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This journal is dedicated to the tutors of the Foundation YearProgramme. Your tireless patience and your ability to foster a connection

between text and student is the cornerstone of the FYP experience.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Discussing MontaigneJacob Baker Kretzmar.1

Discussing LutherAustin Hiltz....4

Discussing Renaissance ArtNiki Foley....7

Discussing RousseauClaire Ahern.10

Discussing KantSaima Desai..14

Discussing De PizanRebecca Steele....18

Discussing Marx and EngelsJonathan Brown Gilbert..23

Discussing OwenMaggie ORiordan Ross.28

Discussing Hegel, Eisenstein, and CoppolaOlivia Tucker34

Discussing Einstein

Josh Feldman..39

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Montaigne

Jacob Baker-Kretzmar

Such defects may be all on the surface, but they augur badly: when we see cracksin the plaster and cladding of our walls it warns us that there are fissures in the

actual masonry(Montaigne, On sumptuary laws, FYP Handbook 151). Discuss.

Although the subject of Michel de Montaignes On sumptuary laws fashionseems shallow, what underlies his criticism of the laws governing spending onextravagant clothing and furnishings is a powerful warning against social short-sightedness. Montaigne was deeply concerned with human nature, and he toucheson it in all his essays, not least of which this cryptic critique. He discusses fashion

and the new laws regulating it, but only in order to address more pressing issues.He writes, when we see cracks in the plaster and the cladding of our walls it warns

us that there are fissures in the actual masonry, proposing that the seeminglysuperficial issues surrounding fashion are in fact indicative of deeper and moreserious flaws in society, and several of his essays support this idea, including On

one of Caesars sayingsand On experience(Montaigne, On sumptuary laws, 151).In particular, the flaw that he connects to fashion is a fixation with novelty and

change. This hunger for newness reaches so far that it obscures societys view ofthe present and alienates them from the past, preventing people from living theirlives in the moment and to their full potential.

Montaigne disdains fashion, particularly the way in which it so rapidly andarbitrarily changes. The apparent focus of On sumptuary lawsis the many issues

surrounding the fashion industry and the attempts to regulate it; however, this

exploration is merely a tool to make his point, and he does not take fashionseriously at all. He calls spending money on lavish clothing insane and inane,and goes on to cite the many problems with such luxury, not the least of whichbeing that kings, who buy fancy clothes most often, need them the least and havethe most already (Montaigne, On sumptuary laws, 149). He continues to degradethe practice of spending so lavishly, and suggests that the whole mess could easilybe reversed, because were nobles to stop spending so much, everyone else wouldfollow suit: The rest of the country adopts as canon the canons of the Court(Montaigne, On sumptuary laws, 150). He lists several other cultural annoyancesthat could be remedied in the same way, and then introduces the metaphor ofcracks and fissures in the wall. He begins, Such defects may be all on thesurface, referring to all the problems he has just listed, but primarily fashion,allowing that they may indeed be of little consequence in and of themselves(Montaigne, On sumptuary laws, 151). But going on to explain that it augursbadly, he posits that the issues of fashion foreshadow something much moreserious (Montaigne, On sumptuary laws, 151). In the construction analogy thatfollows, he compares fashion to the cracks in the plaster, imp lying that thefissures in the actual masonry represent another, graver issue: an obsessionwith change (Montaigne, On sumptuary laws, 151).

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The deeper problem that Montaigne points to is a lust for novelty thatdisrupts mans very ability to live his life in the present and to fully experience it.He cites Plato in warning against allowing people to change from fashion tofashion in their dress running after novelties (Montaigne, On sumptuary laws,151). The problem that Montaigne sees in this unrelenting culture of materialreplacement is that no one enjoys what he or she has while they actually have it.By the time someone purchases an article of clothing, they are already consumed

with thoughts of the next one. They do not enjoy what they have in the moment,missing the experience of the present on account of a constant anticipation of thefuture. To Montaigne, who values the human experience so highly and constantlyencourages his reader to be aware of themselves and live in the present, thisabandonment of the immediate for the expected is unacceptable. In On one ofCaesars sayings, he quotes Lucretius in damning the fickle nature of thesedesires: as long as we do not have it, the object of desire seems greater than

anything else: as soon as we enjoy it, we long for something different with an equalcraving (Montaigne, On one of Caesars sayings, 147). Montaignes issue is thatpeople shift their focus away from the present, and in readjusting their desires sorapidly they begin to abandon constancy in other areas of their lives too, until little

in them remains constant. He implores us to live in the present, reminding us inOn experiencethat It is the life of the fool which is entirely sacrificed to thefuture (Montaigne, On experience, 420). He warns that the deferral of the presentis dangerous, and that it signals even graver trends.

Some might argue that Montaigne is, in On sumptuary laws, nothing morethan a grumpy old conservative, opposing change only for the sake of opposition.Quite on the contrary, he is not opposed to social change in general, and in factencourages it: he tells the reader earlier in On experiencethat there is no way of

life more feeble and stupid than one which is guided by instilled habit(Montaigne, On experience, 386). What he sees as a problem in this case is thereason behind why these changes are occurring; he takes issue not with fashionitself but with the motivations behind it, the unceasing thirst for newness andaversion to stasis. Montaigne argues that nature tells us to take pleasure in the

present. As an example, imagine a person who craves a bag of chips, and indulges.Montaigne would have a problem if she ate the chips hurriedly and just for the

sake of eating, without fully enjoying them or even really tasting them at all. Hewould not take issue with her eating the chips, but would simply instruct that sheshould really eat them, enjoying every single bite. For him, what one does is of lessconsequence than how one does it: he says of the soul in On repentingthat itsvalue is not in going high but in going ordinately (Montaigne, On repenting, 238).

So, in the case of fashion and the underlying obsession with newness, it is not thepractice of buying new clothes that Montaigne would disparage, but rather theresulting abandonment of the present in an all-consuming scramble for the nearfuture.

This skipping over what people are meant to be enjoying, in societys lust fornovelty, has even more serious implications. An obsession with the future thateclipses both present and past, a constant pressure for radical change, takes toomuch attention off the daily experience of living. It is crucial for Montaigne thatpeople live their lives slowly and fully aware of their experiences. He describes hisown adherence to these principles: When I dance, I dance. When I am strolling

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through a beautiful orchard I bring [my thoughts] back to the walk and tome (Montaigne, On experience, 415). When an entire community stops doing this,stops focusing on the moment and being actively aware of their present selves,then they lose their connection to the past and to the present. They become unableto situate the present in its historical context. Montaigne argues that this blindfetish for change is how all ancient principles are brought into disdain andcontempt (Montaigne, On sumptuary laws, 151). In discussing Plato, he connects

the traditions of the ancients, and long standing moral customs, to human natureitself. The laws he refers to, those to which God had vouchsafed so long acontinuance that no one knows that they had ever been different, are nothingother than human nature, the most basic and pivotal natural customs whichMontaigne values so highly (Montaigne, On sumptuary laws, 151). As people losesight of the present, they also lose their knowledge of the wisdom of the past, andthereby of their own natures. For Montaigne, who believes so strongly in the

human experience, there can be nothing worse.In attacking fashion, Montaigne in fact warns of the dangers of forgetting

the importance of the present moment. He sees in fashion the trappings of a deeperpreoccupation with newness and the future, one that is in fact beginning to take

precedence even over the lessons of the past. Immersion in the present, with aconsciousness of and connection to the past, is the way to live a worthwhile andgood life, but this masonry of ancient customs and human nature wasthreatened by the French nobilitys ceaseless lust for novelty (Montaigne, Onsumptuary laws, 151). He sees people growing distant both from their immediatephysical experience of the world and of their own life, and also from the eternal

thread of human consciousness, from humanity itself. And he fears that this riftwill consume them allin the loss of an awareness of the present, grounded in

history, there is ultimately a loss of self.

Works Cited

De Montaigne, Michel. The Essays: A Selection. Trans. M. A. Screech. New York:

Penguin Classics, 2004. Print.

De Montaigne, Michel. On one of Caesars sayings. Foundation Year ProgrammeHandbook. Halifax: University of Kings College, 2013-2014. Print.

De Montaigne, Michel. On sumptuary laws. Foundation Year ProgrammeHandbook. Halifax: University of Kings College, 2013-2014. Print.

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Luther

Austin Hiltz

Since, therefore, this faith can only rule in the inner man [] and since faith alonejustifies it, it is clear that the inner man cannot be justified, freed, or saved by anyouter work or action at all, and that these works, whatever their character, havenothing to do with this inner man (Luther, The Freedom of a Christian, FYP

Handbook 92). Discuss.

Luther, in his work On the Freedom of a Christian, reconciles the apparentlyincompatible relationship between the performance of works by Christians and thesalvation of the soul solely by virtue of ones faith, asserting that this faith cannotexist in connection with works (92). Despite this, Luther does not permit thereader to conceive of a Christian indifference towards the external, asserting laterthat faith in Christ does not free us from works but from false opinions concerningworks (105). Moreover, by positing the accomplishment of faith in the soul as theinstrument of salvation Luther resolves the tension regarding the human beingsapparent lack of agency, given that any works are absolutely ineffectual inattaining righteousness. Luther acknowledges the inability of the human being toaffect his own fate by means of external action as a source of necessary despair,without conceding that the human lacks agency. Even the externality ofrighteousness, available to humanity only by the imputation of God (Thorne FYPlecture) does not deprive the human being of some essential agency, which isdemonstrable in his very capacity to despair. True Christian liberty, however, isemancipation from the restrictions imposed upon the unsaved human, who

though an agent lacks an essentially free will.By the investigation of faith, the conditions of the agency that precede

imputed righteousness are made apparent. It is the imperative of this argument toexamine the means by which Luther identifies the liberation of the Christian will.Luther conceives of a composite human nature, indicating both a spiritual and abodily [nature] in man, which he identifies as the soul and the flesh, respectively(91). Concerned with the life of the inner man, Luther employs Scripture to support

his declaration that the soul can do without anything except the Word of God(91), which dismisses the efficacy of works in affecting the soul. Emphasising theprimacy of the Word in the instruction of the soul, Luther later says that faith

alone is the saving and efficacious use of the Word of God (92). That faith isderived from the intellectual engagement of Scripture (echoed in Father Thornesexplanation of Christian faith as an attentioned listening to the Word) suggeststhe activity of becoming faithful. The Word of God is divided into two parts byLuther: the Commandments, which exist to lead one to despair at ones inabilityto fulfill them, and the Promises, which assure one of salvation despite thatinability. Upon study of the Commandments one finds in himself nothingwhereby he may be justified and saved (93) and so becomes humbled. From this

humility regarding the impotence of works the Christian can comprehend that

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their only recourse is to fully trust God and his promises. Here Luther wouldremind us that our faith shall be reckoned to us as righteousness if we believe(94) and thus one can discern a causal link between faith and justification. Thiscausal link exists not out of necessity, but because of the pure and free mercy ofGod (99) who we trust completely to fulfill His promise of salvation. It is apparentthat the righteousness imputed by God is entirely other to our nature. So to befaithful and to be righteous are one and the same, for one cannot be either without

assuming the other.The obligation of the Christian to engage in the active study of the Word in

order to recognise his inability to do good (93) and to bring the soul to firmly[trust] in Gods promises (94) demonstrates an activity of the individual prior tothe imputation of righteousness by God. To become faithful must therefore be anact undertaken by an individual agent, as Luther notes that [faith] is a splendidprivilege and hard to attain (96) and not experienced universally (90). As becomingfaithful is essentially the recognition of ones own inability, it might be seen asmerely the concession of the impossibility of action. However, this impossibilityapplies only to the realm of the external while faith is an act of the inner man.

Furthermore, to concede ones incapacity is an act in itself. Clearly, then, the

unfaithful person possesses the ability to make choices and act, both as an innerand outer man, for it is possible for him to become faithful by way of his ownaction. In this way, the agency of the human being presupposes the Christianliberty that renders him free from all things so that he needs no works to makehim righteous and save him (97). That Luther refers to the Christian as free fromall things (97) illustrates the relationship between the agency of the individual,irrespective of the grace of God, and the Christian liberty received by the faithful.Christian liberty confers a freedom from all things, namely from all works (102)and from the wickedness (94) that taints all works done in unbelief with sin.Even an unchristian person seems to possess the capacity to act upon themselves

and so decide independently. For example, he can decide what sorts of works hemight undertake, though he is not at liberty to remove the sinfulness inherent inworks proceeding from unfaithfulness.

Regarding ones capacity to become righteous, one can in fact imagine a manin chains: if he is an unfaithful man he will have only his works to fall back on,

and seek to be at liberty by the merits of his own struggling against his bonds. Byassuming he has this power the unfaithful man will violently force [himself] intothe office and glory of grace (100), aping the authority of God, the jailor. Thefaithful man recognises that he cannot escape his chains by the merit of his ownexternal action in any measure whatsoever, and so must trust in the pure and

free mercy of God (99), his jailor, to free him from the very chains that He saw fitto impose. And as it is true that God is truthful and just (94) by ceding ourinability to God and depending on Him for our salvation and liberation we shallfind that we are justified for the same reason our faith shall be reckoned to us asrighteousness if we believe (94). So to be Christian is to be like a stoic, and theonly decision that befalls us is whether to recognise and accommodate our cosmicpredicament or to rally hopelessly against it, like a dog against a cart.

By couching salvation in belief Luther conceives a God who leaves thehuman being to secure his own faith and humility independent of His owninvolvement. However, it is arguable that because God is omnipotent and extra-

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temporal the presence of His will in all things necessitates predestination andrenders human agency obsolete. This argument appears to find support even inLuthers own statements asserting the predestination of salvation in another of hisworks, the Disputation against Scholastic Theology.The logical extension of hisown discussion of Gods power in contrast to our incapacity in The Freedom of aChristianmay appear to problematize agency, such as when he says we come tofaith that all things may be Gods alone He alone commands, he alone fulfills

(93), implying the omnipresence of Gods will. This does not nullify Christianfreedom, however, any more than we understand God working through thePharaoh in Exodus to deprive the Pharaoh of agency (Brandes FYP lecture). Thedouble-motivation of the divine will manifest in humans cannot in fact beunderstood to deprive us of the freedom to choose independently. The will of Godin man can, however, when properly engaged (that is, by faith) provide one withthe freedom from sin that is essential to Christian liberty.

We have shown here that the human being possesses some innate authorityover himself, which is enhanced and made righteous by the liberating influence ofChristian faith. The emancipation from the necessity of works does not make theagent obsolete any more than it does the works themselves. Both remain essential

to the life of the Christian from whose faith thus flow[s] forth love and joy (102)in the form of works undertaken freely and out of love for ones neighbour (103).Luther responds to the problem of selfish human nature by perceiving that faithunites the soul with Christ (94) and takes on its sins. Thus one is freed to act,seeking neither benefit nor salvation since [one] already abounds in all things(99-100), by virtue of the grace of God. Without depriving the essential agency of

the person as an individual, Luther reveals to his readers the potential toexperience a still greater freedom: the freedom to love. The freedom to love for thefirst time, truly unrestrained by the selfishness of merit.

Works Cited

Brandes, Daniel. The Hebrew Bible I: Genesis and Exodus. Foundation YearLecture, 5 September 2013.

Luther, Martin. The Freedom of a Christian. Foundation Year ProgrammeHandbook. Halifax: University of Kings College, 2013-2014. Print

Thorne, Gary. The Protestant Reformation. Foundation Year Lecture, 22November 2013.

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Renaissance Art

Niki Foley

What is the attitude of Renaissance Art to antiquity and the value of ancient

sources?

During the Renaissance visual art witnessed a profound shift in theperception of the value of Antiquity, from a desire to imitate the past to a desireto surpass the great skill of the Ancients. The fluid combination of Ancientinfluences with contemporary stylistic tendencies to produce a work of masterywith no division between influence and personal style was considered the artists

greatest achievement. The 15th century Florentine sculptor Lorenzo Ghiberti isconsidered to have achieved such a feat with his piece "The Creation of Adam

and Eve" for the doors of the of the Florentine Baptistery (see Figure 1). With thispiece Ghiberti expertly incorporates Antique figures to an extent in which his

own work seems to retranslate Hellenistic characteristics not accessible to the15thcentury artist. This expert imitation displays Ghiberti's respect towards the

merits and beauty ofAntiquity, however it is in his careful manipulation of the

figures of Adam and Eve that Ghiberti surpasses Antiquity. Lorenzo Ghibertiportrays Adam and Eve as reminiscent of Pagan gods to outline both the way

Antiquity bends to modern desires and the meaning behind The Book of Genesisand original Sin.

At the time that Ghiberti was creating the 'Gates of Paradise' for the

Florentine Baptistery, his incorporation of Antique-influenced figures wasundergoing a radical shift. Prior to the creation of the gates Ghiberti's workpossessed little Antique influence. As Richard Krautheimer states, at this pointGhiberti used Antiquity as "a pool from which to draw an occasional motif"(Krautheimer 25). However the unveiling of the Gates demonstrates the

abounding incorporation of Antique figures into Ghibertis overall aestheticdesign. Krautheimer claims this shift finds root within Ghiberti's visit to Rome

in the 1430s, during which he was exposed to more expansive collection ofAntique artwork than would have been possiblein Pisa and Florence.This claim

offers an interesting explanation for Ghiberti's shifting understanding of the

merits of Antiquity. It presents the notion that through exposure to a greatervariety of Antique influences Ghiberti was capable of discovering figures which

he found aesthetically pleasing and worthy of being incorporated into his own

works. With this greater exposure to Antiquity and the resulting sketchescompleted by the artist of those piecesviewed, Ghiberti was capable of evolving

his view of the merits of Antique art. Such a shiftprovided the basis from which

Renaissance artists ultimately surpass the influences themselves.

The clearest piece in which Ghiberti's Antique influences may be seen is"The Creation of Adam and Eve," which also serves as the piece in which Ghibertimay have surpassed the greatness of these influences. Antique influence inrelation to Ghiberti's work is presented most prominently in his figures,specifically Adam and Eve. These figures resemble the idealized images of ancient

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Greek and Roman gods as opposed to less idealized traditional Christian figures(see Figure 2.1, 2.2). The depiction of these figures as such epitomizes aRenaissance view of Antiquity as full of life, characterized by graceful movement

and elegance.The figure of Adam is presented in an idealized manner, with the

depiction of toned muscle and elegant bodily contours (see Figure 2.3, 2.4). The

more central figure of Eve is similarly presented. Her body is presented in

elegantly curving contours giving a sense of movement to her static figure (see

Figure 2.5., 2.6). The extent of Ghiberti's Antique influence may even be seen inthe figures of God and the Angels. Each wear long flowing robes whosehighlighted drapery explicitly portray a sense of movement beyond the fixedmaterial image (see Figure 2.7, 2.8). The figures presented by Ghiberti within his

piece clearly display the extent of Antique influence in his work at the time.Further, the conscious choice to utilize perfected, graceful and elegant figuresrepresents the respect Ghiberti has cultivated for Antiquity and hisacknowledgement of its greatness. Beginning with his expert replication Ghibertiis then able surpass these influences with the greatness of his own skill andpersonal perspectives.

Upon first glance Ghiberti's "The Creation of Adam and Eve" presentsreplicated Antique figures. However with closer analysis it becomes clear thatthrough carefully considered manipulation of these Antique figures Ghiberticomes to accomplish the Renaissance ideal of surpassing the greatness of

Antiquity. Within this piece Ghiberti utilizes bodily forms to present a detailedaccount of the events of The Book of Genesis. In this single piece one may see thecreation of Adam, the creation of Eve, original sin in the form of eating from theTree of Knowledge, and their expulsion from the Garden of Eden. In the accountof these events Ghiberti consciously places Eve as the central figure. The contours

and facial features of Adam are less precisely detailed than those of Eve. Forexample, the figure of Eve clearly displays a waistline and belly button, whereas

that of Adam is less defined (see Figure 3.1). At one point, Adam is even completelyhidden by Eves prominent figure (see Figure 3.2). Furthermore, the figure of God,the seven angels, the lying Adam, and the sharp linear contour of the 'door' withinthe piece seem to form a kind of frame around the creation event and figure ofEve (see Figure 3.3). Ghiberti radically contrasts the treatment of Adam and Eveto allude to their roles within The Book of Genesis. Adam is seen as passive andsubmissive to the more dominant Eve. Moreover, Eve may be seen as the keyfigure in Genesis, alluding to views of her as the instigator of original sin, withthe placement of her creation in the centre of the actions portrayed in the piece

(see Figure 3.4), in addition to the frontal positioning of her figure in the portrayedexpulsion (see Figure 3.5). Ghiberti also manipulates the Antique influence of the

figure of Eve to allude to her role as a 'seductress' or 'temptress' in styling herbodily form in a manner clearly influenced by earlier images of the Greek/Romangoddesses of sexual love and lust, Aphrodite and Venus (see Figure 2.1). Howeverit is in Ghiberti's distinct contrast of the figures of Adam and Eve and that of God,that he displays his true mastery over Antiquity. As written in The Bible, Adam

and Eve ate from the Tree of Knowledge in hopes of becoming like God. Ghibertiemphasizes this crucial notion within his piece by forming the figures of Adamand Eve in a manner reminiscent of Ancient Pagan gods and fashioning the figureof God in a more traditional Christian image of a divine figure. The contrast of the

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divinity of these figures serves to visually convey Adam and Eve s attempt anddesire to be like God. The presentation of Adam and Eve as merely Ancient divinefigures and distinctly other to the figure of God, serves to outline the failure oftheir attempt and the consequential expulsion from Earthly Paradise. With themasterful manipulation of Antique figural forms, Ghiberti clear representsvisually the Biblical warning of the dangers of betraying God and giving over totemptation and sin. The manipulation further demonstrates Ghiberti's

accomplishment in mastering and surpassing with his own skill the influences ofAntiquity.

The Renaissance artistic ideal may be seen as a desire to go beyond thesimple replication of Antique influences to surpass and master these influenceswith one's own skill. Lorenzo Ghiberti is one artist considered to haveaccomplished such an ideal. This success is seen in Ghiberti's incrediblemanipulation of Antique bodily figures in his piece "The Creation of Adam andEve" to portray visually the events, meaning and Christian teachings of the Bookof Genesis. Figures reminiscent of Pagan gods are used for Adam and Eve todisplay the consequence of original sin and attempting to place oneself in the roleof God. In his aesthetic treatment of Antique figural influence Ghiberti is seen to

consider Antiquity as a time characterized by beauty with elegant forms and

graceful movement.However with the analysis of "The Creation ofAdam and Eve"

it is clear that despite this Ancient beauty, to Ghiberti, the time for the greatnessof Antiquity has passed, displayed in his presentation of the sinning Adam andEve as reminiscent of now un-venerated Pagan Gods. Antiquity will come to besubject to the changing demands and views of a new era, an era to be definedartistically by ones ability to manipulate and surpass those distant influences.

Works Cited

Krautheimer, Richard. "Ghiberti and the Antique." Renaissance News. Vol. 6, No.2. Summer 1953: 24-26. Print.

Polykleitos. Fragments of a Marble Statue of the Diadoumenos. 69-96 AD.Metropolitan Museum of Art. metmuseum.org. Web. November 26 2013.

Marble Statue of Aphrodite. 1st-2nd century AD. Metropolitan Museum of Art.

metmuseum.org. Web. November 26 2013.

Marble Head of a Goddess. 4th century BC. Metropolitan Museum of Art.metmuseum.org. Web. 26 November 2013.

Marble Head of a Horned Youth Wearing a Diadem. 3rd-2nd century BC.

Metropolitan Museum of Art. metmuseum.org. Web. 26 November 2013.

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Rousseau

Claire Ahern

"I am referring to pity a virtue all the more universal and all the moreuseful to man in that it precedes in him any kind of reflection" (Rousseau,Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, 62). Discuss.

For Rousseau, an individual's consideration of that which is outsideof themselves arises from their instinctive experience of pity. Further, heclaims that pity provides the basis of human relationships and ultimatelybenefits the community it produces. Pity is an instinctual, compassionatereaction to the sufferings and misfortunes of others. Rousseau considerspity to be an immediately felt sentiment because it is a natural, visceral

occurrence in "savage man" (Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin ofInequality,40). Rousseau reckons it to be a virtue and quality of moralmerit; a "natural goodness" (55). He argues that pity inaugurates man'sreflection beyond the egocentric confines of self-centeredness, in that itdraws the mind to that which is outside and other than the individual. Assuch, pity is the precursor to human relations and society. This paper willanalyze Rousseau's concept of the nature of pity, its contribution toreflection, and analyze its universal and useful aspects in his Discourse on

the Origin of Inequality.For Rousseau, pity is a feeling immediately evoked through an

instinctual inclination when one person witnesses the affliction and

adversities of another. As a reaction that occurs prior to any mediation,"Pity is what carries us without reflection to the aid of those we seesuffering" (55). Rousseau elaborates that pity is mankind's "innaterepugnance to seeing his fellow men suffer" (53). He holds that pity is a

"natural sentiment" and also a "natural virtue", his diction connotingesteem and summoning acclaim (53). In doing so, Rousseau presents pityas a positive characteristic of humanity's natural tendencies and praisesit as advantageous (54). In the temperament of the "noble savage",Rousseau presents compassion as an indication of "[admirable] moral

integrity" (FYP lecture). One might ask why Rousseau expands upon theprinciple of pity rather than a concept of natural empathy. To address this

question, the two must firstly be defined. Whereas empathyinvolves engaging in feeling someone else's suffering and taking it up intoone's own experience, pity involves simply recognizing their adversesituation. The individual feeling pity understands that they themselves arenot exempt from experiencing a similar situation in the future.Simultaneously, they are psychologically removed from the situation inknowing that they themselves are not currently subject to the distress theyare observing. Pity and empathy have differing implications; empathy

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would not be compatible with Rousseau's argument for the developmentof mankind's cognitive process. I will further elaborate why the emotional

and mental separation between 'self' and 'other' is pivotal to Rousseau'snotion of human reflection.

Rousseau argues that pity precedes reflection for the twofold reasonthat while it is firstly an instinctual response that is not founded indeliberation, it secondly awakens in man the beginnings of reflection.Rousseau asserts the purity of experiencing pity as a "movement of natureprior to all reflection" and "is what carries us without reflectionto the aidof those we see suffering" (55, Emphasis mine). His language alsoemphasizes the power of pity: "such is the force of natural pity" (54).Alongside its raw influential capacity, Rousseau highlights its naturalness.Pity is thereby evoked in man by nature, and cognition plays no role in theimmediate matter. This analysis addresses the concepts implicit when

Rousseau writes about pity as 'preceding' reflection. Rousseau describes

meaningful thought as an effectof compassion. Pity urges "natural man"(59) to consider persons outside of his own self; in acknowledging them,the existence of a reality beyond his own being emerges and becomesvalidated. From this mental response, the piqued intellect begins to form

distinctions and associations: "Everything begins to take on a newappearance People become accustomed to consider different objects andto make comparisons" (63). Egotism arises from man's developingreflection: "it is reflection that strengthens [self-love]" (54). Rousseausuggests that while pity is an instinctual emotional response, it irreversibly

stirs a person's potential intellect, thus triggering the onset of reflection.Pity is a universal sentiment for Rousseau because it is inherent to

his concept of human nature. Prevalent in his writing is the considerationof pity as a "natural sentiment", described as a "pure movement of nature"(54-5). By emphasizing its organic character, Rousseau asserts that pityis a deep-rooted component of human nature. He uses the example oftheatrically evoked pity by writing that

"Even the most depraved moresstill have difficulty destroying [the force of natural pity], since everyday onesees in our theatres someone affected and weeping at the ills of someunfortunate person" (54). Rousseau demonstrates how in the craftedsimulations of theatre, which imitate but never replicate reality, pity reignstrue in the face of corrupt custom. Instinctual pity is so fundamental thatit can be activated through artificiality, and is powerful enough to

overcome depravity. He further casts light on its presence in the mostuncompassionate individuals, calling on the historical figures of Sulla andAlexander of Pherea, who were both despots (54). Alongside their ruthless,"bloodthirsty" passions, they are presented as subject to pity in theirrespective "sensitiv[ity]" and "not dar[ing] to attend the performance of any

tragedy for fear of being seen weeping" (54). This ubiquitous notion ofcompassion is embedded in Rousseau's "movement to a deeper standpointwithin us, our fundamental, natural selves" (Robertson. FYP lecture).

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Thus, the universality of pity is derived from its presence in every humanbeing.

Rousseau argues that pity is useful because it benefits every personas an individual and therefore promotes the collective well-being of

humanity. Every individual's intrinsic disposition is tempered by pity and

acts as an agent of unified good, exemplified when Rousseau writes that"nothing is so gentle as man in his primitive state limited equally byinstinct and reason to protecting himself from the harm that threatenshim, he is restrained by natural pity from needlessly harming anyone" (64).Alongside being a virtue, pity is an agent of moderation; "a naturalsentiment which, by moderating in each individual the activity of the loveof oneself, contributes to the mutual preservation of the entire species"(55). Rousseau addresses the effect of pity on the self-centeredness ofhuman nature, where pity "inspires all men of a [useful] maxim of naturalgoodness: Do what is good for you, with as little harms as possible to others"

(55). Rousseau's maxim of natural pity is pragmatic; each individual

attends to the necessity of one's own welfare, without imposing upon thewell-being of others. This maxim is crucial considering the life cycle ofman, especially the tenderness of childhood and frailties of old age: "Pityis what will prevent every robust savage from robbing a weak child or an

infirm old man of his hard-earned subsistence, if he himself expects to beable to find his own someplace else" (55). Pity is a faculty that serves theindividual in view of long term safekeeping, while providing for othersthrough circumstantial solicitude. What is omitted in the initial quotationthis essay addresses is restored here: "I am referring to pity, a disposition

that is fitting for beings that are as weak and as subject to ills as we are; avirtue all the more useful to man" (53, Emphasis mine). Our limitations

necessitate pity as a tactic of survival and continuance of the human race.Rousseau goes beyond this practicality, demonstrating pity's social uses,where "benevolence and even friendship are, properly understood, theproducts of a constant pity fixed on a particular object; for is desiring thatsomeone not suffer anything but desiring that he be happy?" (54). Here

Rousseau ties together how pity provokes an awareness of others, and itsvirtuous nature. He argues pity as a basis of moral quality: "In fact, whatare generosity, mercy, and humanity, if not pity applied to the weak, to theguilty, or to the human species in general" (54. Emphasis mine). Thisquotation also demonstrates Rousseau's claim that the attribute ofhumanity, a characteristic linguistically linked to what it is to be

essentially human, is itself based in pity.Rousseau finds pity to be a focus of consideration when seeking to

understand humanity's base emotional constitution and ability to reflect.He outlines a compelling relationship between compassion andcontemplation, where a primal reaction acts as a precursor of human

thought and ultimately human community. This community then turns tothe natural faculty of pity as a means to sustain itself. Rousseau presentsin this co-dependence a profound linkage, where society and each

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individual's prosperity become indebted to pity's usefulness anduniversality. Since pity is imminent in mankind, it affects every individual,

from the theatre-goer to the tyrant. Because of its commonality, everyindividual operates as an agent of pity for the benefit of the feeble, in light

of their own certain weakness. Therefore, Rousseau advocates that pity is

ingrained in our nature and acts to our collective benefit so that "no oneis tempted to disobey [pity's] sweet voice" (55). Pity draws man beyondoneself and into the engagement of reflection and ultimately, employingRousseaus positive connotation of the term, into a pitiful society of pitiablecreatures.

Works Cited:

Robertson, Neil. Shakespeares The Tempest. Foundation Year Lecture,

10 January 2014.

Rousseau, Jean- Jacques. Basic Political Writings of Jean-JacquesRousseau. Ed. Trans. Donald A. Cress. Indiana: HackettPublishing Company. 1987. Print.

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Kant

Saima Desai

Question 10: How are synthetic propositions a priori possible? (Kant,Preamble, Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics, 18). Discuss

When Hume first proposed that our notion of causality was derivedfrom habit rather than reason, he threw all prior metaphysics into doubtby undermining the way that metaphysicians viewed the attainment ofknowledge. Roused from his dogmatic slumber (Kant 5) by this assertion,Kant set out to redefine and strengthen the foundation of metaphysics, sothat we can once more examine how the mind links events together. Whathe accomplished was to locate metaphysics completely in the realm of the

mind, thereby revolutionizing the study of being. Kant proposed thatmathematics, natural science, and metaphysics were all types of a priorisynthetic propositions. But the two concepts of a prioriand synthetic arenot ones that are easily reconcilable. I will be answering the question thatKant posed at the beginning of his Prolegomena: how are synthetic

propositions a prioripossible? (Kant 18). In order to do so, I will break itinto three smaller questions and deal with each individually. What are

synthetic a prioripropositions? Where do they come from? What causesthem to arise?

When dealing with the first question, one must combine theconcepts of synthetic judgments and a priori knowledge. While the

concepts of a priori and a posteriori are epistemological, thesynthetic/analytic distinction is structural. An analytic judgment isaccurately named because it requires only analysis in order to understand

it. An analytic predicate contains certain characteristics, and it is bydissecting the predicate that one can know the characteristics implied inits existence (10). Synthetic judgments, on the other hand, connect twounattached analytic judgments and require an additional cognition to doso (11). A posteriori is knowledge that comes from experience, while a

priori, is knowledge that precedes experience. The latter are conceptsinherent to all rational minds that cannot be contradicted or altered by

anything our senses tell us. It is for this reason that Kant considers a priorito be pure knowledge.

A priori knowledge, therefore, naturally seems to accord withanalytic judgments, because in its purity it should be self-contained. Allanalytic judgments are a priori (10) because both a priori and analytic

judgments rely on a notion of wholeness in that they contain their owntruth. A basic example of this is numbers, since you can count to five inyour head and the idea of five contains within it the notion of consecutiveincreasing amounts. Numbers are ideas independent of experience;

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nothing you can experience can convince you that five is not a validconcept. And while the most basic a prioriknowledge is analytic, it is by

combining multiple analytic a priori ideas that we arrive at complexmetaphysical judgments, such as all substance is permanent (40).

This leads to the second question: where do they come from?

Synthetic a priori propositions introduce a difficulty because they beg thequestion of what connects these two self-contained pure ideas. Kant usesthe example of the sum 7+5=12 to illustrate synthetic a priorijudgments.In this case, the sum 7+5 contains merely their union in a single number,

without its being at all thought what the particular number is that unitesthem (11). This means that a separate cognition is required to reach the

answer. Since 7, 5, and 12 are all distinct predicates, there is anintellectual leap required to traverse the distance between the sum andthe answer. Upon examining the sum, it is easy to say that the + sign isthe factor that unites the a priori concepts of 7 and 5, but in realityaddition is simply another a prioriconcept in itself. The intellectual leap is

somewhat more similar to the = sign in the equation, inthat it activelyconnects the sum to the answer by equating the two.

Kant believes that by applying the rules of space, time, and causalityto the concepts of 7, 5, and 12, one can link them together. This is possiblesince he proposes that concepts of space, time, and causality, rather thanbeing actual qualities inherent in things in themselves (27), areembedded within our minds. Kant calls them the form of sensibility (27)in that they allow us to make sense of our ideas and perceptions. All oura priorias well as our a posterioriknowledge must conform to the rules ofspace and time. These concepts differ from a priorinotions because theyrenot exactly ideas in and of themselvesthey affect all our other ideas and

are necessary for us to understand them. Theyre more functional thanideas, so theyre more akin to lenses through which everything in our mindis viewed.

By accepting this premise, we can attain an answer to our secondquestion: a priorisynthetic judgments arise from our lenses of space andtime. In the example of mathematics, Kant argues that our synthetic apriori understanding of geometry comes from the pure intuition of space(24) that is built into our minds. Although we already contain the a prioriconcepts of straight lines and shortness, by viewing these two conceptsthrough the lens of three-dimensional space, we can go on to assert thatthe shortest distance between two points is a straight line. Similarly, Kant

argues that by applying the lens of temporality (which implies consecutiveincrease) to the sum 7+5, we can reach the conclusion that this equals 12(25).

So while we may think that a priori knowledge is the mostfundamental that our knowledge can be, in reality these lenses are much

more primal and integral to our minds. A priori knowledge is simplycontained by our minds from birth, making it less fundamental to thefunction of our brains. But the architecture of the mind itself is that of

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spatial and temporal understandings, and it is by applying these form[s]of sensibility that we can come to synthetic a priori conclusions, often

without even realizing it. We are absolutely dead certain of the truth of oura prioriknowledge because it is derived exclusively from the most basic

truths that our minds containspace, time, and causality. This is not to

say that our rules of space, time and causation are truths in theuniversal moralistic sense, but that they are present as the building blocksof all rational minds and so they comprise our human definition of truth.

This brings us to the final and perhaps most important Kantian

question to the field of metaphysics. What causes synthetic a priorijudgments to arise? We still dont know how a priorisynthetic knowledge

comes from the forms of sensibility, only that it does. The idea of spaceis applied to the concepts of shortness and straight lines, but what is theforce doing the application?

I talked earlier in this essay about the leap of intuition required tocombine analytic a prioriideas. Kant calls this pure reason (64) the

force that connects two predicates when they are unable to be experienced.Reason is a facultya force which the mind employs to merge ideas withlenses, with the aim to understand the collective unity of all possibleexperience, and thereby go beyond every given experience (65). Therefore,the deeper question implied here is where does reason come from? Byapplying Kants theories that I have already outlined, we can come to theconclusion that this is an unanswerable question.

Just as we can perceive but not experience noumena, we can knowthat reason exists but not know anything about its true nature. Similarly,we can observe the actions of reason and understand its function, buttrying to get at its essence is futile. Even saying that reason is a faculty is

simply a tautology. We run up against a boundary in which reason cannotinquire about itself. But by being aware of this boundary, we can come tounderstand that we have reached the crux of metaphysics. Because we areunable to move any further in our inquiries, it means we have reached thebasis of all knowledge. We have no deeper faculty that would help us

understand reasonreason is the First Cause in a long chain of intuitionsand cognitions that lead to our experience of the world.

There are some concepts that are simply beyond the realm of ourunderstanding. Kant revolutionized metaphysics by locating temporality,spatiality, and causality within our minds, but by doing so, designated anentire realm of the world incomprehensible. Similarly, he methodically

dissected the contents of knowledge and distilled out rationality as theunderlying force. In the end, we do get an answer to the question how aresynthetic propositions a priori possible? Reason applies the lenses ofspace, time, and causality to inherent concepts in order to join themtogether into complex abstract ideas. But the answer is unsatisfying,because the essential actor in that sentence remains indefinable. Even asmetaphysics is driven by the insatiable human desire to understandourselves, Kant admits that human faculties are bounded. Kants

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metaphysics challenges us to both marvel at the power of our reasoning,as well as come to peace with its limits.

Works Cited

Kant, Immanuel. Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics. Trans. JamesW. Ellington. 2nd ed. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing CompanyInc., 1977. Print.

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De Pizan

Rebecca Steele

Discuss the role of freedom in Christine de Pizan.

In her book The City of Ladies, Christine de Pizan hopes to secure afreedom for women that is quite different from the petitions of 21st centuryfeminist. She is unconcerned with a womans place in society and insteadfocuses on a much more fundamental struggle surrounding the inherentnature of women. It is precisely this, the identity of women, which de Pizan

seeks to protect through her creation of the City of Ladies. By making aclear connection between identity and freedom, Christine de Pizansupplies an important contribution validates her contributions to a debate

on women that has thus far excluded its subject. Shifting the focus ofwomens freedom to a more personal level allows her to reject premisesbacked by authority in favor of arguments grounded in example. ChristineLaennec explores how de Pizan compels men to engage with her work inUnladylike Polemics: Christine de Pizans strategies of Attack andDefense, an article that will support my claims regarding de Pizanstactics. By changing the scope of the debate on women, Christine de Pizancreates a long overdue opportunity for women to engage in the discussion

surrounding their own identity.De Pizan identifies mens evil spoken of women as the mechanism

by which men dictate womens identities and thus limit their freedom

(I.2.2). Christine and the personifications of virtues that appear to her takeissue with these false assertions predominantly because they have proven

to be convincing. Men have made women less attractive to other men ina successful bid to control the way womens characters are perceived(I.8.5). Furthermore, men have been able to determine even how womensee themselves. Christine herself illustrates this point as she describeshow she detested [herself] and the entire feminine sex (I.1.1). Women arebarred from realizing their full potential when they undervalue it, an effectthat is compounded by the limitations placed on them by men who areunable to appreciate their merit. It is the prevention of exactly these sortsof attacks that necessitates the protection the City of Ladies. Without this

protection, women are internally and externally denied the fundamentalfreedom of dictating and realizing the potential of their own identity.

Men are able to achieve this control over womens identity and byextension freedom through the use of authority. This concept is explainedmost explicitly by the figure of Reason, who articulates the common beliefthat all the words of the philosophers are articles of faith (I.1.2) It is notjust Christine that has erroneously subscribed to this view that texts must

be accurate and truthful if their authors are old and well known. Many

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men have been convinced as well; men who in order to show they haveread many authors [] repeat what other writers have said (I.8.4). The

fact that this concept is criticized by the physical embodiment of reason ita testament to the lack of critical thinking and intelligence that this

fallacious appeal to authority involves. Nevertheless, the success of this

strategy has resulted in a situation wherein authority is necessary forwomen to disprove these men, but women must disprove these men inorder to have authority. Considering this paradox, it is difficult to imaginehow women might be able to enter the discussion in order to defendthemselves and redefine their identity.

Aware that it is impossible to win on such terms, de Pizan launchesa criticism against authority and introduces new methods ofargumentation to validate her cause. She explicitly refutes the infallibilityof authority with the reminder that these same philosophers contradictand criticize one another (I.2.2). De Pizan also makes an implicit criticism

of appealing to authority. After describing many mens tendencies to cite

different authors, on the subsequent page she herself mentions anargument whose source she attributes to the man I cannot rememberwhich one (I.8.4, I.8.8). Considering the ease with which she could havedetermined the name of the author, the reader can assume that it was a

calculated decision to forget his name. This instance provides asubstantial criticism of her opponents rhetoric, suggesting that suchsources are not universally recognized let alone universal truths. Incontrast to mens tendencies, it also shifts the focus to the content of thesource rather than its author, in a way that allows her to engage more

effectively with the ideas being presented. In doing so, de Pizandemonstrates that her arguments can stand alone, whereas men who use

famous names without engaging much with the material often fall into thelogical fallacy of circular reasoning.

Christine Laennec provides complementary analysis of how de Pizandenies authority in her essay on Unladylike Polemics: Christine de PizansStrategies of Attack and Defense. Laennec suggests that admittingweaknesses or faults actually strengthens de Pizans case, arguing thatthe less authority for her writing she appears to have, the greater the forceof her arguments [] weakness (like victimization) is a sign of herintellectual superiority (Laennec 52-53). Laennec derives this idea from

Reasons explanations of how certain deficiencies are signs of otherstrengths, considering that Nature makes up the difference with an even

greater boon than she has taken away (de Pizan I.13.1). I would arguethat the instance of de Pizan neglecting to source her argument is justsuch an instance of turning a weakness into a strength. Forgetfulness is

certainly a sign of a lack of authority, but de Pizan has set herself up in away that has not only removed authority as a necessary prerequisite to herargument but actually turns reliance on authority into a weakness.Explicitly and implicitly, Christine reminds the reader that theeffectiveness of an argument must be determined based on its contents as

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opposed to its author. She has removed authority as an entry barrier tothe debate surrounding the identity and freedom of women and therefore

opened it up to women themselves.Considering the personal nature of a discussion surrounding

identity, the example-based proofs that de Pizan favors over authority are

undeniably more appropriate. Initially this strategy may seem similar tothe examples men employ, but I would argue that they put these examplesto entirely different purposes. The text indicates that men use examplesas a starting point from which they make a series of extrapolations thatsuccessively become farther removed from the truth. De Pizan illustratesthis tactic in her discussion of church attendance, in which misogynistsclaim that women go there all dressed up to show off their beauty and toattract men, when the truth of the scenario is that for each of thesewomen there are twenty or thirty old women dressed simply (I.10.1). Incontrast, the examples presented on behalf of women by Reason avoid this

fallacy of composition. Each of the stones that are used to build the City

of Ladies is an example of a particular woman, and the physicality of thisanalogy is symbolic of how Christine substantiates her examples in a waymen do not. De Pizan attributes sense, prudence, and strength toThamiris, and takes the time to authenticate these assertions by detailing

the conquests that rightfully earned her this reputation (I.17.2). This tacticis representative of her approach to redefining the identity of women assomething that is unique and personal. She portrays identity as a conceptthat applies on an individual basis instead of a constructed characterforcefully applied to the group as a whole.

To some extent, Christine is more successful in her use of examplesbecause she has a lesser burden- whereas men make assertions pertaining

to the entire female sex, Christine rejects universals and recognizes thatthere are women who are evil, dissolute and perverted and do not fit intoher narrow definition of a virtuous women (I.8.3). She simply demonstratesthe potential of women and their right to be considered based on theirindividual virtue and merit. Despite the moral difficulties with herdefinition of virtuous women, she cannot be faulted from an argumentativestandpoint for refusing the impossible burden of proving identity assomething universal as men do. It may seem as though de Pizansjudgments of women promotes an unfair or elitist view of freedom,

considering that women who lack virtue are excluded from the protectionof the City of Ladies (I.3.3). However, Christines definitions assume that

women who lack virtue are already free. The City of Ladies is built toprotect women who have no defense against the false accusations againstthem and therefore find their identity subject to the manipulation of men

(I.3.3). Christine suggests that the women excluded from her city haveearned their reputation; it is a more accurate representation of theiridentity and therefore they need no protection. Recognizing thedistinctions between women allows de Pizan to make compelling

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arguments that the men who tend towards generalizations are precludedfrom.

Shifting the debate on the identity of women to something moreexample-based and personal is fitting, but there is no guarantee that men

will accept this approach and engage with the words of someone with no

authority to back them. Christine Laennec encapsulates the strategy dePizan uses to engage men by citing the martyrs referenced in the bookitself: it is through being attacked that the martyr herself defeats heropponents (Laennec 48). By responding directly to accusationsChristinejustifies herself as a defender of women, although often the pretense ofdefense reveals itself to be a counter-attack (50). De Pizan capitalizes onher position as the victim, with the assumption that if women are attackedthey are in the right (51). By justifying her involvement in the debate inthis sense, de Pizan is able to elicit responses that further validate herclaim without taking on the position of the antagonist.

Laennec tends to focus on the rhetoric structure of de Pizans

argument, and in fact takes issue with the plot it is embedded in.Laennecs commentary on the description of the impenetrable city thatwill never be destroyed is that this claim to immunity from attack ishighly problematic, considering that de Pizans engagement is entirely

through response. (de Pizan I.4.2, Laennec 49). However, I would arguethat the construction of the City of Ladies is exemplary of de Pizans formof example-based response. Contrary to Laennecs criticism, de Pizansclaims of an invincible city actually invites attack in that it presents thereader with a challenge. She posits that the city will be stormed by

numerous assaults but that it will never be taken or conquered (de PizanI.4.2). Recognizing that men will argue with her but preemptively claiming

they will fail is an invitation for her opponents to try to prove her wrong.The writing of the book The City of Ladies is in fact symbolic of thebuilding of the city itself, and therefore de Pizan invites her readers toattack the material within her book, solidifying her place within the debate.Laennec stipulates that attack is essential: without it, the primaryjustification for the entire work would not exist (Laennec 50). Althoughoutwardly denying attack, the creation of the city provides a challenge thatde Pizans opponents would find difficult to turn down. She is fulfilling therole of the martyr Laennec identifies her with, and by inviting attack on

her own work turns herself into one of the examples of women that havethe potential to redefine their identity.

De Pizan has created a place for every woman within the debatesurrounding womens character. She has turned herself into an effectiveexample that disproves false allegations against women, and in

symbolically laying the bricks of the City of Ladies she paves the way forother women to do the same. De Pizan has demonstrated that identity isnot something that is universally applicable but instead something thatmust be discovered on an individual basis, which implies that a womancan be the only authority on her own identity.

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Works Cited

Pizan, Christine. The Book of the City of Ladies. New York: Persea, 1998.Print.

Laennec, Christine Moneera. "Unladylike Polemics: Christine De Pizan'sStrategies of Attack and Defense." Tulsa Studies in Women'sLiterature12.1 (1993): 47-59. Web.

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Marx & Engels

Jonathan Brown Gilbert

You reproach us, therefore, with intending to do away with a form ofproperty, the necessary condition for whose existence is the non-existenceof any property for the immense majority of society (Marx & Engels, TheCommunist Manifesto, 14). Discuss.

Published in 1848, Karl Marx and Frederick Engels CommunistManifesto gives voice to a powerful political movement that was emergingat the time, and the ideas it presents remain enormously relevant tocontemporary political and economic discourse. The Manifesto provides abrief but sharp analysis of the ideological influence the bourgeoisie1exerts

on all members of modern society. The cultural acceptance of bourgeoisvalues is demonstrated by the reproach with which Marx and Engels weremet for their [intention] to do away with a form of property, the necessarycondition for whose existence is the non-existence of any property for theimmense majority of society (Marx & Engels171).

The interests of theenormous majority, the proletariat, are in direct conflict with those of theiroppressors, the bourgeoisie; however, because the bourgeoisie is the ruling

class, the dominant political and cultural forces of society reflect bourgeoisinterests. It is my contention that the revolutionary potential of theproletariat is undermined by the widespread influence and internalizationof bourgeois values, especially among those whose interests such values

do not represent.Marx and Engels suggest that because ones socio-economic class

determines the social and material conditions of their existence, it alsodetermines their consciousness. It seems relatively uncontentious to pointout that ones class has a significant impact on ones relation to society,its institutions, and its other members. Marx and Engels extend this trainof thought, arguing that, as a consequence of this impact, mans ideas,views and conceptions, in one word, mans consciousness, changes withevery change in the conditions of his material existence, in his socialrelations and his social life (174).

The mediation of an individualsexperience by the social and material conditions of their existence resultsin the possession of particular interests according to ones class-

positioning with society.Marx and Engels argue that every past society has been structured

according to the relation of different classes, structured according to the

1By bourgeoisie is meant the class of modern Capitalists, owners of the means of social production

and employers of wage-labour. By proletariat, the class of modern wage-labourers who, having no

means of production of their own, are reduced to selling their labour-power in order to live. [Note

by Engels to the English edition of 1888] (158).

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advantage of one class at the expense of another. To this effect, they writethat the history of all past society has consisted in the development of

class antagonisms, antagonisms that assumed different forms at differentepochs. But whatever form they may have taken, one fact is common to

all past ages, namely, the exploitation of one part of society by the other

(175).

This class-antagonism rooted in exploitation, Marx and Engelssuggest, has, despite taking on different forms, remained constantthroughout history: freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord andserf, guild-master and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed(159). In each case, there exists a different exploitative class-relation inwhich the interests of the ruling class conflict with the interests of thosethey exploit.

History, Marx and Engels argue, has been the playing-out of theconflict between opposing classes. The Manifesto begins with the famousdeclaration, The historyof all hitherto existing society is the history of

class struggles (Marx & Engels, 158). According to this model, all major

historical events have been the manifestation of opposing class-interests,the exploited rising up against their oppressors, a fight that each timeended, either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large, or in thecommon ruin of the contending classes (Marx & Engels 159).

These

events, The Manifesto suggests, eventually resolve into a new society witha different class structure and a new set of corresponding class-tensions.

The bourgeoisie, Marx and Engels contend, have created theconditions for a proletarian revolution, and consequently, their owndestruction. The Capitalist class, they argue, is responsible for the

growing proletariat, increasingly desperate, and increasingly unified. Thebourgeoisie, they write, keeps more and more doing away with the

scattered state of the population, of the means of production, and ofproperty. It has agglomerated population, centralised means ofproduction, and has concentrated property in a few hands (Marx & Engels162-3).

Marx and Engels are calling attention to the fact that, respondingto the demands of modern industrial production, the bourgeoisie isresponsible for the rapid geographical concentration of the proletariat, aswell as their reduction to a common state of material poverty, concludingthat the necessary consequence of this was political centralisation (163).

The emergence of the proletariat as a unified political body represents thefirst step towards a revolution, the consequence of which would be acomplete restructuring or even undoing of class-relations. The

bourgeoisie, they assert

has left remaining no other nexus between manand man than naked self-interest, than callous cash payment. It hasresolved personal worth into exchange value In one word, forexploitation, veiled by religious and political illusions, it has substitutednaked, shameless, direct, brutal exploitation (161).

Unlike societies of

the past, which obscured and justified their exploitative class-structurewith religious and cultural traditions, the relationship between bourgeoisieand proletariat is transparent in its exploitation. As a result of the

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historically unique transparency and brutality with which the bourgeoisieexploits the proletariat, the proletarian revolution unlike the class-

restructurings of the pastcannot be successful without doing away withthis exploitation all together, that is, the total disappearance of class

antagonisms (Marx & Engels 175). For Marx and Engels, this represents

the end of history as it has been known thus far.Marx and Engels argue that the consequence of the proletarian

revolution is the abolishment of private property. The theory of theCommunists, they write, may be summed up in the single sentence:Abolition of private property (170).

Private property, they suggest, is themeans by which Capitalism functions, producing wealth for the owners ofat the expense of the labourer, it is the final and most complete expressionof the system of producing and appropriating products that is based onclass antagonisms, on the exploitation of the many by the few (Marx &Engels 170).

It is through abolishing private property, then, that this

exploitation is prevented. The bourgeoisie, TheManifesto claims, do not

see the logic in doing away with hard-won, self-acquired, self-earnedproperty! (Marx & Engels 170). Here Marx and Engels ask a crucialquestion, Does wage-labour create any property for the labourer? Not abit

(170). Commenting on Capitalist industrial society, they note that

those of its members who work, acquire nothing, and those who acquireanything, do not work (172).

If, however, by property was meant theproperty of the petty artisan and of the small peasant,

Marx and Engelswrite,

There is no need to abolish that (170).

Communism does notprohibit the individual from enjoying the products of their own labour, nor

does it deprive

man of thepower to appropriate the products of society;all that it does is to deprive him of the power to subjugate the labour of

others by means of such appropriation (172). What is being abolished inthe proletarian revolution is the exploitation of those who do not haveproperty by those who do.

Marx and Engels argue that the bourgeoisie maintain their powerthrough the propagation of the values, norms, and interests of their class.The ruling ideas of each age, they write have ever been the ideas of itsruling class (Marx & Engels 174). The interests of the ruling class havealways constituted the dominant values of society, and those promoted byits institutions. Marx and Engels suggest that this influence is now so

absolute that the bourgeoisie has at last, since the establishment ofModern Industry and of the world market, conquered for itself, in the

modern representative State, exclusive political sway. The executive of themodern State is but a committee for managing the common affairs of thewhole bourgeoisie (Marx & Engels 161). The representative state tends to

represent those with the most power, and thus serves the interests of thebourgeoisie at the expense of the proletariat. Bourgeois values extend

throughout the different branches of the government, propagated by eachof the many institutions the state supports. With regard to the legalsystem, Marx and Engels address the bourgeoisie, stating that, your very

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ideas are but the outgrowth of the conditions of your bourgeois productionand bourgeois property, just as your jurisprudence is but the will of your

class made into a law for all, a will, whose essential character and directionare determined by the economical conditions of existence of your class

(172).

The legal system operates according to a bourgeois perspective, and

so, like all state institutions, it tacitly functions in such a way that it servesthe interests of the bourgeoisie.

The revolutionary potential of the proletariat is undermined by thewidespread influence of bourgeois values, and their internalization amongthose whose interests they do not represent. Marx and Engels recognizethat

[their current] culture, the loss of which [the bourgeois] laments, is,for the enormous majority, a mere training to act as a machine (172).Insofar as culture encourages one to participate in Capitalist society, it isserving the interest of the bourgeoisie. Education toothe promises ofwhich are all the more enticing for the disenfranchisedcan be seen as

preparing us for such participation, making us more useful under the

guise of giving us an advantage. And an advantage over whom? we mightask, remembering that our success in a Capitalist system relies on thesubjugation of others. It is for reasons such as this, Marx and Engelssuggest, that Communists seek to rescue education from the influence of

the ruling class (173). The revolution is stifled by the internalization ofbourgeois values by the proletariat, a result of the ideological control thebourgeoisie achieves through private businesses, such as newsorganizations; state institutions, such as public education; and broadlythrough popular culture.

Capitalism will continue to function so long as it is able to counteropposition with reforms and maintain ideological control. The scene has

changed considerably since the publication of The Communist Manifesto in1848. The majority of unskilled factory wage-labour has since beenoutsourced from the developed to the developing world. In so-calleddeveloped nations, a large middle-class of voracious consumers hasemerged, and the bourgeois state has become increasingly effective atconvincing us to buy into its competitive game. Capitalism has learned toappropriate and commoditize opposition; even political revolution can beaestheticized, mass-produced in China, and sold back to us for a smallfee. Capitalism has also seen some reform since the time of Engels and

Marx. Citizens of economically developed nations receive varying degreesof support from their governments in the form of social services. These

services have been funded primarily with graduated income tax schemes,a practice Marx and Engels include amongst their measures for aCommunist state (175). All these developments have contributed to

keeping the proletarian revolution at bay. Whether capitalism is capableof effective reform remains a matter of much debate. Marx and Engels

certainly thought the answer was no, and with many of todays thinkersarguing that Capitalist reforms are but a band-aid solution to afundamentally problematic economic system, perhaps they were correct in

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their suggestion that Capitalism would continue until it creates theconditions for its own destruction, if not about the specifics of when and

how.

Works Cited

Marx, Karl, and Frederick Engels. Selected Writings. Ed. Lawrence HughSimon. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994. Print.

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Owen

Maggie ORiordan Ross

My friend, you would not tell with such high zest / To children ardent forsome desperate glory, / The old Lie: Dulce et decorum est / Pro patria mori(Owen, Dulce et Decorum Est 24-28). Discuss.

In the act of analyzing literature, one must consider how much

influence the author should have in ones understanding of the work.When the author is anonymous, or unknown, the answer is alreadyprovided. Yet when ones subject matter and poetic style is so deeplyshaped by their personal experiences, when does one draw the line?Wilfred Owen is Englands most beloved war-era poet, and his art isprofoundly defined by his mental trauma and personal life. Can the

analysis of his poetry be differentiated from an understanding of theperson? Would a Freudian reading distort Owens person, or would itprovide an insightful study of his poetry? I do not claim to give a Freudianaccount of Owens shell-shock condition it would be in bad taste toproject Freudian ideals on anyone, much less one as talented and belovedas Wilfred Owen. Rather, it is my endeavor to outline an analysis of OwensDulce et Decorum Est using a Freudian lens to provide check-points tohelp guide the reading. As it is with any great poet, his writing is thegreatest way to access himan analysis of the poem ought to give us aninsight into the man himself. Through the three indicators of destruction-

drive, or a compulsion to repeat, Eros, and the theme of irony, I hope to

shed some light on Wilfred Owens poetic style and attitude towards thehorrors of the Great War.

Wilfred Owen, like so many of the soldiers at the front in the GreatWar, suffered from war neurosis, experiencing repeated nightmares.Sigmund Freud, in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, accounts for thistendency to repeat symptoms of traumatic stress as the ego portion of the

mind suppressing the content to obviate the unpleasure that would beexcited by the release of the repressed content (62), while the traumaticcontent causes an impulsion to repeat (61), for it wishes to be expressedsomehow. The compulsion to repeat is brought on by the destruction-drive, an impulse to lead the organism to death (77). One can see the

repetition compulsion at work in Owens writing when he accounts for hisdreams. Owen writes, Till on the haunting flares we turned our backs(3). The haunting flares are like the repetition of nightmares, followingyou. The repression of the material is implied by saying, we turned ourbacks, like one turning ones ego against the traumatic material. Owendescribes watching a man succumb to the chlorine gas, writing, Butsomeone still was yelling out and stumbling / And floundring like a manin fire or lime... (11-12). The man flounders like a fish out of water. Air

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should be his natural element, but it has paradoxically been turnedagainst him. The nature of war is like drowning above water. The ellipsis

after the burning lime represents the moment before Owen pulls themask over his face. He should be able to breathe after this, yet the

atmosphere of the poem is hazy and smothered, as though it is in slow

motion. He then writes, Dim, through the misty panes and thick greenlight, / As under a green sea, I saw him drowning (13-14). Dim is apowerful word to start the sentence, sounding like a drone in a Gregorianchant where one note is held throughout the duration of the hymn. The

closed short vowel sound i indicates narrowness, like a musical note,while the m sound implieshollowness--there is no true endto the sound,thus it carries. Dim contributes to the hazy atmosphere of the poem. Itreminds the reader of the way that soundis different when one is underwater or a mask. Sounds from outside sound muffled, while sounds fromunder the mask ring. The green light seems unnatural, until one realizesthat the gas masks had green panes of glass--Owen would have literally

seen this experience in green light. This sequence is about Owensrepeated dreams of the man paradoxically drowning above water wherelife cannot be sustained. He then writes, in what would have been mostrelived, In all my dreams, before my helpless sight, / He plunges at me,guttering, choking, drowning (15-16). Words like plunges, gutteringand drowning further bring out the metaphor of the sea. Under thisgreen sea, logic has been inverted. Men can drown out of water. The seais usually seen as being life-giving, yet life is undermined in this war. Lifeitself has beenpoisoned. Wilfred Owens struggles with war neurosis and

repetition compulsion due to his trauma can be outlined through thetheme of dreams in Dulce et Decorum Est.

According to Freud, there is a tension between the destruction-drive,which leads to recurring nightmares, and Eros, the pleasure principle,which wishes to self-immortalize (83). The theme of repetition of dreams isevidence of the destruction-drive, but the need to bear witness to thosewho have died is unarguably Eros. In The Great War and Modern Memory,

Paul Fussell observes that revisiting the battlefields in memory becomesas powerful a ritual obligation as visiting the cemeteries (327). With so

many soldiers dying deaths of the masses, one needs a way to provide avoice for those who die as cattle (Anthem 1). Owens poetry tends tofocus on the physicality of man; his semi-erotic poems depict fragments ofthe male body in an era when complete physicality was understood to be

essentialto see a broken man was to see a family without means ofsupport, or someone lacking masculinity. He picked up on the fact thattrue suffering could be portrayed through elements of the male body. Inreference to this, Fussell notes, he arrives by disciplined sublimation at astate of profound pity for those who for such a brief moment possess them(291). Owens usual style is to romanticize the body, as he does in Anthemfor Doomed Youth. He writes, but in their eyes / Shall shine the holyglimmers of good-byes (10-11). Their eyes is the last word of the line,

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thus it gains a sense of permanence and echoes through the readers mind.Yet in Dulce et Decorum Est, Owen abandons this elegiacal diction, and

provides a distorted, satanic account of the drowned man, saying, Andwatch the white eyes writing in his face, / His hanging face, like a devils

sick of sin (19-20). His usage of imagery is appropriate here; had he

painted a picture of the glimmers of good-byes, the reader may havegained a sense of the glory and romanticism of war, which would havecontradicted the theme of the poem. By using such disturbing imagery,like that of the hanging face, he fragments the soldiers body and urgesthe reader to focus on each distorted element. He describes the face asbeing like a devils sick of sin. The s sibilant in devils sick and sinsounds like a hissing snake, winding through the words and following thereader. The closed short vowel k sound in sick adds a touch ofharshness and precisionOwen chooses these words and sounds verywisely, and they have their desired effect of burning on the readers tongue,

sounding harsh and evil.

In May of 1917, Wilfred Owen was being treated in England for warneurosis, or shell-shock. In a letter he describes being trapped in closeproximity to the fragments of a friends body. He describes it as being invarious places around and about, if you understand. I hope you dont!

(242). Both the physical fragments and the mental trauma seem to haunthis writing. His method of using elements of the body to account for theirsuffering is a way to universalize the experience and account for themasses while retaining the pathos that only individual accounts can bring.One is not sensitive to words like thousands died, but individual elements

of particular suffering, like the hanging face and innocent tongues,draw up individual images which deeply affect the reader. As Fussell puts

it, To speak of sufferings is not enough; one must see and feel the bloodyhead cradled on ones own shoulder (295-296). This method of expressingthe particulars of their body, likely brought on by his particular trauma ofbeing so near the physical fragments of a fellow soldier, translates the rawpain of an entire generation into a language that retains the deep pity hehimself feels. In Freudian terms, it is his Eros that drives him to write; thewill to live and preserve memory. The last letter he writes his motherdescribes his fellow soldiers and the effects they have on him. Owen tellsher, Of this I am certain you could not be visited by a band of friends half

so fine as surround me here (362). The Eros that illuminates Owenswriting is undeniableit is the driving force of his poetry. One can come

to understand the Eros in Owens poetry through his style of expressinguniversal suffering through particular fragments of the male body.

Freud describes a paradox (75) in the organism between the

pleasure principle, or Eros, and the destruction drive. He writes that theorganism seeks to die only in its own way; these guardians of life, too, were

originally the bodyguards of death (78). Freuds work is deeplyparadoxical, attempting to convince the reader that every living being ispulled by their impulses in one direction towards life, and in another

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towards death. One must question, is similar irony expressed in Owenswriting? Fussell argues that this is unavoidable, as irony is an essential

element of war and its expression in literature. He writes, Every war isironic because every war is worse than expected. Every war constitutes an

irony of situation because its means are so melodramatically

disproportionate to its presumed ends (7). This is particularly evident inthe Great War, as combat on that large a scale had never been seen before.Dulce et Decorum Est exhibits the way that modern irony was born inthe trenches. It is seeping with irony, which is outlined through diction,structure, and intertextuality. Owen describes the soldiers as Bentdouble, like beggars under sacks, / knock-kneed, coughing like hags, wecursed through sludge (1-2). Rather than singing songs praising theircountry, they are only capable of coughing and [cursing] throughsludge. Like Caliban in The Tempest, who says to Prospero, You taughtme language, and my profit ont / Is I know how to curse (I. ii. 366-368),

all England has given these soldiers is knowledge of the ways that

language can be twisted. The Latin title brought expectations of praise tolanguage and the human mind, which is crushed by the basest expressionof human language, that of cursing. Lines like Gas! Gas! Quick, boys!--An ecstasy of fumbling (9) offer paradoxes that may throw the reader off.

An ecstasy reminds one of a religious experience, which fumbling wouldnot normally be connected to. This is a clumsy, reactionary ritual. Nothingspontaneous or glorious is going on, only a ritual of daemonic chaos. Thedash -- is that split-second reaction of life-impulse taking over. Inaddition to the diction, the poetic structure is ironic as well. The lack of

convention may be unsettling to one accustomed to reading strictlyformatted poetry. The structure is similar to a French ballade poem, with

twenty-eight lines, however the structure is broken by the irregulardivision of stanzasthe two lines in the middle divide the rhyme scheme.One might expect them to be a rhyming couplet, because of the way theyhave been singled out, but they rhyme with lines in the previous stanza.There is no closureto the lines, which is very off-putting. Owen is outlininghow convention and the tradition of values in society are breaking downand cannot be sustained through poetic structure. Owen chosenot to forma couplet. The atrocities of war do not allow for such closure; there mustbe irony and fragmentation when writing about war. The poetic structureitself is like a man walking with an awkward limp in his gait--strides areno longer measured. In Poetic Meter and Poetic Form, Fussell writes that

meter is pleasurable due to a humanistic delight of witnessing order andcontainment being born out of chaos (6). The reader expects similar orderand containment in the poem, after all, it seems like it could havestructure, as it has a clear rhyme scheme. However, the expected iambicpentameter is nowhere to be found; the poem hobbles along in pentameter,with five feet per line. This breakdown of metering is disturbing, and onemay feel disoriented in reading the poem. Like walking down a steepstaircase without a banister, there is little convention to hold on to. The

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