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2010 by JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH, Inc. Vol. 37 April 2011All
rights reserved. 0093-5301/2011/3706-0004$10.00. DOI:
10.1086/656577
The Curious Case of Behavioral Backlash:Why Brands Produce
Priming Effects andSlogans Produce Reverse Priming Effects
JULIANO LARANAMY N. DALTONEDUARDO B. ANDRADE
Five experiments demonstrate that brands cause priming effects
(i.e., behavioraleffects consistent with those implied by the
brand), whereas slogans cause reversepriming effects (i.e.,
behavioral effects opposite to those implied by the slogan).For
instance, exposure to the retailer brand name Walmart, typically
associatedwith saving money, reduces subsequent spending, whereas
exposure to the Wal-mart slogan, Save money. Live better, increases
it. Slogans cause reverse primingeffects and brands cause priming
effects because people perceive slogans, butnot brands, as
persuasion tactics. The reverse priming effect is driven by a
non-conscious goal to correct for bias and can occur without any
conscious mediation(i.e., following subliminal exposure to the word
slogan). These findings provideevidence that consumer resistance to
persuasion can be driven by processes thatoperate entirely outside
conscious awareness.
Consumer behavior is influenced by a vast arsenal ofmarketing
tactics, including brand names, slogans, en-dorsers, pricing, and
salespeople. Often these tactics exerttheir influence
automatically, in subtle ways that consumersdo not intend, are not
aware of, or cannot control (Jani-szewski 1988; Shapiro 1999; Wyer
2008). Even incidentalexposure to a marketing tactic can activate,
or prime, as-sociated mental constructs and cause consumers to
think
Juliano Laran ([email protected]) is assistant professor of
marketing, Uni-versity of Miami, Coral Gables, FL 33124-6524. Amy
N. Dalton ([email protected]) is assistant professor of marketing,
Hong Kong Universityof Science and Technology, Clear Water Bay,
Hong Kong. Eduardo B.Andrade ([email protected]) is
associate professor of market-ing, University of California,
Berkeley, CA 94720. The authors thank BobWyer for providing
feedback on an early draft of this article, AndrewHayes for
consulting on study 3s mediation analysis, and Tanya
Chartrand,Gavan Fitzsimons, Chris Janiszewski, Gordon Moskowitz,
and JaideepSengupta for providing helpful comments. Financial
support from HongKong University of Science and Technology (grant
DAGS09/10.BM04) isgratefully acknowledged. All authors contributed
equally to this work.
Ann McGill served as editor and Patti Williams served as
associate editorfor this article.Electronically published September
10, 2010
and behave in a manner implied by a tactic (Berger andFitzsimons
2008; Fitzsimons, Chartrand, and Fitzsimons2008; Laran 2010c). For
instance, seeing the brand nameWalmart (or Nordstrom) primes value
(or luxury) and boostssubsequent evaluations of economy-priced (or
luxury-priced) merchandise (Chartrand, Huber, et al. 2008).
Al-though it is clear that marketing tactics have the power
toinfluence consumers automatically, it remains unclearwhether all
marketing tactics are equally effective in thisregard. Indeed,
certain tactics may automatically affect con-sumers in ways that
oppose what marketers would intend.
We propose that priming effects depend not only on thebehavior
implied by a marketing tactic but also on the typeof marketing
tactic used. Rather than behaving in a mannerimplied by a tactic,
consumers may automatically behavein a contrary manner, becoming
more thrifty when tacticsimply spending money and more indulgent
when tacticsimply seeking value. That is, rather than a priming
effect,marketing tactics may cause a reverse priming effect
onbehavior. We suggest that priming effects are reversed
whenconsumers perceive a marketing tactic as a source of
per-suasion. This view has important implications for
under-standing consumers ability to resist persuasion. Prior
re-search implies that consumers are ill-equipped to counteract
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1000 JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH
the effects of the countless marketing tactics encounteredeach
day. Not only are the effects subtle and pervasive, butcorrecting
for them typically requires consciously mediatedprocesses (Forehand
and Perkins 2005; Gorn, Jiang, andJohar 2008; Hung and Wyer 2008;
Kray, Thompson, andGalinsky 2001). We, however, suggest that
consumers cor-rect for the persuasive effects of some marketing
tactics byrelying on an automatic response.
Next, we delineate consumer perceptions of how
differentmarketing tactics are meant to influence behavior.
Theseperceptions, we argue, explain why certain marketing
tacticstrigger a reverse priming effect. We then describe the
un-derlying psychological process of the reverse priming
effect.
CONSUMER PERCEPTIONS OF BRANDSAND SLOGANS
While virtually all marketing stimuli are persuasion
tactics,consumers might perceive certain marketing stimuli, but
notothers, as persuasion tactics. One might expect perceptionsabout
persuasion intent to generalize across marketing tac-tics, given
that consumers often resist marketing efforts andare skeptical of
the experiences they will derive from con-sumption (Dimofte,
Forehand, and Deshpande 2003; Knowlesand Linn 2004; Meyers-Levy and
Malaviya 1999). But, infact, responses to marketing tactics vary
tremendously andcan be quite favorable. The present research
focuses onconsumer perceptions of brands versus slogans.
Brands are not treated as simply another tool in a mar-keters
tool kit. For instance, brands are attributed humanlikepersonality
traits and are treated like relationship partnerswith whom
consumers develop emotional attachments andshare commitments (Aaker
1997; Aaker, Fournier, andBrasel 2004). Consumers respond
differently to differenttactics for diverse reasons, among which
are consumer per-ceptions and lay theories about the different
purposes thesetactics serve (Hung and Wyer 2008). A brand name is
aninherent attribute of a product. Few if any products are soldthat
do not have a brand name associated with them. Abrand name may be a
cue to prestige or quality, but becauseit is a generic feature,
like price, that all products necessarilyneed to have, consumers
may not perceive a brand as apersuasion tactic. Slogans, on the
other hand, are used tosell brands. Slogans are part of a
persuasive appeal that isobviously intended to convey something
good or to remindconsumers of a brands attributes (Dimofte and
Yalch 2007).Thus, although brands and slogans are both persuasion
tac-tics, consumers can recognize how slogans are meant toinfluence
their behavior more easily than brands. The per-suasion knowledge
model (Friestad and Wright 1994) positsthat when consumers
understand how a stimulus is intendedto influence their behavior,
they are more likely to perceiveit as a persuasion tactic. Because
slogans have a more trans-parent purpose than brands do, consumers
should be morelikely to perceive slogans as persuasion tactics
compared tobrands.
A pretest was conducted to provide additional support for
this view. The pretest used a 3 (priming tactic: sentence,brand,
slogan) # 2 (behavior: save vs. spend) between-subjects design.
Fifty participants viewed a series of fiveslogans, brands, or
sentences (the latter were included toestablish a baseline) that
conveyed either saving or spendingmoney. (The stimuli are also used
in study 1 and are listedin the appendix.) For each item,
participants responded tothe question, To what extent do you think
this item is tryingto persuade you? on a 7-point scale. Ratings of
persuasionintent were averaged across the five items (i.e.,
sentences,brands, or slogans) that each participant viewed and
ana-lyzed in an ANOVA. Neither the main effect of behaviornor the
interaction between behavior and priming tactic wassignificant (F !
1). As predicted, the main effect of primingtactic was significant
(F(2, 44) p 3.47, p ! .05). The per-suasion intent of slogans was
higher (Mp 5.13) than eitherthat of brands (M p 3.20; F(1, 44) p
3.47, p ! .05) orsentences (M p 3.00; F(1, 44) p 8.15, p p .01),
whilethe persuasion intent of brands and sentences did not
differfrom each other (F ! 1). These findings suggest that
con-sumers perceive marketing stimuli as persuasion tactics
ir-respective of whether the stimuli promote spending or sav-ing.
Central to our hypothesis, the findings suggest thatbrands are
perceived to be innocuous (no different fromcommon sentences) but
that slogans are perceived to bepersuasion tactics.
AUTOMATIC CORRECTION AGAINSTPERSUASION
To understand what transpires psychologically and behav-iorally
when consumers encounter brands or slogans, weintegrate literatures
on correction and automaticity. Correc-tion research finds that
when consumers encounter a sourceof unwanted bias, mental processes
and behaviors are in-stigated to correct for its potential
influence (Petty, Wegener,and White 1998; Williams, Fitzsimons, and
Block 2004;Wilson and Brekke 1994). Responses include
counterar-gument (Kardes 1988, 2005), negative evaluations of
thesource of persuasion (Campbell and Kirmani 2000; Main,Dahl, and
Darke 2007), and reversed preferences or behav-iors (Fitzsimons and
Lehmann 2004; Wicklund 1970). Asconsumers acquire richer knowledge
of marketing tacticsand experience coping with such tactics, they
come to relyon routine, spontaneous processes and responses (Darke
andRitchie 2007; Friestad and Wright 1994). If certain tacticsare
repeatedly and consistently met with skepticism, then itis
plausible that a once consciously mediated correction pro-cess
could be activated and could influence behavior non-consciously
(Bargh 1990; Laran 2010a). One marketing tac-tic that could elicit
an entirely nonconscious form ofcorrection is slogans. Given that
consumers perceive slogansas persuasion tactics and that marketers
use slogans exten-sively, it is likely that consumers cope with the
persuasiveeffects of slogans countless times in the course of daily
life.Thus, we predict that slogans automatically activate
correc-
jmhernandezRealce
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SLOGANS AND REVERSE PRIMING EFFECTS 1001
tion but that brands, which are not perceived as
persuasiontactics, do not.
Priming and Reverse Priming Effects on BehaviorIf slogans
automatically activate a correction process and
brands do not, then slogans and brands would have
oppositedownstream effects on behavior. Consumers exposed tobrands
would behave in a manner implied by the brands.This view is
consistent with research showing that consum-ers evaluate prestige
(value) products more favorably fol-lowing exposure to prestige
(value) brand names (Chartrand,Huber, et al. 2008) and think more
creatively followingexposure to the company logo for Apple
(Fitzsimons et al.2008). Conversely, consumers exposed to slogans
wouldengage in behavior that is opposite to that implied by
theslogans. That is, the correction process would extend beyondthe
slogan that provoked it and would affect a consumptiondecision that
is not directly related to it. As is often thecase, correction
would be excessive and would result in areversed behavioral effect
(Glaser and Banaji 1999). Ac-cordingly, whereas the brand Walmart
causes thriftiness,the slogan Save money. Live better causes
indulgence.Pertinent to this argument, Chartrand, Dalton, and
Fitzsi-mons (2007) find that peoples behavior following sublim-inal
exposure to the name of a relationship partner (e.g., afriend,
coach, or parent) depends on the perception that thepartner is
controlling. Behavior is consistent with the wishesof partners who
are not considered controlling but opposesthe wishes of partners
who are considered controlling. Sim-ilar to relationship partners,
marketing tactics construed asunwanted sources of influence should
automatically elicitopposing behaviors. Specifically, we
predict:
H1: Because consumers do not perceive brands as per-suasion
tactics, exposure to brands evokes behav-ior that is consistent
with the behavior implied bythe brand (i.e., a priming effect). In
particular,brands that convey spending (saving) should in-crease
(decrease) subsequent willingness to spend.
H2: Because consumers perceive slogans as persua-sion tactics,
exposure to slogans evokes behaviorthat is inconsistent with the
behavior implied bythe slogan (i.e., a reverse priming effect). In
par-ticular, slogans that convey spending (saving)should decrease
(increase) subsequent willingnessto spend.
According to these hypotheses, the behavioral effects ofbrands
and slogans depend on consumer perceptions. Be-cause the default
perception is that slogans are persuasiontactics but brands are
not, the default effect is reverse prim-ing for slogans but priming
for brands. Importantly, tem-porarily changing consumer
perceptions, such that brandsare perceived as persuasion tactics or
slogans are not, shouldchange these effects.
The present research can be couched in a wider literature
showing that priming effects on behavior are mitigated
orreversed by a range of situational or individual
differencefactors, such as psychographic and demographic
character-istics (Sela and Shiv 2009; Smeesters et al. 2009;
Wheelerand Berger 2007), temporary goals or need states (Laranand
Janiszewski 2009, 2011, in this issue; Strahan, Spencer,and Zanna
2002), consumer expertise (Laran 2010b; Mandeland Johnson 2002), or
values (Smeesters et al. 2003). Forinstance, Laran, Janiszewski,
and Cunha (2008) found thatnovel situations (e.g., purchasing a
gift for a friends father)generate behaviors that oppose those
implied by primingstimuli. Smeesters et al. (2003) demonstrated
that primingmorality reduces, rather than increases, cooperative
behavioramong certain individuals oriented toward maximizing
in-dividual outcomes. Another set of findings shows that ex-treme
exemplars generate so-called contrast effects (Dijk-sterhuis et al.
1998; Moskowitz and Skurnik 1999; Shen,Jiang, and Adaval 2010),
which refers to judgment that isincongruent with an exemplar that
precedes it. The termcontrast maps onto the term reverse priming
used here,but for the sake of clarity we use only reverse priming
todescribe the current effects.
Correction via Nonconscious Goal PursuitWe propose that
marketing tactics can cause reverse prim-
ing effects by automatically activating processes aimed
atcorrecting for persuasion. This view leads to a specific
pre-diction about the psychological mechanism underlying thereverse
priming effect. It is well established that avoidingbias requires
motivation (Martin, Seta, and Crelia 1990; Wil-son, Houston, and
Meyers 1998). As described by Wegenerand Petty (1995, 38), When
people are motivated and ableto correct, they consult their naive
theories about the direc-tion and magnitude of bias brought about
by contextualfactors. . . . When there is sufficient motivation and
ability,then, corrections are made in an attempt to remove the
per-ceived bias. Keeping with this literature, we posit that
mar-keting tactics cause reverse priming effects via a goal
tocorrect for bias; but our perspective deviates from the
tra-ditional view of correction in a key way. Whereas that
viewimplies that consumers deliberately motivate correction,
weargue that if a goal to correct for bias is routinely activatedin
response to certain marketing tactics, then it can be ac-tivated
and pursued without awareness or intent (Chartrand,Dalton, and
Cheng 2008). Our perspective bears resem-blance to that of Glaser
and Banaji (1999, 682), which raisedthe intriguing possibility that
a goal to avoid bias can operateautomatically and affect other
automatic processes.
According to our theorizing, slogans cause a reverse prim-ing
effect, but brands do not, because slogans, not brands,activate a
nonconscious goal to correct for bias. Prior re-search has linked
reverse priming effects to a variety ofpsychological processes,
such as comparison processes(Scherer and Lambert 2009; Schwarz and
Bless 1992; Shenet al. 2010), which would imply that the mental
constructevoked by slogans is not a goal but a cognitive
construct,such as a trait or exemplar. Goal-based and cognitive
mech-
jmhernandezRealce
jmhernandezNotaTodas as marcas so so iguais? E a marca O melhor
bolo de chocolate do mundo, I can't believe it's not butter ou
mesmo marcas descritivas tipo Limpex?
jmhernandezRealce
jmhernandezNotaE se a naive theory contra o slogan?
jmhernandezRealce
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1002 JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH
anisms can be teased apart because goal-directed
behaviorexhibits specific properties that define it as
motivationalrather than cognitive in origin (Bargh et al. 2001).
Onequality of a motivational state is it dissipates quickly
oncesatiated (Lewin 1951). For this reason, a goal that is
pursuedand satisfied no longer affects behavior (Chartrand,
Huber,et al. 2008). Thus, we predict:
H3: Exposure to slogans activates a nonconscious goalto correct
for bias. The correction goal can besatisfied and its behavioral
effect eliminated.
OVERVIEW OF STUDIESFive studies collectively show that (a)
exposure to marketingstimuli that are perceived to be persuasion
tactics can causea reverse priming effect, (b) the reverse priming
effect ismediated by a nonconscious correction goal, and (c) it
canoccur without any conscious intervention. Study 1 estab-lishes
that consumers behave in a manner consistent withthat implied by a
brand (a priming effect) but inconsistentwith that implied by a
slogan (a reverse priming effect).Studies 2 and 3 examine
persuasion intent as the catalystfor these effects. If these
effects are triggered by the per-ception that slogans are
persuasion tactics but brands arenot, then temporarily altering
these perceptions should alterthese effects. Accordingly, study 2
finds that slogans pro-duce a priming effect if aspects of slogans
other than per-suasion intent become salient. Study 3 shows that
brandscause a reverse priming effect if their persuasion intent
be-comes salient, and it shows mediation by perceived persua-sion
intent. Study 4 establishes that a nonconscious correc-tion goal
determines the reverse priming effect. Finally,study 5 uses
subliminal priming to show that the reversepriming effect can occur
without any conscious interventionin conditions where people are
unaware that they have en-countered a marketing tactic.
STUDY 1Study 1 investigated the hypothesis that brands cause a
prim-ing effect, whereas slogans cause a reverse priming
effect.Participants viewed a series of brands, slogans, or
sentencesthat were related to spending money or saving money orwere
neutral. The purpose of including neutral stimuli wasto establish a
baseline against which we could compare thespending and saving
conditions. The purpose of includingsentences, in addition to
brands and slogans, was to dem-onstrate priming effects using
stimuli that are common inprior research (Bargh et al. 2001;
Chartrand and Bargh1996). Doing so would allow for qualitative
comparisonsacross the prime tactics and would stave off concern
thatthe key results for brands and slogans are due to
idiosyn-crasies in the procedure. The purpose of including
stimulirelated to both saving and spending was to establish thatthe
results are driven not by the behavior implied by the
stimuli (saving or spending), but rather by the type of
stimuli(brands vs. slogans).
The priming stimuli were presented in a bogus memo-rization
study. In an ostensibly unrelated study, participantsreported their
willingness to spend on a shopping trip. Wepredicted that when the
priming stimuli were sentences orbrands, consumers would be willing
to spend less moneyfollowing exposure to save-related stimuli and
more moneyfollowing exposure to spend-related stimuli.
Conversely,when the priming stimuli were slogans, consumers wouldbe
willing to spend more money following exposure to save-related
stimuli and less money following exposure to spend-related
stimuli.
MethodParticipants and Design. A total of 435 undergraduate
business students participated in exchange for course credit.The
design was a 3 (priming tactic: sentence, brand, slogan)# 3
(behavior: save, spend, neutral) between-subjects de-sign.
Procedure and Stimuli. Participants were seated at per-sonal
computers and informed that they would participatein two unrelated
studies. The first study, which actually wasthe priming task,
purportedly investigated which types ofstimuli are most memorable
to people. Five stimuli appearedindividually in the center of the
computer screen for 2 sec-onds each. These stimuli were either
spend-related, save-related, or neutral sentences, brands, or
slogans (see theappendix). Participants were instructed to remember
thestimuli because they would be asked about them later.
Afterviewing each stimulus three times (for a total of 15
presen-tations), participants recalled everything they
remembered.Recall was generally good (M p 4.07) and did not
varyacross type of stimuli (F ! 1). The second study,
calledShopping Decisions, presented the following
instructions:Imagine that you want to go shopping and you are
won-dering whether you should spend a lot of money or try tosave
money during your shopping trip. Indicate below howmuch money you
would be willing to spend when shop-ping.
Participants moved a slider button on the computer screento
select an amount of money between $0 and $500. Next,participants
completed Hong and Faeddas (1996) 13-itemreactance scale, then
responded to the question: To whatextent do you tend to react
against marketing tactics intendedto persuade you? Neither measure
moderated the effectsof the experimental manipulations (all F ! 1),
so these mea-sures are not discussed further. Finally, participants
com-pleted a funneled debriefing (Bargh and Chartrand 2000)designed
to probe for suspicions about the experiments truepurpose. No
participant could identify the real purpose ofthe experiment or the
potential link between the first andsecond tasks. This finding was
consistent across multiplestudies and suggests that the effects of
the manipulationson the dependent measure were indeed nonconscious.
There-fore, funneled debriefings are not discussed further.
jmhernandezNotaE marcas proprias? Tm o mesmo valor de marcas? Me
parece que sim.
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SLOGANS AND REVERSE PRIMING EFFECTS 1003
FIGURE 1
STUDY 1 RESULTS
ResultsPretesting. Pretests were conducted to test whether
the
stimuli conveyed the behaviors they were intended to con-vey.
Responding on a 5-point scale (1 p totally associatedwith saving
money, 5 p totally associated with spendingmoney), a group of 91
participants indicated that brandswere more strongly associated
with saving money in thesaving condition (M p 1.64) compared to the
neutral con-dition (Mp 3.16; t(90)p 30.14, p ! .01) and were
morestrongly associated with spending money in the
spendingcondition (M p 4.53) compared to the neutral
condition(t(90) p 30.54, p ! .01). Responding on the same
5-pointscale, a separate group of 61 participants indicated that
slo-gans were more strongly associated with saving money inthe
saving condition (M p 2.18) compared to the neutralcondition (M p
3.13; t(60) p 10.51, p ! .01) and weremore strongly associated with
spending money in the spend-ing condition (Mp 3.94) compared to the
neutral condition(t(60) p 11.02, p ! .01). A final pretest was
conducted toestablish that the slogans, which were created for this
re-search, were perceived as slogans. Responding on a 5-pointscale
(1 p looks totally like a regular sentence, 5p lookstotally like a
slogan), a group of 91 participants indicatedthat the slogans
looked more like slogans (Mp 4.33) thanthe sentences looked like
slogans (Mp 2.61; t(90)p 30.09,p ! .01).
Willingness to Spend. Means are presented in figure 1.An ANOVA
on the willingness to spend variable revealedan interaction between
the priming tactic and behavior fac-tors (F(4, 426)p 13.03, p !
.01). In the sentence condition,willingness to spend depended on
the primed behavior (F(2,426) p 10.52, p ! .01). Compared to
neutral sentences (Mp $145.93, SE p 13.45), willingness to spend
was lowerfor save sentences (M p $105.92, SE p 12.89; F(1, 426)
p 4.76, p ! .05; Cohens d p .49) and higher for spendsentences
(M p $185.18, SE p 11.55; F(1, 426) p 4.90,p ! .05; Cohens d p
.38). In sum, sentences generatedpriming effects.
In the brand condition, willingness to spend also dependedon the
primed behavior (F(2, 426) p 13.29, p ! .01). Aspredicted, compared
to neutral brands (M p $150.73, SEp 13.45), willingness to spend
was lower for save brands(M p $94.30, SE p 13.16; F(1, 426) p 9.28,
p ! .01;Cohens d p .62) and higher for spend brands (M p$189.27, SE
p 13.02; F(1, 426)p 4.24, p ! .05; Cohensd p .35). In sum, brands
generated priming effects.
Finally, in the slogan condition, willingness to spend de-pended
on the primed behavior (F(2, 426)p 8.40, p ! .01).As predicted,
compared to neutral slogans (M p $142.93,SE p 12.39), willingness
to spend was higher for saveslogans (M p $184.58, SE p 13.02); F(1,
426) p 5.54,p ! .05; Cohens d p .44) and lower for spend slogans
(Mp $105.23, SE p 14.45; F(1, 426) p 3.92, p ! .05; Co-hens d p
.52). In sum, slogans generated reverse primingeffects.
DiscussionIn study 1, brands produced priming effects on a
sub-
sequent consumption decision: compared to their willing-ness to
spend following exposure to neutral brands, con-sumers were willing
to spend more following exposure tobrands related to spending money
but were willing to spendless following exposure to brands related
to saving money.Slogans, however, produced reverse priming effects:
com-pared to their willingness to spend following exposure
toneutral slogans, consumers were willing to spend less fol-lowing
exposure to slogans related to spending money butwere willing to
spend more following exposure to slogans
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1004 JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH
FIGURE 2
STUDY 2 RESULTS
related to saving money. We attribute these effects to
con-sumers perceptions that slogans are persuasion tactics
andbrands are not. Study 2 tests this view.
STUDY 2If the reverse priming effect is triggered by the
perceptionthat slogans are persuasion tactics, then temporarily
chang-ing consumers perceptions of slogans should change theeffect.
If consumers contemplate aspects of slogans orbrands other than
persuasion intent (e.g., creativity), thenthese more accessible
perceptions would be a likely inputinto consumers subsequent
spending decisions. Thus, par-ticipants rated the creativity (vs.
the persuasion intent, whichserved as a control condition) of
brands or slogans in thepriming task. When creativity was made
salient, slogansshould no longer produce a reverse priming effect
but apriming effect.
MethodParticipants and Design. A total of 315 undergraduate
business students participated in exchange for course credit.The
design was a 2 (rating: persuasion [control] vs. crea-tivity)# 2
(priming tactic: brand vs. slogan)# 2 (behavior:spend vs. neutral)
between-subjects design.
Procedure and Stimuli. The procedure and stimuli wereidentical
to study 1 with one exception. During the primingtask, participants
in the control condition (i.e., persuasionratings) rated each brand
or slogans intent to persuade them,whereas participants in the
creativity ratings condition ratedeach brand or slogans creativity.
Ratings were on 9-pointscales (1 p not at all, 9 p very much).
ResultsWillingness to Spend. Means are presented in figure
2.
An ANOVA on the willingness to spend variable found athree-way
interaction between the rating, priming tactic, andbehavior factors
(F(1, 307) p 4.42, p ! .05). In the per-suasion rating (control)
condition, the analysis revealed aninteraction between the priming
tactic and behavior factors(F(1, 307)p 5.83, p ! .05). Willingness
to spend was higherfor spend brands (M p $216.71, SE p 21.79)
comparedto neutral brands (Mp $164.95, SEp 14.56; F(1, 307)p3.90, p
! .05; Cohens d p .43). However, willingness tospend was lower for
spend slogans (M p $125.84, SEp21.08) compared to neutral slogans
(M p $182.31, SE p16.43; F(1, 307) p 4.46, p ! .05; Cohens d p
.48). Theresults of the persuasion rating condition replicated
study1s results: brands generated a priming effect, and
slogansgenerated a reverse priming effect.
As predicted, in the creativity rating condition, the anal-ysis
found no interaction between the priming tactic andbehavior factors
(F ! 1), only a main effect of behavior(F(1, 307)p 8.62, p ! .01).
Willingness to spend was higherfor spend brands (M p $217.33, SE p
17.30) compared
to neutral brands (Mp $163.30, SEp 21.08; F(1, 307)p3.93, p !
.05; Cohens d p .45) and was higher for spendslogans (M p $199.12,
SE p 19.29) compared to neutralslogans (M p $136.84, SE p 23.47;
F(1, 307) p 4.20, p! .05; Cohens d p .62). In sum, when consumers
ratedcreativity, both brands and slogans generated priming
ef-fects.
DiscussionStudy 2 demonstrated that slogans produce a reverse
prim-
ing effect when consumers consider their persuasion intentand a
priming effect when consumers consider their crea-tivity. These
results support the hypothesis that reverse prim-ing effects are
triggered by the perception that slogans arepersuasion tacticswhen
this perception was temporarilyoverridden, the reverse priming
effect was replaced by apriming effect. Following a similar logic,
study 3 manipu-
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SLOGANS AND REVERSE PRIMING EFFECTS 1005
lates perceptions by heightening the perceived persuasionintent
of brands.
STUDY 3Study 3 tested the prediction that reverse priming
effects inresponse to brands can be obtained if consumers
recognizehow brands would be instrumental to persuasion
(Friestadand Wright 1994). Accordingly, rather than merely
ratingpersuasion intent in the priming task, participants
wereprompted to temporarily focus on brands (or slogans)
asmarketing tactics. This manipulation should not change
per-ceptions of slogans, which already are perceived as persua-sion
tactics, but should change perceptions of brands. Brandsshould no
longer produce a priming effect; rather, both slo-gans and brands
should produce reverse priming effects.Study 3 also examined the
hypothesis that the perceivedpersuasion intent of brands or slogans
mediates the effects.
The procedure was modified in additional ways to ruleout
alternative hypotheses and establish the robustness ofour findings.
First, study 3 used only well-known brandsand slogans to rule out
the possibility that the reverse prim-ing effect is due to
unfamiliarity. We predict that slogansare perceived as persuasion
tactics and produce reversepriming effects even when they are
familiar. Second, insteadof presenting typeset brand names, we
presented brand lo-gos. We made this change because typeset brand
namesmight detract from the brands persuasion intent,
whereastrademarked logos might make persuasion intent more
ap-parent. Third, in the slogan condition, brand logos
werepresented alongside slogans. We made this change becausebrand
logos are commonly presented alongside slogans and,when presented
this way, the priming effect from brandsmight dominate the reverse
priming effect from slogans. Wepredict that slogans are seen as
persuasion tactics and causea reverse priming effect even when they
are paired withbrands.
MethodParticipants and Design. A total of 315 undergraduate
business students participated in exchange for course credit.The
design was a 2 (persuasion focus: persuasion focus vs.control) # 2
(priming tactic: brand vs. slogan) # 2 (be-havior: save vs.
neutral) between-subjects design.
Procedure and Stimuli. As in the previous studies, thepriming
task was purportedly a memorization study. Partic-ipants viewed
either brands or slogans that either were re-lated to saving or
were neutral. Then, in an ostensibly un-related study, participants
reported their willingness to spendon a shopping trip. In study 3,
we included only familiarbrands and slogans (see the appendix),
used brand logosinstead of typeset brand names (see the appendix),
andpaired each slogan with its corresponding brand logo.
Inaddition, study 3 included a manipulation of persuasion fo-cus.
The persuasion focus condition included the followingsentence along
with the brands or slogans: Imagine that
you just came across this brand logo [slogan] in a magazinewith
several ads selling an array of different products andbrands. In
the control condition, the sentence read: Imag-ine that you just
came across this brand logo [slogan] in amagazine. After
participants indicated their willingness tospend, they responded to
the question: To what extent werethe brand logos [slogans] in the
recall task an attempt topersuade you? Participants responded on a
9-point scale(1p not at all, 9 p very much).
ResultsPretesting. A pretest (N p 62) confirmed that the
slo-
gans in the saving condition were more strongly associatedwith
saving money (Mp 1.81) compared to the slogans inthe neutral
condition (Mp 3.23; t(61)p 15.61, p ! .01).
Willingness to Spend. Means are presented in figure 3.As
predicted, an ANOVA on the willingness to spend var-iable
demonstrated a three-way interaction between the per-suasion focus,
priming tactic, and behavior factors (F(1,307)p 5.10, p ! .05). In
the control condition, the analysisrevealed an interaction between
priming tactic and behavior(F(1, 307) p 11.47, p ! .01).
Willingness to spend waslower for save brands (M p $113.90, SE p
14.88) com-pared to neutral brands (M p $163.53, SE p 17.07;
F(1,307) p 4.80, p ! .05; Cohens d p .55) and higher forsave
slogans (M p $191.18, SE p 17.07) compared toneutral slogans (M p
$134.60, SE p 17.30; F(1, 307) p5.42, p ! .05; Cohens d p .60).
As predicted, in the persuasion focus condition, there wasno
interaction between the persuasion focus and primingtactic factors
(F ! 1), only a main effect of behavior (F(1,307)p 8.35, p ! .01).
Willingness to spend was higher forsave brands (M p $200.77, SE p
18.90) compared toneutral brands (M p $143.37, SE p 16.05; F(1,
307) p5.36, p ! .05; Cohens dp .48) and higher for save slogans(M p
$203.21, SE p 19.89) compared to neutral slogans(M p $148.76, SE p
14.88; F(1, 307) p 4.81, p ! .05;Cohens d p .42).
Persuasion Intent Ratings. An ANOVA on the persua-sion intent
ratings found an interaction between persuasionfocus and priming
tactic (F(1, 307) p 7.19, p ! .01). Inthe control condition,
ratings of persuasion intent were lowerfor brands (M p 2.83, SE p
.28) compared to slogans (Mp 4.36, SE p .30; F(1, 307) p 14.40, p !
.01). In thepersuasion focus condition, ratings did not differ for
brands(M p 4.70, SE p .30) compared to slogans (M p 4.74,SE p .30;
F ! 1).
Mediation Analysis. We predicted that slogans producea reverse
priming effect to the extent they are perceived tobe high in
persuasion intent, and that brands produce a prim-ing effect to the
extent they are perceived to be low inpersuasion intent. Given the
experiments design, we pre-dicted that perceived persuasion intent
would depend notonly on whether participants were exposed to brands
orslogans but also on whether consumers focused on the per-
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1006 JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH
FIGURE 3
STUDY 3 RESULTS
suasion intent of these stimuli. Moreover, the effect of
per-suasion intent on willingness to pay should depend on theprimed
behavior (save or neutral). We tested this theorizingin a moderated
mediation analysis based on model 4 pro-posed by Preacher, Rucker,
and Hayes (2007).
The analysis used a series of regression models to testthe
effect of priming tactic on persuasion ratings, moderatedby
persuasion focus, and the effect of persuasion ratings
onwillingness to spend, moderated by primed behavior. Thefirst
model regressed willingness to spend on persuasionfocus, priming
tactic, behavior, and their interactions andyielded the three-way
interaction (B p 10.76, SE p 3.23;t(307) p 3.33, p ! .01). The
second model regressed per-suasion ratings on persuasion focus,
priming tactic, and theirinteraction and yielded the two-way
interaction (Bp1.60,SE p .58; t(311) p 2.76, p ! .01). The third
modelregressed willingness to spend on persuasion focus,
primingtactic, persuasion focus# priming tactic, persuasion
ratings,
behavior, and persuasion ratings # behavior. Consistentwith our
predictions, persuasion ratings # behavior pre-dicted willingness
to spend (B p 9.19, SE p 4.59; t(308)p 2.13, p ! .05), but
persuasion focus # priming tacticdid not (B p 15.76, SE p 24.65;
t(308) p .64, p 1.52). When persuasion ratings# behavior was added
to themodel with the persuasion focus # priming tactic # be-havior
interaction tested above, the three-way interactionwas not
significant (B p 17.93, SE p 13.70; t(306) p1.31, p 1 .19).
Finally, we tested conditional indirect effects. These anal-yses
examine whether the effect of priming tactic on will-ingness to
spend is mediated by persuasion ratings at eachlevel of the two
moderators, persuasion focus and behavior.In the control focus
condition, the effect of priming tacticon willingness to spend was
mediated by persuasion ratingsin the saving condition (Bp 12.67,
SEp 6.59; zp 1.92,p p .05) but not in the neutral condition (B p
2.86, SEp 5.11; z p .56, p 1 .57). In the persuasion focus
con-dition, the effect of priming tactic on willingness to spendwas
not mediated by persuasion ratings in the saving con-dition (B p
.07, SE p 3.63; z p .02, p 1 .98) or theneutral condition (B p .02,
SE p 1.49; z p .01, p 1 .99).
DiscussionStudy 3 demonstrated that brands cause a reverse
priming
effect when consumers are prompted to perceive brands
aspersuasion tactics. It also demonstrated that priming andreverse
priming effects that follow exposure to brands andslogans are
mediated by perceived persuasion intent. Study4 examines the
psychological process underlying these ef-fects.
STUDY 4We propose that slogans generate a reverse priming
effectvia a nonconscious correction goal. To provide support forour
hypothesis, study 4 adopted a goal satiation procedure(Chartrand,
Huber, et al. 2008; Kawakami, Dovidio, and VanKamp 2007). This
procedure involves inserting a goal-rel-evant task following
exposure to slogans but prior to col-lecting the dependent measure.
If slogans produce a reversepriming effect via cognitive construct
activation, then theintervening task would sustain this activation,
and the re-verse priming effect would remain. If, as we propose,
themechanism is goal activation, then the intervening taskwould
satisfy the goal, and the reverse priming effect wouldbe eliminated
or even become a priming effect.
One way to satiate the correction goal is to write aboutan
episode where one resisted an external influence. Similarwriting
tasks have been successfully used to provide peoplewith credentials
associated with actually having performeda behavior (Forster,
Liberman, and Higgins 2005). This leadsto the prediction that
participants who write about an episodeof correction in an
intervening task should exhibit a primingeffect, whereas
participants who do not do so should exhibita reverse priming
effect. One additional modification was
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SLOGANS AND REVERSE PRIMING EFFECTS 1007
FIGURE 4
STUDY 4 RESULTS
made to further establish the robustness of our findings.
Weincorporated both familiar and unfamiliar slogans to ex-amine
whether slogan familiarity would moderate thestrength of the
reverse priming effect.
MethodParticipants and Design. A total of 168 undergraduate
business students participated in exchange for course credit.The
design was a 2 (stimulus familiarity: familiar vs. un-familiar) # 2
(correction: no correction vs. correction) #2 (behavior: save vs.
neutral) between-subjects design.
Procedure and Stimuli. The procedure and stimuli wereadapted
from study 1s slogan condition, with a few amend-ments. First, in
all conditions, slogans were paired with thecorresponding brands.
Second, half of the brands and slo-gans were unfamiliar, while the
other half were familiar (seethe appendix). Third, study 4 included
a correction manip-ulation. After the priming manipulation but
before the de-pendent measure, participants in the no-correction
(control)condition were instructed: This is a two-minute task
thatwill clear your mind for the next task. Type your
currentthoughts in the space below. In the correction
condition,participants were instructed: This is a two-minute task
thatwill clear your mind for the next task. Think about a
situationin which your parents asked you to do something and youdid
the opposite of what they wanted you to do. Type adescription of
the situation in the space below.
ResultsMeans are presented in figure 4. Supporting our
hypoth-
eses, an ANOVA on the willingness to spend variableshowed that
the three-way interaction was not significant(F(1, 160) p .46 p 1
.49) but that the interaction betweenthe correction and behavior
factors was significant (F(1,160) p 18.73, p ! .01). In the
no-correction (control) con-dition, willingness to spend was higher
for save slogans (Mp $243.97, SE p 19.19) compared to neutral
slogans (Mp $128.51, SE p 22.48; F(1, 160) p 15.26, p ! .01;Cohens
d p .89). This effect was obtained despite thepresence of the brand
along with the slogan and was notmoderated by slogan familiarity
(F(1, 160) p 1.13, p 1.29).
In the correction condition, willingness to spend waslower for
save slogans (M p $88.05, SE p 17.43) com-pared to neutral slogans
(M p $140.20, SE p 17.96; F(1,160) p 4.34, p ! .05; Cohens d p
.45). Again, sloganfamiliarity did not moderate this effect (F(1,
160) p .09,p 1 .75).
DiscussionStudy 4s results point conclusively to
motivational
(rather than purely cognitive) underpinnings for the
reversepriming effect. In particular, the results specifically
suggestthat slogans generate a reverse priming effect by
activating
a goal to correct for bias, as the manipulation designed
tosatisfy this particular goal eliminated the effect.
In the final study, we probe deeper into the role of
con-sciousness in producing the reverse priming effect. Studies14
show that consumers engage in correction withoutawareness, but the
marketing stimuli eliciting correction inthose studies were
presented supraliminally. Although con-sumers were unaware that the
stimuli prompted correction,they certainly were aware of
encountering the stimuli andperhaps even thought about the stimuli
as persuasion tactics(indeed, they were even instructed to think
this way attimes). Study 5 examines whether consumers need to
beaware of a tactic for reverse priming effects to occur.
STUDY 5Study 5 tests whether correction occurs among
consumerswho are prevented from explicitly attending to the
tacticsthey encounter. Most research suggests that consumers
must(at a minimum) attend to a source of bias before they
cancorrect for its influence (Forehand and Perkins 2005; Gornet al.
2008; Hung and Wyer 2008; Kray et al. 2001; Schwarzand Clore 1983).
However, some evidence suggests thatfamiliar sources of unwanted
persuasion can be respondedto without conscious attention
(Chartrand et al. 2007). Giventhat slogans are well-known
persuasion tactics, it is plausiblethat the entire sequence of
correctionfrom perceiving per-suasion intent, to motivating
correction, to executing cor-rective behaviorcan transpire
nonconsciously. The mostrigorous test of this possibility is to use
a subliminal primingprocedure and test for the reverse priming
effect amongconsumers who are unaware that the construct slogan
isactive. Along these lines, we presented the spend, save,
orneutral sentences used in study 1 (and shown to cause prim-ing
effects) but paired these items with subliminal presen-tations of
either the word slogan or sentence (in a control
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1008 JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH
FIGURE 5
STUDY 5 RESULTS
condition). If mere activation of the construct slogan
issufficient to trigger correction, then subliminally presentingthe
word slogan should provoke a backlash against thecontent of the
sentences with which slogan is paired. Sub-liminal presentation of
the word sentence should have noeffect; that is, the supraliminally
presented sentences shouldsimply produce priming effects. Thus, we
predict that sub-liminally presenting sentence or slogan should
causepriming or reverse priming effects, respectively.
MethodParticipants and Design. A total of 229 undergraduate
business students participated in exchange for course credit.The
design was a 2 (subliminal prime: sentence vs. slogan)# 3
(behavior: saving, spending, neutral) between-subjectsdesign.
Procedure and Stimuli. The procedure and stimuli weresimilar to
those of study 1, but the priming task was modifiedto accommodate a
subliminal presentation procedure(adapted from Chartrand and Bargh
1996). The priming taskwas described as an attention task that
would test theability to perform two tasks simultaneously.
Participantswere instructed to focus their gaze on sentences that
ap-peared one at a time in the center of a computer screen (asin
the previous studies, participants were told to learn thesentences
for an upcoming recall test). Simultaneously, par-ticipants were
asked to indicate whether flashes appeared tothe left or the right
by pressing a corresponding key asquickly and accurately as
possible. In the slogan (sentence)condition, the flashes were the
word slogan (sentence)presented for 15 milliseconds, followed by a
masking stringof random letters for 15 milliseconds. The subliminal
stimuliappeared in one of the screens four quadrants, in
random-ized order, equidistant from the fixation point, and at
anglesof 45, 135, 225, and 315 degrees. Chairs were placed
ap-proximately 90 centimeters away from the screen to ensurethat
the priming stimuli fell in the parafoveal region of par-ticipants
visual fields. Each trial presented a prime word,mask, and
sentence. Sentences were taken from the save,spend, or neutral
condition of study 1. As in that study, eachparticipant viewed a
set of five sentences. Participants com-pleted five practice trials
and 25 experimental trials, for atotal of six exposures to each
sentence. After the primingtask, participants completed the
willingness to spend mea-sure in an ostensibly unrelated study.
ResultsMeans are presented in figure 5. An ANOVA on the
willingness to spend variable revealed an interaction be-tween
subliminal prime and behavior (F(2, 223) p 12.99,p ! .01). As
predicted, subliminal priming with sentenceresulted in priming
effects (F(2, 223) p 6.52, p ! .01).Compared to the neutral
condition (M p $156.82, SE p13.69), willingness to spend was lower
in the save condition(M p $115.94, SE p 13.94; F(2, 223) p 4.37, p
! .05;
Cohens d p .41) and higher in the spend condition (Mp$211.68, SE
p 23.51; F(2, 223)p 4.07, p ! .05; Cohensd p .49). Conversely,
subliminal priming with slogancaused reverse priming effects (F(2,
223)p 6.79, p ! .01).Compared to the neutral condition (M p
$151.06, SE p14.49), willingness to spend was higher in the save
condition(M p $197.22, SE p 18.11; F(2, 223) p 3.96, p ! .05;Cohens
d p .38) and lower in the spend condition (M p$106.68, SE p 16.62;
F(2, 223)p 4.07, p ! .05; Cohensd p .53).
Additional Evidence: Brand StudyIn study 5, the subliminally
presented word slogan pro-
voked a behavioral backlash against the content of
sentencespaired with it. As a point of comparison, sentence has
nosuch effect. These findings support our argument that slo-gans
activate correction even when their presence is un-known. Yet our
argument also states that correction is elic-ited by slogans and
not brands. To lend additional supportto this view, study 5s
procedure was replicated usingbrand and word (in the control
condition) as subliminalprimes. That is, we presented identical
supraliminal stimuliand varied only the subliminal stimuli.
The word brand or word was subliminally presentedto 111
participants, while spend- or save-related sentenceswere
supraliminally presented. Neither brand nor wordshould elicit
correction; therefore, both should producepriming effects.
Supporting this hypothesis, an ANOVA ofwillingness to spend showed
a main effect of behavior (F(2,105)p 10.19, p ! .01) and no
interaction between sublim-inal prime and behavior (F ! 1).
Compared to the neutralcondition (Mp $153.02, SEp 13.69),
willingness to spendwas lower in the save condition (Mp $105.38,
SEp 16.89;F(1, 105) p 6.08, p ! .05; Cohens d p .57) and higher
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SLOGANS AND REVERSE PRIMING EFFECTS 1009
in the spend condition (M p $213.96, SE p 17.17; F(1,105) p
5.07, p ! .05; Cohens d p .61).
DiscussionStudy 5 paired spend- or save-related stimuli with
the
subliminal prime slogan or sentence. The former causeda reverse
priming effect, while the latter caused a primingeffect. An
additional study paired spend- or save-relatedstimuli with the
subliminal prime brand or word. Aspredicted, both generated priming
effects. These data showthat even subliminal activation of the
construct slogan (butnot brand) influences how consumers perceive
and re-spond to supraliminally presented sentences, with
slogantriggering correction. Thus, study 5 provides
unequivocalevidence that slogans elicit correction without any
consciousintervention.
GENERAL DISCUSSIONFive experiments collectively suggest that
exposure to mar-keting tactics can activate concepts and goals
related to per-suasion that generalize to subsequent consumer
decisionsand can provoke a behavioral backlash against the
tactic.Study 1 established that whereas brands cause a
primingeffect, slogans cause a reverse priming effect on
behavior.Studies 2 and 3 provided evidence that the reverse
primingeffect is triggered by perceived persuasion intent.
Specifi-cally, study 2 showed that slogans produce a priming
effect,rather than a reverse priming effect, if consumers
contem-plate aspects of slogans other than persuasion intent
(i.e.,creativity). Study 3 showed that perceived persuasion
intentmediated the effects and that brands produce a reverse
prim-ing effect, rather than a priming effect, if consumers are
ledto perceive brands as persuasion tactics. To ascertain thatthe
reverse priming effect is driven by a nonconscious goalto correct
for bias, study 4 showed that among consumerswho are given a
correction opportunity on an interveningtask, slogans no longer
produce a reverse priming effect.Finally, to establish that the
reverse priming effect requiresno conscious intervention, study 5
demonstrated a reversepriming effect following subliminal exposure
to the wordslogan.
Automatic Correction against PersuasionBy linking reverse
priming effects to the operation of an
automatic correction process, our investigation promises tobuild
on the correction literature in several respects. Theliterature
typically reports that correction involves severalparts that vary
in the extent to which they are consciouslymediated. A person need
not be consciously aware of theprocesses used to execute the
correction (Schachter andSinger 1962; Schwarz and Clore 1983) nor
the precise natureof the behavioral effect (Nisbett and Wilson
1977), but be-fore correction is initiated, a person perceives a
stimulus asa potential source of bias (Martin et al. 1990; Wegener
andPetty 1995; Wilson and Brekke 1994). As a result, correction
tends to occur only when people attend to potentially
biasingfactors (Gorn et al. 2008; Petty et al. 1998). For
instance,Forehand and Perkins (2005) found that attitudes
towardcelebrities biased participants explicit attitudes
towardbrands paired with a celebrity voice-over. Only when
atten-tion was drawn to this potential source of bias were
explicitattitudes toward the brands (over)corrected. Moreover,
cor-rection tends to occur only when people perceive a
stimulusconsciously (Kray et al. 2001). Kray et al. (2001)
demon-strated this effect in the context of correcting for
stereotypeeffects on behavior. Only when stereotypes were
activatedexplicitly (vs. implicitly) did participants behave in a
ste-reotype-inconsistent manner. In stark contrast to this
liter-ature, we find that correction can occur automatically.
We establish the operation of the correction process in-directly
and focus on the unintended consequences it canhave for subsequent
consumer decisions. Correction wasunintentionally (mis)applied to a
consumer decision that wasunrelated to the slogans that provoked
it, and correction wasinitiated even when the construct slogan was
activatedimplicitly. This finding suggests that the entire sequence
ofcorrection can occur automatically: the perceptions that trig-ger
correction need not be consciously salient, the goal thatdrives
correction need not be consciously held, and the be-havioral
backlash that results from correction need not beconsciously known.
We suggest that correction can occurautomatically because it can be
based on rich and well-rehearsed persuasion knowledge. Along
similar lines, whileKray et al. (2001) suggest that correcting for
the biasingeffects of stereotypes requires conscious attention,
Moskow-itz et al. (1999) suggest that individuals can
automaticallyavoid relying on stereotypes if they chronically
rehearsetheir response.
It is quite likely that the triggers and consequences
ofautomatic correction are much broader than the current re-search
suggests. For instance, it is plausible that the reversepriming
effect documented here is just one of many con-sequences that would
result from correction. Negative eval-uations of the marketing
tactics involved, or of persuasiontactics in general, are other
potential candidates. It is alsoplausible that slogans are just one
of many persuasion tacticsthat could activate automatic correction.
For example, flat-tery in sales contexts is typically met with
immediate re-sistance (Campbell and Kirmani 2000; Chan and
Sengupta2010). Flattery by a salesperson can even produce
automaticnegative judgments (Main et al. 2007). It is plausible
thatthese automatic negative effects occur because, like
slogans,insincere flattery activates an automatic goal to resist
per-suasion. This view would predict that persuasion tactics
ac-tivate a nonconscious goal to correct for bias that not
onlyleads to a reverse priming effect on behavior but also
un-derlies automatic negative effects on attitudes.
Implications, Limitations, and Future DirectionsThe findings
reported here raise questions of interest to
consumer researchers, marketing practitioners, and policymakers
alike. On the research front, we began the current
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1010 JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH
investigation with the belief that marketing needs a theoryof
priming effects that takes into account marketings idio-syncrasies.
One key idiosyncrasy is that, unlike most otherstimuli in the
environment, people often view marketingstimuli as persuasion
tactics. This article addresses the con-sequences this perception
has for priming effectiveness and,in doing so, uncovered a key
implication for priming re-search in marketing: priming effects
depend on the type ofmarketing stimuli used. Moving forward, the
goal of thisline of inquiry would be to understand which types of
mar-keting stimuli (brand names, slogans, endorsers,
pricing,salespeople, etc.) have a larger nonconscious influence
onbehavior and which factors increase or decrease this influ-ence.
Additional factors to consider include order of cueexposure
(primacy vs. recency), level of cue emotionality(affect-rich vs.
affect-poor), or evolutionary-invoking cues(faces vs. figures).
Consider the simple act of a consumerentering a supermarket. The
number of cues and potentialpriming effects is overwhelming. Among
a cashiers friendlysmile, a well-established brand, and a discount
sign, whichcue dominates and why? Future research is needed to
de-velop a richer framework for priming effects in marketing.
On a practical front, marketing managers have long beenaware of
the complex factors underlying consumer behaviorand have struggled
with ways to understand and improvemarketings effectiveness (Aaker
and Lee 2006; Lee andLabroo 2004). As early as 1901, Fogg-Meade
advised thatthe successful advertisement is obtrusive. It
continuallyforces itself upon the attention (1901, 231). For over
acentury, marketers have heeded this advice. Even in a timeof
financial crisis, U.S.-based companies spent a whopping117 billion
dollars on advertising in 2009 alone (Nielsen2010). At first blush,
our findings might imply that firmsshould allocate more resources
to developing and maintain-ing strong brands, rather than spending
the roughly $1 mil-lion required to develop a good slogan. But
drawing thisimplication would be premature. Although slogans
generallygenerated consumer backlash, slogans positively
influencedbehavior among consumers who focused on aspects of
slo-gans unrelated to persuasion intent. Other research hasshown
positive effects of slogans with double meanings(Dimofte and Yalch
2007) and positive effects of repeatedexposure to slogans (Berger
and Fitzsimons 2008). There-fore, the current findings do not
suggest that slogans haveuniformly negative effects.
A possible limitation of the current work is that we donot
investigate why people have negative preconceptionsabout slogans
but not about brands. Perhaps it is because itis easier for
consumers to understand how slogans are meantto influence them,
because slogans have a directive structurethat is easier to process
and react against, because slogansevoke a narrower range of
associations compared to brands,or even because consumers fail to
connect to slogans in thesame emotional manner in which they
connect to brands.While this article does not explicitly address
the factorsunderlying consumer perceptions of different marketing
tac-tics, an important agenda for future research is to uncover
the reasons why consumers tend to perceive some marketingtactics
as persuasion tactics, and to determine when thisperception is more
or less salient.
From a consumer welfare perspective, one might wonderhow
consumers can protect themselves from the influenceof marketing
stimuli. Since consumers are often unaware ofthe stimulus and its
impact on cognition and behavior andmust combat marketing efforts
using minimal cognitive andself-regulatory resources, consumers may
appear defense-less against the strongest marketing cues driving
their be-havior. For a defense mechanism to be of use, it must
coun-teract persuasion attempts in an adaptive and flexible
manner.This view is congruent with the notion of a smart
uncon-scious, which, among other things, is capable of
helpingpeople achieve their goals even when executing novel
tasks(Eitam, Hassin, and Schul 2008), coordinating
nonverbalbehaviors (Dalton, Chartrand, and Finkel 2010), and
makingdecisions in complex environments (Nordgren and Dijk-sterhuis
2009). Rather than being defenseless, we find thatconsumers exhibit
automatic responses that reflect their per-ceptions of the
persuasion intent of different marketing tac-tics, even when these
perceptions are not salient. Our in-vestigation highlights that a
critical factor determining theeffectiveness of defense mechanisms,
conscious or auto-matic, is the persuasion knowledge that feeds
into them.One lingering and provocative question that speaks to
theadaptive nature of correction is whether and to what
extentpersuasion knowledge can itself be acquired with
minimalconscious intervention.
APPENDIXBRANDS, SLOGANS, SENTENCES, AND
LOGOS USED AS STIMULI
BRANDS IN STUDIES 1, 2, AND 5
Saving money:WalmartKmartDollar StoreRossWinn-Dixie
Spending money:TiffanyNeiman MarcusNordstromSaks Fifth AvenueAnn
Taylor
Neutral:PublixJC PenneyDillardsBed, Bath, and BeyondBarnes and
Noble
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SLOGANS AND REVERSE PRIMING EFFECTS 1011
UNFAMILIAR SLOGANS IN STUDIES1, 2, AND 4
Saving money:Saving keeps you going.Dont worry, we know you
value your money.Focus on value, think us!It is a matter of
price.The best deals are always here.
Spending money:Fine, good, us.The place for excellence.It is a
matter of quality.Because you can afford it.Luxury, you deserve
it.
Neutral:Time is what you make of it.Think wisely, think us.Play
hard, start now.Love everyday of your life.It is a matter of
choice.
SENTENCES IN STUDIES 1 AND 5
Saving money:He wore cheap attire.The car was economical.We
wanted to save.Dont waste your money.
He cares about value.
Spending money:He wore high-end attire.She bought fine
china.Always try to impress.Quality lies above all.He has superior
taste.
Neutral:He wore blue pants.She used her laptop.Ready for the
exam?Will they clarify this?Dont conceal your paper.
FAMILIAR SLOGANS IN STUDIES3 AND 4
Saving money:WalmartSave Money. Live Better.SearsThe Good Life
at a Great Price. Guaranteed.Home DepotMore Saving. More
Doing.RossDress for Less.Dollar GeneralSave Time. Save Money.
Everyday.
Neutral:Coca-ColaThe Pause that Refreshes.NikeJust Do
It.CharminPlease dont squeeze the Charmin.NokiaConnecting
People.AppleEverything is easier on a Mac.
LOGOS IN STUDY 3FIGURE A1
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1012 JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH
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