The Art of the Arcane: the June Plenum of 1957 and the Clash of Generations

Katya Vladimirov (Kennesaw, GA, USA)

THE ART OF THE ARCANE: THE JUNE PLENUM

OF 1957 AND THE CLASH OF GENERATIONS

"Each generation has only one great adventure." '

Woodrow Wilson

In 1957 Nikita Khrushchev affirmed himself as the undisputed leader of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The June 1957 Plenum of the Cen- tral Committee was an essential landmark in his victorious struggle. In a ritu- alized course of action it wrested power from one political clique arid gave it to a new one formed out of the Khrushchev's supporters.' His victory was a battle of two generations that cleared the way to power for the next cohort of the Soviet leaders.

' '

In consolidating power, Khrushchev narrowly survived a plot to oust him. The main conspirators, V. M. Molotov, G. M. Malenkov, and L. M. Kagano- vich,2 machinated against Khrushchev not because of his political views or his unethical behavior but because by reaffirnning his power, he was dimin-

ishing theirs. Malenkov had been in conflict with Khrushchev since 1955.3 3

Molotov clashed with Khrushchev even earlier (in 1954) and Kaganovich de- tested Khrushchev because his former protege refused to give Kaganovich proper respeCt.4 Molotov despised Kaganovich as well, but they joined forces because their animosity towards Khrushchev was stronger than the feeling of mutual hostility. The main conspirators recruited others. One was K. E.

Voroshilov,5 nominally the head of state, but in reality nothing more than a

1. William Taubman, Khrushchev: The Man and His Era (New York and London: W. W. Norton, 2003), p. 241. ; . 2. G. M. Malenkov (1902-1988) was a member of the Politburo until 1957. From 1957-1961 he served as the director of two electro stations in the Urals. He retired in 1961 at which time was expelled from the party; V. M. Molotov (Skriabin) (1890-1986) was a member of the Polit- . buro. After 1957 he served as the ambassador to Mongolia. From 1960-1962 he was the chair- man of the Soviet mission in MAGATE, and he retired in 1961; L. M. Kaganovich (1893-1991) was the Minister of Light Industry and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers. From 1957- _ _ 1961 was the Director of an Ural metal factory. He retired in 1 961 ...

3. Taubman, Khrushchev, p. 4. Ibid, p. 57. I , 5. K. E. Voroshilov (1881-1969) was the Chairman of the Presidium until 1960. He was a '

member of the Presidium until his death in 1969.

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figurehead, "a grandfather" whose retirement was a pressing issue. Nonethe-

less, the conspirators wanted him on board because he was one of the oldest

surviving Bolsheviks, and this gave their power struggle additional legiti- macy. There were also minor accomplices, including N. A. Bulganin,6 M. Z.

Saburov,7 M. G. Perwkhin,8 and D. T. Shepilov,9 who had become caught up in this clash of the titans. They, especially Shepilov, challenged Khrushchev and criticized his "peasant" behavior and his lack of proper education. Khru- shchev in return despised Shepilov's "academic" standing because it re- minded him of his own shortcomings. 10 The conspirators attempted to lure G. K. Zhukov and A: 1. Mikoian 1 to their side as well, but failed.

Such was the conspiring "gang of eight" (seven of whom constituted a ma-

jority of the 'Presidium's full members). At first they resisted Khrushchev's

initiatives, attacked his proposals, and spread rumors that Khrushchev was to be appointed the minister of agriculture while Malenkov would replace him as the first secretary of the party. After a while they attempted to take control of the KGB and the armed forces.

On June 18, the main conspirators called a meeting of the Council of the Ministers' Presidium, of which most participants, excluding Khrushchev, were already members. The Presidium supposedly met to discuss Khru- shchev's trip to Leningrad. Once in session, however, the meeting was de- clared a session of the Party Presidium itself, which was the same trick that had been used against L. P. Beria. 12 This was an open act of defiance in an

attempt to remove Khrushchev and to take full control over the party and

government. 13 Frantic maneuvering followed. Mikoian and Zhukov, who supported

Khrushchev, pressed many members to take their side. A letter was drafted

from twenty Central Committee members demanding an urgent Central Committee Plenum. With the help of the KGB and the military, Khrushchev

transported the members of the Central Committee to Moscow by military

planes. It was an airlift on a massive scale since many Khrushchev's loyalists

6. N. A. Bulganin (1895-1975) served as the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the So- viet Union and was later transferred to Stavropol' as a director of the sovnnrkhoz. He retired in 1960. .

7. M. Z. Saburov (1900-1977), the member of the CPSU Central Committee Presidium in 1957..

8.: M. G. Pervukhin (1904-1978), the member of the Presidium in 1957. 9; D. T. Shepilov (1905-1995), the Minister of the Foreign Affairs in 1957. 10. Taubman, Khrushchev, pp. 312-13. _ , , 11. G. K. Zhukov (1896-1974) was the Minister of Defense, retired in 1958; A. I. Mikoian '

(1895-1978) was a member of the Politburo, retired in 1975. 12. L. P. Beria (1899-1953), a member of the Presidium of the Politburo from 1946-1953, ar-

rested and executed in 1953. ' 13. Taubman, Khrushchev, p. 314.

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were in remote locations. This "harvest" of almost 200 members was suc- cessful. By June 20 the conspirators' were in retreat and the Presidium agreed to convene a Central Committee Plenum the following afternoon

The Plenum began on June 22 and ended on June 28. After the plot failed, official condemnations named Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich as chief

instigators. Shepilov was denounced as the "one who had joined them"

(primknuvshiy k nim Shepilov).15 Saburov, Pervukhin, Voroshilov and Bul-

ganin were not even mentioned in the official documents. The Plenum

unanimously affirmed the leadership of Khrushchev. The Plenum of 1957 has been traditionally described as the fight over the

new direction towards de-Stalinization and liberalization. More recent inter-

pretations define it as a power struggle that resulted in the victory of the Khrushchev's political camp over the "anti-Party" group within the Soviet of- ficialdom. There is, however, another very important and ignored dimension to this power struggle and to the victory of Khrushchev's supporters. The

Plenum was an open clash between two generations that resulted in ousting "the old guard" out of power.

While many scholars argue about the definition of "generations" and their classifications they agreed that generations as a category should be included in the historical discourse because they are concrete social groups not dis- similar to classes. People strongly identify themselves "with the other people of their own generation," feel closer to their generational contemporaries than

to any other group of people on earth, suggesting that their generational con-

sciousness often outstrips other considerations. - The generation can be de- scribed as "a caravan within which man moves as a prisoner."17 Each caravan travels through life together with other caravans and separately at the same time while every man within it "mysteriously recognizes all the rest of his

collectivity, as the ants in each ant hill recognize each other by a peculiar pat- tern of odor." 18 The generation thus unites the members of a close age group, , which is shaped by history within thins framewark.19 .

- . , '

14. A. Iakovlev, ed., Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich. 1957: Stenogramma iiulskogo ple- numa TsK KPSS I drugie dokumenty (Moscow: MFD, 1998), pp. 2-3.

15. Ibid, pp: 5-6. 16. "Posledniaia 'antipartiinaia' gruppa: Stenograficheskii otchet iiun'skogo plenuma (1957

g.) TsK KPSS:" Istoric.heskie archivy, nos. 3-6 (1993) and nos. 1-11 (1994). 17. Jose Ortega y Gasset, "The Importance of Generation hood," in T7ie Youth Revolution:.. ,

The Conflict of Generations in Modern Histoiy, Anthony Esler,'ed. (Lexington, MA.: D. C. Heath, 1974), p. 6. `

18. Ibid. ' , : 19. Julian Marias, Gener-ations: A Historical Method (LJniversity: Univ. of Alabama Press,

1967), pp. 3-5. ..

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The statistical analysis of the 1950s party nomenklatura reveals a great . deal of information about the generational issues that plagued Soviet official- dom. The research and analysis of the party elites suggests that 66 percent of the four hundred eleven members of the 1957 Plenum were between ages of

thirty and fifty. The majority among this group was born between the years 1905-1910, which made these dignitaries forty-seven to fifty two years old in 1957.2° They started their career ascent around 1935-1939. It took them ap-

proximately two decades to climb the party laddei and reach some significant

positions of power. There were only a few people bom after 1917. While the forty-seven years old dignitaries were identified as "the young,"

the older generation representatives were approximately sixty-two' years of

age and bom between the years 1895 and 1900. Ln 1935-1939, at the time

when "the young ones" just started ascent up the party ladder, they already were an active part of the Soviet elites 21 ...

The processes of political, economic and social changes caused each gen- eration to be different in many ways from its predecessors. Karl Mannheim

emphasizes that in a rapidly changing society, the formative experiences of

youth are bound to be different for each successive generation. The inevitable

result, argues Mannheim, is the increasingly radical differences between gen- erations themselves.22 The group bom in 1895-1900 and the ones bom in

1905-1910 had a different teenage and young adulthood years, which con-

tributed to the formation of their outlook on life, cultural choices and political

opinions. While the "older" became adults during the turmoil of the World War I, revoluiion and the civil war, the younger ones were still teenagers and

did not have the same life experiences. 23 Some of the older generational camp

20. The representatives of this generations included the Mowing members of the 1957 Ple- num : L. I. Brezhnev (1906-1982), S. M. Batizov (1909-1967), F. D. Varaksin (1908-1975), S. A. Vinogradov (1907-1970), A. P. Volkov (1910-1990), G. I. Voronov (1910-1994), B. H. Gafurov (1908-1977), K. P. Gorshenin (1907-1978), F. S. Goriachev (1905-1985), A. A. Grechko (1903- 1976), 1. T. Grishin (1908-1973). I. A. Grishmanov (1906-1979), E. 1. Gromov (1909-1981), P.V. Dementiev. (1907-1977), A. A. Yepishev (1908-1985), V.G. Zhavoronkov (1906-1987), I. K. Zhegalin (1906-1984), D. G. Zhimerin 91906-1995), K. P. Zhukov (1906-1988), A. A. Ishkov (1905-1988), V. D. Kalmykov (1908-1974), S. Kamalov (1910), A. P. Kirilenko (1906-1990), A. I. Kirichenko (1908-1975), P. F. Lomako (1904-1990), L. I. Lubennikov (1910-1988), V. N. Ma- lin (1906-1980), V.S. Marklv (1905-1978), D. V. Pavlov (1905-1991), N. S. Patolichev (1908- 1989), N. M. Pegov (1905-1991), B. N. Ponomarev (1905-1995), S. O. Postovalov (1907-1983), V. F., Promyslov (1908-1993), K. G. Pysin (1910-1984), 1. P. Razzakov (1910-1979), P. A. Su-

doplqtov (1907-1996), D. F. Ustinov (1908-1984), E. A. Furtseva (1910-1974). 21. E. T. Abakuumov (1895-1953), A. A. Andreev (1895-1971), I. Kh. Bagramian (1897-

1982), I. P. Boitsov (1897-1988), S. M. Budennyi (1883-1973), N. A. Bulganin (1895-1975), A. F.Gorkin (1897-1988).

22. Karl Mannheim, Essays on Sociology ofKnowledge (London: Routledge, 1952), pp 315-

16. , . ' 23. The Youth Revolutions, p. 12..

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had been in contact with and taught by the master, i.e., Stalin, himself for al-

most three decades, while the younger generation although benefiting greatly from Stalin's policies, had worked under him for less than ten years after

World War II. There were also dissimilarities in education and career training that re-

sulted from different historical period in which both generations grew up. The seniors were the NEP "vydvyzhentsy," while the y6unger advanced pri- marily through the social mobility of the First and Second Five-Year plans.24 The latter were not only a decade younger, but more educated, with engineer-

ing degrees and industry work experience. "The NEP generation" was not

only older, but it lacked technical higher education or had none at all. 25

Another important difference was in the numbers of each generational rep- resentatives in power. The system of the Soviet officialdom and particularly of the partly elites was rigid and hierarchical and the party officials served un-

til death or retirement late in life. Consequently, in the 1950s there should

have been a significant number of the "older" group of officials. Yet in 1957

the sixty-two year old officials were a minority. Their relatively small num-

bers and the absence of a significant group only slightly younger indicate that

the entire generation of the party officials was missing. The purges of the 1930s and the World War II interrupted a natural way of bureaucratic pro- . 26 gression. 26

The governmental elite was as a closed system. There were almost no op-

portunities for additions, transfers or replacements. Therefore, those who

started their career climb in the 1930s and survived purges and wars climbed

to the highest positions of power at the expense of those who did not survive:

"The Great Purge removed almost the entire top stratum, and the vydvy- zhentsy [...] stumbled into their place.,,27 In the 1930s these people were

young and they accumulated power simply by virtue of staying alive. The

24. Sheila Fitzpatrick, Education and Social Mobility in the Soviet Union, 1921-1934 (Cam- bridge : Cambridge Univ. Press, 1979), p. 248.

25. Malenkov was a NEP vydvyzhenets. He joined the Central Committee apparatus in 1925 after his graduation form the Moscow Technical School. Many others, like Saburov, had degrees in socials sciences and were the graduates from the Moscow or Leningrad universities.

26. Among many were 1. A. Adamovich (1896-1937), P. D. Akulinushkin (1899-1937), la. I. Alksnis (1897-1938), V. A. Antonov-Ovseenko (1883-1938), 1. P. Belov (1893-1938), M. D. Berman (1898-1939), A. S. Bubnov (1884-1938), N. 1. Bukharin (1888-1938), Ia. B. Gamamik (1894-1 937),.N. N Demchenko (1896-1937), N. N. Zimin (1895-1938), V. G. Knorin (Knorinsh) (1890-1938), S. V. Kosior (1889-1939), N. N. Kerstinskii (1883-1938), A. I. Krinitskii (1894- 1937), V. I. Kuritsyn (1892-1937), A. K. Lepa (1896-1938), M.-I. Litvin (1892-1938), A. F. Radchenko (1887-1938), I. P. Rumiantsev (1886-1937), K. V. Ryndin (1893-1938), A. D. Se- mushkin (1898-1938), Ia., G. Soifer (1885-1938), M. O. Stakun (1893-1938), S..M. Ter- , Gabrielian (1886-1937), V. Ia. Chubar' (1891-1939), B. P. Chebuldaev (1895-1937). .

27. Fitzpatrick, Education and Mobility in the Soviet tlnion, p. 242..

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purges, and wars in such a closed system were beneficial because it allowed. them to break the glass ceiling and grab the positions on the top, bypassing the natural and slow bureaucratic growth. By 1950s, however, "the young ones" became "an older generation" themselves and feared in turn for their

power. Although the seniors were in minority, they hold the most powerful and

prestigious positions while the rest were deprived of the access to highest power. By the summer of 1957 the situation among the Soviet leadership be-

came explosive. Every discussion between the two camps could have erupted in crisis. Compromises became no longer possible, and each group was get- ting ready for a flight to death. As Malenkov mentioned in his conversation

with Saburov: "If we won't remove them now, they will take us out

The Central Committee Plenum became a defining point in the clash be-

tween the remnants of the Stalinist elite, i.e., Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, Shepilov and Voroshilov (bom between 1893 and 1902), and the

"the youngsters" (bom between 1905 and 1910).29 "The young" as we have

seen were not all that young, and the age discrepancy did not neatly lend it-

self to a typical "fathers" and "sons" profile. Due to their age, these genera- tional differences should be described as of the "fathers and grandfathers" rather than the "fathers and sons". The fathers "driven by their elders' obsti-

nate refusal to make way for the new dispensation" had to force the grandfa- thers to abdicate their power.3° During the summer of 1957 their struggle was

a success: they ousted the elderly members and opened the stage for them-

selves. , The Plenum of 1957 was a ritual by which the purge of the old guard was

accomplished. The Plenum therefore was not an outright farce, but it was "an

organized hypocrisy.,,31 The purpose of the June Plenum was supposedly "to

affirm the power of the Central Committee under the leadership of Khru-

shchev in the name of socialism and the Soviet people." Yet the proceedings of the Plenum were only connected to Soviet ideology on a very superficial level. Khrushchev's supporters mimicked true believers while the accused

"conspirators" purged themselves in a bizarre procedure that was only thinly veiled by the pretense of ideology.32 The Plenum more closely resembled

tribal and peasant Communal rituals akin to the French charivari or the Japa- nese kegare than an official meeting of the Communist Party. These social

Stenogra'mma, p. 14. , 29. Ibid., pp. 764-840. _ . 30. Anthony Adler, Bombs, Beards and Barricades: 150 years of Youth in Revolt (New

York: Stein and Day, 1971), p. 146. . 31. Lazar P.istrak, .7he Great Tactician: Khrushchev's Rise to Power (New York: Praeger,

1961 ), p.17. , . ' 32. Nikolai Berdiaev, "0 fanatizme, ortodoksii I isfine," Russkie zapiski, no. 1 (1937), p. 9.

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customs were perfonned to punish publicly the deviants. They "leveled" the social convention and tightened the cohesion of the larger social structure.

Khrushchev captured the very essence of the Plenum when he compared it to his village practice: "The misbehaved were flogged periodically with

krapiva so they would not entirely loose the right direction."33 The Plenum was therefore a social manifestation that signified the domination of the col- lective over the "the deviants". It also allowed the winning faction to savor their victory. It was a group activity through which they annihilated the op- ponent's dignity and showed them their proper place within the hierarchy of

power. Much like in the traditional.village environment the elders who had to

accept their loss of status in the community after they had lost their former

physical abilities, the old party guard had no choice but to expedite their own punishment because such humiliation spared their lives and privileges.

The younger participants of the Plenum ferociously reaffirmed the group conformity that led them to attack the opponents and defend their own. Sens-

ing the weakness of the elders, they perceived the Plenum as a battlefield . 34 The old guard was demonized and depicted as "power mongers," "Machia-

vellians," and "two-faced Januses," who attempted to usurp power by seizing the Presidium of the Party35 and the KGB. The Plenum was consequently the last stronghold against these perpetrators. 36

The language of the struggle was especially pronounced in the discussions of the generational rift between the old guard and the new leaders. Many speakers at the proceedings implied that the time had come for the old to re- tire and for the young to "steer the ship into the future. ,,37 The "old" guard was identified with those who shared a privileged status in recognition of their participation in the revolution and the civil war. However, the associa- tion with Stalin and his crimes had tainted this glorious identification. The "old" were against Khrushchev's Virgin Land campaign, against the competi- tion with the USA, and against Realpolink as.well as the modernization of leisure. The "young," on the other hand, were for all of the above. But more

importantly they desired to ostracize "the masters" and then claim their posi- tions, status and privileges. Similarly to the Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution in China, they wanted compensation for their years of sacrifice. The timing was perfect: the mighty god-Stalin was gone and without his pro- tection it was easy to kick the already "toothless" idols.

33. Stenogramma, p. 519. '

34. Ibid., p. 655. ' ' I

35. Ibid., pp. 619, 621 . ' 1 I 36. Ibid., p. 635. - " '

37. Ibid., p. 425. -

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Many speakers used the age factor as a weapon for an attack. The speak- ers, who identified themselves as "the youngsters," claimed that the rude be- havior of the elderly hurt their system of beliefs and their ability to work effi-

ciently.38 Some called them hypocrites and liars and insisted that their "fluid

morality" was dangerous to life.39 Others implied that their longevity in

power was only due to their betrayal of their former colleagues .40 They claimed that it was clearly unsafe to work in such close proximity to such monsters. According to many speakers, Molotov, Kaganovich and Malenkov,

occupied their power-seats way too long and now had to yield them.41 The age issue was also used as a weapon of defense. Molotov used his

personal connection to Lenin and Stalin as a license for power.42 Voroshilov

simply claimed senility. He was tolerated as an amusement particularly after he confessed that he was an idiot not to recognize the true nature of the

coup.43 He also begged for mercy on the grounds of his age, v??hich pleased the crowd enormoUSIY.44

The age was a symbol of a particular way of thinking, which was not al-

ways connected to biology since a political generation is not to be equated with a biological generation. Implicit in a generations approach to .politics were the responses of younger and older generations to the conformity within the Soviet system itself. Consequently, in "the party of elders" there had been several renegades from the youngsters. Pervukhin, for example, was much

younger than Voroshilov, Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, and Saburov. At -

the same time, each generation speaks out with more than one voice and there

were a few older dignitaries among the youngsters as well. Suslov, for in-

stance, was the oldest surviving cadre of the NEP promotional policies. Yet

he chose to oppose the seniors and even presided over ten out of eleven ses-

sions of the June Plenum. It was a smart political move. Not only had he sur-

vived the purges but he also continued to be on the top of the power until late

1970s. Khrushchev supported "the youngsters," although he was not exactly a

spring chicken himself. By declaring his support for the young, Khrushchev was "reborn again" and reached a new level of consciousness. He then pro- moted the regeneration of the Central Committee with "new blood,"45 and

reprimanded "the elderly" who were holding to their positions "as tightly as a

38. Ibid., p. 433. .3,9. Ibid., p.'436. 40. Ibid., pp. 542, 678. , 41. Ibid-, p. 633.

.. 42. Ibid., p. 485. .

44. Ibid., p. 3§7. ' 45. Ibid., p. 539.

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dog to a bone . ,,46 From his perspective, he belonged to the young ones not because of the age difference, but because of his position and his outlook.

Two different ways of thinking did not reflect mere biological differences, but also symbolized a particular group's program, which was achieved

through displays of loyalty to the group and to the leader. One after another the members of the Khnishchev group took the podium and pledged alle-

giance to the Central Committee, affirming their righteousness and rebuffing the accusations against Khrushchev. Such a ritual had to be performed with a

sense of urgency. Molotov and Co. based their plot against Khrushchev on his character flaws and poor decision-making. The charges brought up against him were grave and could have ended in his exile from serious. poli- tics.

There were several issues that separated the members of both camps and caused the fight before and during the Plenum. Khrushchev's idea to radi-

cally reform industrial management, for instance, was not popular with the

senior camp because it shifted the power from the center to the regions. By denouncing the conspirators and by supporting Khrushchev the speakers at

the Plenum agreed with the abolition of the national economic ministries and

replacing them with regional economic councils. This move gave much more

power to the specialists in the industries and the regional party elite. The

change was welcomed by the party of the young and severely opposed by the seniors who saw it as a loss of their power. 47

Another aggravating issue was Khrushchev's pledge to surpass the United States in the production of meat, butter, and milk, which was impossible to

fulfill. The youngsters' camp welcomed the challenge while the older more

experienced Malenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich opposed it and suggested to

avoid direct confrontation with the West. Khrushchev's pledge, however, was not a blueprint or a guideline based on economic reality or scientific calcula- tions. It was an article of faith akin to a "deep feeling" that lives inside politi- cal leaders when they want to ignite masses with unachievable nationalistic

goals. Khrushchev realized that at the time of political crisis people had to be

permanently mobilized because "the masses choke on dry ideology not lubri- cated by inspiring MottoS.,,48 US intimidation and critical'views of the Soviet

economy were presented as pure bullying, which had to be challenged. The

purpose of the motto therefore was not to overtake the US, but to display the

superiority of the Soviet people under the leadership of Khrushchev. The ma-

jority of the speakers at the Plenum warmly supported Khrushchev's motto,

' 1

46. Ibid., p. 551. 1 1 t !

47.1bid.,pp.567,453.. ' '

48. Ibid., p. .

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which simply meant, "Let's show America who is in charge," as an inspiring . political maneuver.

Another divisive issue was Khrushchev's interaction with the Soviet intel-

ligentsia. After the program of De-Stalinization inspired "The Thaw," liberal tendencies alarmed the leadership of the party. The Soviet intellectuals na-

ively assumed that they had become equal participants in the decision-

making process. Instead of dialogue, Khrushchev reprimanded them.49 His

speeches, however, were not a critique of art as many have assumed. They were sermons that served to reaffirm his position as the Chief Ideologue and the Guardian of'the traditional "values" of the Soviet culture. The writers, were offended and made their irritation with Khrushchev publicly known. The speakers at the Plenum, however, agreed with Khrushchev that the lib-

eral intellectuals had to know their proper place, since they were merely a

serving and not a ruling class.5° Besides, concluded many, only they, i.e., the

"new" leadership had a right to criticize Stalin and Soviet society whereas the

old Stalinist elite as well as mortals were not allowed to do .

But nothing was more sinister than "the sauna problem." Molotov charged Khrushchev of taking a sauna during his official visit to Finland, which was beneath the dignity of a Soviet political leader. Behind such a ridiculous

charge lurked the more serious crime of flirting with the West. "The Sauna

Question" appeared numerous times during the June Plenum discussions.

Some Khrushchev supporters looked at it as a sign of great respect to Finns, while others praised it as a smart diplomatic move, and yet others saw it as a

big sacrifice since Khrushchev "was clean enough and did not need to wash

himself in the company of foreigners."52 Many speakers displayed their loy-

alty to Khrushchev, randomly confessing their own transgressions, i.e., that

they themselves had succumbed to the temptation of the sauna at one time or

another. And more importantly, a visit to the sauna was a more fashionable

sign of the "modem" times; the one "the old generation" was incapable of

understanding. 54 The somewhat irrational discussions of these issues matched the absurdity

of the Plenum's conduct. The Plenum followed a particular script and its out-

come was prearranged: the old guards had to be condemned and had to vacate

their high positions of power. Yet the hearings went on for twelve exhausting

49. Vasilii Aksenov, "Zima trivogi nashei ili kak marksist Nikita uchil pisatelei partiinoi pravde," Literaturnyi kur'er, no. 12 (1 986- 1 987)...

. 50. Stenogramma, p. 512. 5 51. Ibid., p. 530. : 52. Ib,id., pp. 126-27, 158.

' .

. 53. Ibid., p. 439.. ' 54. Ibid.

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days, two sessions a day.55 What was the purpose of such an extended psy-

chological torture? More than 200 leaders of the party and state claimed that

they were searching for the Truth, which justified this extension. They talked

about it, pressed for it, and demanded its revelation. As a result an abundance

of important and highly disturbing facts came to the surface. Yet none of

these facts were seen as the Truth, nor understood, reflected upon or used to

prosecute the perpetrators. '

Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich, Saburov, Pervukhin, Shepilov and Bul-

ganin were forced to produce accounts of their evil deeds and were kept on

the stand until they delivered them in the smallest details. The emerging pic- ture was disturbing. Many of the accused were said to have personally par-

ticipated in the numerous arrests, purges and executions of hundreds of thou-

sands of innocent people. Molotov, for instance, signed a document on No-

vember 12 of 1938 ordering an execution of 3,167 people in one day. 56 Ka-

ganovich showed an even crueler and sinister side when he composed a ver-

dict that read: "Bravo! Kill the bastards !,,17 Some speakers charged them with

the annihilation of the entire Polish Communist party, which amounted to

more than half a million people. 58 Others shared the accounts of tortures ap-

plied to the alleged enemies of the people in the secret KGB prison. And sev-

eral speakers named the members of the government responsible for the star-

vation of millions that resulted in death, epidemics and cannibalism59

The Plenum had the ability to act upon these allegations and press charges, but remarkably it did not. This was not its purpose. The facts were brought up

only to illustrate the character of the accused, to hurt them, and to frighten

them, but not to punish them for their crimes. Thus, the pathos of the "Truth"

had nothing to do with actual truth. It was part of the rhetorical strategy that

preserved the interests of the ruling elite. Nikolai Berdiaev wrote in 1937 that

the modem epoch knew nothing of critical and intellectual dispute, but only of exposing, expelling and chastising, but these rhetorical tricks suggest that

he may have been too mild in his description. 60 Khrushchev explained it

much better when he said: "We have to treat them like a good housekeeper who teaches her cat by sticking his nose in his own piss."61

The ritual performed at the Plenum had little to do with Communist ideol-

ogy. Its methods followed the framework of a communal celebration of the

_

55. During the session of the Plenum from June 22 to June 29 there were twelve meetings, one in the morning and one in the evening.

56. Stenogramrna, p. 38. ' '

57. Ibid., p. 47. ' .

58. Ibid., p. 537. ' , 59. Ibid., pp. 290,456,'667. , , 60. Berdiaev, "O ianatizme," p. 6.

'

61. Stenogramma, p. 447. ..

186

sacrament of Penance, where penance depended on "the admission of faults to one's brethren, fraternal correction, examination of conscience, acceptance of their faults for the sake of righteousness. "62 The accused had to confess and repent, ask for forgiveness and endure their punishment. Their

"judges," i.e., the Plenum participants, had to forgive their "sins" and deter- mine the manner of penance. Michael Foucault argued that confession be- came one of the most highly valued techniques for producing truth, which had nothing to do with the actual truth. Instead the confession became a ritual of discourse that unfolds within a power relationship. Such a ritual, Foucault

argued, "exonerates, redeems, and purifies a person who articulates the con-

fession ; it unburdens him of his wrongs, liberates him, and promises him sal-

vation. !?64 '

The participants used the Plenum proceedings to restore the sanctity of the fraternal community of the Central Committee. The speakers portrayed the Central Committee as a sacred institution injured by the inappropriate con-

duct of the conspirators. The speakers yelled, "How could you spoil this sa-

cred place?" and "You ruined the sanctity of the Central Committee. We used

to come here to worship!" and "We used to hold our breath when we entered this sacred place. Now you have stained it with your dirty The

speakers expressed their outrage at the conspirators' "dragging Lenin's name

through the mud,"66 and described the conspirators as "foul who

turned "the bright of the day into the dark night," and who "strongly blem- - ished Khrushchev."69

' -

Khrushchev also liked the dirt that polluted the allegedly sanitary CPSU as a metaphor. The intentions of the accused were "dirty" because the "dirt

dripped from their hands" (apparently mixed with the blood of their fallen

comrades) and from their hearts. 710 Their filth, however, was of a special kind, not to be confused with manure, whose production Khrushchev highly

praised.71 The implication was that the conspirators, including their body

parts and their intentions, were unclean, that is, evil. Interestingly enough the

sauna discussion was also a part of the same discourse. Khrushchev and his

62. Luke 9:23. '

63. Alexander Iakovlev, Omut pamiati (Moscow: Vagrius, 2002), pp. 127-29. 64. Michael Foucault, The History of Sexuality, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage

Books, 1980), 1 : 59. 6$. Stenogramma, pp. 34, 56, 145. ¡ 66. Ibid., p. 624... . 67. Ibid., p. 639.

. 68. Ibid., p. 6'57.. 69. Ibid., p. 6j8.

:

70. I6id '.,pp. 5,12-13. _ ' 71. Ibid.

187

supporters were "pure" (i.e. baptized) since they enjoyed the sauna while the

opponents of the sauna became automatically "unclean."72 The speakers insinuated that the conspirators were universal liars and had .

a pact with devil, which inspired them to attack the Central Committee. The actions of the accused were therefore described as a schism that ripped asun- der the monolith of their fraternity. The speakers referred to the accused as .

members of a sect (sektanty), as schismatics (raskol'niki), as high priests of

treason, and as Judas .7' The unity was preserved solely through the efforts of

the Central Committee members whose righteous belief helped them to with-

stand the evil The accused were pressured to admit not only their personal deviancy, but

also the existence of the anti-party group. In the eyes of the Plenum such a

schism was comparable to a mortal sin because the group participation im-

plied premeditation with full knowledge. All of the accused eventually admit-

ted deliberate intent, except Voroshilov, who pleaded ignorance, but who was

excused on the grounds of his senility. It'was also important for the Plenum to get full confessions. Pressure was

put on the accused to reveal every little detail about their activity, their con-

servations, and their drinking parties at the dachas. It seemed essential to rec- reate the exact order of events. And the conspirators_ were aware of what was

demanded of them. Kaganovich, for example, pleaded with the audience that

kept interrupting him with additional questions. Twelve times he repeated: "Ia vse skazhu" (I will tell you everything) while Bulganin repeated the same

thing five times and Saburov six times. Knov,Ting from prior personal experi- ence that stubbornness was detrimental, they also asked for "collegiality" and

hoped to avoid revenge. 75 The pressure to confess was applied by a variety of methods. The desig-

nated speakers pushed hard for the admittance of guilt. But only a few were allowed to address the Plenum. Still, the rest made sure that they made com- ments that indicated that they understood the gravity of what was going on.

They made comments like "rightly so," "correct," "incorrect," "conspirators," "enemies," "be honest," "clear as day," "gangsters," "will not allow,"

"provocation," "killers," "mummies," and "monstrosity" aligning with the

speakers or rejecting them. The accused therefore were pressed to display a

complete understanding of their sinful behavior and they consequently made

a willing resolution not to behave badly again. Many times the members of

the Plenum refused to accept their confessions as "insincere," "unaccept-

72. Ibid., p. 439. '

, 73. Ibid., pp. 529,603,605,634,637,654.. ? 1 ! 74. Ibid., p. 512.

' '

75. Jbid.,pp. 70-71. ' ' '

188

"distrustful" in which case the accused had to try again until the admittance was done in a way satisfactory to the Plenum.

Not all of the judged accepted their fate submissively. At first some of them denied the accusations, defended themselves, and even argued with Khrushchev and the members of the Plenum. By the end of the session, how-

ever, they learned their parts and the show went smoothly. In the first session, Malenkov, for instance, attempted to give explanations, appealed to Khru-

shchev, calling him a brother and reminding him of the good old days that

they had shared together.'6 Kaganovich also resisted, referring to Khru- shchev's negative character traits, and accusing him of usurping power. 77 -

Bulganin in the beginning also argued with Zhukov and denied every- thing. 71 On the next day, however, he asked to speak again, at which time he

confessed to the existence of the anti-party group and acknowledged the lead-

ing role of Malenkov and Molotov, whom he called "the Godfathers."79 He admitted that he was sucked into "a swamp" and promised to be smarter next

Zhukov wisely noted it was better late then never.81 And yet Bul-

ganin's ordeal was not over. Several people questioned the concept of "a

swamp." According to them, there were "swamps beyond redemption" not to be confused with nicer, redeemable ones. As a result, Bulganin attempted an- other confession during the morning session on June 27. His monologue lasted thirty seconds but it was right to the point. Totally humiliated, Bul-

ganin "fully and completely" realized the severity of his sins, which required a serious self-purgiI1g. Everyone was satisfied. Even Zhukov who was a harsh and unbending critic of Bulganin said: "Well done, good job, Molodets!"g2

Shepilov's performance even better illustrated the personalized nature of the power struggle. After several days and many admissions, his judges did not want to let go. Shepilov had some aggravating circumstances: many hated him because of his higher education, mannerisms and alleged arrogance. Time and time again he was rudely interrupted and finally he was told to shut

Behind the scenes Khrushchev and Mikoian pushed Shepilov to con-

fess, which he finally did on June 28. His confession however was declared

"insincere" because he refused to accept his role and thus was not giving the

"whole" truth. The furious and tired participants told him to either ask for

forgiveness or to leave the podium, after which Shepilov confessed every-

76. Ibid., pp. 55-57. Ibid., pp. 59-62 ;

78. Ibid., pp. 75-77. , , 79..Ibid., pp. 166-67. ' 80. Ibid., p.

81. Ibid., p: 1 70. "

82. I6id., p. 346. _ ' 83. Ibid., pp. 142-43.

189

thing and promised to cleanse himself and then to work for the party until his last breath. 84 Although the Plenum wars not entirely happy with Shepilov, his final plea got him an easy deal. He was soon forgiven and appointed the di- rector of the Institute of Economics of the Kyrgyz republic, a nomenklatura

position. . Saburov understood the rules of the game very quickly. Already during his first speech he admitted the existence of the anti-party group. So did the

younger Pervukhin, who also confessed to the existence of the anti-party group, but claimed that it consisted of Molotov, Malenkov and Kaganovich, who had seduced Pervukhin and Saburov. Although the Plenum was satis-

fied, Saburov and Pervukhin aspired to give more to the demanding audience

and went beyond simple confessions. At the ninth meeting Pervukhin and

Saburov took a podium again. This time around not only they accepted their

own guilt but also turned against own and demanded that Malenkov, Ka-

ganivich and Molotov "to be disarmed in front of the party."$6 They also

asked for severe punishment for the entire anti-party group. 97 Such an amaz-

ing transformation had a logical explanation. They obviously made a deal that guaranteed their preservation in exchange for loyalty. Both were taken back into "the bosom of the party" and continued to work in high positions after the Plenum was over.

This process of "leveling" was exhaustingly long. The speakers spent time ' readings the letters from the repentant conspirators. In his letter, Kaganovich fully admitted his political mistake, which he called a crime and a sin, asked for forgiveness, and pledged not to sin again.88 Malenkov also acknowledged his wrongdoings, deeply regretted the methods and his anti-party behavior, asked for mercy, and promised to work for the party and people.89 Even Molotov apologized for the anti-party group tendencies.9° When the readings of the resolution of the Plenum was over both Kaganovich and Malenkov once more pledged to serve the party, admitted their sins and ask for forgive- ness.91 Molotov also addressed the Plenum but only promised to be truthful.

His position as the former right hand of Stalin protected him from the confes- . .

sionary zeal of the younger members. His refusal however did not change the

outcome of the show. He was "fixed" without his collaboration.

_

84. Ibid., p. 409.. 85. !bid., p. 836.

'

86. Ibid., pp. 411-12. '

87. Ibid., pp. 412-13. ' .

88. Ibid., pp. 499-500. ' ,

89. Ibid., p. 501. I , , 90. Ibid. , p. 504.

'

. 91. Ibid., p. 503 .. ' '

190

Many commentators are puzzled by this outcome of the Plenum,92 which

disappointed them by the absence of violence. The results of the long Plenum seemed illogical to many contemporaries. No formal charges were pressed and no transcript was available for almost four decades. Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich and Shepilov were publicly denounced and removed from their

posts, yet they remained a part of the party apparatus until their retirement. Even Molotov remained a member of the Central Committee and was sent to Vienna as a representative of the CPSU Central Committee. Saburov, Per- vukhin and 'Bulganin were simply reprimanded.93 The success of the power struggle should be judged, however, not by its leniency towards the accused, but by what happened after the denunciations and removal of the conspira- tors. In the second act of the show, Khrushchev's' loyalists A. B.' Aristov, N.

I. Beliaev, L. I. Brezhnev, N. G. Ignatov, A. 1. Kirichenko, F. P. Kozlov, N.

A. Mukhitdinov, A. P. Kosygin, A. P. Kirilenko, and K. T. Mazurov, among others, replenished the Presidium.94 The generational revolt was accom-

plished.

Kennesaw State University

92. Pistrak, The Great Tactician, pp. 77, 272. , , ' 93. Stenogramma, pp. 2-3.

'

' 94. A. B. Aristov (i903-1973), N. I. Beliaev (1903-1966), L. I. Brezhnev (1906-1982), N. G. Ignatov (1 901 -1 966), A. P. Kirilenko (1906-1990), A. I. Kirichenko (1908-1975), F. P.:Koziov (1908-1965), A. P. Kosygin (1904-1980). K. T. Mazurov (1914-1989), N. A. Mukhitdinov

(1915). ' '