The Anumana. - Shodhgangashodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/37031/11/11_chapter7.pdf · exposition, of the process of the ... logic, though they are useful for debate. So

Mcthodolegy ( 107 )

Chapter VII

The Anumana.

Anumana or inference is defined as the instrument of

judgment or inferential knowledge. 1 When finding smoke rising

from a hill, we remember that since smoke cannot be without

fire, and thus come to the conclusion that there must also be

fire on the hill, it is an Anumana. Here from the knowledge

of the observed mark ( Linga ) we get the knowledge of the thing possessing it. Anumli.na is the process of ascertaining,

not by perception or direct observation, but through the

instrumentality or medium of a mark, that a thing possesses a

certain character.

In inference what is perceived points to something else,

not perceived, with which it is connected. 2 The basis of infereace

1 '' aT .:~f+rfa<ti{IJJ+J'I''l'Fil{ 1 '' T arka-sangraha, p. 34. ... ... 2 " ~~~T f~~-tt~~~~ '"ll~(~~lS'-11~~'11~~ I '' Vatsyayana-bha~ya on ... '\ "'

Gautama's Nyaya-~iitra, p. 16.

Methodology ( 108)

1s an observed fact. So it ts also defined as knowledge which

is preceded by perception. 1 Vatsyayana holds that no inference

can follow in the absence of perception. Thus inference is

knowledge that follows other knowledge. Inference operates

neither with regard to things unknown, nor with regard to

those known definitely for certain; it functions only with regard

to things that are doubtful. 2

In the process of inference there is, first, the knowledge

or apprehension of smoke, which is associated as a mark ( Liilga

or Hetu ) with the hill, which is the subject with reference to

which something is inferred ( Pak~J. ). Secondly, there is the

recollection of the relation of invariable concomitance ( Vyapti) between smoke and fire as we have observed in the past.

After the consideration of the mark as possessed by the subject,

111 relation with the invariable concomitance, there results,

thirdly, the knowledge of the existence of the unperceived fire

in the hill which is intended to be inferred ( Sadhya ). This

process of inference is called consideration of the mark ( Liilga­

paramarsa ). So Anumana is also defined as Linga-paramarsa. 11

1 " tri'liiSIJIUI(~~E'-1 ~'ili:~'-1 Sl faq~'(~'~Tirll 1 " \" atsyayana-bha~ya

on Gautama's NyAya-siitra, p. 127.

2 " ~ ~CRS~ if ~offasif o:~'-'= Sl<fda, Ai aft, ~f"'~s~ 1 " Vatsyayana-bhafta on Gautama's Nyaya-siitra, p, 3.

Methodology ( 109)

To make a correct inference, the follow!ng five conditions

must be fulfilled:- ( 1 } The Hetu or Linga must be present

in the Pak~a ( Pak~a-sattva ). ( 2} It must be present in all

other known objects similar to the Pak~a, in having the Sadhya

in it ( Sapak~a-sattva ). ( 3) It must not be present in any such

object as does not possess the Sadhya ( Vipak~a-vyavrtti }.

( 4 ) The inferred assertion should not be· such that it is invali­

dated by direct perception or testimony of the Sastra ( Abadhita­

vi~ayatva ). ( 5) The Linga should not be such that by it an

inference in the opposite way could also be possible ( Asat­

pratipakfatva ). 1

In the process of inference appn;:hension of Vyapti or

invariable concomitance has a very great importance. It cannot

be said that Vyapti necessarily depends n pon the relation of

identity ( Tadatmya) between the Linga and the Sadhya, nor the

relation of causation ( Tadutpattitva ) between them, though in

some cases of concomitance these relations may be existing.

For the apprehension of Vyapti, it is sufficient, that as a result

of adequate observation one thing is known to accompany the

other invariably, although the inner connection between them

is not demonstrabk. :t Cloven hoofs and horns furnish an example

1 '' aTf"'l qs:"f~qrflf I qf:5'<Hl~~ ~q!S

~t~t~:Ifaqf:5toi ~fa 1 '' Tarka-bhata, p, 41.

2 "~T~"'~frJllm o'1Tfl=r: 1 " Tarka-sarigraha, p. 34.

Methodology ( 110)

of such invariable concomitance. It is therefore quite legitimate

to deduce the presence of the one from the presence of the other.

The process of inference includes both induction and

deduction. 1 In the apprehension of Vyapti we have to depend

upon induction. The Nyaya method of induction can be analysed

into the following steps:-

( 1 ) · Observation of a relation of agreement in presence

( Anvaya) between two things.

( 2 ) Observation of a relation of uniform agreement in

absence ( Vyatireka ) of those things.

( 3 ) Observation of absence of any contrary instances

( Vyabhicaragraha ).

1 cf. " The inference of the Oriental systems was in

no respect on all fours with what we call induction and de­

duction. It testifies neither to a passage from the general to

the particular or vice versa, nor to the passage of fact into

law or vice versa. The A11umana, as inference is called,

designates a knowledge ' by connection ', which grasps the

solidarity of two attributes of a single substance ........ but which

nevertheless apprehends them both sim::1ltaneously, the one being

perceived, so to speak, through the other. ''

P. Masson-Oursel ; Comparative Philosophy, p. 145-146.

Methodology ( Ill )

{ 4 ) Elimination of adventitious conditions on which

the relation may depend ( U padhinirasa ).

( 5 ) Indirect proof by the method of reductio ad

absurdum ( Tarka ).

( 6 ) Samanya-lakfal}.a perception, or the intuition involved

m the apprehension of the universals.

Thus in the process of induction Nyaya employs all the

three methods viz. enumeration, indirect proof and intuition.

Inference is said to be of two kinds, v1z. Svartha. or

that which resolves a doubt in one's own mind, and Parartha

or that which does so in another's. 1 In Parartha Anumana a

man intends to demonstrate the truth of the conclusion to

other men. 2 It is couched in language, and takes the form of

a syllogism. It has five members, viz. ( 1 ) Pratijfia or the

proposition, ( 2 ) Hetu or the reason, ( 3 ) U dahara:t;la or the

explanatory examlJle, ( 4 ) Upanaya or the application, and

( 5 ) Nigamana or the statement of the conclusion. 3 Its several

stages are thus expressed :-

1 '' ~~ ft;Jefl[ ~<n~ ~1'1 :q 1 " Tarka·sailgraha, p. 37.

2 11 ~~ ~~li \l'IT~Ji~q;r~ qurfatR~'i q$'q1Cf~iliffcfti sr~~·~ a~r.r-~ *" .... ..:1 "" ...:il

;rr;!il,l " Tarka-sangraha, p. 37.

3 "sr~~UJ1~f~;l¥t;rl .. liC(?:IifT: t " Gautama's Nyaya-siitra,

I. i. 32.

Methodology ( 112)

( 1 ) The hill is fiery. ( Pratijiia ) .

( 2 ) Because it has smoke. ( Hetu ) •

( 3 ) Whatever has smoke has fire, e. g. the kitchen.

( U daharaJ;la ) .

( 4) The hill has smoke, such as is always accompanied

by fire. ( Upanaya ).

( 5) Therefore the hill is fiery. ( Nigamana ).

Inference for the sake of others is rather a formal

exposition, of the process of the movement of thought. In it

the last two members are unnecessary from the stand-point of

logic, though they are useful for debate. So later on the

three-membered syllogism came to be recognised as a valid

syllogistic form.

In inference, as a PramaJ;la, the form was never considered

to be essentially important. If the syllogistic form is described

as Anumana, it is only by courtesy. The verbal view of logic

was never accepted in Indian philosophy. It was never for­

gotten that the subject matter of logic is thought and not, in

any sense, the linguistic forms in which it may find expression. 1

So the inference arrived at by a syllogism, even by dropping

the third member, was considered to be valid, since the

1 Hiriyanna : Outlines of Indian P~ilosophy, p. 255.

Methodology ( 113)

general proposition IS implied m the reason. This form

corresponds to enthymeme, and is found much in use in the

treatises of Indian philosophy. This explains why Vada does

not necessarily require argumentation through the method of

Five Factors of reasoning, as mentioned before.

Another classification describes inference as of three kinds,

viz. Purvavat, Se~avat and Sci.manyato-dr~~a. 1 Purvavat is the

inference of the effect from the cause, e. g. that of rain

from clouds. Se~avat is the inference of the cause from the

effect. Samanyato-dr~ta is the inference in all cases other than

those of cause and effect. This classification is given by Gautama

and is accepted by other early writers of Nyaya.

The new school of logic gives still another classification

of Anumana. According to these Naiyayikas inference is of

three kinds according as its Linga is ( 1 ) Anvaya-vyatireki,

( 2 ) Kevalanvayi or ( 3 ) Kavala-vyatireki. The first IS an

inference where the invariable concomitance is observed in all

instances by agreement both in presence and absence. 1 The

second is arrived at through the method of agreement in presence

only, as there is no negative instance of their agreement in

1 :t a:Jtl Q~~cti f?lfq\1'~ '{c"f<r~tilq~JIItritm :q 1 " Gautama's

Nyaya-siitra, I. i. 5.

2 " a:Jo:c(~"l c~M~ur :q ~TfR~~o~f~Pfi 1 " Tarka-sangraha, p. 40.

Methodology ( 114)

absence; as for example the inference- ' the pot is nameable,

since it is knowable. ' 1 The third is arrived at by means of

a Vya.;ti only through the method of agreement in absence,

since there is no instance of agreement in presence; as for

example the inference- ' the earth is different from other ele·

ments, since it has smell. 1 2 This classification is more logical

inasmuch as it is based on the nature of induction by which

we get the knowledge of Vyapti, on which the inference depends.

The N yay a school is chiefly responsible for the systematic

development of the theory of Anumana, and the contribution of

this system to the topic is so great that other systems of Indian

philosophy tacitly accept the general structure of the Nyaya

theory in this respect, only occasionally suggesting innovatiom;

for harmonising it to their tenets or for making it more conve­

nient for the proofs of their doctrines.

In the Vaise{!ika system, the Ka:Q.ada.sutras show the

beginnings of the logical theory of inference. In this work, the

knowledge of concomitance between Hetu and Sadhya was

assumed but the idea seems to be more loose than the technical

1 " ~7:1;n'Ji~C?:IlfH~ iti~Cif~ ~til ~i'rsfl1~?;j: Slit?;j(Cffiq~CIQ, I '' Tarka­

sailgraha, ?· 40.

2 '' ~fa~olflftt<i itiCfii5o?;jftl'tf.t; ?;j~l 'l~~a't~) ~a ttr'C{CI~CIH\ 1 ''

Tarka·sangraha, p. 40.

.. -

Methodology ( 115 )

Vyapti of the Nyaya theory. 1 The types of inferences referred

to by Kal}.ada are (1) inference of non-existence of some things from

the existence of some other things, ( 2 ) of the existence of some

things from the non-existence of some other things, ( 3 ) of the

existence of some things from the existence of others.

Later on, however, the Vaise~ika and the Nyaya developed hand

in hand, so the theory of inft~rence mentioned before was the

one accepted by the combined N yaya-Vaise~ika system.

According to the Sail~hyas, inference is divided into

two kinds, viz. Vita and Avita. Vita inference is based on

affirmative concomitance and is sub-divided into Purvavat and

Samanyato-dn~a. Avita inference is based on negative concomi­

tance and corresponds to the S(~.lvat variety of the Nyaya

system. 2 The five-membered form of the syllogism is admitted.

Vyapti, which is constant concomitance, is the result of obser­

vation of the agreement in presence and the non-observation of

the presence of one while the c.ther is absent.

The Sankhyas utilize the Samanyato-dr~ta variety of

inference in transcendental matters, and thus restrict the scope

of Vedic testimony considerably. For instance, through such

1 S. Dasgupta : A history of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I,

p .. 304.

2 II :r:JJ;cp.J'I~ Sl~ilJ;j fq\ll~ili q1d~ I ;~f~itiliJR~Of Sl~Hlill<i f~'<1'i'lCftQ+{ I . ' ~ -

Vacaspati Misra: Tattva-kaumudi, p. 11.

Methodology ( 116)

inference the existence of supersensuous Pralqti is postulated.

Sailkhyas appeal to the authority of scripture only where not

even this type of inference is possible.

The Yoga theory of inference is similar to that of the

Sailkhya system, and has nothing special about it. Like the

latter it accepts the theory of mental modification, and hence

inference is the mental modification through which we cognise

the generic nature of objects.

In the Mirnai}lsa, with respect to Anumana there is a

general resemblance with the Nyaya-Vaisel;ltka. Its theory about

inductive generalization ( Vyapti ) etc. is similar to that of the

Nyaya system. According to Sahara when a certain fixed or

permanent relation has been known to exist between two things,

we can have the idea of one thing when the other one is

perceived. This kind of knowledge is called inference. 1 He

divides inferences into two kinds, viz. Pratyak~1to·dn~a, when

the invariable relation holds between objects which are

perceptible, and Samanyato-dH~a, where the relation is not

apprehended by the senses, but known only as general notions.

The first corresponds to the Piirva vat & Sel;la vat varieties of

N yaya, while the second to the Samanyato-dr~ta.

Cinnasvamisastri: Tantrasiddhanta-ratnavali, p. 57.

Methodology ( 117 J

As regards the number of members necessary for the

explicit statement of the process of inference for convincing

others, both Kumarila and Prabhakara hold that only three viz.

Pratijiia, Hetu and· Dr~~ii.nta are quite sufficient.

Sankarii.cii.rya has not discussed the nature of Anumana,

since according to the Vedanta theory it is of very little impor·

tance. in metaphysical matters. In this respect we have mainly

to depend on the writers who followed his views. The

Advaita theory of inference 1s very much similar to that of the

Bhii.Ha school of M1mii.yp3ii..

According to the Advaita view, Anumana is a kind of

means for Parok~a or mediate knowledge. It is of the nature of

a Vrtti of the internal organ in which the Sii.k~in is immanent. 1

Inference is produced by the knowledge of invariable concomitance,

acting ·through specific past impression~, roused on a perceptual

cognition. In this system the nature of concomitance is altogether

subjective; inference has no material validity, but only subjectiv~

and formal validity. s

1 M. Hiriyanna : Outlines of Indian Philosophy, p. 145.

2 S. Dasgupta: A history of Indian Philosophy, Vol. It

p. 473.

Methodolog7 ( 118)

The nction of concomitance being altogether subjective,

the Advaita Vedanta docs not emphasize the necessity of

perceiving the concomitance in a large number of cases. Even

one case of concomitance is regarded as being sufficient for making

an inference, Thus seeing the one case of appearence, e. g.

silver in the conch-shelJ, to be false, we can infer that all

things except Brahman are false.

As is argued by Sri-har~a, Advaita Vedanta does not sub­

scribe to the Nyaya view that, for the establishment of invariable

concomitance there must be a mental contact with class-concepts

or universals, whereby an affirmation of all individuals of

a class without experiencing them all becomes possible.

According to the Vedanta such mental contact with the class­

concept need not he the basis of a Vyapti. 1 It does not

recognise the Samanya-lak~at;ta perception at all. 1

In the same way it is pointed out that Tarka or

eli min a tory consideratio!! cannot be the basis of forming

Vyapti. It may only be helpful in judging the possibilities. a

1 S. Dasgupta: A history of Indian Philosophy, Vol. II,

p. 139. 2 " lf!~re'lil ~f~~f<'ail~:::( ~~voi ef~<t;q il~lfi:qst;: I " ... ...

Jhalkikar: Nyaya-kda, p. 1015. 3 S. Dasgupta: A history of Indian Philosophy, Vol. II,

p. 140.

:rrreth'odology ( 119 )

Advaita Vedanta accepts only the concomitance expressed

in a universal affirmative proposition. Kevalii.nvayi and Kevala­

vyatireki inferences arc not accepted in this system.l The

chssification of inferences as Svartha and Parirtha finds its

place here also. The latter type of inference has only the

first three or the last three members instead of five as in Nyaya.

In Anumana, even though the mind functions through

its modification, the Pramar;:ta does not give immediate knowledge.

Inferential knowledge is mediated through relation with the

Liilga or reason. 2 Though mediate it is none the less knowledge

just like perception, since its nature is manifestation of the

object. The difference between perception and inference is that

in inference the inferred object does not form a datum and there

is no direct and immediate contact of the inner organ with

the inferred object. In inference the inner organ is in touch

only ·with the reason or Linga and through this there arises an

idea in the mind which is called inference"

Sankaracarya 1s fully aware that inference cannot be

helpful as a means for the knowledge of a super-sensuous

entity like Brahman. He has frequently stated that the purpose

·1. S. · Radhakrishn~n: Indian Philosophy, Vol. II,

p. 493-494.

2 S. Dasgupta: A ·history of Indian Philosophy, Vol. II,

p. 106.

.....

Methodology ( 1~0)

of Brahma-sutra is not to establish the nature of Brahman by

means of logical arguments. He asserts that the nature of

Brahman can be known through U panifJ.ds only. 1

The Vedanta Sutras can claim only to interpret the

revealed sayings of the U pani~adic texts; they do not intend to

advance independent inferences not warranted by Sruti texts.

The Sfttras merely afford opportunities to collect the material

from Sruti for thought and discussion, consequent on which.

Olnd not simply due to inference and other PramfiQas, there

springs up the knowledge of Brahman. 2 Inference is welcomed

and is considered to be a serviceable instrument of knowledge,

if it is brought forward to strengthen the conclusions of Srutis.•

BadarayaQa himself has asserted the futility of logical

reasoning or Anumfina in super-sensuous matters in his Siitra:-

6'fitqffisor~1~t1.1•7.i'tr-j_il7.if'lfa ~~q~1.ifq+i'r~~ell: l • In commenting on this

Sankaracarya eloquently makes it clear, how inferential conclusions

cannot come to finality. He is aware that reasoning affords

1 .. a~,n~·~'!.? ~"'la1Rt1.iltl1.11~~'1.ilf'tfll+r: 1 '' Brahma .. sfttra Sankara­

bha,ya, I I. i. 27. 2 11 ~~t•a<tt'f':nfot fq: ~~h~Tf;;E1.i fq:qT~o:a 1 qr<f~ttif~:;;n~un~7.f'l6t~fot~~t

f{ Jilll<ltt!a<~i•un~T~tr+nuwad<t~"'ll '' Brahma-sfttra Sankara-bha~ya, I. i. 2 . ..:. .

3 " ~~~"' ~ 6(11-i(il"f a~1.il~~'Ctat<rn{ l " Brahma-siitra Sankara·

bh~ya, I. i. 2. 4 Brahma-siitra, II. l· 11.

Methodo1o'' ( 121 J

permanent scope for correction of already admitted propositions, t

but he makes it clear that only this much is not sufficient to

arrive at right knowledge. Though reasoning may appear to

hold good in certain cases, still with regard to the unfathomable

nature of Reality, it is of no use unless it is backed up by

Sruti. 2 S.1il~ara.:iirya rightty points out th1.t even when the

ordinary things such as gems and herbs produce different

opposite effects on different o~casions and in different placei

and times, and thereby baffle the intellect of man if it is not

properly instructed, it must be much more difficult to fathom

the powers of Brahman by mere intellect.

So according to Sailkadkarya reasoning cannot be applied

to what is unthinkable; we must resort to Sruti alone to know

the super-sensuous. 3 Brahman is neither the object of perception

nor of inference; it has neither form nor sound to be seen or

heard, nor any sign en account of ·which it is to be inferred.~

1 '' at~W-1 a~~"t~1iTU ~~f'af10acci ~~'' 1 ~ f( m~~a~q~~~Ti'lwt f<lH~~a~:

srfatre•~) 11<rfu 1 '' Brahma-siitra Sailkara-bha~ya, I I. i. 11.

2 " wt {t~qfalJ'ij\'( lll'fi.IT'llc'li '!fmF-IiJ•'l~llllftJ'fi'citiJf1c'lf\lliJ~ ~if'.lil. 1 ''

Brahma-siitra Sailkara-bhafya, I I. i. 11.

3 " a~qJ•iJ·~~ ~iitftfil'1.1'f'i-!Ut~H~?.Ilf'clrur: l " Brahma-siitra Sankara­

bha~ya, I I. i. 27.

4 II ~qlflq'[qJf~ OITq'Pl: Sl~qttJll')~{:, fts~llfl!~l''f

Brahma-siitra Sankara-bh~ya, II. i. 11.

Methodology ( 122 )

~ankaradi.rya is fully a ware that C()nclusions arrived at

by reasoning or inferences may vary according to the abilities

of the reasoners. That is why from the same data different

conclusions are arrived at by different logicians. As the subjective

factor influences the conclusions of reasoning, Sankaracarya is

not prepared to accept that inference can be of any use for

the knowledge Brahman. Mok~a is impossible to be attained by

any other means except through the right kind of knowledge

given to us by U pani~ads.

SJ.nkaradi.rya points out that Anumiina has no scope

for establishing the validity of scripture. 1 Scripture being a

Pramal}.a which produces new, uncontradicted and unambiguous

knowledge is self-valid. 2 It does not require any other means

to prove its validity. So he declares that Upanifads are valid,

even though they do not enjoin actions like other portions of

the Veda. 3 The authoritativeness of the U panifads cannot be

made dependent on instances observed elsewhere.

Though Sankaraciirya

metaphysical matters, he

I. i. 4.

denies validity for

docs not thereby

reasoning tn

preclude this

2 11 aTill~Ol~f"liltn~f~l'tf'll~\fl;JCf.t~ f( ~'flUT~<f ll''llUflrtt Q'i:q' ~"tl ~~q .. .. "fl~(llf 1 '' Va-:aspati-misra : Bhamatl, p. 65. . ....

3 11 ~'-JC~r~?{ ~<:_i!lif<-tl~j fqf"cUilq~~i(I'Uf ll''flUH<{ rt ti', ~'fl~tc'lfCI:uTiltll q:j~qlo:mcn~ 6ft;:t.~~t~ ~1~{~ Sll'll"zi ~if~ ll'~~l~~l~~ 1" Brahma-siitra Sankara­bha~ya, .I. i. 4.

Methodology ( 123}

important means of knowledge from· the. province of philosophy.

The spirit of inquiry, the spirit of affording constant scope

for examining and re-examining the postulates in the light of

newer and newer propositions, the spirit of constant questioning

for the attainment of truth 1s a principle on which

philosophising prides itself. Sankarfi.:li.rya, though not prepared

to give finality to reasc..ning, does not hamper this spirit of

inquiry. He affords due scope for all means of knowledge in

their proper spheres.

Sankaracli.rya ts an astute logician, as is revealed by

even a superficial examination of his Bha~ya. None can doubt

his staunch faith in the revealed nature and the infallibility of

the Srutis.J. None can also doubt his sincerity when he states

that his doctrine is purely based on the authority of U pani~1.dic

texts and that he thinks that he is only the interpreter of th~

BadarayaQ.a Sutras, which illustrate, investigate and remove the

doubts in the Vedanta texts. 2 Granting all this, there remains the

fact that Sankaracarya has given a new turn to the whole inter­

pretation of the Vedanta by his genius which shows astounding

logical acumen, but which is not. accepted by many as a

faithful interp. etation.

·~ ..

Brahma-sii:ra S.lil cara-bh5fya, I. i. 3.

2 11 ~pu 'ifl1.11l~a e~~t it~-=ar.~t a'-11 Cf~'R~t ~'l~!li~llhn~t Sl~ilfll'~: 1 " Brahma-sutra Sail~ara-bhft;a, Introduction.

Methodology ( 12 4 )

In order to i11ustrate the above remarks, a few instances

may be cited. The introductory part of his commentary,

called Adhyasa Bhatya, clearly shows his power of subtle

reasoning and his ability to arr: ve at inferences irrefutable by

severe and critical counter-reasoning. As this part is an

Utsfitra Bhafya, a discussion not based on any Sfltra, it plausibly

raises the doubt, whether the view·p::>int arrived at by Sankaracii.rya

is purely based on a studious interpretation of the Prasthana­

trayi or is also the outcome of his subjective cogitation. 1 The

rigour of his reasoning here as well as through-out his Bha{lya

has driven his opponents to impute him with the charge of

foisting his own view-point on the BadarayaJ;la Sutras instread

of faithfully interpreting them.

The second Pada of the second Adhyaya in his Bha~ya

is also noteworthy in this connection. Sankaracarya has copiously

quoted U pani~adic texts in all parts of his Bhfifya, except

this Pada called the Tarka Pada. , ; Herein he does not depend \ .

on scriptural authority at all. This portion is purely logical.

In this he refutes the theories of antagonistic philosophers on

their own grounds, by showing their internal contradictions. In

refuting the tenets of different antagonistic philosophical systems;

1 cf. Govindananda's attempt to prove that the Adhyasa

Bh~ya is a regular part of the Bha~ya- 11 -g;ij;f ~Jqfmtlt<rT~e­

~·~) ot "115llf~Jfa fot~~tlll.l " Govindananda : Bhii.fya-ratna-prabha, p. 4.

Methodology ( 125 )

by means of pure reasoning, s~n!{ara::arya proves hi~self sup:!r~ as a logician. From his arguments we find that he is endowed

with asto:mding power of subtle analysis and marvelous insight

in fundamental principles. He is quite an adept in using inference

as a means of proof and three-membered syllogistic form as a

weapon of argumentation.

Ramanujadi.rya did not write any work for propounding

his views of logic consistent with the system of his philosophy.

Some of his followers, however, have revised Gautama's logic

in accordance with the Visi{ltadvaita tradition.

According to the Ramanuja school, inference is the result

of Padi.mar~.l or the knowledge of the existence of reason in the

object. It is a process by which, from universal proposition, we

can make an affirmation regarding a particular case.

The principle of Vyapti is defined as unconditional and

in variable association. It does not

temporal co-existence of the Vyapya

assume the spatial or the

and the Vyapaka. In many

cases of Vyapti sp<itio-temporal co-existence is observed to exist

but that does not exhaust all cases, as for example, the sunset

and the surging sea.l

1 S. Dasgupta: A history of ~ndian Philosophy, Vol. III,

p. 226.

Methodology ( 126)

A single instance is considered to be :sufficient to suggest

the Vyapti or the general proposition. 1 But in order to remove

doubts, a wide experience of concomitance is held to be indis­

pensable for the affirmation of a general propo~ition.

In the establishment of Vyapti, we have to make use

of both the positive and negative instances, eliminate the non­

essentials and arrive at the right concomitance. This requires

that the obsrrvation of many instances is indispensable for the

formation of Vyapti. 1

RarnAnuja logic admits the necessity of Tarka as an

i:ldispensable means of inferential conclusion, since it helps the

process of forming inductive generalisation. 3

Ramanuja's own intention regarding the types of inference

that may be admitted, seems to be uncertain. From the references

in Sri-bha~ya it appears that he divides the Anumana into

Vi~e.ato-dr~~a and Samanyato-dHta. 4 His followers, however,

accept the classifications as are given by later N aiyayikas,

p. 226.

1 S. Radhakrishnan: Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 673.

2 S. Dasgupta: A history of Indian Philosophy, Vul. III,

3 S. Radhakrishnan: Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 673.

4 " if'!1=llif'l'lo:{l{ 1 fC{i\~~ ri UTIW'<I(f) ~i C{J 1 '' Riimanuja : Sri-"'

bha~ya, I. i. 3.

M ethodolagr ( 127 ~

The treatment of inference according to the Rimanuja.

school is very much the same as that in the Nyaya system.

There are, however, certain points in which Vi~i~~advaita ·logic

differs from Nyaya .. One of such important points is the refusal

on the part of the former to accept the Kevala-vyatireki form of

inference, which is admitted by'the latter. Concomitance through

the joint method of agreement and difference ( Anvaya-vyatireki)

and by pure agreement ( Kevalanvayi ) is admitted. 1 It is consi­

dered that the Kevala-vyatireki form of inft~rence cannot be

legitimately accepted since inference through mere negative con-

comitance can never lead to the affirmation of any positive

characier. In this connection it may be noted that Yamunacarya

has also rejected the Kevala-vyatireki form of inference.

Inference is always limited to those cases in which

the general proposition has been enunciated on the basis of

experience derived from sensible objects. It cannot be employed

for the affirmation of ultra-sensuous objects, since things

which trans:end the sense cannot be grasped by inference.

Like Sankaracarya, Ramanujacarya also believes that only

scripture is the means of knowing transcendental things.

Inference 1s acceptable merely for strengthening the statemenh

' 1 S. Dasgupta: A history of Indian Philosophy, Vol. III~

p. 228.

Methodology ( 126 J

of scripture. 1 Following BadarayaQ.a, Ramanuja accepts the

inconclusive nature of reasoning.

As inference is based on perception, and is consequently

futile in grasping transcendental things, it cannot be the means

of the knowledge of Brahman. Ramanuja rightly observes that

inference, whether arrived at through the particular way of

deduction or arrived at through the generic way of induction,

is not the means of proving Brahman. The first type of

inference is imposible to be the ·means because there is no

knowledge of its relating to anything which is beyond the

senses. There is also no such basis of inductive inference as

is seen to give rise to generalisation and as is invariably

associated with the Lord who is capable of directly perceiving

all things and actually bringing those things into existence. 1

Ramanuja does not accept that the existence of God can

be inferred, as is done by the N aiyayikas. The fact that the

Lord is the creator of this universe cannot be made out on

1 " stc:i'ls~'lr;~~s~ ~1~iter !liJlOfll.; a~~~""~"' a<& ;oqJ~'-1:; a'-U =-1T~

' an~ 'CI'JiN~ld ~ ~~~161Tf<iU~T lll~acfi'l~~~:e v 'CI'~ it~ ~a~: I " Ramanuja:

Sr'i-bha~ya, II. i. 12.

Also:- " ~1~~<tstii1UJi<i1~ illlar: 1 " Ramanuja: Eri- bha~y3, I. i. 3.

2 " ;nt~~'ilWill, I f<~il"'ffi' t! VTII1•1.io) ~ <iT I atcfr~irq 1(~ ~Jifo:~­

<r<TRUJf<i~ fC~~cO Ulf I ~'i~aCf<g~.n~R'iil~~f.ir'!TGre'i~~~f<ii!ISif.1~Hf ~ffi Uqfq '\

~ ~•ll'~'t~~a 1 " Ramanuja : Sri-bha,ya, I. i. 3. ' ...

Methodology ( 1~9)

the basis of an inference of th<:: cause of all causes. 1 So like

other Bhafyakaras, Ramanuja depends on scripture for proving

the nature of Brahman.

As regards the number of members necessary for a

5yllogism, the system of Rarnanuja does not insist that all the N) aya. It is regarded

They may be either

speaking the number

five are necessary, as is done by the

that only three members are sufficient.

the first three or the last three. Really

of members in a syllogism is not considered important, according to

this system. So many propositions as are necessary to make

the inference convincing may be admitted.

Syllogism as an instrument of polemics is very efficiently

employed by Rarnanuja in his Bha~ya. In its polemical parts,

especially when he attacks the postulates of the Advaita system,

he shows marvellous skill in the employment of formal

5yllogisms. They occur to him naturally in the course of the debate.

The following may be cited as typical examples of these:-

( 1 ) That ignorance, which is the subject of our dispute,

is not capable of being removed by knowledge; because it does

1 '' ~~'dl, 61<r~<ft<flf~ 'lilii 6~ Glm{, 'filq:so<f a~.qa~~f~illil'l..il;i ~'~fllfa

W~~~flf~~iUJa~t~f;!NifilGiit~:q(}~: ttif,;-q~"J.~q -.,fa I a~~:mq_, I ''

Ramauuja : Sri-bha~ya, I. i. 3.

Methodology ( 130)

not possess the power of concealing the objects of knowledge.

Whatever non-knowledge is removed by knowledge, that conceals

the objects of knowledge, like the non-knowledge relating to

the shell etc. 1

( 2) That knowle.dge, which is acquired with the help

. of the accepted means of proof, and which is the subject of

our dispute, has not, for its antecedent in time, any ignorance

which is different from its own antecedent non-existence; because

that possesses the character of such knowledge as is obtained

with the help of accepted means of proof, like the knowledge

which, being derived with the help of the accepted means of

proof, proves the ignorance that is admitted by you. 2

( 3 ) That ignorance, which has the nature of an entity,

1s not capable of being destroyed by knowledge; because it

possesses the nature of an entity, like pots etc. 3

1 '' ~crl~qtfea~~·;i "" ~~"'!~crt~~ • ~t"'l~6l~totlcr~OJtCi'lf(. 1 ~\i~~~crti~~r;:f "\

ai{ti~~·ncr\cri <~t~r ~f.fa'li,e.nti~~- l " Ramii..1uja : Sri-bha~ya, I. i. 1, p. 90.

2 " fo.p.ft~t\i<{Tfea ~~rOJ~Ft ~crt~Ft+rl'~lfaf\if~T~~'l.~~ ~ +rcrfa 1 ~'liOJ~~tcrltt,. 1

ilcr~'l'lal:ulot61~~~"'fll~•ol"Hll '' h.an,a.lU j a : Sri- bna~ya, I. i. 1, p. 9J-:J 1.

3 " lltcr•q~m;t ~ ~r~fcr~tll~~ • ~ncr&=qccrtf(. 1 t:l?;Jf~crf~fu 1 " "\

Ra.di.nuja : Sri-bha~ya, I. i. I, p. 91.

Methodolog~· ( 131 )

( -4) The earth, the mountain etc., which are the subject

of our discussion, are produced effects; because they are made

up of constituent parts, as is the case with pots etc. 'l

( S ) The earth, the ocean, the mountain etc., which

are the subject of our discussion, are produced effects; because,

being themselves gross, they possess the property of ,;:being set

in motion, as is the case with a pot. •

( 6) The body, the world etc. ha,·e t\1e individual souls,

for their agents; because they possess the character of being

produced effects, as a pot does. 3

( 7 ) The Lord is no agent; because he has no purpose,

just as the released souls.4o

( 8) The distinctions of bondage and liberatio':'l and

1 " P<f<~r~tt1.1Tf~Hi ~'!_'tl\tf~ Clit~ ~n·P~<IcCffit ~~~f~cm: 1 ''

Ramanuja : S 1- bha~ya, I. i. 3.

2 " f<~<~t~T~~tf6(1'!Cff;Jqjwf\;l''l~l'Cl~lf~ Clil~, 'I{~ efa fiji~TCI~CIH( ~Tf~C{(( I "

Ramanuja : S. i-bha~ya, I. i. 3.

3 " ~~<~;n~ 15';1~!fi~ifi Clil~c•no:. ~~qo:, 1 " Ramanuja: Sri-bha.~ya, I. i. 3.

4 " {~ref~: 'li«i ot ~<fftr, lfllt~~.,:-<it<fl~mi!l<( r " J\aminuja: Sri:-bl.i.f ,a, I. i. 3.

Methodology ( 132 )

thoae of oneself ~nd others are imagined by ignorance, since

they are unreal, like the distinctions seen in a dream etc. 1

( 9 ) Other bodies also are the products of my igno­rance, since they are bodies, since they are effects, since . they

are non-sentient, or since they are products, just like this body .1

( 10) All sentient things, which are the subject of our

dispute, are identical with me, since they are sentient; whatever

is not identical with me is observed to be non-sentient as a

pitcher. 8

In the Sri:-bra~ya, Farranuja bas occasionally displayed

.such feats of formal logic, and has proved himself to be versatile

m the employment of this important missi1e in the armoury

of disputants. Such occasions, however, are not too many.

1t must be said to the credit of Ran anu;acarya, that he has

never lost sight of the pursuit of truth, by losing himself in

labyrinth of formal logic. He is fully aware that logical

1 " il"~'lliSo~~~~T: ~IR,o~CI~'flJI:"f ~~fCI~JT<tif~q(n:, SlqJ~'flN<fit<fl({, ~~t;{­

(!c~~~"'ll!lf~fa 1 " Ran,anuja: S1i-bLii~Ja, I I. i. 15.

2 " ~'\'hto:a~lll~fq ~~fcl;n<fif~q(itfif, ~'\,~cC!Hl,. ~t.l~c~T~, ~c<mr"' <lifitqatl!llit,

~'i\R·l~~a~1 " Rarna.~uJa : ~:ni-bhii~Ja, II. i. 15.

3 " fclcn~~~~f~Hi ~a~a'~~tWi, ~ailc<ll~, ~~-.~~ a~~a.i aq, ~~~ Iii~: ' "

Rarr.anuja : Sri~u1.a ... .t, I I. i. 15.

~I -

Methodology ( 133)

technique is only an instrument for arnvmg at right know­

ledge. On the whole, the arguments in his Bha{!ya follow the

traditional method of Vada 1 wherein propositions are proved by

means of Pramai_las independently or through formal syllogisms.

The Bhit{!ya of Nimbltrka, which purports to give

simply the intepretation of the Veda.1ta Sutras, does not

contain lengthy discussions. So inference as a means of know­

ledge, and syllogism as a means of argumentation h:tve very little

scope in this Bh;'i~ya.

The followers of Kimbilrka have accepted the Nyltya

theory of Anurnana in general and have employed it in the

elucidation of their doctrines. Their theories of concomitance etc.

are the same as those of the Nyaya system. The two divi-

sions of Anurnana, viz. Svartha and

Though the Nirn barkaites generally

Parartha, are

follow the

admitted.

Ramanuja

views about Prarnfi.l)as, there is a difference of opinion with

respect to the classification of Anumana. The followers of

Nimbarka admit all the three kinds of inference, v1z. Anvaya·

vyatireki, Kevalanvayi and Kevala-vyatireki. In the theory of

Vyapti, the followers of Nimburka have a special point deserving

notice. In addition to the well-known concomitance arising from the

above three ways, represented by the three kinds of Anumi.1as,

scriptural assertions arc also regarded as cases of concomitance. 1

1· S. Dasgupta: A history of Indian Philosophy, p. 427.

~.1 cthol!ology ( 134)

Like the other Bhn.~yakaras, Kim l arka also believes that

Brahman can be known only through the Vedas. Inference is of

no use in achieving that purpose. The Naiyayika tenet of

inferring God from the effect, viz. the universe, is refuted

by Srimvasa. 1

According to Madhvadi.rya, inference is only an Anupram!l)a,

and as such it is only externally instrumental in producing

knowledge. Like other Anupramfi.Q.a!;, it gives knowledge only

indirectly. ' Thus in the theory of Madhvacarya we cannot

dic;tinguish between Pratyak~a and Anumana as immediate and

mediate means of knowledge. Accoruing to this system, percep­

tion, inference and testimony are the three kinds of means of

Parok~a or mediate knowledge.

Madhvfi.c1lrya does not give much importance to infer­

ence in knowing the important philosophical principles. The

Veda is the only means that can be helpful m solving the

riddle of the universe. As is stated before, Madhva cites the

authority of many scriptural texts, especially the PuraQ.as and

points out that inferences are quite useless to arrive at important

1 '' ~ci fttc1.1~·~~~<~t · Rf~lo:Jt ifit~ionqfq 'lil~(~o:J ~•ilo:J 01 un:nml "\~ "\ . -.:;

\'IIH~ I" Srinivasacarya : Vedanta- kaustubha, p. 1 6.

2 M. Hiriyanna: The Essentials of Indian Philosophy,

p. 197.

--------------------~~ ..

Methodology ( 13.5 )

philosophical conclusions, as they are indefinite. 1 Thus

in the province of Brahma-jfif.na, inference has very little

independent scope. Inference is incapable of supplying us with

new facts. At the most it can help us to test and systematize

the facts obtained through other means, especially through the

scriptures. That is why Anumana is denied any independent

position as a Pramii.Q.a, in the system of Madh,a:arya. If there

is any doubt in reconciling the . apparently contradictory state­

ments of scriptures, Anumana may be of some use. 2

As Madhva ~~cepts only three Pramll.:Q.as, U pamuna is

~onsidered to be a variety of inference. 3 In his Brahma-siitra

Bha~ya, Madhva has employed inference only occasionally. The

use of syllogisms is also found only in rare cases. Madhva

depends more on scriptural quotations than reasoning for proving

his view-point.

Vallabhadi.rya has no special point as regards the theory

of Anumana. He holds the opinion that in metaphysical matters

Sastra is the final authority and our reason cannot protest.

1 Chapter IV, p. 64-65.

2 " Sli?:J~~Tuli'I?:Jt~U't f~~?:JT~ ~ l ~"lllf~) ~ ~ar'Jiu sr111UJq~iill ~~:

._ "' bhifya, II:i. 18.

3 S. Radhakrishnan: Indian

p .. 739.

n ~ ~lliN'IaiSl 1 " Madhva-

PhU<;lSOphy, Vol. II,

..•

Methodology ( 136)

aganist it. He asserts that his main doctrine, that Brahman is

the substratum of contradictory qualitles, is proved by scriptural

'texts and there is no questioning about it by logic.1 Like

perception, inference is not indevendently valid. It depends on

extraneous circumstances for its validity. Like other Adi.ryas,

Vallabhacarya fully q.ccepts that the nature of inferential conclu­

sions is indefinite, and asserts that mere reasoning, unsupported

by. scriptural texts, has no scope in knowing the real nature

of Brahman.'

Vallabhacarya exhibits considerable skill in argumentation.

His arguments are, howevert mainly based on scriptural texts

and not on inferences. Even in the :polemical.i parts of his

AQ.-!bhifya, he take3 his stand mainly on scriptural texts.

1 u ~ Sl ~~6il~'~ ~~~li ~~ llfaqJV~ OR:?tl~~~ii~~'<II'~ I "

AQ.u-bhaf/a, I. i. 19.

2 II ~~sii 'J.'ititi~IIJ Sl~~ ... ~llll"''f~'Qq_ I m~SI~'OJ;Il<{ I , AI,lu-bha~ya, I. l. 11.