UNIVERSITY OF LEICESTER THE EVALUATION OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the M.Sc. Security, Conflict and International Development Submission: 17 th March 2015 Word Count: 19,852 words
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UNIVERSITY OF LEICESTER THE EVALUATION OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the M.Sc. Security, Conflict and International Development
Submission: 17th March 2015 Word Count: 19,852 words
DECLARATION OF OWN WORK I declare that this dissertation The Evaluation of Peacekeeping Operations is entirely my own work and that where any material could be construed as the work of others, it is fully cited and referenced, with the appropriate acknowledgement given. Date: 17th March 2015
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
My thanks to my supervisor, Mr. Conor Foley, for his guidance and advice in
the development of this dissertation, and to the staff at the University of
Leicester for their support through the entire MSc programme.
Additionally, I would like to recognise those persons who willingly participated
in interviews for this study. Their insights are central to this paper.
Finally, my gratitude to my wife Miriam Lyne Corcoran. As we were married
during the MSc programme I will be forever grateful for her patience and help.
From a marriage in New York through a move to Ireland to a posting to the
Middle East, I am painfully aware of the time spent in study, during which she
was never anything but supportive and encouraging.
DEDICATION
This dissertation is dedicated to the memory of the fifty peacekeepers who
have died in the service of UNTSO. All deserve recognition, however my
friends Major Paeta Hess-von Kruedener (Canada), Major Hans-Peter Lang
(Austria), Lieutenant Senior Grade Jarno Mäkinen (Finland) and Major Du
Zhaoyu (China) remain foremost, as always, in my mind, as they have since
they were killed by Israeli Air Force fire on 25th July 2006.
ABSTRACT On 28th February 2015 the United Nations had 123,560 personnel from 120 countries
deployed on 16 peacekeeping operations, and $8.47 billion of approved resources
for the year ending 30th June 2015. The failures are noticed more than the
successes. With the public demanding accountability for the massive commitment of
people and finances, the need for evaluation of peacekeeping operations has never
been as pressing as it is now.
This paper provides a comprehensive review of contemporary consideration of the
evaluation of peacekeeping operations. It contains the findings of primary research,
revealing the thinking of peacekeeping practitioners, both deployed as commanders
in the Middle East and serving within UN Headquarters in New York.
The paper concludes by identifying a number of evaluation criteria either not
previously identified or understated, namely National Caveats, Host Nation Support
and Status of Forces Agreements.
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Table of Contents
Declaration of Own Work Acknowledgements and Dedication Abstract CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background to the Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Aim and Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.3 Conceptualising Key Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.4 Structure of Dissertation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
CHAPTER TWO - LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2 The Key Texts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.3 Framework Dimension: Stakeholders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12
2.4 Framework Dimension: Time Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.5 Framework Dimension: Assessment Baselines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.6 Framework Dimension: Force Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.7 Framework Dimension: Type of Peacekeeping Missions . . . . . . .15
2.8 Core Goal: Violence Abatement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.9 Core Goal: Conflict Containment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.10 Core Goal: Conflict Settlement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.11 Factor: Operational Effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17
2.12 Factor: Geography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.13 Factor: Mandate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.14 Factor: Command and Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.15 Factor: Neutrality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.16 Factor: Actors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.17 Factor: External Influencers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.18 Factor: Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.19 Factor: Financing . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
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CHAPTER THREE - METHODOLOGY
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24
3.2 Background to Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24
3.3 Purpose and Assumptions of Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.4 Research Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.5 Informant Selection and Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.6 Ethical Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.7 Interview Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.8 Analytical Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.9 Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30
3.10 Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
CHAPTER FOUR - FINDINGS 4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .32
4.2 Theme: Evaluation Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35
4.3 Theme: Evaluation Drivers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .43
4.4 Theme: PKO Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .45
4.5 Theme: PKO Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .45
4.6 Theme: PKO Requirements & Restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .51
4.7 Theme: PKO Outputs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
CHAPTER FIVE - CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .75
5.2 Implications of findings and conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .75
5.3 Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .78 Annexes Annex A: Map of UNDOF Deployment as of December 2014 . . . . . . 85 Annex B: General Framework of the Assessment Process . . . . . . . . 86 Annex C: Model of Assessment Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 Annex D: Interview Schedule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
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Annex E: Participant Consent Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 Annex F: Adjusted Participant Consent Form for Anonymous . . . . . . 92 Annex G: UNSCR 50 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 Annex H: UNSCR 2192 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
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TABLE OF FIGURES Fig.1 Codes and Themes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Fig.2 Codes x Descriptors: Baselines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Fig.3 Codes x Descriptors: Compact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Fig.4 Codes x Descriptors: Comparisons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Fig.5 Codes x Descriptors: Complexity and Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37
Fig.6 Codes x Descriptors: General Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Fig.7 Codes x Descriptors: Mechanism of Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .39
Fig.8 Codes x Descriptors: Terms of Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Fig.9 Codes x Descriptors: Western Perspectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .39
Fig.10 Codes x Descriptors: Interim Assessments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Fig.11 Codes x Descriptors: Repeat Evaluations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Fig.12 Codes x Descriptors: Temporal Dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Fig.13 Codes x Descriptors: Items to be evaluated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .41
Fig.14 Codes x Descriptors: Key Performance Indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .41
Fig.15 Codes x Descriptors: Military Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Fig.16 Codes x Descriptors: NATO & EU PDT Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Fig.17 Codes x Descriptors: UN Assessment Team / PET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Fig.18 Codes x Descriptors: UN PDT Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Fig.19 Codes x Descriptors: The Brahimi Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Fig.20 Codes x Descriptors: Purpose of Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Fig.21 Codes x Descriptors: Cessation of Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .45
Fig.22 Codes x Descriptors: Resolution of Underlying Causes . . . . . . . . . . .45
Fig.23 Codes x Descriptors: Adaptability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .46
Fig.24 Codes x Descriptors: Cooperation and Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Fig.25 Codes x Descriptors: Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Fig.26 Codes x Descriptors: Effectiveness and Efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .49
Fig.27 Codes x Descriptors: Ethical Behaviour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Fig.28 Codes x Descriptors: Impartiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Fig.29 UN Uniformed Peacekeepers Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .52
Fig.30 Codes x Descriptors: Budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Fig.31 Codes x Descriptors: Caveats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Fig.32 Codes x Descriptors: Client States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .53
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Fig.33 Codes x Descriptors: Country Team Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .53
Fig.34 Codes x Descriptors: Credibility and Perception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .54 Fig.35 Codes x Descriptors: Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Fig.36 Codes x Descriptors: Host Nation Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .56
Fig.37 Codes x Descriptors: Leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Fig.38 Codes x Descriptors: Mandate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Fig.39 Codes x Descriptors: Military / Civilian staff on PKOs . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Fig.40 Codes x Descriptors: NGOs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Fig.41 Codes x Descriptors: PKO as Political Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .59
Fig.42 Codes x Descriptors: Policies and Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .60
Fig.43 Codes x Descriptors: Regional Organisations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
Fig.44 Codes x Descriptors: Regional Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .60
Fig.45 Codes x Descriptors: SOFA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Fig.46 Codes x Descriptors: Stakeholders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .61
Fig.47 Codes x Descriptors: Stakeholders’ Reputation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .61
Fig.48 Codes x Descriptors: TCCs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Fig.49 Codes x Descriptors: Selection for PKOs - Competencies . . . . . . . . .63
Fig.50 Codes x Descriptors: TCCs Foreign Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Fig.51 Codes x Descriptors: Superpowers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Fig.52 Codes x Descriptors: UNSC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .64
Fig.53 Codes x Descriptors: Outputs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .65
Fig.54 Codes x Descriptors: Development of Peacekeepers . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Fig.55 Codes x Descriptors: Interaction with locals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .65
Fig.56 Codes x Descriptors: Mission Influence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
Fig.57 Codes x Descriptors: International norms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
Fig.58 Codes x Descriptors: Local Agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .66
Fig.59 Codes x Descriptors: Local Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67
Fig.60 Codes x Descriptors: Local Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67
Fig.61 Codes x Descriptors: Success in Failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Fig.62 Codes x Descriptors: Refugees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
Fig.63 Codes x Descriptors: Returnees. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
Fig.64 Codes x Descriptors: Safety and Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
Fig.65 Codes x Descriptors: SG’s Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Fig.66 Codes x Descriptors: Pressure Release Valve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .69
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Fig.67 Codes x Descriptors: Prevention of Spillover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
Fig.68 Codes x Descriptors: Protection of Civilians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .70
Fig.69 Codes x Descriptors: Tactical Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .71
Fig.70 Codes x Descriptors: Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Fig.71 Codes x Descriptors: End State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
Fig.72 Codes x Descriptors: Expectation Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .72
Fig.73 Codes x Descriptors: Lessons Learned . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Fig.74 Packed Code Cloud . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
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LIST OF ACRONYMS
AOL Area of Limitation AOS Area of Separation FC Force Commander DFC Deputy Force Commander MINURCAT United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad OGG Observer Group Golan OGL Observer Group Lebanon ONUC United Nations Operation in The Congo UN United Nations UNAMIR United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda UNDOF United Nations Disengagement Observer Force UNIFIL United Nations Interim Force In Lebanon UN PET United Nations Policy, Evaluation and Training UNSC United Nations Security Council UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution UNSG United Nations Secretary General UNSMIS United Nations Supervision Mission In Syria UNTSO United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation
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CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION _____________________________________________________ 1.1 Background to the Study
The United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation, UNTSO, was the first
mission mandated by the United Nations Security Council, and had the task to
observe the various agreements written after the 1948 war in the Middle East.
It currently has relations with five host countries, Egypt, Israel, Jordan,
Lebanon and Syria. Having remained in the Middle East throughout the wars
of 1956, 1967 and 1963, it today supports the Peace Keeping Operations
(PKOs) of United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) and
United Nations Interim Force In Lebanon (UNIFIL). (UN 2015g) All three
operations are ‘classic’ or first generation peacekeeping.
As an experienced peacekeeper, the author initially proposed researching the
evaluation of PKOs in March 2014, while still a Chief Instructor in the United
Nations Training School Ireland. Between drafting the proposal and receiving
approval from the Ethics Board of University of Leicester to conduct primary
research, the author was unexpectedly posted to the Golan. As a United
Nations Military Observer (UNMO), the author observed the battle for control
of that part of the Golan not occupied by Israel, (See Annex A: UNDOF
Deployment December 2014, UNDOF 2014b), and UN peacekeepers fired
on, laid siege to and abducted by Jihadists, who form part of the Anti-
Government Armed Elements (AGAEs).
This provided access to a PKO undergoing massive change, as the security
situation within the Area of Operational Responsibility of UNDOF became a
battleground, which resulted in Syrian Arab Armed Forces (SAAF) being
unable to provide for the security of UNDOF. In September 2014 UNDOF
moved it’s headquarters and most of its personnel to the ‘Alpha’ Side, that
Area of Limitation (AOL) west of the supposedly demilitarized zone of the
Area of Separation (AOS). It has been unable to conduct operations in most
of the AOS since that time. An initial assumption might be that UNDOF had
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failed. This paper demonstrates this to be far too simplistic.
In providing a case study for the analysis of the evaluation of PKOs, in what
Paris (2000: 29) would refer to as a ‘micro approach’ to the study of
peacekeeping, this study provides a comprehensive review of academic
research done to date in relation to PKO evaluation. Interviews with key PKO
practitioners, from UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO),
UNTSO and UNDOF are analysed in order to complement what Diehl and
Druckman referred to as their goal of ‘Bridging theory with practice’ in
providing their evaluation framework for Peace Operations, (Diehl and
Druckman 2010:6).
1.2 Aim and Objectives This paper aims to validate the currently used evaluation criteria and propose
further criteria for use in the evaluation of peacekeeping operations.
1.3 Conceptualising Key Terms Throughout this paper both the terms peacekeeping and peacekeeping
operation (PKO) are used to identify the deployment of troops of member
states of the United Nations (UN) in order to implement in full or in a
supporting role a mandate authorised in a United Nations Security Council
Resolution (UNSCR). The use of the terms is not discounting of police and
civilian peacekeepers, and does not differentiate between the Chapters of the
UN Constitution used to mandate the mission.
1.4 Structure of Dissertation
The paper is separated in to five chapters. Following this short introduction
the key literature in the development of a conceptualisation of the evaluation
of PKOs is comprehensively reviewed in Chapter Two - Literature Review.
The methodology of the paper’s primary research is provided in Chapter
Three - Methodology before the analysis results of the primary research is
presented in Chapter Four - Findings. The paper concludes with a discussion
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of the findings, which provokes a number of conclusions and
recommendations.
4
CHAPTER TWO - LITERATURE REVIEW _____________________________________________________
2.1 Introduction
This chapter considers the literature relating to the evaluation of
peacekeeping. As the literature often draws on previous works, it is first
considered chronologically, before major themes are addressed individually.
These themes then provide points for the primary research as detailed in
Chapter Four.
2.2 The Key Texts
Paul Diehl provides much of the insight available in relation to the evaluation
of a peacekeeping operations (PKO). In an early reference to the evaluation
of peacekeeping missions, Diehl posits that ‘Estimating a peacekeeping
operation's success is a difficult problem.’ (Diehl 1988: 489). The paper is
significant as it introduces some key themes that Diehl returns to in later
writing. For Diehl ‘as is prominent in the literature on conflict and
peacekeeping, the importance of third parties, neutrality, and geography is
reaffirmed.’ (Diehl 1988: 504) These emerge as significant themes and are
considered individually later in this chapter.
Diehl further states that ‘no approach to peace is ideally suited to every
situation. One approach may be a complete success under one set of
conditions, but a total failure under another.’ (1988: 487) Using the criteria
given, Diehl finds that UNIFIL (in 1988) is a failure, as terrorist attacks from
Lebanon continue to strike Israel, and rather than assisting the government of
Lebanon to hold sovereignty in South Lebanon, the Israelis have invaded as
far North as Beirut (and in 1988 were in occupation of a large part of South
Lebanon). This paper will demonstrate that such a designation is limited by
its evaluation criteria.
5
Diehl (1988) then identifies five factors influencing success in peacekeeping;
financing, geography, clarity of the mandate, command and control, and
neutrality. Furthermore, the role of relevant actors is analysed. These actors
are, primary disputants, third party states, subnational groups and
superpowers.
Diehl posits that ‘the main reason for the failure of peacekeeping operations
has been the opposition of third party states and subnational groups.’ (Diehl
1988: 501) He attributes the failure of UNIFIL to third party states and
subnational groups ‘refusing to stop violent activity and in some cases
attacking the peacekeeping force’ (Diehl 1988: 502). Host nations are
required to invite a peacekeeping mission, while the superpowers can, if
desired, simply veto any proposed action (Diehl 1988: 502). Therefore, it can
be argued that while the ‘Permanent Five’ members of the UN Security
Council (UNSC) and Host Nations determine the creation of a peacekeeping
mission, the third part states and subnational groups determine the success of
a mission.
Doyle and Sambanis (2000) is ‘the first quantitative analysis of the correlates
of successful peacebuilding and of the contribution of UN operations to
peacebuilding outcomes.’ (Doyle and Sambanis 2000:782) The research
design argued that the probability of successful peace-building is a function of
a country’s capacities, the available international assistance, and the depth of
war-related hostility.’ (Doyle and Sambanis 2000: 782) The model was tested
‘by identifying and measuring proxy variables for Hostility, Local Capacities,
and International Capacities and by computing the relative significance of
each of these determinants for peacebuilding success.’ (Doyle and Sambanis,
italics in original, 2000: 782).
The authors’ main concern is how ‘UN peace operations in particular,
influence the probability of peacebuilding success’. (Doyle and Sambanis
2000: 783) Of significance to this proposal is the selection of two dependent
variables, lenient and strict versions of peacebuilding success. While the
lenient dependent variable defined success as ‘an end to the war and to
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residual lower-level violence and uncontested sovereignty’, representing ‘a
minimum (or negative) measure of peace, focused on the absence of
violence.’ This is then compared to the stricter dependent variable, which
‘also requires a minimum standard of democratization.’ (Doyle and Sambanis
2000: 795)
Diehl next writes of peacekeeping evaluation in International Peacekeeping
(1994), with the aim of determining what the factors contributing to a
successful PKO are. Since 1988 peacekeeping went from being ‘considered
largely ineffective and unlikely to be a major international approach to peace’
to being ‘top of the agenda of the United Nations and other international
decision makers’ (Diehl 1994: ix).
Diehl begins by identifying the difficulty of finding universal characteristics in
all PKOs. Each PKO is unique and ‘in some sense any generalization distorts
the details of the events in that operation.’ (Diehl 1994: 11) Diehl provides an
excellent history of the concepts and development of peacekeeping,
beginning with the inter-war military operations of the League of Nations.
This history include the first UN operation, UNTSO, which when created in
1948 was not referred to as a PKO, the creation of the traditional PKO
UNDOF in 1974, providing a demilitarized buffer zone between Syria and
Israel, and the traditional PKO UNIFIL in Lebanon. All three missions
continue to operate in the Middle East.
Two criteria for the evaluation of PKOs are provided, on which a proposed
framework rests, firstly ‘their ability to deter or prevent violent conflict in the
area of deployment’ (Diehl 1993: 34) and secondly the missions’ ‘ability to
facilitate the resolution of the disagreements underlying the conflict’ (Diehl
1993: 37). Using this framework of evaluation, Diehl analyses five peace
operations, including UNIFIL. His conclusion is that peace operations are
most likely to succeed if host nations and third parties consent to the
operation, peacekeepers use minimum force and are minimally armed,
maintain neutrality and impartiality, the mission is deployed in inter-state as
7
opposed to intra-state conflicts and deployed in areas which assist an
unopposed separation of combatant forces.
Johansen posits that Diehl’s “theoretical framework does not quite fit the real
purposes of peacekeeping” (Johansen 1994: 308), citing for example the
example of UNEF I, asked to depart by Host Nation Egypt in the lead up to its
1967 assault on Israel. While UNEF I had not observed armed conflict in the
first eleven years of its deployment, the mission is evaluated as failing to
prevent the armed conflict in 1967. In considering the second criterion of
conflict resolution, Johansen (1994: 308) again finds that Diehl’s criteria
evaluate something not within the remit of a peacekeeping operation to
control, and asks why the mission should ‘be held accountable for violence
from "other causes" which are largely outside of their control?’ Diehl himself
has qualified this in his earlier writing, when he argues that the successful
outcome of UNEF II, following the Camp David Accords, was as a result of the
leadership of Anwar Sadat and the intervention of the US, which was assisted
by helping prevent military conflict, ‘but overall its role was comparatively
small.’ (Diehl 1988: 505) Johansen is answered by Diehl and Druckman
(2010: 27), who posit that ‘the measure of the dependent variable [resolution
of the conflict] should not be confused with or determined by the purported
strength of the independent variable [the PKO’s support of attempts towards
resolution].’ Johansen’s reaction to Diehl gave the impetus to a forum formed
of both Diehl, Johansen, and three further academics, at which a number of
factors of evaluation were discussed.
Because ‘Diehl and Johansen differed on the appropriate framework for
analysis and on standards for evaluation’ (Druckman and Stern 1997: 151),
the five academics answered four common questions on the evaluation of
peacekeeping missions. In considering how the success of peacekeeping
missions may be evaluated, Diehl outlined a number of criteria, the first of
which is whether the purpose of the PKO, as defined in the mandate, had
been achieved. This is in keeping with Doyle and Symbanis’s (2000) use of
lenient and strict dependent variables and the finding of Hegre et al (2010)
that mandate strength affects conflict reduction.
8
Bratt identifies four criteria of operational success ‘mandate performance,
facilitation of conflict resolution, conflict containment, and limitation of
casualties’ (Bratt 1996: 64). Using these criteria, he evaluates 39 PKOs. Of
note for the traditional peacekeeping missions of the Middle East, Jett,
referring to Bratt, posits that;
in classical peacekeeping in intrastate conflicts, limiting casualties and
containing the conflict are often sufficient reason to justify the continued
existence of the PKO and to consider it a success by three of the four
measures.’ (Jett 1999: 20)
Bratt (1997) considers a number of variables of evaluation and finds some to
be more important than others. He posits that the support of parties to the
conflict, a Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the support of both the
UNSC and the US are key indicators of success.
Pushkina (2006: 134) provides the following criteria for PKO evaluation;
1: Limiting violent conflict in the host state is the primary goal of
peacekeeping.
2: Reduction of human suffering is another primary goal of peacekeeping
missions.
3: Preventing the spread of conflict beyond the object state’s borders is also
important for ensuring regional security.
4: Promoting conflict resolution is a final measure of the effectiveness of the
UN mission.
Howard (2008: 6) finds that the measurement of variables of PKO evaluation
‘vary significantly’, while the particular variables used are difficult to apply
generally as PKOs deploy into different conflict-types and the influence of
external actors is not always incorporated with a uniform weighting.
The UN themselves (2008a: 80) identify prerequisites for a successful PKO; a
genuine desire of opposing forces for peaceful resolution, a clear mandate,
strong international political support, and the provision of the financial and
9
human resources necessary to achieve the operation’s objectives. The UN
states specifically that ‘peacekeeping must accompany a political process; it
must not and cannot substitute for one.’ Drawing on the 2000 Report of the
Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, (The Brahimi Report), the UN’s
(2008b) ‘Capstone Document’ posits that there are factors, identified through
a Lessons Learned process, without which a PKO is unlikely to succeed; a
peace to keep, positive regional engagement, the full backing of a united
UNSC, and a clear and achievable mandate with resources to match (UN
2008b: 49-51). Considering the first factor of success, ‘a peace to keep’.
Dombrowski, writing of his tour with OGL in 1986, remarks ‘There, I
experienced first-hand the frustrations of trying to be a peacekeeper in the
middle of a civil-war with no peace to keep.’ (Dombrowski 2007: xiv)
In Peace Operations Diehl (2008) posits that success in peacekeeping is
dependent on different criteria for different evaluators (2008: 19), and is also
dependent on the longitudinal methodology being used (2008: 21). Diehl,
again with Druckman, mentions the Golan specifically when providing an
example of intractable issues which ‘may signal to the peace operation that a
long term deployment … is likely, with all the attendant costs and risks.’
(2009: 14) They also identify the provision of services and infrastructure, for
which PKOs may have a supporting and sometimes responsible role, as a
factor of success. This author would therefore include the provision of
services and infrastructure as a variable for evaluation.
De Coning and Romita (2009) note the difficulty in identifying a causal
correlation between particular dependent variables and the impact of a PKO
because of the difficulties in evaluating each in isolation of the other. They
also recommend an evaluation to use both quantitative and qualitative
approaches to evaluation, as appropriate. It is recommended that evaluators
are those who will be charged with implementing any recommendations
made. Significantly, the benefit of ‘the process of identifying benchmarks and
indicators … can forge common understandings of outcomes to be achieved
in strategic decisionmaking processes.’ (de Coning and Romita: 1)
10
Diehl and Druckman’s 2010 publication Evaluating Peace Operations begins
by identifying the lack of academic focus on the independent variables
(inputs) and a lack of development of the dependent variables (outputs) in
PKOs (Diehl and Druckman 2010: 1). The authors posit that the value placed
on the dependent variables determines the standards for success (Diehl and
Druckman 2010:2). For them, the differences between traditional PKOs and
comprehensive PKOs have resulted in ‘a lack of consensus on what peace
operation success means.’ (Diehl and Druckman 2010: 3) There is, however,
a need to use criteria that are mission specific, as the ‘one-size-fits-all
approach may lead analysts to miss successes or failures that are specific to
the kinds of missions performed’ (Diehl and Druckman 2010: 5).
Diehl and Druckman aim therefore to give a framework to the evaluation of
PKOs, using primarily the dependent variables, while also discussing the
independent variables (Diehl and Druckman 2010: 7). Deconstructing Diehl’s
core goal of PKOs ‘to deter or prevent violent conflict in the area of
deployment’ (Diehl 1993: 34), two separate core goals, of violence abatement
and conflict containment, are added to the now third core goal of conflict
settlement (Diehl and Druckman 2010: 9). These goals are regarded as
common to all PKOs, and are considered below.
In constructing an evaluation framework, Diehl and Druckman (2010: 11)
consider five dimensions of evaluation; stakeholders, time perspectives,
baselines, ‘lumping’ (their term for how a operation is packaged) and mission
types. This paper considers each of these dimensions individually in the
following sections.
Diehl and Druckman’s Decisionmaking Template Approach is;
Step 1: Identify primary goals relevant to the mission.
1. Generic
2. Mandate specific
Step 2: Identify key questions required to achieve primary goals.
Step 3: Identify measures of progress to answer those questions.
Step 4: Identify benefits and limitations of those measures of progress.
11
Step 5: Ascertain extent to which primary goals have been
accomplished.
This template generates indicators of success from practical questions.
Proposed ‘as an aid to the decisionmaking process’ (Diehl and Druckman
2010: 25), the utility of the framework is examined in relation to UNDOF and
UNTSO in Chapter Four.
Kaldor (2010) takes a Cosmopolitan approach to conflict. Her prescience of
the current situation in Syria is marked, ‘Today’s wars, by contrast to the
European wars of the 19th and 20th centuries, are inconclusive, long lasting
and have a tendency to spread.’ (Kaldor 2010: 271) The war in Syria, which
began as a peaceful demonstration against rough tactics in Deraa (Erlich
2014: 15), is now entering its fifth year. Its dynamics are ever changing, as
various groups emerge and dominate. Fighters from Europe and the
Americas add evidence to Kaldor’s description of conflicts based on identity
politics, in which movements ‘mobilize around ethnic, racial or religious
identity for the purpose of claiming state power.’ (Kaldor 2012: 79)
Sigri and Bașar (2014: 394), detail the evaluation mechanisms within the UN.
The UNSC, UNGA, UNGA’s Fourth Committee on Special Political and
Decolonization issues, the Fifth committee on Administrative and Budgetary
issues, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, the Advisory
Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, the Office of Internal
Oversight Services, the Board of Auditors, the Committee for Programme and
Coordination, and the Committee for Programme and the Joint Inspection Unit
all conduct evaluations of PKOs. Sigri and Bașar (2014: 394) also,
cognoscente of a lack of a comprehensive evaluation model, propose a model
for the evaluation of PKOs. This is reproduced in full at Annex C. Their
general framework for evaluation of PKOs is reproduced in full at Annex B.
This paper now details the dominant factors in PKO evaluation which have
emerged as themes during the literature review process.
12
2.3 Framework Dimension: Stakeholders
Druckman and Stern (1997: 163) identify stakeholders with an interest in
PKOs as being the peacekeepers, the NGOs, and the International
Community. Diehl posits that success in peacekeeping is dependent on
different criteria for different evaluators (2008: 19), and is perceived differently
by the various stakeholders. Diehl and Druckman (2009: 26, 2010: 12) identify
these stakeholders as being the international community, Troop Contributing
Countries (TCCs), protagonist states and groups, and the local population.
Individual states may have very individual interests in the PKO. In the case of
South Lebanon, Syria and Iran ‘will want the interests of Hezbollah protected
in any agreement’ (authorising PKOs in the area). Likewise, Israel will have
its own individual concerns in regard to its ability to defend its borders as it
sees fit. (Diehl and Druckman 2010: 12).
Diehl and Druckman (2009: 21) state that ‘The cooperation of government
authorities in the host state is of limited value unless they exercise effective
authority over the area of deployment and related regions.’ This is very
relevant for UNDOF, and will be discussed further in Chapter Four.
As to who runs a PKO, Sigri and Bașar (2014: 391) posit that ‘the UN has
legal, financial and organizational superiority and has the most effective
decision-making mechanisms.’ For TCCs, success may be measured less by
conditions in the Area of Operations and more by the safe return of its troops,
now trained and experienced in peacekeeping. The reimbursement of states
for the use of its troops and equipment may be regarded by some TCCs as a
measure of success (Druckman and Stern 1997: 159, Diehl and Druckman
2010: 13).
2.4 Framework Dimension: Time Perspective
A short-time perspective may evaluate goal achievement during or
immediately following a PKO, while a long-time perspective assesses a PKO
years after the completion of a PKO (Diehl and Druckman 2010: 17). The
13
latter ‘will miss short-term impacts and not provide the necessary feedback to
policymakers in order to make timely and informed decisions.’ (Diehl and
Druckman 2010: 17) In relation to PKOs which have time-specific tasks, de
Coning and Romita posit that an evaluation ‘process that is focused on the
mandate and tasks of such a peacekeeping operation can at best speculate at
progress made towards the potential achievements of the strategic longer-
term aims.’(2009: 6)
Diehl and Druckman identify the issue of temporal dynamics, in which the
mandate given may be overtaken by future events. As an example, they cite
UNIFIL, which was deployed in 1978 but underwent major mandate
modification in 2006 following the Hizb’allah v Israeli war. The author was
serving with Observer Group Lebanon (OGL), under Operational Control of
Force Commander UNIFIL throughout this time and can attest that in the
months after the war both the operational tempo and footprint of UNIFIL
changed both rapidly and dramatically.
Diehl and Druckman (2009: 15), in describing how a changed attitude of a
party to an agreement can result in attacks on PKOs, state that ‘such attacks
included those against UNIFIL, with conflicting accounts on whether this was
intended or not.’ This is a reference to the IDF’s repeated targeting of an
OGL Observation Post / Patrol Base which resulted in the killing of four of the
author’s colleagues (Corcoran 2006). The impact of this is still relevant today,
as will be developed in Chapter Four. For Diehl and Druckman
‘Peacekeepers must adjust their strategies to circumstances. This suggests
that the mission may be defined and evaluated differently at different points in
time.’ (2010: 18) This has major significance for UNDOF, which, as will be
detailed in Chapter Four, has had recently to adjust its strategy massively due
to circumstances outside of its control.
2.5 Framework Dimension: Assessment Baselines
Diehl and Druckman (2010) question how to set baselines for evaluation,
whether to use the absence based criteria, evaluating PKO independent
14
variables in comparison with estimating what those independent variables
may be in the absence of any PKO. An example of absence based criteria is
provided by Hegre et al (2013:2), who posit ‘that an ambitious UN
peacekeeping policy will reduce the global incidence of armed conflict by two
thirds relative to a no-PKO scenario’. This method is regarded as being
difficult ‘because it is a negative’ (Diehl and Druckman 2010: 19), estimating
rather than recording. It may also result in too low a baseline, as any
deployment of a PKO is expected to be better than none at all, hence the
PKO succeeds merely by being (Diehl and Druckman 2010:19). Likewise, in
estimating what other policies may have achieved, ‘assessing specific
opportunity costs would have to be weighted by the probability of another
option, something that is a priori difficult to determine.’ (Diehl and Druckman
2010: 19) Menkhaus would caution that such counterfactual reasoning is a
constraint on individual evaluations and must be very cautious in ascribing
causal correlations (Menkhaus 2004: n.p.).
A longitudinal standard described by Diehl and Druckman (2010) is an
‘interrupted time series’ (Bingham and Felbinger 2002:123) whereby the
deployment of the mission, or ‘Initial Operational Capability’ (UN 2008b: 62),
is taken as the baseline, a method that facilitates evaluation across PKOs.
PKOs are expected to deploy during or immediately following the highest
conflict point (2010:20).
The third standard detailed by Diehl and Druckman (2010: 20) is Bingham and
Felbinger’s ‘benchmarking’ (2002: 45) method, which evaluates effectiveness
using a cross-section of PKOs. However, should a mission be relatively
successful in comparison to others, ‘significant flaws’ may be missed unless
an exemplary mission is used as a standard for evaluation (2010: 21).
2.6 Framework Dimension: Force Characteristics Diehl and Druckman (2010: 22) refer to the Force Characteristics as ‘lumping’.
This refers to the way in which the make-up of an individual PKO benefits the
success of that force. The characteristics are a PKO’s Tactics, Techniques,
15
and Procedures (TTPs), Force Composition, its training for and strategy of
peacekeeping, the clarity of the mandate and any changes to it (considered
individually below), time horizons, and the interaction with civil society and
host nation support.
2.7 Framework Dimension: Type of Peacekeeping Missions
This dimension refers to the specific aims of PKOs, be they election
supervision, human rights protection, arms control verification and so forth.
This partly determines how much the PKO interacts with the host nation and
its population. These varied aims determine what actions of the PKO are to
be evaluated. This dimension, like that of Force Characteristics, is linked with
the mission mandate, which often (and increasingly) iterates the aims of the
relevant PKO.
2.8 Core Goal: Violence Abatement The limitation of armed conflict is a common criterion for all PKOs and
therefore ‘the first criterion for judging the success of peacekeeping
operations is their ability to deter or prevent violent conflict’ (Diehl 1994: 34).
Diehl (1994: 3) cites UNFICYP as an example of a PKO succeeding in conflict
reduction and prevention while the wider UN failed at conflict resolution.
Diehl (2008: 122) suggests a number of possible dependent variables for the
evaluation of violence abatement ‘the number of combatant and peacekeeper
casualties, shooting incidents, or most commonly the number of days or
months without renewed warfare.’ For Diehl and Druckman (2010: 30) this
requires ‘the reduction or total limitation or armed violence’. PKOs can be
used to separate parties to the conflict, by using a demilitarized zone and
international condemnation is to be expected should peacekeepers be
targeted in renewed hostilities. The author has witnessed the former work in
UNDOF (2004-2005), and the latter occur in UNIFIL (2006).
16
2.9 Core Goal: Conflict Containment
This refers to a PKO’s attempts to prevent armed conflict from spreading
within a country, or spilling-over into a neighbouring country. The author is an
UNTSO officer currently deployed with UNDOF on the Golan, where a central
concern is of the Syrian conflict spilling over into Israeli Occupied Golan,
located on the western, ‘Alpha’ side of the Area of Separation (see Annex A:
UNDOF Deployment December 2014).
Diehl (2008: 122) provides a number of suitable dependent variables for the
evaluation of conflict containment such as ‘the number of parties involved in
the conflict and arms and financial flows to the combatants.’ Diehl and
Druckman (2010: 36) divide the goal into geographic and actor containment.
They refer to a ‘halo-effect’ (2010: 37) whereby the influence of a PKO can be
seen in tension-reduction throughout a wider region. It is the opinion of the
author that such an effect is an important indicator of success for Middle
Eastern PKOs, and this will be addressed in Chapter Four.
For Diehl and Druckman (2010: 38) not only an increase in the number of
actors, but also the relations of those actors with neigbouring states and major
powers must be considered. This indicator is very relevant to PKOs in the
Middle East, as the influence of neighbouring states has had major
implications for both Lebanon and Syria. While Comprehensive PKOs are
conceived to come following a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA),
traditional PKOs have deployed in order to facilitate the construction of a
CPA. Diehl and Druckman (2010: 47) cite UNDOF as an example of this.
Having deployed in 1974 to assist Israel and Syria oversee the Agreement of
Disengagement, the PKO remains deployed ‘pending agreement on a
peaceful solution’ (Findlay 2002: 7).
2.10 Core Goal: Conflict Settlement
Diehl (2008: 122), while recognizing that PKOs can deploy either prior to or
following the development of a CPA, suggest that the ‘presence of ongoing
17
negotiations and actual settlement agreements could serve as benchmarks to
chart progress according to this standard.’ For Diehl and Druckman (2010:
31) PKOs are not expected to develop negotiations or mediation themselves,
but rather ‘create the conditions’ conducive to the resolution. This is referred
to by mission planners as a shaping line of operation. Diehl and Druckman
(2010: 33) posit that it is unlikely that a PKO would operate in an area of no-
conflict, and indeed a PKO may be deployed into an area in which war may
breakout, as happened in UNIFIL’s Area of Operations (AO) in 1982 and
2006, and UNDOF’s AO in recent years. Importantly, Diehl and Druckman
(2010: 47) allow that ‘progress in peace settlements is the one dimension that
is least under the control’ of a PKO.
2.11 Factor: Operational Effectiveness
Conversely, Operational Effectiveness may the prinicipal goal of a Force
Commander. In considering Operational Effectiveness, Diehl and Druckman
(2010: 48) place great emphasis on the relations the PKO has with local
actors and populace, and regard public opinion surveys as the best means of
collecting data on this. Another useful dependent variable can be the number
of attacks on a PKO. Other indicators of Operational Effectiveness are
‘maintaining the security of personnel, coordinating among national units,
measuring the cost-effectiveness of the mission, and sharing costs among the
partners.’ (Diehl and Druckman 2010: 51)
2.12 Factor: Geography
For Diehl, geography plays a significant role in determining success.
‘Peacekeeping operations performed best when their areas of deployment
adequately separated the combatants, were fairly invulnerable to attack, and
permitted easy observation.’ (Diehl 1988: 503) In considering the role of
geography for UNIFIL he identifies as a limitation the valleys of South
Lebanon, which are good infiltration and exfiltration routes for combatants
(Diehl 1988: 495).
18
This author finds Diehl’s notion that ‘peacekeeping forces ideally should be
placed in an area that is relatively invulnerable, yet is easy to patrol and
separates the combatants at a distance capable of preventing armed
exchanges’ (Diehl 1988: 497) to be unrealistic, as the peacekeepers location
is determined at the strategic level, covering a typically large area, in which
the Force must site itself as best it can, as accepted by the Host Nation. In
the case of UNDOF, the strategically determined Areas of Separation and
Limitation do provide the necessary space to prevent an immediate major
assault between Syria and Israel, but the ‘invulnerable’ ideal could in fact
reduce the ability of UNDOF, and especially UNIFIL, to make those all-
important links with the local community.
2.13 Factor: Mandate
Bratt (1996 n.p.), Howard (2008: 7) and Diehl and Druckman (2010: 24) all
see benefit in using the mandate as a variable of evaluation. Diehl (2008:
123) and Diehl and Druckman (2010: 24) posit that mandates, in the form of
UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs), are politically acceptable
documents, and that vagueness may indicate a lack of UNSC resolve, though
the mandates are increasingly prescriptive. Diehl holds that while a clearly
defined mandate places limits on the mission, this can also limit ‘both the
controversy over possible actions and the potential manipulation of the force
by interested parties.’ (Diehl 1988: 496) The vagueness of the UNTSO
mandate has created difficulties for the mission (Diehl 1994: 28). However, a
vague mandate can also be beneficial for the freedom it bestows. Vagaries in
the languages ‘may provide considerable leeway for the actual conduct of the
operation.’ (Diehl 1994: 12) The vague mandate permits PKOs to ‘attribute
their major problems to something other than the mandate itself.’ (Diehl
1988: 496) Significantly, Diehl posits that ‘A clear mandate was useful, but
hardly critical in determining the outcome.’ (Diehl 1988: 503) Diehl concludes
that ‘the importance of a clear mandate is probably overestimated, for it is
merely a surrogate for the political consensus underlying it.’ (Diehl 1988: 496)
19
For Diehl, the vagueness of mandates makes it difficult to evaluate the
success of a PKO in relation to fulfillment of that mandate. Using this criteria
alone ignores the common purposes of PKOs (Diehl 1994: 33, 2008: 123).
Durch asks ‘whether the operation fulfilled its tasks as set forth in the mandate
and whether it was effectively planned and carried out’, while for Ratner
‘Evaluating missions in terms of their mandates or in terms of
accomplishments of other operations has drawbacks.’ (Ratner in Druckman
and Stern 1999: 80) Both Johansen and Fetherston ‘favor criteria that assess
peacekeeping in terms of its contribution to positive peace or combating
cultures of violence and repressive civil or state structures.’ (Druckman and
Stern 1999: 80)
2.14 Factor: Command and Control
Despite political distancing of the UN from the League of Nations, the
experiences of the latter had a major influence on the policies of the former. Unlike earlier League of Nations joint military operations, the Saar force of
1920-1935 was placed under a unified command (Winter Roeder and Simard
2013: 203). This has since served as a model of peacekeeping. The League
of Nations operation in the Saar was commanded by General J.E.S. Brind,
whose after action review ‘contained several recommendations that would
become standard for limitations on the use of military force in peacekeeping
missions.’ (Diehl 1994: 19)
In relation to Command and Control, Diehl (1988) finds that poor command
and control has not been a significant factor in the missions he studied, as
‘Most peacekeeping operations have run smoothly, with command and control
problems affecting the efficiency, but not the overall success, of the missions’
(Diehl 1988: 497), with any difficulties ‘never serious enough to jeopardize any
of the operations.’ (Diehl 1988: 503) In fact ‘Other than an unprecedented
case of complete incompetence, command and control problems are unlikely
to ruin a peacekeeping operation.’ (Diehl 1988: 498)
‘It has become common for the United Nations to fill leaderships posts in
20
peacekeeping operations with individuals who have experience in prior
operations.’ (Diehl 1994: 13) The UN themselves recognise the requirement
for good leadership, both civilian and military within their PKOs, ‘selection of
senior mission leaders must be a carefully considered process.’ (UN 2008b:
78) This paper recognizes the central role of mission leadership, and Chapter
Four uses the opinions of two PKO Generals to provide the benefit of
practitioners experience to the paper.
2.15 Factor: Neutrality
Considering neutrality, Diehl (1988: 503) finds that ‘The neutrality of the
peacekeeping forces was also significant. If the peacekeeping force is
perceived as biased, support from interested parties was likely to be withheld
or withdrawn.’ Brind’s recommendation was that future PKOs should be
constituted from nations with no interest in the relevant dispute, ruling out the
involvement of the major powers (Diehl 1994: 19).
For Diehl, peacekeepers from non-alligned countries, while not essential, are
beneficial, as the possibility ‘that a force composed from nonaligned countries
will take action favoring one party (or be perceived as doing so) is much less.’
(Diehl 1988: 503) If one party is suspicious of the Force, it can have severe
implications. For example, as ‘Israel claimed UNIFIL was guilty of aiding the
Palestinian cause’ (Diehl 1988:498), this may have led to further difficulties in
relation to cooperation. This is now detailed in relation to actors in the AO.
2.16 Factor: Actors
Importantly, different actors will measure success differently; ‘Different actors
and constituencies have different objectives and different criteria for
evaluating success.’ (Druckman and Stern 1999: 84) In the case of primary
disputants, Diehl observes Israel’s reluctance to cooperate with UNIFIL,
refusing to cede control of territory so that it could be patrolled by UNIFIL, and
subsequently invading Lebanon through the UN area of operations, which
‘showed a complete disregard of the force and its mission.’ (Diehl 1988: 500).
21
In the case of third party states, Diehl holds Syria accountable for its ‘critical
role’ in the failure of UNIFIL, because of its dominant role in Lenaon. ‘A large
portion of the blame for the UNIFIL[‘s] … failures must be borne not by the
primary disputants, but rather by hostile third states.’ (Diehl 1988: 500).
MacQueen posits that ‘Israel’s lack of cooperation at this time marked the
beginning of something of a national tradition of hostility to UN involvement in
the region that has done little to improve Israel’s standing internationally.’
(MacQueen 2006: 16)
Peacekeeping increasingly occurs in theatres of intra-state conflict, resulting
from the ‘new wars … about identity politics in contrast to the geo-political or
ideological goals of earlier wars’ (Kaldor 2012: 7). These conflicts may
counter attempts at preventive diplomacy, which may, according to Diehl
(1988: 501) ‘be viewed unfavorably by groups seeking to topple the
government of the host state; preservation of peace and the status quo favor
the established government.’ The number of actors in a conflict is promoted
as an dependent variable as an increase in the number of actors in the
dispute is correlated with ‘the likelihood that one or more of them will object to
a cease-fire and the provisions for the deployment of the peace forces.’ (Diehl
and Druckman 2009: 10)
Peacekeepers are increasingly threatened by non-state actors, who are free
to act without concern of international opprobrium. In considering the Middle
East, Diehl demonstrates this in relation to the PLO’s non-acceptance of
UNIFIL, which has been followed since the 1982 invasion of Lebanon by local
resistance, ‘UNIFIL has continued to have difficulty dealing with uncooperative
local militias, particularly the South Lebanese Army.’ (Diehl 1988: 501) The
author himself witnessed this in 1999, when the South Lebanese Army killed a
colleague peacekeeper by mortar firing a UNIFIL position (Corcoran 2006:
5’39”). Diehl’s 1988 findings are still pertinent today, such as when he posits
that in civil conflict;
Peace means continued domination by the status quo elites in the eyes
of rebel groups. Unless that perception can be changed, subnational
22
groups will view the peacekeeping operation as hostile to their interests.’
(Diehl 1988: 505)
This is very significant for PKOs such as UNDOF, created to assist Syria and
Israel observe the 1974 Agreement on Disengagement, pending a final peace
settlement. While waiting for a peace settlement, the Area of Separation has
almost completely come under the control of various Anti-Government Armed
Elements (AGAEs), whose attitude to the peacekeeping operation proved
critical to the decision to relocate most UNDOF positions to the western side
of the Alpha Line (UNDOF 2014: 18). As Diehl posits, ‘it may be almost
impossible to patrol areas where many different groups operate, much less
balance competing interests among them.’ (Diehl 1988: 504)
Peacekeeping missions may, according to Diehl, actually hinder reaching a
final settlement, as parties are permitted a cooling-off period. ‘The status quo
under peacekeeping also may become a desirable outcome itself for the
parties; it offers a halt to the fighting without loss of face.’ (Diehl 1988: 506)
This may then be a strategic purpose of peacekeeping, it gives the
International Community the ability to ‘do something’ while giving nations the
ability to normalise conditions while remaining ‘at war’.
2.17 Factor: External Influencers
Concerning the influence of superpowers, Diehl writes of the ability of
superpowers to exert their influence on actors in the area of conflict through
political, economic and military power, giving them ‘the potential to rescue or
destroy peacekeeping operations.’ (Diehl 1988: 502) However, their role is,
according to Diehl’s five case studies, over-exaggerated, ‘their actual
influence was less than conventional wisdom might predict.’ (Diehl 1988: 502)
2.18 Factor: Environment
For Diehl and Druckman (2009: 6) ‘The conflict environment is among the
most important aspects, if not the most important, in determining peace
23
operation success.’ (Diehl and Druckman 2009: 6) The factor is divided into
three categories; characteristics of the conflict, local governance, and the
local population (Diehl and Druckman 2009: 8).
2.19 Factor: Financing Diehl posits that while all PKOs he examined experience financial difficulties,
this was not seen to negatively affect the conduct of the missions (1988: 494).
Conversely, Howard (2008: 30) cites the example of UNAMIR, which suffered
as the UNSC ‘did not recommend adequate funding’ during preparation to
deploy, while Hegre et al (2013:1) found that, allied with a strong mandate,
increased budgets have a beneficial effect on PKOs’ success.
This Chapter has outlined the major concepts and themes of evaluation of
PKOs. It has demonstrated the differing opinions on what criteria are suitable
for evaluation. The paper will now detail the methodology of the primary
research, the findings of which will be detailed in Chapter Four.
24
CHAPTER THREE - METHODOLOGY 3.1 Introduction
This chapter outlines the organisation of the research project. The
background to, purpose of and design of the research are detailed. The data
collection method and ethical considerations are examined before the
interview design and analytical framework are determined. The chapter
concludes with an evaluation of the challenges and limitations of the research.
3.2 Background to Research
This paper was first proposed while the author was the Chief Instructor of the
Irish Defence Forces’ United Nations Training School Ireland (UNTSI), which
is ‘the focal point of the Defence Forces to standardise preparation for Peace
Support Operations.’ (Defence Forces 2014 n.p.) At this time the author
served on the Defence Forces Peacekeeping Doctrine Board. The author has
a strong background in peacekeeping operations and wanted to examine how
peacekeeping was being assessed at the operational level. It was expected
that there would be a common checklist of evaluation criteria. In order to
confirm or deny this it is necessary to determine and validate the usefulness
of evaluation criteria.
3.3 Purpose and Assumptions of Research
The UN has conducted Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs) since 1948. Initially
overseen by the UN Office of Special Political Affairs, 23 PKOs were initiated
before the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) was established
in 1992, six of these are still deployed (UN 2013c). Since 1992, 45 new PKOs
have been initiated, nine of which are currently deployed (UN 2013a). The
annual budget for these operations is currently $8.47 billion (UN 2015e). In
return for this significant investment to world peace, the 193 UN member
states can reasonably expect a measured evaluation of success.
25
This study aims to identify and validate the criteria for the evaluation of classic
PKOs, and to determine whether those proposed by academia are those
which are used by military commanders of PKOs. As such it has a descriptive
purpose, description being ‘the process of defining, classifying, or categorizing
phenomena of interest.’ (Marczyk, DeMatteo and Festinger 2005: 16)
In order to position the research within a theoretical framework, the author
considered a theory of International Relations as best suited for a study of
value weighting within the United Nations realm. According to Geoff Cooper
‘theoretical and conceptual issues are indispensable features of social
research, and can enrich it in a number of ways.’ (Cooper, G. 2008: 19)
Taking PKOs to be a function of international will, the legitimacy afforded
them is dependent on moral and ethical behavior. As such the theoretical
foundation of PKOs is informed by the Normative International Relations
Theory (or International Political Theory) and Ethical Cosmopolitan Theory of
International Relations.
The research relies on some assumptions. Using the Normative International
Relations theory, it is assumed that, holding the idealist paradigm, human
behaviour can improve and world peace is possible. This paradigm focuses
on values. In order to determine values, participant observation is useful. A
qualitative analysis is therefore suitable for purpose.
3.4 Research Design The research uses the mixed method research design. Following a review of
theory gained from a literature review, interviews of a target group of
commanders of PKOs and DPKO staff was used to collect data. The
interviews contain both structured and semi-structured elements. As the
target group were selected for their experience in PKOs, an interview was
expected to be far more beneficial than a questionnaire in terms of qualitative
data generation, as ‘A skillful interviewer can follow up ideas, probe
responses and investigate motives and feelings, which the questionnaire can
26
never do.’ (Bell 2005: 157). In considering the investments of time and effort,
interviews are assessed as the best means to do justice to the research.
This approach is not without precedence, as mixed methods can be used ‘to
understand the beliefs of a range of participants (e.g. different stakeholders in
a policy area).’ (Alexander, V.D., Thomas, H., Cronin, A., Fielding, J., and
Moran-Ellis, J. 2008: 131) It is considered to be the most suitable for
collecting and analysing data to answer the research question and has
previously been used by researchers to allow for a diversity of views,
‘combining researchers’ and participants’ perspectives through quantitative
and qualitative research respectively, and uncovering relationships between
variables through quantitative research while also revealing meanings among
research participants through qualitative research.’ (Bryman, A., 2006: 107)
The design was selected in order to give as complete an interpretation of the
data as possible. This is reflected in Alexander et al when they note that ‘The
outcome of mixed methods may be more accurate measures of important
variables, a multifaceted picture of a complex phenomenon, or findings on a
broader range of questions.’ (Alexander et al 2008: 135) The analysis is
presented in a combined method. 3.5 Informant Selection and Access The target group consists of two military officers of general rank who are the
Acting Force Commander of UNDOF (at the time of the interview) and the
Head of Mission of UNTSO respectively. The third interviewee is a senior
officer of DPKO. Each interviewee was approached in person some months
before the interviews and agreed to cooperate. The interviews were
conducted in the Generals’ offices, and the interview with the DPKO officer
was conducted via the telephone. Each interview lasted about ninety
minutes. It might be anticipated that belonging to the same profession could
cause difficulties, as suggested by Pierre Bourdieu; ‘Belonging to a
professional group brings into play an effect of censorship which goes far
27
beyond institutional or personal constraints: there are questions that you don’t
ask, and that you can’t ask’ (Bourdiue :8).
Similarly, Stefanie Kappler writes ‘often when approaching and/or interviewing
people in professional settings, they will resort to technical language, possibly
reproducing the official lines of the institution/organization they represent.’
(Kappler: 135) This can lead to ‘those pre-censored discourses [which] are
also to be found within international institutions’. (Kappler 2013:135) The
expected effect is contrary to this, as the common bond of service will ease
the interviews, and allow the interviewees to quickly feel at ease with the
interviewer.
3.6 Ethical Considerations
Bulmer provides two key statements in regard to the role of ethics in
sociological research. Firstly, ‘Ethics is a matter of principled sensitivity to the
rights of others.’ (Bulmer, M. 2008: 146) Interviewees must be told explicitly
what the purpose of the interviews is, how their words will be analysed, and
how the data will be stored. The interviews must be conducted with sensitivity
to the political strategic sphere in which the target group work. This
information was provided to each interviewee in the Participant Consent
Form, reproduced as Annex E.
Before any primary research could be completed the author was required to
submit a research proposal to University of Leicester whereby ‘the initial
review of projects will be undertaken by a departmental/school research
ethics officer and there will be reference to a departmental/school/faculty
research ethics committee where this is required’ under the University
Research Ethics Code of Practice (Department of Criminology, 2013).
According to Bulmer, ‘The best counsel for the social researcher is to be
constantly ethically aware.’ (Bulmer, M. 2008: 160) Interviewees must be
reminded throughout the process that their responses are being recorded for
an analytic purpose. ‘One of the reasons for routine explicit assurance of
28
confidentiality in research interviews is to overcome the natural similarity
between research interviews and everyday conversations with strangers,
which have the implicit norm of nonconfidentiality.’ (Bradburn, Wansink and
Sudman 2004: 14) Both Generals provided their responses unconditionally.
The senior DPKO officer spoke under a number of conditions. Firstly, the
author, as a serving UNTSO Military Observer attached to the Force
Headquarters of UNDOF, had to seek the clearance of the chief civilian, Mr.
Bernard Lee, the Chief of Mission Support, confirming that;
a. The author has been cleared to conduct an MSc Security, Conflict
and Development (University of Leicester) Dissertation examining the
evaluation of DPKO missions on the Golan.
b. That the author agrees that the research is only to be used in this
role.
c. That the author understands and attests that he will act on his
personal capacity and not as a representative of the UN, whereby his
response will only engage himself and not the UN.
d. That the study is for use only in part fulfillment of the MSc Security,
Conflict and Development (University of Leicester) and will not be
published elsewhere.
e. That this disclaimer will be included in the Ethics Consideration
chapter of the dissertation.
Prior to the interviews all informants were advised of the purpose of the
interview and signed a Participant Consent Form (Annex E). Following the
interviews a transcript of the relevant interview was made available to the
informant, who was free to clarify or retract any element. No clarifications or
retractments were sought.
3.7 Interview Design As ‘the semi-structured interview is a key technique in 'real-world' research’
(Gillham 2000: 21), it was selected as the most appropriate method of data
collection. All interviewees were asked the same open questions from one
interview schedule (Annex D Interview Schedule), and the question order was
29
varied as required in order to allow interviewees the opportunity to give
developed responses. In addition, further questions were asked in order to
probe and develop the responses, ensuring reliability. Given the high level of
expertise of the ‘elite’ target group, their own experiences are key to the
validity of the data.
The objective of the non-standard interview ‘is to find out what kinds of things
are happening rather than to determine the frequency of predetermined kinds
of things that the researcher already believes can happen.’ (Lofland, J. 1971:
76 as cited in Fielding and Thomas 2008: 247) The data collected in the
interviews is analysed thematically and discrete variables are quantitatively
analysed in order to reveal correlations between the criteria as identified.
However, a limitation of the interview is that ‘The precise wording of questions
plays a vital role in determining the answers given by respondents.’
(Bradburn, Wansink and Sudman 2004: 1) The questions were asked in an
open fashion, with the author ‘raising the topic and indicating the kind of
answer but where the actual answers are entirely up to the interviewee.’
(Gillham 2000: 41) Prompts and probes ensured that each interview stayed
on course yet gathered data as fully as possible, ‘steering the interviewee so
as to keep him or her on the topic and moving in the right direction’ (Gillham
2000: 24).
The interviews held potential to develop new variables and themes, as ‘non-
standard interviews are valuable as strategies for discovery.’ (Fielding and
Thomas 2008: 247) As the target group are high-level professionals within
the field of PKOs, it is was anticipated that they would reveal strongly held
convictions, that would at times differ or even oppose each other’s opinions.
‘Interviews are often used to establish the variety of opinions concerning a
topic or establish relevant dimensions of attitudes.’ (Fielding and Thomas
2008: 248) After trialing the interview with a senior officer of UNDOF, minor
adjustments were made to the wording and order of questions, and it was
decided to begin the interview with a general question so as to settle the
informant, and also to collect unexpected data.
30
Two face-to-face interviews were conducted, in the interviewees’ offices, one
in Occupied Golan and one in Jerusalem. The informants were seated at a
angle to the author, and all were seated on comfortable seating, with the
author cognoscente of the role of proxemics, paralanguage, eye-contact and
other aspects of non-verbal communication in the interview. Each interview
took about one and a half hours to complete, and was recorded by a
dictaphone app. The telephone interview was done using a cell-phone and
recorded by the same dictaphone app. All interviews were transcribed.
3.8 Analytical Framework The analytical framework used is that developed by Braun & Clarke (2006).
This ensures familiarisation with data, generation of initial codes, searching
for and reviewing of themes, defining and naming of those themes and
producing the report.
The data collected contains both quantitative data in the form of discrete
variables, and qualitative data in the form of opinion and experience. A
content analysis was conducted on the transcribed interviews. Substantive
data was identified and categorized in codes. The transcripts were peer-
reviewed in order to confirm categorisation and reduce selective bias.
Selected excerpts were loaded to the Mixed Methods Analysis software
package Dedoose (http://www.dedoose.com), allowing for both quantitative
analysis of evaluation criteria and qualitative analysis of latent content.
3.9 Limitations
A third interview was conducted by telephone between the Galilean town of
Tiberias and New York. The semi-structured telephone interview is less
effective than the ‘in person’ semi-structured interview as the visual feedback
must be replaced with positive reinforcement, while not breaking the
information flow. It also lacks the benefit of non-verbal communication cues,
hence more care must be given to the paralanguage cues such as the
informant’s vocal pitch and tone. Given the limitations imposed by distance,
31
and the lack of visual cues and feedback, it is possible that a respondent may
on occasion develop an unintended understanding of the meaning of a
question, leading to a possible statistical skewing of results. Following the
advice of Gillham (2000: 86), the telephone interviewee was sent the
Interview Schedule a number of days prior to prepare answers.
Another limitation is ‘social desirability bias’. ‘Social desirability bias is a
significant problem in survey research. This is especially the case when the
questions deal with either socially desirable or socially undesirable behavior
or attitudes.’ (Bradburn, Wansink and Sudman 2004: 11) It is expected that
the high professional status (General rank or equivalent) mitigated this bias.
A final limitation is the high inference of the qualitative analyses of the data.
The author posits that this was reduced by his own professional experience
on PKOs. To counter such inference, each code is depicted graphically, to
ensure that the excerpts not presented in the qualitative analysis are recorded
by the paper.
3.10 Challenges
The research has been conducted during a time of crisis within UNDOF. In
late 2012 Japan withdrew, Croatia followed in early 2013. By June 2013 the
Austrian government too signaled its intent to withdraw its personnel,
following several attacks on and abductions of peacekeepers. The author
began his fifth tour of duty with UNTSO in June 2014 and immediately found
himself encountering Al Qaeda affiliated jihadists. In late August, in the week
that 45 peacekeepers were abducted by Jabhat Al Nusra, the author prepared
his own position for evacuation while advising a company commander seven
kilometres away, who was surrounded by jihadists, of potential evacuation
routes. Days later, from a hilltop overlooking the AOS, he reported Syrian and
Anti-Government Armed Elements movements, assisting UNDOF to
temporarily relocate the majority of its assets into Area of Limitation Alpha, in
Occupied Golan. This crisis has been immensely influential on UNDOF
operations, and is often referred to in the next chapter, ‘Findings.’
32
CHAPTER FOUR - FINDINGS
4.1 Introduction Diehl and Druckman state that ‘Bridging theory with practice is a goal of our
research’ (Diehl and Druckman 2010: 6). This paper now builds on this by
considering interviews conducted with three key practictioners.
Brigadier General Anthony Hanlon was, at the time of interviewing him, the
Acting Force Commander of UNDOF, covering the transition of command
from Lieutenant General Iqbal Singh Singha to the current Force Commander,
Major General Purna Chandra Thapa. He is recognised as an expert in
PKOs, having the most ‘overseas’ service of any member of the Irish General
Staff, with thirteen previous tours of duty on ten PKO missions, seven of them
as a UN peacekeeper.
Major General Michael Finn is Chief of Staff of UNTSO, and one of the few
military Heads of Mission of UN PKOs. Like Brigadier General Hanlon, he
has extensive PKO experience, including three tours with UNIFIL and six with
UNTSO.
Anonymous is a senior officer within UNDPKO with experience in the
Evaluation and Training Division, including evaluation of UNDOF.
As observed by Finn, ‘I think it is very challenging to come up with a set of
evaluation criteria considering the different types of missions you have’ (Finn
2015). This chapter will propose 71 codes, or evaluation criteria, which
constitute seven themes. These themes are;
a. Evaluation Drivers
b. Evaluation Framework
c. PKO Fundamentals
d. PKO Goals
e. PKO Outputs
33
f. PKO Planning
g. PKO Requirements and Restrictions
Codes are analysed within their particular theme. Each code analysed is
diagrammatically represented by a code x descriptor (organization affiliation of
interviewee). Analysis of the interviewees generated 71 codes. 198 excerpts
were selected for their usefulness in analysis, and these resulted in 256
applications of the 71 codes. It is this which is depicted in each ‘code x
descriptor’ diagram, the amount of selected excerpts relating to each code
which are attributable to each interviewee. These diagrams provide a richer
analysis, as quotes from excerpts were selected on their suitability to enhance
understanding, hence some excerpts were not selected to avoid duplication.
It must be noted that the interviewees were selected because of their role
within organisations, however their statements are not to be attributed as
organizational policy, rather they are based on the professional expertise of
the interviewees. The overall plan for the themes and interlinking of codes is
depicted in the following diagram.
As already detailed in Chapter Three, the analysis of the data was conducted
using the thematic analysis framework as designed by Braun and Clarke
(2006: 87). After becoming completely familiar with the data, coding was
done using the Dedooce Mixed Methods software. A total of 71 codes were
determined, which were mapped as depicted in the following Codes and
Themes Diagram, which also demonstrates where some codes were
analysed as being sub-codes of others, and codes are often linked with
others, sometimes in different themes.
34
Fig.1 Codes and Themes
35
4.2 Theme: Evaluation Framework In considering the development of a framework of evaluation, this paper has
identified a number of elements regarded by PKO practitioners as valid
factors in PKO evaluation.
Baselines In order to evaluate, metrics are required. Metrics imply a zero-point or a
baseline. The setting of baselines is necessary for comparison, which will be
analysed shortly. As can be seen from Fig.1, Anonymous of the DPKO was
most responsive in relation to baselines. In considering baselines,
Anonymous referred to the short-lived UN Supervision Mission in Syria
(UNSMIS), which operated in Syria in 2012 (UN 2015a: N.P.). For
Anonymous, the baselines were intentionally too high, creating, as will be
referred to later in this thematic analysis, unrealistic expectations, as ‘the bar
was set that high because certain Council members wanted the mission to fail
and ordered to take measures of their own.’ (Anonymous 2015)
This first code to be considered reveals that evaluations are not within the
dominion of peacekeepers alone, but are part of the international
governmental process, and are conducted, in however unempirical a method,
by the public themselves. Being aware of this, expectation management,
using unrealistic baselines, can ensure a mission will fail evaluation. By
simply comparing the situation before and after deployment, PKOs, unless
they uncharacteristically worsen the situation, are expected to have a positive
effect. According to Anonymous ‘usually it is that the situation before the
peacekeeping mission deploys which is usually a conflict situation - is better
afterwards.’ (Anonymous 2015) The strategic assessment pre-deployment,
which defines the baseline, is actually conducted ‘more to look at the concept
drivers and how a UN response in the form peacekeeping or otherwise will
address them. And then of course you could measure the changes in those
conditions.’ (Anonymous 2015)
36
Fig.2 Codes x Descriptors: Baselines
Compact The Compact is a written agreement between the UN Secretary General and
the UNTSO Heads of Mission and Force Commanders. It is the guiding
document for the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, as it details the ‘objectives and
improvements you have to bring about to better facilitate you in carrying out
your mandate.’ (Finn 2015) For Finn, the compact is ‘quite rigorously adhered
to’ ensuring that ‘it is very much a driving factor in achieving the mandate, and
achieving progress from year to year in the mandate.’ (Finn 2015) This paper
proposes that evaluation of compact observance is therefore congruous with
the evaluation of the relevant PKO. It details all facets of the mission;
the thing about the compact is that it impacts on all elements of
the mission; the military component, the political component, the
support component, there are objectives in there for each and
every one of them…
(Finn 2015)
Fig.3 Codes x Descriptors: Compact
Comparisons As detailed in ‘Baselines’, comparisons are made between pre- and post-
deployment of a PKO, ‘usually it is that the situation before the peacekeeping
mission deploys which is usually a conflict situation, is better afterwards. …
So the mission has had an impact and those comparisons I think are a matter
of course.’ (Anonymous 2015) This comparison is based on the findings of
the UN Country Team who are able to advise on the improvements (or
37
otherwise) post-deployment ‘whether its UNDP development or refugees or
World Food Programme as well or UNICEF.’ (Anoymous 2015)
Fig.4 Codes x Descriptors: Comparisons
Complexity and Context Anonymous provided significant information in relation to the specific political
considerations relevant in all UN activities. As already demonstrated, political
considerations impacted heavily on UNSMIS, for example;
peacekeeping is very subject to the political priorities and political
dynamics among Security Council members … we’re subject to
the Council’s will and beholden to its member states and the
effectiveness despite all these measures that we have discussed
also depends on factors that are those factors that are intangible
but very determinative.
(Anonymous 2015)
These intangible factors, however determinative, are outside the remit of the
PKO to affect, and therefore reside outside the evaluation of PKOs.
Fig.5 Codes x Descriptors: Complexity and Context
General Framework / Mechanism of Evaluation / Terms of Reference / Western Perspectives While the context of each PKO may differ, an evaluation unit must use a
general evaluation framework. Anonymous talks of;
whether [there were] the correct policies and procedures in place,
was the strategy clear, were the mechanisms in place to
38
implement it, was there coordination and cooperation, the
necessary cooperation and coordination between the units
involved, was support adequate, was guidance from headquarters
sufficient, … was the cooperation of the country team that had
some involvement…
(Anonymous 2015)
UN Policy, Evaluation and Training (PET) then tailors this general framework
to each specific mission, and then ‘there’s a multitude of interviews where
information is collated and you know, sort of, the analysis of the composite
information is made’ (Anonymous 2015).
The design of these information requirements is defined by the Terms of
Reference, which ‘are built on broad based consultations with a sort of cross
section of stakeholders in the field and in headquarters.’ (Anonymous 2015)
Prior to the publication of the Terms of Reference there are ‘very intense
discussions with the mission members, mission leadership, as well as the sort
of relevant people involved in both DPKO and DFS … again in that overall
framework of effectiveness and efficiency.’ (Anonymous 2015)
Allowing that the ‘western view of what’s the right solution is not necessarily
the right one for other parts of the globe’ (Hanlon 2015), it must be noted that
it is not the west alone which dominates, that ‘the super-powers as they are
today, they have a significant role, they are potent forces because they are
the ones who support the policy of operations, they are the ones who create
enablers for any limited or wide missions.’ (Hanlon 2015)
Fig.6 Codes x Descriptors: General Framework
39
Fig.7 Codes x Descriptors: Mechanism of Evaluation
Fig.8 Codes x Descriptors: Terms of Reference
Fig.9 Codes x Descriptors: Western Perspectives
Interim Assessments / Repeat Evaluations / Temporal Dynamics For UNTSO, free of the requirements of mandate renewal, evaluations are
conducted about every three years ‘by decree of the USG [Under Secretary
Feneral] and the Inspector General’s office’ (Anonymous 2015). In the case
of UNDOF Reports are regularly prepared for the UNSG ‘be it six months,
three months, or annual’ (Finn 2015) which inform the UNSG’s report which
‘show how the mission is achieving it’s mandate as set out. So that, in a way,
is a measure of success or otherwise of mandate of a mission.’ (Finn 2015)
Should a PKO be subject to an adjustment in mandate or a substantive
change in conditions these interim assessments are used, and can be used
‘in an integrated fashion’ by a combined headquarters and mission team
(Anonymous 2015). Routine assessments are used for ‘projecting where a
situation, where mandate implementation is going, anticipating obstacles and
how, you know, how they are met, how the chosen mechanisms that we use.’
(Anonymous 2015)
The interim assessment is vital for the mission now facing UNDOF, a PKO
operating in a vastly different environment from that of its first forty years
(1974-2014). Hanlon provides an excellent summary of the situation in 2014;
It was never written into the mandate what to do if one of the
parties was shelling into the Area of Separation. Some of it was
40
coming into the Headquarters of the mission. Shells were coming
into UN positions, posts were going into shelter on a regular basis.
Peacekeepers were kidnapped. There was nothing written into the
mandate about that. (Hanlon 2015)
The sudden change justifies interim assessments, ‘things changed very much
in ’11, very quickly in ’12, ’13, in the first nine months of ’14, that changed the
situation so much so that looking at time as year blocks it is difficult to see
UNDOF being a success.’ (Hanlon 2015) Consideration of this temporal
dynamic is essential for PKO evaluation, as criteria for assessments are
situation, as well as mission, specific, ‘measures that they specifically looked
at, the cessation of armed conflict, the resolution of the underlying causes, I
think that that belongs in a particular time.’ (Hanlon 2015) As the criteria
change, so too does the definition of success. ‘There is a very significant
challenge to understand how you would see UNDOF as a success now
compared to what it was like for thirty-seven years or thereabouts.’ (Hanlon
2015)
In general DPKO does not evaluate a mission following its completion, this is
instead conducted by ‘organizations and think tanks and organizations
associated or linked to the UN that would look at, you know sort of, did this
mission do X, Y, Z?’ (Anonymous 2015) However, ‘there were two that I am
aware of that looked at, if you will, towards the end of a mission mandate or
immediately post’ (Anonymous 2015), a process that feeds into Lessons
Learned.
Fig.10 Codes x Descriptors: Interim Assessments
Fig.11 Codes x Descriptors: Repeat Evaluations
41
Fig.12 Codes x Descriptors: Temporal Dynamics
Items to be Evaluated / Key Performance Indicators Hanlon provides many examples of what can be assessed as Key
Performance Indicators (KPIs)in PKOs;
implementing effects both locally and regionally, it can be assisting
the delivery of aid, education, it can be secondary health care, it
can be helping to take them out of the country for vital surgeries, it
can be utility provision, providing power generation, providing
water, developing health programs. It can be through donor aid, it
can be through law, it can be through governance, it can be
through disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, reconstruction,
there are many different ways that you can establish metrics, and
then develop out KPIs.
(Hanlon 2015)
This is using the tactical assets to improve quality of life for locals, ‘you can
achieve successes at the tactical level, both locally and community wide,
regionally, that may not be resource heavy, which become best for mandate
success.’ (Hanlon 2015)
Fig.13 Codes x Descriptors: Items to be evaluated
Fig.14 Codes x Descriptors: Key Performance Indicators
42
Military Evaluation / NATO & EU PDT Evaluation Explaining the role of the military in PKO evaluation, Anonymous states that
the evaluation of UN PKOs is ‘always a mix of political, military, security’ and
that when ‘you have military personnel they will be looking more at the
operational aspects whereas the political people would look more at the
political aspects.’ (Anonymous 2015) Internal to DPKO there is a military
staff who conduct ‘evaluations of, or assessments of, sort of a military
capacities or capabilities for mandating implementation in the strength and
partnerships with TCCs to enable that.’ (Anonymous 2015)
The military are familiar with evaluation, and often bring with them the
experience of pre-deployment assessments for units on NATO and EU PKOs.
Finn explains that while NATO has a dedicated evaluation unit ‘in NATO
headquarters in SHAPE in Brussels that does carry out evaluations of TCCs
before they are deployed’ (Finn 2015), for EU PKOs however ‘there was
never any agreement that the EU would set up a mechanism whereby they
would access the TCCs so … they very much self assessed and certified that
they were ready to take up the mission’ (Finn 2015).
Fig.15 Codes x Descriptors: Military Evaluation
Fig.16 Codes x Descriptors: NATO & EU PDT Evaluation
UN Assessment Team / PET / UN Pre Deployment Training Evaluation Within DPKO there is ‘a managerial board that decides on the evaluation
priorities and an evaluation can also be requested by a mission.’ (Anonymous
2015) DPKO’s Policy Evaluation and Training unit provides DPKO (and DFS)
with a dedicated evaluation unit. Its findings feed into Lessons Learned, and
can identify weaknesses in pre-deployment training for TCCs, and ‘help the
43
country with increasing or enhancing its training capacity or focusing on
whatever gaps were identified.’ (Anonymous 2015)
‘Our goal with evaluations is to ensure that the mission, if you will, is sort of fit
for purpose and able to conduct its mandate respectively.’ (Anonymous 2015)
The standardisation of pre-deployment training is an aim of PET. In UNTSO,
TCCs are advised of the training needed before officers report to UNTSO HQ,
‘the criteria laid out to the member states and the troop contributing countries
in advance in relation to the type of training the observers offered by TCCs
should contribute.’ (Finn 2015)
UNTSO has to take UNMOs who have ‘a range of experience, a range of
knowledge, a range of competencies’ (Finn 2015), and additional training is
given in a formalised programme. ‘I suppose having got what you’ve got, you
have to live with it … and at some stage there will be a leveling of the playing
field’, says Finn, before revealing that ‘UN headquarters can go back to a
particular TCCs that is not measuring up under the various criteria that might
be in place in a mission and get the message to them that they need to
improve in certain areas.’ (Finn 2015)
Fig.17 Codes x Descriptors: UN Assessment Team / PET
Fig.18 Codes x Descriptors: UN PDT Evaluation
4.3 Theme: Evaluation Drivers The Brahimi Report / Purpose of Evaluation The literature review established that, following studies on the reasons for
success of PKOs, there is now an increasing interest in how this success is
measured. This mirrors an increased awareness of the importance of
44
evaluation within DPKO and TCCs themselves. One driving force behind this
was the 2000 ‘Brahimi Report’. As Finn recollects when considering TCC
appreciation for evaluation, ‘Then we had the Brahimi report which talked
about, you know, the competencies of TCCs and importance of mandates, of
missions having proper mandates and mandates appropriate to difficulties.’
(Finn 2015)
The paper will address mandates in a following section. Of merit here is the
concern for the competencies of TCCs. Finn continues ‘then I think [of] the
Brahimi report, which came out about that time, talking about more robust
missions and missions being better prepared to meet the situation.’ (Finn
2015) The increased robust nature and expectations of PKOs demanded
TCCs to address their preparation to reach such demands.
Reflecting on the events leading up to the temporary relocation of UNDOF,
when 45 peacekeepers were abducted from UNDOF position 27 by Jabhat Al
Nusra Hanlon states ‘What happened to us in 27 will never happen to us
again in any deployment. They followed an SOP [Standard Operating
Procedure], they followed an order, we’ve got to learn from that to ensure that
it doesn’t happen again.’ (Hanlon 2015) The After Action Review from such
an event contributes to PKO Lessons Learned. Hanlon explains ‘you’ve got to
get into the lessons indicated, lessons learned process, the After Action
Review must show what’s relevant to us’ (Hanlon 2015).
Recalling the words of Anonymous, ‘Our goal with evaluations is to ensure
that the mission, if you will, is sort of fit for purpose and able to conduct its
mandate respectively.’ (Anonymous 2015) For Hanlon ‘We have to write
evaluation policies so that we can deliver success. It is probably going too far
to say that the mission will close and we’ll achieve everything.’ (Hanlon 2015)
Fig.19 Codes x Descriptors: The Brahimi Report
45
Fig.20 Codes x Descriptors: Purpose of Evaluation
4.4 Theme: PKO Goals Cessation of Conflict/ Resolution of Underlying Causes For Hanlon, speaking of Diehl and Druckman’s three core peacekeeping
goals of violence abatement, conflict containment, and conflict settlement
(Diel and Druckman 2010: 29), by those ‘measures that they specifically
looked at, the cessation of armed conflict, the resolution of the underlying
causes,’ (Hanlon 2015) UNDOF has had limited success, ‘UNDOF’s success I
think historically has been that Syria and Israel didn’t go back to war.’ (Hanlon
2015)
Fig.21 Codes x Descriptors: Cessation of Conflict
Fig.22 Codes x Descriptors: Resolution of Underlying Causes
4.5 Theme: PKO Characteristics As in any organization, a PKO is better poised for success when it possesses
certain of characteristics. In the evaluation of PKOs, these characteristics, or
qualities, include some of the following.
Adaptability The Brahimi Report, Finn notes, described ‘more robust missions and
missions being better prepared to meet the situation.’ (Finn 2015) This
preparation requires adaptability. As to whether an unchanging mandate
46
might limit adaptability, Finn believes ‘the wording in it is such and so general
that it can be adapted and has been adapted over the years – very much
observe and report and assist the parties’ (Finn 2015).
Fig.23 Codes x Descriptors: Adaptability
Cooperation and Coordination / Relationships UNTSO is an active presence in the coordination of UN efforts in the Middle
East. Co-located with the Jerusalem headquarters is the Office of the United
Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process (UNSCO)
(UN 2015b). A similar mission, the Office of the United Nations Special
Coordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL) is based in Beirut (UN 2015c). Finn
refers to the mandates of UNSCOL and UNTSO overlapping with that of
UNIFIL, as all are concerned with peace between Israel and Lebanon. As
UNTSO’s mandate involves Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, Finn is
continually in communication with the diplomatic bodies of all five nations.
This is central to Finn’s outlook. Referring to a 2014 internal review of
UNTSO, Finn states that ‘it acknowledged the value of this latitude I have to
go to - have mobility between the five countries.’ This entails collaborating
with UNDOF, UNIFIL, UNSCO and UNSCOL to ‘avoid duplicity and just try
and have greater collaboration and coordination’ (Finn 2015).
As Anonymous said in ‘Evaluation Framework’, ‘was there coordination and
cooperation’ (Anonymous 2015). This criteria is one which is central to
UNTSO, and as PKOs are increasingly complex it is becoming more central to
all PKO activities.
Cooperation and coordination is linked with another code, ‘Relations’. For
Finn ‘uniquely I do have the opportunity to carry out diplomatic calls to all of
the five countries, meeting military leadership, as well as the diplomatic
ambassadors, and security, other UN agencies’ (Finn 2015). With liaison
47
offices in Beirut, Damascus and Ismailia (Cairo), Finn has a network for
coordination with other UN missions and agencies. Relationships take time
and effort to foster, and a limitation faced by Finn is that the calibre of
Lieutenant Colonels who serve as liaison officers is dependent on TCCs, ‘and
we find again a discrepancy or mismatch sometimes in the qualification of the
people that are given to us by the TCCs.’ (Finn 2015) In addition, Liaison
Officers typically serve for one year, and to build ‘a trustworthy relationship
with interlocutors it takes three months’ (Finn 2015) and hence relationships
are underdeveloped, a situation which Finn hopes can be alleviated through
the appointment of long-term analysts. Similarly, for Hanlon, any PKO leader
‘needs time to develop in the mission, an understanding of the role that
peacekeeping plays, generating, fostering, encouraging, developing positive
constructive interaction between … host governments’ (Hanlon 2015).
For Hanlon, the withdrawal of embassies from Damascus has been ‘a
significant disabler because they were real enablers for us, they had a line
into the Syrian government that we don’t have, at the ambassadorial level.’
(Hanlon 2015)
Relationships are important not just at the operational level, but also at the
tactical. This has always been a feature of UNIFIL ‘where traditionally UNIFIL
forces, some better than others, some TCCs better than others, it would have
been a feature that they mingled with the local population’ (Finn 2015). Such
a relationship with locals was not as developed in UNDOF ‘and it’s probably in
recent years, or since the conflict started it probably has been seen as a
disadvantage or, you know, a regret that there wouldn’t have been greater
closeness with the local population.’ (Finn 2015) Revealingly, Finn considers
that ‘maybe that was a product of the government, the control the government
were exercising on their people anyway (Finn 2015). This paper will return to
this point when considering the role of government.
In having to deal with armed forces such as Hizb’allah and Jabhat Al Nusra,
who are not signatories to Agreements and considered terrorists by many, the
ability to subtly develop relationships is a key enabler for PKOs at the tactical
48
level. Talking specifically of UNIFIL, Finn recalls that ‘you would have had the
PLO in there, you had Hizb’allah, you had Amal, and the contingents and
elements of UNIFIL would have been talking to them as well in an informal
way’ (Finn 2015).
These informal relationships are regarded as necessary for Force Protection,
and can be a key criteria of success for PKOs. Finn explains ‘you are not
giving them any legitimacy but you are in someway making them understand
that you are not interfering with them … that you need the freedom of
movement and that you need not to be interfered with’. (Finn 2015)
For Finn, once again some TCCs are in general better suited to this role. This
author, in conversation with the commander of the Fijian peacekeepers
abducted by Jabhat Al Nusra, formed the opinion that the Fijians’ positive
approach to their aggressors made their time in captivity easier, though their
release was organised at the political-strategic level.
Fig.24 Codes x Descriptors: Cooperation and Coordination
Fig.25 Codes x Descriptors: Relationships
Effectiveness and Efficiency In considering effectiveness and efficiency, Anonymous believes that proper
planning is required in order to provide for this characteristic. For Anonymous
‘there are consequences of planning that could be apparent after you know
after some time or mission deployment so I think those things would all come
in to play there. (Anonymous 2015)
49
Fig.26 Codes x Descriptors: Effectiveness and Efficiency
Ethical Behaviour The potential force for destruction of reputation ensures that PKOs strive for
systematic ethical behavior. Missions which have sullied by unethical
behavior of peacekeepers have had a stigmatizing effect which current PKO
practitioners are keen to avoid. Finn finds that ‘it can go top of the pile in
relation to any reference to a peacekeeping mission – oh that’s the mission
that had this indiscretion or scandal’ (Finn 2015)
Recalling an analysis of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by peacekeepers in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Anonymous refers to a ‘contributing
factor to misconduct in some situations was that the remuneration – the
troops get a daily allowance or are supposed to but … it goes to the
government not to the beneficiary.’ (Anonymous 2015)
This factor is linked with the ‘disparity between troop resources, trainings, and
capabilities’ (Anonymous 2015), and will be returned to under consideration of
‘Budget’.
Such concern with ethical behavior ensures that operational planners include
ethical responses to crises in their planning, even if the PKO is not going to be
the lead agency in the particular crisis response. Take for example the
current concern in UNDOF and UNTSO in regard to potential refugees from
Syria. Finn states ‘I know in the UNDOF case, the headquarters would be
very conscious of it and would encourage UNDOF to be supportive of the
IDPs within their capabilities’.
50
Fig.27 Codes x Descriptors: Ethical Behaviour
Impartiality There are three principles of UN peacekeeping;
1. The consent of the parties.
2. Impartiality
3. Non use of force, except in self-defence and defence of the
mandate.
(UN 2015d)
In considering the principle and characteristic of impartiality, Finn believes that
the efforts of UNDOF and UNIFIL rely on this ‘impartiality, openness, you
know that you don’t give any information to one party to the peace agreement
rather than the others so there needs to be openness with both the host
nations in the case of both missions.’ (Finn 2015) Anonymous agrees, ‘I
would say it’s principals of impartiality not between parties but impartiality in
implementing the mandate are essential.’ (Anonymous 2015)
For Hanlon, whose PKO is currently only able to conduct inspections within
the Israeli controlled Area of Limitation, this need to be seen as impartial
requires deliberate explanation, as Israel ‘say well all the inspections are
being done here in our face and yet there’s none of this being done on the
other side.’ (Hanlon 2015) To counter this Hanlon points out that all violations
of the 1974 Agreement on Disengagement are recorded and protested
whenever they are observed.
Fig.28 Codes x Descriptors: Impartiality
51
4.6 Theme: PKO Requirements & Restrictions Budget With a current annual budget of about $8.47 billion (UN 2015e), UN PKOs are
a major global financial consideration. Since 2003 a results based budgeting
process has been used which is ‘basically a logical framework that sets out
the, sort of you know, the mission concept, the mandate, and the specific
input functions or activities that are measured by indicators of progress to
reach a particular objective’ (Anonymous 2015).
With 128 countries providing the 104,235 uniformed peacekeepers (UN
2015e), the TCC makeup is heavily weighted on peacekeepers from
developing countries, as demonstrated in the UN graphic below (UN 2015f).
As already alluded to under ‘Ethical Behaviour’, financing of UN PKOs can be
a significant factor for TCCs as the ‘costs are shared more widely’ (Finn
2015).
For Hanlon, the reduction in UNDOF troop numbers over the past couple of
years is taking not just skills and experience for the mission, but also finances.
‘Today the only way you can measure UNDOF is by the budget. … Resources
are always challenged, we’re going through that now and the loss of budget’
(Hanlon 2015). While not an evaluation criteria, budget does provide an
indication of UN prioritisation of a mission in comparison to other PKOs.
52
Fig.29 UN Uniformed Peacekeepers Contributors
Fig.30 Codes x Descriptors: Budget
Caveats Each TCC can put national caveats in place in relation to the operations which
their respective peacekeepers will conduct, and in what fashion. Such
caveats can include limitations on where in the mission their UNMOs will
operate. This is not a limitation unique to UN PKOs, as Finn describes
caveats impacting on the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) during the riots of
March 2004, after which ‘there was a very critical After Action Review done …
what really came to the fore at that stage was the issue of caveats, … and
that was seen afterwards as being a hugely inhibiting factor’ (Finn 2015).
Caveats became a problem for UNTSO at ‘the end of 2012/2013 when some
troop contributing countries saw the operation and the developing situation in
the BRAVO side as being of unacceptable risk to their observers’ (Finn 2015)
For Finn, the imposition of caveats is easy, the lifting of those caveats far
harder ‘It is easy to impose caveats but it becomes more difficult to, sort of, for
53
TCCs to lift those caveats.’ (Finn 2015) An increased burden is then put
those peacekeepers from TCCs without caveats. ‘All down to the fact that a
few critical member states who were providing UNMOs in their teams,
including Ireland, did not impose caveats, and that was critical.’ (Finn 2015)
Fig.31 Codes x Descriptors: Caveats
Client States For Hanlon, all Middle Eastern states are client states of more powerful
nations. This then plays out in the intentions of the superpowers and Security
Council. ‘Last week I read a comment’, Hanlon says, ‘Russia is the voice for
Syria. People would say ‘well that’s not actually true. I think they’re the voice
for some part of Syria’ (Hanlon 2015).
Fig.32 Codes x Descriptors: Client States
Country Team Support The support of the UN Country Team is one of the criteria evaluated by
DPKO’s PET, ‘was the cooperation of the country team that had some
involvement’ (Anonymous 2015).
Fig.33 Codes x Descriptors: Country Team Support
Credibility and Perception As already alluded to in ‘Ethical Behaviour’, Credibility and Perception are key
criteria in PKO evalution. For Finn indiscretions have ‘created huge
54
reputational damage not just to the mission operating in a particular country
but to the organisation as a whole.’ (Finn 2015) As the Head of Mission, this
is ‘something that I try to drill in to our peacekeepers in UNTSO and hopefully
... it is something you can never be lax about or lose track of the emphasis,
the importance of that.’ (Finn 2015)
It is not just unethical behaviour which impacts on PKO credibility. There is
often an unrealistic expectation that a PKO is a panacea, the ‘general
consensus is that all the problems have to be tackled at once otherwise you
lose credibility or you know conflicts start again because certain kinds of
grievance haven’t been settled’ (Anonymous 2015) This requires Expectation
Management, which will be detailed later in the paper. Anonymous states that
‘mission credibility and public perceptions are paramount’ (Anonymous 2015),
and recalls that, in relation to UNSMIS, the expectation held by Syrians that
any UN operation could end the crisis required ‘a very very serious
communications campaign, a public information campaign to avoid that the
mission would be discredited’. (Anonymous 2015)
Fig.34 Codes x Descriptors: Credibility and Perception
Government Hanlon, in comparing Jabhat Al Nusra and Islamic State, posits that ‘They
both want a Caliphate, which is a governance, government.’ (Hanlon 2015)
The long-term prospects for both organisations is dependent on their ability,
like Hizb’allah in South Lebanon, to provide government and social support.
This is an important factor, that people want to be governed, and lacking a
responsible democratic one, the absence will be filled by others.
Fig.35 Codes x Descriptors: Government
55
Host Nation Support Host nation support was recognized by all interviewees as being a significant
evaluation criteria. When, in an interstate PKO, one state fails to provide for a
safe and secure environment, the other in turn can be less supportive.
Recent Hizb’allah presence on the Golan is causing just such a predicament
for Israel, ‘the presence of Hizb’allah there – all that adds to the tension and
adds to the risk that the disengagement agreement might be threatened’ (Finn
2015).
Israel has been a vocal critic of the agreements in the past, as when it
‘renounced, the armistice agreements way back in 1967, saying they no
longer existed and they longer recognized them.’ (Finn 2015) However, the
armistices ‘are a fact of life so no one state can unilaterally decide the
armistice agreement no longer exists.’ (Finn 2015) Finding Isareli
interlocutors ‘very professional and very supportive of me in the liaison aspect
and they’ll talk openly about their views et cetera on issues in the region’, Finn
cedes Host Nation Support as an evaluation criterion. (Finn 2015)
Host Nation Support is identified by Anonymous as an evaluation criterion of
DPKO, as when considering ‘was engagement with the government
supportive’ (Anonymous 2015). For Hanlon, positive engagement with the
host nation, as already outlined in ‘Relationships’ is necessary for ‘trying to
develop or to build relationships, strengthen the mission to get that strong
response of accountable actions, on the host government side (Hanlon 2015).
This is an obvious source of frustration, as Hanlon reveals when he notes that
Syria is ‘obstructing UNDOF, by not affording us the ability to satisfy them as
the host government, the senior partner in the agreement.’ Likewise, he
detects ‘Equally on the Israeli side there is somewhat of an un-reality about
the fact that they were instrumental in supporting the temporary relocation but
perhaps a little unrealistic at the aspirational level’ in relation to UNDOF’s
temporary relocation to Occupied Golan. (Hanlon 2015)
56
Fig.36 Codes x Descriptors: Host Nation Support
Leadership Similarly, all interviewees agreed that leadership is a key criterion for PKO
success. Citing the 2010 study on leadership in the United Nations by
Fabrizio Hochschild, In and Above Conflict, Anonymous mentions how the
political selection process for command of PKO has direct effects on the
implementation of a PKO thereafter. Mission Leadership has direct influence
into the formation of Terms of Reference for DPKO evaluations of PKOs.
For Hanlon, leadership is a basic qualifier, as when officers ‘who’ve returned
from deployed missions back to their home nations, who’ll ask them was it a
success or failure and by and large you’ll get the stock phrase. They base
that around a fairly strong Mission Leadership.’ (Hanlon 2015) For Hanlon
‘Mission Leadership is learned through lessons. Where do you get those
from?’, a question answered by Finn ‘Of course you’ll have learned lessons
from the past but I think you look at the mandate you have now and the
expectation that you have from ..... that the mission leadership has from the
TCCs assigned to it. (Finn 2015) Finn continues ‘And then is up to leadership
within the actual mission to try and achieve a cohesive unit or cohesive
mission comprising of all the different elements, units, within the mission.’
(Finn 2015) The formal Lessons Learned process, allied with experience
established on previous PKOs (a code which is examined later in this
chapter|), provides a foundation for reasoned decision making, ‘You draw
upon the insights of Mission Leadership, draw upon your experiential archive,
draw upon the experiences of key people’ (Hanlon 2015).
Finn summarises the importance of leadership, ‘Oh it is key … I think a
mission can really go back if you don’t have a leader that is pushing toward
progress, pushing best practices, pushing professionalism, high standards, all
of this.’ (Finn 2015)
57
Fig.37 Codes x Descriptors: Leadership
Mandate Of all the codes, the mandate is the most often cited by all three interviewees,
‘the mandate has a huge significance’ (Hanlon 2015). The limitations
imposed by mandates are not always recognized, as Finn notes, ‘one of the
problems for peacekeeping missions is that they have very confined
mandates, oftentimes, and that wouldn’t be appreciated by parties to the
conflict or by host nations and that would be very much a factor.’ (Finn 2015)
For Finn, it is the mandate with provides the overarching tasks and limitations
for a PKO. Speaking of the current situation Finn notes that ‘the Syrian
conflict erupted and much of that conflict took place within the area of
separation or within the area of limitation.’ (Finn 2015) The mandated tasks
continued to be completed ‘they continued to report violations of the area of
separation or area of limitation of both sides but it was all over shadowed if
you like by the Syrian conflict.’ (Finn 2015)
In ‘The Brahimi Report’ this paper has already identified the concern with
providing a suitable an achievable mandate for a PKO. While UNSCR 50
establishes UNTSO, and does not, uniquely, require a review, UNTSO
UNMOs are also operating under the respective mandates of UNDOF and
UNIFIL, ‘for the moment, they are operating under the mandates of UNIFIL
and UNDOF.’ (Finn 2015)
That UNTSO continues under the original mandate may provide guidance on
the importance of flexibility in mandate design and implementation ‘the
wording in it is such and so general that it can be adapted and has been
adapted over the years – very much observe and report and assist the parties
– those are two key phrases in it.’ (Finn 2015)
58
For Anonymous, the mandate can be too limiting, ‘it can set the bar too low
and people expect more like again like UNIFIL and UNDOF where the
expectations far exceed the mandate that the missions are given.’
(Anonymous 2015) Citing the UNSMIS example, Anonymous recalls of the
300 UNMOs deployed in the first month ‘in their initial presence was, despite
what people claim to the contrary, was actually very effective, perhaps mainly
not because of their mandate but I think the fact that they were there.’
Anonymous (2015)
As outlined at the beginning of this chapter, under ‘Baselines’, Anonymous
believes that the mission was mandated to fail. While Anonymous feels that
‘contemporary mandates are way too broad for any organisation to effectively
tackle at least simultaneously’ (Anonymous 2015), the freedoms of a simple
mandate can be appreciated by Mission Leadership, as when Hanlon says of
the UNDOF mandate, ‘It’s a very simple mandate. Make your best effort to
maintain the ceasefire. That is scrupulously observed. Why is the
agreement and the protocol to the agreement so simple?’ (Hanlon 2015)
Anonymous continues ‘the mandate of UNDOF is not an independent
Security Council intervention it is in fact … the disengagement agreement
between Israel and Syria and the Council basically endorses that agreement’
(Anonymous 2015) The implementation of the mandate forms the basis for
the regular mission assessments provided to UNHQ, ‘There are mission
assessments as well which are part of, I would say, the regular routine in
terms of projecting where a situation where mandate implementation is going’
(Anonymous 2015).
The mandate implementation also informs the Secretary General’s report
‘which is again a sort of a more qualitative assessment of the mandate
implementation and how a mission is handling that process and, you know,
from a strategic, political, and operational perspective.’ (Anonymous 2015)
UNTSO’s mandate is reprinted in full as Annex F: UNSCR 50, and UNDOF’s
current mandate is reprinted in full as Annex G: UNSCR 2192.
59
Fig.38 Codes x Descriptors: Mandate
Military / Civilian Staff of PKOs / NGOs In PKO evaluation, PET can call on the relevant personnel to conduct an
informed evaluation. This means that ‘the evaluation teams no matter which
framework they fall under are always a mix of political, military, security’
(Anonymous 2015). Similarly, should Non Governmental Organisations
(NGOs) be linked as partners to a PKO there is an evaluation of ‘the
effectiveness of the partnership, the level of cooperation’ (Anonymous 2015).
Fig.39 Codes x Descriptors: Military / Civilian staff on PKOs
Fig.40 Codes x Descriptors: NGOs
PKOs as Political Function Peacekeeping is a function of the international community, and must be
regarded as a political function, ‘peacekeeping is political instrument no
matter, you know, how forceful it becomes…’ (Anonymous 2015).
Fig.41 Codes x Descriptors: PKO as Political Function
Policies and Procedures DPKO evaluations begin ‘from a level of whether, … were the correct policies
and procedures in place…’ (Anonymous 2015).
60
Fig.42 Codes x Descriptors: Policies and Procedures
Regional Organisations While this paper is concerned with UN PKOs, an increasing number of PKOs
are being conducted by Regional Organisations such as the European Union
and the African Union, ‘there have been several cases of evaluations of
transitions from an AU force to an AU or an EU force to a UN force. So if they
are, … yes they are part of an evaluation.’
(Anonymous 2015)
Fig.43 Codes x Descriptors: Regional Organisations
Regional Security The role of PKOs in promoting Regional Security is an important element. In
considering the Middle East, ‘The whole region is raging.’ (Hanlon 2015)
Fig.44 Codes x Descriptors: Regional Security
SOFA In international law, a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) provides the
mechanism for the stationing of foreign troops within a sovereign territory, and
separates it from the responsibilities of an occupying force. Unusually, the
majority of UNDOF is currently stationed in Occupied Golan, and there is no
SOFA with Israel. For Hanlon major problems are caused by the absence of
a SOFA. ‘One of the key things, is a key problem, there’s no SOFA. I know
61
they tried over, I’ve researched this, and they’ve tried over decades, to put a
SOFA in place, because without the SOFA…’ (Hanlon 2015)
Fig.45 Codes x Descriptors: SOFA
Stakeholders / Stakeholders Reputation Stakeholders in Agreements have often been participants in the conflict. This
paper is interested as to whether this has an implication on the subsequent
evaluation of the resulting PKO. For Anonymous, in relation to such
stakeholders, ‘you work with stakeholders who are involved and have an
effect on the mission’s role and I think, frankly I don’t think that reputational
legitimacy matters except in your assessment of what they tell you.’
(Anonymous 2015)
Fig.46 Codes x Descriptors: Stakeholders
Fig.47 Codes x Descriptors: Stakeholders’ Reputation
TCCs / Selection for Service on PKOs - Competencies / TCCs’ Foreign Policies It is the foreign policies of individual TCCs which decide whether and how to
contribute to PKOs. In the case of his own nation, the Republic of Ireland,
Hanlon clearly identifies the link, which is a justification for deployment to
missions in East and Central Africa. ‘This area gets our foreign aid
investments, that chunk of Africa where we want to have the political will.’
(Hanlon 2015)
62
For whatever reason they deploy, as alluded to in ‘Budget’ and ‘Leadership’,
the composition of TCCs has a major impact on PKOs. For Finn ‘there is a
range of experience, a range of knowledge, a range of competencies I
suppose between different, the contributors of different TCCs.’ (Finn 2015)
Finn sees it as a function of Mission Leadership to provide in-theatre training
to all peacekeepers to ensure that all are prepared to perform the duties
assigned to them. As previously mentioned, Finn recalls the Brahimi Report’s
concerns with the competencies of TCCs. In terms of evaluation, Anonymous
states that the motivations of TCCs are not an evaluation measure.
Anonymous does speak of ‘the disparity between troop resources, trainings,
and capabilities; you know they impact any number of things.’ (Anonymous
2015)
Hanlon sees this disparity as being a function of Mission Leadership to
mitigate against, through ‘learning from each other, and success factors that
one TCC might have in an area over, as against another TCC in an area, and
I think it is there that TCCs don’t want to be embarrassed’ (Hanlon 2015).
Finn agrees when he states that the UN ‘leave it to the member states if you
like to achieve those guidelines and certify themselves if you like as being
ready to take up a mission.’ (Finn 2015) It is left ‘to leadership within the
actual mission to try and achieve a cohesive unit or cohesive mission
comprising of all the different elements, units, within the mission.’ (Finn 2015)
For Finn, the UN is cognoscente of this and may be expected to take a more
descriptive line in the near future, ‘taking a greater interest in the
competencies of the TCCs that were being provided to missions.’ (Finn 2015).
Finn continues ‘I think the UN has, and is very much waking up to the fact that
they must have, a say in the quality of the troops being provided and the
contingents being provided.’ (Finn 2015)
Finn mentions the development of this procedure which will allow UNHQ ‘go
back to a particular TCCs that is not measuring up under the various criteria
63
that might be in place in a mission and … get the message to them that they
need to improve in certain areas.’ (Finn 2015)
Fig.48 Codes x Descriptors: TCCs
Fig.49 Codes x Descriptors: Selection for PKOs - Competencies
Fig.50 Codes x Descriptors: TCCs Foreign Policies
Superpowers / UNSC As indicated in ‘Client States’, Hanlon regards the intentions of superpowers
to have a huge bearing on PKO success. Anonymous, as indicated in
‘Baselines’, believes that in the case of UNSMIS ‘the bar was set that high
because certain Council members wanted the mission to fail and ordered to
take measures of their own.’ (Anonymous 2015) Within the UNSC ‘the P5,
they are potent factors that determine the terms of mission mandate view.’
(Hanlon 2015).
Anonymous states that the individual agendas of UNSC members can
influence PKO planning because of the competing interests of ‘the Security
Council members, or member states themselves... those factors would
probably be consolidated in looking at planning, in evaluating or accessing the
planning for a mission’ (Anonymous 2015)
Fig.51 Codes x Descriptors: Superpowers
64
Fig.52 Codes x Descriptors: UNSC
4.7 Theme: PKO Outputs Outputs / Development of Peacekeepers In defining UNDOF outputs, Hanlon states ‘UNDOF does 27,000 patrol days a
year, completes four Secretary General’s reports per annum, reporting
particularly the violations and protests of violations on both sides.’ (Hanlon
2015) For Hanlon, these metrics are ‘the only real ways that you can define
the tangible measures of success.’ (Hanlon 2015)
One output which this author did not identify in the literature review was the
development of a cohort of well experienced peacekeepers. Such an output
is hard earned but can be of critical importance to Mission Leadership.
Hanlon, speaking of a 2013 Irish engagement with Anti Government Armed
Elements on the Golan, explains that ‘their first response was the right thing,
they self-recovered by laying down suppressive fires and recovered
themselves.’ (Hanlon 2015) This builds a future cohort of leaders
experienced in command under fire. ‘The longer it goes on, the longer we are
engaged in theatres where we deploy and employ the capabilities the
resources on longer robust missions, the better.’ (Hanlon 2015)
When asked whether the production of better peacekeepers can be regarded
as an outcome of PKOs, Hanlon says ‘it might not be the purpose but it is
certainly an outcome and one that’s recognized as positive in the international
sphere or the UN sphere.’ (Hanlon 2015) For Anonymous, the benefit ‘is also
exposure to, you know, a broader range of … international norms, …
international humanitarian law, the kinds of overarching regulatory
requirements that are experienced…’ (Anonymous 2015). However, for
Anonymous, this output is difficult to evaluate. (Anonymous 2015)
65
Fig.53 Codes x Descriptors: Outputs
Fig.54 Codes x Descriptors: Development of Peacekeepers
Interaction with locals / Mission Influence
Long-term PKOs influence those locals in contact with them, even if, in
UNDOF’s case, ‘the host government didn’t want interaction with the locals.
Of course there was, that’s a natural effect that’s created in a place by
soldiers being in a place for a long long time. There was humanitarian output.
(Hanlon 2015) Such interaction can also be evaluated. For Hanlon ‘it
probably has been seen as a disadvantage or, you know, a regret that there
wouldn’t have been greater closeness with the local population. But then
maybe that was a product of the government’ (Hanlon 2015).
For Finn, there is a discernable advantage to being an unarmed UNMO.
Citing OGL UNMOs, in South Lebanon, ‘there is a sense that patrols by
unarmed observers, close to the Blue Line for instance, are more acceptable
in the villages than patrols by armed soldiers of UNIFIL.’ (Finn 2015) This,
Finn states, is because OGL’s ‘raison d’être, their way of operating, was very
much geared towards interacting with the local population.’ (Finn 2015) For
Hanlon a PKO ‘can have great influence at the local level, district level, at the
regional level, at the sub-national level’ (Hanlon 2015).
Fig.55 Codes x Descriptors: Interaction with locals
66
Fig.56 Codes x Descriptors: Mission Influence
International Norms For Anonymous, ‘assuming that international norms are the same as UN
norms’, PKOs should help develop international norms, ‘the norm itself is a
goal and so obviously whatever your goal is, you know, however that is
translated in to operational terms would be the reflection of the evaluation.’
(Anonymous 2015)
Fig.57 Codes x Descriptors: International norms
Local Agreements, Economy and Security Local agreements are an outcome of PKOs. ‘We may be able to broker local
arrangements, in fact we’ve brokered arrangements just across the
[Technical] fence here’ (Hanlon 2015) For Anonymous ‘the ability to return is a
key factor because that is basically about the security and the economic
conditions and the … ability of government, support for public services’
(Anonymous 2015).
The output of local security is, for Hanlon, a major success criterion, as
locals, while not having in-depth knowledge of the agreement ‘would have
recognised the blue flag and the blue beret and the white vehicles and the
mission is a good thing because there are no rockets or bombs or aircrafts
strafing where we are living.’ (Hanlon 2015)
Fig.58 Codes x Descriptors: Local Agreements
67
Fig.59 Codes x Descriptors: Local Economy
Fig.60 Codes x Descriptors: Local Security
Success in Failure This paper is concerned with the evaluation of success. However, given its
enthusiasm for Lessons Learned, it is to be expected that the UN can benefit
from the hard lessons of mission failure. Even when a mission is regarded as
an overall failure, it is highly unlikely that it is a complete failure. As noted by
Hanlon ‘we’ve had failures where we’ve had considerable influence in the
betterment of lives.’ (Hanlon 2015).
Fig.61 Codes x Descriptors: Success in Failure
Refugees / Returnees / Safety and Security The protection of Refugees and Returnees (e.g. MINURCAT in Chad) is often
a mandated action for PKOs. For Anonymous, ‘I would say is that in my
experience we have not looked at the outflow of refugees and its impact on
other countries in terms of economic and political cost as a measurement of
mission effectiveness.’ (Anonymous 2015) Given the current IDP crisis in
Syria, UNDOF is currently monitoring a growing IDP presence on the Golan.
Finn explains ‘headquarters would be very conscious of it and would
encourage UNDOF to be supportive of the IDPs within their capabilities’ (Finn
2015). The concern remains ‘that this would become unmanageable if the
conflict erupted to such an extent that you were dealing with thousands of
68
refugees’. (Finn 2015) UNDOF may be better placed to support the
operations of other agencies.
PKOs, though not the lead agency, can act in a supporting role, enabling and
shaping the promotion of a safe and secure environment for both refugees
and returnees, ‘the ability to return is a key factor because that is basically
about the security and the economic conditions’ (Anonymous 2015). This
shaping operation is explained by Finn, gradually as you are facilitating the
host nations or the legitimate military and the security establishments of the
host nation to become established the military element of the peacekeeping
mission should diminish in role’ (Finn 2015). For Anonymous ‘I believe that
the security and stability should be the primary focus in the initial phase and
then sequenced redress of other aspects’ (Anonymous 2015)
Fig.62 Codes x Descriptors: Refugees
Fig.63 Codes x Descriptors: Returnees
Fig.64 Codes x Descriptors: Safety and Security
SG’s Report As previously mentioned, regular reporting is provided to UNSC, ‘where the
reports of the Secretary General show how the mission is achieving it’s
mandate as set out.’ (Finn 2015) For Finn, this ‘is a measure of success or
otherwise of mandate of a mission.’ (Finn 2015) For Anonymous, the
Secretary General’s report ‘is again a sort of a more qualitative assessment of
69
the mandate implementation and how a mission is handling that process and,
you know, from a strategic, political, and operational perspective.’
(Anonymous 2015)
Fig.65 Codes x Descriptors: SG’s Report
Pressure Release Valve PKOs also serve a purpose for parties to the conflict, giving them respite from
combat. The intention would be for this respite to become preferable than a
renewal of armed hostilities. For Hanlon, PKOs can give;
That necessary time where there is a ceasefire, disengagement or
at least kinetic activity has petered out or has stopped for a period of
time to allow people to recover and maybe to take pressure off, to
take a look or to allow other interlocutors come onboard, which can
allow new thinking to come out.
(Hanlon 2015)
Fig.66 Codes x Descriptors: Pressure Release Valve
Prevention of Spillover To contain a conflict, to prevent ‘spillover’, is a PKO output. It is difficult to
evaluate, often the presence of a PKO can produce intangible benefits. It is
related to local security, and it dominated by regional security. Its not just just
in the three missions that we have conjoined here. In the Middle East, where
‘The whole region is raging’ (Hanlon 2015), it is a constant concern. For
Anonymous, assuming a PKO goal is ‘to contain and remove the sources of
violence from the area, in the UNIFIL and UNDOF case, UNDOF has no
ability to stop the spread of the Syrian conflict and in fact it’s not mandated to
70
do so’ (Anonymous 2015). Anonymous believes that though the prevention
of spillover could be a measure, it is ‘simplistic’ (Anonymous 2015).
Fig.67 Codes x Descriptors: Prevention of Spillover
Protection of Civilians Protection of Civilians is increasingly becoming a mandated task of PKOs, ‘its
top priority now in peacekeeping and in all the more recent mandates it’s
highlighted as being a very important key part of all the new missions’ (Finn
2015) However, the Protection of Civilians is not a mandated task for UNDOF
and ‘they don’t have the capacity to provide great protection to civilians’. (Finn
2015) For Finn, any major protection of civilian task would leave UNDOF
unable to fulfill its existing mandate (Finn 2015). Recalling Finn’s thoughts in
‘Mandate’ in regard to confined mandates being unappreciated by host
nations (Finn 2015), such an expectation to deliver Protection of Civilians has
the potential to destroy mission credibility. Given the immense reverberations
of Srebenica it is highly unlikely that PKO forces would not seek to protect
civilians, however this ability must be planned for prior to its need. UNIFIL’s
Protection of Civilian tasks are identified by Anonymous, ‘in UNIFIL it has a
generic mandate to protect, you know, civilians within capacities and in, you
know, under imminent threat’ (Anonymous 2015)
Fig.68 Codes x Descriptors: Protection of Civilians
Tactical Evaluation PKOs, both in their pre-deployment and in-theatre training, are continually
self-evaluating. UNTSO’s in-house training provided to UNMOs is regulated
and obligatory. For Finn, the monthly turnover of incoming and outgoing
71
UNMOs ‘together with the actual physical tests and physical examinations
they do in the first weeks to qualify themselves as fully fledged trained
UNMOs is a strength that we have and I think others can learn from it for
sure.’ (Finn 2015)
Fig.69 Codes x Descriptors: Tactical Evaluation
4.8 Theme: PKO Planning Planning Planning for a PKO ‘would likely be one of the aspects that the evaluation
focuses on, not just for planning itself but for the implications.’ (Anonymous
2015. Given the logistical complexities of setting up a PKO in a country such
as Chad, proper planning is essential to create the foundation of a successful
mission.
Fig.70 Codes x Descriptors: Planning
End State The need to plan for an end state is becoming increasingly evident for PKOs.
‘I think more and more now that it is very much a factor and you hear things
such as security sector reform, rule of law, and disarmament, and
disengagement, all this sort of thing and moving towards an end state.’ (Finn
2015) This goal is continually informing ‘every security report, every report
that is written by UNSCOL, there is always a little thing in there in relation to
efforts or tweaking of efforts to trigger something that might bring about talks
on a permanent peace.’ (Finn 2015) Again, the thinking of Hanlon as
outlined in ‘Pressure Release Valve’ is linked to this goal. The PKO can
72
provide an operational pause and an opportunity for ‘new thinking to come
out.’ (Hanlon 2015)
Fig.71 Codes x Descriptors: End State
Expectation Management The code of ‘Expectation Management’ has been mentioned many times in
this paper. It is appropriate here, in the final theme, to mention once more the
vital role it plays in perceptions of PKO success or otherwise. Public
Information offices within a PKO play an essential role in regulating the public
expectations of a PKO. As already mentioned, a PKO is not a panacea, it is
limited by its mandate, budget, host nation support and many of the other
codes this paper has identified. For Anonymous ‘the expectations, and the
commitments, and obligations that are generated by a mandate can be either
too much for an international organisation to handle effectively … or in
contrast a minimalist mandate is not really understood as such.’ (Anonymous
2015) For Finn, while expectations may be idealistic, this is in keeping with
the strategic goal of peacekeeping ‘accountability you can actually hold, …
there is hope, there is a presence that can deliver hope, and we’ve a
government … being held to account. Its very aspirational and its idealistic,
but we must try to insitutionalise it.’ (Finn 2015)
Fig.72 Codes x Descriptors: Expectation Management
Lessons Learned Throughout this paper, the importance of Lessons Learned has been affirmed.
‘I think it is important that we learn from our experiences.’ (Finn 2015) For
Finn ‘I think the UN generally and other internationals have improved a lot in
learning from each other, the lesson learned aspects of missions now has
73
become much more prevalent.’ (Finn 2015) Finn also notes that ‘the lessons
learned process you know facilitates an evaluation of how things have worked
and I think that is the main mechanism that we have in the UN now’ (Finn
2015).
Hanlon notes that the After Action Review ‘must show what’s relevant to us, in
our construct, the mandate that we’re trying to implement, the theatre that
we’re operating in, the environment that we’re operating in, … and the
governments … attitude towards that mission.’ (Hanlon 2015) The ultimate
purpose of Lessons Learned is ‘to basically capture lessons learned, if you
will, and how to do things better, and best practices which are good examples
for peacekeeping over all.’ (Anonymous 2015)
Fig.73 Codes x Descriptors: Lessons Learned
4.8 Conclusion This chapter has analysed key leaders opinions on the evaluation of PKOs. It
identified 71 codes, and using extracts grouped each code into one of seven
themes. The charting of this procedure was provided, before each theme and
its constituent codes were analysed. The relative mentioning of each
throughout the interviews is depicted below in the Packed Code Cloud. The
analysis revealed a number of issues which the author views as important for
future planning for evaluation of PKOs. These will now be elaborated in
Chapter Five - Discussion.
74
Fig.74 Packed Code Cloud
75
CHAPTER FIVE - CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 5.1 Introduction This chapter presents the implications of the findings of the primary research,
and determines how these findings relate to the literature reviewed.
Conclusions are drawn and recommendations made.
5.2 Implications of findings and conclusions
Bratt (1996 n.p.), Howard (2008: 7) and Diehl and Druckman (2010: 24) all
see benefit in using the mandate as a variable of evaluation. This paper
justifies this, as mandate was found, in both qualitative and quantitative
analyses, to be the single most significant code and evaluative criterion in the
field. As it guides mission planning, informs the PKO commander’s compact,
and is used in interim and end of mission analysis, it cannot be overstated
how key a document it is. Diehl’s recognizes both the problems caused by the
vagueness of the UNTSO mandate (Diehl 1994: 28) and the freedoms it gives
(Diehl 1994: 28), the current Head of Mission for UNTSO regards its
vagueness as a strength (Finn 2015).
Unlike Diehl (1988), this paper reveals Mission Leadership to be critical to
PKO success. While such a finding might be expected when speaking with
professional military commanders, the finding is qualified by a civilian
practitioner also speaking, unprompted, of its importance.
Throughout the primary research, the importance of a structured Lessons
Learned process was repeatedly referred to. While such a process can
inform evaluation, it is in no way commensurate with it. The existence of an
functioning Lessons Learned process can itself be a criterion of evaluation.
And yet this was not reflected in the literature reviewed.
One of the most limiting factors identified in the primary research was national
caveats. These limit the operational command a Force Commander can
exercise, they impede on operational planning and they can subvert unit
76
cohesion. Nevertheless, at no point in the literature reviewed were caveats
identified as potential criteria of evaluation. Such neglect ill serves the
promotion of good peacekeeping policies.
The importance of TCCs in selecting and training their best candidates for
PKOs is evident throughout the primary research. Peacekeepers are
expected to arrive in mission with basic operational competencies.
Peacekeepers must be given the right equipment and tools for peacekeeping,
and such tools include the ability to apply principles of human rights, inter-
cultural and communication skills. While these may be considered ‘soft
power’ skills by some TCC military institutions, they are vital to force
protection and mandate implementation in PKOs. The primary research
indicated that interaction with locals is a measurable activity, and thus suitable
as a criteria of evaluation. During the primary research a development of
DPKO criteria for TCCs was alluded to. Should these skills be evaluated, and
included in pre-deployment training of peacekeepers, they can be expected to
enhance mission success.
Host Nation Support also featured strongly throughout the primary research.
Without it, a PKO has a much more difficult challenge. As alluded to in
primary research, such support must be positive and proactive, and is
pertinent at the tactical, operational and political-strategic levels of PKOs.
Such support must include SOFAs, which are a basic requirement for all
PKOs.
5.3 Recommendations Based on the literature reviewed, many criteria of evaluation have already
been correctly identified and none are unusable. The primary research has
however identified gaps in the evaluation criteria as proposed. This paper
recommends that greater encouragement be given to TCCs to ensure that,
pre-deployment, the requisite training be given to peacekeepers. TCCs
should be strongly discouraged from providing national caveats. Host nations
must be compelled before a PKO deploys to complete SOFAs. Where none
is in place, post-deployment, host nations are strongly to support their
77
creation, as the absence of a SOFA is an unjustifiable limitation on PKOs.
Finally, this paper endorses the continuing care already evident in the
construction of implementable mandates.
78
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ANNEX A: UNDOF Deployment December 2014 (UNDOF 2014b)
86
ANNEX B: General Framework of the Assessment Process
(Sigri and Bașar 2014: 396)
87
ANNEX C: Model of Assessment Process (Sigri and Bașar 2014: 397)
88
Annex D: Interview Schedule
QUESTIONS FOR SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS ON EVALUATION OF DPKO MISSIONS ON THE GOLAN
Participants will be asked for their view of the importance of each of the following factors in the evaluation of peacekeeping missions;
1. Stakeholders - a. International Organisations
i. Reputation and legitimacy b. International Community
i. Prevention of spillover or spread of violence ii. Refugees
1. Economic Cost 2. Political Cost
iii. International norms c. Troop Contributing Nations
i. Interstate competition ii. Resource flow iii. Gain of training and operational experience as opposed
to casualties and fatalities iv. Reimbursement for poorer states
d. Protagonists e. NGOs
i. Competition for funding f. Local population
i. Quality of life ii. Freedom to return to homes iii. Local economy iv. Social effects
2. Time Perspectives
a. Short b. Long
i. Life expectancy ii. Path dependency iii. Intervening forces
c. Temporal Dynamics
3. Mission Type
4. Baselines a. Opportunity costs b. Absence based criteria c. Comparison of pre and post deployment conditions
i. Before / After ii. Interrupted time series
d. Cross-sectional benchmarking
5. Lumping a. Civil society
89
b. Constituent countries support c. Tactics d. Mandate e. Strategy f. Host country support g. Time constraints h. Training
90
ANNEX E: Participant Consent Form
Participation Information and Consent Form
The Evaluation of DPKO’s Middle East Missions.
You are invited to take part in a research study into peacekeeping. This study is being conducted by: Ronan Corcoran as part of the course requirements for a MSc Security, Conflict and International Development, awarded by the University of Leicester, UK. Background Information The purpose of this study is: 1 To identify and critically examine evaluation criteria in order to propose a
standardized system for military commanders and their staff in the field to evaluate the
effects of their peacekeeping operations.
2 To determine key differences between DPKO peacekeeping missions and other
multi-national peace support operations in order to determine whether criteria are valid
and suitable for the current situation.
3 To determine whether all commanders and DPKO have a shared understanding
of current evaluation criteria in order to support a proposed common systematic
evaluation of DPKO missions.
91
2 of 2
Procedures: If you agree to participate in this study, you will be required to: Take part in an hour long interview about the evaluation of DPKO Missions. This interview will be recorded and later transcribed. Confidentiality: Data will be stored securely and only the researcher will have access to it. Any recording or transcripts will be destroyed by 01 October 2015. Voluntary Nature of the Study: Participation in this study is voluntary. This study is being conducted independently from the UN and all DPKO missions. If you do decide to participate, you are free to withdraw at any time and request that all the data that you have provided is destroyed.. Contacts and Questions: If you have any questions please contact Ronan Corcoran at [email protected] . If you have any concerns about your participation in this research please contact my dissertation supervisor Conor Foley at [email protected] . You will be given a copy of this information to keep for your records. Statement of Consent: I have read the above information. I have asked questions and have received answers. I consent to participate in the study. Signature:__________________________________________________ Date: _______________ Signature of Researcher:______________________________________ Date: _______________
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ANNEX F: Adjusted Participant Consent Form for Anonymous
Participation Information and Consent Form
The Evaluation of DPKO’s Golan Missions.
You are invited to take part in a research study into peacekeeping. This study is being conducted by: Ronan Corcoran as part of the course requirements for a MSc Security, Conflict and International Development, awarded by the University of Leicester, UK. Background Information The purpose of this study is: 1 To identify and critically examine evaluation criteria in order to propose a
standardized system for military commanders and their staff in the field to evaluate the
effects of their peacekeeping operations.
2 To determine key differences between DPKO peacekeeping missions and other
multi-national peace support operations in order to determine whether criteria are valid
and suitable for the current situation.
3 To determine whether all commanders and DPKO have a shared understanding
of current evaluation criteria in order to support a proposed common systematic
evaluation of DPKO missions.
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Procedures: If you agree to participate in this study, you will be required to: Take part in an hour long interview about the evaluation of DPKO Missions. This interview will be recorded and later transcribed. Confidentiality: Data will be stored securely and only the researcher will have access to it. Any recording or transcripts will be destroyed by 01 October 2015. No statements or inferences will be attributed to the interviewee. The interviewee will be identified, if necessary, as ‘anonymous’. The transcript will be provided for review / correction. Voluntary Nature of the Study: Participation in this study is voluntary. This study is being conducted independently from the UN and all DPKO missions. If you do decide to participate, you are free to withdraw at any time and request that all the data that you have provided is destroyed. Contacts and Questions: If you have any questions please contact Ronan Corcoran at [email protected] . If you have any concerns about your participation in this research please contact my dissertation supervisor Conor Foley at [email protected] . You will be given a copy of this information to keep for your records. Statement of Consent: I have read the above information. I have asked questions and have received answers. I consent to participate in the study. Signature:__________________________________________________ Date: _______________ Signature of Researcher:______________________________________ Date: _______________
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ANNEX G: UNSCR 50
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ANNEX H: UNSCR 2192
United Nations S/RES/2192 (2014)
Security Council Distr.: General 18 December 2014
14-67524 (E) *1467524*
Resolution 2192 (2014)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 7346th meeting, on 18 December 2014
The Security Council,
Noting with concern that the situation in the Middle East is tense and is likely to remain so, unless and until a comprehensive settlement covering all aspects of the Middle East problem can be reached,
Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) of 28 November 2014 (S/2014/859), and also reaffirming its resolution 1308 (2000) of 17 July 2000,
Stressing that both parties must abide by the terms of the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic and scrupulously observe the ceasefire,
Concurring with the Secretary-General’s findings that the ongoing military activities conducted by any actor in the area of separation continue to have the potential to escalate tensions between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic, jeopardize the ceasefire between the two countries, and pose a risk to the local civilian population and United Nations personnel on the ground,
Expressing grave concern at all violations of the Disengagement of Forces Agreement,
Stressing that there should be no military forces in the area of separation other than those of UNDOF,
Strongly condemning the recent intense fighting in the area of separation, calling on all parties to the Syrian domestic conflict to cease military actions in the UNDOF area of operation and to respect international humanitarian law, and further condemning the use by armed Syrian extremist groups of improvised explosive devices in the UNDOF area of operation,
Condemning the use of heavy weapons by both the Syrian armed forces and armed groups in the ongoing Syrian conflict in the area of separation, including the use of tanks by the Syrian armed forces and opposition during clashes,
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Echoing the Secretary-General’s call upon all parties to the Syrian domestic conflict to cease military actions throughout the country, including in the UNDOF area of operation,
Strongly condemning the incidents threatening the safety and security of United Nations personnel in recent months, including the detention of 45 UNDOF peacekeepers by the Al-Nusra Front, stressing that there can never be any justification for these attacks on and detention of UN peacekeepers, and emphasizing the need to hold those responsible accountable,
Reaffirming its readiness to consider listing individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities providing support to ISIL or to the Al-Nusra Front, including those who are financing, arming, planning, or recruiting for ISIL or the Al -Nusra Front and all other individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities associated with Al -Qaida under the 1267/1989 (Al-Qaida) sanctions regime, including those participating in or otherwise supporting attacks against UN peacekeepers,
Recognizing the necessity of efforts to flexibly adjust UNDOF’s posture on a temporary basis to minimize the security risk to UN personnel as UNDOF continues to implement its mandate, while emphasizing that the ultimate goal is for the peacekeepers to return to their positions in UNDOF’s area of operations as soon as practicable,
Underscoring the need for UNDOF to have at its disposal all necessary means and resources to carry out its mandate safely and securely, and recalling that the theft of United Nations weapons and ammunition, vehicles and other assets, and the looting and destruction of United Nations facilities, are unacceptable,
Expressing its profound appreciation to UNDOF’s military and civilian personnel, including those from Observer Group Golan, for their service and continued contribution, in an increasingly challenging operating environment, underscoring the important contribution UNDOF’s continued presence makes to peace and security in the Middle East, welcoming steps taken to enhance the safety and security of UNDOF, including Observer Group Golan, personnel, and stressing the need for continued vigilance to ensure the safety and security of UNDOF and Observer Group Golan personnel,
1. Calls upon the parties concerned to implement immediately its resolution 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973;
2. Stresses the obligation on both parties to scrupulously and fully respect the terms of the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement, calls on the parties to exercise maximum restraint and prevent any breaches of the ceasefire and the area of separation, and underscores that there should be no military activity of any kind in the area of separation, including military operations by the Syrian Arab Armed Forces;
3. Underlines that there should be no military activity of the armed opposition groups in the area of separation, and urges Member States to convey strongly to the Syrian armed opposition groups in UNDOF’s area of operation to halt all activities that endanger United Nations peacekeepers on the ground and to accord the United Nations personnel on the ground the freedom to carry out their mandate safely and securely;
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4. Calls on all groups other than UNDOF to abandon all UNDOF positions and the Quneitra crossing point, and return the peacekeepers ’ vehicles, weapons, and other equipment;
5. Calls on all parties to cooperate fully with the operations of UNDOF, to respect its privileges and immunities and to ensure its freedom of movement, as well as the security of and unhindered and immediate access for the United Nations personnel carrying out their mandate, including the unimpeded delivery of UNDOF equipment and the temporary use of alternative ports of entry and departure, as required, to ensure safe and secure troop rotation and resupply activities, in conformity with existing agreements, and urges prompt reporting by the Secretary-General to the Security Council and troop-contributing countries of any actions that impede UNDOF’s ability to fulfil its mandate;
6. Welcomes the efforts being undertaken by the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force to implement the Secretary-General’s zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse and to ensure full compliance of its personnel with the United Nations code of conduct, requests the Secretary-General to continue to take all necessary action in this regard and to keep the Security Council informed, and urges troop-contributing countries to take preventive and disciplinary action to ensure that such acts are properly investigated and punished in cases involving their personnel;
7. Decides to renew the mandate of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force for a period of six months, that is, until 30 June 2015, and requests the Secretary-General to ensure that UNDOF has the required capacity and resources to fulfil the mandate in a safe and secure way;
8. Requests the Secretary-General to report every 90 days on developments in the situation and the measures taken to implement resolution 338 (1973).
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