The Cause of Housing Market Fluctuations in China An Indirect Inference Perspective Yue Gai Supervisor: Prof. Patrick Minford Dr Zhirong Ou Economics Department Cardiff University A Thesis Submitted in Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy of Cardiff University Cardiff Business School May 2019
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The Cause of Housing Market
Fluctuations in ChinaAn Indirect Inference Perspective
Yue Gai
Supervisor: Prof. Patrick Minford
Dr Zhirong Ou
Economics Department
Cardiff University
A Thesis Submitted in Fulfilment of the Requirements for the
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy of Cardiff University
Cardiff Business School May 2019
Declaration
I hereby declare that except where specific reference is made to the work of others, the
contents of this dissertation are original and have not been submitted in whole or in part
for consideration for any other degree or qualification in this, or any other university. This
dissertation is my own work and contains nothing which is the outcome of work done in
collaboration with others, except as specified in the text and Acknowledgements. This
dissertation contains fewer than 65,000 words including appendices, bibliography, footnotes,
tables and equations and has fewer than 150 figures.
Yue Gai
May 2019
Acknowledgements
This thesis becomes a reality with the kind support and help of many individuals. I would
like to extend my sincere thanks to all of them.
First and foremost, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor Prof.
Patrick Minford for the continuous support of my PhD study and research, for his patience,
motivation, enthusiasm and immense knowledge. Also, thank him for providing me with a
full PhD scholarship. I would also like to thank my secondary supervisor, Dr Zhirong Ou for
his encouragement, insightful comments and hard questions.
I thank all my fellow in office B48 for the stimulating discussion, for the days we were
working together before exam and deadlines, and for all the fun we have had in the last five
years. ’The big family’ belong to us. And also thank my friends who support me and help
me in every way.
Last, I would like to dedicate my work to my beloved parents Renlong Gai and Juan
Li for their love, endless support, encouragement and always standing by me. I would also
thank my husband Qiupeng Kong for always believing in me, encourage me and raising me
up when I was feeling down.
As a final word, I would like to thank each and every individual who has been a source
of support and encouragement and helped me to achieve my goal and complete my thesis
successfully.
Abstract
This thesis addresses two main issues related to the housing market in China. It discovers:
i) the key driving forces behind the movements of housing price and the evaluation of
the model’s capacity in fitting the data. ii) try to identify whether the Chinese housing
market can be explained better by using a model with collateral constraint. The Dynamic
Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model including the housing sector and capturing
some important features of the Chinese economy is employed to explore the above questions.
Moreover, an Indirect Inference method is used to explore these issues in an empirical way.
Estimation results show that the estimated model using Indirect Inference method can explain
the data behaviour well. The estimated model shows that the capital demand shock plays a
significant major role in explaining the housing price dynamic. In terms of the second issue,
the Indirect Inference testing results show that the model with collateral constraint cannot
provide better performance in explaining the data.
land prices and legal land use constraints. The results show that household disposable income
and construction costs have stronger explanatory power on house price fluctuation.
Some fundamentals variables considerably influence housing price in the short-term,
other variables have more explanatory power in the long-term. Quigley (2002) employ 41 U.S.
metropolitan areas data over a fifteen-year period to study the average housing price variation
influenced by economic fundamentals. The empirical findings show that some fundamentals
variables such as unemployment rate, housing supply and construction permission cannot
2.1 The Source of Housing price Dynamics 9
give the powerful explanation in housing variation in the short run, but explain well in the
long run.
Another explanation for the fluctuation of housing price is monetary policy. Jud and
Winkler (2002) study the dynamics of real housing price appreciation in 130 metropolitan
areas across the United States. Their study finds that not only population growth, real
income changes can strongly affect real house price, but monetary policies also influence
the variation in housing price in the long run. Ahearne et al. (2005) focus on the study
of the influence of monetary policy on the housing price dynamics. The empirical results
show that monetary policy plays a significant role in explaining the fluctuation of the house
price. Similar results reported by Jacobsen and Naug (2005) show that interest rates, housing
construction, unemployment rates and household income play an important role in explaining
the house price dynamics in Norwegian.
For China, researchers also want to explore whether these factors have the same ex-
planatory power on house price dynamics. They explore Chinese housing market influenced
by the fundamental factors from both demand and supply sides. Many have the similar
conclusion that the fluctuation of housing price in China is mainly a reflection of the market
fundamentals.
Li and Chand (2013) study the contribution of market fundamentals to house prices in
urban China using annual data from 29 provinces. Their findings show that the level of
income, construction cost and user cost of capital are the primary determinants of house
prices. It is quite interesting to find that the supply factors including construction costs, the
user cost of capital play a significant role in explaining more developed provinces. Wang
and Zhang (2014) evaluate the importance of fundamental changes in explaining the rising
housing prices in China. The results suggest that the fundamental factors such as population,
wage income and construction costs can account for a major proportion of the housing price
rise. Similar results can be found in Chow and Niu (2015). They use annual data to show
10 Literature Review
that the fundamental economic factors in both demand and supply side can explain well in
the variation in housing prices, with income determining demand and construction affecting
supply. Deng et al. (2009) agree the conclusion that the fundamental factors such as income,
housing supply and construction cost are the important determinant, but in their research,
interest rate and population growth cannot explain the variation of housing price.
Monetary policy is also an explanation for the house price dynamics in China. Some
researchers believe that the monetary policy plays a significant major role in explaining
the real housing price in China rather than economic fundamentals. Xu and Chen (2012)
employ quarterly data from 1998 to 2009 to study the impact of monetary policy variables
on the fluctuation of house prices in China. Empirical results suggest that the volatility of
housing prices is mainly driven by monetary policy, which an expansionary monetary policy
increase the growth of housing price while restrictive monetary policy decreases the growth
of housing price. The similar results can be found in Zhang et al. (2012), Yu (2010) and Guo
and Li (2011). They believe that monetary factors such as bank loan rate, excess liquidity,
money supply growth, mortgage rate and mortgage down payment requirement can explain
the housing price dynamics well.
There is no consensus among researchers regarding the source of housing price dynamics
in the existing empirical literature using a single regression model. Liu and Ou (2017) give
the explanation why use single regression model may come across such an ambiguity. The
first reason they summarised is using a single regression model may exit the omitted variable
problem when the ’equilibrium conditions’ are derived and put forward for estimation. Hence,
it is easy to understand why some factor is shown to be significant in one model, but in other
models not. It may be because the model has failed to consider other important factors that
would reflect the facts.
The second issue when using this method is endogeneity problem, which forces econome-
tricians either to assume these variables are exogenous such as Deng et al. (2009) just cited,
2.1 The Source of Housing price Dynamics 11
or using ’instruments’ to avoid inconsistent estimation. Liu and Ou (2017) list two reasons
showing that endogeneity problem does not go away even employing a more inclusive model,
which is just inherent in any model version where equilibrium is estimated with a single
equation. On the one hand, the economic interactions as reflected by the data would be
artificially abandoned in the modelling process by imposing exogeneity. On the other, the
partial equilibrium model omits the information about the rest of the world. The endogeneity
arises due to little information about the ’true’ instruments, which can overstate the standard
error of the coefficients of these variables causing some variables to be shown insignificant
even they are important.
These studies of the housing price dynamics using the various econometric models exist
the above two issues that cannot solve to its root. Therefore, some researchers go one further
to employ a dynamic econometric model (VAR or VECM). There are some advantages
of using VAR and VECM model. On the one hand, VAR and VECM can circumvent the
endogeneity problem through using lag for all explanatory variables. On the other hand,
some factors such as gender, marriage and urbanisation are difficult to model in a structural
model, but VAR and VECM can consider as one of the explanatory variables. (Liu and Ou
(2017))
Vargas-Silva (2008) study the importance of monetary policy shock in explaining the
housing market in the U.S. using VAR. The results show that monetary policy shock plays
a significant role in explaining the house price dynamics. There is a negative relationship
between housing price and contractionary monetary policy shock. Lastrapes et al. (2002) use
a different identifying restriction to study the impact of money on the housing price. They
have a similar conclusion that money supply shock contributes significantly to the variance
in housing price. Gete (2009) use an SVAR to study the housing market in OECD countries.
He finds that housing demand shock is the essential factor for house price dynamics.
12 Literature Review
In terms of the literature of housing price dynamics in China using VAR or VECM, Bian
and Gete (2015) employ VAR identified with theory-consistent sign restrictions to study
housing dynamics in China. They consider seven potential determining factors such as
population increase, credit constraint, housing preference, savings rate, tax policy, change in
land supply and productivity progress. Their results suggest that productivity, savings and
policy stimulus play an important role in explaining the housing price dynamics in China,
even if all shocks play relevant roles. Garriga et al. (2017) study the importance of the
structural transformation and urbanisation process to the Chinese housing market. Their
findings suggest that supply factors and productivity are the dominant drivers in housing
price dynamics in China.
However, according to Liu and Ou (2017), there are some limitations that VAR or VECM
cannot address. In terms of policy analyses, there is little information about the transmission
mechanism that policymakers would be interested since these reduced form models cannot
provide such information about how the housing price is determined. Although some
researchers try to use theoretical restrictions on estimating to cover this issue, however, the
implication is often sensitive to the imposed restrictions. Therefore, a micro-foundation
structural model is chosen in this thesis to study the housing market dynamics in China,
which can show the causalities among economic variables that established as a result of
different agents’ interactions with their optimal choice. Hence, it is necessary to set up a
model that can capture the transmission mechanism and fit the data well.
Theoretical
A micro-founded dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model is widely used to
study the dynamics of the housing market and the transmission mechanism working behind
it. The increasing researchers have followed Iacoviello (2005) and Iacoviello and Neri (2010)
to discover the housing market fluctuation, which use housing as collateral for loans to study
2.1 The Source of Housing price Dynamics 13
the housing sector and business cycles. In their extended model, the collateral constraint is
faced by both firms and impatient households. Iacoviello and Neri (2010) construct a DSGE
model including a rich housing sector to a framework to study the sources and consequences
of fluctuations in the U.S. housing market using the Bayesian method. On the supply side
of their model, they consider a multi-sector structure with different rates of technological
progress to capture some important observations in the housing market. The other feature
of their model is on the demand side. They introduce the collateral constraint by splitting
households into two different types: patient (lenders) and impatient (borrowers). They treat
the constraint as a channel to emphasise the spillovers effect, which the increase of housing
price affect borrowing and consumption of constrained households. Their results show that
housing demand shock and productivity shock in the housing sector are the main driving
force of the volatility of housing prices. The contribution of monetary factors in housing
price appears more important in the long term. In terms of consequences of fluctuations,
their results show that the collateral constraint amplifies the effects on consumption given the
increase of housing price.
There is growing interest in Iacoviello-type model studying the driving forces of housing
price dynamics in China. More factors are considered to enrich the model based on their
analysis framework in the following literature. Minetti and Peng (2012) focus on the demand
side and try to identify whether there is social psychology - the ’keeping up with the Zhangs’
behaviour - that influence households’ behaviour and thus drives the fluctuation of housing
price. They include the factor of ’keeping up with the Zhangs’ in the utility function and
assume that there is a positive relationship between the household’s utility and individual
consumption in housing purchases. On the contrary, there is a negative relationship between
the household’s utility and society’s average consumption in housing services. Their Bayesian
estimation results show that there is ’keeping up with the Zhangs’ and the presence of this
social psychology play a significant major role in explaining the volatility of real housing
14 Literature Review
prices. Liu and Ou (2017) focus on the banking system to investigate the source of housing
price dynamics, which allow for a ’shadow’ bank affiliated to the ’normal’ bank capturing
Chinese economy. They find that housing demand shock is the main driving force for housing
price fluctuation, which accounts for over 80%.
In terms of the DSGE framework, monetary policy variable is also an important explana-
tion for the fluctuation of the house price. Researchers analyse different monetary policies to
study how to stabilise the housing market in China. Ng (2015) use an estimated DSGE model
with a Taylor rule to discover the sources and consequence of fluctuations in the Chinese
housing market. In addition, they also discover what is housing demand shock in China.
Their model is based on Iacoviello and Neri (2010)’s framework with sectoral heterogeneity
on the supply side and collateral constraint considered on the demand side. Their estimated
results show that housing demand shock is the main driving force in explaining the house
price dynamics. Monetary policy also contributes significantly and appears more important
in the 1990s. Ng (2015) employ a price rule - Taylor rule to study, while Wen and He (2015)
adopt a quantity rule - McCallum rule to discover the key driving force of housing price
fluctuations in China. Money supply and credit constraint are considered in their model to
capture some features of the Chinese economy. Empirical results show that housing demand
shock plays an important role in explaining the fluctuation of the house price. Money supply
shock cannot explain housing price movements compared with housing demand shock. On
the other hand, their policy suggestion shows that it is better to include the real housing price
in monetary policymaking. The combination of real housing price and money supply rule
can stabilise the Chinese economy. Zhou et al. (2013) consider in a similar vein. In order to
study how to stabilise the expanding housing market, they summarised a series policies that
the Chinese government issued into four different categories: land policy, monetary policy,
property tax policy and affordable housing policy. The empirical results show that a policy
2.2 Collateral Constraint 15
mix can keep the housing market stable, which the property tax policy control the demand
side while the land policy adjusts the supply side.
In summary, most of the literature that using a micro-founded DSGE model employing
Bayesian estimation have come to conclude that the housing demand shock plays an important
role in explaining the fluctuation of housing price in China. Policy suggestion given by
the above literature shows that some policy such as property tax and property purchasing
limitations could affect housing demand directly so that to decrease the house price and keep
the housing market stable.
2.2 Collateral Constraint
In the last section, I summarise the literature about the sources of fluctuations in the Chinese
housing market. In this section, I am going to focus on the literature about collateral constraint
in the structured DSGE model. We learn a lesson from some developed countries that a
slump in housing prices might have a seriously negative effect on the wider macroeconomy.
The reason is the housing property is usually used as a significant collateral. Therefore, the
transmission mechanisms is set up through the collateral constraint and link the housing
market and the real economy.
The model with collateral constraint
I introduce a channel that connects the housing market and the wider economy: the collateral
constraint. There are different ways to introduce the collateral constraint into the structure
model either on the firm side or the household side. In this thesis, I focus on the household
side, which follows Iacoviello and Neri (2010) and includes the collateral constraints into the
structured DSGE model.
16 Literature Review
The increasing interest in DSGE housing model literature have focused on the role of
collateral constraint.The collateral constraint is first introduced to explain the financial crisis
by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). The line of this research introduces how collateral constraint
interact with aggregate economic activity over the business cycle. More specifically, they
endogenise the collateral constraint that limits the borrowing capacity. There are two types
of agents in their framework: patient agent and impatient agent. The patient agents are
called gatherers in their paper, which is a saver. The impatient one are called farmers in
their paper, which can be thought as entrepreneurs or firms that wish to borrow from the
patient agent to finance their investment projects. The difference between the patient agent
and impatient agent is that they have a different rate of time preference. The collateral
constraint is faced only by the impatient agent.1 Therefore, loans will only be made when the
impatient household use some other form of capital (such as land, buildings and machinery)
as collateral. The borrowers’ credit limit and an investment decision are affected by the value
of the collateral asset and the tightness of the credit market. That implies if the value of
durable assets decreases for any reason, the borrowing capacity of the impatient household
also decreases. In such an economy, A significant transmission mechanism is generated
through the dynamic interaction between credit constraint and asset prices, which the effects
of exogenous shocks persist, amplify and spread out.
The transmission mechanism of collateral constraint in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) shows
that how a small scale, temporary shocks to productivity or income distribution can give rise
to large changes in production and asset prices and also their effects spillover to the rest of the
economy. The key point in their paper is the collateralisable asset plays two different roles in
their model: i) they are a factor of production. ii) they serve as collateral for loans. Suppose
that there is a negative productivity shock, which reduces the land price. The decrease in land
price reduces the net worth of the impatient agents because land is the collateralisable asset.
1The collateral constraint in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) is: Rtbt ≤ qt+1kt , where Rt is the nominal interestrate, bt is the amount of borrowing, qt+1 is the durable asset price in the next period,kt is the durable asset.
2.2 Collateral Constraint 17
The constrained agents are forced to reduce their investment, which also affects them in the
next period. The credit cycle works like this: less revenue they earn (due to less investment),
less net worth they gain. Again they reduce investment because of credit constraints. That
implies the temporary shock in period t has a significant impact on the behaviour of the
constrained agents not only in period t but also in following periods. There are two factors
affect the amplification of the shock: the credit limit and the price of the collateralisable
asset. Therefore, a significant transmission mechanism is generated through the dynamic
interaction between credit limits and asset prices, which amplify the shocks and spillover to
the economy.
Extension of the model with collateral constraint
Following Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)’s work, Iacoviello (2005) extend his work by including
two features. First, instead of using land as the collateral, he uses housing stock owned by the
entrepreneurs as the collateral to borrow. Second, he uses nominal debts like Christiano et al.
(2010). He studies a monetary business cycle model with endogenous collateral constraints
and nominal debt. The estimation results show that the collateral effects significantly improve
the efficiency of the economy to a positive demand shock. In particular, Iacoviello and Neri
(2010) consider the collateral constraint in the housing market. They construct a dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium model with collateral constraints estimated using Bayesian
methods to study the source and consequence in the US housing market.
There are two important features of housing captured by the DSGE model of the housing
market they developed. The first is sectoral heterogeneity on the supply side. The second is
the collateral constraint on the demand side. On the supply side of the economy, Iacoviello
and Neri (2010) allow for multiple sectors with different rates of technological progress. The
non-housing sector employs labour and capital to produces consumption, business investment
and intermediate goods. The housing sector using capital, labour land and intermediate goods
18 Literature Review
to produce new houses. In their model, following most of the DSGE literature, nominal
wage rigidity is presented in both the non-housing and housing model and price rigidity is
only allowed in the non-housing sector. The reason for developing the multi-sector structure
is based on the observation of the housing market. The post-world-war-II U.S. data show
that the relative price of housing has a long-run upward trend. The probable reason is
heterogeneous trend technological progress between the housing and other sectors of the
economy.
The second feature of their model is the collateral constraint on the demand side. Ia-
coviello and Neri (2010) introduce this constraint on the demand side by splitting households
into two different types: patient household (lenders) and impatient household (borrowers).
Similar in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), the difference between patient and impatient house-
hold is they have a different rate of time preferences. Patient households buy consumption
goods and housing goods and also supply labour. They lend funds to both firms and impatient
household. Impatient households also buy consumption and housing goods and supply labour.
The difference is they need to borrow money from the patient household to finance their
down payment due to their high impatience. Hence, the change in housing price affects the
behaviour of the impatient household.
The collateral constraint is one of the important feature in Iacoviello and Neri (2010)’s
work. The transmission mechanism of collateral constraint in Iacoviello type model work
as following. When there is a positive demand shock, the demand for housing rise, housing
price also increases. The rise in asset prices increases the borrowing capacity of the debtors.
That implies they can borrow more due to the high asset prices, allowing them to spend
and invest more. The change in investment will cause the output to fluctuate, which in turn
influences the current asset price. Therefore, a significant transmission channel is generated
through the dynamic interaction between the credit constraint and asset prices.
2.2 Collateral Constraint 19
Based on their analysis framework, more types of shocks and frictions are introduced
to study the housing market. Ng (2015) employ Iacoviello type model to study the sources
and consequences of the fluctuations in the Chinese housing market. In terms of the nature
of shocks driving housing price dynamic, they find that housing demand shock explains the
majority of the fluctuations in housing price. In terms of spillover effect work through the
collateral constraint, there is not a unique way to quantify the effect, which depends on the
nature of shocks. Housing demand shock has a larger contribution to the spillover effect
compared to the technology shock. However, the technology shock plays a negligible role
in the spillover effect. Liu and Ou (2017) use a DSGE model with a collateral constraint
considering shadow bank to study the Chinese housing market. Apart from investigating
the main driving force of housing market fluctuation, they also study the housing market
spillovers effect in China. They find that there is a weak spillover effect from the housing
market to the wide economy. He et al. (2017) employ a Bayesian DSGE model with collateral
constraints to investigate the interaction between the housing market and the business cycle.
They find that the collateral constraint plays a significant role in explaining the fluctuate of
the business cycle in China, which amplifies the impact of various economic shocks.
Chapter 3
Benchmark Model
3.1 Introduction
Based on the background of the housing market in China discussed in Chapter 1, we know that
the Chinese housing market has experienced extraordinary growth during the past decades.
In the very beginning, the individuals could get the state-owned houses at a meagre price
which is only one-third of the cost of housing. The full marketisation reform started in July
1998 in the following stages. The housing market in China has experienced the first round of
market boom since that. Liu and Ou (2017) mentioned in their paper, there is a considerable
increase (184%) of commercial residential housing price in China over the period between
2002 and 2014. Besides, according to Minetti and Peng (2012), the Chinese housing prices
are volatile. They show that the growth rate of housing prices approximately ranged from
-7.5% to 10% and the growth rate changes frequently. Therefore, these factors raise my
interest to think about what is the main driving force behind housing price fluctuations in
China. This is also one of the research questions I listed in Chapter 1, which I am going to
answer in this chapter.
As Reviewed in Chapter 2, the Chinese housing market has been attracting the increasing
economists to study although it does not exist for a long time. A dynamic stochastic
22 Benchmark Model
general equilibrium (DSGE) model constructed by Iacoviello and Neri (2010) estimated
using Bayesian methods is widely used to identify the main driving force of housing price
fluctuation in China and study the transmission mechanism working behind it. Ng (2015)
use an estimated DSGE model with a Taylor rule (price rules) to discover the sources and
consequence of fluctuations in the Chinese housing market. They find that not only housing
preference shock, monetary policy shock also contribute significantly to the volatility of
housing prices in China. While in the same year, Wen and He (2015) adopt another policy
rule, McCallum rule (quantity rules), to check whether it can stabilise the housing market.
They show that housing demand shock is the main driving force in housing price dynamics,
and a real house price-augmented money supply rule is a better monetary policy for China’s
economic stabilisation. Minetti and Peng (2012) using a DSGE model to analyse China’s
housing market in a different way. They focus on the demand side and try to identify whether
there is a social psychology force that affects households’ behaviour in the housing market
and thus drives the housing price dynamic. The results show that the social psychology
"keeping up with the Zhangs" plays an important role in explaining housing price dynamic.
Liu and Ou (2017) employ a DSGE model to investigate the driving force of housing price
dynamics in China. In order to capture the situation in China, they model the featured
operating of the ordinary and ’shadow’ banks in China. They have the similar findings that
the housing demand shock is the essential factor of the housing price fluctuation. In summary,
most of the literature that using a micro-founded structural DSGE model employing Bayesian
methods have come to conclude that the housing demand shock plays an important role in
explaining the fluctuation of housing price in China.
It should be noticed that none of the previous DSGE literature about Chinese housing
market evaluates the model’s capacity in fitting the data. It is quite important to evaluate
how best the empirical performance of DSGE models is. Therefore, this gap is going to
be filled in this chapter. A powerful testing procedure (Indirect Inference) is employed to
3.1 Introduction 23
apply in the New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with the
housing sector in China and check whether this theory can explain China’s housing market.
The Indirect Inference evaluation is proposed initially in Minford et al. (2009) and refines
by Le et al. (2011) who evaluate this method using Monte Carlo experiments. This testing
aims to compare the simulated data with the actual data through the auxiliary model. An
auxiliary model that is entirely independent of the theoretical one is used in this approach to
generate a description of data against the performance of the theory. A cointegrated vector
autoregressive with exogenous variables (VARX) is chosen as the auxiliary model. The
Wald statistic is employed as the criterion for evaluating the model, which compare the
Wald statistic calculating using simulated data and using actual data. For Indirect Inference
estimation, a set of parameters that are best able to satisfy the test criterion are found when
carried out the testing. In the empirical procedures, Indirect Inference is used to test the
model on some initial parameter values that mainly based on previous literature. If the
structured model with calibrated value cannot pass the test, Indirect Inference estimation
is used to improve the overall performance of modelling fitting, which is based on Indirect
Inference testing. It allows the parameters to move flexibly to the values that maximise
the criterion of replicating the data behaviour. The detail of Indirect Inference testing and
estimation procedure are going to be introduced in Section 3.3.
This chapter is organised as follows: In Section 3.2, I first highlight some features of
the model in this chapter and then display the model setting. The principles and procedures
of the indirect inference method for evaluating and estimation are explained in Section 3.3.
Section 3.4 displays data description and also shows the calibration of the structure model.
Empirical results are discussed in Section 3.5. Firstly, I present the estimation and testing
results and then check the properties of the model like impulse response functions, shock
and variance decomposition. Section 3.6 is the conclusion part.
24 Benchmark Model
3.2 Model
3.2.1 Key Features in the Model
As mentioned in Chapter 1, there are two main research questions relating to the Chinese
housing market I am going to answer: i) the key driving forces behind the movements of
housing price and the evaluation of the model’s capacity in fitting the data. ii) try to identify
whether the Chinese housing market can be explained better by using a model with collateral
constraint compared to the benchmark model. A Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium
(DSGE) model with Indirect Inference evaluation and estimation are employed to explore the
above questions. This chapter focus on the first issue that what is the sources of fluctuations
in the Chinese housing market. There are some important features of the Chinese housing
sector considered in my research. First of all, two sectors are allowed on the supply side of
the economy with explicit modelling of the price and quantity of the housing sector to study
the behaviour of the housing sector. Secondly, the productivity shock in both housing and
general sector are assumed to be the non-stationary shock.
In terms of the first feature, early literature on using a micro-foundation based DSGE
modelling approach studying the housing sector usually construct a multi-sector structure
which includes housing and non-housing products in a Real Business Cycle (RBC) model
such as Campbell and Ludvigson (1998), Davis and Heathcote (2005) and Baxter (1996).
They allow homogeneity among different sector enjoying the same competitive attribute -
perfect competition. However, in the Real Business Cycle (RBC) model, money is typically
said to be neutral in both the long run and short run. Some monetary transmission mechanism
cannot work in this scenario. As we know from some previous literature, monetary policy
variables play a significant role in explaining the real housing price. I also want to check
how monetary policy works in the structure model. In Iacoviello and Neri (2010)’s work,
price rigidity is introduced in the general sector and keep the housing price flexible. There
3.2 Model 25
are several reasons why housing might have the flexible price. According to Barsky et al.
(2003), housing production is very sensitive to a monetary contraction, while the production
of general goods not. More specifically, the value of new houses decreases by almost 10%
compared to CPI when there is a monetary contraction. They also show that compared to the
inflation persistence of CPI, there do not exhibit any inflation persistence of new houses. As
in Barsky et al. (2007), a high value on the housing allows a bargaining space on the price of
housing goods. I follow their idea to construct the firm side with two sectors but simplify
their setting, which assumes factor market in both sectors operates perfectly competitive.
In terms of the second feature of the model, other than most previous literature, the
productivity shocks in both housing sector and general sector are assumed to be non-stationary.
The reason for setting non-stationary productivity shock is practical and substantial: practical
because, empirically, after the financial crisis, the output cannot go back to the previous level.
Le et al. (2014) use Figure 3.1 to show this stylized fact in China, which shows the level of
output cannot reach its previous level after the crisis. The non-stationary shocks could shed
light on the large deviations from steady time trends that economies experience no matter
booms or crises; Substantial because, non-stationary is the feature of macroeconomic data.
On the other hand, a model using nonstationary data could explain the large deviations from
steady state, which those models using stationary data do not. The business cycle model
focus on studying the dynamics and choice of macroeconomic policy on stabilising the
fluctuations, which try to abstract from the uncertainty surrounding the economy’s long-term
future and eliminate the trends from the data so as to make it stationary. Hodrick-Prescott
(HP) and Band Pass (BP) filters are the most common techniques that used in trend-removal.
However, HP and BP filters are a mathematical tool used in the business cycle to decompose
the raw data into cyclical and trend component, which are not based on theories. Hence, the
precision of the driving process that leads to trend behaviour cannot be identified using these
techniques. In addition, according to Cogley and Nason (1995) and Murray (2003), they
26 Benchmark Model
study the spurious dynamic causing from HP and BP filters to non-stationary data and show
that these filters cannot distinguish between difference-stationary and trend-stationary. The
business cycle dynamics can be generated using the HP filter even if they are not present in
the original data. Therefore, instead of using filtered data, the non-stationary data are used to
evaluate and estimate the model.
In addition, according to Le et al. (2014), they develop a model of the Chinese economy
using a DSGE framework with a banking sector based on non-stationarity to shed light on the
banking crisis in China. The model with non-stationary productivity shock can successfully
explain China’s economy well. Therefore, I follow Le et al. (2014) to propose a DSGE model
with non-stationary productivity shock to study the Chinese housing market in my research.
Fig. 3.1 China real GDP per capita and pre-crisis trendSource: cited in Le et al. (2014)
3.2 Model 27
3.2.2 The Model Setting
The households on the demand side of the economy try to maximise their lifetime utility by
choosing general consumption goods as well as bond, supplying labour and accumulating
housing in each period. There are two goods sectors on the supply side: housing goods
sector and general goods sector. Housing sector produces new housings, and general sector
produces general consumption goods. Assuming labour and capital markets in both sectors
operate perfectly competitive and factors flow freely across two sectors. Price rigidity is
allowed in the general sector and flexible price presents in the housing sector. Taylor rule
is used as monetary policy by the central bank. A various of shocks are introduced in the
economy, which will be specified in the model.
Households
There is a continuum of measure one of households. The household’s decisions consist
of maximising lifetime utility subject to a period by period budget constraint. Assuming
a constant relative risk aversion utility function (CRRA), the representative households’
lifetime utility can be written as
U = E0
∞
∑t=0
βtε
pt
[C1−σc
t
1−σc+ ε
ht
H1−σht
1−σh− ε
ltN1+η
t
1+η
](3.1)
where E0 is the expectation formed at period 0, β ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor. The
households obtain utility from general consumption goods Ct ,houses Ht and disutility from
labour supply Nt . The parameters σc,σh are the inverse of intertemporal elasticity of substi-
tution of consumption and housing, while η denotes the inverse of the elasticity of labour
supply with respect to real wage. It measures the substitution effect of a change in the wage
rate on labour supply.
28 Benchmark Model
Three shocks are introduced in the utility function: εpt ,ε
ht and ε l
t . The terms εpt and ε l
t
capture the shocks to intertemporal preferences and to labour supply. The shock εht is what
the previous literature called housing preference shock or housing demand shock. According
to Iacoviello and Neri (2010), the housing demand shock can be some social, institutional or
income changes and so on, which might shift households preferences on purchase housing
relative to other consumption goods. According to the literature, all these three shocks are
assumed followed an AR(1) process:
lnεpt = ρp lnε
pt−1 + vp,t (3.2)
lnεht = ρh lnε
ht−1 + vh,t (3.3)
lnεlt = ρl lnε
lt−1 + vl,t (3.4)
where vp,t , vh,t and vl,t are independently and identically distributed i.i.d. processes with
variances σ2p , σ2
h and σ2l .
The households’ period by period budget constraint in real terms is given by:
From equation (3.5), it should be noticed that the households can use his wealth in each
period to buy consumption goods, bond and also to accumulate houses. Note that the housing
price is the relative price. All of these outflows of funds of the households is shown on the
left-hand side of equation (3.5). The households’ wealth on the right-hand side consists of
real wages wt earned from supplying labour Nt , the interest rate gain of bond holdings from
the previous period (1+ rt−1)Bt−1 and also the real profits Πt from firms. Then, the aim of
the households is trying to maximise the utility function (3.1), subject to the budget constraint
3.2 Model 29
(3.5) by choosing Ct , Nt , Bt and Ht via the Lagrangian. Given the first order conditions, there
comes:
εpt C−σc
t = λt (3.6)
εlt ε
pt Nη
t = λtwt (3.7)
λt = βEtλt+1(1+ rt) (3.8)
λt ph,t = εpt ε
ht H−σh
t +βEtλt+1(1−δh)ph,t+1 (3.9)
For all the above equations, the marginal utility loss of choosing relevant allocations is
shown on the left-hand side. Compared to that, the right-hand side expresses the marginal
utility gain. Combining equation (3.6) and equation (3.8), we could get the well-known Euler
equation. It is a dynamic optimality condition showing a dynamic optimality decision for
consumption in the present and the future. The optimal intra-temporal substitution between
labour and consumption is shown when combining equation (3.7) and equation (3.6). The
difference between this paper and the classical New Keynesian model is I have one more
equation to represent housing demand, which can be found in equation (3.9). In the housing
demand equation, we can see that the marginal utility gain of increasing in housing services is
equal to the marginal utility loss of decreasing in consumption. There are two parts consisting
of marginal utility gain of increasing housing housing services. One is housing services in
the current period. The other is the expected value of housing.
30 Benchmark Model
Firms
On the supply side, as mentioned earlier, there are two sectors: general sector as well as
the housing sector. The general sector and housing sector produce consumption goods and
new houses using capital (Kc,t , Kh,t) and labour (Nc,t , Nh,t). Sticky prices is introduced
in the general sector by assuming monopolistic competition through Calvo-style contracts
and flexible housing price is allowed in the housing sector, which two sectors use different
technologies (Ac,t , Ah,t). As mentioned in Section 3.2.1, there are two reasons why housing
might have flexible prices. First, housing is relatively expensive, which have a bargaining
space on the price of housing. Second, housing production is very sensitive to a monetary
contraction. In the following, I first display some common features in both housing sector
and general sector and then discuss the behaviour of each sector respectively.
The Representative Firm
The general sector and housing sector both hire labour (Nc,t , Nh,t) and buy capital (Kc,t , Kh,t)
to produce consumption goods (Yc,t) and new houses (Yh,t). The technology in different
sectors available to economy is described by a constant-return to scale production function 1:
Yi,t = Ai,tKαi,t−1N1−α
i,t i = c,h (3.10)
where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 is output elasticities of capital. It measures the responsiveness of output
to the change of capital. Yi,t is consumption goods when i = c and is housing goods when
1I do not include the factor land on the supply side of the housing sector in my research. The reason is Ifocus on the cyclical fluctuations in the Chinese housing market and abstract from the long-run housing pricedynamics that may be related to long-run income and population growth. Land expansion is a proportion of thepopulation growth. According to Deng et al. (2008), they use the empirical study to show that the populationgrowth in China is one of the key variables in the urban land expansion. And also, Deng et al. (2009) rejectthe role that population growth is an important determinant factor in explaining the fluctuation of housingprice in China. In addition, the housing price consists of land price and house value. The land price rise inproportion with population, which is not concerned in my research. I focus on the later one housing value thatis the fluctuation of the housing price.
3.2 Model 31
i = h. Ki,t−1 and Ni,t represent capital and labour in the different sectors. Ac,t measures
productivity in the non-housing sector and Ah,t captures the technology in the housing sector.
As mentioned earlier, the productivity shock in both sectors are assumed to be non-stationary,
which follow a stochastic trend. Therefore, the stochastic process of productivity shock can
be written as:
∆lnAc,t = ρc,t∆lnAc,t−1 + vc,t (3.11)
∆lnAh,t = ρh,t∆lnAh,t−1 + vh,t (3.12)
This specification implies that shocks, vi,t , will have permanent effects on the level of Ai,t .
The firm invest capital following the linear capital accumulation identity.
Ki,t = Ii,t +(1−δk)Ki,t−1 i = c,h (3.13)
where δk is the depreciation rate and Ii,t is the gross investment in the different sector.
Housing Sector
Firms in the housing market operate the perfectly competitive product, which hire labours
and buy capitals to produce new houses. Empirical studies show that the capital stock does
not change very much from period to period. Economists usually rationalise this by assuming
that there are some forms of "adjustment costs" that prevent firms from changing their capital
stock too quickly. Hence, the "capital adjustment costs" is introduced in the firm side so that
to avoid the investment excessively volatility. Assuming there is a convex adjustment cost to
capital facing by the representative firm. I use the quadratic form for tractability.
Φ(.) =κ
2(Kh,t+1 −Kh,t)
2 (3.14)
32 Benchmark Model
The function Φ(.) represents capital adjustment costs, which is assumed to satisfy Φ(0) =
Φ′(0) = 0 and Φ′′(0) > 0. κ captures a multiplicative constant, which affects adjustment
costs. The firms discount future profit flows by stochastic discount factor. The stochastic
discount factor was defined as:
Mt = βt E0u′(Ct)
u′(C0)(3.15)
The reason why the stochastic discount factor written like this is because this is how
households value future dividends. An additional units of utility u′(Ct) is generated at time t
because of one unit of dividend returned to the household, which using β to discount back to
the present period 0. Therefore, the firm maximise the present discounted value of profit,
Vh = E0
∞
∑t=0
Mt [Yh,t ph,t − Ih,t − (wt + εnht )Nh,t −
κ
2(∆Kh,t)
2] (3.16)
subject to the constraints law of motion of the capital stock (3.13) and production function
(3.10) by choosing capital Kh,t and labour Nh,t
Imposing the constraints in each period, the firm’s problem can be re-written as:
maxKh,t ,Nh,t
Vh = E0
∞
∑t=0
Mt [(Ah,tKαh,t−1N1−α
h,t )ph,t − (wt + εnht )Nh,t
−(1+ εkht )Kh,t +(1−δk)Kh,t−1 −
κ
2(∆Kh,t)
2]
(3.17)
where the terms εnht and εkh
t are the labour demand shock and capital demand shock in the
housing sector, which capture other imposts or regulation on firms’ use of capital and labour
respectively. Over the last two decades, China has maintained a rapid economic growth
rate and experienced housing institution reforms. These have significantly affected capital
demand of housing industries and are plausible sources of capital demand shock. The firms
in the housing sector optimally choose capital and labour to maximise their profits. The
3.2 Model 33
demand for labour and capital are represented below:
(1−α)Yh,t
Nh,tph,t = (wt + ε
nht ) (3.18)
Equation (3.18) shows the labour demand of firms in the housing sector, which sets the
marginal product of labour equal to labour price- the real unit cost of labour to the firm wt
and the stochastic shock term εnht .
(1+ rt)[1+κ(Kh,t −Kh,t−1)+ εkht ] =
αYh,t
Kh,tph,t +(1−δk)+κ(Kh,t+1 −Kh,t) (3.19)
Equation (3.19) represents the capital demand of firms in the housing sector. εkht is the
stochastic shock to capital demand. From the above equation, we can see that firms can either
invest 1+κ(Kh,t −Kh,t−1)+ εkht amounts of bonds in period t, which yields a gross return of
(1+ rt)[1+κ(Kh,t −Kh,t−1)] in period t +1 or to get the additional unit of capital (marginal
product of capital) yields AtFK(Kt ,Nt) units of output next periods. Also, an extra unit of
capital reduces tomorrow’s adjustment costs by κ(Kh,t+1 −Kh,t)
General Sector
Production in the general sector is split into two stages, where the final goods stage operate
perfect competition and the intermediate goods stage is monopolistic competition. For the
final goods stage, the general final goods are produced by applying a constant elasticity (CES)
bundler of intermediate goods. The downward sloping demand curve for intermediate goods
producers is obtained through the profit maximisation in the final goods sector operating
competitively. For the intermediates goods stage, the intermediate goods are produced using
the Cobb-Douglas production function. The large number of intermediates producers behave
as monopolistically competitive and have pricing power. The difference between the general
34 Benchmark Model
sector and the housing sector is the intermediate producers in the general sector optimises
along three dimensions, not only capital and labour but also price of intermediate goods. The
intermediate goods firms in the general sector can exploit their market power.
The Final Goods
There are one final goods firm and a continuum of intermediate goods firms (of unit indexed
by k ∈ [0,1]) . The final goods firms behave as perfectly competitive and produce the final
goods at the time t,Yc,t , which aggregates the continuum of intermediate goods in period t,
Yc,t(k) according to the CES production function.
Yc,t =
[∫ 1
0Yc,t(k)
ψ−1ψ dk
] ψ
ψ−1
(3.20)
where there is an assumption: ψ > 1; ψ is the elasticity of substitution among the different
intermediate goods. The integral is raised to the power ψ/(ψ −1) to make the production
function display constant returns to scale.
Final good firms face the problem of profit maximising.
maxYc,t(k)
Pc,tYc,t −∫ 1
0Pc,t(k)Yc,t(k)dk (3.21)
substitute out Yc,t using equation (3.20). The profits will end up with zero since the firm
behaves as perfectly competitive, which total revenue that the final goods price times the
amount of final goods minus total cost that the price of all intermediate goods times quantity.
maxYc,t(k)
Pc,t
[∫ 1
0Yc,t(k)
ψ−1ψ dk
] ψ
ψ−1
−∫ 1
0Pc,t(k)Yc,t(k)dk (3.22)
The first order conditions with respect to Yc,t(k):
3.2 Model 35
Pc,t
[∫ 1
0Yc,t(k)
ψ−1ψ dk
] 1ψ−1
Yc,t(k)− 1
ψ = Pc,t(k) (3.23)
this results in the demand function for intermediate goods k
Yc,t(k) = Yc,t
(Pc,t(k)
Pc,t
)−ψ
(3.24)
this demand function represents that the demand for intermediate goods depends negatively
on its relative price and positively on total production. Substitute out Yc,t(k) using equation
(3.24) into (3.20) comes:
Yc,t =
∫ 1
0
[Yc,t
(Pc,t(k)
Pc,t
)−ψ]ψ−1
ψ
dk
ψ
ψ−1
= Yc,t
[∫ 1
0
(Pc,t(k)
Pc,t
)1−ψ] ψ
ψ−1
(3.25)
rewrite equation (3.25) gives,
1Pc,t
=
[∫ 1
0
(1
Pc,t(k)
)ψ−1
dk
] 1ψ−1
(3.26)
and this results the aggregate price level,
Pc,t =
[∫ 1
0Pc,t(k)1−ψdk
] 11−ψ
(3.27)
The Intermediate Goods Firms
The intermediate goods firms behave as monopolistically competitive, and the Cobb-Douglas
production function is used to produce intermediate goods. They optimise along three
dimensions, not only capital and labour like in the housing sector but also price. The
intermediate goods firms set price following a Calvo rule (Calvo (1983)). That is in each
period, a fraction 1−ω of firms are randomly selected to reset their price for period t, P⋆t (k).
36 Benchmark Model
The rest fraction ω of firms are not able to choose their prices optimally. They keep their
price as same as the last updating.
The intermediate goods firms in the general sector share the similar optimal behaviour
of choosing capital and labour like in the housing sector. The optimal choice of labour and
capital in the general sector are presented below 2:
(1−α)Yc,t
Nc,t= (wt + ε
nct ) (3.28)
Equation (3.28) shows the labour demand of firms in the general sector. The marginal
product of labour equal to its price wt , which is the real wage that is common to all firms in
both sectors. εnct is the labour demand shock in the general sector.
(1+ rt)[1+κ(Kc,t −Kc,t−1)+ εkct ] =
αYc,t
Kc,t+(1−δk)+κ(Kc,t+1 −Kc,t) (3.29)
Equation (3.29) represents the capital demand in the general sector. It shares the
same interpretation in the housing sector. The left-hand side of equation (3.29) gives
the intermediate firms behaviour of investing bonds in period t with the gross return of
(1+ rt)[1+κ(Kc,t −Kc,t−1)] in period t +1. The right-hand side shows the return of getting
the additional unit of physical capital. Therefore, it is equivalent to invest bond or capital.
εkct is capital demand shock in the general sector.
The labour demand and capital demand in the general sector are obtained by maximising
the discounted present value of profits. However, the choice of optimal price is not part of
today’s maximisation problem. The reason is the optimal price that chosen in period t +n is
independent of the price chosen today, which depends on the realisation of the economy from
period t to period t +n and information available in period t +n. There are often two steps to
2The detailed derivation can be found in Housing sector
3.2 Model 37
obtain the optimal price. First, minimise the costs to get marginal cost and then maximise
the market value of intermediate goods firms subject to the demand for their output by the
final goods firm following a Calvo contract (Calvo (1983)).
The firms in the general sector face the cost minimisation problem.
minKc,t(k),Nc,t(k)
[rtKc,t(k)+wtNc,t(k)] (3.30)
subject to the production function, equation (3.10). obtain the marginal cost
mct =1
αα(1−α)1−αA−1
t rαt w1−α
t (3.31)
Price rigidity is introduced in the general sector and follow Calvo (1983) contract. That
implies the firms cannot change their prices freely each period. In particular, in each period
a fraction ω of firms are not able to change its price and has to stick to the price chosen
in the previous period. The rest firms (1−ω) can adjust their prices at time t. A firm is
given the ability to change its price at time t. It adjusts their prices to maximise the expected
discounted value of profits, since it will, in expectation, be stuck with this price for more
than just the current period. In this case, the firm discount factor contains two parts, not only
have the usual stochastic discount factor but also include the probability that firm cannot
change their price. Hence, the firms will discount profits s periods into the future by:
βs u′(Ct+s)
u′(Ct)ω
s (3.32)
where β s u′(Ct+s)u′(Ct)
is the usual stochastic discount factor and ωs is the probability that firm
will be stuck with a price for s periods. If ω is small, then the firms get to update their prices
frequently and thus will heavily discount future profit flows when making current pricing
decisions. On the other hand, if ω is large, it is very likely that a firm will be "stuck" with
38 Benchmark Model
whatever price it chooses today for a long time and thus be relatively more concerned about
the future when making its current pricing decisions.
The intermediate goods firms choose the optimal price in case of the possibility of being
stuck with a price. The firms try to maximise the profit :
maxPc,t(k)
Et
∞
∑s=0
(ωβ )s u′(Ct+s)
u′(Ct)
(Pc,t(k)Pc,t+s
Yc,t+s(k)−mct+sYc,t+s(k))
(3.33)
substitute out Yc,t+s(k) using equation (3.24) gives:
maxPc,t(k)
Et
∞
∑s=0
(ωβ )s u′(Ct+s)
u′(Ct)
(Pc,t(k)Pc,t+s
(Pc,t(k)Pc,t+s
)−ψ
Yc,t+s −mct+s
(Pc,t(k)Pc,t+s
)−ψ
Yc,t+s
)(3.34)
Equation (3.34) shows the problem that intermediate goods firm faced to maximise the
real profits discounted by the stochastic discount factor and the probability of being able to
change the price. The optimal behaviour of choosing price is:
Equation (3.55) is capital demand equation in the general sector. Similar to the capital
demand in the housing sector, the capital demand in the general sector depends negatively
on the real interest rate and positively on other variables. I follow Meenagh et al. (2010) to
calibrate these parameters.
The price setting equation is given by:
πc,t = βEt πc,t+1 +(1−ω)(1−ωβ )
ωmct (3.56)
44 Benchmark Model
The corresponding marginal cost is given by:
mct = (1−α)wt +α rt − εpnt (3.57)
Equation (3.56) is the standard purely forward-looking New Keynesian Phillips curve. The
above two equations (3.56) and (3.57) show that the current inflation depends on expected
future inflation and the current cost, which the marginal cost is a function of real interest rate,
the real wage and the productivity.
The general goods market clearing condition can be written as:
yc,t = c0ct + k0kt − k0(1−δk)kt−1 + εgt (3.58)
Equation (3.58) is the general goods market equilibrium condition, where c0 is the steady-
state consumption-output ratio, k0 is the steady state capital-output ratio. There are two
kinds of goods produced in the general goods sector: general consumption goods and capital
goods. Therefore, the supply of capital goods can be found in this equation. The general
consumption goods can be consumed by the household and the capital goods can be invested
by firms themselves in both sectors.
Central Bank
The Taylor rule can be expressed as:
it = i+θπ(πc,t −π⋆)+θGDP( ˜GDPt − ˜GDP⋆
t )+ εmt (3.59)
The simply Taylor’s rule is set to achieve both its short-run goal for stabilising the economy
and its long-run goal for inflation. Coefficients θπ and θGDP are assumed to be positively and
chosen by the monetary authority. εmt can be interpreted as monetary policy shock, which
deviates from the steady state due to a change in the policy. A positive εmt can be interpreted
3.3 The Method of Indirect Inference 45
as a contractionary monetary policy shock. On the contrary, a negative εmt represents an
expansionary monetary policy shock.
It should be noticed that the model is loglinearised around a steady state growth path
driven by the growth of the shocks, including the drift term in non stationary productivity.
On the other hand, the level of potential GDP varies with the stochastic trend in produc-
tivity. Therefore, the model is loglinearising around potential GDP which is following the
deterministic trend and stochastic trend.
Equations (3.47) to (3.59) and some identities equations ((3.43) to (3.46)) determine
seventeen endogenous variables in the model. There are eleven exogenous shock variables
in the model driving the stochastic behaviour of the system of linear rational expectations
equations.
3.3 The Method of Indirect Inference
3.3.1 Introduction of Indirect Inference
There are two contributions in this chapter. First, the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
model is set up incorporating housing sector and some important features of the Chinese
economy. This provides a framework to describe the Chinese housing market in a reasonable
detail. Second, the evaluation and estimation strategy followed Indirect Inference method
using unfiltered non-stationary data are employed in this chapter. The benchmark model
has already discussed in the last section. Therefore, in this section, I focus on introducing
the Indirect Inference method. To be specific, Indirect Inference evaluation and estimation
are going to be introduced in the following. I will emphasise the feature of the unfiltered
non-stationary data in the next section.
Indirect Inference method evaluates the model’s capacity in fitting the data, which
introduced by Minford et al. (2009) and Le et al. (2011) refine this method using Monte
46 Benchmark Model
Carlo experiments. Bayesian also can evaluate the model by creating a likelihood ratio, but
the problem is it can only compare the model with the benchmark model and cannot evaluate
the model against the real data. However, Indirect Inference can provide a classical statistical
inferential framework for testing, which provides a statistical criterion and tells how close
the model is to the actual data. In addition, Le et al. (2016) use Monte Carlo experiments
to compare the power of the Indirect Inference test with the power of the likelihood ratio
test 3. The results show that the power of the Likelihood Ratio test is much lower than
the Indirect Inference test especially in the small sample. The idea of Indirect Inference
evaluation is that the auxiliary model completely independent of the theoretical model is used
to compare the performance estimated on the real data and simulated data. The auxiliary
model in my research is VARX since the unfiltered data are used in evaluation and estimation.
According to Meenagh et al. (2012b), a Vector Error Correction (VECM) model or Vector
Auto Regression with the Exogenous variable model (VARX) can be used as an auxiliary
model if the shocks are non-stationary. Wald test is employed as the criterion when evaluating
the model, which compare the Wald statistic calculated using simulated data with the Wald
statistic calculated using actual data. If the model can pass the test, that implies the simulated
data generated by the model are similar to those generated using the actual data. It shows
that the model can explain the economy properly. For this reason, the behaviour of simulated
data is not significantly different from the behaviour of actual data. If the model fails the test,
Indirect Inference estimation is used to search for a set of coefficients that could improve the
performance of the model.
In terms of indirect inference estimation, which has been widely used in the estima-
tion of structural models (eg.Smith (1993), Gregory and Smith (1991) Gourieroux et al.
(1993)(Gregory and Smith, 1991); Gourieroux and Monfort (1996) and Canova (2007))4.
Indirect Inference estimation is based on the Indirect Inference testing, which repeats the3They use both stationary and non-stationary data to do the comparison.4Recent literature using this method include Minford and Ou (2010), Liu and Minford (2014) and Le et al.
(2014)
3.3 The Method of Indirect Inference 47
testing procedure to find out the global minima of the Wald statistic. The basic idea of
Indirect Inference is trying to search for a set of coefficients that are best able to satisfy the
test criterion. Simulated Annealing algorithm is employed to execute the idea of finding the
minimum Wald statistics.
In summary, the reason why use Indirect Inference evaluation and estimation in my
research is one can test the model unconditionally against the data and can find a certain
set of structural parameters to ensure it to fit the data as closely as possible. On the other
hand, according to Le et al. (2015) the low sample bias feature is another advantage of the
Indirect Inference for small samples. Consider the Chinese housing market does not last for
a long time, the data is limited. Therefore, it is valid and efficient for using indirect inference
method.
3.3.2 Indirect Inference Testing
Indirect Inference is a simulation-based method for estimating the parameters of economic
models. Therefore, it is better to know the testing principle and procedure before estimation.
Testing uses the auxiliary model to compare the actual data with the simulated data generated
from the model. Vector Auto Regression with the Exogenous variable model (VARX) is
employed as an auxiliary model following Meenagh et al. (2012b). The detail of the auxiliary
model will be discussed in the following section. The Wald statistic is used as the criterion
when testing the model, which is the differences between the coefficients from simulated and
actual data. The VAR coefficients β α can get from the actual data and the N sets of VAR
coefficients β i(i = 1 : N) can be obtained from the simulated data, from which we perform
the relevant calculation. The Wald statistic is calculated as following:
W = (β α − β )′Ω−1(β α − β ) (3.60)
48 Benchmark Model
where β = E(β i) = 1N ∑
Ni=1 β i and Ω = cov(β i − β ) = 1
N ∑Ni=1(β
i − β )(β i − β )′
It is interesting to find whether the Wald statistic calculated using actual data lie in the
range of Wald statistic get from the N sets of simulated data. If in that range the model can
pass the test, which means the macroeconomic model is the data generating mechanism.
There are three steps to perform the testing procedure, which originally proposed in
Minford et al. (2009) and Le et al. (2011) refined using Monte Carlo experiments, and also Le
et al. (2016) apply this testing procedure using non-stationary data. A brief testing procedure
is presented in the following.
Step1: Calculate shock processes
The residual and innovation of economic model condition on the data and parameters
are calculated first. If the model equation has no future expectations, the structural errors
can be simply back out from the observed data and parameters of the model. If there are
expectations in the model equations, the rational expectation terms can be calculated using
the robust instrumental variables methods of McCallum (1976) and Wickens (1982). The
lagged endogenous data are used as instruments and hence the auxiliary VAR model are used
as the instrumental variables regression. The errors are treated as autoregressive processes
and use OLS to estimate the autoregressive coefficients and innovations.
Step 2: Simulated data by bootstrapping
Step two is simulating the data. The innovation can be obtained from step one, and
the simulated data can be obtained by bootstrapping these innovations. Bootstrap by time
vector is used to preserve any simultaneity between them and solve the resulting model using
Dynare. This process needs to be repeated so that I can get the N bootstrapped simulations 5,
drawing each sample independently.
Step 3: Compute the Wald statistic5I bootstrap 1000 times in my research.
3.3 The Method of Indirect Inference 49
I use both actual data and the N samples of simulated data obtained from the last step
to estimate the auxiliary model, which can obtain the coefficients of the auxiliary model
from both actual and simulated data. Then, I use Equation (3.60) to calculate the Wald
statistic. According to Le et al. (2011), there are two different types of Wald statistic: the
’Full Wald’ and the ’Directed Wald’. In the Full Wald, all the endogenous variables from
the DSGE model need to be considered in the auxiliary model. It should be noticed that the
more variables and lags are included in the auxiliary model, the higher the chance that the
model will be rejected. Adding more endogenous variables to the auxiliary model will raise
the power of the test, which provides a more stringent test. Therefore, the Directed Wald
statistic is used to focus on some aspects of the model’s performance, which consider some
key endogenous variables in the auxiliary model.
In order to make the model to fit the data at the 95% confidence level, Wald statistic
for the actual data should be less than the 95th percentile of the Wald statistics from the
simulated data. In order to make it easier to understand whether the model has been rejected
by the data, the transformed Wald is introduced. The criteria of rejection is that when the
Wald statistic was equal to the 95th percentile from the simulated data, which the transformed
Wald is 1.645 using Formula 3.61. Then compare the transformed Wald of the actual data
with the criteria (Transformed Wald of 1.645). If the transformed Wald of the actual data is
greater than 1.645, then the model reject by the actual data. If it is less than the criteria, that
means the structure model can replicate the behaviour of the data.
T = 1.648(
√2wα −
√2k−1√
2w0.95 −√
2k−1) (3.61)
where wα is the Wald statistic on the actual data and w0.95 is the Wald statistic for the
95th percentile of the simulated data.
50 Benchmark Model
The above steps show how to test a given model with particular parameter values. These
steps can be also shown graphically. I follow Minford and Ou (2010) to illustrate testing
procedure using the diagram (Figure 3.2) below. Panel A of Figure 3.2 summarises the main
features of Indirect Inference testing I described above. The mountain-shape diagram in
Panel B, replicated from Meenagh et al. (2009), shows that how ‘reality’ is compared to the
model’s predictions using the Wald test when two parameters are considered. In panel B, the
mountain represents the corresponding joint distribution generated from model simulations
and the real data estimation can be either spot. If point A is the real data based estimates, the
theoretical model falls the test because what the model predicts is too far away from what
reality suggests. In contrast, if the real data based estimates ‘on the mountain’,that means the
reality is captured by the joint distribution of the chosen features implied by the model. The
Wald statistic I introduce above formally evaluates these distances.
3.3 The Method of Indirect Inference 51
Fig. 3.2 The Principle of testing using indirect inferenceSource: Minford and Ou (2010)
The above have already shown how a given model with particular parameter values is
tested specifically and expressed the principle using the graph. These parameter values can
get from calibration. However, if the calibrated value is inaccurate, the model would be
probability rejected since the power of the test is high. Therefore, it is necessary to search
for a set of coefficients that can explain the behaviour of data. This is where I introduce
Indirect Inference Estimation. The idea of this estimation is that searching for the numerical
parameter values to minimise the Wald statistic and test the model on these values. The
52 Benchmark Model
model itself is rejected if it is rejected on these values. The detail of Indirect Inference
estimation is going to be introduced in the next section.
3.3.3 Indirect Inference Estimation
The evaluation method using Indirect Inference is to check whether the chosen parameter set
could have generated the actual data. As discussed in the above section, the model would be
probability rejected if the calibrated value is inaccurate. Another set of parameters could pass.
If no set of parameters can be found to pass the test, then the model itself is rejected. Maybe
the model has already unrejected since it has already gotten closer to the data with alternative
parameters. Indirect estimation is used to find the parameters that can minimise the overall
Wald statistic and maximise the chances of the model will not be rejected. The process of
Indirect Inference estimation is simply shown as the following: First, the coefficients are
taken as an input to minimise the object function, then do the testing procedure as mentioned
above. At last, the output is the Wald statistic.
Following Le and Meenagh (2013), a simulated annealing algorithm is chosen as the
minimising algorithm to perform the Indirect Inference estimation, which is a way to imply
the Indirect Inference into practice. Simulated annealing is the physical process of heating
to minimising the system energy by lowering the temperature to decrease defects. It is the
same logic to search for a minimum in a more general system when applying to Indirect
Inference. The algorithm is used when finding the minimum Wald statistics implied by the
real and simulated data. A new state is randomly generated at each iteration of the simulated
annealing algorithm and then decides whether to moving the system to a new state or just
staying in the current state. The distance between new state and the current state is based on
a probability distribution with a scale proportion to the temperature. This leads the system to
move to the states of lower Wald statistic. At last, this iteration will stop when the objective
function is minimised.
3.3 The Method of Indirect Inference 53
The advantage of simulated annealing compare to other methods is the algorithm avoids
become trapped in the local minima and can find globally for more possible solutions. It
repeats the testing procedure to search for the global minima of the Wald statistic. A smaller
Wald statistic compared with any point preceding it in the previous is found at a new point in
the parameter space. The algorithm chooses this current point as a starter to search for the
minimum proceeds. In the following searching procedure, it is normal for the algorithm to
move to points with larger Wald statistic. At last, after a certain number of best points are
found, the search is once again widened by increasing the acceptance probability. There are
different setting for Simulated Annealing. In my research, the bounds are set to be within
40% of the initial calibrated parameters and the maximum number of iterations is set to be
1000.
3.3.4 The Choice of the Auxiliary Model
As mentioned in Section 3.2.1, the technology shock in both housing and general sector are
non-stationary shock and the data used in the evaluation and estimation are unfiltered data.
According to Le et al. (2016), if the data are non-stationary, in order to do the evaluation, an
auxiliary model with stationary errors need to be created. Therefore, VAR with the exogenous
variable is used as the auxiliary model when data are non-stationary. Meenagh et al. (2009)
also mentioned that the VAR model is an approximation of the reduced form of the DSGE
model.
The structural DSGE model after log-linearisation usually can be written as a function:
A(L)yt = B(L)Etyt+1 +C(L)xt +D(L)et (3.62)
54 Benchmark Model
where yt is a vector of endogenous variables, Etyt+1 is a vector of expected future
endogenous variables, xt is an exogenous variable which is assumed to be driven by
∆xt = α(L)∆xt−1 +d +b(L)zt−1 + c(L)εt (3.63)
The exogenous variables xt including stationary and non-stationary shocks like productiv-
ity shocks. et and εt are both i.i.d and the means are zero. xt is non-stationary, yt is linearly
dependent on xt . Therefore, yt is also non-stationary. L is the lag operator Yt−s = LsYt and
A(L), B(L) etc is a matrix polynomial functions in the lag operator of order h that have roots
of the determinantal polynomial lies outside the complex unit circle.
The general solution of yt can be written as
yt = G(L)yt−1 +H(L)xt + f +M(L)et +N(L)εt (3.64)
where f is a vector of constants and polynomial functions in the lag operator have roots
outside of the unit circle. Since yt and xt are both non-stationary, the solution of the model
has p cointegrated relations given by:
yt = [I −G(1)]−1[H(1)xt + f ] = Πxt +g (3.65)
The matrix Π is a p∗ p matrix, which has rank 0≤ r < p, where r is the number of linearly
independent cointegrating vectors. yt − [Πxt +g] = ηt , where ηt is the error correction term.
yt is a function of deviation from the equilibrium in the short run. In the long run, the solution
to the model is given by:
yt = Πxt +g (3.66)
3.3 The Method of Indirect Inference 55
xt = [1−α(1)]−1[dt + c(1)ξ ] (3.67)
ξt =t−1
∑s=0
εt−s (3.68)
where yt and xt are the long run solution to yt and xt respectively. It can be seen
that the long run solution of xt can be decomposed into two components: a deterministic
trend xdt = [1−α(1)]−1dt and a stochastic trend xs
t = [1−α(1)]−1c(1)ξt . There are two
components in the endogenous variables: this trend and a VARMA in deviations from it.
Meenagh et al. (2012a) formulate this as a cointegrated VECM with a mixed moving average
error term, wt .
∆yt =−[I −G(1)](yt−1 −Πxt−1)+P(L)∆yt−1 +Q(L)∆xt + f +M(L)et +N(L)εt
=−[I −G(1)](yt−1 −Πxt−1)+P(L)∆yt−1 +Q(L)∆xt + f +wt
(3.69)
wt = M(L)et +N(L)εt (3.70)
This suggests that the VECM can be approximated by the VARX:
Again, in the above equations, the marginal utility losses of choosing relevant allocations
is shown on the left-hand sides; the marginal utility gains of choosing relevant allocations
is presented on the right-hand sides. For housing demand of patient households (4.18), the
marginal utility gain only depends on two components compared to the housing demand of
impatient households. That is the direct utility gain of an additional unit of housing and the
expected utility coming from the future consumption. Further imply:
C−σcpt ε
pt = β
pEtC−σcp,t+1ε
pt+1(1+ rt) (4.19)
4.2 Model 91
εht H−σh
pt =C−σcpt ph,t −β
pEt(C−σcp,t+1 ph,t+1(1−δh)
εpt+1
εpt
) (4.20)
92 Model with Collateral Constraint
4.3 Estimation
4.3.1 Data
The collateral constraint is introduced in the benchmark model by splitting the households
into two types (patient households and impatient households). Therefore, five more variables
involved in this model. They are consumption of patient households (Cpt), consumption of
impatient households (CIt), housing demand of patient households (Hpt), housing demand of
impatient households (HIt) and impatient households borrowing (BIt). The rest variables are
the same as that used in Chapter 3, which sample period covers from 2001Q1 to 2014Q4.
The detail of data description are outlined in the Appendix A. It should be noticed that the
unfiltered data also used in this chapter to do the evaluation and estimation.
4.3.2 Calibration
Calibrated parameter values are introduced in this section, which are divided into two groups
like in Chapter 3. The parameter values in the first group govern the dynamics of the model,
which are calibrated according to previous literature and the observations in some empirical
analyses. If the model using these calibrated values cannot pass the test, I would reestimate
these parameters using Indirect Inference estimation. The calibration values in this group
keep as same as those in Chapter 3 except for β p, β I , m. These three more parameters are
introduced since the collateral constraint is employed in this chapter. The second group of
the parameters are the steady state of the model, which are obtained from the data same in
those in Chapter 3.
In this chapter, I split out the households into two types (patient households and impatient
households) and introduce the collateral constraint between these two households. The key
feature that distinguishes between patient and impatient households is they have the different
discount factor. The discount factor of impatient households is less than the discount factor of
4.3 Estimation 93
patient households, which implies the patient households are more patient than the impatient
households. Hence, these two parameters are calibrated to evaluate and estimate. They are
the discount factor of patient households β p, the discount factor of impatient households β I .
Because of lending between two different households, one more parameter is introduced.
That is loan-to-value ratio m.
In terms of the discount factor, I calibrate β p at 0.985 and β I at 0.97 in line with Iacoviello
and Neri (2010) to guarantees that the borrowing constraint is binding for the impatient
households in equilibrium. The binding constraint captures the financial accelerator effect,
which allows the interaction between the housing sector and the rest of the economy.
m is the loan-to-value ratio, which captures the amount of loan that impatient households
can get with a given market value of the house. The maximum loan-to-value ratio in China is
0.8. However, the average loan-to-value ratio is much lower than that, around 0.3 to 0.42.
According to Liu and Ou (2017), the observed debt-to-GDP ratios of households is around
23%. Hence, I calibrate the loan-to-value ratio at 0.3, which captures the features of the
Chinese economy.
2The data are from Housing Finance Network.
94 Model with Collateral Constraint
Table 4.1 Calibrated Coefficients - Model with Collateral Constraint
Defination Parameter Calibration
Households:
Elasticity of substitution of normal goods consumption σc 2
Elasticity of substitution of housing goods consumption σh 1
Inverse of elasticity of labour η 0.5
Patient households’ discount factor β p 0.985
Impatient households’ discount factor β I 0.97
Loan-to-value ratio m 0.3
Firms:
Price rigidity ω 0.84
Output elasticity of capital α 0.3
Quarterly depreciation rate of housing δh 0.015
Quarterly depreciation rate of capital δk 0.03
Capital demand coefficients k11, k12 0.51, 0.47
Capital demand coefficients k13, k14 0.02, 0.25
Capital demand coefficients k15 0.5
Monetary Policy:
Taylor Rule response to inflation θπ 1.5
Taylor Rule response to output θGDP 0.125
4.3 Estimation 95
4.3.3 Empirical Results
In this section, I am going to discuss the Indirect Inference empirical results. The VARX
auxiliary model is still used in the evaluation and estimation in this chapter. The choice
of the auxiliary model is in line with the model in Chapter 3, which include total output,
housing price and nominal interest rate in the auxiliary model. I do the evaluation first. If
the model does not pass the test, the calibrated value can be predefined as starting value to
implement Indirect Inference estimation. It should be noticed that all the coefficients are
allowed to change when doing the estimation except for quarterly discount rate of patient
and impatient households (β p,β I), quarterly depreciation rate of capital and housing (δk,δh)
and the loan-to-value ratio (m) because they are identified through accounting information
or other government policy. The simulated annealing algorithm is used when applying
Indirect Inference estimation to discover the best fit set of coefficients. Table 4.2 presents
the empirical results for the model with collateral constraint. The calibration values are also
shown here for comparison.
I compare the estimated values with the calibrated values. The results show that all of
these estimated values have moved some way from the initial calibration values. On the
households side, for the estimated elasticity of substitution of consumption and housing, σc
is estimated to be 3.30 and σh has increased to 2.55, both estimated values are larger than the
initial values. The higher value of σi means that the consumption growth is less sensitive to
changes in the real interest rate. From the estimated results, the estimated σh is still lower
than the estimated σc, which implies that the substitution of housing goods is still relatively
more sensitive compared to the substitution of general consumption goods when changing in
the real interest rate. The estimated inverse of elasticity of labour supply η is significantly
larger than the starting value, which implies that labour supply inelastic. However, this high
inverse of elasticity of labour supply is much closer to other research reported by Zhang
(2009) who employed the DSGE model to study Chinese monetary policy.
96 Model with Collateral Constraint
On the firm side, for nominal rigidities parameters, the price stickiness ω is estimated
to be 0.33, much lower than the calibration value. The parameter ω measure the degree of
nominal rigidity. The estimated result shows that only around 33% of all firms cannot adjust
their price while the remaining 67% can adjust. This implies that the Chinese economy may
not be that sticky, which is similar to the empirical results in Liu and Ou (2017).
The value of the share of capital in production adjusts slightly, which only increase to
0.31. For capital demand coefficients, the coefficient k11 is lower than the starting value.
This implies that lower adjustment cost. The higher value of estimated k12 implies that lower
discount rate of capital. The coefficients k13 remains the same as the starting value. The
long-run relationship among coefficients in the capital demand equation is also approximately
satisfied, which is that k11 + k12 + k13 = 1.
Overall, monetary policy is estimated to be less responsive to inflation and more respon-
sive to output fluctuation. More specifically, the responsiveness of interest rates to inflation
θπ increase from 1.5 to 1.2. On the contrary, the responsiveness of output increase to 0.42
compared with the calibrated value.
This chapter aims to investigate the case when there is a collateral constraint. I want to
explore whether the model can perform well if it introduces the collateral constraint. To this
end, I compare the testing results generated from the benchmark model, where there is no
lending, with those with collateral constraint. Table 4.3 represents the comparison of the
testing results based on Indirect Inference estimation of the two models. The results show
that both models can pass on the weaker test, but the model with the collateral constraint is
obviously inferior to the benchmark model according to the Wald statistic. The benchmark
model is more probable.
In order to check both models performance with the stronger test, I add one more
endogenous variable to the existing auxiliary model. The test becomes more stringent and
powerful when I extend the features of the structural model that the auxiliary model seeks
4.3 Estimation 97
to match. The second row of Table 4.3 shows the testing results when I raise the power of
the test. The results display that the only benchmark model can pass the stronger test at 3%
significance level, while the collateral model does not pass. That implies the benchmark
model is the best model using the Wald statistic as a guide.
Different model with different coefficients may give different analysing results. Therefore,
it should be cautious when choosing the model. The benchmark model is better to be chosen
when do not focus on the lending since it has the better Wald statistic. If lending is the
important part when analysing the economy, the model with collateral constraint should be
considered. In the following, I am going to do the standard analysis such as impulse response
functions, variance and historical decomposition for the model with collateral constraint.
98 Model with Collateral Constraint
Table 4.2 Estimated Coefficients - Model with Collateral Constraint
Defination Parameter Calibration Estimation
Households:
Elasticity of substitution of consumption σc 2 3.30
Elasticity of substitution of housing σh 1 2.55
Inverse of elasticity of labour η 0.5 6.96
Patient households’ discount factor β p 0.985 0.985
Impatient households’ discount factor β I 0.97 0.97
Loan-to-value ratio m 0.3 0.3
Firms:
Price rigidity ω 0.84 0.33
Output elasticity of capital α 0.3 0.31
Quarterly depreciation rate of housing δh 0.015 0.015
Quarterly depreciation rate of capital δk 0.03 0.03
Capital demand coefficients k11, k12 0.51, 0.47 0.46, 0.53
Capital demand coefficients k13, k14 0.02, 0.25 0.02, 0.14
Capital demand coefficients k15 0.5 1.33
Monetary Policy:
Taylor Rule response to inflation θπ 1.5 1.2
Taylor Rule response to output θGDP 0.125 0.42
Trans-Wald (GDP, HP, R) 22.67 1.49
P-value 0.00 0.06
4.3 Estimation 99
Table 4.3 Comparison of the Testing Results Based on II estimation
Auxiliary Model-VARX(1) Benchmark Model Collateral Model
GDP, HP, R 1.02 1.49
(0.11) (0.06)
GDP, HP, R, C 1.92 3,46
(0.03) (0.00)
4.3.4 Indirect Inference Power Test
In the last section, the Indirect Inference testing is employed to evaluate the estimated
structural model. We would like to know how powerful the Indirect Inference test is.
Therefore, in this section, I am going to check the evaluation of the power of Indirect
Inference. In order to evaluate the power of Indirect Inference test on both benchmark
model and model with collateral constraint, I follow Le et al. (2012) and Le et al. (2016) to
conduct Monte Carlo power statistical test against parameter misspecification. Following
their research, they assume the models they used is the true model and the estimated residuals
are also treated as the true residual. Then they use the result of the Monte Carlo experiment
to establish their degree of accuracy.3 They use the Monte Carlo experiment to show that
how often the test rejects at the chosen nominal rejection rate. Their results show that
the confidence level is 5.7% when the true rejection rate at a nominal 5%. Therefore, this
experiment is fairly accurate. I employ their experiment results and treat estimated benchmark
model as well as the constraint model as the true model, using the true rejection rate at a
nominal 5% with a three variables VARX(1). Now I am interested in how the frequency of
rejection of the false model when both true models deviate increasingly from the original.
310000 Monte Carlo experiments are set up to obtain the 10000 sample of data. In each sample, theinnovations were bootstrapped to find the Wald distribution.
100 Model with Collateral Constraint
The false models are created by moving the parameters away from their true values (estimated
value) by x % in both directions for alternate values.
Table 4.4 displays the rejection rates at a nominal 5% given the parameter falseness from
0.5% to 7%. 4 We can see clearly from the table that when the falsity of parameters increases,
the probability of rejecting the false model increase. This implies the power is considerably
high given a significant falseness. More specifically, the benchmark model is 100% rejected
when the falsity of parameters increases to 7%. Comparing with the benchmark model,
the model with collateral constraint seems more sensitive to the increase in the degree of
falseness. The rejection rate has already increased to 100 when the degree of falseness
equal to 3. It is interesting to find that the model with collateral constraint has more power
compared with the benchmark model. It might be because the collateral model has more
restrictions, so a small change in the parameter will create the more significant overall worse
match.
Table 4.4 Monte Carlo Power test- 3 variables VARX(1)
Model with collateral constraint 5 20.5 57.4 88.7 100 100 100 100
The testing results in the last section show that the benchmark model passed at 3%
significance level while the model with collateral constraint did not pass when a 4-variable
VARX(1) was used. I want to check how robust the benchmark model is with respect to
misspecification and I also want to gauge to what extent the collateral model was misspecified.
Hence, this attracts me to do the Monte Carlo experiment again, but this time, the rejection
rates at a nominal 3% with a 4-variable VAR. Table 4.5 displays that how the rejection rates
vary when one more endogenous variable is included in the auxiliary models. It is interesting
4The rejection rate is obtained using true data from the true model and false model, which calculate howmany false model would be rejected by the true data from the true model with 95% confidence.
4.3 Estimation 101
to find that increasing one more endogenous variable raise the power of Indirect Inference test
as well. In this case, the benchmark model is already 100% when the falsity of parameters
just increase to 5%. Comparing with the benchmark model, the collateral model rejects 99%
of the time when the parameter falseness only raises to 3.5%. The more features that the
auxiliary model tries to match, the higher the probability that model is rejected by the data,
which is in line with the argument.
Table 4.5 Monte Carlo Power test- 4 variables VARX(1)
supply shock, productivity shock in both housing and general sectors, capital demand as
well as labour demand in both sectors and monetary policy shock) into six categories. The
preference shock and labour supply shock belong to private shocks. The public shocks contain
labour demand shock in different sectors and capital demand shock in the general sector
and housing sector. The policy shocks consist of monetary policy shock and government
spending shock.The TFP including the technology shock in two sectors. The housing demand
shock does not be classified into private shocks category since I want to observe how this
shock influence the real housing price and real consumption.
From Figure 4.5, I find that the fluctuation of housing price is mainly driven by the
technology shock and public shocks. The contribution of housing demand shock appears less
important. The figure also displays that the housing price seems relatively stable during the
period 2000-2003 and period 2010-2012, but it fluctuated a lot during the crisis period. It
should also be noticed that there was a drop started in 2007, which reflected the stock market
boom in 2007 and the market’s reaction to the global crisis. The housing market recovered
after the crisis and rise dramatically until earlier 2010. The economy increased rapidly these
years, which lead households in China earning increasing wealth. They tended to use their
wealth to purchase the house since housing market developed these years rapidly. I also
114 Model with Collateral Constraint
Fig. 4.5 Historical Decomposition of Real Housing Price
find that after 2010, the housing price decreased continuously as lower productivity. These
findings are generally in line with Liu and Ou (2017). They show that the housing market
triggered another significant slowdown as demand and productivity both continued to fall
from 2013 onwards, which the housing price was corrected toward its equilibrium level.
As for the macroeconomy, I focus on the dynamic of consumption. Figure 4.6 shows the
historical decomposition of real consumption. We can see clearly from the figure that the
fluctuation of real consumption is driven by private shocks like preference shock, housing
demand shock and productivity shock, which in line with the finding in variance decompo-
sition. More specifically, during period 2000-2003, the real consumption seems relatively
stable. The positive productivity shock increased the real consumption, which implies higher
productivity translated into higher household income and higher real consumption. The
negative effect can be found during period 2011-2013. The real consumption started to
fall since productivity fell. The historical shock decomposition of real consumption further
suggests the contribution of collateral constraint, which housing demand shock affected
the real consumption dramatically in late 2007. However, during period 2008-2011, the
contribution of preference shock appears more important.
4.5 Conclusion 115
Fig. 4.6 Historical Decomposition of Real Consumption
4.5 Conclusion
The aim of the chapter is that I want to explore whether the model can explain the Chinese
housing market well if I include the collateral constraint. Indirect Inference evaluation is
employed to answer this question. The testing results show that both benchmark model and
model with collateral constraint can match the data, but the model with collateral constraint
is obviously inferior to the benchmark model according to the Wald statistic. This implies
the benchmark model is the best model using the Wald statistic as a guide. Hence, it should
be quite cautioned when choosing the model. In the following, I conduct IRFs, variance and
historical decomposition to further study the model with collateral constraint. The results
show that the collateral constraint explains the spillover effect from the housing market to
the wider economy. The productivity shock in the general sector plays a significant role in
the movements of the key macroeconomic variables.
Chapter 5
Conclusion
The dramatic rise and the large fluctuation of housing price motivate me to study the Chinese
housing market. This thesis addresses two research questions related to the housing market
in China: i) the sources of fluctuations in the Chinese housing market. ii) identify whether
the model with collateral constraint enables a better performance. A DSGE model using
Indirect Inference method is employed to explore these two issues.
Following the above two motivations, I reviewed the literature about the driving forces
behind movements in the housing sector and the structured DSGE models with collateral
constraint in Chapter 2. In the existing empirical literature, the housing price fluctuation
is affected by the economic fundamentals such as construction costs, disposal income and
population. There is no consensus among researchers regarding the source of housing price
dynamics in the existing empirical literature. There are some limitations when using various
econometric models such as omitted variables problem and endogeneity problem. Therefore,
a micro-foundation structural model is chosen in this thesis to study the housing market
dynamics in China. The increasing researchers have followed Iacoviello and Neri (2010)
who use a Bayesian estimated DSGE model to discover the housing market fluctuation. More
factors are considered to enrich the model based on their analysis framework. In summary,
most of the literature that using a micro-founded DSGE model employing Bayesian estima-
118 Conclusion
tion have concluded that the housing demand shocks play an important role in explaining
the fluctuation of housing price in China. In terms of the model with collateral constraint,
I reviewed Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) who first introduced the collateral constraint and
Iacoviello (2005) who extend Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) ’s work by using housing stock as
the collateral.
Chapter 3 focus on answering the first research question: What is the driving force in
the fluctuation of housing price. A DSGE model with housing sector and some important
features of the Chinese economy is established to address this question. Two features of
the Chinese housing sector are considered in this model: i) two sectors on the supply side.
ii) the non-stationary productivity shock in both housing and general sector. In order to
check whether this model can explain the data behaviour in the Chinese housing market,
Indirect Inference evaluation is employed. The testing results show that the model using
the calibration value is rejected by the data. Hence, Indirect Inference estimation is used
to estimate the model over the period 2000-2014, which find out a set of coefficients that
can pass the test. The estimated model can fit the data well when a variety of endogenous
variables are added to the auxiliary model, explaining the output, housing price and interest
rate that I concerned about. I discovered the housing market using this right estimated model,
which can perform well in explaining the data. In terms of the driving force of fluctuations in
the Chinese housing market, the variance and shock decomposition suggest that the capital
demand shock play a significant major role in explaining the housing price. That maybe
because the housing market reform stimulates the Chinese housing industry, which develops
some new regime of capital accumulation. These regulation change on the supply side played
a key role in housing development.
The increasing interest in the DSGE housing model literature have focused on the
collateral constraint on the households’ side, which treats as a channel that connects the
housing market to the wider economy. Hence, in Chapter 4, I focus on discovering that
119
whether adding a collateral constraint to a New Keynesian DSGE model enables a better
performance. Indirect Inference evaluation is used to examine it. From the modelling point
of view, my starting point is the benchmark model that introduced in Chapter 3. In order to
examine whether the model with collateral constraint can explain the Chinese housing market
well, I include another feature into the benchmark model: collateral constraint. I add this
constraint by splitting the households into patient and impatient households. The impatient
households in the economy face a binding collateral constraint when participating in loan
and mortgage market. Indirect Inference testing results show that the model with collateral
constraint cannot provide a better performance in explaining the data. More specifically,
both benchmark model and model with collateral constraint model can match the data, but
the model with collateral constraint is obviously inferior to the benchmark model according
to the Wald statistic. This implies the benchmark model is the best model using the Wald
statistic as a guide. Hence, it should be quite cautioned when choosing the model. I also use
Monte Carlo experience to show how the power of Indirect Inference. I evaluate the power of
Indirect Inference test on both benchmark model and model with collateral constraint. The
experience results show that the power is considerably high given a significant falseness. It is
also interesting to find that the model with collateral constraint has more power compared
with the benchmark model. It might be because the collateral model has more restrictions, so
a small change in the parameter will create the more significant overall worse match.
There are two contributions in this thesis. First, the dynamic stochastic general equilib-
rium model is set up incorporating housing sector and some important features of the Chinese
economy. This provides a framework to describe the Chinese housing market in a reasonable
detail. Differing from the most previous literature, the productivity shock in both the housing
sector and general sector are assumed to be non-stationary. The non-stationary shocks could
shed light on some stylized fact in China. Second, the evaluation and estimation strategy
followed Indirect Inference method using unfiltered non-stationary data are employed in this
120 Conclusion
thesis. To my knowledge, there has been no evaluation of DSGE model with housing sector.
This is the perspective adopted in this thesis.
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Appendix A
Data
Benchmark Model
The sources of these observables from 2000Q1 to 2014Q4 are from the National Bureau
of Statistics of China (NBSC), Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security,P.R.C
(MHRSS), the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) and the Oxford Economics (OE). In this case
where the quarterly data are not available, it is only available on annual basis. I follow Liu
and Ou (2017) to convert the annual data into the quarterly data using either the ’quadratic-
match sum’ or the ’quadratic-match average’ algorithms with Eviews. The Table A.1 below
summarise all the description and sources of the data used in the evaluation and estimation.
128 Data
Table A.1 Data Description and Source of Benchmark Model
Symbol Variable Source
GDP Total Output NBSC
Yc,Yh Output in different sector Model implied2
C Total private consumption NBSC
H Total housing consumption Model implied2
W Average Wage per person MHRSS
π Quarter-on-quarter CPI inflation NBSC
N1 Total Employment Oxford Economic
Nc,Nh Employment in two sectors Model implied4
ph Real housing price NBSC
I, Ic, Ih Investment NBSC
K,Kc,Kh capital Model implied3
i Nominal interest rate POBC
Notes on Table A.1:
1. The variable Nt in the model represent the aggregate supply of labour hour of household.
The measurement of the aggregate supply of labour is the multiplication of supply of labour
in each household and the total employment. It is assumed that the working hour in the
contract is fixed (around 8 hours). Therefore, the aggregate supply of labour hour can be
equal to the total employment. In my research, due to the data limitation in China, the total
employment is used to represent Nt in the model.
2. Constructed data: Yc,Yh, H
The output in different sectors are constructed following Liu and Ou (2017). The value
of housing (Residential investment) is the multiply of the price of housing (ph) and the
quantity of housing (Yh). In this identification, the value of housing and the price housing
129
are all available from NBSC. Therefore, it is easy to the quantity of housing (Yh). The
unobservable variable Ht is obtain from the marketing clearing condition in housing sector.
The depreciation rate used in calculating Ht following Liu and Ou (2017). The output in
general sector (Yc) is calculated using the definition of GDP.
3. Constructed data: Kc,Kh,K
The total capital and the capital in different in different sectors are calculated following
Caselli(2004) using the capital accumulation equation (3.13). The investment can obtain
from NBSC. The depreciation in each sector follow Liu and Ou (2017).
4. Constructed data: Nc,Nh
Follow Barsky et al. (2007)’s assumption and the identification equation (3.44) to con-
struct Nc and Nh. Barsky et al. (2007) assume that factors flow freely across industries,
nominal wages and rental prices will be equal in each sector. That means the capital-to-
labour ratios will equalize across industries since the production function is homogeneous
of degree one no matter which sector have sticky prices and which one have flexible prices.
Consider the identification equation, there are two equations and two unknown, it is easy to
solve for Nc and Nh
130 Data
Model with Collateral Constraint
Five more variables are introduced in this model due to the inclusion of the collateral
constraint by splitting the households into two types. They are consumption of patient
households (Cpt), consumption of impatient households (CIt), housing demand of patient
households (Hpt), housing demand of impatient households (HIt) and impatient households
borrowing (BIt). The rest variables are the same as that used in Chapter 3, which sample
period covers from 2001Q1 to 2014Q4. These five variables cannot be obtained from database
directly. Hence, the observables and model equations are used to construct these variables.
The identification and steady state ratio following Andrés et al. (2013) are used to calculate
consumption and housing demand of different type of households. The unfiltered data also
used in this chapter to do the evaluation and estimation. The reason why using unfiltered data
have already been discussed in the last chapter. Table A.2 below summarise the variables
and source of the data used in this model.
131
Table A.2 Data Description and Source of Model with Collateral Constraint
Symbol Variable Source
GDP Total Output NBSC
Yc,Yh Output in different sector Model implied2
C Total private consumption NBSC
Cp Patient households consumption Model implied5
CI Impatient households consumption Model implied 5
H Total housing consumption Model implied2
Hp Patient households housing consumption Model implied6
HI Impatient households housing consumption Model implied6
BI Total borrowing of Impatient households Model implied7
W Average Wage per person MHRSS
π Quarter-on-quarter CPI inflation NBSC
N1 Total Employment Oxford Economic
Nc,Nh Employment in two sectors Model implied4
ph Real housing price NBSC
I, Ic, Ih Investment NBSC
K,Kc,Kh capital Model implied3
i Nominal interest rate POBC
132 Data
Notes on Table A.2: The detail of Note 1 to Note 4 can be found in Appendix A
benchmark model.
Note 5: Model implied data: Cp, CI . The identified equation of total consumption
goods Ct = Cpt +CIt along with the ratio of consumption of patient and impatient house-
holds following Andrés et al. (2013) are used to construct consumption of different type of
households.
Note 6: Model implied data: Hp, HI . They are calculated applying the same logic like
calculating Cp, CI . Using total housing demand together with the ratio of housing demand
of patient and impatient households by Andrés et al. (2013) to calculate housing demand of
patient and impatient households.
Note 7: Model implied data: BI . The total borrowing of impatient households can be
obtained from the binding borrowing constraint (equation 4.3). The data on the right-hand
sides of equation 4.3 are available. Hence, it is easy to get BI