The Case for a Light Footprint. The international project in Afghanistan Astri Suhrke, SOAS 17 March 2010.

The Case for a Light Footprint.The international project in

Afghanistan

Astri Suhrke, SOAS 17 March 2010

Structure of involvement

• Towards 130 000 NATO and allied forces• 8-10 bill USD in aid a year• 60 donors and 37 troop contributing countries• parallel structures

– international advisors ubiqtuous– external budget (2/3 of funds)

• COIN: military and civilian ’surge’ to defeat ’the enemy’ and provide ’government in a box’ (General McChrystal)

Status

• 8 years of investment in money and lives have brought expanding armed conflict and risk of ’losing the war’ (McChrystal August 09)

• some positive development indicators (health/education/NSP/ roads)’ but growing insurgency, corruption, poor governance, aid bubble

• comparisons with other ill-fated interventions increasingly common (Vietnam, Soviet in Afghanistan)

• need a ’surge’ to exit

Key questions

• How did we get to where we are today – given that we started from a ’light footprint’?– ’disjointed incrementalism (quagmire)– ’march of folly’ (Tuchman) – deliberate policy design/ rational actor

• What does the result tell us about the limitations/contradictions of a ’liberal internationalism

• Alternative policy options at this point?

The first, light footprint

• October-November 2001: disinterest/caution/– US: military engagement

• don’t follow Soviet path, use Afghans’• ’let the UN handle the rest’ (Bush/Powell 2001)

– UN: fears of another Somalia, but narrative of collective responsibility in Afghanistan

– Brahimi: self-determination on principle and in practice

-Afghanistan unruly/unfriendly territory

-Soviet experience

-Afghan transitional administration prerequisite for aid

-Afghan, not international, security force in Kabul

The aid regime moves in

• The pledging conferences

– Tokyo 2002 (8.2 bill), Berlin 2004 (8.2 bill), London 2006 (10.4 billion), Paris 2008(20 bill/ANDS)

• Aid agencies, INGOs and NGOs emphasize direct execution

– lack of local capacity

– massive needs

– massive donor money on the horizon

• Afghan Ministry of Finance fighting to establish control

– dilemma of funds inflow vs building capacity

– 2004: capitulates w/external budget

Momentum towards a heavier aid footprint

• Under-estimating task of reconstruction and ’state-building’ • Problem-solving: ’more of same’ – increase international

resources rather than adjusting course. Why?– Ideology of liberal internationalism

• Lingering optimism of Bonn– Huge needs vs limited local capacity– Organizational vested interests– Control imperative – Political scrutiny at home– Military lobby for ’comprehensive approach’ (2005/6)– Limited imagination?

Military escalation

• ISAF expansion from Kabul to provinces – aid actors support to provide security for programs– UN Mission supports; buoyed by welcome of ISAF in

Kabul – allies support as least difficult option (PRTs)

• ISAF/PRTs expand in size and function, merging command structure with other forces into unified NATO command

• OEF force expansion to fight ’AQT’• Merging ISAF/OEF command – 130 000 (over Soviet)

Force levels

0

10000

20000

30000

40000

50000

60000

70000

80000

90000

100000

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Year

So

ldie

rs other ISAF

US(OEF+ISAF)

Characteristics of military increase

• Gradual increase with little public notice/disucssion until 2008

• Unclear or limited articulation of policy rationale in US– GWOT– Afghanistan ’good war’ but ’neglected war’

• NATO allies– Alliance calculus – Goal inflation (’NATO’s future at stake’)– Solution in search of a problem

Dynamic of US military involvement

• Afghanistan pre 9/11 not on US strategic radar• Accidental involvement, random trigger (9/11)• Internal dynamic of escalation

– failure of ’Afghan model’ in counter-terrorism (2002)– growing insurgency(2003-4)– security for elections (2005)– recasting strategy – give COIN a chance (2007-8)– the ’windows thesis’ (’peacebuilding studies showing

initial military stabilization critical; now make up for it with more)

– what we need to ’do the job’

Rationality of military involvement

• Quagmire? (unwilling – unwitting)• Oil and gas pipeline?• Organizational rationality (’can do’, no defeat on ’my watch’)• Investment trap • Rhetorical trap • Strategic instrumentality post hoc

– NATO’s new strategic concept, global ’new threats’ require ’fit and flexible’ NATO (Fogh Rasmussen), Afghanistan good training ground

– US – strategic access in region (Iran/Central Asia)• Political risk (’I will withdraw, but not until after the next

election’ -JFK on Vietnam in 163)

The surge decision

• March 2009 – Obama opens for AQ vs Taliban distinction; debate on COIN versus counter-terrorism goes public

• December 2009 surge decision, clarity of March speech gone.

• Unclear rationale

– who is the main enemy and why?

– additional forces more likely to suceed than previous increases?

– if main enemy AQ now in Pakistan, why fight Taliban rather than split them off?

– if train Afghan forces, who is their enemy?

• Part of a ’bargaining from strength’ strategy

– if so, why undercut by saying withdrawal by mid-2011?

The political anatomy of the surge

• Surge only makes sense as a political not strategic decision

– second-term president– defend against the conservatives at home– protect legislation in Congress– do what is minimally necessary– low risk ’on my watch’

Meta-logic of US involvement

• George Kennan’s prehistoric beast

• Miltarization of foreign/national security policy (Bacevich)– Culture, professional military ’caste’,mil-

industrial complex, Wilsonian idealism– [structure of U.S.capitalism]– Afghan engagement totally irrationality in terms

of US ’national interests’

Levels of rationality

• Partial/fragmented rationality (political,organizational)

• Internal dynamic of intervention towards goal expansion and deepening involvement

• Limits policy options and increases risk:– deepening involvement limits future choices

at each juncture– investment trap (defend what have

done/investment)– rhetoric trap (increased the stakes to justify

involvement)• Increasing political costs of eventual

defeat/compromise

Will ’it’ work?

• Unclear/multiple objectives (statebuilding, democracy,WHAM, reconstruction, rights-based development)

• ’State-building’ – reasonably effective and legitimate state– key to other objectives

• International project of statebuilding weakened by five contradictions

# 1 Control vs ownership

• Strong external demand for control over policy • ambitious policy objectives • limited or ”irrelevant” local capacity • high stakes (NATO’s future)• time constraint (political will at home uncertain)• bureaucratic/political demands for result

• Strong Afghan demands for ’ownership’• ideological framework• material-political benefits

• Contradictions play out on all levels• Project, subnational admin/appointment, national

policy)

#2 Dependenc vs sustainability

• external aid– overwhelming national legal resources

• 90-95% of all state and development expenditures

• 70 percent of recurrent expenditures in state-controlled budget

– present ’rentier state’ unprecedented in Afghan history

• incl Daoud and Soviet period• rentier states tend to collapse with loss of aid

Afghan rentier statesAfghan) budget (’core’ )

(mill afs)

% financed by aid

External budget (mill afs)

President Daoud(1st year)

1973 11 318 37 0

President Daoud(2nd year)

1977 24 326 39 0

PDPA (1st year) 1979 30 173 48 0

PDPA (Babrak Karmal)

1982 42 112 29 0

President Karzai

2004/5 41 952 69 12 144

#3 Dependence vs legitimate state

The rentier state • weakens local political accountability and

representation– lowers incentives for local accountability – marginalizes elected/parliamentary structures– patron-client relations structured towards

donors– donor priorities take precedence– salutary effects of domestic taxation reduced

# 4 Effective vs legitimate state

• heavy external hand may increase state efficiency• but

– weakens traditional and historically important sources of legitimacy (nationalism/Islam)

– generates opposition on nationalist, religious,conservative ground

– feeds into the insurgency• legitimacy of external aid limited - utilitarian

(’social contract) • elections as secondary source of legitimacy for

state – external and manipulated by all

Cross-cutting contradiction: Building the ANA

• Armed forces central to historical process/projects of statebuilding

• Increase of ANA now ’dramatic’ relative to earlier plans and periods: 130 00/300 000 by 2013 (or before)

• Problems:– nationally unsustainable (WB:70 00 goal ’unsustainable)– extreme dependence on foreign funds undercuts

national legitimacy in country and region (whose army? what purpose?)

– unlikely to foster a democratic/legitimate state when civilian institutions weak (Afghan army in two previous coups, ’73+’78)

The multiplier effect

The ongoing war intensifies the contradictions in the statebuilding project– pressure for more and faster result– pressure for more external

control/direction/presence– military objectives/institutions favored – collateral damage and foreign troop presence

used by adversaries to undermine legitimacy of Afghan government and state

What to do?

• More-is-more: counsel of reinvestment – more foreign funds, consultants, troops

• Strengthen contradictions in short run– Possibly overcome in the long run if sufficient

• funds&consultants to reform the state, drive out the black economy,

• foreign troop to work with ANA on training and COIN– Practically feasible?(to date, more-strategy produced

modest results)– Politically feasible? To succeed will require such foreign

presence as to be de facto trusteeship? (’shared sovereignty’)

Alternative:

• Pull back to reduce contradictions and conflictual consequences of heavy presence– military strategy

• reduced NATO presence in provinces, cease offensive operations

• give space for Afghan political dynamic/pragmatism– political strategy

• reduce our interference in ’the political marketplace’– counter narrative/chance of ’renewed civil war’

• military: international stabilization of capital • political: devolution of power to provinces

- insurgency: - National framework for some power-sharing and

local-level deals or change of power structure

Ideals and interests

• Ideally: transition needs regional buy-in

• In practice: partial , continuous process

• Long-term: more important to accommodate interests of regional states than Western powers

• Long-term Western interests in Afghanistan?

– Humanitarian and development assistance

– Moral/political obligations to facilitate transition to lower levels of violence and framework for Afghan autonomous development

– More cost-effective and focused counter-terrorist policies

– Taliban can be our allies, not enemy