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India
Of the four countries observed in this report, India has the most diverse extremism profile. Religiously-
inspired extremist groups operate on mainly two fronts: those claiming to fight for Kashmiri
independence, or those engaged in communal violence.41 The latter are often associated with religious
extremist movements based on Hindutva ideology, which regularly target minority communities,
predominantly Muslims and Christians. Popularised in the early 1920s, Hindutva represents a
communal identity based on Hinduism as the predominant form of Hindu nationalism in India. The
first such specifically Hindu nationalist organisations such as Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (founded
1925) were founded at that time.42 Extremist factions have since mobilised and exploited Hindutva
and in recent years the conditions relating to common religious freedoms have progressively
deteriorated and facilitated intolerance.43
Other extremist movements in India include left-wing extremism (Naxalites and other Maoist groups),
sometimes taking the form of a low-level insurgency. Naxalite issues for instance are directly related
to ethnic violence, as testified by local practitioners from north east India during the SCN South Asia
Regional Workshop in Kolkata in 2018. Northeast India has suffered from continuous violent uprisings
since partition due to separatist movements. In a region inhabited by nearly 213 tribes that resist
integration, such groups focus their attacks towards the Indian government and illegal immigrants.
Dominant separatist groups in this region include organisations like the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation
Front (JKLF), a secular non-Islamic group, as well as Sikh and Tamil separatist groups.44
The Indian government has generally had a reactive hard security approach when responding to violent extremism. In a paper detailing the success of counterterrorism strategies implemented by the Indian government, a former Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army’s Central Command lists all measures taken within the government’s multi-dimensional, overarching approach. Taking a closer look it is clear that most of those measures relate primarily to law enforcement, with very little detail on the efforts made towards addressing the root causes of rising extremism. The same military official lists three initiatives aimed at fostering the government’s approach. The first one looks at strengthening the relations between the government and madrassas and ensuring “a good quality and modern education system”. The second one, led by the Naga Mother’s Association, seeks to create a dialogue between mothers and warring rebel groups. Finally, he mentions that “a few states have provided incentives to various groups to promote their local languages, culture, traditions, art, craft and music at various fora”. 45 However, there are no details regarding the implementation or tangible results of these initiatives, making any assessment of their effectiveness difficult.
In addition to its failure to develop and implement an effective and comprehensive P/CVE strategy,
there is a perception that the government actions can serve to foster a discriminatory attitude towards
religious minorities. State authorities have on occasion reportedly allowed, justified or even allegedly
facilitated attacks against minority groups, for instance during the riots in Gujarat in 2002, where over
a thousand people were killed. In its operations against insurgencies in Kashmir and the North-eastern
regions, as well as against left-wing groups, government forces stand accused of committing wide-
ranging human rights abuses, including torture and sexual misconduct. Moreover, the Armed Forces
Special Powers Act (AFSPA) “gave unconditional permission to Indian security forces to shoot on sight,
arrest individuals without a warrant, and conduct searches without consent”46 and has been heavily
criticised for causing civilian casualties. This law was effective in all seven states of Northeast India in
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On the civil society side, SMART has created television programmes featuring mothers of radicalised
individuals and victims of terrorism in both India and Pakistan in an effort to develop and disseminate
counter-messaging. The NGO is also partnering with local radio stations to reach out to audiences who
lack access to the internet or social media to deliver counter-messaging initiatives in north India.
Under an SCN local innovation grant, SMART gathered relevant stakeholders from the education
sector in Kashmir (government officials, school directors, education officers, teachers, students,
mothers, international organisations and civil society representatives) to discuss ways of providing
quality and sustained education throughout the lasting conflict as a means of preventing youth
recruitment into extremist groups. The Confederation of Voluntary Associations (COVA), a national
network of over 700 organisations working for communal harmony, peace and social justice, has
introduced P/CVE-related projects such as the launch of Cyber Operations For Fraternity and
Integration (COFI) networks, a mechanism to check hate campaigns in social media and ultimately
promote tolerance and peace within communities.47
The Maldives
The archipelago of the Maldives in the Indian ocean comprises 26 atolls and a population of 392,709
(2017). A third of the population is concentrated in the capital city of Male, which has one of the
highest population densities in the world.48
In the 2008 elections President Gayoom was defeated by Mohamed Nasheed after 30 years of rule.
Since then, the Maldives has been suffering from continuous political unrest as different groups vie
for political power. In 2012 President Nasheed resigned, but later claimed that he was actually forced
out of power after a coup. In 2013 the old regime returned to power with President Gayoom’s half-
brother, Abdulla Yameen, at its helm.49 President Yameen’s rule was characterised by corruption,
human rights abuses, jailing of political opponents, rising debt – and religious violence.50
Radicalisation in the Maldives intertwines with gang violence, which has become part of the country’s landscape since the first democratic elections in 2008. A number of politicians are reported to have ties with gangs, using them “to intimidate opponents or stop rallies”.51 Gang members are predominantly under 30-year-old males. The World Bank reports the main reasons for young people joining these gangs as unemployment, drug use and drug-related violence, a desire to prove masculinity, and well as political violence. Hence, radicalisation in the Maldives is a result of a “combination of radical preaching, organised crime and social problems.”52
Recent events demonstrate that radical Islamism has made some inroads within Maldivian society, despite the country’s reputation as moderate and tolerant. At the domestic level, pro-Islamist demonstrations and targeted killings of secular personalities on religious grounds have increased. The Maldives gained international attention through reports of their high numbers of FTFs when over 200 Maldivians left the country to fight with Daesh in Iraq and Syria. In 2015, the Maldivian government issued the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), setting out legislation for acts of terrorism and their perpetrators. The previous administration sought to address the FTF phenomenon by training its security forces and strengthening security systems in airports and seaports. A National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) was then established in 2016 within the Ministry of Defence and National Security. This new institution was intended to coordinate between the various agencies and serve as a point of contact for international security partners.53
In 2016, the Maldives issued a State Policy on Terrorism and Violent Extremism that iterated a zero-
tolerance policy. It also indicated a willingness to focus on community-based prevention and
cooperation with international security partners to develop counter terrorism and preventive law
enforcement mechanisms. Following this, the NCTC published a National Strategy on Preventing and
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1 World Facts (n.d.), ‘The 10 Largest Cities In The World’, https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/the-10-largest-cities-in-the-world.html (last accessed 19 December 2018) 2 Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP) (2018) ‘Global Terrorism Index 2018’, http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2018/12/Global-Terrorism-Index-2018-1.pdf (last accessed 29 March 2019)
3 Ibid. 4 Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP) (2017) ‘Global Terrorism Index 2017’, http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2017/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2017.pdf (last accessed 16 November 2018)
5 Bureau of Counterterrorism (2017) ‘Country Reports on Terrorism 2016 – The Maldives’, United States Department of State Publication, https://mv.usmission.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/212/2017/07/Country-Reports-on-Terrorism-2016-The Maldives.pdf (last accessed 16 November 2018)
6 Counterextremism Project (n.d.) ‘India: extremism and counterextremism’, https://www.counterextremism.com/countries/india (last accessed 16 November 2018)
7 Dipankar Banerjee (2017) ‘Countering Youth Radicalization in South Asia’, Consortium of South Asian Think Tanks, http://www.cosatt.org/uploads/news/file/Countering%20Youth%20Radicalization_20171012041148.pdf (last accessed 16 November 2018); Shabana Fayyaz (2017) ‘De-radicalization of Youth in Pakistan: A Challenge!’, Consortium of South Asian Think Tanks, http://www.cosatt.org/uploads/news/file/Countering%20Youth%20Radicalization_20171012041148.pdf (last accessed 16 November 2018)
8 Anatol Lieven (2017) ‘Counter-Insurgency in Pakistan: The Role of Legitimacy’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, 28:1, 166-190, DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2016.1266128
9 Providing statistics on number of FTF per country for the same year is difficult to the scarcity of data. The statistics provided are nonetheless helpful in demonstrating the varying scale of this phenomenon.
10 World Population Review (2018), ‘Bangladesh Population 2018’, http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/bangladesh-population/ (last accessed 26 November 2018)
11 World Population Review (2018), ‘India Population 2018’, http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/india-population/ (last accessed 26 November 2018)
12 World Population Review (2018), ‘Maldives Population 2018’, http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/maldives-population/ (last accessed 26 November 2018)
13 World Population Review (2018), ‘Pakistan Population 2018’, http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/pakistan-population/ (last accessed 26 November 2018)
14 Sarah Ashraf (2018), ‘Of Military and Militancy. Praetorianism and Islam in Pakistan’, http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/3778/1/Ashraf__of-military-and-militancy.pdf, p.185 (last accessed 20 November 2018) 15 Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP) (2017) ‘Global Terrorism Index 2017’, http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2017/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2017.pdf (last accessed 16 November 2018)
17 United Nations Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) (2018), ‘2018 Annual Report’, https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/Tier2_INDIA.pdf (last accessed 16 November 2018)
20 Vanda Felbab-Brown, ‘Why Pakistan supports terrorist groups, and why the US finds it so hard to induce change’, Brookings Institute, 5 January 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/01/05/why-pakistan-supports-terrorist-groups-and-why-the-us-finds-it-so-hard-to-induce-change/ (last accessed 16 November 2018); Counter Extremism Project (2018), ‘Pakistan : Extremism & Counter-Extremism’, https://www.counterextremism.com/countries/pakistan (last accessed 20 November 2018)
21 Christine Fair (2014,) The Pakistan Army’s Way of War, New York: Oxford University Press; TV Paul (2015), The Warrior State: Pakistan in the Contemporary World, London: Oxford University Press; Aqil Shah, The Army and Democracy: Military Politics in Pakistan ( 2014), New York: Harvard University Press
22 Anatol Lieven (2011), ‘Pakistan: A Hard Country’, London: Allen Lane, p.8.
23 Global Center on Cooperative Security (2017), ‘Going Local – Supporting Community-Based Initiatives to Prevent and Counter Violent Extremism in South and Central Asia’, http://www.globalcenter.org/publications/going-local-supporting-
of the whole or any part of this document or attachments without prior written approval from ISD is prohibited.
community-based-initiatives-to-prevent-and-counter-violent-extremism-in-south-and-central-asia/ (last accessed 20 November 2018)
24 Dipankar Banerjee (2017) ‘Countering Youth Radicalization in South Asia’, Consortium of South Asian Think Tanks, http://www.cosatt.org/uploads/news/file/Countering%20Youth%20Radicalization_20171012041148.pdf (last accessed 16 November 2018)
25 CIA World Factbooks (2018), ‘Pakistan’, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/geos/xx.html (last accessed 20 November 2018)
26 Shafqat Munir (2017), ‘Radicalisation without Borders: Understanding the Threat of Youth Radicalisation in Cyberspace’, http://www.cosatt.org/uploads/news/file/Countering%20Youth%20Radicalization_20171012041148.pdf (last accessed 16 November 2018); Faramarz Tamanna (2017), ‘Countering Youth Radicalization in South Asia’, http://www.cosatt.org/uploads/news/file/Countering%20Youth%20Radicalization_20171012041148.pdf (last accessed 16 November 2018)
27 Shafqat Munir (2017), ‘Radicalisation without Borders: Understanding the Threat of Youth Radicalisation in Cyberspace’, http://www.cosatt.org/uploads/news/file/Countering%20Youth%20Radicalization_20171012041148.pdf, p.14 (last accessed 16 November 2018)
28 We Are Social (2018), ‘Global Digital Report 2018’, https://wearesocial.com/blog/2018/01/global-digital-report-2018 (last accessed 16 November 2018)
29 Shahab Enam Khan (2017) ‘Bangladesh: The Changing Dynamics of Violent Extremism and the Response of the State’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, 28:1, 191-217, DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2016.1266127
30 Iftekharul Bashar (2017), ‘Countering Violent Extremism in Bangladesh’, Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis, 9:6, 17-21, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/319123622/download (last accessed 20 November 2018); Counter Extremism Project (2018), ‘Bangladesh : Extremism & Counter-Extremism’, https://www.counterextremism.com/countries/bangladesh (last accessed 20 November 2018)
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid. 34 See http://www.manusherjonno.org/ 35 See http://cri.org.bd/about-us/
36 See https://www.facebook.com/EmpowermentHumanDevelopmentSocietyEhds/
37 See http://www.brac.net/
38 See https://www.gcerf.org/lessons-from-gcerf-funded-programmes-in-bangladesh/
39 Bangladesh NGOs Network for Radio and Communication (BNNRC) (2018), ‘Countering violence extremism (cve) through community radio in rural Bangladesh’, http://bnnrc.net/cve-through-communnity-radio/ (last accessed 16 November 2018); Rafia Bhulai (2017), ‘Going Local. Supporting Community-Based Initiatives to Prevent and Counter Violent Extremism in South and Central Asia’, Global Center on Cooperative Security, http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Going-Local_PCVE-in-South-and-Central-Asia.pdf (last accessed 16 November 2018)
40 See https://bei-bd.org/ 41 Counter Extremism Project (2018), ‘India : Extremism & Counter-Extremism’, https://www.counterextremism.com/countries/india (last accessed 20 November 2018)
42 Gino Battaglia (2017), ‘Neo-Hindu Fundamentalism Challenging the Secular and Pluralistic Indian State’, Religions, 8:10, 216, DOI: 10.3390/rel8100216
43 United Nations Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) (2018), ‘2018 Annual Report’, https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/Tier2_INDIA.pdf (last accessed 16 November 2018)
45 Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP) (2017) ‘Global Terrorism Index 2017’, http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2017/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2017.pdf (last accessed 16 November 2018)
46 Counter Extremism Project (2018), ‘India : Extremism & Counter-Extremism’, https://www.counterextremism.com/countries/india (last accessed 20 November 2018) 47 See http://www.covanetwork.org/about-us/overview/
48 CIA World Factbooks (2018), ‘The Maldives’, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mv.html (last accessed 16 November 2018)
49 BBC, ‘Maldives profile – timeline’, BBC News, 24 September 2018, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12653969 (last accessed 22 November 2018)
of the whole or any part of this document or attachments without prior written approval from ISD is prohibited.
50 Zaheena Rasheed, ‘Maldives has a new President. These are the 5 big issues he faces’, Al Jazeera, 18 November 2018, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/11/maldives-president-5-big-issues-facing-181118175339156.html (last accessed 22 November 2018)
51 Jason Burke, ‘Paradise jihadis: The Maldives sees surge in young Muslims leaving for Syria’, Guardian, 26 February 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/26/paradise-jihadis-the Maldives-islamic-extremism-syria (last accessed 22 November 2018)
52 Ibid.
53 United States Department of State (2017), Country Reports on Terrorism 2016 - Maldives, http://www.refworld.org/docid/5981e42b21.html (accessed 21 November 2018)
54 Kai Schultz, ‘The Maldives, Tourist Haven, Casts Wary Eye on Growing Islamic Radicalism’, New York Times, 18 June 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/18/world/asia/the Maldives-islamic-radicalism.html (last accessed 16 November 2018); National Counter Terrorism Centre (2017), ‘National Strategy on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism’, https://nctc.gov.mv/events/pcve.pdf (last accessed 16 November 2018)
55 Ibid.
56 United States Department of State (2017), Country Reports on Terrorism 2016 - Maldives, http://www.refworld.org/docid/5981e42b21.html (accessed 21 November 2018)
57 See http://mipstar.org/
58 See http://mdn.mv/
59 Maldivian Democracy Network (MDN) (n.d.), ‘Preliminary Assessment of Radicalisation in the The Maldives, http://mdn.mv/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/tmp_13983-REPORTRADICALISATION-1318299314.pdf (last accessed 20 November 2018)
60 Rafia Bhulai (2017), ‘Going Local. Supporting Community-Based Initiatives to Prevent and Counter Violent Extremism in South and Central Asia’, Global Center on Cooperative Security, http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Going-Local_PCVE-in-South-and-Central-Asia.pdf (last accessed 16 November 2018)
61 Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP) (2017) ‘Global Terrorism Index 2017’, http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2017/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2017.pdf (last accessed 16 November 2018)
62 Farhan Zahid (2017), ‘Pakistan’s CVE Programme: An Overview of Achievements and Challenges’, Counter Terrorism Trends and Analyses, 9:6, 11-16, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/26351527.pdf (last accessed 20 November 2018)
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
65 Douglas Johnston, Andrew McDonnell, Henry Burbridge and James Patton (2016), ‘Countering Violent Religious Extremism in Pakistan. Strategies for engaging conservative Muslims’, International Center for Religion & Diplomacy, https://icrd.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Countering-Violent-Religious-Extremism-in-Pakistan-White-Paper.pdf (last accessed 20 November 2018)
66 Bureau of Counterterrorism (2017), ‘Country Reports on Terrorism 2016 – Pakistan’, United States Department of State Publication, https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2016/272233.htm#PAKISTAN (last accessed 16 November 2018)
67 Hedieh Mirahmadi, Waleed Ziad, Mehreen Farooq and Robert D. Lamb (2015), ‘Empowering Pakistan’s Civil Society to Counter Global Violent Extremism’, U.S.-Islamic World Forum Papers 2014 (last accessed 23 November 2018)
68 Saad Sayeed, ‘Pakistan tells 18 international NGOs to leave – ActionAid’, Reuters, 4 October 2018, https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-pakistan-ngos/pakistan-tells-18-international-ngos-to-leave-actionaid-idUKKCN1ME1OD (last accessed 16 November 2018)
69 Tahir Mehdi, ‘Why NGOs in Pakistan are at the brink of extinction’, Herald, 19 November 2018, https://herald.dawn.com/news/1398721 (last accessed 20 November 2018)
70 Samira Shackle, ‘Imran Khan’s treatment of Asia Bibi is a dangerous betrayal’, Guardian, 13 November 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/nov/13/asia-bibi-imran-khan-pakistan-blasphemy-law (last accessed 18 November 2018)
71 Transparency International (2018), ‘Corruption Perceptions Index 2017’, https://files.transparency.org/content/download/2185/13756/file/2017_CPI_Brochure_EN.PDF (last accessed 23 November 2018); Transparency International (2017), ‘Corruption Perceptions Index 2016’, http://files.transparency.org/content/download/2089/13368/file/2016_CPIReport_EN.pdf (last accessed 23 November 2018)
72 UNDP (2018), ‘Reducing corruption could help prevent violent extremism’, http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/blog/2018/Reducing-Corruption-could-help-Prevent-Violent-Extremism.html (last accessed 23 November 2018)
of the whole or any part of this document or attachments without prior written approval from ISD is prohibited.
73 World Population Review (2018), ‘Bangladesh Population 2018’, http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/bangladesh-population/ (last accessed 23 November 2018)
74 World Population Review (2018), ‘India Population 2018’, http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/india-population/ (last accessed 23 November 2018)
75 World Population Review (2018), ‘Maldives Population 2018’, http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/maldives-population/ (last accessed 23 November 2018)
76 World Population Review (2018), ‘Pakistan Population 2018’, http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/pakistan-population/ (last accessed 23 November 2018)
77 World Facts (n.d.), ‘The 10 Largest Cities In The World’, https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/the-10-largest-cities-in-the-world.html (last accessed 13 March 2019)
78 Sarah Ashraf, ‘How India Became Pakistan’s Unlikely Saviour’, Huffington Post, March 2019, https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/india-pakistan_uk_5c7ce5f3e4b0e1f77653ac9a (last accessed 14 March 2019)
79 Stuti Bhatnagar and Priya Chacko, ‘India, Pakistan and the changing rules of engagement: here’s what you need to know’, The Conversation, 12 March 2019, http://theconversation.com/india-pakistan-and-the-changing-rules-of-engagement-heres-what-you-need-to-know-113114 (last accessed 14 March 2019)
80 Lily Kuo and Niko Kommenda, ‘What is China’s Belt and Road Initiative?’, Guardian, 30 July 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/cities/ng-interactive/2018/jul/30/what-china-belt-road-initiative-silk-road-explainer (last accessed 13 March 2019)
81 Ibid.
82 Nyshka Chandran, ‘China can make its Belt and Road project more successful if it taps locals, experts say’, CNBC, 14 September 2018, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/09/14/china-must-do-more-to-tap-locals-in-belt-and-road-initiative-panel.html (last accessed 13 March 2019)
83 Patrick Wintour, ‘‘All-weather friendship’ : but is Pakistan relying too heavily on China ?’, Guardian, 3 August 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2018/aug/03/all-weather-friendship-but-is-pakistan-relying-too-heavily-on-china (last accessed 13 March 2019)
84 Simon Mundy and Kathrin Hille, ‘The Maldives counts the cost of its debts to China’, Financial Times, 11 February 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/c8da1c8a-2a19-11e9-88a4-c32129756dd8 (last accessed 28 March 2019)
85 We refer here to member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council.
86 Anthony Sarota (2017), ‘BASELINE EVALUATION OF: Katika Usalama Tunategemeana and Pamoja! Strengthening Community Resilience in Tanzania’, Search for Common Ground, https://www.sfcg.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Baseline-Report.Final_.Public.pdf (last accessed 15 March 2019)
87 Pew Research Center (2018), ‘Remittance Flows Worldwide in 2016’, http://www.pewglobal.org/interactives/remittance-map/ (last accessed 13 March 2019)
88 Gulf Research Center (2015), ‘Demography, Migration, and the Labour Market in Bahrain’, http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/35882/GLMM_ExpNote_06_2015.pdf?sequence=1 (last accessed 14 March 2019)
89 Gulf Research Center (2013), ‘The Demographic and Economic Framework of Migration in Kuwait’, http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/32155/GLMM%20ExpNote_01-2013.pdf?sequence=1 (last accessed 14 March 2019)
90 Gulf Research Center (2015), ‘Demography, Migration, and the Labour Market in Oman’, http://gulfmigration.org/media/pubs/exno/GLMM_EN_2015_09.pdf (last accessed 14 March 2019)
91 Gulf Research Center (2014), ‘Demography, Migration, and the Labour Market in Qatar’, http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/32431/GLMM_ExpNote_08-2014.pdf?sequence=1 (last accessed 14 March 2019)
92 Gulf Research Center (2014), ‘Demography, Migration, and the Labour Market in Saudi Arabia’, http://gulfmigration.org/media/pubs/exno/GLMM_EN_2014_01.pdf (last accessed 14 March 2019)
93 Gulf Research Center (2015), ‘Demography, Migration, and the Labour Market in the UAE’, http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/36375/GLMM_ExpNote_07_2015.pdf (last accessed 14 March 2019)
94 Pew Research Center (2018), ‘Remittance Flows Worldwide in 2016’, http://www.pewglobal.org/interactives/remittance-map/ (last accessed 13 March 2019)
95 Shelly Mahajan, ‘The changing nature of Russia’s engagement in South Asia’, South Asia Program at Hudson Institute, 20 March 2018, http://www.southasiaathudson.org/blog/2018/3/20/the-changing-nature-of-russias-engagement-in-south-asia (last accessed 14 March 2019)
of the whole or any part of this document or attachments without prior written approval from ISD is prohibited.
96 Ibid.; Alexey D. Mraviev, ‘Russia is a rising military power in the Asia-Pacific, and Australia needs to take it seriously’, The Conversation, 30 October 2018, https://theconversation.com/russia-is-a-rising-military-power-in-the-asia-pacific-and-australia-needs-to-take-it-seriously-105390 (last accessed 14 March 2019)
97 Shelly Mahajan, ‘The changing nature of Russia’s engagement in South Asia’, South Asia Program at Hudson Institute, 20 March 2018, http://www.southasiaathudson.org/blog/2018/3/20/the-changing-nature-of-russias-engagement-in-south-asia (last accessed 14 March 2019) 98 Ibid.; Uzair Younus, ‘Pay Attention to Russia’s South Asia Strategy’, Diplomat, 7 June 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/06/pay-attention-to-russias-south-asia-strategy/ (last accessed 14 March 2019)
99 Chloe Colliver, Peter Pomerantsev, Anne Applebaum and Jonathan Birdwell (2018), ‘Smearing Sweden. International Influence Campaigns in the 2018 Swedish Election’; Institute for Strategic Dialogue (2019), ‘The Battle for Bavaria. Online information campaigns in the 2018 Bavarian State Election’, p.4 100 Institute for Strategic Dialogue (2019), ‘The Battle for Bavaria. Online information campaigns in the 2018 Bavarian State Election’, p.4