The CBW Non-Proliferation Regime Neuroethics Education Module Unit 12.

The CBW Non-Proliferation Regime

Neuroethics Education ModuleUnit 12

OBJECTIVE

• Unit 12 begins by reviewing how State Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, and more recently to the Chemical Weapons Convention, have come to understand that few practicing scientists have any knowledge of these conventions and of their responsibilities under them. The unit ends by outlining the main elements of the two conventions and the crucial role that scientists should play in strengthening the non-proliferation regime.

OUTLINE

• A. (Education About) Military Applications– Slides 1 - 6

• B. Prospects and Constraints– Slides 7 - 9

• C. Relevant History– Slides 10 - 16

• D. Thinking It Through– Slides 17 - 20

A1. The Present Lack of Education• “7. The analysis of the various experiments made

by State Parties…seems to reveal a number of key findings:– (a) Existing curricula and/or training at universities or

research facilities do often contain references to aspects related to (bio-)safety, but rarely contain any aspects related to (bio-)security;

– (b) While the existence of a well-developed sense for aspects related to (bio-)safety among students and practising life scientists has been repeatedly confirmed, there is, in general, a limited level of awareness of the risk of malevolent misuse of the biological sciences…”

A2. Codes of Conduct (i)?

• “… it was suggested that codes of conduct can:– (ii) Raise awareness of the Convention and of the

potential risks inherent in scientific activity, and promote the need for reflection, coordination and discussion of possible security implications of scientific work;

– (iii) Help build a culture of responsibility and accountability among the scientific community…”

A3. Codes of Conduct (ii)?

• “…codes of conduct…can support the objective and purpose of the Convention… in conjunction with other measures…[in]combating the present and future threats posed by biological and toxin weapons, as well as by raising awareness of the Convention, and by helping relevant actors to fulfil their legal, regulatory and professional obligations and ethical principles.”

A4. Education First?

• “14. The Conference urges the inclusion in medical, scientific and military educational materials and programmes of information on the Convention and the 1925 Geneva Protocol. The Conference urges State Parties to promote the development of training and educational programmes for those granted access to biological agents and toxins relevant to the Convention and for those with the knowledge or capacity to modify such agents and toxins, in order to raise awareness of the risks, as well as of the obligations of State Parties under the Convention.”

A5. Education Approach Detailed• “State Parties agreed on the value of education

and awareness programmes:– (i) Explaining the risks associated with the potential

misuse of the biological sciences and biotechnology;– (ii) Covering the moral and ethical obligations

incumbent on those using the biological sciences;– (iii) Providing guidance on the types of activities which

could be contrary to the aims of the Convention and relevant national laws and international law;

– (iv) Being supported by accessible teaching materials, train-the-trainer programmes, seminars, workshops, publications, and audio-visual materials…”

A6. Education

• Director-General of the OPCW, 2012• “Many chemists, academics, scientists, engineers,

technicians…have little or no exposure during their training and professional life to the ethical norms and regulatory requirements of the CWC….Education and awareness-raising about the norms and principles enshrined in the CWC are therefore becoming increasingly important.”

B7. CWC Transition?

• Advisory Panel on Future Priorities for the OPCW, 2011

• “…the OPCW needs to prepare for a transition from mandates and efforts primarily characterised by the elimination of chemical weapons stockpiles and production facilities to an agency that will have its main task to ensure that the menace of chemical warfare and the use of toxic chemicals for hostile purposes will never reappear…”

B8. Convergence?

• Advisory Panel on Future Priorities of the OPCW, 2011• “… biological science is increasingly making use of

chemistry, to the point where it has become possible to chemically synthesize components of biological systems and simple biological agents such as viruses…. At the same time, the manufacturing of some chemical products makes use of biological processes. Examples include the use of bio-catalysts in chemical synthesis or even the use of living organisms (plants and animals) as production vessels for certain chemical products…”

B9. Neuroscience• “III. Neuroscience and peptides: medium to long term

considerations

• 8. The Royal Society recommends that advances in neuroscience, particularly in the development and delivery of peptides and other transmitters, should be included in the review of science and technology….Although neuroscience is not specifically mentioned in the list of topical scientific subjects to be addressed by the new intersessional process, advances in production, dispersal and delivery technologies of biological agents and toxins is to be considered in 2015. This would be time to pay direct attention to this Royal Society recommendation, and the UK calls upon State Parties to come prepared to that meeting. In the meantime the UK favours placing the implications of neuroscience for the BTWC (and the CWC) as part of the regular scientific and technological review discussions in the intersessional process…”

C10. Article I of the BTWC• “Each State Party to this Convention undertakes

never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain:

• 1. Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes;

• 2. Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.”

C11. Article XII of the BTWC• “Five years after the entry into force of this

Convention… a conference of States Parties to the Convention shall be held at Geneva, Switzerland, to review the operation of the Convention, with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Convention, including the provisions concerning negotiations on chemical weapons, are being realized. Such review shall take into account any new scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention.”

C12. BTWC Outline/Weaknesses

• Other Articles– III. Not to transfer to or assist others;– V. To consult and co-operate in solving problems;– VI. May lodge a complaint with the Security

Council;– VII. To provide assistance in the event of a

violation;– X. Co-operation for peaceful purposes.

C13. Article IV BTWC

• “Each State Party to this Convention shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, take any necessary measures to prohibit and prevent the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in Article I of the Convention, within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere.”

C14. Article I CWC

• “1. Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never under any circumstances:

• (a) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons or transfer directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone;

• (b) To use chemical weapons….• 2. Each State Party undertakes to destroy

chemical weapons it owns or possesses…”

C15. Article II CWC

• “2. ‘Toxic Chemical’ means:• Any chemical which through its chemical action on life

processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals. This includes all such chemicals, regardless of their origin or method of production, and regardless of whether they are produced in facilities, munitions or elsewhere.

• (For the purpose of implementing this Convention toxic chemicals which have been identified for the application of verification measures are listed in Schedules contained in the Annex on Chemicals.)”

C16. Article VIII CWC• “B. THE CONFERENCE OF THE STATE PARTIES….• Powers and functions….• 22. The Conference shall not later than one year

after the expiry of the fifth and the tenth year after the entry into force of this Convention…. undertake reviews of the operation of this Convention. Such reviews shall take into account any relevant scientific and technological developments. At intervals of five years thereafter…further sessions of the Conference shall be convened with the same objective.”

D17. Education in the SAIs for 2012-2015

• Co-operation– (e) education, training and twinning programmes…

• Science and technology– (d) voluntary codes of conduct and other measures to

encourage responsible conduct…– (e) education and awareness-raising about risks and

benefits of life sciences and biotechnology…• National Implementation– (d) national, regional and international measures to

improve laboratory biosafety and the security of pathogens and toxins…”

D18. The Crucial Role of Scientists• “We recommend that State Parties…agree language along

the following lines:– ‘State Parties recognise that all those engaged in the life

sciences need to be aware of the prohibitions and the obligations of the Convention in order to achieve effective implementation and the State Parties agree that:

– (a) increased efforts be made nationally, regionally and internationally to ensure that all those engaged in the life sciences are aware of the Convention and its prohibitions and obligations;

– (e) State Parties be requested to advise subsequent Meetings of State Parties of the steps they have taken in regard to the above so that the experience gained and best practices can be shared for the benefit of all State Parties.’ “

D19. BTWC Education Programme, 2012

• “…State Parties recognised the value of pursuing various national measures, in accordance with national needs and circumstances, such as:– (a) Promoting interaction between relevant national agencies and the

scientific community;– (b) Strengthening linkages between biosafety and biosecurity training

and broader issues of responsible conduct;– (c) Encouraging the addition of relevant elements to existing codes,

where they exist, as an alternative to developing new codes;– (d) Supporting the inclusion of relevant material in professional

training courses;– (e) Encouraging the development of practical tools for the use by

individuals and organisations to familiarize them with the provisions of the Convention;

– (f) Enabling specific outreach for those working outside of institutional research and commercial environments.”

D20. The International Nuclear Security Education Network

• “41. First and foremost, there is a need for state-led initiatives, commitment and cooperation at international and regional level in the field of biosecurity education…

• 42. Secondly, there is a need for a synchronised and coordinated approach that builds upon the existing expertise in the field of biosecurity education [but allowing for] broader participation…

• 45. Thirdly, the implementation of a comprehensive biosecurity education plan will require adequate financial support…

• 46. Fourthly, it is important that the biosecurity education plan should include short-term, mid-term and long-term goals and that corresponding milestones are defined…

• 47. Last, but not least, the establishment of biosecurity education needs to be regarded as the basis for fostering a culture of responsibility and awareness among those engaged in the life sciences…”

QUESTIONS

• What do we know about the present level of knowledge of life scientists in regard to the possible malign misuse of their work? Why has such a situation come about?

• Why, as there a clear convergence of the sciences of chemistry and biology, are there two different international control mechanisms (the BTWC and the CWC) designed to protect their results from malign misuse? What is being done to ensure that there is not a gap between the implementation of these two agreements?

• Compare and contrast the main strengths and weaknesses of the BTWC and the CWC.

• Are the present efforts to improve the security education of neuroscientists adequate? If not, what do you think should be done about this?

Bibliography• UNIDIR (2012) Agent of Change? The CW Regime. Disarmament Forum, 1.

Available at: http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/agent-of-change-the-cw-regime-en-312.pdf

• UK (2012) The convergence of chemistry and biology: implications of developments in neurosciences. BWC/MSP/2012/MX/WP.1 Available at: http://www.unog.ch/__80256ee600585943.nsf/%28httpPages%29/26e4793f76daf81ec1257a87002c4700?OpenDocument&ExpandSection=1

• Poland (2012) The crucial role of life scientists in the effective implementation of the BTWC. BWC/MSP/2012/WP.2 Available at: http://www.unog.ch/__80256ee600585943.nsf/%28httpPages%29/89835cb0a2daa4a0c1257b6e003415c5?OpenDocument&ExpandSection=1#_Section1

• Royal Society (2012) Brain Waves 3: Neuroscience, Society and Conflict. Available at: https://royalsociety.org/policy/projects/brain-waves/conflict-security/