The Knobe Effect in Experimental Economics Kyoto Sangyo University, Kyoto , Japan, 1st October, 2011 Yan Zhou (Kyoto Sangyo University) Sobei H. Oda (Kyoto Sangyo University)
Feb 22, 2016
The Knobe Effect in Experimental Economics
Kyoto Sangyo University, Kyoto , Japan, 1st October, 2011
Yan Zhou (Kyoto Sangyo University)Sobei H. Oda (Kyoto Sangyo University)
Construction
1. Philosophical Experiment by Knobe (2003) 2. Economic Experiment of the Knobe Effect by Utikal and
Fischbacher (2009)3. Our Experiment4. summary
Harm Scenario The CEO of a company is sitting in his office when his
Vice President of R&D comes in and says: “We are thinking of starting a new program. It will help us increase profits, but it will also harm the environment.”
The CEO responds that he doesn’t care about harming the environment and just wants to make as much profit as possible. The program is carried out, profits are made and the environment is harmed.
Question: Did the CEO intentionally harm the environment?
HELP ScenarioThe CEO of a company is sitting in his office when his Vice President of R&D comes in and says: “We are thinking of starting a new program. It will help us increase profits, and it will also help the environment.” The CEO responds that he doesn’t care about helping the environment and just wants to make as much profit as possible. The program is carried out, profits are made and the environment is helped.Question: Did the CEO intentionally help the environment?
The Knobe EffectExperimental Results: Those who said the CEO did intentionally is
82 per cent for the harm case and 23 per cent for the help case.
Philosophical Implication: The notion of intentionality can depend on moral judgement; people tend to think that negative side effects are bought about intentionally by the decision-maker while positives ones are not.
Social Implication: You will be criticised for harming others intentionally if you do something good for you but bad for others, while you may not be praised for helping others intentionally if you do something good both for you and others.
PositiveNegative
Intended Not Intended
PunishmentWorthy
Not RewardWorthy
Side Effect
Third Party’s Judgement
International Conference
How and why economists and philosophers do experiments:
dialogue between experimental economics
and experimental philosophyKyoto Sangyo University, Kyoto,
Japan27-28 March 2010
http://www.cc.kyoto-su.ac.jp/project/orc/execo/conf2010/index2010.html
Utikal and Fischbacher’s three-person two-stage game (2009)
1. Player 1 can move from X to Y, which increases his/her profit while generating (positive/negative) side-effect on Player 2. Question to Player 1: Do you move to Y?
2. Player 3 redistributes income between Players 1 and 2. Question to Player 3: How do you want to redistribute income if Player 1 moves (does not move) to Y?
Main effect: Y1-X1>0
Side effect: Y2-X2 >0 Y2-X2 =0 Y2-X2 <0
Scenarios (U-F experiment)+1
-2
+1
0
+1
+2
+1
-2
+1
0
+1
+1
+1
+4
U-F Working Hypothesis : 0 ≤ reward < punishment
6000
3000
4500
4500By chance
5000
5000
5000
1000
Side effect-2000
Side effect+2000
4500 –punishment
4500 +punishment
4500 +reward
4500 - reward
Chance Move Player 1’s Choice Player 3’s Choice
U-F Working Hypothesis : 0 ≤ reward < punishment
6000
3000
4500
4500By chance
5000
5000
5000
1000
Side effect-2000
Side effect+2000
4500 –punishment
4500 +punishment
4500 +reward
4500 - reward
Chance Move Player 1’s Choice Player 3’s Choice
Not observed in their experiment : denial of the Knobe Effect 。
Our experiment
Introduction of the Keynesian beauty contest
Opinion questions: What do you want to do (as a fair non-interested third party)?
Guess questions: What do you think will be the median opinion? (Monetary rewards will be shared among those who will have given the median answer.)
-2000
+1000
-1000
+1000
0
+1000
+1000
+1000
+2000
+1000
Scenarios (Our experiment)
Results of Our ExperimentPlayer 3’s Answers to Guess QuestionsRedistribution of unequally distributed income
6000
3000
4500 + α4500 - α
4500 - β4500 + β
55.5%
33.8%
10.7%
4500
4500
<
<
<Player 1’s Income > Player 2’s Income
Player 1’s Income=Player 2’s Income
Player 1’s Income <Player 2’s Income
Player 1’s Income >Player 2’s Income
(39.3%)
(50.4%)
(10.4%)
(Opinion)
Results of Our ExperimentPlayer 3’s Answers to Guess QuestionsRedistribution of unequally distributed income
3000
6000
4500 - α4500 + α
4500 + β4500 - β
8.0%
26.6%
65.4%
4500
4500
<
<
<
Player 1’s Income <Player 2’s Income
Player 1’s Income =Player 2’s Income
Player 1’s Income >Player 2’s Income
Player 1’s Income <Player 2’s Income
(Opinion)
(9.8%)
(50.1%)
(40.1%)
Results of Our ExperimentPlayer 3’s Answers to Guess Questions
Redistribution of equally distributed income
4500
4500
4500 + α4500 - α
4500 - β4500 + β
10.2%
57.7%
32.1%<
<4500
4500
Player 1’s Income >Player 2’s Income
Player 1’s Income =Player 2’s Income
Player 1’s Income <Player 2’s Income
Player 1’s Income =Player 2’s Income
(Opinion)
(7.9%)
(78.6%)
(13.5%)
Redistribution of unequally distributed incomePlayer 3’s Answers to Opinion & Guess Questions
Player I’s Income > Player J’s Income
Player I’s Income > Player J’s Income
Player I’s Income = Player J’s Income
Player I’s Income < Player J’s Income
Redistribution of equally distributed incomePlayer 3’s Answers to Opinion & Guess Questions
Player I’s Income = Player J’s Income
Player I’s Income < Player J’s Income
Player I’s Income = Player J’s Income
Player I’s Income > Player J’s Income
SummaryA: Inequality Aversion: unequal distribution must be equalised (no matter
what is the reason for the present inequality).
B: Inequality-reversing Aversion. The existing inequality must be respected (no matter what is the reason for the present inequality). Inequality should be reduced, but must not be reversed.
C: The Knobe Effect. Who is responsible for the present distribution matters.
A>B in the answers to Opinion questions, while B<A in the answers to Guess questions.
C is the third principle in the answers to either question, but stronger in the answers to guess questions.
Subjects may have not seriously considered opinion questions, which they knew would not affect their income: they may have saved time to concentrate their attention to guess questions, which they knew would affect their income.
If subjects answered both opinion and guess questions seriously, they followed a simple rule ( inequality aversion ), suspecting that others would take account of other factors ( inequality-reversing aversion).
Thank you for your attention !
Player 1’s Answer to Opinion Questions Side Effect Aversion
-2000 -1000 0 1000 20000
25
50
75
100
1 2 3
[6000,3000]
[4500,4500]
[3000,6000]
0
25
50
75
100
total (average [%])
Side effects
[Player 1’s income, Player 2’s income]
Percentage of moving to X(to increase his/her own income)
Player 1’s Answer to Guess Questions Side Effect Aversion
-2000 -1000 0 1000 20000
25
50
75
100
1 2 3
Side effects [Player 1’s income, Player 2’s income]
Percentage of moving to X(to increase his/her own income)
[6000,3000]
[4500,4500]
[3000,6000]
0
25
50
75
100
total (average [%])
Table 7
Table 8
Table 9
Table 10