Strategies of War and Peace Syllabus

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STRATEGIES OF WAR AND PEACE POL 391-AUniversity of PortlandSpring Semester 2015

Instructor: Dr. Jeffrey MeiserCourse #: POL 391ADay/Time: Wednesdays, 4:10-6:55pmClassroom: ROM 203

Dr. Meiser’s Office: BC 432Office Hours: T/Th 2:30-4:00pm or

Office Phone: 503-943-7037E-mail: [email protected]

COURSE PURPOSE

All individuals and organizations pursue strategies to achieve their goals, however, these strategies are usually implicit and not subject to much introspection or critique. This is one reason why people, corporations, and nation-states often pursue bad strategies. Understanding what strategy is and when and why different types of strategies work is crucial to the success of all goal-seeking actors.

This course focuses on the range of strategies that countries use to solve national security problems and pursueforeign policy goals. We identify, understand, and evaluate the tools that are available to countries in times of peace,war, and the gray area in between. The class progresses through four parts: Shaping the Peace, Engaging the Challenger, Winning the War, and Restoring the Peace. Each part emphasizes how different international conditions shapethe options available to governments seeking to achieve security and other important national goals. Throughout thecourse we analyze when, why, and how some strategies are more effective than others.

COURSE OBJECTIVES

Understand the meaning and importance of strategy.

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Identify and understand the different factors that shape the strategies of different kinds of organizations.

Identify and understand the strategic options availableunder different sets of external conditions.

Understand and analyze the strategies available to countries pursuing their national interests.

Evaluate the efficacy of different strategies under a variety of conditions.

Identify and understand the options the United States has in dealing with its numerous foreign policy challenges.

Understand that strategy requires critical thinking andstrategic problems are complex and ambiguous.

COURSE REQUIREMENTS

There are three types of assignments for this course:1. Each student will take four (4) Quizzes; each is worth

10% of the total course grade. The questions will require short answers derived from the course reading and class discussion.

2. Each student will take two (2) Take-Home Exams worth 20% each. The exams will be essay responses to questions distributed by the instructor.

3. Class contribution is worth 20% of the total grade. Class contribution requires regular attendance and includes (but is not limited to) the following: askingquestions of the instructor or fellow students during class time; answering questions posed by the instructoror fellow students during class time; interjecting withappropriate comments during class time; and especially,respectfully critiquing the ideas of the instructor, fellow students, and the authors of required readings. At the midpoint of the course students will be given feedback on their level of class contribution.

Procedure for Turning in Assignments: At-home exams must besubmitted electronically either by email or through Moodle. 

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The instructor will provide further guidance.

Late Assignment Policy: All assignments will be penalized 10% for each day they are late. For example, assignments turned in up to 24 hours late is -10%, assignments turned inup to 48 hours late is -20%, and so on. Exceptions are madein extraordinary circumstances.

COURSE TEXTS

Required*

John Baylis, James J. Wirtz, and Colin Gray, Strategy in the Contemporary World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.

RecommendedCarl Von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter Paret,

eds. and trans. (Princeton: Princeton University Press,1976).

Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Samuel B. Griffith trans. (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1963/1971) or Roger Ames trans.(Ballantine Books, 1993).

GRADING STANDARDS

Grading Scale97% = A+93% = A90% = A-

87% = B+83% = B80% = B-

77% = C+73% = C70% = C-

67% = D+63% = D60% = D-less than 60%= F

Take-Home Exam assessment guidelines:A: This is an excellent paper. The content is thoughtful, perceptive, and supported well with evidence from class and with political science concepts. The style is superior, allscholarly references are properly cited, and the mechanics * Required readings not found in the textbook are available through electronic reserves.

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are close to flawless.B: This is a good paper. Its original, complex ideas are well developed, well-organized, and compellingly defended. It doesn’t contain any major distracting errors in mechanicsand usage. However, it lacks the distinctive style and/or content and/or evidence to set it above other good papers.C: This is an average paper. It is a competent effort thatis generally clear and coherent, but it contains errors in organization and/or mechanics and/or evidence. It carries out the assignment in a routine manner, but the writing is not vigorous nor the ideas fresh.D: This is a poor paper. It is intelligible but weak; it addresses the assignment but does not state or support a commitment to the topic. It contains frequent grammatical errors, making the paper difficult to read. Its content andevidence shows minimal effort.F: This paper is unintelligible. It contains incoherent sentences and paragraphs, illogical or unrecognizable work choices, and it is factually inaccurate, logically inconsistent, and/or irrelevant to the assigned topic. An Fpaper is so poorly organized and so carelessly written that a reader finds it difficult, if not impossible, to decipher.Included in this category are plagiarized papers, which demonstrate no original thought or stylistic effort on the part of the writer.

Class Contribution assessment guidelines: A: Strikes a good balance between “listening” and “contributing.”Demonstrates superior preparation for each session as reflected in the quality ofcontributions to group discussion. Frequently demonstrates insightful and originalthought. Respects the opinions of others but challenges whenappropriate. Perfect or nearly perfect attendance.B: A solid contributor to seminar sessions. Joins in most discussions.Contributions to group understanding of the topic and discussions reflect understanding of the material.

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Respectful of the views of others. May occasionally interrupt others and/or speak without having thought the issue through. Nearly perfect attendance. C: Generally prepared. Sometimes contributes voluntarily; more frequently needs to be encouraged to enter into discussions. Routinely allows others to take the lead in group discussions. Spotty attendance.D: Minimal contribution to group discussions suggesting lackof preparation for classroom sessions, as well as little or no interest in contributing to group endeavors. Sometimes displays a negative attitude. Low attendance.F: Class contributions fall below what is expected of UP students either in terms of no contribution or disruptive behavior in class or many absences.

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SUMMARY OF THE COURSE SCHEDULE(Subject to change with sufficient notice.)Part Date Topic AssignmentsI. Introduction

Jan. 14

Concepts and Theories

Jan. 21

Strategy

II. Shapingthe Peace

Jan. 28

Building Conditionsfor Peace

Feb. 4

Balance of Power

III: Engaging theChallenger

Feb. 11

Positive Engagementand Diplomacy

QUIZ 1

Feb. 18

Deterrence

Feb. 25

Coercion

IV: Winning the War

Mar. 4

Definition of War, Causes of War, and Laws of War

QUIZ 2

Mar. 11

SPRING BREAK

Mar. 18

Military Strategy Take Home Exam 1 Due(Covers material up through Feb. 25)

Mar. 25

Irregular Warfare

Apr. 1

Military Strategy, Operations, and Tactics I

Quiz 3

Apr. 8

Military Strategy, Operations, and Tactics II

V: Restoringthe Peace

Apr. 15

Winning the Peace

Apr. Keeping the Peace Take Home Exam 2 Due

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22 (Covers material up through April 15)

Apr. 29

Quiz 4

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COURSE SCHEDULE(Subject to change with sufficient notice.)

PART I. INTRODUCTION

Concepts and Theories, January 14Required Reading: noneAdditional Resources:

James Fallows, “The Tragedy of the American Military,” Atlantic Monthly (January/February 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/features/archive/2014/12/the-tragedy-of-the-american-military/383516/.

Defining Strategy, January 21Required Reading [70]

Lawrence Freedman, Strategy: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), ix-xiii. [5]

Paul Kennedy, “Grand Strategy in War and Peace: Toward a Broader Definition,” in Grand Strategies in War and Peace, ed. Paul Kennedy (Yale UP, 1991), 1-7

Richard Rumelt, “The Perils of Bad Strategy,” McKinsey Quarterly (June 2011), 1-10. [10]

Michael Porter, “What is Strategy?” Harvard Business Review (November-December 1996), 61-78 [18]

W. Chan Kim and Renee Mauborgne, “Blue Ocean Strategy,”Harvard Business Review (October 2004), 77-84. [9]

Baylis, “Strategy in the Contemporary World: Strategy after 9/11,” pp. 2-15 [14]

Additional Resources Richard Betts, “Is Strategy an Illusion?” International

Security, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Fall 2000), 5–50. Rodger L. Martin, “The Big Lie of Strategic Planning,”

Harvard Business Review (January-February 2014), 79-84. [6]

PART II. SHAPING THE PEACE

Building and Maintaining Conditions for Peace, January 28 Required Reading [82]

Bruce Russett and John Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy,

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Interdependence, and International Organizations, (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001), 15-42. [28]

Marek Thee, “Towards a culture of peace based on human rights,” The International Journal of Human Rights, Vol. 1, No. 4 (1997), 18-34. [19]

Joseph Nye, “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616 (March 2008), 94-109. [15]

Richard Halloran, “Strategic Communication,” Parameters (August 2007), 4-14, http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/07autumn/halloran.pdf. [11]

John Mueller, “Policing the Remnants of War,” Journal of Peace Research volume 40, number 5 (September 2003), 507-518. [9]

Additional Resources Robert A. Howell, Paul Argenti, Karen A. Beck, “The

Strategic Communication Imperative,” MIT Sloan ManagementReview “Spring 2005), 83-89. [7]

Edward Comor and Hamilton Bean, “America’s ‘engagement’delusion: Critiquing a public diplomacy consensus” International Communication Gazette vol. 74 no. 3 (April 2012), 203-220. [18]

Dana P. Eyre and James R. Littleton, “Shaping the zeitgeist: Influencing social processes as the center of gravity for strategic communications in the twenty-first century,” Public Relations Review 38 (2012) 179–187.

Managing Power and Threat, February 4Required Reading [78]

Sebastian Rosato and John Schuessler, “A Realist Foreign Policy for the United States,” Perspectives on Politics Vol. 9/No. 4 (December 2011), 803-819. [17]

G. John Ikenberry, “The Future of the Liberal World Order,” Foreign Affairs Vol. 90, No. 3 (May/June 2011), 56-62, 63-68. [13]

Baylis ch. 11, “The Control of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” pp. 214-228. [15]

Baylis ch. 8, “Intelligence and Strategy,” 151-169.

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[17] David Strachan-Morris, “Threat and Risk: What Is the

Difference and Why Does It Matter?” Intelligence and National Security, 27:2, (2112), 172-186. [15]

Ashley Tellis, “Balancing without Containment: A U.S. Strategy for Confronting China’s Rise,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Fall 2013), 109–124, http://csis.org/files/publication/TWQ_13Winter_Tellis.pdf. [16]

Additional Resources Inis Claude, “The Balance of Power Revisited,” Review of

International Studies, Vol. 15, No. 2, (1989), 77-85. [9] Stephen Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of

World Power,” International Security, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Spring, 1985), pp. 3-43. [40]

John Mearsheimber, “Can China Rise Peacefully?” The National Interest (October 25, 2014), http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-china-rise-peacefully-10204.

Reuben Steff & Nicholas Khoo, “Hard Balancing in the Age of American Unipolarity: The Russian Response to USBallistic Missile Defense during the Bush Administration (2001–2008),” Journal of Strategic Studies Vol. 37, No. 2 (2014), 222-258. [37]

PART III. ENGAGING THE CHALLENGER

Diplomacy and Positive Engagement, February 11Required Reading [82]

Dennis Ross, Statecraft: And How to Restore America's Standing in theWorld (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2008), ch. 8, 10. [37]

Miroslav Nincic, “The Logic of Positive Engagement: Dealing with Renegade Regimes” International Studies Perspectives (2006) 7, 321–341. [19]

Nien-chung Chang Liao, “Comparing Inter-Korean and Cross-Taiwan Strait Trust-Building: The Limits of Reassurance,” Asian Survey, Vol. 54, No. 6 (November/December 2014), 1037-1058. [22]

Peter Baker, “U.S. to Restore Full Relations With Cuba,Erasing a Last Trace of Cold War Hostility,” New York Times http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/18/world/americas/us-cuba-

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relations.html?action=click&contentCollection=Asia%20Pacific&module=RelatedCoverage&region=Marginalia&pgtype=article. [2]

Andrew Kramer, “French Leader Urges End to Sanctions Against Russia Over Ukraine,” New York Times (January 5, 2015) http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/06/world/europe/francois-hollande-says-destabilizing-sanctions-on-russia-must-stop-now.html?mabReward=RI%3A5&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&region=CColumn&module=Recommendation&src=rechp&WT.nav=RecEngine. [2]

Additional Resources Miroslav Nincic, “Getting What You Want: Positive

Inducements in International Relations,” International Security, Volume 35, Number 1, (Summer 2010), 138-183. [46]

Jeffrey W. Knopf (2012) “Varieties of Assurance,” Journal of Strategic Studies, 35:3, 375-399.

Deterrence, February 18Required Reading [70]

Baylis ch. 12, “Conventional Power and Contemporary Warfare,” pp. 231-245. [15]

Michael Gerson, “Conventional Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age,” Parameters (August 2009), http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/09autumn/gerson.pdf, 32-48. [14]

Baylis ch. 11, “The Second Nuclear Age: Nuclear Weapons in the Twenty-First Century,” pp. 196-211. [16]

Richard Betts, “Suicide for Fear of Death?” Foreign Affairs. January/February 2003, 34-43. [10]

Kenneth Waltz, “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb,” Foreign Affairs, (July/August 2012), 2-5. [4]

Colin Kahl, “Iran and the Bomb,” and Kenneth Waltz’s response Foreign Affairs (September/October 2012), 157-162.[6]

David Elliott, “Deterring Cyber Attack,” IEEE Security & Privacy (September/October 2011), 36-40. [5]

Additional Resources John Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Cornell UP,

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1983), chapter 2. [44] James Wood Forsyth Jr., B. Chance Saltzman, and Gary

Schaub Jr., “Remembrance of Things Past: The Enduring Value of Nuclear Weapons,” Strategic Studies Quarterly (Spring2010), 74-89. [13]

Albert Wohlstetter, “The Delicate Balance of Terror,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 37, No. 2 (Jan., 1959), 211-234. [24]

Robert Jervis, “The Confrontation between Iraq and the US: Implications for the Theory and Practice of Deterrence,” European Journal of International Relations vol. 9 no. 2 (June 2003), 315-337. [18]

Coercion, February 25Required Reading [80]

Robert Pape, “Coercion and military strategy: Why denial works and punishment doesn't,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 15, No. 4 (1992), 423-475. [43]

Bruce Jentleson, “Coercive Diplomacy: Scope and Limits in the ContemporaryWorld,” Policy Analysis Brief,

Stanley Foundation (December 2006). [12] Yongho Kim, “North Korea's Use of Terror and Coercive

Diplomacy: Looking for their Circumstantial Variants,” Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Volume 14, Issue 1, 2002, 45-67. [23]

Katerina Oskarsson, “Economic Sanctions on Authoritarian States: Lessons Learned,” Middle East Policy Volume 19, Issue 4, pages 88–102, Winter 2012. [15]

Rick Gladstone, “Iran Admits Western Sanctions Are Inflicting Damage,” New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/20/world/middleeast/iran-admits-western-sanctions-are-inflicting-damage.html?_r=0. [2]

Thomas Erdmbrink, “Sensing a Deal on Sanctions, Iran isBullish,” The New York Times, December 12, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/13/world/middleeast/anticipating-nuclear-deal-and-end-to-sanctions-iran-awaits-a-business-boom.html?_r=0. [2]

Thomas Rid & Peter McBurney, “Cyber-Weapons,” The RUSI Journal, Vol. 157, No. 1 (2012), 6-13. [8]

David Sanger and Nicole Perlroth, “U.S. Said to Find

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North Korea Ordered Cyberattack on Sony,” New York Times,(December 17, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/18/world/asia/us-links-north-korea-to-sony-hacking.html?action=click&contentCollection=Asia%20Pacific&module=RelatedCoverage&region=Marginalia&pgtype=article. [2]

Additional Resources Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence, chapter 1, “The

Diplomacy of Violence,” (Yale UP, 2008) pp. 1-34. [34] Jack Levy, “Deterrence and Coercive Diplomacy,”

Political Psychology, Vol. 29, No. 4, 2008, 537-552. [14]

Robert Pape, “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” American Political Science Review Vol. 97, No. 3 August 2003. [15]

Robert Pape, “Blowing Up an Assumption,” New York Times (May 18, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/18/opinion/18pape.html?_r=1. [2]

Andrei Lankov, “Changing North Korea: An Information Campaign Can Beat the Regime,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 88,

No. 6 (November/December 2009), 95-105. [11] Maria Sperandei, “Bridging Deterrence and Compellence:

An Alternative Approach to the Study of Coercive Diplomacy,” International Studies Review Vol. 8, No. 2 (June 2006), 253–280.

Daniel Drezner, “Sanctions Sometimes Smart: Targeted Sanctions in Theory and Practice,” International Studies Review (2011) 13, 96–108. [10]

PART IV. WINNING THE WAR

The Nature, Causes, and Laws of War, March 4Required Reading [83]

Baylis ch. 1, “The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace,” pp. 20-38 [19]

Baylis ch. 5, “Law, Politics, and the Use of Force,” pp. 97-113. [17]

Carl Von Clausewitz, On War ed. and trans. by Michael

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Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton UP, 1984), Clausewitz, 75-99. [15]

MCDP 1: Warfighting ch. 1, “The Nature of War,” pp. 3-20, http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/MCDP%201%20Warfighting.pdf. [18]

Baylis ch. 16, “The Rise of Cyberpower,” pp. 304-317. [14]

Additional Resources Richard Ned Lebow, Why Nations Fight (Cambridge UP, 2010). Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War (Third Edition) (The Free

Press, 1988).

March 11 No Class, Spring Break – Read Gerhard L. Weinberg, World War II, A Very Short Introduction (Oxford UP, 2014).

Military Strategy, March 18Required Reading [90]

o Baylis ch. 2, “The Evolution of Modern War” pp. 40-58. [19]

o Frank G. Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars, (Arlington, VA: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007), 28-30, 35-42.[11]

o Baylis ch. 3, “Strategic Theory” pp. 61-74 [14]o Carl Von Clausewitz, On War ed. and trans. by Michael

Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton UP, 1984), 595-600 [6]

o Sun Tzu, The Art of War chapters 1, 3, 4, and 6, https://www.sonshi.com/the-art-of-war-translation.html. [12]

o MCDP 1: Warfighting ch. 2, “The Theory of War,” pp. 23-49,http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/MCDP%201%20Warfighting.pdf. [28]

Additional Resourceso Allan Millett and Williamson Murry, “Lessons of War”

The National Interest (Winter 1988-89), 83-95 [13]o Baylis ch. 4, “Strategic Culture” pp. 77-93. [17]

Irregular Warfare, March 25Required Reading [84]

o Baylis ch. 9, “Irregular Warfare: Terrorism and Insurgency,” pp. 174-193. [20]

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o 3rd Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group. “Liberation ofMazar-e Sharif,” Special Warfare (June 2002), 34-41, http://www.soc.mil/swcs/swmag/archive.html. [8]

o William Rosenau “Subversion and Insurgency” RAND Counterinsurgency Study Paper 2 (2007), 1-17, http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP172.html. [17]

o Ronald J. Deibert and Rafal Rohozinski, “Cyclones in Cyberspace: Information Shaping and Denial in the 2008 Russia-Georgia War,” Security Dialogue 43, 1 (2012), 3-24. [22]

o Lawrence Freedman, “Ukraine and the Art of Limited War,” War on the Rocks (blog), October 8, 2014, http://warontherocks.com/2014/10/ukraine-and-the-art-of-limited-war/. [12]

o Maciej Bartkowski, “Can Political Struggle Against ISILSucceed Where Violence Cannot?” War on the Rocks (blog), December 20, 2014, http://warontherocks.com/2014/12/can-political-struggle-against-isil-succeed-where-violence-cannot/. [5]

Additional Resourceso USASOC, “Counter-Unconventional Warfare” White Paper

(September 26, 2014), https://publicintelligence.net/usasoc-counter-unconventional-warfare/. [23]

o Dan Madden, Dick Hoffman, Michael Johnson, Fred Krawchuk, John E. Peters, Linda Robinson, and Abby Doll, “Special Warfare: The Missing Middle in US Coercive Options,” War on the Rocks (blog), (November 20, 2014), http://warontherocks.com/2014/11/special-warfare-the-missing-middle-in-u-s-coercive-options/.

o John Mearsheimer, “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’sFault,” Foreign Affairs September/October 2014.

o Lawrence Freedman (2014) “Ukraine and the Art of Limited War,” Survival, 56:6, 7-38. [32]

Military Operations I: Using Land Power, April 1Required Reading [82]

Baylis ch. 6, “Geography and Strategy,” [15] Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in

Modern Battle (Princeton UP, 2004), ch. 3, pp. 28-51. [24] MCDP 1: Warfighting ch. 4, “The Conduct of War,” pp. 71-

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96, http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/MCDP%201%20Warfighting.pdf. [26]

Baylis ch. 13, “Iraq, Afghanistan, and American Military Transformation,” pp. 248-264. [17]

Additional Resources Christopher Tuck, Understanding Land Warfare (Routledge,

2014). Antoine Lecerf, “Land Warfare,” chapter 28 in Oxford

Handbook of War (Oxford UP, 2012), 417-429. [13]

Military Operations II: Using Sea and Air Power, April 8Required Reading [91]

Robert Pape, “True Worth of Air Power,” Foreign Affairs 83,2 (March/April 2004), 116-130. [15]

Dylan Matthews, “Everything you need to know about the drone debate, in one FAQ,” Washington Post Wonkblog, March 8, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/03/08/everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-drone-debate-in-one-faq/. [7]

Richard Andres, “The Afghan model in northern Iraq,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 29, No. 3 (2006), 395-422. [26]

Douglas Ollivant, “Can Air Power Stop ISIS?” CNN.com, August 8, 2014, http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/08/opinion/ollivant-air-power-iraq-isis/. [1]

“How the Air Campaign Against ISIS Grew,” New York Times http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/12/31/world/middleeast/isis-airstrikes-map.html.

Geoffrey Till, “Maritime Strategy in a Globalizing World,” Orbis Volume 51, Issue 4, (2007), 569-575. [7]

Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes, “Command of the Sea with Chinese Characteristics,” Orbis (Fall 2005), 677-694. [18]

David W. Kearn Jr., “Air-Sea Battle and China's Anti-Access and Area Denial Challenge,” Orbis Volume 58, Issue 1, Winter 2014, Pages 132-146. [15]

Victor Beattle, “US Navy ‘Shaping Events’ in South China Sea,” Voice of America (May 20, 2014), http://www.voanews.com/content/us-navy-shaping-events-in-south-china-sea/1918187.html. [1]

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Geoff Dyer and Richard McGregor, “Pentagon plans new tactics to deter China in South China Sea,” Financial Times (July 10, 2014), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/83c0b88e-0732-11e4-81c6-00144feab7de.html#axzz3OdImO6tI. [1]

Additional Resources Michael Boyle, “The Race for Drones,” Orbis Volume 59,

Issue 1 (2015), 76-94. [19] Alan William John West, “Maritime Warfare and the

Importance of Sea Control,” chapter 29 in Oxford Handbook of War (Oxford UP, 2012), 430-443. [14]

Jonathan Holslag (2013) “The Eurasian Sea,” Survival, 55:4, 155-176. [22]

Frans Osinga, “Air Warfare,” chapter 30 in Oxford Handbook of War (Oxford UP, 2012), 444-459. [16]

Dag Henriksen (2008) “Inflexible Response: Diplomacy, Airpower and the Kosovo Crisis, 1998–1999,” Journal of Strategic Studies, 31:6, 825-858. [34]

James Kraska, “How the United States Lost the Naval Warof 2015,” Orbis (Winter 2010), 35-45. [11]

Géraud Laborie, “The Afghan Model More Than 10 Years Later: An Undiminished Relevance” Air and Space Power Journal-Africa and Francophonie (3rd Quarter 2013), 49-60, http://www.au.af.mil/au/afri/aspj/apjinternational/aspj_f/article.asp?id=27. [11]

US Air Force, Air Force Basic Doctrine, Organization, and Command,Air Force Doctrine Document 1 (2011), pp. 11-20, http://www.au.af.mil/au/cadre/aspc/l004/pubs/afdd1.pdf.[10]

US Navy, Naval Operational Concept, Ch. 7, “Sea Control,” (2010), 51-59, http://www.navy.mil/maritime/noc/NOC2010.pdf. [9]

PART V. RESTORING THE PEACE

Winning the Peace, April 15Required Reading [79]

Gideon Rose, How Wars End: Why We Always Fight the Last Battle ch.

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1, 8. [53] Dominic Tierney (2014) “Mastering the Endgame of War,”

Survival, 56:5, 69-94. [26]Additional Resources

Dominic Tierney, Failing to Win: Perceptions of Victory and Defeat in International Politics (Harvard UP, 2006).

Keeping the Peace, April 22Required Reading [81]

Baylis, chapter 15, “Humanitarian Intervention and Peacekeeping,” pp. 287-300 [14]

James Dobbins, et al., The UN’s Role in Nation-Building (RAND Corporation, 2005), chapters 12 and 13, pp. 225-251, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG304.html. [26]

Lorenzo Zambernardi “Counterinsurgency's Impossible Trilemma,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 33 No. 3 (2010), 21-34, http://csis.org/files/publication/twq10julyzambernardi.pdf. [14]

Alexander Benard, “Lessons from Iraq and Bosnia on the Theory and Practice of No-fly Zones,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 27, No. 3 (2004), 454-478. [25]

Julian E. Barnes and Adam Entous, “NATO Air Strategy Gains Renewed Praise,” Wall Street Journal (October 21, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052970203752604576643531745513712. [2]

Additional Resources David J. Kilcullen, “The City as a System: Future

Conflict and Urban Resilience,” Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Vol. 36 No. 2 (summer 2012), 19-39, http://www.fletcherforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/Kilcullen.pdf. [20]

T.E. Lawrence, “The Evolution of a Revolt,” Army Quarterly and Defence Journal (October 1920): 55-69, http://143.84.167.79/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/lawrence.pdf. [15]

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David Galula, Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958 (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1963), http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG478-1.html.

Colin Kahl, “COIN of the Realm: Is There a Future for Counterinsurgency?” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 6 (Nov. -Dec., 2007), 169-176. [8]

Final Quiz, April 29, 4:10pm

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UNIVERSITY POLICIES AND RESOURCES

University of Portland’s Code of Academic Integrity Academic integrity is openness and honesty in all scholarly endeavors. The University of Portland is a scholarly community dedicated to the discovery, investigation, and dissemination of truth, and to the development of the whole person. Membership in this community is a privilege, requiring each person to practice academic integrity at its highest level, while expecting and promoting the same in others. Breaches of academic integrity will not be toleratedand will be addressed by the community with all due gravity.Assessment Disclosure Statement Student work products for this course may be used by the University for educational quality assurance purposes. Disabilities Statement If you have a disability and require an accommodation to fully participate in this class, contact the Office for Students with Disabilities (OSWD), located in the UniversityHealth Center (503-943-7134), as soon as possible. If you have an OSWD Accommodation Plan, you should make an appointment to meet with me to discuss your accommodations. Also, you should meet with me if you wish to discuss emergency medical information or special arrangements in case the building must be evacuated. The Learning Resource Center The Learning Resource Center, located in Franz 120, houses the Writing Center, Math Resource Lab, Speech Resource Center, and the International Language Lab. Writing. Go to www.up.edu/lrc/writing. You will need to register as a user the first time you go there. If you cannot make any of the posted office hours, you can arrange an appointment by emailing [email protected]. Math. Math assistants are available on a walk-in basis. Please go to www.up.edu/lrc/math for a current schedule of hours math assistants are available. Speech. Speech assistants are available to help with public presentations on a walk-in basis. Please go to www.up.edu/lrc/speech for a current schedule of hours speech

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assistants are available. Group Process. Group process tutors are available on a walk-in basis. Please go to www.up.edu/lrc/groupprocess for a current schedule of hours group process assistants are available. International Languages. Go to www.up.edu/lrc/languages/signup. You will need to register as a user the first time you go there. The Learning Assistance Counselor. He or she teaches learning strategies and skills that enable students to become more successful in their studies and future professions. The Counselor provides strategies to assist students with reading and comprehension, note-taking and study, time management, test-taking, and learning and remembering.

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