaborative or traditional model. These surveyshave been conducted since 1993 and are completed byan average 81 percent of districts each year. For thepurposes of the survey, traditional bargaining isdefined as: "A bargaining process often characterizedby adversarial and confrontational strategies."Alternative/ collaborative bargaining is defined as: "Abargaining process incorporating problem-solving,trust, and co-operation."
As Appendix F shows, there was a dramatic in-
GENERAL INFORMATION March 1999 (rev’d December 2000) 7 OF 29
crease in districts reporting the use of an alternativemodel of bargaining from the 1993-94 school year.Interest in alternative models among school districtswas high in the late 1980s. Work on the developmentof the OEA-OSBA model started in 1989, and themodel debuted in the 1990-91 school year. Asknowledge of different models increased, moredistricts started to use them.
After this initial surge, the growth in alternativebargaining plateaued with at least 56 percent of dis-tricts using a collaborative model, which has onlyincreased to 59% by 2000-2001. We do not know howmany districts use a purely collaborative model andhow many use a hybrid model. Despite an increase inthe use of collaborative techniques, they have nottotally replaced traditional techniques. As the chartindicates, traditional bargaining is still chosen by 49%of Oregon’s school districts in 2000-2001. (See Ap-pendix G for data).
Does Collaborative Bargaining Affect Wages?
The bargaining model chosen by a district does notnecessarily determine the size of wage increases.Appendix H shows the average increase from 1994-2001 according to size of district. Statewide averagesshow that in the seven years this survey has been con-ducted, alternative methods have resulted in higherwage increases four times. The difference is less thana percent, however.
There are some differences based on size ofdistrict, however. The larger the district, the morelikely it is that alternative bargaining brought largerwage increases. In the 3000+ ADM category, this istrue every year; in the 1000-2999 ADM category, fiveyears; in the 500-999 ADM category, three years; inthe 100-499 ADM category, four years; and in the 1-99ADM category, two years.
Putting it all Together
Based on the data gathered from surveys and ourown experience in labor-management relations, we be-lieve the following to be true:
1. Traditional/adversarial and alternative/ colla-borative strategies are points along the same continu-um, rather than totally separate techniques.
2. Collaborative or interest-based strategies havenot replaced traditional/adversarial models but seem toexist in dynamic tension with them.
3. Growth in the use of collaborative techniquesappears to have plateaued in Oregon.
4. There appears to be a life cycle to labor-management relations and the use of a particular barg-aining model.
5. School districts have a choice among differentbargaining models within a traditional or collaborativeframework, as well as hybrid models.
6. On a practical level, there may be no puretraditional or pure collaborative techniques, but simplymixtures of both with one technique predom-inating.
7. Labor and management play various rolesduring the life of an agreement, ranging from highlyadversarial to strategic partnerships.
8. The differing roles create inherent tension inthe workplace. Internal or external factors may causethe parties to alter this dynamic tension.
9. The labor-management relationship and colle-ctive bargaining are cyclical over time. Three patternshave emerged from the data:
a) Adoption of a collaborative modelb) Adoption of a traditional modelc) Impact of a strike
10. The effect of collaborative vs. traditionalbargaining on economics (as reflected by the averageBA percent increase to salary schedules) appears to bemixed. In larger districts, collaborative bargaining ap-pears to give unions a modest advantage over tradi-tional methods.
By: Ron Wilson, Director of Labor Relations
GENERAL INFORMATION March 1999 (rev’d December 2000) 8 OF 29
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Appendix A-1
GENERAL INFORMATION March 1999 (rev’d December 2000) 9 OF 29
Traditional Bargaining Models in Oregon School DistrictsCharacteristics of Models
Type Origins AdvocatePresence/
Input
Team Structure
ParticipantTraining
Process Sessions\ TimeFrame
GroundRules
AdversarialNegotiationsModel
• Private SectorManufacturing• Trade Union StyleBargaining
Outside professionalnegotiator usuallypresent
• Professionalnegotiator• Team participationusually limited tocaucuses
Structure/Participation
• Highly Structured• Written proposals• Positional statements• Rationalize and justify positions• Maximize gains • Minimize losses• Demand concessions• Apply pressure• Few and small concessions• Packaging proposals
• Sessions typically scheduled for everyother week for 2-3hours at a time• Typically 8-12meetings prior tomediation• 2 to 12 monthstypically
• Usually avoided• Can be submitted for strategic purposes
Process-OrientedAdverserialModel
• Private SectorManufacturing• Trade Union Style Bargaining
Outside professionalnegotiator usuallypresent
• Professionalnegotiator• Team participationusually limited tocaucuses
Genericnegotiationstraining
• Process usedstrategically• Focus oneconomics• Apply pressure• Written proposals• Positionalstatements• Maximize gains • Minimize losses• Demandconcessions• Few and small concessions• Distributivebargaining
• 1-2 day marathon sessions• 30 day option• Option for non-expedited format• 6-7 monthsdepending on thenumber of issues
• Usually avoided• Can be submitted for strategic purposes
Informal,AdversarialModel
• Private SectorManufacturing• Trade Union StyleBargaining• Limited ProblemSolving• Limited IssueBargaining• Personality based
Behind the scenes, ifat all
• Superintendent/board chair/board representativeserves as solespokesperson• Team participationand discussion at thetable
• Loosely structured,short duration, lowfrequency sessions• Typically 2-8sessions total• Variable, usually 2to 4 months
• Usually no
ExpeditedTraditionalModel
• Private SectorManufacturing• Trade Union Style Bargaining• Limited issues
Variable,professionalnegotiator may bepresent or advisingbehind the scenes
• If present,, usuallythe professionalnegotiator isspokesperson;otherwise, thesuperintendent/board chair/boardrepresentative servesas sole spokesperson• Team participationand discussion at thetable
Genericnegotiationstraining, if any
• District-specific procedures• Limited issues• Marathon sessions• Limited number of sessions• Written proposals• Discussion ofbottom-line positions
• 1-2 day marathon sessions/weekends• 30/60/90 day options• Variable
• Facilitators usually not present• Usually none during actual negotiations
Yes active, ifpresent
Facilitatorprovidedtraining
•District- specific procedures• Written proposals may be used• Issue identification• Mutual Interests• Problem solving• Win/Win solutions• May use chief spokespersons
• Springfield• Bend-LaPine• South Lane• Lebanon• Rainier• Ontario
•Self-facilitation•May use one facilitator•Advocates may facilitate•Minimal content interventions, focus on process
Yes, active incontent andprocess
Two daytraining
• Expedited• Issue identification• Structured problemsolving/ Brainstorming• Focus on hard issues first• Establish written standards for judging options in advance• No written proposals• Active participation by participants
• 1-2 day marathon sessions• 30 day option• Option for non-expedited format• 48 hour marathon• 30-day option
• Bethel• Rainier• Jewell• Hillsboro Elem.• South Lane•Barlow-Gresham• Sandy UH• LaGrande• St. Helens• Lebanon• Warrenton- Hammond• Scappoose• Corbett• Tillamook
•Two-Union and Management in tandem•Process related input only
Optional andcontrolled byground rules
1 day minimum;1 to 3 daysavailable
• Highly Structured• Meet off site• Extensive discussion of interests and issue identification•Problem-solving strategy• Brainstorming• Emphasis on communication by participants• No written
• Two "weekends"• Multiple Subcommittee meetings• High intensity activity• 10-12 weeks duration
ADM 100-499Adrian 61Annex 29Blachly 90Cove 15Days Creek 15Dufur 29Echo 5Gilliam ESDGold Beach UH1Huntington 16Imbler 11Jordan Valley 3Long Creek 17McKenzie 68North Lake 14Pilot Rock 2Pine Eagle 61Prairie City 4Prospect 59Riverdale 51JSherman 1Sherman ESDVictor Point 42
ADM 500-999Colton 53Corbett 39Monroe 1JNeah-Kah-Nie 56Nestucca Valley 101JNorth Douglas 22Oakridge 76Riddle 70Stanfield 61Umatilla 6Welches 13
GENERAL INFORMATION March 1999 (rev’d December 2000) 24 OF 29
1997-1998 Statewide Bargaining Survey
Districts using Traditional Bargaining Districts using Alternative Bargaining
ADM 1-99Dayville 16JMitchell 55Monument 8Spray 1
ADM 100-499Adrian 61Annex 29Burnt River 30Camas Valley 21Cove 15Crow-Applegate 66Days Creek 15Echo 5Elkton 34Falls City 57Marcola 79JMcKenzie 68North Lake 14Pine Eagle 61Prairie City 4Prospect 59Riverdale 51JSherman 1St. Paul 45
ADM 500-999Amity 4Athena-Weston 29Central Linn 552Colton 53Corbett 39Harrisburg 7Monroe 1JNestucca Valley 101JOakland 1Oakridge 76Port Orford-LangloisStanfield 61
ADM 1000-2999Astoria 1Chenowith 9Creswell 40Estacada 108Glide 12Grant ESDHarney 3North Marion 15North Santiam 29Nyssa 26Philomath 17Rogue River 35Seaside 10
ADM 100-499Arlington 3Condon 25Fossil 21JHuntington 16Jewell 8Jordan Valley 3Long Creek 17Mapleton 32Paisley 11Perrydale 21JPetersburg 14Pilot Rock 2Powers 31Sauvie Island 19South Wasco County 1Wallowa 12
ADM 1000-2999Central 13JColumbia 5Coquille 8Fern Ridge 28John Day 3La Grande 1Lakeview 7Molalla RiverMorrow CUMyrtle Point 41North Bend 13Phoenix-Talent 4Pleasant Hill 1Rainier 13Reedsport 105Region 18 ESD
ADM 100-499Arlington 3Burnt River 30Condon 25Helix 1Huntington 16Imbler 11Jewell 8Long Creek 17Mapleton 32Pilot Rock 2Pine Eagle 61Powers 31South Wasco County 1Union 5Wallowa 12Wasco County 29
ADM 500-999Bandon 54Banks 13Central Linn 552Colton 53Dayton 8Enterprise 21Jefferson 14JMt. Angel 91Myrtle Point 41Santiam Canyon 129Scio 95Stanfield 61Vernonia 47Warrenton-Hammond 30
ADM 1000-2999Chenowith 9Coquille 8Estacada 108Gervais 1Gladstone 115John Day 3La Grande 1Molalla RiverNorth Santiam 29Philomath 17Phoenix-Talent 4Pleasant Hill 1Region 18 ESDScappoose 1JSiuslaw 97South Umpqua 19St. Helens 502The Dalles 12Umatilla 6Vale 84
ADM 3000 & UPAshland 5Central Point 6Clackamas ESDDallas 2David Douglas 40Douglas ESDEagle Point 9Grants Pass 7Greater Albany 8Hermiston 8Jefferson ESDKlamath Falls City SchoolsLake Oswego 7Lebanon Community SchoolsLincoln CULinn-Benton-Lincoln ESDMcMinnville 40Medford 549Multnomah ESDNorth Clackamas 12Oregon City 62Redmond 2JReynolds 7Roseburg 4Salem-Keizer 24JSouth Coast ESD 7Three Rivers/Josephine CUUmatilla-MorrowUnion-Baker Region 13 ESDWest Linn-Wilsonville 3Willamette Regional ESD
Appendix G-6
GENERAL INFORMATION March 1999 (rev’d December 2000) 26 OF 29
1999-2000 Statewide Bargaining Survey
Districts using Traditional Bargaining Districts using Alternative Bargaining
ADM 1-99Dayville 16JMitchell 55
ADM 100-499Adrian 61Annex 29Burnt River 30Butte Falls 91Camas Valley 21Cove 15Crow-Applegate 66Echo 5Elton 34Huntington 16Joseph 6Lowell 71North Lake 14Prospect 59Riverdale 51JSherman 1Yoncalla 32
ADM 1-99Fossil 21JHarper 66Long Creek 17Monument 8Ukiah 44
ADM 100-499Arlington 3Condon 25Culver 4Days Creek 15Elgin 23Falls City 57Helix 1Jordan Valley 3Paisley 11Perrydale 21JPilot Rock 2Pine Eagle 61Powers 31South Wasco County 1Wallowa 12Wasco County 29