THE CRISIS OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

WINYI SOLOMON

TOPIC: THE CRISIS OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

OUTLINE

1.0. INTRODUCTION2.0. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN GENERAL

2.1. Definition of Humanitarian Intervention 2.2. Emergence of the Doctrine and Practice of Humanitarian

Intervention 2.3. Humanitarian Intervention during the Cold War 2.4. Humanitarian Intervention after the End of the Cold War

3.0. CHANGING CONTEXT OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

3.1. State Sovereignty vs. Responsibility to Protect 3.2. State Sovereignty and Violations of Human Rights

4.0. EMERGENCE OF CURRENT CRISIS IN HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION4.1. Authorization and implementation of Humanitarian

Interventions 4.2. UN General Assembly and Security Council on

legitimization4.3. Denial of access to the site 4.4. Suspicious influence of United States and NATO

5.0. CAUSES OF FUTURE CRISIS IN HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION5.1. Division among the Permanent members of the UN

Security Council5.2. The expeditionary forces sponsoring and propping up

an alternative government/Regime change5.3. Abuse of Responsibility to Protect and its extensive

definition. 6.0. Case studies:

6.1. Libya6.2. Afghanistan: Creating a Worse Situation6.3. Iraq: Humanitarian Intervention Perverted

6.4. North Korea7.0. Conclusion

7.1. References

1.0. INTRODUCTION

Events in Libya and Syria have again brought to the forefront the question of armed humanitarian intervention or the “responsibility to protect.” Under the so-called Westphalia system, the nation-state emerged as the basic unit of international relations, sovereign unto itself and expected to respect the sovereignty of other states, be they ruled by people or princes. The supremacy of national sovereignty as a principle,however, clashed with the reality of conflicts among states. Thussystems of collective security like the United Nations emerged both to protect and to circumscribe the exercise of the principleof national sovereignty.

In recent years, the principle of national sovereignty has been limited from another quarter, from the expansion of the doctrine of human rights. Ever since the tragic events in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, there have been efforts to further circumscribe the principle of sovereignty to justify foreign state intervention when genocidal events or massive violations of human rights take place within a country. This enterprise has produced the doctrine of the “responsibility to protect” or “humanitarian intervention.”Recent interventions, such as in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya illustrate, in the view of many in the South, the perils ofa course of action that may begin with good intentions on the

part of those calling for it, but end up with detrimental consequences for the sovereignty of nations, the integrity of national territory, and the maintenance of regional and global peace and security.

2.0. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN GENERAL

2.1. DEFINITION OF UNILATERAL HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

Various scholars have defined intervention differently and it is so with the concept of humanitarian intervention. Intervention has been defined broadly to include even verbal remarks of government actors concerning another state’s affairs. On the other hand, some writers have defined it narrowly to include only dictatorial interference by a state in the internal affairs of another state or in the relations between other states.

Customarily, when we refer to ‘intervention’, in international law, we refer to prohibited intervention. One couldhowever distinguish between basically three forms of “intervention”, depending on the degree of coercion employed in order to influence other states. In the first place, “intervention” simply means discussion, examination, and the recommendatory action. Second, “intervention” refers to the taking of measures that are coercive in nature but short of the use of force. Finally, “intervention” is used to refer to the useof force in the domestic affairs of another state.

Humanitarian intervention has been defined as the justifiable use of force for the purpose of protecting the inhabitants of another state from treatment so arbitrary and persistently abusive as to exceed the limits within which the sovereign is presumed to act with reasons and justice. It has also been defined as “the theory of intervention on the ground ofhumanity… that recognizes the right of one state to exercise an international control by military force over the acts of another in regard to its internal sovereignty when contrary to the law ofhumanity. Teson, a contemporary international law scholar defineshumanitarian intervention as “ the proportionate transboundary help, including forcible help, provided by governments to

individuals in another state who are being denied basic human rights and who themselves would be rationally willing to revolt against their oppressive government.”

Although these definitions are not necessarily identical, they convey what the doctrine of humanitarian intervention entails. They shed light on significant factors that must be identified and understood in order to fully comprehend the issuesinvolved in the doctrine. First, the use of armed force is a common feature of all the definitions. Thus, humanitarian intervention connotes rightly the use of military force in the internal affairs of a state by another state or group of states. Second, for there to be humanitarian intervention, the justification for the use force depends on human rights violations in the target state.

As stated by Teson, the customary meaning of prohibited intervention denotes “dictatorial interference in the affairs of another state for purposes of altering or maintaining the actual order of things” in a matter which is essentially within the discretion of the target state. Therefore, as rightly noted by Teson, for an intervention to be prohibited, the means used must be coercive and the ends of the intervention must be to influenceanother state’s decision or conduct in a matter that is essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of that state

2.2. EMERGENCE OF THE DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE OF HUMAN INTERVENTION

Humanitarian interventions from 1990s and onwards have more legitimacy in the international arena. Humanitarian interventionsbefore 1990s (during the Cold War) such as Belgium’s intervention in the Congo (1960), the United States’ interventionin the Dominic Republic (1965), Vietnam’s intervention in Cambodia (1978), France’s intervention in Central Africa (1979), the US’ intervention in Grenada (1983) etc. are mostly justified by humanitarian considerations by the intervening states. However, in most of the cases the protection of the human rights of nationals abroad was used as cloak to hide the real motivations. Powerful states used humanitarian interventions as alegal pretext for their interventions. Strong states which are –

for reasons of good or bad- determined to intervene in a weak state have no shortage of legal rationalizations for their actions.

Systemic change that is change of the international system of bipolar Cold War structure to multipolar post-Cold War structure, has been one of the reasons that humanitarian intervention gained much more concern and attention of the international community. The politics of the 1990s have moved humanitarian intervention to the center of world affairs. In the following pages, I will try to explain the basic differences between humanitarian interventions during the Cold War period andpost-Cold War period.

2.3. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION DURING THE COLD WAR

The United Nations has not been an effective organization inresolving conflicts, bringing international peace and security asit is expected to be. The reason is that it does not have a supranational executive mechanism to implement its resolutions and also the interests of the permanent members of the Security Council. Sovereignty of states puts the great obstacle on the UN.The United Nations championed sovereignty of nation states at theexpense of protection of human rights. In the Article 2(4) of theUN Charter it is stated that “All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.” Enforcement of human rights law is left to the consensus of the member states including the permanent SC members. If national interests of sovereign states of members of the UN, especially permanent members of the Security Council, are threatened by violations of human rights, then action against aggressors became an option. Only then “will forces under the UN command be used if necessary to enforce the observance of human rights

During 1980s, most of the Western, advanced states were not in favor of humanitarian intervention, both because they feared international controversies over the decision to intervene and because there were serious violations of human rights in many countries that intervention in all of these states were

impossible. International human rights organizations could not intervene in the internal affairs of these states to protect people from violent actions of sovereign governments especially before 1990s. Only after the end of the Cold War and the acceleration of the effects of globalization that humanitarian intervention gained more support and international organizations began to have an effective role in protecting human rights.

2.4. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AFTER THE END OF THE COLD WAR

The practice of humanitarian intervention in the post- Cold War era has changed very much. The international community witnessed the proliferation of intra-state conflicts in such places as the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda and Afghanistan etc. On the other hand, the UN Security Council became more flexible in defining threats to international peace and security to include refuge flows, humanitarian disasters and abuses of human rights. Also with the end of the Cold War, there is an increasing cooperation between the permanent members of theSecurity Council, so it became easier to take decisions whether to intervene in order to end civil wars and humanitarian disasters.

The most substantive departure in the post- Cold War era remains the Security Council’s willingness to authorize military actions in response to matters thought previously to be solely within the domestic jurisdiction of states. Because of all of these factors, the number of humanitarian interventions has increased very much.

The end of the Cold War increased the scope of humanitarian interventions, because some of the obstacles before the interventionary activities are lifted, and also the number of ethnic conflicts, starvation, human rights abuses by authoritarian leaders of failed states increased. All these reasons led to the increase of the cases of humanitarian intervention. East-West conflict during the Cold War blocked any possibility of decision taking in the Security Council in favor of conducting humanitarian intervention. Third World countries and authoritarian regimes played two superpowers against each other and used state sovereignty as a shield against any

intervention in their domestic affairs. After the end of the ColdWar, it became easier to take decisions to conduct humanitarian intervention or to interfere in the internal affairs of states. However, the international community experienced a great disappointment when humanitarian interventions in Somalia, Haiti,and Bosnia during the first half of 1990s failed to achieve its purposes and led to retreat of the international community from humanitarian interventions. But, during recent years, again thereis an increasing tendency to intervene in the internal affairs ofweak and failed states.

In the age of globalization, most of the conflicts are internal. Interstate conflicts and wars decreased while the number of intra-state conflicts increased dramatically. When the superpower rivalry ended, most of the ethnic groups claimed a right to self-determination. In other cases, civil strife in failed states in the Third World started to have direct and indirect effects on the world order, because state collapse causes chaos in one country and region can spill to other regionsand escalated to the extent that it may threaten world order and international security badly.

The United Nations intervention in Somalia is an important case, because for the first time the UN sent troops to the territory where humanitarian disasters occurred. In this case, wealso see a broad interpretation of Chapter VII of the UN Charter by the Security Council, because the mission includes purely humanitarian crises as a threat to peace. Domestic crisis within a state was seen as a threat to international peace and UN troopsare authorized to stop humanitarian crises and to rebuild order and peace in Somalia. State sovereignty in the areas of humanitarian issues is challenged and international organizationsstarted to assume authority over humanitarian issues.

If international problems pose a threat to international peace and security, foreign intervention in the internal affairs of states can be considered as possible and just (and maybe necessary). In Chapter VII of the UN Charter the limits to state sovereignty are recognized. These limits are at the points “at which the UN Security Council determines a threat to

international peace and security under Chapter VII.” Article II (VII) which sets down the principal of non-intervention in the internal affairs of states also gives the limits to this principle: “This principle shall not prejudice the application ofenforcement measures under Chapter VII.”Since the end of the ColdWar, broader interpretation of Chapter VII of the UN Charter resulted in the rise of the number of humanitarian interventions.The Security Council started to decide what constitutes a threat to international peace and security in a more flexible manner than during the Cold War. At the UN Security Council summit meeting of 31 January 1992, members of the Security Council stated that “the absence of war and military conflicts amongst states does not in itself ensure international peace and security. The non-military sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to peace and security. After the end of the Cold War, theinternational community developed a new understanding that they have a right to involve in the domestic affairs of states, to interfere in internal affairs, because these threats have international consequences

The Western ideas of democracy, respect for human rights andfundamental liberties, good governance, and economic liberalization are the main driving forces behind humanitarian interventions and with globalization the spread of these ideas are accelerated. However, there is also another side of the medallion: International humanitarian intervention is also viewedwith suspicion and fear since it reminds many backward countries the memories of imperialism, colonialism, and racism. Nevertheless, this attitude of hostility to humanitarian intervention seems to be changing gradually. It’s argued by some that under the name of “humanitarianism recolonization of Africa is taking place in international relations again. The Third Worldstates are mostly in favor of non-intervention principle and against humanitarian interventions because they feel threatened by imperialism. However, disengagement by the international community in the intrastate conflicts and human rights violationsmay be as much a threat to the Third World countries as fears of colonialism, imperialism associated with humanitarian intervention. Some objective criteria for the conduct of

humanitarian intervention may be helpful to overcome the fears ofvulnerable Third World countries. Setting of objective criteria will also be helpful in addressing the legitimacy problem which is at the center of the humanitarian intervention debate.

In questioning the legitimacy of humanitarian interventions, analyzing of the concepts of state sovereignty and non-intervention principles will be beneficial.

3.0. CHANGING CONTEXT OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

3.1. State Sovereignty vs Responsibility to Protect

Sovereignty is defined as “the supreme legitimate authority within a given territory. Constituent parts of sovereignty is therefore territoriality (sovereign has the legitimate authority within defined borders), legitimacy (sovereign should be acknowledged by domestic and international community, otherwise his power cannot make him absolute sovereign within that defined territory) and supremacy (sovereign should be the supreme authority that nobody could challenge his authority.)

Stephen Krasner defines four different meanings of sovereignty. First, “independence sovereignty” means the ability of state authorities to have control over borders, to manage movements across borders. However, globalization has reduced thisability of states, because movements of goods, capital, people and technology across borders became easy and sovereign governments cannot regulate everything. Second, “domestic sovereignty” is the acknowledgement of authority as legitimate bypeople within territorial boundaries of the state and sovereign authority should be able to exercise effective control over people. It can also be called as internal sovereignty. Third, “Vattelian sovereignty” which is introduced by Emmerich de Vattel, means that sovereign authorities are free from foreign intervention in their internal affairs. States are free to do as they pleased within their territory. This is the principle of non-intervention. Vattelian sovereignty can also be called as external sovereignty. Forth, “international legal sovereignty” isabout mutual recognition that is independent states recognize

each other as competent in entering into international relations,making treaties etc.

In the contemporary international system, all ex-colonies are given sovereignty rights and they enjoy formal equality with other states in the international arena. The newly independent states which possess sovereign rights do not have the capacity toprovide socio-economic welfare to their populations also don’t have well functioning institutions. They have “juridical statehood”, but not “empirical” statehood that is the ability to rule their population in line with international law and democracy. Jackson calls these states “quasi states.” Although quasi states lack the institutional capacity to sovereign statehood, they cannot be deprived of sovereignty by war or invasion. External foreign intervention was not justified under the changed international norms at that time(during 1960s, 1970s and 1980s). Quasi-states are not capable of freedom to act, but the doctrine of negative sovereignty is intended to justify independence of these states. Negative sovereignty can be definedfreedom from outside interference: “Non-intervention and sovereignty in this meaning are two sides of the same coin.” Positive sovereignty, on the other hand, means freedom to act, toprovide political goods to its citizens, to have the authority todeclare and implement policies domestically and internationally. States that possess positive sovereignty have the characteristicsof empirical statehood that is they are able to provide their people protection from external and internal threats and provide them socio-economic welfare.

The meaning, purpose and limits of sovereignty, was also thesubject of the mandate of the Independent International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) which was established in order to promote a global debate on the relationship between intervention and state sovereignty and to reconcile the international community’s responsibility to act facing with massive violations of humanitarian norms while respecting the sovereign rights of states

ICISS also concludes that state sovereignty is the concept that lies at the heart of both customary international law and

the UN Charter and remains both an essential component of the maintenance of international peace and security and a defence of weak states against the strong.According to the ICISS, state sovereignty denotes the competence, independence and legal equality of states. Every state is free to choose its own political, economic, cultural and social system as well as the formulation of the foreign policy. The scope of the freedom of choice of states in these matters is not unlimited; it depends ondevelopments in international law (including agreements made voluntarily) and international relations.

In Kofi Annan’s article on the “two concepts of sovereignty”in The Economist, he argues: State sovereignty, in its most basicsense, is being redefined – not least by the forces of globalization and international co-operation. States are now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples, and not vice versa. At the same time individual sovereignty – by which I mean the fundamental freedom of each individual, enshrined in the Charter of the UN and subsequent international treaties – has been enhanced by a renewed and spreading consciousness of individual rights. When we read the Charter today, we are more than ever conscious that its aim is toprotect individual human beings, not to protect those who abuse them. Despite the crucial role of the state sovereignty notion ininternational relations, it has been confronting certain challenges particularly since last decades of the 20th century.

In the 19th century, examples of military intervention have been justified by the humanitarian considerations of the major powers, but it involved the political interests of the intervening parties. “At the end of the 19th century, many legal commentators held that a doctrine of humanitarian intervention existed in customary international law.” However, many legal scholars disagreed, because the state practice prior to 1945 was inconsistent with regard to humanitarian interventions that the existence of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention was questionable

In 2000, the Canadian government and several other actors announced the establishment of the International Commission on

Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) to address the challenge of the international community's responsibility to act in the face of the gravest of human rights violations while respecting the sovereignty of states. It sought to bridge these two concepts with the 2001 Responsibility to Protect (R2P) . A year later, the co-chairs of the commission, Gareth Evans of the International Crisis Group and Algerian diplomat Mohamed Sahnoun,wrote in Foreign Affairs: "If the international community is to respond to this challenge, the whole debate must be turned on itshead. The issue must be reframed not as an argument about the 'right to intervene' but about the 'responsibility to protect.'"

The commission included environmental or natural disasters as possible events after which the international community could intervene if the state failed in its responsibility to protect its population. But in 2005, when the responsibility to protect doctrine was incorporated into a UN outcome document, environmental disasters had been dropped as a reason for intervention. In a long-anticipated report to Member States of the United Nations, Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon described the ‘responsibility to protect’ (known in short-hand as R2P) as an “idea whose time has come and presented a comprehensive plan for operationalizing the principle within the UN system. The Secretary-General’s report responds to States’ endorsement of R2Pin the Outcome Document of the 2005 World Summit by providing both conceptual clarity on the principle, and a set of processes and tools for translating it from words into deeds.

Paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 Outcome Document recognize the responsibility of individual sovereign states to protect their own populations from genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and ethnic cleansing. Unanimously, Member States also affirmed that the international community should assist states in fulfilling these responsibilities and in the event that a state was manifestly failing to protect its population from the four crimes, should take collective action ina timely and decisive manner in accordance with the UN Charter. Thus, as currently understood by Member States, R2P has three components or ‘pillars’: the protection responsibilities of individual States; the international community’s role in

assisting States to fulfill their responsibilities (capacity-building); and the international community’s residual responsibility for timely and decisive response.

Additionally, the R2P affirms the need for a range of escalating non-coercive and coercive measures to prevent or halt crimes against humanity. The ultimate coercive measure—military intervention—is reserved as a remedy of last resort. There is a specific criteria for military intervention to be justified and specific standards governing how such actions should be conducted. These criteria include “just cause,” “right authority,” “right intention,” “last resort,” “proportional means,” and “reasonable prospects.” The only just cause for military intervention is to halt or revert “large scale loss of life” or “large scale ‘ethnic cleansing”. The primary purpose or right intention of the intervention must be to halt or avert human suffering, regardless of intervening states’ other motives.The scale, duration, and intensity of the planned military intervention should be the minimum necessary to secure the humanitarian objective in question and the means employed must beproportional to the ends sought. There must be reasonable prospects for success in halting or averting the suffering, with the consequences of action not likely to be worse than those of inaction. Finally, the intervention may only proceed with the right authority; Security Council authorization should in all cases be sought prior to any military action If the Council rejects a proposal or fails to deal with it in a reasonable time,alternative options include consideration of the matter by the General Assembly in Emergency Special Session under the “Uniting for Peace” procedure and action by regional or sub-regional organizations, subject to their seeking subsequent authorization from the Security Council.

After its initial publication in 2001, R2P struggled to get traction in the international community based on the events of 9/11 and the subsequent perversion of R2P’s principles by the Bush Administration in its justifications for the invasion of Iraq in 2003. By 2005, the world was willing to return to discussing R2P and in that year, the UN General Assembly adopted the R2P in principle through the World Summit Outcome Document.

The 2005 version of R2P differed from the tenets of the original ICISS report and justified invocation of R2P under four specific circumstances: genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, andethnic cleansing. In spite of acknowledging and adopting R2P in principle in 2005, the international community still proved hesitant to honor it when situations of humanitarian crisis emerged. The 300,000 deaths for example in the brutal Darfur war—named by Kofi Annan as the first genocide of the twenty first century—offered a glaring example of the supposed “responsibilityto protect” innocent victims being avoided again

The R2P met the next phase in its evolution in 2009 when UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon released a report entitled “Implementing the Responsibility to Protect.” This report led to a UN General Assembly debate in July 2009, and it was the first time since 2005 that the General Assembly had come together to discuss the R2P in a meaningful way. Ninety-four member states spoke and the majority supported the R2P principle, although someimportant concerns were voiced. Discussions led to questions surrounding how R2P could be consistently and legally implementedin crisis situations around the world. The debate highlighted theneed for regional organizations, like the African Union, to play a strong role in implementing R2P; the need for stronger early warning mechanisms in the United Nations; and the need to clarifythe roles UN bodies would play in implementing R2P. An important outcome of the debate was the first resolution referencing R2P adopted by the General Assembly. The Resolution (A/RES/63/308) showed that the international community had, in principle, not forgotten about the concept of R2P, and it decided “to continue its consideration of the responsibility to protect.” Only time would tell if this would have the desired effect on the international community.

In spring 2011, the UN Security Council approved an intervention in Libya in response to the Gaddafi regime’s brutal suppression of political protests. In passing Resolution 1973 in March 2011, the Security Council authorized the establishment of a no-fly zone in order “to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack.” For the first time in its history, the UN Security Council approved the use of military

intervention in a sovereign state against the express will of that state’s government.

3.2. State Sovereignty and Violations of Human Rights.

In most of the Third World countries, violations of human rights, repression of people and civil wars have occurred and still this is the case. Citizens of these states became victims of violence inflicted by sovereign governments. In those countries, states pose a threat to the security of their population rather than being the main provider of security. This situation creates a contradiction between sovereignty rights and human rights. As a result, a reaction to this negative sovereignty regime occurred in the international society: Codification of human rights in many international conventions. International humanitarian law is formed against the sovereign governments that fail to protect human rights. Because governments of the Third World countries “use their sovereign rights to deny or at least neglect human rights” government’s freedom of actions is intended to be limited by human rights laws. Arbitrary uses of force, oppression of political, social, cultural and economic rights of people are some examples of humanrights violations. International human rights norms set the standards of conduct by the rulers to their people and also conduct between people. Today, for the first time in history, howa sovereign state treats its own citizens is no longer a matter for its own exclusive determination, but a matter of legitimate concern for all states and for their inhabitants

In most of the Third World countries, there are many different ethnic groups which are marginalized and not given political and economic rights. They do not have the right to self-determination and their basic human needs are not met, so most of the ethnically different people have to migrate and greatnumbers of refugees flow to other countries which creates security problems for the region and even for the international community. Self-determination, independence, sovereignty are all considered as good, but whether these concepts are good or bad depends on the circumstances. Most of the Third World states usedthese rights for their authoritarian purposes or the governments

are so inexperienced in governing that they were unable to operate in accordance with rule of law and humanitarian law.

The sovereign rulers are mostly concerned with their own security and survival of their regime rather than the security oftheir people. Statesmen of the Third World states are mostly abusive and coercive in their domestic conduct with their people and this leads to internal disorder. Most of the Third World states use the new international norms such as non-intervention, self-determination etc. as a shield against any criticism made byWestern governments with regard to human rights violations by abusive governments. So, it can be argued that international norms and rules or new doctrines such as negative sovereignty contributes to abusive actions of sovereign governments, because these norms are mostly in favor of sovereign governments at the expense of the human rights of the population of these states

Sovereignty is compromised by globalization and humanitarianinterventions. Globalization means intensification of interactions between states, civil societies, ethnic groups and people around the world. Globalization makes it more crucial for states to be more concerned with what is going on different partsof the world, with domestic problems of even distant countries. Conflicts in those countries may have a significant impact on international peace and security. Sovereignty is confronted by globalization and economic interdependence. “No longer is the state the sole or the most important actor in the international arena.” In the age of globalization, states need to cooperate in order to be able to manage the problems that globalization generated or intensified. The process of globalization has blurred the distinction between domestic and international.

With the acceleration of globalization, interdependence between states increased, non-state actors emerged, awareness of human rights violations increased across the globe, so the immunity of state sovereignty started to be questioned in our contemporary world. However, this does not mean a total erosion of state sovereignty, because sovereignty is still one of the organizing principles of world politics.

State sovereignty became more problematic in today’s globalized world. States are not anymore free to do anything as they pleased in their domestic affairs. Human rights norms put a universal standard of conduct and NGOs and IOs started to monitorhuman rights violations. We also see the emergence of supranational organizations that states give up some of their sovereignty and a kind of “pooled sovereignty” emerged. Here we see a regional integration. On the other hand, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, many small states emerged andthey possess state sovereignty. So, there is a trend towards two different directions: One is towards greater integration and the other is towards “subnational disintegration.”

4.0. EMERGENCE OF CURRENT CRISIS IN HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 4.1. Authorization and implementation of Humanitarian

Interventions As it is mentioned in the previous chapters, for

humanitarian interventions to be legitimate, it should be conducted multilaterally by international organizations rather than unilateral interventions by some powerful states. In this regard the United Nations is the authorizing source of military interventions and also should be the main agent that organize andconduct humanitarian interventions. Otherwise, humanitarian interventions will be open to abuses by major powers and the mainobjectives of humanitarian interventions cannot be realized

Authorization for the use of force for humanitarian purposesis one of the important functions that the UN has and does not want to lose, because it shows that the UN is capable of addressing significant issues regarding security of the international society. The United Nations is established for the purpose of providing and maintaining of international peace and security, so authorization of the use of force is an important function of the UN for the fulfilling of its main objective of providing and maintaining international security. Regional organizations such as NATO and EU or major powers such as the United States should not assume the role of the United Nations and try to substitute it in providing international peace and security. Although the United Nations has some deficiencies and

need to be reformed in many aspects, it is still viewed in most of the world as the primary agent of international legitimacy, sothe UN authorization of interventions should remain the norm.

Major Powers’ domination in the Security Council and veto right of the five permanent members negatively affect the legitimacy of the decisions of the Security Council. Most of the developing countries, but not all of them, have a stance against humanitarian interventions, because they fear that imperialism will regenerate and major powers will impose their powers and interests on the weak states. They also fear that cases of intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states will open the way for the interference in the domestic jurisdiction ofstates, so they mostly argue against humanitarian interventions

As mentioned before, the UN is established for the purpose of providing and maintaining international peace and security andthe UN rules in the UN Charter is aimed to represent a single universal view on the legitimacy of the use of force, under what conditions use of force can be justified. However, in the United Nations, there is not an agreement among the UN members. For example, some members especially underdeveloped countries in Latin America and Africa and Arab states are against military humanitarian interventions whereas Western democratic states are mostly in favor of humanitarian interventions. Furthermore, sometimes there are disagreements between the Western countries such as between USA and European countries.

More so, in the real world it is not always possible for permanent members to put international interests ahead of national interests and take decisions in the Security Council to authorize military interventions just for the protection of humanrights. So, in cases that the Security Council fails to take decisions, actions from the General Assembly need to be sought. Emergency Special Session under the established “Uniting for Peace” procedures, the General Assembly should meet within 24 hours and take decisions as early as possible. Although decisionsof General Assembly is not binding, two thirds majority of statessupports military intervention for humanitarian purposes, then the intervention would have some degree of legitimacy if not

full legitimacy. Article 10 and 11 of the UN Charter and Resolution of “Uniting for Peace” in 1950 are the sources that give the UN General Assembly a kind of responsibility to address threats to international peace and security

If the Security Council and General Assembly fail to act in response to massive violations of human rights and do not adopt aresolution that authorize the military intervention in conflict-torn states, then we can observe an increase in the number of interventions by ad hoc coalitions and/or by a single state. Unilateral interventions without the authorization of the UN bearthe risk that the objectives of the humanitarian intervention is not exactly met and it may serve to the interests of the intervening state, not to the international interests. This kind of interventions also severely affects the authority and credibility of the United Nation.

4.2. Denial of access to the site

At the outset, it must be emphasized that, according to the principle of subsidiarity, the responsibility to ensure the proper nourishment and other essentials of the population of a country first and foremost rests upon the State. Relief societiesare only called upon to play an auxiliary role by assisting the authorities in this task.

According to international humanitarian law, humanitarian organizations have a ‘right of initiative’ in offering relief actions. Concerning non-international armed conflicts, this is pronounced in Art 18 (1) APII:

Relief societies located in the territory of the High contractingParty, such as Red Cross (Red Crescent, Red Lion and Sun) organizations, may offer their services (…)

Art 18(2) APII in fine stipulates that if the civilian population is suffering undue hardship owing to a lack of the supplies essential for its survival, relief actions “shall be undertaken subject to the consent of the High Contracting Party concerned”.A strict reading of these provisions clearly necessitates the agreement of the affected State to receive the humanitarian

assistance, in order for the humanitarian actors to be able to perform their functions.

Concerning international armed conflicts, Art 59 GC IV states that when the whole or part of the population of an occupied territory is inadequately supplied the Occupying Power “shall agree to relief schemes” on behalf of that population. This would seem to be the most imperative stipulation of the GC complex with respect to affected States’ lack of possibility to refuse humanitarian aid. Out of a concern to protect the nationalsovereignty of the State receiving the relief, Art 70 API assertsthat relief actions “shall be undertaken, subject to the agreement of the Parties concerned in such actions”. However, thedenial of access of humanitarian assistance in international armed conflicts must be founded on valid grounds.

Returning to internal armed conflicts, the ICRC Commentary on Additional Protocol II states that the fact that Art 18 APII requires consent “does not mean that the decision is left to the discretion of the parties”. The Commentary then goes on to exemplify this by putting forward that denial of access to reliefsocieties would amount to a violation of Art 14 APII prohibiting starvation as a method of warfare. It also points to the authoritative  expression “shall be undertaken”, appearing also in other versions of the text, e.g. “seront enterprises”.When the living conditions for the civilian population are such as those described in Art 18(2) APII (“undue hardship owing to a lack of the supplies essential for its survival”) humanitarian aid will indeed make the difference between whether civilians starve or not.  However,even accepting the Commentary’s assumption that starvation in all circumstances would be used as a method of warfare.

Following Myanmar's cyclone in May 2008, some experts say the spirit of the R2P doctrine, if not its letter, was tested. The country's regime was incapable of providing relief to millions of affected citizens and it refused to let in international aid and aid workers for several days. French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner suggested the United Nations invoke the R2P doctrine as the basis for a resolution to allow the delivery of international aid even without the junta's

permission. But the French proposal faced opposition from Security Council members Russia, China, and South Africa. China'sUN ambassador, Liu Zhenmin, argued it was not an issue for the Security Council. "The current issue of Myanmar is a natural disaster," and the situation should not be politicized, he said. Experts warned that Southeast Asian nations and India might also take exception to intervention in Myanmar.

Since September 2011 the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic has charted themany violations of human rights in the conflict. In September 2013 it described “the deliberate targeting of hospitals, medicalpersonnel and transport, the denial of access to medical care, and ill-treatment of sick and wounded”, mainly – but not exclusively – by government forces. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), while maintaining its tradition of neutrality, has called on all parties to comply with the rules ofinternational humanitarian law and to allow humanitarian agenciesto deliver aid, including much-needed medical supplies, to all people in need whoever they may be. This is against the background of the death as of November 2013 of no less than 32 Syrian Arab Red Crescent aid workers. This lack of respect for humanitarian impartiality – while not unique to Syria – is nevertheless one of the most concerning dimensions of the crisis.

4.3. Suspicious influence of United States and NATO

In the real world, while R2P has a wonderful aura of benevolence, it will be put in play only at the instigation of the Great NATO Powers and it will therefore never be used in the interest of unworthy victims, defined as victims of the Great Powers or their clients. For example, it was never invoked to constrain Indonesian violence in its invasion and occupation of East Timor from 1975 onward, although this invasion-occupation accounted for an estimated 200,000 deaths on a population base of800,000, thus exceeding the proportionate deaths under Pol Pot. In this case the United States gave the invasion a green light, gave further arms to the invaders and protected them from any UN response. This is a case where the UN Charter was being violated and East Timorese desperately needed protection, but as the

United States supported the invader no international response transpired.

UN does not maintain its own standing army; it must rely on prospective troop-contributing countries to supply forces and equipment. Generating a full-fledged peacekeeping force takes nine to twelve months on average, although deployment times vary substantially based on political will. And it’s on this basis that United States and NATO quickly seize the opportunity if theyfeel there is need to intervene. Besides this United states leading role in intervention in Libya and Iraq is questionable asI will show in the case studies.

On October 4, 2011 United Nations Security Council draft resolution S/2011/612, which sought Security Council approval forpunitive measures against Syria, was defeated by the vetoes cast by Russia and China. Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa were outraged that Resolution 1973, authorizing a no-fly zone in Libya for the exclusive purpose of protecting civilians, morphed into promiscuous attacks on Libya by NATO, and blatant NATO support of the Libyan opposition, in gross violations of NATO’s mandate. Indeed, former Chairman of the Arab League, Amre Moussa had called an emergency meeting of the Arab League, and stated: “What is happening in Libya differs from the aim of imposing a no-fly zone, and what we want is the protection of civilians, and not the bombardment of more civilians.”

5.0. CAUSES OF FUTURE CRISIS IN HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION5.1. Division among the Permanent members of the UN Security

Council

There is a growing lack of consensus among the P5 which is quite vital for any humanitarian military intervention to take place. The failure by the Permanent Members of the UN Security Council, the P5, is evident when they failed to help the government of Syria and its opponents find a political solution has been catastrophic. From the early days of the crisis in 2011 P5 members locked horns over regime change, with the West’s call for President Assad to go blocked by the newly-assertive Russiansand Chinese.

Thus Kofi Annan’s role as mediator was doomed from the start. By allowing themselves to disagree so publicly and outspokenly (for example Susan Rice, the US Ambassador to the UN,called the Russian and Chinese decision to block a Security Council Resolution “disgusting and shameful”) the P5 forfeited the chance to place the weight of their collective moral authority behind the independent humanitarian action of the ICRC and the other humanitarian agencies. When neutrality went out of the window in New York, impartiality became impossible in Syria.

5.2. The expeditionary forces sponsoring and propping up an alternative government/Regime change

it was clear from the start that the imperial-power-warriorswere using civilian protection in Libya as a “figleaf” cover for their real objective—regime change and the removal of Gaddafi (with substantial evidence that his death was part of the programand carried out with U.S. participation). The war that followed was one in which the imperial powers worked in close collaboration with the rebel forces, serving as their air arm, but also providing them with arms, training and propaganda support. The imperial powers, and Dubai, also had hundreds of operatives on the ground in Libya, training the rebels and givingthem intelligence and other support, hence violating R-1973’s prohibition of an occupation force “in any form.”

Intervention initially motivated by the desire to protect civilians is prone to expanding its objective to include regime change, even if doing so magnifies the danger to civilians, contrary to the interveners' original intent. That is partly because intervening states, when justifying their use of force todomestic and international audiences, demonize the regime of the country they are targeting. This demonization later inhibits the interveners from considering a negotiated settlement that would permit the regime or its leaders to retain some power, which typically would be the quickest way to end the violence and protect noncombatants. Such lessons from NATO's use of force in Libya suggest the need for considerable caution and a comprehensive exploration of alternatives when contemplating if and how to conduct humanitarian military intervention.

5.3. Abuse of Responsibility to Protect and its extensive definition.

Edward Luck (Special Adviser to Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon for responsibility to protect) said R2P’s goal is not regimechange per se: “The goal is to protect populations. It may be in some cases that the only way to protect populations is to change the regime.” The problem with ambiguity is that some states, including influential states, may balk at taking action in the event of future humanitarian crises if they believe operations and mandates will be manipulated.

It has to be said that support for R2P principles is still fragile within the international community, even after the 2005 UN General Assembly endorsement..As Alex Bellamy, Professor of International Security at Griffith University in Australia, has pointed out, when the Williams Report condemning the Sudan government for grave breaches of humanitarian law in Darfur was released, it was ―denounced by Arab and Asian members of the Human Rights Council, and it took six months to persuade the Security Council to reaffirm a principle to which its members hadgiven their assent in 2005; several governments have argued that they did not in fact endorse the principle in 2005… In fact, China‘s reluctance to press for sanctions against Sudan ―enjoyed the support of a significant chunk of the Non-Aligned Movement, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference.

There was real fear and a ―common belief among governments (especially members of the Non-Aligned Movement) that R2P is simply a more sophisticated way of conceptualizing and hence legitimizing humanitarian intervention and potentially without the sanction of the UN Security Council in effect a Trojan Horse for the legitimization of unilateral intervention. The current understanding of R2P at the United Nations does not set out

criteria for military intervention, contrary to what the originalauthors of the International Commission on Intervention and StateSovereignty (ICISS) report had ambitiously hoped for. What it does do is provide a framework to judge when the international community should become engaged.

While the implementation plan for R2P is both comprehensive and politically sensitive, it leaves some important questions unanswered and opens up the possibility for institutional overlap. Indeed, there is a risk that by placing so much emphasison Pillars 1 and 2, the Secretary-General’s report enmeshed R2P in the already well-established agendas of capacity-building and conflict prevention, and obscure what is truly novel about the concept – namely, generating and exercising the international responsibility to respond to mass atrocities when state authorities fail to protect their populations. More significantly, in some areas the report called for greater UN activism in areas traditionally seen as being within the domesticjurisdiction of states. Thus, while Ban Ki-Moon insists that R2P is designed to be an ally of sovereignty, rather than its adversary, some States will viewed it with suspicion, the measures he has outlined.

Recent events in global politics show how the language of R2P can be used in ways not necessarily intended by the original authors. In the case of the cyclone in Burma,for example, many called for the application of R2P– some even going so far as to characterize the actions of the military junta as a crime againsthumanity. But this broad rendering of the principle did not necessarily help the cause of R2P, raising concern within the developing world about the extent of interventionism implied by the concept.

6.0. CASE STUDIES

6.1. NATO Intervention in Libya (2011)

The uprising for political reforms in Libya against the Muammar el-Qadhafi regime occurred in the context of the so-called “Arab Spring,” in which states in North Africa and the Middle East claimed democratization of their states.  In mid-February 2011, several protesters were killed by Qadhafi’s forcesin Benghazi and other eastern cities.  During the clashes betweenthe Libyan authority and the opposition group, Qadhafi’s forces used armed force to contain those protesters.  While the Qadhafi regime still maintained its authority in Tripoli, the capital of Libya, the opposition headquartered in Benghazi occupied eastern Libya.  Qadhafi denounced protesters as “cockroaches” and stated that he would “cleanse Libya house by house.” 

 On February 26, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1970, establishing an arms embargo and imposed sanctions on Qadhafi and his family. In March, the UN also dispatched some officials to Libya to persuade Libyan government officials to endthe violence.  Moreover, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon personally spoke with Qadhafi on the phone to persuade his compliance with the resolution. However, those diplomatic effortsturned out to be failures.  Consequently, on March 17, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1973, authorizing “all necessary measures…to protect civilians…” On the next day, NATO air forces initiated bombing on Libya. 

NATO claimed that the intervention saved Libyan civilians from Qadhafi’s aggression. NATO also successfully collapsed the Qadhafi regime, though the purpose of the intervention was not regime change. The majority of the bombing targets were also military-related facilities that would threaten Libyan people. However, NATO again failed to improve the humanitarian situation, and Libya remains highly unstable today.  The Interim National Transitional Council (INTC), established by the Libyan opposition group and supported by NATO, has been incapable of functioning as the central authority. Occasional clashes between militias are another reason for instability.  Particularly, the opposition-sponsored militia “have unlawfully detained thousands of regime supporters, executed others, driven misused communitiesfrom their homes and engaged in widespread torture.” Furthermore,according to the International Crisis Group, roughly 12,500

Libyans remained armed, and the small arms proliferated throughout the country.  Thus, considering Libya’s chaotic situation, it is questionable whether the NATO intervention can be viewed as a “humanitarian” intervention.

Why did NATO Intervene in Libya?

NATO member states expressed humanitarian concerns about theimminent threat in Libya.  President Obama stated, “We cannot stand idly when a tyrant tells his people there will be no mercy.” French President Sarkozy also claimed, “In Libya, the civilian population, which is demanding nothing more than the right to choose their own destiny, is in mortal danger…it is our duty to respond to their anguished appeal.” In addition, the UN Security Council concluded that attacks of pro-Qadhafi forces “may amount to crimes against humanity.” Thus, Qadhafi’s explicitaggression against protesters and the sense of moral duty to savethem, to some extent, urged NATO to intervene.

However, NATO intervening states had concrete national interests to preserve in Libya. 

Restoration of access to Libya’s oil reserve was vital for European states.  Libya has exported roughly 85 percent of oil toseveral European states, such as Italy, France, and the UK. Libyan oil accounted for more than 28 percent of Italian oil imports, 17 percent of French oil imports, and 8 percent of UK’s oil imports.  During the civil war, oil production significantly dropped, amounting to less than 20 percent of Libya’s domestic needs.  This decline likely caused great damage to the economies of those oil importing European states.  Therefore, ending the civil war to restore Libya’s oil production was the primary purpose of their intervention.  Consequently, those European states played leading roles in the intervention by providing air forces, training the Libyan rebels, and providing them weapons. 

Western states feared that Libya could return to a terrorist-sponsored state if Qadhafi won the civil war. Since Qadhafi established terrorist training camps in Libya in the early 1970s, the Libyan government provided a large amount of

weapons, money, and safe heaven to various terrorist groups. The US then added Libya to the list of states sponsoring terrorism and implemented trade restrictions against Libya. In 1999, Qadhafi started cutting his ties with terrorist groups, and his efforts eventually made the US decide to remove Libya from the list in 2006.  Hence, it can be assumed that Qadhafi did not sponsor any terrorist groups at the time of the civil war.  Yet, Western states were afraid of Qadhafi’s potential return to a sponsor of terrorism, which would greatly threaten the security of Europe because of Libya’s proximity.

Third, Western states feared Libya’s possession and potential use of chemical weapons against them.  In the mid-1970s, Qadhafi pursued nuclear weapons.  Libya’s use of chemical weapons against Chad was also severely criticized in the late 1980s.  In 2003, the Libyan government announced that it would abandon its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) including nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. However, Libya still failed to completely give up their chemical weapons.  Because Qadhafi was not generally considered a rational actor, his possession of weapons was a threat to Western states.  Thus, the interests of NATO member states including economic and security concerns were greater driving forces behind the intervention than humanitarian concerns.  Similar to Kosovo’s case, realism seems to better explain states’ motivations in Libya.

6.2. Iraq: Humanitarian Intervention Perverted

Although the main rationale for the U.S. invasion of Iraq was Saddam’s alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), an important supporting rationale was regime change for humanitarian reasons. When no WMDs materialized, the Bush administration retroactively justified its intervention on humanitarian grounds: getting rid of a repressive dictatorship and imposing democratic rule.

The rest is history. Iraq today is a base for U.S. geopolitical control of the oil-rich Middle East. It is a state propped up by U.S. military power, its oil resources and its wealth geared primarily to serve the West. A drastically weakened

polity, the country is threatened by the centrifugal forces of ethnic and sectarian conflict. Secular values and the status of women have been eroded by fundamentalism. Rampant crime and terrorism have generated a high level of physical insecurity.

6.3. Afghanistan: Creating a Worse Situation

When the invasion of Afghanistan took place in 2001, the North put up little resistance to the U.S. move to oust the Taliban government. Washington took advantage of sympathy for theUnited States generated by 9/11 and the image of the Taliban government sheltering al-Qaeda to eliminate negotiations with theTaliban as an option. Using Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which sanctioned retaliation in self defense, the UnitedStates invaded Afghanistan with little protest from European countries. But to strengthen its position, the Bush administration not only used the rationale of crushing the threatof al-Qaeda to the United States. It also painted its move into Afghanistan as a necessary act of humanitarian intervention to depose the repressive Taliban government–one that was justified by the precedent of Kosovo. Invoking the humanitarian rationale, NATO member states like Canada, Germany, and the Netherlands alsoeventually sent armed contingents.

Like the Kosovo air campaign, the Afghanistan War soon showed the pitfalls of humanitarian intervention. As in Kosovo, great-power logic soon took over. Hunting for bin Laden yielded to the imperative of establishing and consolidating a U.S. military presence in Southwest Asia that would allow strategic control of both the oil-rich Middle East and energy-rich Central Asia. Then-Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld seized on Afghanistan as what one analyst described as “a laboratory to prove his theory about the ability of small numbers of ground troops, coupled with air power, to win decisive battles. The Afghanistan invasion’s main function, it turned out, was to proveobsolete the Powell Doctrine dictum about the need for a massive commitment of troops in an intervention, which the administration

used later to persuade skeptics to support its strategic objective of invading Iraq.

The campaign in Afghanistan soon ended up doing what it was supposed to eliminate: terrorizing civilians. U.S. bombing could not, in many cases, distinguish military from civilian targets, which was not surprising since the Taliban enjoyed significant popular support in many parts of the country. The result was a high level of civilian casualties. One estimate, by Marc Herrold, placed the figure of civilian deaths at between 3,125 and 3,620, from October 7, 2001 to July 31, 2002. According to the UN mission in Afghanistan, 9,579 civilians were killed in theconflict between 2006 and 2010.

The campaign also ended up creating a political and humanitarian situation that was, in many respects, worse than that under the Taliban. One of the fundamental functions of a government is to provide a minimum of order and security. The Taliban, for all their retrograde practices in other areas, were able to give Afghanistan its first secure political regime in over 30 years. In contrast, the regime of foreign occupation thatsucceeded them failed this test miserably. According to a report of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “security has actually deteriorated since the beginning of the reconstruction in December 2001, particularly over the summer andfall of 2003.” So bad is basic physical security for ordinary people that one-third of the country has been declared off limitsto UN staff and most NGOs have pulled their people from most parts of the country. The Washington-installed government of Hamid Karzai does not exercise much authority outside Kabul and one or two other cities, which prompted then-UN Secretary GeneralKofi Annan to state that “without functional state institutions to serve the basic needs of the population throughout the country, the authority and legitimacy of the new government will be short-lived.”

Worse, Afghanistan has become a narco-state. The Taliban were able to significantly reduce poppy production. Since their ouster in 2001, poppy production has gone up 40-fold and 20 timesas much additional land has been brought under poppy cultivation.

Many of Afghanistan’s top officials and legislators have been involved in the heroin trade, the most prominent of these being the brother of President Karzai, Ahmed Wali Karzai, who was head of Kandahar’s Provincial Council until his assassination a month ago.

Many Afghans would say that this life is no improvement overTaliban rule for at least the Taliban could provide one thing: basic physical security. This argument may not cut any ice with upper and middle class people in the North that live in safe suburbs or gated communities. But talk to poor people anywhere, and they put great value on ridding their shantytown communities of criminals, drug dealers, and corrupt policemen.

6.4. North Korea

The human rights and humanitarian situation in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is dire. Crimes against humanity as well as other systematic and widespread humanrights violations continue to be committed by the government under the current “Supreme Leader,” Kim Jong-un. Despite testimony from defectors and other credible evidence accumulated over the last decade, the government has never acknowledged the existence of abuses, nor amended its repressive policies. Extremepolitical isolation and governmental intransigence continue to hamper further investigation and accountability

Amid mounting human rights concerns in DPRK, on 21st March 2013 the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council adopted resolution 22/13, establishing a Commission of Inquiry (CoI) to investigate systematic, widespread and grave violations of human rights, particularly where “these violations may amount to crimesagainst humanity.”The CoI published its findings on 7th February2014, establishing responsibility at the highest level of government for ongoing crimes against humanity, including “extermination, murder, enslavement, torture, imprisonment, rape,forced abortions and other sexual violence, persecution on political, religious, racial and gender grounds, the forcible transfer of populations, the enforced disappearance of persons and the inhumane act of knowingly causing prolonged starvation.”

The report noted the government’s failure to uphold its primary responsibility to protect its population

The DPRK government bears the primary Responsibility to Protect (R2P) its population from genocide, ethnic cleansing, warcrimes and crimes against humanity, but is manifestly failing to do so. This Policy Brief clarifies the application of R2P in the case of DPRK, outlining the responsibility of the international community in relation to the government’s commission of crimes against humanity. While the situation remains complex and dangerous, the international community, especially the UNSC, has not exhausted all options and can no longer continue to overlook ongoing mass atrocity crimes in DPRK.

R2P has helped to redefine sovereignty as responsibility, inwhich the legitimacy of a government is partly determined by its commitment to the safety and dignity of the population within itsterritory, including their protection from mass atrocity crimes. Where a state is unable to discharge this duty, it becomes the responsibility of the international community to assist the statethrough appropriate diplomatic and humanitarian means. Where a state is unwilling to uphold its protective responsibility, the international community is compelled to act, including through coercive measures authorized by the UNSC under Chapter VII of theUN Charter, if deemed necessary and as a matter of last resort.

Although R2P applies to all cases in which a state is perpetrating crimes against humanity against its population, the case of DPRK presents a unique challenge. Not only has the government demonstrated its absolute refusal to meaningfully engage with the international community, but genuine concerns over DPRK’s threat to deploy nuclear weapons have also overshadowed human rights concerns. The highly sequestered natureof the DPRK regime raises the question of how R2P can be effectively utilized to respond to such a case

While DPRK is avowedly hostile to external criticism and hasrejected dialogue, coercive action would likely do more harm thangood and bring little positive change to the North Korean people.Previous attempts to offer incentives have had limited success incompelling the government to change its policies or act in

accordance with international human rights and humanitarian law. In addition, the government’s strict control and mismanagement ofresources has historically left the majority of the population toabsorb the cost of tying humanitarian aid to political agreements.

Nevertheless, R2P remains an essential lens through which toview and address the DPRK situation, given the systematic commission of mass atrocities as a matter of state policy. While opportunities for the international community to engage the government are more limited than in other cases, it is imperativeto keep international focus on the grave human rights situation. The CoI report offers strong evidence that mass atrocities will most likely continue in DPRK. In February 2014 High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay said that the report “sheds light onviolations of a terrifying scale, the gravity and nature of whichin the report’s own words do not have any parallel in the contemporary world. There can no longer be any excuses for inaction.” R2P stipulates that it is incumbent upon the international community to make every effort to halt these ongoing abuses.

Conclusion

Humanitarian intervention has benefited from the evolution of international norms about violence, especially the emergence of “the responsibility to protect,” which holds that the international community has a special set of responsibilities to protect civilians -- by force, if necessary -- from war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, and genocide when national governments fail to do so. However rules and procedures on how to it should implemented need to be tailored to fully function without suspicion. Therefore the responsibility to protect needs to be well stipulated and avoid loopholes especially regime change needs to be fully discussed once for all if R2P is to expeditiously implemented in cases like Syria.

The other immediate concern is the misuse of R2P to serve dominant powers such as United states to serve their national interests however basing on the case studies its quite visible that there is need to strengthen the role of United Nations

security council on authorization of the interventions and also readdress the veto power component of the P5 characterized by lack of consensus that has failed to find solutions for atrocities like those happening Syria.

REFERENCES;

Address by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to the conference on ‘Responsible Sovereignty: International Cooperation for a ChangedWorld’. UN doc. SG/SM/11701 of 15 July 2008.

Roberta Cohen, “World Food Day: The Challenge of North Korea,” Brookings East Asia Commentary, 8 October 2013, available At http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/10/08-world-food-day-north-korea-cohen

See the Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the UN Secretary-General(Geneva: 25 January 2005). While the Commission found evidence of attacks that were deliberately and indiscriminately directed against civilians, it concluded that the Government of Sudan was not pursuing a policy of genocide – due to the absence of clear genocidal intent on thepart of the government.

See, for example, the debate within the Council on the ‘Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict’. UN doc. S/PV.5577, 4December 2006

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), “Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator Valerie Amos: Security Council briefing on Syria, New York, 25 October 2013”, available at:https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/25%20Oct%2013%20Valerie%20Amos%20Statement%20to%20Security%20Council%20on%20Syria.pdf

UNOCHA, 16 December 2013 “Humanitarian Bulletin: Syrian Arab

Republic”, available at:http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Syria%20Humanitarian%20Bulletin%20No%2039.pdf

Oxford Research Group (ORG), November 2013, “Stolen Futures: The hidden toll of child casualties in Syria”, available at:  http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/publications/briefing_p apers_and_reports/stolen_futures

United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), 12 September 2011, “President of Human Rights Council appoints International Commission of Enquiry to investigate humanrights violations in Syria”, available at:  http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx? NewsID=11369&LangID=E

OHCHR, 8 October 2013,“Assault on medical care: a distinct and chilling reality in Syria“, available at:http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/AssaultOnMedicalCare.aspx

ICRC, 19 November 2013, “The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement deplores the death of another aid worker in Syria”, available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/statement/2013/11-18-syria-death-aid-worker.htmMike Aaronson, 30 May 2012, e-IR blog, “Has Kofi Annan failed in Syria?”, available at: http://www.e-ir.info/2012/05/30/has-kofi-annan-failed-in-syria/

The Guardian (source Reuters), 7 February 2012, “Russia and China’s Syria veto ‘disgusting and shameful’ says US – video”, available at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2012/feb/07/russia-china-syria-veto-us-video

Alex De Waal (2007), “No such thing as humanitarian intervention”, originally published in Harvard International

Review, available on Global Policy Forum at: http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/154/26062.html

‘Implementing the responsibility to protect’. Report of the Secretary-General. UN doc. A/63/677, 12Jan. 2009. The Report was prepared with the assistance of the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on issues related to the responsibility to protect, Edward Luck. Luck was appointed in February 2008 to consult with Member States on the best approach for implementing R2P.

The Outcome Document was later adopted as a General Assembly Resolution. See UN Doc. A/RES/60/1, 16 Sep. 2005. In April 2006, in a debate on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, the Security Council reaffirmed the principles outlined in Paragraphs 138 and 139. SeeUN Doc. S/RES/1674, 28 Apr. 2006.