United Nations interventionism: peacekeeping operations in Kosovo

United Nations interventionism: peacekeeping operations in Kosovo, Eurolimes Vol. 18, Autumn 2014, Oradea University Press, pp. 129-145

1

United Nations interventionism: peacekeeping operations in Kosovo

MÉSZÁROS Edina Lilla1

Abstract: The Kosovo crisis was in the air for a long time, since the first protests of the

Kosovar Albanians in 1981, after Tito's death continued to grow during the disintegration of the

Yugoslav Federation in the early 1990s. The intervention of the international community in the

summer of 1999 whose legality was and is still questioned, apparently managed to end the war,

but not animosities and ethnic discrimination between Serbs and Albanians. This paper seeks to

find answers to several questions, including the effectiveness of the peacekeeping process and of

international interventions in post-conflict areas and their contribution to a more stable peace.

The objective of the research is to describe the peacekeeping activities deployed in the unstable

region of Kosovo and to analyze their role played on the international security system and their

effects on the civilian population from the province. This paper aims to initiate in the backstage

of the phenomenon of peacekeeping, bringing the pros and cons in terms of efficiency of the

KFOR troops in Kosovo.

Keywords: blue helmets, Agenda for Peace, Tito, Eulex, Racak, Multinational Brigades

Origins of the peacekeeping phenomenon

The study of peacekeeping operations was surnamed an isolated backwater in the

field of International Relations during the Cold War, but a succession of new operations

launched in the late 80s and 90s - in Namibia, Cambodia, Somalia, Bosnia have managed

to draw out peacekeeping form obscurity, transforming it into the mainstream of

International Relations Scholarship.2 We must acknowledge that the majority of the

writings on peacekeeping from the early post-Cold War period compassed only some

single case studies that were criticized for lacking theoretical foundations. Since then,

driven by the necessity and curiosity of identifying and explaining the causes that make

some operations more successful than others, the rudiments regarding the peacekeeping

operations have deepened, leading to a certain maturity of the theoretical enterprise.3In

our days the study of the phenomenon of peacekeeping and its various operations occupy

a very important place on the agenda of researchers and scholars, whose greatest concern

is to offer to the readers as an impartial and objective image as possible, underlining both

the successes and the failures of these operations.

Peacekeeping missions and operations under the auspices of the United Nations,

in the form of the emplacement of a team or force of “blue helmets” had to cover a long

1PhD. student UBB Cluj-Napoca in International Relations and Security Studies, University of Oradea,

[email protected] 2Roland Paris, “Peacekeeping and the Constraints of Global Culture,” in European Journal of International

Relations, Vol. 9, no. 3, (September 2003): 441, accessed April 21, 2014,

http://ejt.sagepub.com/content/9/3/441.abstract. 3Ibid., 442.


2

road form their origins as observer forces that were deployed in the immediate post-war

era as a result of the emergence of new states and zones of influence.4

At the end of World War II, the idea of creating an international force for the

collective global security had been delineating in the minds of the forgers of the United

Nation’s Charter.5Recognizing the eager necessity of the creation of such international

force, but acknowledging at the same time the disapproval of the great powers regarding

forces that imply the idea of collective security, in the second half of the 1940s6, the UN

Secretary-General, Trygve Lie came out with a path breaking proposal, suggesting the

creation of international forces based on the model of observer groups, then operating in

the Middle East. His proposal marked the beginning of that movement, which has

advocated for the appearance of international troops that were not designed for collective

security purposes. Unfortunately, even this limited plan had failed to obtain the approval

of the United Nations Security Council, specially the consent of the Soviet Union.

In his work NATO and Peacekeeping, Robert J. Jackson affirms that the first so

called peacekeeping mission was the UNTSO or United Nations Truce Supervision

Organization, deployed in 1948 in the Middle East between Israel and the Arab States.7

After familiarizing with other sources we realize that the Middle East was the first region

witnessing the emplacement of the first genuine peacekeeping forces when UNEF

(United Nations Emergency Force I) was launched in 1956 to replace the French, English

and Israeli troops in the Suez Crisis. The significant difference between UNTSO and

UNEF I is the simple fact that while the first had only an observer and supervisory task,

the second was empowered to intervene between the hostile parties in the case of an

erupting conflict.8It has been 66 years since the first UN peace observation team

(UNTSO) was sent on the field and more than 50 years since the precedent-setting

deployment of the UNEF I in the Middle East. During this time, there have been various

proposals toward institutionalizing the UN peacekeeping operations and toward creating

a permanent peacekeeping force.9

The use of the veto right in the UN Security Council had impede the organization

from deploying its forces into power blocks or other zones of influence which were

situated at the clash point of big superpowers, this having nefarious effects on the

peacekeeping mechanism, culminating first in a 6 year break between 1967-1973, and a

second one between 1978-1988, period when no new peacekeeping operation was

authorized by the Security Council.10

The “warming up” of the relations between the two superpowers (USA and Soviet

Union) and the profound change in the international security environment had a positive

effect upon the peacekeeping mechanism, giving birth to new operations, extending the

4Nigel D. White, “U.N. Peacekeeping – Development or Destruction?,” in International Relations, Vol. 12,

no.1, (April 1994): 129, accessed April 29, 2014, http://ire.sagepub.com/content/12/1/129.citation. 5 Paul F. Diehl, “A Permanent UN Peacekeeping Force: An Evaluation,” in Security Dialogue, Vol. 20, no.

1, (1989): 28, accessed April 20, 2014, http://sdi.sagepub.com/content/20/1/27.extract. 6Larry L. Fabian, Soldiers without Enemies: Preparing the United Nations for Peacekeeping (Washington:

Brookings Institution, 1971), 73. 7Robert J. Jackson, “NATO and Peacekeeping,” Cambridge, Final Report for NATO Fellowship (30 June

1997): 10, accessed May 03, 2014, http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/95-97/jackson.pdf. 8 Paul F. Diehl, “A Permanent UN Peacekeeping Force ...,”28.

9 Ibid., 27.

10 Nigel D. White, ”U.N. Peacekeeping – Development or Destruction,” 129.


3

practice of peacekeeping in places like El Salvador, Cambodia, Mozambique, Somalia,

East Timor, and Yugoslav States.11

What does the term peacekeeping mean and which are the principles which

lie on its basis?

After this little historical bypass it is essential to clarify the meaning of the term

peacekeeping. Familiarizing with the specialised literature, one can find various

explanations of the notion of peacekeeping. One scholar is identifying the term as a

“political mechanism that uses military means for the creation of certain conditions which

facilitates the regulation of controversies between conflicting parties.”12

We can say that

the phenomenon of peacekeeping occupies the twilight between war and peace in which

the law hasn’t been established yet, while the peacekeeping operation “is a technique

designed for the preservation of peace and security at an international level, numbering

between the long range of activities undertaken by the United Nations and other

international actors.”13

Alex Morrison form the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre understands

by this notion “actions which are destined to increase international peace, security and

stability, which posses the authorization of competent national and international

organizations, being undertaken individually or in a cooperative manner by civil and

military agencies.” 14

In An Agenda for Peace the former UN Secretary-General, Boutros

Ghali identifies peacekeeping with the launch on field of UN forces, having the consent

of the belligerent parties, involving military and/or police and civil personnel of the

United Nations.15

As we see explanations and opinions vary, but they all agree upon the fact that

peacekeeping itself does not involve any enforcement action: indeed the peacekeeping

troops are not designed to affect the military balance in the specific area, meaning the

placement of interposition forces between conflicting parties (which is different from

unarmed observer forces).16

For the peacekeeping missions to be crowned with success it is indispensable to

respect the three principles which stay on its basis. Here we speak about the Trinity of:17

11

Ibid. 12

Nicholas Tsagourias, ”Consent, Neutrality/Impartiality and the Use of Force in Peacekeeping: The

Constitutional Dimension,” in Journal of Conflict and Security Law, Vol. 11, no. 3, ( Winter 2006): 468,

accessed May 04, 2014, http://jcsl.oxfordjournals.org/content/11/3/465.full. 13

United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPO), ”United Nations Peacekeeping

Operations, Principles and Guidelines,”, approved by J. – M. Guehenno on 18th

of January, 2008, 17,

accessed April 23, 2014, http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf. 14

Major D. M. Last, “From Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding Theories Cases, Experiments and Solutions,”

Royal Military College Working Paper, Kingston, Ontario, (May 1999): 6, accessed 10 January 2014,

www.rmc.ca/academic/poli-econ/last/pkpb-rmc-r4.pdf, the link is not functional. 15

“An Agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping,” Report of the

Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31

January, A/47/277-S/24111, 17 June 1992, 5, accessed April 23, 2014,

http://www.unrol.org/files/a_47_277.pdf. 16

P. F. Diehl, “A Permanent UN Peacekeeping Force ...,” 28. 17

UNDPO, „United Nations Peacekeeping Operations...,”17.


4

1) Consent of the parties: every peacekeeping operation must be implemented in a

region only after having the approval of the conflicting parties. If this consent is

not given, or it is forced out by using some political, economical or military

pressure, the operation itself risks becoming an active participant in the conflict,

this way exceeding its initial intrinsic role of peacekeeping.

2) Impartiality/Neutrality: is the second pillar of the peacekeeping operations

underlining the fact that those empowered with the application of peacekeeping

operations always have to be objective and impartial in their dialogue with the

conflicting parties.

3) Use of force only for self-defence: this principle refers to the fact that those

operations which were entrusted with peacekeeping do not represent enforcement

measures; the only way of using force is on tactical level. Although by conferring

to peacekeeping operations “robust mandates” the Security Council gave its

approval for using all the necessary means to prevent the destruction of the

political and peace process, protecting at the same time the civil population from

an imminent physical attack, assisting to the maintenance of the rule of law by the

local authorities. It is elementary to know that soldiers participating in a UN

peacekeeping mission can only use force as a last mean, when every other

peaceful enforcement and pressure tools and means have been exploited.

Living with the words of the former UN Secretary-General, Boutros Ghali the

respect and honour of this Trinity of principles are essential for a positive end of every

peacekeeping operation, this being valid for the subject of our research, for the

peacekeeping mission from Kosovo.18

General legal basis of peacekeeping operations

Reading these lines one may wonder, yes we know what a peacekeeping

operation means, how did it appear and after which principles is guided, but we don’t

know who and what law provides the legal background to the United Nations that allows

the creation and the deployment of such forces in various countries of the world?

The International Community, together with the UN, affirms the responsibility to

use all the necessary diplomatic and humanitarian means, in straight accordance with the

7th

and 8th

Chapter of the UN Charter to provide help for the local civilian population,

protecting them from genocide, war crimes giving birth to the doctrine of responsibility

to protect.19

Before drawing any type of conclusion it is necessary to acknowledge the fact that

the term “peacekeeping” appears nowhere in the “so called” UN Constitution (or UN

Charter), and that the debates regarding its legality have reached to be an important

18

United Nations General Assembly, “Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-

General on the Occasion of Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations,” Report of the Secretary-General of

the Work of the Organization, A/50/60 – S/1995/1(1995),

Art. 33, accessed May 01, 2014,

http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/50/plenary/a50-60.htm. 19

Susan C. Breau, „The Impact of the Responsibility on Peacekeeping,” in Journal of Conflict and Security

Law, Vol. 11, no. 3, (January 2007): 430, accessed April 28, 2014,

http://jcsl.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/11/3/429


5

subject on the agenda of the International Court of Justice, which categorically refused to

identify a specific article as the legal basis of the peacekeeping operations. Of course like

everything in this world, this problem also can be interpreted in different ways, and the

United Nations and other competent international actors construe the issue for their own

benefit. Although Article 2(7) prohibits the United Nations to intervene in the domestic

affairs of a country, but at the same time fails to identify which these domestic affairs in

concern would be.20

Article 24 from Chapter VII of the UN Charter empowers the UN Security

Council with the primary responsibility to maintain peace and international

security.21

According to Article 39 the Security Council when it apprehends a possible

threat to peace, violation of peace or act of aggression, can apply some means, like the

total break of diplomatic relations, embargos and even the use of force, if it’s necessary.22

The possibility of deployment of cross-border forces lies in the Article 51 which even

recognizes the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in the case of an

armed attack against one member of the UN.23

After the analyses of these judicial aspects of the peacekeeping operations it’s up

to the reader to decide whether the United Nations possesses enough rights to deploy

peacekeeping troops in the sensitive and insecure parts of the world. However one thing

is certain, the fact that international legitimacy is one of the most important foundation of

UN peacekeeping operations, deriving from the fact that it came into existence only after

getting an authorization from the Security Council, of which most important and primary

responsibility is to maintain the world peace and balance.

The Kosovo crises and the road which was paved with the blood of the

innocent

Before deciphering the peacekeeping operations in Kosovo it is proper to reveal

the causes which led to the eruption of the war, after which the international presence was

absolutely necessary. For many is not a surprise to hear that the territory of Kosovo has

been a subject of dispute between the Serb and Albanian for many centuries, the roots of

the conflicts dating back to the medieval period.24

For most of the 20th

century the Serbs have been in a minority in Kosovo, in 1912

Serbia annexed the province, this act being recognized by the Treaty of Versailles in

1918. After the end of the 2nd

world conflagration Josip Broz Tito the leader of the

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, became the ruler of the autonomous province of

Kosovo, which at that precise moment compiled as an integral part of the federation.

20

Gareth Evans, Mohamed Sahnoun, “The Responsibility to Protect,” Report of the International

Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Ottawa, Published by International Development

Research Centre, 2001, 47, accessed May 06, 2014, http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf. 21

Ibid. 22

United Nations, “A More Secure World: Our shared responsibility,” Report of the High-level Panel on

Threats, Challenges and Change „”2004, Part 3, 62, accessed May 07, 2014,

http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pdf/historical/hlp_more_secure_world.pdf . 23

Ibid., 63. 24

Hugo Beach, ”Interventions and Just Wars: The Case of Kosovo,” in Studies in Christian Ethics, Vol. 13,

no. 2, (August 2000): 17, accessed April 23, 2014, http://sce.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/13/2/15.


6

Based on a very crafty diplomacy, Tito was able to quell every nationalist and separatist

movement, preventing every constitutive element of the federation to gain dominance

over the other.25

With the Constitution of 1974, which gave a larger autonomy to the little

province from the heart of the Balkans, he gained respect and prestige amongst the

Albanian speaking population.26

The Serbian nationalism never managed to swallow the provisions of the

Constitution of 1974, considering that the Titoist leadership with this “ustav”27

crumbled

Serbia in 3 parts (Serbia, Voivodina and Kosovo), making possible the birth of a new

Albanian country inside the body of the holy Serbian state. Their claims have found

justification in the phenomenon of the ‘Albanianisation’ of the region, which precisely

can be dated at the time of the extended autonomy, almost tripling the number of the

Albanian population, increasing from 480.000 (1948) to 1.227.000 in 1981.28

This

‘Albanianisation’ policy forced many Serbs to leave the region, complaining of

discrimination, but in reality it was caused by economic reasons (low life standards),

reducing the Serbs share to less than 10%. If we can give credit to numbers of the

scholar, Carl Savich during 1971-1988 an estimated number of 128.000 had left the

province, migrating beyond the borders.29

In 1986-87 Slobodan Milosevic rose to power in Serbia on the back of Serb

grievances against those who speak the language of the eagles ‘sqip’30

in Kosovo. His

objective of creating Great Serbia by reintegrating the autonomous regions in the body of

Serbia was succeeded on 28th

of March 1989, when he revoked the Albanian autonomy

putting the province under the vigilant eyes of the Serbian central government.31

He

installed “draconian rules”, banning the Albanian language in schools and offices, firing

Albanian speaking officials from the government, depriving the common people from

access to state run educational and health institutions.32

To counteract the despotic rule of

Milosevic, in 1992, under the moderate, pacifist leadership of Ibrahim Rugova a strategy

of passive resistance was adopted, with the creation and the setting up of a parallel state;

also new constitution was proclaimed and elections were held.33

The role of this ‘shadow

government’ was to stimulate the feelings of national unity and to forestall the attention

of the international community in a non-violent manner over the abuses and atrocities

committed by the Serbian authorities against the civilian Albanian community.34

Unfortunately for the international community the Kosovo issue till 1998 was of a

secondary importance, the problem of the little region from the Balkans missing from the

25

László Szabó, A koszovói válság [The Kosovo Crisis] (Budapest: Honvéd Kiadó, 1999), 8. 26

Carl. K. Savich, “The Kosovo Crisis: Origins and History,” 2000, accessed April 24, 2014,

http://www.rastko.rs/kosovo/istorija/csavich-kosovo_crisis.html. 27

Meaning constitution 28

Miranda Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian. A History of Kosovo (New York: Columbia University

Press, 1998), 195. 29

Carl K. Savich, “The Kosovo Crisis…”. 30

Kosovar Albanian 31

Lenard J. Cohen, “Post-Federalism and Judicial Change in Yugoslavia: The Rise of Ethno-Political

Justice, in International Political Science Review, Vol. 13, no. 3, (July 1992): 313, accessed May 04, 2014,

http://ips.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/13/3/301, pp. 301-319. 32

Stephen Schwartz, Kosovo: Background to a War (London: Mark Hegarty Anthem Press, 2001), 129. 33

Hugo Beach, “Interventions and Just Wars...”, 17. 34

László Szabó, A koszovói válság..., 10.


7

day to day agenda of the big world superpowers, these agreeing on the fact that the

Kosovo question was an internal affair of Serbia, and because of this specific reason its

involvement would be inappropriate and illegal.35

In 1995, however, the Dayton Agreement recognized Serbia and Montenegro as

the new Yugoslavia, within existing boundaries, with no special recognition for the status

of Kosovo. Arguably this was a great opportunity missed, fostering the dissatisfaction of

the Albanian speaking Kosovar population, culminating in the switch of allegiance from

the strategy of passive resistance to the Kosovo Liberation Army or UCK( Ushtria

Klirimtare e Kosoves), a sort of terrorist group, using guerilla tactics, seeking secession

by violent means.36

By 1998 the scale of violent incidents initiated by the KLA in the Drenica and Pec

region had brought heavy-handed reprisals by the Yugoslav security forces.37

The

extensive investigation of the Human Rights Watch revealed that these events have

constituted a ‘crucial moment’38

in the so called Kosovo crises.

As an answer, the Security Council imposed an arms embargo on the area by the

UN Resolution 1160, sanctioning the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, but during the

summer of 1998 the scale of violence increased.39

In September the Security Council

called for a cease-fire to end the violence by UN Resolution 1199 and a month later it

established an international supervision in the region under the auspices of the

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).40

The OSCE Verification

Mission, an international team of 2000 civilian observers received green light to

supervise the cease-fire, to protect the human rights of every ethnic group from Kosovo,

and also to investigate the possible violations of these rights.41

In January 1999 Yugoslav security forces executed some 45 Albanian civilians at

Racak using the pretext of destroying a KLA terrorist nest. Later the international

observer groups proclaimed the events as a bloody massacre, succeeding this way to

awake the faded attention of the international public opinion.42

As a last measure for calming the spirits can be identified the peace conference

convened at Rambouillet under the joint chairmanship of the 2 most distinguished

members of the Contact Group43

, United Kingdom and France, which held sessions

between 16-23 February and 15-19 March. The aim of this conference was to manage to

put the conflicting parties in front of a negotiating table and to forge a compromise,

35

József Juhász, István Magyari, Péter Tálas, LászlóValki, Koszovó egy válság anatómiája [Kosovo, the

Anatomy of a Crisis] (Budapest: Osiris Kiadó, 2000), 52. 36

András Borsányi, A Koszovói Felszabadítási Hadsereg (UCK) rejtélye [The Enigma of the Kosovo

Liberation Army] (Budapest: Bona-L Bt, 2000), 47. 37

Independent International Commission on Kosovo, “The Kosovo Report,” Oxford, Oxford University

Press, Oxford, 2000, 68, accessed April 12, 2014,

http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/6D26FF88119644CFC1256989005CD392-

thekosovoreport.pdf. 38

Ibid. 39

László Szabó, A koszovói válság...,. 27. 40


László Szabó, A koszovói válság...,. 30-31. 42

“The Kosovo Report”, 83. 43

UK, France, Italy, Germany, USA, Russia.


8

whereby the Albanians were promised enough freedom to persuade them to stop the

fighting, while the Serbs were reassured that the province would remain part of Serbia.

By the 19th

of March the Albanian representatives had accepted the Rambouillet

proposals, but the Serbs never did so, instead of reaching an accord, Milosevic continued

to pull heavy weapons in the province.44

On the 22nd

of March the American special

envoy, Richard Holbrook delivered an ultimatum to Milosevic which was rejected. The

OSCE Verification Mission withdrew its members and on the following day the NATO

air strikes began. The ensuing campaign which lasted for 78 days was code named

Operation Allied Force.45

This NATO campaign can be considered a total success, because on the 9th

of

June 1999 at Kumanovo, Milosevic accepted the retreat of all Serbian military and

paramilitary forces from the province, giving relay to some international troops lead by

the North Atlantic Organization.46

However accepting the earned values of the Operation

of Allied Force, many scholars argue and put under a question mark the legality of this

military intervention. Their doubts find a certain type of justification in the inexistence of

an authorization of the UN Security Council at the beginning of the air campaign. Article

53 from Chapter 7 of the UN Charter seems to give foundation to their grievances,

because it clearly affirms that no type of enforcement actions can be taken by regional

agencies or actors without possessing an authorization from the UN Security Council.47

The question of legality, morality and also the dilemma of the so called

humanitarian intervention in Kosovo have become one of the ‘open ended’ discussions

inside the groves of international politics, on which researchers and analysts hardly will

reach to an agreement.

The international presence in Kosovo, peacekeeping operations and various

missions

After the end of the air campaign, the United Nations Security Council adopted

Resolution 1244, elaborating the principles after which the province had to be

reconstructed and administrated. One of the most important provisions of this document

which refers to authorization given by the UN Security Council to relevant member states

and international organizations to establish the international security presence in the

region with the substantial presence of the North Atlantic Organization, empowering this

44

József Juhász et. al., Koszovó egy válság anatómiája, 200. 45


Enrico Milano, “Security Council Action in the Balkans: Reviewing the Legality of Kosovo’ s Territorial

Status,” in European Journal of International Law, Vol. 14, no. 5, (2003): 1001, accessed April 23, 2014,

http://ejil.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/14/5/999. 47

Niels Blokker, “Is the Authorization Authorized? Powers and Practice of the UN Security Council to

Authorize the Use of Force by ’Coalitions of the Able and Willing’,” in European Journal of International

Law, Vol. 11, no. 3, (2000): 551, accessed April 23, 2014,

http://ejil.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/11/3/541.


9

international presence to use all the necessary means for providing a safe and secure

environment, facilitating the return of refugees and of all the displaced persons.48

The reconstruction of the region devastated by the war was designed on 4 pillars:

the United Nations was charged with administrative tasks; the UNHCR (United Nations

High Commissioner for Refugees) as even its name reveals was made responsible with

the reallocation of all the displaced persons, while the OSCE was envisioned to take care

of the process of ‘democratization’ of the region, emphasizing on the protection of human

rights in an impartial manner, for every ethnic group, and last but not the least the

European Union was charged with the economic recovery.49

As a 5th

non-official pillar

steps on the stage KFOR or the NATO Kosovo Force, responsible for the creation of a

security milieu, without being tied or subordinated in any way to the United Nations

Interim Administration Mission. Amongst these international actors a strong cooperation

was needed and each of them was driven by the same goal of setting up a functioning

security and legal system which can be self-sustainable.50

The most important from these international actors, constituting the main theme

of our research is KFOR. We must know that the first KFOR contingents arrived in the

region on the 12th

of June 1999, reaching until 2001 a number of 50.000 troops.51

These

NATO effectives represent the multi-dimensional form of the peacekeeping operations,

deployed in post-conflict zones, including a mix of strategies, like military, civilian and

police capacities, aimed at building a sustainable environment through the

implementation of a peace accord. Other analysts identify the NATO troops from Kosovo

as forming part of the ‘second generation’52

of peacekeeping.

At the beginning of the post-conflict operation KFOR was divided into 5

Multinational Brigades, splitting the province into 5 sectors of control. Each one of these

brigades named a military officer with enough high rank to become the commandant of

these multinational brigades. The Supreme Commandment was established in Pristina,

and the other 5 regional Brigades were lead at North by the French, Italians (North-

West), by the British in the centre, Germans ruling the South-West of the province and

the remaining South-East sector was put under a tight American control.53

The problem

with this division was that inside every brigade each nation has developed its own

48

Michael J. Matheson, “United Nations Governance of Postconflict Societies,” in The American Journal

of International Law, Vol. 95, no. 1, (January 2001): 79, accessed May 02, 2014,

http://www.jstor.org/pss/2642038. 49

Andreas Heinemann-Grüder, Igor Grebenschikov, “Security Governance by Internationals: The Case of

Kosovo,” in International Peacekeeping, Vol. 13, no. 1, (2006): 44, accessed May 04, 2014,

http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a741534984~db=all~order=page. 50

Ibid. 51

Organizaţia Tratatului Nord Atlantic, Manualul NATO [NATO Manual] (Bruxelles: Office of Information

and Press NATO, 2001), 87. 52

László Z. Kiss, Lessons of the Kosovo War Dilemmas Regarding Abilities of NATO and the EU to

Manage National and Ethnic Conflicts in Central and South-Eastern Europe (Budapest: PXP, 2001), 18. 53

Thomas S. Sowers, “Beyond the Soldier and the State: Contemporary Operations and Variance in

Principal-Agent Relationships,” in Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 31, no. 3, (2005): 387, accessed May 12,

2014, http://afs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/31/3/385.


10

identity and work agenda, fact that many times led to serious controversies between these

nations.54

It is important for us to know that beside its administrative role, from 2003 the

UNMIK was charged with other responsibilities as well, various Civilian and Military

Police Units joining its structure, which hand in hand with the NATO military forces had

initiated and carried out operations which envisioned security aspects.55

The UNMIK

Police was empowered to lead investigations, to arrest and patrol in zones of high risk,

alone or accompanied by the KFOR troops. Perhaps the uniqueness of this peacekeeping

operation lays in the fact that these previously enumerated tasks are absolutely new for

some units that form part of an organization empowered to carry out the administrative

duties of the province.56

Focusing attention on the initial mandate of the Kosovo peacekeeping forces, we

realize that it did compress many activities of which we will list only the most relevant

ones, like preventing the renewal of the hostilities by creating a safe environment for all

the citizens, without taking account of their national membership, contributing to the

demilitarization of the KLA, providing at the same time support for the international

humanitarian efforts.57

If we dig even deeper we acknowledge that between the

obligations of the Kosovo peacekeeping troops appear some actions which facilitate the

return of refugees and displaced persons, medical assistance, protection of minorities and

cultural patrimonies, nonetheless border control and the deactivation of war mines.

A special attention is granted to the protection of minorities, this including regular

patrols, in the minority enclaves, check points, and escorts for minority groups. After

checking the research material we whiteness the tremendous efforts undertaken by the

security forces every day for laying the foundations of a safe zone for all the civilians, to

enjoy finally a normal life, a life of which they were deprived for many years.58

To honour their responsibility they undertook daily over 800 patrols, guarding

more than 550 key objectives and supervising over 250 vehicle check points. If we can

give credit to the statistics each day 2 of 3 soldiers were engaged in security operations.59

The failure of those who maintain peace

Due to the large number of international organizations present in Kosovo, many

times the security responsibilities were overlapping and were not clearly defined, driving

to controversies among these actors. One might identify this situation with famous

proverb in which the child, which in our case is Kosovo, remains lost between midwifes,

which are the international organizations.

54

Clive Baldwin, “Implementation through Cooperation? Human Rights Officers and the Military in

Kosovo 1999- 2002,” in International Peacekeeping, Vol.13, no .4, (December 2006): 492, accessed May

06, 2014, http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a767881404~db=all~order=page. 55

A.ndreas Heinemann-Grüder, Igor Grebenschikov, “Security Governance by Internationals...,” 44. 56

Katarina Månsson, “Cooperation in Human Rights: Experience from the Peace Operation in Kosovo,” in

International Peacekeeping, Vol. 8, no. 4, (2001): 119, accessed May 12, 2014,

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13533310108413923?journalCode=finp20#.VMk_eiyjuIQ. 57

KFOR Official Homepage, “Kosovo Force,” accessed April 12, 2014, http://www.aco.nato.int/kfor.aspx. 58

Clive Baldwin, “Implementation through Cooperation...,”493. 59

Manualul NATO, 86.


11

First we must speak about the lack of cooperation between the different

Multinational Brigades, every leading nation stepping on the road established by itself, at

many times culminating with conflicting arrangements and contradictory agendas.60

The first failure of those who keep the peace can be identified the incapability of

the KFOR military troops together with the UNMIK Police Units to forestall the

escalation of violent attacks against the non-Albanian community (in majority Serbs,

Gypsies, and Slav Muslims), some members of the kosovar Albanian community were

being accused of ‘collaboration’ 61

against the Serbs. According to the statistics provided

by the UNMIK officials, around 271 Serbs were killed, and about 650 were missing, not

much time after the end of the war. Espen Eide and Tor Holm have noticed that the “lack

of a concrete official response had driven to even more violence, assassinations and

criminal activities, meanwhile reducing the feeling of security”.62

Reading the provisions of the 1244 Resolution we find the demobilization and

demilitarization of the well known Kosovo Liberation Army. If we dig deeper we won’t

find the wanted results in this case, because KFOR and UNMIK not just didn’t carry on

the demilitarization mission, but even more they have permitted this guerrilla and

terrorist group to resurrect from its ashes as phoenix bird, reorganizing itself in a new

military force, the Kosovo Protection Corps.63

While for the international community the creation of the KPC was a matter of

compromise, for the kosovar Albanian people it represented the nucleus of a future

Albanian army. The commanders of the peacekeeping forces agreed on that it’s more

advantageous for the peacekeeping process to have the former KLA members “in the

KPC, than in the mountains and uncontrolled.”64

Relations between the KPC,

respectively UNMIK/KFOR remained cordial until 2000-2001, when the ties between the

two entities have began to degrade, mostly due to the appearance of such founded

rumours about high ranked KPC officers involved in organized crime, and in terrorist

attacks against the Serbian minorities.65

By 2000 the safety has deteriorated in Kosovo, especially in the region of the

mixed city of Mitrovica. To improve the situation it was appealed to the introduction in

the judicial system of international judges, increasing at the same time the tasks of KFOR

in justice and detention matters. This step had a negative effect on the peace process

60

Robert Muharremi, Lulzim Peci, “Administration and Governance in Kosovo: Lessons Learned and

Lessons to be Learned, Pristina/Geneva: Centre for Applied Studies in International Negotiations

(CASIN), 2003, 22, accessed May 12, 2014,

http://www.google.ro/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCwQFjAA&url=http%3A

%2F%2Fmercury.ethz.ch%2Fserviceengine%2FFiles%2FISN%2F20287%2Fipublicationdocument_single

document%2F1120fa74-152f-497d-9dd2-

5dca443a42bf%2Fen%2F01.2003.pdf&ei=F0HJVOTDGsP2UpSJgcAL&usg=AFQjCNHOuWtrN_ElfVpt0

UsnWEYgYiNa5A&bvm=bv.84607526,d.bGQ. 61

Andreas Heinemann-Grüder, Igor Grebenschikov, “Security Governance by Internationals...,”44. 62

Espen B. Eide, Tor T. Holm, “Postscript: Towards Executive Authority Policing? The Lessons of

Kosovo,” in International Peacekeeping, Vol. 6, (1999): 218, accessed May 12, 2014,

http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a784170956~db=all~order=page. 63

Sven G. Simonsen, “Building "National" Armies-Building Nations?: Determinants of Success for

Postintervention Integration Efforts,” in Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 33, no. 4, (July 2007): 581, accessed

May 02, 2014, http://afs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/33/4/571. 64

Andreas Heinemann-Grüder, Igor Grebenschikov, “Security Governance by Internationals...,”44. 65

Ibid.


12

causing a serious damage in the prestige of the peacekeepers, because of the so called

‘extra-judicial’, illegal detentions undertaken by the American troops of KFOR. From

2001 they have began to arrest Albanian people accused of attacks against the minority

groups, without having sufficient proves and evidences. These illegal detentions from

Camp Bondsteel have awakened the attention of the OSCE observers, whose primary

mission was to protect human rights, and to forestall any action that might violate these

rights.66

But instead of ending these illegal detentions, the American troops had even

gone further, when they began to arrest Albanians who were released before by the

international judges, using the pretext of finding new incriminating evidence.67

Analyzing all the facts we have reached the conclusion that the first major test to

which the peacekeeping forces were exposed can be identified with the ethnic riots from

March 2004. The ethnic riots broke out on the 17th

of March based on allged pretexts,

about one Serbian boy assassinated by Albanians, and 3 Albanian boys drown in the

River Ibar. The crises erupted in the divided city of Mitrovica and lasted for 2 days, time

in which all the province transformed into an alarmed vespiary. 68

The destructions were

giant, villages burnt till the ground, houses destroyed, not to mention the loss of innocent

lives. In the village of Svinjare all the 137 Serbian houses were made equal with the

ground, while the Albanian houses have remained intact. To calm down the spirits 3500

more troops were sent to the region, unfortunately not with great success. From the

objective reports realized by the Human Rights Watch we acquire precious information

about the incompetency of the French, Italian and mostly German troops, which have

failed to carry out their duty. In their way to Svinjare village the rioted Albanian mass

have passed in front of a French base, which didn’t move one finger to help to alarmed

Serbian minority, witnessing the burning of their own homes.69

At Prizren the German troops were surrounded and had to surrender in front of the

Albanian crowd which destroyed the Monastery of the Archangels, an orthodox

architectural masterpiece from the 14th

century. The peacekeepers have justified their

behaviour hiding behind the 3rd

principle of peacekeeping operations, namely the use of

force only for self-defence. If we look at the principle we might find justification for their

acts, but as human beings we must put the question if it was not possible and proper

another interpretation of this pillar. The Human rights observer underlines some possible

causes for the incapacity and failure of the peacekeeping forces, affirming that mostly the

lack of preparedness and coordination between the security forces can be blamed for this

action of mismanagement.70

As we can notice, March of 2004 signifies a milestone concerning the prestige

and credibility of UNMIK and KFOR. The two days of chaos undoubtedly constitute a

major setback for the international civil and security presence in the region. It is not our

task to blame someone, or to try to take someone out of the great burden of responsibility,

our duty is to analyze and to reproduce the events as impartially as possible.

66

Clive Baldwin, “Implementation through Cooperation...,”493. 67

Ibid. 68

Andreas Heinemann-Grüder, Igor Grebenschikov, “Security Governance by Internationals...,” 44. 69

Human Rights Watch, “Failure to Protect: UNMIK and KFOR’s Inability to Protect the Serbs and other

Minorities,”Vol. 16, No. 6, (2004): 1-2, accessed May 12, 2014,

http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/kosovo0704/kosovo0704.pdf. 70

Ibid., 24.


13

After this failure we assist to the appearance of certain actions which envisioned

the reconstruction of the security presence in the region. In 2005 it took place a huge

transformation of the KFOR structure, replacing the Multinational Brigades with 5

Multinational Task Forces, between which existed a better communication and

coordination of actions, than it was in its predecessor’s case.71

Maybe this first exam which was not promoted with brio by the peacekeepers

served as a lesson to coordinate better their activities, tightening the collaboration, not

forgetting even for one moment the main reason for their presence in the region. The

2008 events from February and March after proclaiming the independence of the

province have shown that the collaboration between the various organs is much better,

succeeding even to end the Serbian riots without civilian victims, not allowing the

tensions to escalate at the level of the chaos 4 years before.72

Although many years have passed since 1999, nowadays KFOR is still operating

in the region, showing that its presence it’s still needed. Since then things have

normalised and also the EU is very committed to provide security in its neighbourhood,

launching the EULEX (European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo), the largest

civilian mission under the Common Security and Defence Policy. The main goal of this

mission is to assist and support the Kosovar authorities in matters concerning the rule-of-

law. EULEX is a technical mission, aimed at monitoring and advising, enjoying only a

number of limited executive powers, working under the United Nations Security 1244

Resolution 1244.73

Also on the 19th

of April 2013 the former High Representative of the

Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton had successfully

mediated between Serbia and Kosovo, managing to hammer a settlement between

Serbia's Prime Minister Ivica Dačić and Kosovo’s Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi.74

Conclusions

At the end of this little bypass everyone should put the question, whether the

peacekeeping mechanism itself it’s necessary and the peacekeeping operations in Kosovo

have ended with the expected result.

Well, in our opinion to give a clear and objective answer it’s not so easy, nor the

things in life are only black and white, somewhere exist a golden middle path. That’s

why this research won’t provide the reader with a straight answer, because that would be

no more than an irresponsible hazardous game, when even the most illuminated and

initiated minds in the field of peacekeeping go no further than some very careful

hypothetical presumptions. It is better to leave everyone to make its own conclusions

after reading this paper.

71

KFOR Official Homepage. 72

BBC News, “Kosovo riots ’were orchestrated’,” 18 March 2008, accessed May 12, 2014,

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7303792.stm . 73

European External Action Service, “EULEX European Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo,” accessed April

29, 2014, http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/en/front/. 74

European External Action Service,“Serbia and Kosovo reach landmark deal,” accessed April 29, 2014,

http://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/2013/190413__eu-facilitated_dialogue_en.htm.


14

Although one thing is sure that the events from the beginning of 2008, have

shown that the presence of the peacekeeping forces it’s still an elementary necessity, and

they will continue to be present in the region, till the moment when the Serbian and

Albanian will pass above the fragility of their interactions, and will learn to coexist

peacefully with each other in a state of good, in a state where dominates the rule of law,

and where human interactions are not measured in religious or ethnic membership.

Bibliography

“An Agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping,” Report

of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit

Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January, A/47/277-S/24111, 17 June 1992.

Accessed April 23, 2014, http://www.unrol.org/files/a_47_277.pdf.

Baldwin, Clive. “Implementation through Cooperation? Human Rights Officers and the

Military in Kosovo 1999- 2002.” in International Peacekeeping, Vol. 13, no .4,

(December 2006): 489-501. Accessed May 06, 2014,

http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a767881404~db=all~order

=page.

BBC News. “Kosovo riots ’were orchestrated’.” 18 March 2008,. Accessed May 12,

2014, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7303792.stm.

Beach, Hugo. ”Interventions and Just Wars: The Case of Kosovo.” in Studies in Christian

Ethics, Vol. 13, no. 2, (August 2000): 15-31. Accessed April 23, 2014,

http://sce.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/13/2/15.

Blokker, Niels. “Is the Authorization Authorized? Powers and Practice of the UN

Security Council to Authorize the Use of Force by ’Coalitions of the Able and

Willing’.” in European Journal of International Law, Vol. 11, no. 3, (2000): 541-

568. Accessed April 23, 2014,


Borsányi,, András. A Koszovói Felszabadítási Hadsereg (UCK) rejtélye [The Enigma of

the Kosovo Liberation Army], Budapest: Bona-L Bt, 2000.

Breau, Susan C. “The Impact of the Responsability on Peacekeeping.” in Journal of

Conflict and Security Law, Vol. 11, no. 3, (January 2007): 429-464. Accessed

April 28, 2014, http://jcsl.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/11/3/429

Cohen, Lenard J. “Post-Federalism and Judicial Change in Yugoslavia: The Rise of

Ethno-Political Justice.” in International Political Science Review, Vol. 13, no. 3,

(July 1992): 301-319. Accessed May 04, 2014,

http://ips.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/13/3/301.

Diehl, Paul F. “A Permanent UN Peacekeeping Force: An Evaluation.” in Security

Dialogue, Vol. 20, no. 1, (1989): 27-36. Accessed April 20, 2014,

http://sdi.sagepub.com/content/20/1/27.extract.

Eide, Espen B.; Holm, Tor T. “Postscript: Towards Executive Authority Policing? The

Lessons of Kosovo.” in International Peacekeeping, Vol. 6, (1999): 201-219.

Accessed May 12, 2014,


15


=page.

European External Action Service. “EULEX European Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo.”

Accessed April 29, 2014, http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/en/front/.

European External Action Service.“Serbia and Kosovo reach landmark deal.” Accessed

April 29, 2014, http://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/2013/190413__eu-

facilitated_dialogue_en.htm.

Evans, Gareth; Sahnoun, Mohamed, “The Responsibility to Protect.” Report of the

International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Ottawa,

Published by International Development Research Centre, 2001, accessed may 06,

2014, http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf.

Fabian, Larry L., Soldiers without Enemies: Preparing the United Nations for

Peacekeeping. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1971.

Heinemann-Grüder, Andreas; Grebenschikov, Igor. “Security Governance by

Internationals: The Case of Kosovo.” in International Peacekeeping, Vol. 13, no.

1, (2006): 43-59, accessed May 04, 2014,


=page.

Human Rights Watch. “Failure to Protect: UNMIK and KFOR’s Inability to Protect the

Serbs and other Minorities.” Vol. 16, No. 6, (2004): 1-66. Accessed May 12,

2014, http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/kosovo0704/kosovo0704.pdf.

Independent International Commission on Kosovo. “The Kosovo Report.” Oxford,

Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000. Accessed April 12, 2014,

http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/6D26FF88119644CFC12569

89005CD392-thekosovoreport.pdf.

Jackson, Robert J. “NATO and Peacekeeping.” Cambridge, Final Report for NATO

Fellowship (30 June 1997): 1-34. Accessed May 03, 2014,

http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/95-97/jackson.pdf.

Juhász, József; Magyari István; Tálas, Péter; Valki, László. Koszovó egy válság

anatómiája [Kosovo, the Anatomy of a Crisis], Budapest: Osiris Kiadó, 2000.

KFOR Official Homepage.“Kosovo Force.” Accessed April 12, 2014,

http://www.aco.nato.int/kfor.aspx.

Kiss Z. László. Lessons of the Kosovo War Dilemmas Regarding Abilities of NATO and

the EU to Manage National and Ethnic Conflicts in Central and South-Eastern

Europe, Budapest: PXP, 2001.

Major D. M. Last. “From Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding Theories Cases, Experiments

and Solutions.” Royal Military College Working Paper, Kingston, Ontario, (May

1999). Accessed 10 January 2014, www.rmc.ca/academic/poli-econ/last/pkpb-

rmc-r4.pdf, the link is not functional.

Matheson , Michael J. “United Nations Governance of Postconflict Societies.” in The

American Journal of International Law, Vol. 95, no. 1, (January 2001): 76-85.

Accessed May 02, 2014, http://www.jstor.org/pss/2642038.

Månsson, Katarina. “Cooperation in Human Rights: Experience from the Peace

Operation in Kosovo.” in International Peacekeeping, Vol. 8, no. 4, (2001): 111-

135. Accessed May 12, 2014,


16

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13533310108413923?journalCode=

finp20#.VMk_eiyjuIQ.

Milano, Enrico. “Security Council Action in the Balkans: Reviewing the Legality of

Kosovo’ s Territorial Status.” in European Journal of International Law, Vol. 14,

no. 5, (2003): 999-1022. Accessed April 23, 2014,


Muharremi, Robert; Peci, Lulzim. “Administration and Governace in Kosovo: Lessons

Learned and Lessons to be Learned, Pristina/Geneva: Centre for Applied Studies

in International Negotiations (CASIN), 2003. Accessed May 12, 2014,

http://www.google.ro/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CC

wQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fmercury.ethz.ch%2Fserviceengine%2FFiles%2

FISN%2F20287%2Fipublicationdocument_singledocument%2F1120fa74-152f-

497d-9dd2-

5dca443a42bf%2Fen%2F01.2003.pdf&ei=F0HJVOTDGsP2UpSJgcAL&usg=AF

QjCNHOuWtrN_ElfVpt0UsnWEYgYiNa5A&bvm=bv.84607526,d.bGQ.

Organizaţia Tratatului Nord Atlantic. Manualul NATO [NATO Manual], Bruxelles:

Office of Information and Press NATO, 2001.

Paris, Roland. “Peacekeeping and the Constraints of Global Culture.” in European

Journal of International Relations, Vol. 9, no. 3, (September 2003): 441-473.

Accessed April 21, 2014, http://ejt.sagepub.com/content/9/3/441.abstract.

Savich, Carl. K. “The Kosovo Crisis: Origins and History,” 2000. Accessed April 24,

2014, http://www.rastko.rs/kosovo/istorija/csavich-kosovo_crisis.html.

Schwartz , Stephen. Kosovo: Background to a War, London: Mark Hegarty Anthem

Press, 2001.

Simonsen, Sven G. “Building "National" Armies-Building Nations?: Determinants of

Success for Postintervention Integration Efforts.” in Armed Forces & Society,

Vol. 33, no. 4, (July 2007): 571-590. Accessed May 02, 2014,

http://afs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/33/4/571.

Sowers Thomas S. “Beyond the Soldier and the State: Contemporary Operations and

Variance in Principal-Agent Relationships.” in Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 31,

no. 3, (2005): 385-409. Accessed May 12, 2014,

http://afs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/31/3/385.

Szabó, László. A koszovói válság [The Kosovo Crisis], Budapest: Honvéd Kiadó, 1999.

Tsagourias, Nicholas. ”Consent, Neutrality/Impartiality and the Use of Force in

Peacekeeping: The Constitutional Dimension.” in Journal of Conflict and Security

Law, Vol. 11, no. 3, (Winter 2006): 465-482. Accessed May 04, 2014,

http://jcsl.oxfordjournals.org/content/11/3/465.full.

United Nations. „A More Secure World: Our shared responsibility.” Report of the High-

level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change „”2004, Part 3. Accessed May 07,

2014,

http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pdf/historical/hlp_more_secure_world.pdf.

United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPO).”United Nations

Peacekeeping Operations, Principles and Guidelines.”, approved by J. – M.

Guehenno on 18th

of January, 2008. Accessed April 23, 2014,

http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf.

United Nations General Assembly. „Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper


17

of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of Fiftieth Anniversary of the United

Nations.” Report of the Secretary-General of the Work of the Organization,

A/50/60-S/1995/1(1995),

Art. 33. Accessed May 01, 2014,

http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/50/plenary/a50-60.htm.

Vickers, Miranda, Between Serb and Albanian. A History of Kosovo, New York:

Columbia University Press, 1998.

White, Nigel D. “U.N. Peacekeeping – Development or Destruction?.” in International

Relations, Vol. 12, no.1, (April 1994): 129-158. Accessed April 29, 2014,

http://ire.sagepub.com/content/12/1/129.citation.

United Nations interventionism: peacekeeping operations in Kosovo

Documents