The Indo Pak 1965 WAR

5/19/2018 The Indo Pak 1965 WAR

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THE ACCOUNT OF 1965 WAR AS FOUGHT

AND SEEN FROM THE AIRBORNE EYES

Brig(Retd) M.M.Mahmud

I have read the account of many an authors, of the 1965 War. It encompasses the rendition

of war as was perceived through the eyes of the Indians, Pakistani and the foreign

authors. Every description has its own ange and sant. !he most comprehensive account

is in the study carried out "y the #irecting $taff and the students of $taff %oege, &uetta

spread over a num"er of years. !his has now "een compied in the form, 'I$!()*

(+I#(-P/I$!0W) of 1965."y ieut 2enera 3ahmud hmed 4)etd. It is

"ased on the War #iaries of the units, interviews and "riefings of many who participated

in the war, and em"odies a comparative anaysis of the Indian officia version and the

detais written "y other contemporary writers. !he near to an accurate description, to my

mind, is covered "y 3en of $tee7 an account "ased on war dispatches of 3a8or 2enera

"rar 'ussain. !his again enumerates the detais of the "attes in a chronoogica order,

date wise. ut what I fee they a ack in, is "asicay that it does not truy capture the

spirit, the motivation and the passionate grit of mind and heart dispayed "y the gaant

men who fought it on ground. It e:uay audes to some of the panic, confusion and

"ra;en "unders committed. !hese aspects need to "e eicited in some detai and given a

pro8ection, so that the facts stem out in their correct perspective and in rea truth.

It is with these feeings that I em"ark on my hum"e effort, to portray the picture of the

"attefied as reaisticay and accuratey as I saw and witnessed. I was privieged to

watch the operations very cosey, in detai and as such truy refective of the happening

on the ground. E:uay, I had cose and intimate contacts, at different eves of command.

I had seen the operations mosty in the roe of air"orne eyes. It provided a graphic picture

of the detais as on a sand mode. It is my earnest effort to enthuse and entrain that spirit,

$ince, I operated ony in the area of %'3 and $I/(! $ector, my rendition, wi

"e confined to these operations. "rief description of )


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It is a pity that our panners denuded our main strike force in the /'E3 /')

$ector, of its re:uisite eement of command and contro. It was not provided with a fuy

integrated rmy viation support. It was aunched in a most hap ha;ard manner and part

of an uncoordinated pan. It proved to "e one of the "iggest mistakes of the war. !he vita

ground that we gained, we coud not hod ony "ecause there was no effective command

and contro. !he vita sector was eft void of fuy integrated rmy viation !hey had no

invoved and dedicated ir "orne eyes to guide them, provide them timey information

and hep in keeping, the cohesion and unity of command. 3ost importanty, the wisdom

of moving of '& > #iv from aoki to %ham" area is not understood. It had "een

tasked, with 1 rmd #iv under its command, to carry out offensive operations in that

sector. I "eieve there were other options too, "ut the pan of attack in the area of /hem

/haran was aso one of the options,

!'E ) (+ /


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taken as to the "oundaries and the area remained undemarcated. !his gave rise to

mutifarious administrative difficuties, particuary in the "order

reas where no effective contro coud "e maintained. !his ed to numerous

incidents ike har"oring of "ad characters "y side, ifting catteFs and other animas,

the poice and the revenue authorities cashing over their 8urisdictions and many other

such ike disputes.

c !hird ttemptB - !he 2ovt of India finay intervened in 19A? and a survey party

was sent to demarcate $ind-/utch "oundaries. !he 3ukhtar of /utch accepted

the caim of 3ukhtar of $ind, to the haf of the territory. !his "ecame infructous

as the authorities of /utch ater "acked out and refused to accept the decision.

!hus conse:uenty, this dispute was inherited "y the 2ovt of Pakistan at the time of

partition. $ind 2ovt maintained its caim over haf of the area. fter partition India

started to deveop a ava ase at /# orth of /utch. !hey aso panned to ink

this "ase, with )a8astan and %entra India, "y )aiway ine via #EE$. !his )aiway

ine was to pass through the )

!he ((-E')< agreement in 195? and the $heikh $waran $ingh meeting hed from

@ to 11 Hanuary, 196D, coud not resove the matter. oth sides decided to continue

studying the reevant materia.

Whie this status :uo was "eing maintained, the Indians decided to "uid up their troop

concentrations in the are a since Hanuary 1965. !here were air vioations of the area "y

the Indian ir +orce, from +e"ruary 1965. t this stage ir 3arsha 3. sghar /han,

%-I-%, P+, caed his counterpart in India. !his had an immediate effect and the

vioations stopped.


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(n =>G=? 3arch, 1965 the Indians carried a ma8or 8oint eercise with %om"ined

rmyGava compiments caed rrow 'ead7. #ue to a these moves, Pakistan aso

retaiated and concentrated its troops in the area. ? #iv, under the command of 3a8or

2en !I// /', was moved in the area. 2.(.%. 3')$!) and 2u8rat area,

3a8or 2enera P.%. 2


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(n =6 pri, 1965, 6 de under command of rig. I+!I/') HH


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(n the return fight from #I, I encountered very "ad weather. (n anding at

$)2(#', in the met "riefing, I was advised of very adverse weather conditions. ow

nd heavy couds with heavy rain and poor visi"iity were the forecast. I was advised not

to proceed further. %onsidering that it was important to get "ack to "ase, I decided to fy

out from $)2(#' to #'3I. ccompanying me was 3a8. /.$. 2hai" in

another -19 and t. %o $aeed &adir was sitting on the rear seat in the -19 "eing fown

"y me. With great difficuty the sat range was crossed. It was raining very heaviy and

the coud "ase was very ow. fter cearing the sat range, the fight to #'3I had to

"e undertaken at a very ow attitude so as to keep visua cose contract with the ground.

!he famiiarity of the area, "eing the oca fying area of #'3I $E heped. With

great difficuty the two aircraft reached the $(W )iver. s a sense of compacency

was "eginning to set in, that we have made it to #'3I ase, the aircraft suddeny

hit a heavy down pour. !he strong rain 8ust made a thick wa of pouring water with no

forward or downward visi"iity. !he aircraft with great difficuty took a "ind turn "ack. I

had aready "riefed 2hai", who was to foow me, to turn "ack immediatey as soon as

he saw I turn. s I emerged safey out of the thick and "inding rain. I saw 2hai"Fs

aircraft ahead of me. I was reieved. !here were other cose cas in my viation career,

"ut this was the cosest to having a fata accident. I was ucky I had accident free fyingcareer throughout my stay in the rmy viation.

#'3I $E, which was so cose, sti proved to "e too far. !he aircraft few "ack

to %'/W. !he parking and the security arrangements were made. We took to the

comfort of the hospitaity of ttock (i )efinery %amp at /$$). We stayed the

night with 3asud, a gofer friend. 'e was a keen gofer and was we known to his

unepected guests. !hrough the communication inks of the ttock (i )efinery,

messages were sent to #hamia ase and the famiies of these officers, informing them

that the aircraft had safey anded at %hakwa. !his put at rest a the panic that was

gripping #hamia ase due to these missing aircraft.


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fter performing reguar and routine missions of recce, iaison, %ommand and %ontro

and some casuaty evacuations, the fight of -19 aircraft and the ' J 1A heicopter

returned to #'3I on 6 3ay, 1965.

7 Div Co!etratio

+irst operationa move that the 1 rmy viation $:uadrons made was when it was paced

under %ommand > #iv. !he s:uadron moved to aoki 'ead works and remained

depoyed there from end 3ay 1965-end Hune 1965. > #iv with 1 rmd #iv under

command, had "een assigned the operationa mission in that sector. It was to act as the

main strike force. '& > #iv was ocated at aoki 'ead works. 1 $:n was depoyed

aong the ) cana. +or this op, 2(% > #iv carried out a very detaied and thorough

panning. 2(% 1 rmd #iv however, remained a "it indifferent participant. ieut

2enera taf &adir had compained to me personay, that 2(%1 rmd #iv did not take

any interest in the pans and often sept during operationa "riefings. 'e personay took

up this matter with 2enera 3usa and re:uested that he "e repaced with some other

%ommander. Why no heed was paid to this advice, wi remain a mysteryL I had earier

seen the shaowness of his command capa"iities, when I had served under him at

/harian. In the aunching of 1 rmored #ivision at /'E3 /), on ? $ept, 1965,

the fiasco committed coud easiy have "een foreseen and averted. o one had any dou"ta"out the professiona incompetence of 3a8. 2en. aseer. Why was he given the

command of the most important and the key strike force of the rmyM It was the singe

most important "etraya of 1965 war. Where ay the responsi"iityM $urey at the door

steps of 2enera 3usa and 2enera yu", who had inficted him in command of the most

important and vita formation of the rmy. I was associated with the pans in some

detais. !hese were on the ines of the ones formuated "y > #iv, when I was 2 II 4(ps

at that '&. !hey had the "est chance of success. 2(% > #iv, t. 2en. taf &adir,

iteray "urnt midnight oi in the meticuous panning and preparation of his pans. Why

he was suddeny posted to %E!(, one faied to understandM ut when t. 2en. taf

&adir received the orders, he was iteray in tears. !his I term as the second most

important "etraya committed "y the rmy high command. !he $:n was moved "ack to

#'3I "y end of Hune 1965. It kept waiting in the wings there.


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Batt"e #ie"d

!he time for the "attefied test arrived ate in ugust 1965. I was caed "y the ase

%ommander, %oone . wan, and he asked me to report to 2enera (fficer

%ommanding > #ivision, ocated near 2u8arat at Haapur. !he move of the $:uadronwas carried out on AD ugust 1965. I with a sma group moved to Haapur and the rest

of the s:uadron was concentrated at 2u8arat irfied. In the meeting with 2(% >

#ivision, 3a8or 2enera .3. *ahya /han, I was informed, that > #ivision

'ead:uarters, had "een moved to this sector with a specific mission. I was tod that on 1

$eptem"er 1965, 1= #ivision was to aunch its attack at %ham". !he phase-1, which was

securing of the ine of )iver 3unawar !WI, was to "e foowed in the phase-11 with the

o"8ective of capture of /'


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efore descri"ing these operations in detai, a "rief summation in essence may provide a

gist of the performance of the Pakistan rmy in 1965 war. !his may serve to highight the

over a spirit. nd the way the war was pursued at different eves of command.

+rom a accounts made "y different writers of the 1965 War, none is more descriptive

than that Fs saved Pakistan. !he three Fs were ah, ir and rtiery. !his may "e

rather an over simpification of the account. rmour may not have payed any key roe in

the other sectors or may "e it performed poory, "ut the "attes of P'I)


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%oming to the account of 1965 War and evauating the roe of rmy viation, needs

correct miitary perspective. !his can "e "est descri"ed in tandem to the operations on the

ground and specific description of the performance "y the rmy viation in support of

these.

rmy viation at this stage consisted of ase '& and three viation $:uadrons,

comprising of 1, = and A rmy viation $:uadrons. !he entire rmy viation had an

integrated maintenance and ogistic support, consisting of 199 viation E3E attaion,

and an (rdnance #epot. !he "ase was "eing commanded "y %oone .. wan. !he

s:uadrons were commanded "y ieutenant %oone 3.3. 3ahmud, %ommanding

(fficer o 1 $:n, t. %o 3ohammad /han, %ommanding (fficer o = $:n and

t. %o .


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!hroughout the %'3 operations, I carried out a the panning and co-ordination of

the tota rmy viation effort in the area. !he fight under 3a8or )a""ani had "een

aready assigned to 1= #iv. and had integrated itsef in the operationa pans of 1= #iv.

efore recording the historica events of the 1965 War and the roe payed "y the rmy

viation in support of it, we shoud pause and refect on the roe assigned to the rmy

viation. When we changed the traditiona ir (P roe to em"race the overa concept of

rmy viation roe in 196@, it was a "ig :uantum 8ump. +rom purey the simpe roe of

ad8usting rty +ire as ir (P, rmy viation was em"arking on a very am"itious roe, as

a fu fedged %om"at rm of the rmy. !he different teachings N definitions of the roe

of rmy viation can "est "e defined and summari;ed under the foowing parametersB-

a. attefied $urveiance

". %ommand and %ontro

c. 3o"iity

d. +ire Power

e. d8ustment of rtiery +ire

f. %asuaty Evacuation

!he rmy viation in Pakistan was sti in its infancy in 1965. It was in transition. !hecapa"iity for any physica mo"iity to act as a force mutipier none eisted. !he ony

mo"iity that it coud provide was to enhance the menta a"iity of the fied commanders

to take :uick and timey decisions. !his is a very vita factor. !he rmy viation had no

integra firepower capa"iity. !he entire roe that it payed has to "e evauated in the

concepts enunciated and recorded in that contet.

No$ the %att"e.s the tanks and the infantry roed out of their positions from the +


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E, #EW, $/) and %'3 sectors. In the $outh 1D= de commanded

"y rig. afar i /han, was tasked in the phase 1, to capture area west of !awi,

incuding 3#I-


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very ow atitude that none of the enemy piots coud "ai out and were a kied. !his

thriing encounter of the first air "atte, was witnessed from an -19 "y ir 3arsha ur

/han, the %-I-% of P+, t %o .


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=ic 3a8. 4ater t %o #


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W to and. 'e mentioned a"out some peope "eing in the post, "ut "eing "usy with

)%-@@, I did not truy understand the impications.

s the heicopter touched down, I 8umped out and with the ony weapon one had 4the

fying cap-akin to the current gof cap, I asked the men to stand up. It then dawned on us

that there was a very arge "ody of troops, in the post 4ater it transpired that it was a

company post of 5th$ikh ight Infantry and as customary in the Indian attaions, they

had the heavy weapons-3ortar, )), and ight 3achine 2un eement from a )HP

attaion. $ti carried "y the desire of souvenirs, I informed 3a8. W to and on the

main "unker, whie I waked into the post, got a coupe of weapons and we woud take

off in the heicopter. 3a8. W, to his credit, convinced me that there may "e a

minefied around the post. I caed out to a $ikh sodier to come over and on my

ascertaining, he confirmed that there were mines aong the "ar"ed wire. I asked him to

ead the way into the post. s I waked in, W "rought over the heicopter and anded

on the main "unker. (n in:uiry, I was informed that they had "een su"8ected to some

sheing and there were a few wounded ying in the "unker. I moved into the "unker and

ifting the "anket from each man, I found that there were a coupe dead and another

coupe who had "een in8ured. !he %ompany %ommander, 3a8. E2I had eft the post on

the pea that he was proceeding to fetch some rations. su"edar was in charge of thepost.

(n emerging from the "unker, I saw two enemy aircraft approaching from the $(


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position and fetch two rifes 4"rand new 2 IIIsL ("serving that the )a8puts 4heavy

Weapons were a itte suen and may react adversey, they were paced at the head of the

coumn and the march towards the P/I$! +#Fs, was made. fter a"out three mies,

I met 4ate 3a8. 4ater 3a8. 2en. #


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notice of the President and re:uested that the news "e reeased to the Press, as it woud

hep in raising the morae of our troop.

$ince I had (! contacted any one in person, varied reports of the incident were

pu"ished in the Press-some indicating that it was a P+ heicopter.

$u"se:uenty, in recognition of this singuar act, I was awarded the $itara-e-Hurat. P$ It

ater transpired that the position was a %ompany post 4P div was fown from his '& at Haapur to

'(HP #iv, had "een earier dropped there. (n arriva

there, 2en. 3usa tried to contact 2en. khtar i 3aik, 2(% 1= #iv. 2(% 1= #iv was

not in communication with any one, either on the wireess or on ine. fter a ot of hectic

efforts, he finay was traced in the area of %ham", where he was "usy epediting the re-

depoyment of the guns of @ %orps rtiery. !his re-depoyment was urgent as after the

crossing of )iver !WI and for advance "eyond that, the range of the guns was re:uired.


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With a ot of efforts, a message was finay conveyed to 2(% 1= #iv through the

'ead:uarters @ %orps rtiery, to come to '& 1D= de. Oery reuctanty he arrived. t

the '& 1D= de, 2en. 3usa gave the orders for 2(% > #iv to assume the %ommand of

the operations. fter receiving the orders of the change over in command, 3a8. 2enera

khtar i 3aik appeared out of the unker. I aong with a few other officersF was

standing there. s he approached us, he had tears in his eyes and remorsey he saidK I

wanted to conduct the operation to its fatefu concusion. I have "een tod to proceed to

3urree and take over my command of 1= #iv.7 !he change of %ommand took pace

:uite smoothy and the rmy viation did faciitate in the change over. ut this change

did resut in some deay in the eecution of the operations. !he orders for esta"ishment

of ridge 'ead, as panned earier and under eecution, were further ea"orated "y 2(%

> #iv. y 19.15 'rs on = $eptem"er, the "ridgehead was esta"ishment "y 1D de, with 6

++ and 1A ancers in the $outh and "y @ $ector in the orth.

It was a fatefu decisionL Was it with any specific intentM #id it have the purpose to

gorify 3a8or 2enera *ahya /han, who was aready "eing groomed as the net %-I-%M

Was 2enera yu" under some specific instructions, from his masters, not to push the

advance so far as to resut in the inevita"e capture of /'


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sheepishy and nervousy informed him, that, 'e was *ahyaFs rigadier7. 'e cassifies

it as a "etraya of many dimensions. I am personay not incined to agree with this

assessment and anaysis. I was a privy to and was in cose touch with 3a8or 2en. *ahya

/han. I "eieve no such instructions were given "y 3a8. 2en. *ahya to rig. ;mat

'ayat, not to receive any further orders from 3a8. 2en. khtar 3aik. !he conduct of

rig. ;mat speaks for it a. ot ony he remained out of communication with 2(% 1=

#iv. on first $eptem"er 1965, "ut he kept repeating the same practice and act even with

2(% > #iv. ater. In my presence, 3a8. 2en. *ahya, on A rd$eptem"er 1965 re"uked him

in the fouest possi"e anguage for remaining out of wireess contact with him. !hat he

peaded with 2en. 3usa and 3a8. 2en. *ahya that he is aowed to go up to /' and sweep southwards to secure H


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In the orth 6 ++ and 1A met increasing resistance from enemy armour, ))Fs and

infantry. It advanced "eyond PW. !he opposition stiffened as own troops

approached !)(!I. Enemy had fooded the paddy fieds which made the movement off

the roads difficut for "oth and Ech vehices. ut despite the odds, 1A 2P contacted

!)(!I posn. "y 1>AD hrs.

In the $outh 1@ Pun8a" gp met ight opposition from W '3I)P


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y 1D de, "y ast ight A $eptem"er, coud not "e accompished. !he main factors

impeding the progress were ack of detaied information a"out the enemy strength and

dispositions occupying !)(!I and H #iv few in an ' 1A heicopters from

his '& at HP


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ater ocated %ommander 1D de, rig. ;mat. When I asked him a"out the progress on

the ground, he epained that 1@ Pun8a" was ordered to advance aong )iver %hena", "ut

his '& had ost contact with them. With this "reakdown of communications and ack of

ade:uate information a"out his units, he was in no position to advance any further. We

then few and anded in the positions of 1A ancers. !hey were a ined up in a nuah.

!he %( 1A ancers epained that there was heavy enemy fire coming from !)(!I

position and as such their advance was hed up. I then few orth and met t. %o.

$iddi:ue %( ? auch and rig. afar i /han in %ommand 1D= de. I was "riefed "y

them that due to rough terrain and ight enemy resistance their advance was "ecoming

increasingy difficut. I gave a detaied report and my assessment of the enemy positions

in the area of !)(!I and H #iv that I had tried my "est to infuence the

minds of a the fied commanders in the area of operations. It was further suggested to

2(% > #iv, that ony he coud personay infuence the situation. 3a8. 2en. *ahya

ceary understood the situation and spontaneousy decided to act. 'e immediatey few

out in the chopper with me to meet the de %ommanders. fter taking off from the

heipad, 2(% was first given a very cear and "road aeria view of the ground, enemy


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dispositions, ocation of own troops and the "ig gap "etween H


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arms and automatic weapons opened up. !he aircraft was ridded with "uets. !he right

fue tank was "ady hit and ruptured. !he fue started profusey gushing into the cockpit.

%apt. /haid $aeed, kept his nerves and coo composure. 'e tod 3a8or eem, ow

there is no dou"t in my mind. !his is the position of the enemy guns, which is

withhoding the advance of own troops. ow concentrate a the avaia"e guns on this

position, at which I have aready ad8usted the fire and "ring down maimum fire7. 'e

aso mentioned, 3y aircraft has "een hit and that the fue is gushing into the cockpit. I

am now rushing "ack to the anding strip est the aircraft catches fire7. %apt. /haid

$aeed was ucky that he anded safey and the aircraft did not catch fire. !he intensive

and accurate concentration of own guns on this position had its teing effect. s a resut

of this fire and aso the outfanking moves of 1D= de and the 1D de, the enemy

a"andoned these positions. !hey eft "ehind a compete compiment of =@ guns of their

fied regiment. Eight guns were sti hooked "ehind their towers with their engines

running and siteen guns remained depoyed in their origina positions. !he enemy

a"andoned them in great haste. In addition, the en eft "ehind 3J tanks, a ot of other

e:uipment, vehices and ammunition. +or this gaant act of %apt. /haid $aeed, his

citation for the award of $H. Was initiated "y me Q Where this citation was ost, one did

not have the time to foow up. ut the deed of %apt. /haid $aeed did rmy viation

proud. !he events of @ $ep turned out to "e very momentous in the operations ofH


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H


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Earier in the day, %omd. @ $ector, rigadier 'ameed, was given the task of capturing

the /aidhar feature on the eft fank of the route eading to /'

of 3WWI /'# was reached in the evening of 5 $ept. It was estimated that a

the enemy, which had faen "ack from %'3, !)(!I and H


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/' #iv, ater reai;ing this, said that it was the "iggest mistake that he

hade made in this war. fter this detaied and precise description of the events at

/' #iv came rushing out of his caravan. (n seeing me,

2en *' said that the %-I-%, 2en 3usa was on the ine a short whie ago. 'e

informed me that 2en 3usa had 8ust tod him that the Indians had attacked P/I$!


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across the Internationa ine. !he attack had come at the H$$) r,


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(n hearing the news of H$$), the teephonic conversation with the #3( and the re-

assuring discussions of the overa situation, normacy was suddeny writ arge in the

atmosphere of the #iv '&. %o 3ehdi tod me that on 5 $ept, a #) of the enemy was

captured. In the mai that was carried "y the #), there were some etters addressed to the

1 rmd #iv. 'e strongy emphasi;ed that it was cear that the enemy 1 rmd #iv, was

now ocated in this area. %o staff gave some important etters and documents in support

of it to me and asked me to fy these out to 2'&. It was done prompty. 2'& now had

this information on 6 $ept that the enemy 1 rmd #iv was in the area $3. ut at

2'& there were some apprehensions, est it was a poy. %o 3ehdi further tod me that I

shoud re-assure 3a8 2enera *'* that his od formation wi not et him down.

I few "ack to !% '& > #iv at %'/ P#I!. 2(% > #iv was waiting very

aniousy for the news. When he was informed that his appreciation of our own strength

at H$$) was correct and that the "ridge was intact, he very ecitedy ecaimed, #id

not I te you that7. 'e further said that he as 2(% 15 #iv had panned the entire defense

of the area. 'e aso epained that he had waked the entire area on foot and that he had

conceived and panned the defensive pan of the area to the minutest detais. 'e then

)emarked that these peope are foos, who "eieve that any ma8or enemy offensive wicome at H$$) Emphaticay, he epained, !he ogica ine of the enemy attack wi

"e %')W-%'()-P'I()'-%'WI#7. !he mention of the names of

these paces did not ring any "e in my ears, at that time. !he names on 6 $ept were

totay unfamiiar to me. ut how propheticay it was correct. It came known ony truy

as the events of the coming days unfoded themseves. When I transmitted the detais of

my discussions at 15 #iv '& and specificay %o 3ehdiFs message to him, he 8ust

scoffed it away. ("viousy %o 3ehdi, for what reasons I do not know, had faen down

in his eyes and estimation.

$I/(! $E%!()

With the I#I attack across the Internationa oundary, some immediate re-grouping

and re-organi;ation of troops was ordered. 1 rmy viation $:uadron was ordered to


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move to $I/(!. !hey were to support the operations of 15 #iv and 6 rmed #iv oc

in the area.

!he move of 1 rmy viation $:uadron to $iakot was competed "y the evening of 6 th

$eptem"er 1965. 1 rmy $:uadron occupied the strip at the P(( ground on the )I2'!

side of the $3)I-$I/(! )oad. !he fight of 3a8. )I, e = rmy

viation $:uadron, which had aready come under the operationa contro of 1 rmy

viation $:uadron, since 1st$eptem"er during %'3-H


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companies were eft stranded in the encave across the ridge they had to wade through

the )iver to return to our own "ank of the river. $ince 115 de was part of 15 #iv, they

were aso reacting irrationayK hapha;ard and iogica decisions were "eing made

without any authentic and accurate information. It was an out right sardonic act. I earnt

a a"out it, when I visited '& 15 #iv, ate in the evening. $ince we had arrived in the

area on the evening of 6 $ept, the whoe day of > $ept, we spent doing our detaied recce

and famiiari;ation of the area. When I arrived at the 15 #iv '& in the evening, there

was the worst and the most compounded state of hepessness and chaotic confusion. It

was a pandemic situation. =@ de aong with =5 %av had "een positioned in area

%')W as part of the defensive pan of 15 #iv. !hey were tasked to defend the most

ikey enemy ine of attack in the area. y the evening > $ept. =@ de 4minus A ++ and

=5 %av had "een ordered to move to the area H$$) r. for any possi"e counter attack.

!he most sensitive corridor of 3')H/E-%')W and %'() had "een

denuded of troops and eft with ony one n i.e. A ++ 4ess a coy and a %oy of =

P


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generay and vaguey tod the %omd =@ de to do something. !he whoe day saw

strange, panicky and amost a"surd se:uences of fase reporting, iogica reactions which

were eading to wrong decisions and at times some defiance of those orders had "een

enacted. !he earier report of 115 de on 6 $ept that the enemy had captured H$$) r

had sent shivers a the way to the %ommand at 15 #iv, '& 1 %orps and 2'&. '& 1

%orp gave orders to 15 #iv to "ow up the ridge, whie our troops were sti across in

the encave on the I#I side. rmy viation, through a :uick recce had ceared the

fog and confusion. !he disastrous orders of "owing up the "ridge had "een fouted and

the situation at H$$) was sta"ii;ed and "rought fuy under contro. $ept, the same catastrophic se:uence of fase reporting "y 115 de, triggered

same a"surdity and stupidity of decision-making. '& 1 %orps ordered the "owing up of

the "ridge whie the troops of 115 de were sti fighting in the encave on the enemy

side. 'ow those orders were given, "y whom and "y what channes, sti defies a

pinning of specific responsi"iities on any person or persons at different eves of

%ommand. ut a disastrous situation had "een created. !he ridge was "own and it kept

haf hanging, whie the troops were sti fighting across the )IOE) and had to wade

through the water in order to withdraw to own "ank. !hree tanks had to "e eft

a"andoned on the enemy side of the river "ank. !his does "ring out the cassic eampe

of how the situation was timey ceared and carified on 6 $ept, "y the detaied reccecarried out "y rmy viation and correcty reported to '& 15 #iv personay "y me. It is

e:uay strange, that whie the same confusion was re-created on > $ept and 1 rmy

viation $:uadron was cosey and fuy operating in support of 15 #iv, no one ever

"riefed them to verify these reports. $ome other missions were ordered, "ut in the area

where vita decisions were "eing taken no effort to use the rmy viation were made.

rmy viation too remained "acked out of a news of H$$) ridgeK as they were

"usy the whoe day in the area famiiari;ation of the corridor from $I/(! S )IOE)

)OI, "ut with a specific "ias towards the areas of 3')H/E, %')W,

%'() and this ikey ine of the I#I attack... rmy viation had aso remained

totay o"ivious to the happenings at H$$) ridge. !he crisis peaked with the

"owing up of H$$) ridge, "ut aso "y ordering the move of =@ de 2p from

%')W S %'() area to H$$) r for a possi"e counter attack on fa"ricated

and assumed I#I penetration in the area. $ince there was no wireess or ine contact


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avaia"e, messengerFs had "een sent. !he forma orders for =@ de 2roup to return to

their origina positions was given ony when the 2(% 15 #iv arrived "ack at $I/(!,

after he rushed from )(W. ut the main pro"ems were that no one knew as to

where =@ de ess n and =5 %av were. #uring the visits to 15 #iv, 6 rmd #iv and at

'& 1 %orps, "y the rmy viations, this serious diemma of ack of information a"out =@

de and =5 %av was the main issue of concern o"served and discussed. !his confusion

persisted the whoe night as no one knew as to what was happening on the ground.

In the evening of >th$ep, 15 #iv asked for a sortie of the -19 aircraft aong the

Internationa order. (rders were given, that without crossing the "oundary, the area

across the I#I side shoud "e o"served. (ne wonders through hindsight, as to why

the rmy viation was not asked to cear the fog of war prevaent at H$$). !he rmy

viator was asked to specificay ook for any ma8or concentrations and movements of

the enemy in the area of %')W. %apt. II was detaied on this mission. 'e few

a aong the "oundary from $I/(! to )IOE) %'E, and noticed no movement

or conc. of the enemy. 'e went to '& 15 #iv and "riefed %o staff, %o 3E'#I. t mid

night >th$ept, a ca came from '& 15 #iv. %o 3E'#I tod %apt II that the

I#I attack at %')W had "een aunched. !he piot was tod to fy on first t. ? th

$ep to confirm this news. 'e was aso tod to o"serve specificay the strength and thedirection of an attack. s %apt II few to area 3')H/E, he noticed an enemy

coumn of tanks moving to $I/(!, on the track 3')H/E - $I/(!. 'e saw

the eading tank reach the vicinity of I/ #I near +I# 46@A1. 'e tried to

approach cose to this coumn to make some assessment of their strength. !he aircraft

came under heavy sma arms fire. !he strength coud not "e estimated and %apt II

returned to $I/(! strip and gave the news to %o $taff 15 #iv personay. !he

maintenance personne, 3a8. $aeed, counted A= "uet hoes in the aircraft. 15 #iv

immediatey sent some ))F$ to I/ #I. s the enemy tanks arrived near I/ #I,

))Fs fired upon them.


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that at first ight, the enemy had aunched its attack. !he main ais of the ine of attack

was 2#2()-%')W-%'()- P'I)


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"rought the I#I advance to a scratching hat. !he air strike asted for a"out =5-AD

minute.

!he pounding of our air force on the attacking coumns of en armour had its teing effect.

etween 15-=D of the armoured vehices were on fire. !he enemy attack had hated and

the en tanks and other vehices were hurriedy dispersing. !hey rushed into the

surrounding viages and "uried themseves into the mud houses. !his form of

camoufage did provide them some refuge. It "ecame the norma pattern in the

su"se:uent operations. Whenever, en formations were pounded "y our heavy

concentrations of arty fire or interdicted "y our air force, they dispersed and su"merged

themseves in the mud houses.

s soon as the ac eft the area, the enemy forces got respite and started to re-group and

re-organi;e themseves again. !he tota deay caused to the attacking enemy forces was

a"out one hour. !his was the most vita time that our air force had gained for us. $horty,

they regrouped and started their advance on the track to %'WI#. !he -19 kept

fying aongside the I#I advancing armored cars and tanks. !he need for integra

fire sp capa"iity with the rmy viation was never so acutey fet "efore. ut sitting

unarmed in an -19 aircraft was :uere depressing.

!he advancing enemy coumn came cose to %'WI#. $o far there was no resistance

or opposition to their advance on the ground. $uddeny from the direction of

%'WI#, signs of movement on the ground appeared. s if the prayers were

answered, sure "ut "ehod they were our own Patton tanks. !he ecitement and the

eu"erance of the rmy viators watching this from the air, is hard to descri"e. !he deay

caused "y the interdiction of our ir force had proved crucia. !he !anks of =5 %avary

arrived in %'WI# at the nick of the time. (ne 8ust shuddered to think what woud

have happened if the massive force of one rmored #iv, supported "y three Infantry

#ivisions had reached the area of %'WI# an hour earier, when our own tanks had

sti not reached there. Was it not the ah and the ir that saved the day for usL !he

sight of own tanks appearing from the direction of %'WI#, created panic in the


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ranks of the advancing I#I coumns. !he I#I inteigence had wrongy

assumed that the P!!( tanks were ony in the 1 rmd #iv of Pakistan. !he sudden

sight of P!!( tanks emerging from the direction of %'WI# immediatey ruffed

and "affed the enemy forces. !hey were totay surprised and in tota confusion, wrongy

assumed, that our 1 rmed #ivision had "een paced in this area. !his was totay against

their earier miitary inteigence reports. !hey turned around immediatey and went

charging aong "ack on the same track that they came on. !he speed of their retreat

appeared fasterL !o compound their sudden fears of strong Pak armour presence in the

area, the sight of 1@ tanks of $:uadron of =5 %O appearing in etended ine a"reast

formation, suggested a "igger force of tanks "ehind the thin ine of own 1@ tanks, as they

appeared in front. !he enemy hardy reai;ed that there was nothing "ehind them. 3a8or

4ater rigadier hmed, who was commanding the $:uadron, ater tod me that since he

was unsure of the enemy disposition, he decided to move on a "road front. 'e ined up

a the 1@ !anks and appeared out of %'WI#, covering a wide front.

I continued fying around the area, evauating the situation on the ground. It appeared that

=@ de gp had arrived "ack 8ust in time. !he sight was very heart warming and the

assessment was that a very precarious situation had "een very dramaticay sta"ii;ed.

!he approimate one-hour deay imposed "y our ir force on the advance of enemyarmour had proved one of the singe most critica, vita and significant interventions.

one of our accounts, even the officia history of the Pakistan ir +orce, has highighted

this most significant and important event. It has totay gone unrecorded and

unrecogni;ed. 3a8. 3ohammad hmad arrived with his $:uadron at %'WI# at the

nick of time. Hust another 1D-15 minutes deay in the arriva of own troops or if the own

ir force had not "rought their advance earier to a grinding hat for neary one hour, the

situation at %'WI# coud we have proved very critica and decisive. $eeing that

the situation had "een sta"ii;ed, I few to $I/(! and went straight to '& 15 #iv. 3y

arriva was most aniousy "eing awaited. !he first accurate news and account of the

arriva of =@ de gp in the area of %'WI# "rought a sigh of reief. !he account of

rapid thrust of the I#I coumns, the action of our air force, the enemy re-grouping

and resumption of advance to %'WI# and the cima of sudden appearance of own

Patton tanks, was "oth chiing initiay, "ut ater e:uay ehiarating.


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+or the second time in two days, the accurate and authentic information provided "y

rmy viation sources, proved sautary. (n return to the strip at $I/(!, I took off in

a heicopter, which was pioted "y %apt. auman 3ahmud. We went to %'WI# and

from there few to P'I)


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%'WI#, the action aready witnessed from the -19 and descri"ed as such earier.

'e further said that the )egiment ess this s:n moved to the area of #


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admira"y. I had a cose ook of the operation from eary morning to ate afternoon.

!here was no more enthraing eperience than that. I was a privy to watching it most

cosey "oth from the air and on the ground. !he words fai me to descri"e the dayFs

"atte ade:uatey.

!his fu fedged enemy rmoured #iv attack supported "y three Infantry #ivisions, was

not ony hated after it had gained its momentum, "ut forced to recoi and withdraw "ack

to the positions cose to from where the attack was aunched on the morning of ? th

$eptem"er. It penetrated up to %'WI# and "y the evening of ? $ept, Enemy fmns

were made to ro "ack to 8ust south of %'(). +rom some accounts one of the tank

troops had even got as far forward as 3')H/E, "ut had to "e pued "ack.

!o the utter dis"eief of every one, =5 %O had singe handed, not ony stemmed the

etent of the enemy advance to up to %'WI#, "ut instead roed them "ack to from

where they had em"arked from, in the eary hours of ? $eptem"er. !his attack had

achieved surprise and even gained some momentum. !hat the net resut was that these

forces were recoied "ack to their firm "ase, which was earier secured "y their =6 I+

#IO, and they sat there now nursing their wounds of the whoe dayFs most am"itious and

adventurous action, which seemed so un"eieva"e. !he enemy attack was reeed "ackto its track from where they had de"ouched in the eary hours. !he un"eieva"e part was

that this feat was accompished "y the daring of =5 %avary, a "y themseves. =@

rigade 2roup through their timey arriva and daring action had fuy sta"ii;ed the

"attefied and had taken defensive positions in the area 2#2()-P'I


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know the ocation of own troops on the ground. !he fiing in of this information was

"oth timey and very usefu at the eve of the %orps '&. !he %orps %omd, t. 2en.

akhtiar )ana asked me to keep visiting %orps '& reguary and keep "riefing them on

the situation, on daiy "asis if possi"e. (n ? $ept, the main task performed "y rmy

viation was coection of vita information and "riefings at '& 15 #iv, 6 rmd #iv and

'& 1 %orps. !hese proved very critica in the formuation of the future pans of these

fmns. !here was not much activity in the way of ad8ustment of arty fire. !his was

essentiay so, "ecause the units of @ %orps rty kept shutting "etween P$)


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understands him. I had known him as our d8utant, my company commander at P3

and ater as 3 of the Infantry rigade at Peshawar. I had a very high perception of him.

I woud consider him as "rave, "od, inteigent, and innovative and in particuar a man

who was we versed and read on 3iitary 'istory. I woud not condemn him as most

others did. ut in a fairness, my description of him on ? $ept was that he was not the

same man that I had known a these years. !his, I attri"ute essentiay, that he "ecame the

victim of circumstances.

!owards the afternoon of ? $ept, 3a8 2en !I// /', had taken over the %ommand

of 15 #iv. I was a witness to it. I had 8ust waked out of the dug out unker of '& 15 #iv

that I met 3a8 2en !I// /', as he was arriving towards the unker. 'e tod me

that he had come to take over the %ommand of 15 #iv. 'e instructed me not to te any

one yet, I went "ack with him into the unker. s he entered, he was met "y rig Ismai

and %o 3ehdi. 'e tod them that he had come 8ust to have the "riefing on the situation

on the ground. %o 3ehdi gave a the "riefing. 'aving istened to a the detais, he then

announced that he had taken over the %ommand of 15 #iv under instructions from %orp

'& and 2'&. 'e accepted "oth rig Ismai and %o 3ehdi as part of 15 #iv. 'e showed

no acrimony towards them. !he first act of %o 3ehdi that upset him was on 9 $ep, !he

dug in position of 15 #iv '&, had "een correcty ocated "y the enemy guns. !hey werepounding these positions heaviy. %o 3ehdi started strongy suggesting that '& 15 #iv

shoud "e moved "ack across the 3) cana, towards $3)I. 3a8 2en !I//

/', very firmy tod %o 3ehdi not to suggest this ever again. 'e ceary said that

'& 15 #iv wi stay in $I/(! with the troops regardess of the sheing. !he net

episode that took pace was that 3a8or 4ater 3a8or 2enera (/')I arrived in '&

15 #iv with his %() %ompany. !his was the ony unit with these newy ac:uired anti

tank missies. $oon after they arrived in the area of 15 #iv, orders were given to '& 15

#iv, to dispatch the %ompany to 6 rmed #iv, which was now facing the main enemy

rmour threat. %o. 3ehdi caed 3a8or (/')I and "riefed him to report to '& 6

rmed #iv aong with his %() %ompany. I arrived in '& 15 #iv, towards the

afternoon. !here was a tota confusion regarding the where a"outs of this %ompany.

$ome one 8ust suggested that the 2rid )eference of the ocation of '& 6 rmd #iv given

"y %o 3ehdi was wrong. !he ocation he gave to 3a8or (/')I was now in enemy


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hands. !his confounded the matters worst. %o 3ehdi picked up the teephone and caed

up some one. 'e asked him, #o you remem"er the "riefing that I had given to 3a8or

okhari.7 'e in particuar, was in:uiring from him, #o you reca the 2rid )eference

given "y me at which 3a8or. (/')I was ordered to report.7 'e then hed the

receiver in his hand and started waiving it. Whie so doing, he asked every one around,

isten as to what is "eing said on the phone7. $uddeny 3a8or 2en !I// ost his

patience. 'e angriy shouted 3ehdi I have had enough of your dramatics. $hut up and

get out7. It stunned everyoneB I had never seen 3a8 2en !I//, in such temper and

mood. !he erstwhie a very promising career of %o 3ehdi, came to this rather a"rupt

end. fter the war, he was posted as $tation %ommander, /arachi. (n one of my visits to

/arachi, I met him at the irport, 'e asked me to accompany him to his office. 'e paced

"efore me the %) that 3a8 2en !I// /' had given him. I read it very carefuy.

It was strong, damning and damaging. %o 3ehdi was highy emotiona. 'e was asking

me that he coud "e censured for many things, "ut coud he "e descri"ed as a cowardL I

had to te him that I woud not think so. I was a privy to a the important episodes of '&

15 #iv, right from the day of 6 $ept to the day when he was removed as %o $taff. !here

was no act of cowardice on his part. ut undou"tedy, the circumstances, the events, the

misreporting of '& 115 ed, had a couded his mind and 8udgment. I wi not pass any

8udgment "eyond that. !he position at '& 6 rmed #iv and '& 1 %orps that I visited inthe evening was e:uay not very re-assuring. !his I can most particuary emphasi;e for

'& 1 %orps. !here was a tota ack of information at the carpFs eve.

I had personay seen the "atte range the whoe day, since the eary morning. !he aeria

view gave me an eceent picture of the operations conducted. In summing up I may say

that my first ook of the intensity of the enemy attack was not too cear. I coud o"serve

two cear coumns of the enemy thrust. !he one on the ais of %')W-%'()-

P'I


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whoe day I kept foowing and o"serving these operations very cosey and I have

aready descri"ed that earier.

#uring the evening of ? $ept, a "atte order of the attack of 16 %av was recovered from a

destroyed tank of this unit. It was rushed to '& 15 #iv at night. !he net morning when

I visited, '& 15 #iv, a the detaied information was avaia"e. %o 3ehdi was ceary

riefing me that it was the ma8or I#I thrust which was ed "y their main rmed #iv

which was supported "y two infantry divisions, which had "een "unted. copy of this

order was given to me. !his is attached as J T T

y the morning of 9 $ept, it was crysta cear to a and sundries, that the attack of ? $ept,

1965, was the fu fedged Indian attack. !hey had payed their fina punch to achieve a

:uick "reakthrough. It was nothing short of a mirace that =5 %avary had a "y itsef

handed and thwarted it. %aptured (perationa (rder f @ 'udsonFs 'orse, gives a the

detais J T T. !his document was captured much ater "y our @ rmed de, on =D

$ept. !he detais show that the attack was to "e aunched "y three Infantry #ivisions and

one rmoured #iv. 6 3tn #iv and =6 I+ #iv were to secure a "ridge head and through

it the 1 rmd #iv was to aunch the main thrust at D6DD 'rs on ? $ept. !he panned

attack was aong three es. !he )ed )oute, the ue )oute and the 2reen )oute. 16%av 2p which was the unit of 2enera H.. %' 'orse 2p. !he

pace of 16 %av on )ed )oute had outstripped that of 1> %av on ue )oute. !here was

no sign of 1@ #iv movements towards afarwa. !he 2reen )oute on which @A orried

I+ de 2p was moving, was too far away from the area that I kept fying the whoe day

and as such I coud not see this eement and its movement.


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the detais of the "atte of ? $ept were now ceary and fuy esta"ished. !he Indian

attack of 1 rmd #iv, supported "y 6 3tn and =6 I+ #iv had "een roed "ack "y

amosty entirey the effort of =5 %av. It was ony in the evening that a company of 9

Pun8a" arrived in support of =5 %av. %( =5 %av, decided to attack the area "etween

2#2()-%'() with T%F $:n and a company of = Pun8a" at a"out 16AD hrs. It

was an eceent eampe of !kGInf %o-operation. !hey showed a very rare eampe of

dash, courage and initiative. !he enemy was taken "y surprise and a"andoned the

position in compete confusion. y 1?DD 'rs the position was secured. Enemy had eft

si tanks a"andoned thereK two of these had their engines sti running. E:uay

magnificent was the action of TF $:n of =5 %av. ot ony had they stopped the attack of

enemy 1 rmd #iv on the is, P'I


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of ah that guided and caused it. ut sti I had no dou"t that it was the wi of the

peope on ground that accompished it. I have gone into a detais as it was one of our

finest moment and hour of the war.

!he events of ? $ept had confirmed and driven home to a, that the attack was aunched

with the fu weight of a the Indian troops avaia"e in this sector. !his direction and

may "e the magnitude of the attack, had ceary "een perceived. !he appreciations

made earier had determined and defined it. What was not understood then and even to-

day, as to why no thorough and detaied pans were made to meet this threat. 15 #iv was

stretched from $I/(!-H$$), "ut the corridor of %')W-%'()-

P'I


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move. We had enough time to do our own panning and preparations to meet this

offensive. !hough '& 1 %orps had moved 6 rmd #iv in this area and they had arrived

during the night on ? $ept in their "atte ocations, sti they were given no pans or

orders. !hey were 8ust vaguey assigned the roe of destroying enemy penetrations E$!

of 3) cana.

!he ocation of our anding strip at the $iakot Poo 2round remained peacefu. fter the

days hectic activity on 6th, >thN ?th$ept. we had sound rest and seep. cross the road

was the ocation of ? 3edium )egt. !he ad8utant of the )egiment was %apt. $3

4ater %oone. 'e "eing an rmy viator, there was very fre:uent iaison carried out "y

him and the piots of the s:uadron. !his "ecame rather ominous. s the hostiities "roke

out throughout the $I/(! sector since eary ? $eptem"er, the guns of ? 3edium

)egiment "ecame very active. In retaiation it started attracting heavy enemy %ounter

om"ardment from the night of ?G9 $eptem"er. $ince ony a thin road divided the

viation position from medium gun ocation, the strip started receiving a fair degree of

share of the enemy fire. !hough the trenches had "een dug and the aircraft were we

dispersed, "ut the first taste of the enemy fire did provoke hasty, panicky and may even

"e descri"ed as somewhat comica reactions. !he trenches had "een earmarked for

different personne. ut in haste, when the piots and the other crews ran to the trenchesto take cover, the principe of first come first served prevaied. Everyone was desperatey

rushing to the nearest trench. 3a8. I), the =1Gc, ran o"iviousy towards the trench

he had earmarked for himsef. (n approaching it, he instinctivey took a eap in the air to

:uicky 8ump into it. s his heavy frame was sti in the air and he was a"out to drop in

his trench, he noticed that the trench was aready occupied. 'e suddeny "raced himsef

and showed a :uick reaction of his mind. )ather than faing in the trench over the

eisting occupants, with his fu weight of ==D "s, thus crushing their "ones, he hed his

"ig frame astride the trench "y parting his egs and hands and anded on the top of the

trench. !he two occupants, thanked heavens and aso thanked their ucky stars. !hey

saved themseves from "oth the enemy sheing and the crushing they may have received

from the weight of their own =1Gc dropping over them. !he incident ony attracted

ighthearted comments of a. )emarka"y, it took a the tension away from the first rea


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"attefied indoctrination of 1 rmy viation $:uadron, due to rea enemy heavy artiery

sheing that it attracted.

(n the morning of 9 th$eptem"er 1965, the %o asked the permission of 2(% 15 #iv to

move the s:uadron to $3)I. It was foohardy to epose the aircraft and the crews

to hostie enemy fire and the 2(% readiy approved. Whie the s:uadron moved to

$3)I on 9th$eptem"er, the tempo of war stepped up. !he focus and the intensity

of the enemy attack had ceary shifted to P'I


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$ince the emphasis of the "atte had shifted more directy to the area of responsi"iity of 6

rmd #iv from 9 $ept onwards, the efforts of 1 rmy viation $:uadron too were

argey focused in support of those operations. !he piots were fuy invoved and

remained a"reast of the activities and operations of 6 rmd #iv. !he %( kept a very

cose contact with '& 6 rmd #iv and fmns. !he visits to '& 1 corps were aso reguar.

these activities provided a cear and authentic picture of the "atte at a critica eves

of command. !his proved most usefu in a decision taking.

It was a we "aanced force. !he main defenses at P'I


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presence of enemy 1 rmd #iv in the area. !his was ignored at 2'& and may "e at the

eve of %orps '& aso. ow there was no scope of dou"ts or iusions eft.

'& 1 %orps was sei;ed with the panning of their operations "ased on this information.

What in puts they received from '& 15 #iv and 6 rmed #iv, I am not aware ofM !hey

aso had the "enefit of studying and anay;ing the operations conducted "y the enemy the

whoe day of 9 $ept. It seems that "y the morning of 1D $ept, '& 1 %orps had made up a

pan. (n 9 $ept, the roes and tasks of 15 #iv and 6 rmed #iv had "een redefined. !he

Inter #iv "oundaries were aso aid down. s a resut some ad8ustments in the aocation

of troops had aso "een made. !hese are a descri"ed earier.

t 11DD hrs on 1D $ept, 2(% 6 rmd #iv was caed to %orps '&. concept of

operations, as deveoped "y 3a8or 2enera 3ohammad *aku" /han, the #eputy %orps

%ommander, was presented to the 2(%. It is mentioned that it was "ased in the ight of

the atest 2'& and %orps Inteigence estimates of the enemyFs strength and intentions...

!here are no detais given. In my mind at "oth these eves, they had no cear, definitive

and epicit information avaia"e through any of their own channes. the information

that coud "e gathered, assessed and pans made on, was the one provided "y the ground

troops who had done a the fighting on ? and 9 $ept, !his was suppemented and furthersu"stantiated as seen, o"served and communicated "y us from the air.

Enemy attacks at P'I


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defense and prepare the main defensive positions around the strong noda points at

%'WI#-#I and possi"y +)W.

!he pan that was prepared was a tota 'otch Potch. It envisaged puing out of =@ de

2p from these areas and reieving them, "y 9 ++ aready covering the track

P'I


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the most sordid and mor"id chapter of the operations in $I/(! $ector. !he reieving

units were given the orders in the afternoon. !he %( 11 %av. was present, "ut the %( 9

++ was asked to stay "ack with the unit and send his =I%. It is rather strange ogic that

the person who was to assume the overa command of these most sensitive positions, is

"eing reayed the orders through =I%. If he had "een present himsef, it is possi"e that

he woud have pointed out to these paper geniuses, the foy of this i-conceived and i

timed orders. !he orders were given at 1@DD 'rs, the =GI% reached the %( 9 ++ at 15AD

'rs and a the pans of the movements of 9 ++ and 11 %av, were put into action at that

time. What time they had avaia"e to move into their new ocations, "efore sunsetM Was

it difficut to assess for a man even with simpe commonsenseM It is reported that %( 11

%av, contacted '& 6 rmd #iv at =DAD 'rs on the teephone net work of '& =@ de. It

is aso presumed that %( 9 ++ was aso present there. !hese discussions took pace in

the presence of %omd =@ de. Incidentay, he had no prior information of this reief in

ine operationsL 'e ony earnt it through %( 11 %av, when he arrived there.

pprehensions are epressed "y the reieving units, 9 ++G11 %av 2roup that it might

prove too weak for the task given "ut were "rushed asideK With the comments that

shoud any thing unepected happen, the #ivision had enough resources to dea it.

s records aso ironicay state, that what was significant was the state of mind of the two

%(Fs. ccusations or may "e inferences are "eing made, that there were non-reveation ifnot actua conceaments, of happenings which "ecame known ater. What is "eing

auded to is that no proper panning and conduct of reief in ines was carried outM What

chance and opportunity was given for it to "e conductedM the detais for a proper

operation of this nature are "eing enumerated now. Was it not crysta cear that it was an

impossi"e taskM =@ de 2p was "eing made to pu out simutaneousy with the arriva

of 9 ++G11 %av 2roup in the area. this was happening at the midde of the night.

Enough detais of how a this was carried out, is ade:uatey covered in most accounts

and detais written. What is "eyond any ogic or reasoning is that how convenienty the

whoe "ame is "eing shifted to the state of minds of the two %(Fs and that they were not

forthcoming with the actua happenings on the ground. If the two %(Fs did not give the

detais, did the #eputy #iv %omd and the reevant staff of '& 6 rmd #iv ask them as to

how satisfactoriy the reiefs in ine operations were "eing carried outM It is "eieved that

a suggestion was made that =@ de 2p shoud stay in their positions and that 9 ++G11 %av


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2p shoud further re-enforce them for the night. If the net day the situation remained

cam, the reief operations coud easiy "e carried out propery during the day ight

avaia"e. !his was competey ignored and dismissed. In fact it was the most ogica

courseL !he "ame game is now going on "ut it was crysta cear where the faut ies. I

did not know a the detais of this whoe pan. ut in the evening of 11 sept, I got the

news that 3a8or 4ater rigadier 3u;affar 3aik, was seriousy in8ured and was

admitted in %3' $I/(!. ater that day I got to visit him. $eeing me, in pain and

agony that he was in, he coud ony mum"e the words, *ou peope hurt too much7 I

coud not understand the meanings. When I met him su"se:uenty, he was in much "etter

condition and frame of mind. 'e epained to me that what he was trying to eucidate

was that he was hit "y an rtiery she, whie he was standing in the open aong with a

group of officerFs. 'e aso epained that the entire reief in ine operations was

conducted on the road side, as the 11 %av, which was coming in and =5 %av, which was

moving out, met whie crossing each other on the road and during the midde of the night.

'e aso tod me that %( =5 %av gave a very "rief account of the operations of ? $ept in

particuar, and aso the su"se:uent operations of 9 and 1D $ept. It was aso mentioned

that %( =5 %av, had ceary stated, that it was the entire enemy 1 rmd #iv attack. !heir

own reaction to this was of dis"eiefL It apparenty was mentioned to %( =5 %av, "y %(

11 %av and =I% 3u;affar 3aik, that, re you trying to suggest that singe handed yourunit had successfuy "atted the whoe rmd #iv and even pushed them "ack to the area

from where they had de"ouched, on the morning of ? $eptL7 !hey 8ust aughed it away

and did not take a serious notice of this impending threat. !his woud sum up as to how

casuay this reief in ine operation was carried out during the night of 1DG11 $ept.

)ather than put the "ame s:uarey at those, primariy the '& 1 %orps argey and #eputy

#ivision %omd and $taff of '& 6 rmd #iv partiay, who were responsi"e for this

fiasco, the "uck is "eing passed down to the two %(Fs invoved.

When the enemy started its we conducted and we co-coordinated attack on 11 $ept, we

were in tota disarray. !hey masked and contained our positions frontay and

outmaneuvered them with two rmd )egiments from the E+!. !o compound the

matters further, %( 1 $P was kied and %( and =GI% 11 %av were in8ured "y enemy

rtiery $heing. !hey were a standing in the open near the P'I


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'ouse. $urey the panners shoud have given them some time to famiiari;e with the are

a and prepare a proper defense pan with proper dug in and fortified positions.

In 3u;affar 3aikFs own words, he tod me, (n the first ight of 11 $ept. I went on top

of a cose "y schoo "uiding and took out my "inocuars to have a first ook at the area of

our operations with my own eyes. Hust as I was o"serving and taking my view of the

ground, I was shocked. I saw a huge pie of dust caused "y the movement of the mass of

the enemy armour which was advancing towards our ocation7. 'e immediatey came

down to "rief his %(, t. %o. ;i; and t. %o. "dur )ahman, %( 1 $P, a"out the

impending Indian attack . %( 1 $P immediatey got "usy "rining down the fire of his

guns on these advancing enemy armour formations. t that time an artiy she fe in the

ocation where they were standing in the open. t. %o. )ahman achieved $haahadat on

the spot. oth the %( and = I% of 11 %avary was seriousy in8ured and was evacuated.

!his fiasco which was aready in the offing, due to the most a"surd reief in ine pans

made "y the #eputy %orps %ommander and the #eputy 2(% 6 rmd #iv took another

unfortunate turn. !he sudden remova of the other key eements invoved in the

operations in the area, further compounded the situation.

o one under stood and knew a"out this impending disastrous pan as was prepared andeecuted during the night 1DG11 $ept. I coud aso not sense it when the de"ace started

to take pace. It seems that at this stage 2(% 6 rmd #iv took over the command

himsef, rather than aow his #eputy #iv. %omd to undertake and do a the insane

caingsL 3a8 2en "rar ordered 2uides %av to charge from the WE$! of

P'I


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two $:uadrons up. In this case the $:uadron woud aso have empoyed may "e one or

two troops ahead. t %o 2 ' and @ 'udsonFs 'orse had aready consoidated themseves in the area

P'I


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!his "od and cassic attack of 2uides %av, coud not etricate own troops at

P'I


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56

and infantry. (wn I+ hed its ground and the tanks of =5 %O "roke up the en attack.

!he we directed fire of a the guns avaia"e in the area, "y the rmy viators provided

good support. $ince the terrain was fat the ground o"servers had very imited fied of

view. !his is where rmy viatorFs usefuness proved very critica. With his "ird eye

view of the "attefied, the air"orne eye, kept the entire area of the operations under their

fu view and surveiance. ny movement of the en immediatey received due attention

and fu concentration of a guns in range which pounded them. !his was to "ecome the

routine of a the rmy viators fying in the area from dawn to dusk. +rom a accounts

a"out >D->5U of a rty shoots were ad8usted "y rmy viators.

1D $ept, was again a reativey :uiet day. Enemy attack on =@ de was repused "y =5

%av. !his operation was supported "y a our guns within range. rmy viators again

came in handy in support a"out seven enemy tanks were destroyed.

(n the afternoon of 1Dth$ept, it was ordered that =@ de "e reieved "y 11 %O and 9 ++

during night 1DthG11th$ept. !he reief caused a ot of confusion. 9 ++ "arey competed its

depoyment at 2#2() "y D=DD hrs on 11 th$ept. y first ight 11th$ept, the fu weight

of the I#I rmd #iv attack came at 2#2(). #ue to enemy rtiery sheing, t.

%o. )'3 4I$P was kied and the %( and the =1% of 11 %O, t. %o. I and3a8. 3


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other detais of enemy movements, were at time :uestioned. ut "y far, most accounts

provided "y the rmy viators, proved accurate and timey.

With the counter attack of 2uides %O from the oc at )/' '


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of A= !#< 4$'E)3 !anks withdrew from that position. !he piot of -19 operating

in the area, %apt ia;i, was tod on wireess net to give the message to the s:uadron to

immediatey return to +)W. In the face of the enemy attack our Infantry positions

were hoding ground and the situation was turning in our favour. !he piot few over the

tanks moving towards #'3!. 'e gestured and kept indicating to them to return to

+)W. !here was no response. 'e wrote a message and dropped it. !o !ank

crewsL !hey read the message, "ut sti kept moving towards #'3!. $eeing that a

efforts had faied, the piot anded the ac on the road, in front of the withdrawing tanks.

)isadar commanded the $:uadron at that time. %apt II personay epained the

position to him and emphaticay persuaded him to return to +)W. !he tanks

were thus successfuy sent "ack. !hey ater very effectivey participated against the

enemy attack at +)W $ector and repused this attack. It was a known fact, that

the $:n %omd of A= !#


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and "ury themseves in the mud houses for their camoufage. !he same practice they

woud foow, whenever our ir +orce pounded them. !his our ir force was doing very

reguary and effectivey. In this the %! sets carried in the -19, was proving to "e very

hepfu. !he eria o"servers were most efficienty directing our aircraft on to the enemy

tanks. #espite a the confusion of the intense "atte on the ground, the cose range

engagements of our tanks, in tank to tank "atte, there is not a singe case where our

aircraft attacked any of our own tanks as of mistaken identity. !his does refect the

professionaism of our air force piots. ut the rmy viators did prove very usefu in

guiding our own piots. !he knowedge of the ground, the eact ocation of the enemy

armour and the fu famiiarity of our positions greaty heped them in meeting this roe.

Every effort was made "y the rmy viators to keep the formations fuy "riefed a"out

a possi"e detais of the deveopment of the "attefied on the ground. )eguary visits

were made to a the fmn '&Fs. t times some iaison was made even at unit eve,

though the fre:uencies of visits at that eve were not as much as was desira"e, "ut

efforts were made to keep every one informed.

very significant event happened on 1Ath$ept. I had sent %apt II to +)W

$ector. !his area came under attack on 1=

th

$ep and it was epected that the enemy maymount another attack in that area. %apt II was tod to keep a watchfu eye. !he piot

was gone for neary four hours. !he endurance of the aircraft was a"out to finish. !his

was causing a ot of aniety at #3/E strip. $uddeny the -19 appeared and

everyone fet very reieved. I was very upset with the piot for having over

$tretched his uck with the endurance of the aircraft. !ruy to his stye, %apt II, very

innocenty and in his simpistic manner, started descri"ing the detais of the sortie. 'e

epained that whie he was fying over +)W, he saw no enemy activity in the

area he was "ored. 'e decided to fy ()!' of our positions at #E2 #I. !he time it

happened, he put was at a"out "etween D?DD-D9DD 'rs. !he sun was in the E$!.

ooking at some distance, he was noticing very fashy refections of the rays of the sun.

!his was over a fairy arge area. !his greaty intrigued him and he kept fying in that

direction. 'e crossed the Internationa oundary, WE$! of #E2 #I. 2etting nearer

to these refections, he saw a huge concentration of enemy vehices, some @ 3ies WE$!


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of $3. 'e had a very carefu ook. 'is estimate was some =DDD-ADDD vehices. 'e

further said that whie returning, he had passed this information on the rty net. !his

graphic and accurate account evoked a very serious attention of a present there. 2auging

the most significant importance of this news, I immediatey few to '& 1 %orps. I

conveyed this information personay to t. 2en. akhtiar )ana. I further very strongy

suggested to him that he shoud himsef re:uest the ir '& for an air strike. I iteray

hed his hands so that he shoud personay do so. 'e did this very prompty. !he ir '&

was very reuctant to accept the authenticity of the news.


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fank and these units were part of enemy 1 rmed #iv. !he other enemy formations in

support in this area were 6 3tn #iv, =6 I+ #iv and 1@ I+ #iv. !he o"8ective given to

1@ I+ #iv was If in position wi capture +W "y ? $ep and there after advance

to %'WI# to take over from 1 rmd #iv.7 !his formation did not take part in the

operation on ?th$ep. Even su"se:uenty, the operationa order of en 1 rmd de ((

oA, captured ater, does not mention their 1@ I+ #iv J %7. !he prisoners

"eonging to this formation and who were captured ater around 1>thG1?th $ep, in the

%'WI# $ector, competed this missing cue of the HI2$W pu;;e-i.e. what

happened to the en 1@ Inf #iv. It was epained that the enemy re-enforcing 1@ I+ #iv,

arrived in $3 area ate. ater on 1Ath$ep, whie sti in their conc. area, they were

spotted and very "ady maued "y our ir +orce. !hey ceased to eist as a proper fighting

formation after that.

+rom the captured en 1rmd de (( D A, which was signed on 1A th$ep at 1A15 'rs, it

is cear that the main I#I )3# #IO attack was panned to "e aunched sometimes

on or after 1@th$ep. Events on the ground confirm the same. It is cear that the attack did

not proceed as panned. !he fierce tank "atte started from 15th$ep. onwards. !he cima

was 16th$ep. +rom the air, the rmy viators, operating in the area from #awn to #usk,

had a very cear "irdFs eye view of the "attefied. !his was a "eing reportedOery professionay to a '&Fs. !he enemy armed formations were not aowed to

deveop the momentum of their attack. o dou"t, our own tanks had payed the main

roe. !he heroic and "od fight put up "y our own tank crews, was "unting a very

determined attack of the enemy. !his epoch "atte was very a"y assisted "y the rmy

viators. !he effective concentration of a avaia"e guns, on the attacking enemy

armour coumns, was "oth pinching and hurting to them. !his couped with the accurate

and effective direction of our own air force, through the %! sets in the aircraft, did

highight the hum"e contri"ution that the un-armed -19 aircraft were making. +rom the

eary morning of 16th$ep, the -19 aircraft were o"serving ceary the three main enemy

coumns of attack. (ne coumn was directed towards %'WI#, the centre coumn

was making its thrust "etween %'WI# and )/' '


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reevant formations. I personay kept the area under o"servation since first ight. I

estimated the strength of enemy aong each ais as one armoured regiment. #uring the

visits to 15 #iv and 6 rmd #iv '&, this appreciation of the direction and the strength of

the enemy attack were ceary and specificay conveyed "y me to the 2(%Fs 15 #IO and

6 rmd #iv. In my opinion, I had estimated this as a fu fedged enemy rmoured #iv

attack. ater it proved to "e propheticay correct. !he seriousness of this main

determined enemy ma8or offensive was vividy emphasi;ed. (n the ground too, as the

pressure of the main enemy armoured thrust "egan to "uid, it was fuy reai;ed that this

was the most critica moment of the "atte in this sector.

In the evening of 16th$ep, I went to '& 1 %orps. Whie I was "riefing %omd 1 %orps, t.

2en. )ana and 3a8. 2en. *akoo", who had earier arrived there as #eputy %orps %omd,

on the detais of this main enemy attack, a :uarry was raised. I was asked as to what

troops we had on the ground specificay opposing against each of these coumns. I was

totay shockedL !he "atte had raged in the area since ? $ep and even now on the day of

16 $ep, they hardy had any cue of the disposition of own troops. It was most annoying

and irritating to reai;e that %ops '&, ti now had no effective communication

inks with its formation. eave aone that, it was aso cear, that there was no system of

coation of attefied Inteigence, its reevant assessment and finay "uiding a pictureof the "attefied, with a view to make there own pans at the eves of %orps '&. I had

not epected anything "etter from ient 2enera akhtiar )ana, "ut I "eieved that 3a8or

2enera *aku" had much "etter professiona acumen. 'e was an armour officer, was ti

recenty the commandant at the %ommand and $taff %oege, &uetta had seen "atte in

frica in the Word War II and was considered a very good professiona officer. It ater

proved, his competence was of rather theoretic nature and not given to practica

appication. I was totay disappointed in him. It was epained "y me that =5 %O was at

%'WI#, 2


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pans are "eing prepared. %o. +)3 I, 4who ater "ecame 3a8. 2en, was acting

as 2( 2$ and he was handing this task.

(n the morning of 1> th$ep, -19 aircraft fying in the area, coud ceary o"serve, that

the heat of the intense "atte that had raged and deveoped throughout the 16 th$ep, had

died down very considera"y. I visited '& 6 rmd #iv on the eary morning of 1> th$ep. I

met with 2(%, 3a8. 2en. "rar, as per the reguar routine. !he feeing of the grimness of

the "atte as it prevaied on 16 th$ep had changed. !he "eaming faces of the 2(% and the

staff tod it a. !he 2(% was epaining that in his opinion the most serious enemy

attack had "een "unted. Enemy had suffered very heavy tank casuaties. (ur own tank

osses were aso high, "ut much ess as compared to the enemy. 2(% 6 rmd #iv had the

ha"it of monitoring the enemy rmd #iv wireess net. 'e mentioned that he had heard a

"anket ca on that net. !he ca was 8ust addressing a the tanks, which had survived the

"itter tank action of 16th$ep, to withdraw individuay, taking cover in sugar cane crops.

%eary enemy 1 rmed #iv had ceased to eist as an +3 and even su" +3Fs. !he

gravity of the "itter truth had dawned on them 2(% 6 rmd #iv was e:uay sei;ed with

the situation. 'e started forming up some counter offensive pans in his mind. 'is own

capa"iity was rather imited, as his units were on much depeted tank strengths due to the

proonged "attes. t this stage, 3a8. 2en. "raar was firmy of the opinion that he coudundertake ony imited counter attack pans. 'e fet that any ma8or initiative coud come

ony at the eve of '& 1 %orps.

$eeing the situation I few to '& 1 %orps, a the detais of the accounts as seen "y the

rmy viators and the important first hand information and description of the assessment

of 2(% 6 rmd were conveyed. It was strongy suggested that we shoud at east now

have a counter attacke pan of our own. oth the %orps %ommander and the #eputy

%orps %ommander were assertive in stating, that they are working on it. %o 4ater 3a8or

2enera )ao +arman i, who was %o %$ at the %orps '&, was aso present and took

part in the discussion. 'e ater few in a heicopter, with %aptain i Hawahar the piot, to

have a detaied ook and carry out the re:uired recce and make his own assessment of the

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I few "ack to '& 6 rmd #iv in the afternoon of 1> th$ep. s I arrived there, 2(% 6

rmd #iv was very peased to see me. !his he aways was, as he epectingy was aways

awaiting for a the atest news of the "attefied. !his time without waiting for any news,

2(% congratuated me. 'e tod him me that the enemy had paid the "est compiment to

the rmy viators. 'e said that whie monitoring the I#I rmd #iv net, he 8ust

heard a ca for cose air support. !he targets "eing mentioned specificay for their ir

+orce were P!!( !anks and -19 ircraft. It was very fattering. (ver the ast 1D

days "atte, the enemy was ceary epaining its frustrations. !he ethaity of the Patton

tanks was "eing compared with the effectiveness of the support that the -19Fs were

providing. !he rmy viator had ceary payed a roe. !he accurate and timey

ad8ustments of the artiery fire support "y the ir (P had made its pinch fet on the

enemy. $o e:uay was the devastating effect of the direction of our aircraft attack

through the air"orne %! in the -19 aircraft. !he pivota roe payed "y rmy viation

had "een ceary driven home in the enemy mind.

$ure enough, when the I#I ir +orce came in cose sp, after the re:uest made on the

enemy wireess set, they came targeting the -19 ircraft. %apt ia;iFs aircraft was hit.

'is rudder contro was damaged. !he aieron too was hit and it was ony partiay

functiona. I was aso in the air at that time, when I heard this account of the attack anddamage on the wireess, I tod %apt II to proceed to $I/(! strip and and there. I

too foowed him there. !he aircraft crash anded at the od poo ground. It was "ady

damaged. ut the piot %apt II and the rear o"server, %apt khtar 3ahmud,

manning the %!, were "oth safe.

!he storm that had gathered since 6 $ep, with the aunching of the Indian attack on

Pakistan, had peaked itsef and attained its maimum intensity on 15 thand 16th$ep. !his

was weathered so "ravey on the ground. arring a few fiascoFs at H$$) r, the in ine

reief of =@ de 2p at P'I


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and the crucia events a "ear testimony to this. !he main o"servation that was made was

that so far we ony kept reacting to the enemy moves and his attack pan. We met a

thrusts and advance of the enemy frontay. !he "irdFs eye view of the "attefied that the

rmy viators had, ceary and strongy suggested that it was time that we pan our own

initiative. !hese views were strongy suggested "y the rmy viators, during a visits

and meeting at different head:uarters. 15 #iv and 6 rmd #iv had remained em"roied in

an intense "atte with the striking enemy formations. !hey had itte capa"iity at their

eves for any ma8or initiative. !his had to come at the eve of the %orps '&.

!his description of the situation as it permeated ti the morning of 1> th$ep, is very

important and critica. (n this day not ony the storm had totay died out, "ut a very grim

situation "egan to deveop for the enemy forces that had made the penetration. Enemy

had massed A Infantry #ivisions, namey 6 3tn #iv, =6 #iv and 1@ #iv and 1 rmd #iv

pus. !hey secured the firm "ase and aunched their attack on ?th$ep. y the morning of

1>th$ep, they coud ony make a sma and modest "udge. !he maimum penetration

made was when '()$E

was eading the attack. 'e certainy was very "od and was fiercey eading the main

offensive. 'e e:uay was matched, as was apty descri"ed ater, "y men of stee. 'ead on

he was met. 'is tank was destroyed and t. %o !)P


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!he hori;ons had "egun to cear from 1>th$ep onwards. !he enemy made some sma and

desperate imited attacks. !he most significant event was that the %(% 6 rmd #iv 2en

"rar gave his orders on the night of 1>th$ept, for a imited offensive on 1? th$ep. !he

area up to HE$$() was ceared. Indians again aunched their fina desperate attack on

the night of 19 $ept. It was "asicay an Infantry attack. It was totay maued. !he net

morning saw hundreds of dead "odies ittering the pace. 3any were captured.

transformation from a purey defensive posture to a imited counter attack had taken

pace in the panning of 6 rmd #iv. !he "attefied picture provided "y the rmy

viation and the assessment so made did greaty hep in this deveopment. !he critica

eve of %ommand which coud take a "oder and decisive action was '& 1 %orp. re-

grouping was made. $ome units of 1 rmd #iv, which had arrived earier from /'E3

/) sector were made part of a rmd #iv and, were re-enforced with some

fmnFsGunits aready in the area of P$)


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6>

3')H/E. o pan to cut the P!'/(!-$3-Hammu road "y advancing

()!' from +)W was made, which woud have the same effect as capture of

/' th$eptem"er and "eyondL cease

fire came on =Ard$eptem"er, "ut our pan of counter offensive was not eecuted. o one

has epained any reasons for this. (ne has heard some muffed ecuses. $hortage of

ammunition "eing one of those. one of the unit %ommanders in the area ever suggested

so. s suggested in the earier description, was it due to some serious faiings of the

:uaities of head and heart at some critica eves of %ommandL (r was there any other

compeing circumstancesM t east no one in the fied of operations was aware of it.

Whie the rmy viation was fuy integrated with the operations of 1= #iv, > #iv, 15

#iv, 6 rmed #iv and '& 1 %orps it is unfortunate, that though some rmy viation

effort was provided to ahore and /asur $ector and the main strike force 1 rmed #iv,

"ut it never got fuy integrated. It is not understood and there is no pausi"e

Epanation, that when you pan to aunch a ma8or offensive in /hem /haran, you do not

ensure that it had the services of ir"orne Eyes, to fuy keep them informed of the rea

time "attefied information. E:uay important was the factor, that when %ommand and

%ontro "ecame difficut through ground channes, why was not the heicopter utii;ed toeffect the necessary inks, co-ordination and "ring a"out cohesion of command. In the

panning, when > #iv and 1 rmed #iv, were to "e aunched as the main strike forceK to

ensure the success of thrust, "ring a"out co-ordination in command and through that

retain the momentum of attack, my $:uadron was affiiated to this force. We remained

depoyed in 3ayGHune at aoki and waited in the wings, for the force to "e aunched

Why this strike force was spit with the move of '& > #iv to %'3 area, Why the

aunching of the 1 rmed #iv, which was the main thrust, undertaken through vague and

am"iguous arrangements aong with 11 #iv, ocated in /asur areaM !hese remain a

mysteryK ieut 2enera taf &adir, 2(% > #iv, had done a the panning for this and

some other options. Why was he posted to %E!(, against his wiM In fact, when the

war was imminent he rushed "ack from /) without any authority or instructions

and peaded at 2'& for the command of > #iv. !his again was refusedL It does not end

at that earier, 3a8or 2enera *ahya /han, had made a the preparations for the defense


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6?

of the $iakot area. 'e had done the recee of the whoe area on foot, made a detaied

appreciation of different contingencies and had made a pans for the dispositions of his

own troops and conceived a possi"e reactions and contingencies to meet any enemy

threat. 'e was moved from 15 #iv to take over > #iv. 'e was repaced "y a most

incompetent and i-suited 2.(.%. rig Ismai. !he 8oke a"out him was, that at an

eercise, when he was to give his pan, in his fowery Engish, he said !hat when my

formation assumes offensive and em"arks on our thrust at fu throtte, no one shoud stop

me7. 'e was tod very "unty. It depends as to in which direction you are moving7.

'e was a stray maverick as a sodier. !he :uestion that arises is as to why he was

inficted as 2.(.%. 15 #iv. E:uay reated are the :uestions of 3a8 2en *ahya /han

moving over to take over > #iv, t 2en taf &adir "eing shunted to %E!( at this

critica stage, the pacing of '& > #iv in the area of %'3 and reieving of 3a8 2en

khtar 3aik from the command of 1= (ps in %'3 on = $eptem"er 1965. !here are

o cear answerFs provided to a these :uestions. (ne did not privies any catastrophic

conse:uences emanating from these decisions at that time, "ut the a"ye that we had to

pay coud have "een reasona"y foreseen. In hindsight, a these foies ceary stood

facing us on our face. s far as the moving over of 3a8 2en *ahya /han to > #iv and

then his taking over the command of %'3 operations on = $eptem"er 1965, the ony

o"8ective reasons coud "e that he was "eing g

The Indo Pak 1965 WAR

Documents

renditionof war

war dispatches of 3a8or

y ieut

indo pak

operations mosty

offensive operations

unity of command

area of hemharan