South Asia Research - CiteSeerX

http://sar.sagepub.com/South Asia Research

http://sar.sagepub.com/content/27/3/271The online version of this article can be found at:

DOI: 10.1177/026272800702700302

2007 27: 271South Asia ResearchShandip Saha

Politics in Nineteenth-Century Western IndiaThe Darbar, the British, and the Runaway Maharaja: Religion and

Published by:

http://www.sagepublications.com

can be found at:South Asia ResearchAdditional services and information for

http://sar.sagepub.com/cgi/alertsEmail Alerts:

http://sar.sagepub.com/subscriptionsSubscriptions:

http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.navReprints:

http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.navPermissions:

http://sar.sagepub.com/content/27/3/271.refs.htmlCitations:

What is This?

- Dec 5, 2007Version of Record >>

at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on March 3, 2014sar.sagepub.comDownloaded from at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on March 3, 2014sar.sagepub.comDownloaded from

http://sar.sagepub.com/


http://sar.sagepub.com/content/27/3/271

http://sar.sagepub.com/content/27/3/271



http://sar.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts

http://sar.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts

http://sar.sagepub.com/subscriptions

http://sar.sagepub.com/subscriptions

http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav

http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav

http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav

http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav

http://sar.sagepub.com/content/27/3/271.refs.html

http://sar.sagepub.com/content/27/3/271.refs.html

http://sar.sagepub.com/content/27/3/271.full.pdf

http://sar.sagepub.com/content/27/3/271.full.pdf

http://online.sagepub.com/site/sphelp/vorhelp.xhtml

http://online.sagepub.com/site/sphelp/vorhelp.xhtml





THE DARBAR, THE BRITISH, AND THERUNAWAY MAHARAJA: RELIGION ANDPOLITICS IN NINETEENTH-CENTURYWESTERN INDIAShandip SahaATHABASCA UNIVERSITY, ATHABASCA, CANADA

ABSTRACT The Vallabha Sampradaya or Pus.t.i Marga Hindu devo-tional community was founded in the sixteenth century by theVais.n. avite philosopher, Vallabha. His successors, known asmaharajas, continued to spread the teachings of the Pus.t.i Margaand enjoyed much success in Rajasthan and Gujarat. Political andeconomic patronage by elites of Western India soon transformedthese maharajas into wealthy landlords whose affluent lifestyleswould cause much controversy in the nineteenth century.

This article uses unpublished documents found in the NationalArchives of India to detail one of these controversies, revolvingaround struggles between the Pus.t.i Marga, the royal house ofMevad., and British authorities for control of the wealth associatedwith Nathdvara, the central focus of Pus.t.i Marga pilgrimage inRajasthan. The protracted struggle for the control of Nathdvaraindicates how Hindu spiritual leaders were far from passive ob-servers of the world who gave themselves purely to the cultivationof spiritual pursuits. On the contrary, this particular controversyis a striking example of how the active engagement of religiousleaders in local and regional politics could profoundly affect theexisting religious and social structures of their time.

KEYWORDS: Giridhar, Govardhanlal, Hinduism, Mevad., Nathdvara,Pus.t.i Marga, Sajjan Sim. h, Sr nathj , tilkayat, Udaypur, VallabhaSampradaya

Introduction

The Vallabha Sampradaya, popularly known as the Pus.t.i Marga or ‘The Path of Grace’,constitutes a Kr.s.n.aite devotional community founded in the sixteenth century by thephilosopher Vallabha (1479–1530), who emphasized the importance of living a lifecompletely reliant on the grace of Kr.s.n.a. Vallabha travelled throughout India preaching

SOUTH ASIARESEARCH

www.sagepublications.comDOI: 10.1177/026272800702700302

Vol. 27(3): 271–291Copyright © 2007SAGE PublicationsLos Angeles,London,New Delhi,Singapore

at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on March 3, 2014sar.sagepub.comDownloaded from



272 South Asia Research Vol. 27 (3): 271–291

his message, followed by his descendants who became the gurus of the Pus.t.i Marga,later known as maharajas, and gained a strong following particularly in Gujarat andRajasthan, where the community continues to flourish today. The maharajas enjoyedthe support of the mercantile and political elites of Western and Northern India andthis patronage eventually transformed them into wealthy, affluent landlords whosearistocratic lifestyle and large estates would open them up to much controversy inthe nineteenth century.

One of these controversies involved the Pus.t.i Marga and its principal patron, theUdaypur royal court (darbar) which ruled over the state of Mevad. in Rajasthan.Since the late seventeenth century, the Udaypur rulers (maharan.as) had honouredthe Pus.t.i Marga lavishly by providing for their material well-being through generousdoses of religious patronage, which included elevating the maharajas to the level ofhigh-ranking noblemen (jag rdars), who then amassed great wealth from the manyestates they held both within and outside Mevad.. The transformation of the maharajasinto nobility altered the relationship between the darbar and the Pus.t.i Marga, andwould culminate in a major political and legal spectacle involving the darbar, the Pus.t.iMarga and the British.

This article lays out the background to this episode and explores the nature of thisconflict, arguing that Hindu spiritual leaders were far from passive observers of theworld who gave themselves purely to the cultivation of spiritual pursuits. The conflictbetween the darbar and the Pus.t.i Marga was, on the contrary, a rather striking exampleof how the active engagement of religious leaders in the politics of their time couldhave a profound impact upon the existing religious and social structures in whichthey lived.

The History of the Pus.t.i Marga Between theSixteenth and Nineteenth Centuries

The philosopher Vallabha founded the Pus.t.i Marga in the sixteenth century andpreached a form of religiosity, which emphasized not renunciation, but the importanceof living a householder life grounded in devotion to the Supreme Lord Kr. s.n.a andpurified by his divine grace (pus.t.i). Vallabha’s community hence came to be known asthe Pus.t.i Marga (‘Path of Grace’), into which one was initiated by taking thebrahmasambandha mantra, a sacred formula which cleansed the individual of all im-purities and made him fit to enter into a loving relationship with Kr. s.n.a (Barz, 1992:80–96, Bennett, 1993: 45–6, 64–74).1

When Vallabha died in 1531, the Pus.t.i Marga was entrusted to his eldest sonGop nath (1512–43) and then to his younger brother Vit.t.halnath (1515–85), whosought to expand the community’s presence on the North Indian religious sceneby actively seeking the patronage of the economic and political elites of his time.Vit.t.halnath targeted, with great success, the wealthy Hindu mercantile communityin the state of Gujarat and even sought the patronage of the Mughals who gave




Saha: Religion and Politics in Nineteenth-Century Western India 273

South Asia Research Vol. 27 (3): 271–291

Vit.t.halnath and his descendants generous tax-free land grants in order to safeguardthe community’s main temples located in the Kr. s.n.aite pilgrimage center of Braj,located several hours outside Delhi. When Vit.t.halnath died in 1585, the spiritualleadership of the Pus.t.i Marga was divided equally among his seven sons who inheritedthe exclusive right to initiate disciples into the community. Vit.t.halnath’s sons werealso given custody over various images of Kr. s.n.a, the principal image of Sr nathjbeing entrusted in the hands of Vit.t.halnath’s eldest son and his descendants.

This distribution of spiritual authority led to the formation of seven divisionswithin the Pus.t.i Marga known as the ‘Seven Houses’, with spiritual leadership ofeach division based upon the principle of primogeniture. Initiatory rights into thecommunity and leadership of each of the seven divisions could only be in the handsof the male descendants of Vallabha traced through Vit.t.halnath, who were now calledmaharajas. The maharajas of the first house were, however, given pre-eminence overother maharajas within the Pus.t.i Marga because the first house had been given thecustody of Sr nathj , the image of Kr. s.n.a that was the principal image of venerationfor all Pus.t.i Marga members. Consequently, the maharajas of the first house weredistinguished from their brethren by being awarded the title of tilkayat.

When the Jat. rebellion against Awrangz b began to cause instability in the Braj re-gion in 1669, all seven houses of the Pus.t.i Marga departed for Rajasthan or Gujaratwhere they sought the protection of Rajput rulers. The period between 1670 and1672 thus saw the establishment of various Pus.t.i Marga shrines in different kingdomsin Rajasthan. The royal houses of Jaypur, Bum. d and B kaner gave refuge to variousPus.t.i Marga images once housed in Braj and in 1672, Raj Sim. h (r. 1653–80) ofMevad. persuaded the members of the first house to reside in his state by promising tobe the community’s new benefactor. That very year the image of Sr nathj was in-stalled in its new temple in a town renamed Nathdvara, which now became the focalpoint of pilgrimage for the community’s mercantile patrons in nearby Gujarat as wellas for members of the Rajasthani nobility.

The temple’s land was exempt from taxation and was to be protected militarily bythe Mevad. darbar in times of turmoil. Royal edicts issued in 1672 and 1680 by theMevad. darbar stipulated that Nathdvara would remain in the hands of the Pus.t.iMarga until the Sr nathj image was returned to Braj. At that point, the land was torevert to the descendants of its original owners. The terms of these documents werereaffirmed at the beginning of a new maharan.a’s reign and remained so until 1737,when the then maharan.a Jagat Sim. h II (r. 1734–51) issued an edict formally statingthat Nathdvara was now in the ownership of the Pus.t.i Marga and would remain so inperpetuity (Tod, 1914, 1.1: 442).

This proved to be important for the Nathdvara maharajas. As the permanentowners of Nathdvara and the adjoining 34 villages gifted to the Pus.t.i Marga by Rajputnoblemen, the Nathdvara tilkayats were now able to collect revenue from the villagesand then use the money to maintain the Sr nathj temple. This right was later recog-nized formally by the Mevad. darbar in a royal edict issued in 1778 by maharan.a





Bh m Sim. h (r. 1778–1828), as reported by Tod (1914, 1.1: 442). In this edict, thetilkayats of the first house were given permission to collect dues and taxes in Nathdvaraand the 34 villages attached to it. The edict then went to great pains to underline theabsolute authority of the Pus.t.i Marga over its land, stating that all the trees, shrubs,foundations and boundaries of these villages belonged solely to Sr nathj .

The year 1809, however, proved to be a turning point in the history of Nathdvarawhen maharan.a Bh m Sim. h further elaborated the rights of the Nathdvara tilkayatsand the extent of powers held over the lands they owned. The 1809 edict began byreiterating some of the standard details found in prior land grants. The town ofNathdvara and all the estates gifted to the tilkayats belonged solely to them, thetilkayats were not to be harassed, and Nathdvara and its allied estates were to beexempt from taxation. The edict went on to add that all goods imported from foreigncountries for use in the Nathdvara temple would be exempt from duties.

Furthermore, all of Nathdvara and its estates, transit duties, assay fees, the dutieson precious metals, and any taxes collected from the local population were to bemade as offerings to Sr nathj in Nathdvara. The edict, however, went one step fur-ther by giving the Nathdvara maharajas the right to grant sanctuary to individualsseeking protection within the lands owned by the tilkayat and to administer justicethroughout all of Nathdvara and its estates without any interference from the Mevad.darbar. Finally, Nathdvara was granted what apparently was a small military retainer,whose primary task was to protect the security of the estate’s borders. Those whotried to revoke these privileges, the grant stated, would suffer a terrible punishment:being reborn as a caterpillar for sixty thousand years (Tod, 1914, 1.1: 442–3).

What were the motivations for Mevad.’s patronage of the Pus.t.i Marga? There wasno doubt that Raj Sim. h sheltered the community for the economic benefits he wouldaccrue from housing a religious community whose principal devotees were wealthymerchants from nearby Gujarat. Mevad. had been severely battered by famine andcontinual warfare with the Mughals and the income generated from pilgrimage trafficcould be used to carry out his economic and cultural reconstruction of Mevad. RajSim. h, however, seems to have had another reason for sheltering the first house inMevad.. His father, Jagat Sim. h I (r. 1628–52), had taken initiation into the thirdhouse of the Pus.t.i Marga when the community was still settled in Braj.2 The maharajasof the Pus.t.i Marga were thus responsible for the spiritual welfare of the entire stateand consequently, all the subsequent rulers of the Mevad. darbar viewed it as theirresponsibility as good Hindu rulers to care for the Pus.t.i Marga by providing for itsfinancial well-being.

This may help to explain why Bh m Sim. h broadened the power of the tilkayatsover their estates in 1809. Bh m Sim. h took this step shortly after the end of a seriouscivil war that began around 1764. The war decimated Mevad. ’s economy and saw therise of the Marathas who invaded the state and took full advantage of the politicalchaos to extract exorbitant tributes from royalty and subjects alike. The Nathdvaratilkayat, utterly unprepared to face the Marathas who attempted to sack the temple






and extort tributes from Nathdvara’s residents, sought the protection of the darbarwho moved the Nathdvara house to Udaypur, where they remained hidden untilstability returned to the region. The civil war thus came to underline how dependentNathdvara was on the darbar for its security and how vulnerable the tilkayats were ifthe darbar became so weakened that it could no longer provide material support forthe temple. Thus, one suspects that in the aftermath of the civil war, Bh m Sim. h wasdeeply concerned with ensuring Nathdvara’s self-sufficiency and material well-being.Consequently, once he returned to power, he continued the long-standing traditionin the Mevad. royal house of honouring the tilkayats at the beginning of a new reignby affirming the land rights of the Nathdvara tilkayats.

Bh m Sim. h, however, went one step further by broadening the power of the tilkayats’control over their estates, according them rights associated with the highest rankingnoblemen (jag rdars) of Mevad.’s aristocracy. First ranking nobles held complete judi-cial, administrative, and economic control over their estates and were allowed toadminister the internal affairs of their jag rs without any interference from the darbar.In return, they were to pledge their loyalty to the maharan.a, provide him with advice,and to wait upon the maharan.a on special ceremonial days such as birthdays orcoronations. Otherwise, first rank jag rdars were free to do as they pleased withintheir estates, which were replicas of the darbar’s governmental structure on a muchsmaller scale.

With regard to the tilkayats, this meant they now had a small military force to pro-tect themselves and could now make all administrative and judicial decisions relatingto the thirty-something estates from which they accrued income for themselves andthe temple without any outside interference from the darbar. In addition, they wouldcontinue to carry out their duties as gurus to the darbar, giving the royal house spiritualcounsel and presiding over special occasions such as coronations or birthday cele-brations. Outside these functions, tilkayats did not attend upon the maharan.as at thedarbar. There was no need for them to do so as first ranking jag rdars, nor would themaharajas ever have allowed this to occur. To be summoned to the darbar to attendupon the maharan.a was tantamount to acknowledging subordination, which wouldcompromise the maharajas’ status as religious leaders.

The Nathdvara tilkayats thus occupied a peculiar position in Mevad. society becausethey held the dual status of jag rdar and guru. As gurus, the darbar promised to re-spect their position as spiritual guides; as jag rdars, the tilkayats were assured thattheir estates could be administered without interference from the maharan.a. Thus,holding the position of a first rank jag rdar certainly had its privileges, but even anobleman of such high stature was still subject to the conditions of treaties signed in1818 and 1878 to strengthen relations between the darbar and the Mevad. nobility.Agreeing to both treaties meant that first rank jag rdars had to obey the authority ofthe maharan.a, ensure their peasants were not to be oppressed, and criminal elementswere not to be harboured within their estates (Ray, 1978: 205–39; Tod, 1914, 1.1:70–1).





There is no record of Nathdvara ever participating in the talks that culminated inthe signing of the two treaties. Consequently, whether or not a tilkayat could exercisehis authority as a spiritual leader to sidestep the authority of the darbar was neverdefined any more than whether or not it was permissible for the darbar to punish amaharaja for actions that violated treaty obligations. This ill-defined aspect of therelationship between the darbar and Nathdvara would cause many difficulties whenboth sides came into serious conflict during the nineteenth century under thecontroversial reign of Giridhar, who was the tilkayat of Nathdvara between 1845 and1876.3

Nathdvara Under the Reign of Giridhar

Giridhar ascended to the throne of Nathdvara at a particularly difficult period in thetemple’s history. His father Govind, ruling from 1827–45, was a minor when heascended to the throne of Nathdvara. Consequently, the running of the Nathdvaraestates was left in the hands of Govind’s mother Laks.m , whose inability to managethe Nathdvara jag r resulted in a deep financial crisis that left the temple teetering onthe brink of bankruptcy. Thus the immediate challenge for Giridhar was to fillNathdvara’s dwindling coffers, which he did quite successfully, but not without muchcontroversy. Giridhar’s exercise of absolute temporal power over the residents ofNathdvara gave rise to rumours about his erratic behaviour and notoriously shorttemper. Soon stories began to abound that he was harbouring criminals, extortingtributes from Nathdvara’s residents, and was excessively cruel to individuals whocrossed him in even the smallest fashion. In addition, Giridhar began to hire Sindhiand Afghan mercenaries to strengthen his personal military retainer and built a newpalace within the temple precincts from where he administered his well-known formof stern and swift justice that frequently seemed cruel to those living within theNathdvara estates.

The darbar seems to have turned a blind eye to the allegations concerning Giridhareven after he decided, in 1858, to hide fugitive rebels involved in the 1857 SepoyRebellion in defiance of maharan.a Svarup Sim. h’s (r. 1842–61) decision to help colonialauthorities hunt down rebels involved in the uprising. The darbar, however, waseventually forced to address the widespread rumors about Giridhar’s alleged maniacalbehaviour.4 Shortly after he succeeded his father to the throne, maharan.a SambhuSim. h (r. 1861–74) began to pressure Giridhar to furnish the darbar with documentsdetailing all his acts of civil and judicial administration for the last six months. Giridharrefused, stating that the maharan.a’s order was a direct violation of the rights guaranteedto him in the 1809 edict that brought the tilkayats into the Mevad. nobility. Fromthat point onwards, between 1873 and 1874, relations between the darbar andGiridhar gradually worsened. Sambhu Sim. h dismissed the tilkayat’s representative atthe darbar, resumed villages attached to the Nathdvara estate, and then sent a militaryforce in February 1874 against Giridhar in retaliation for the tilkayat’s alleged






imprisonment and torture of a temple servant named Parasuram, who had fled fromNathdvara to Udaypur to escape the tilkayat in 1873. Giridhar, however, was saved.Mevad.’s Vais.n.avite population sprung into action and began to pressure SambhuSim. h to desist from using military force (Somani, 1985: 272). The darbar ultimatelybacked down and recalled its troops, fearful that it would alienate a very significantportion of its citizenry.

An emboldened Giridhar made his next move in the summer of 1874 whenSambhu Sim. h became ill, thus throwing Mevad. into a state of uncertainty. The newregent, Sajjan Sim. h (r. 1874–84), was a minor and no one in the state knew who wouldeventually rule over the kingdom until he came of age. It was against this backdropthat Giridhar made a bold move and decided to declare Nathdvara politically inde-pendent from Mevad.. Giridhar thus began to negotiate with the British Political Agent,Col. J.A. Wright in Ajmer, who represented British interests in the state of Mevad.,but Giridhar’s approach was hardly a case study in the practice of subtle diplomacy.Giridhar attempted twice to bribe Wright in an effort to win him over to his causeagainst the darbar. In each instance, Wright refused Giridhar’s offer and when Giridharbegan a letter writing campaign asking for colonial support, the British simply refusedto answer any of his letters.5

The British, publicly, acted indifferently to Giridhar’s behaviour, claiming thatthe conflict was an internal matter that had to be solved by the darbar. But privately,they knew they could not remain uninvolved in what had now become a long drawnout matter. The political competency of the darbar was being called into questionand so was the competency of the British to maintain authority in Mevad. . Thus, inDecember 1874, two months after the death of Sambhu Sim. h, the office of theGovernor General for Rajputana wrote to the Political Agent in Mevad., telling Wrightthat the conflict had to be finally settled and that he was now officially empowered toact on behalf of the British to put an end to the dispute between Nathdvara and thedarbar.6

A month later, in early 1875, Wright’s successor, Col. Herbert, wasted no time inusing his position as the chairman of the Regency Council that governed on behalf ofSajjan Sim. h to chart a plan to depose Giridhar and install his young son Govardhanlal(r. 1876–1934) on the Nathdvara throne. Mevad. nobles sitting on the Council werereluctant to commit themselves to use any sort of armed force, hoping diplomacywould somehow convince Giridhar to leave. Herbert, however, used his advisoryposition on the Council to pressure the nobles into rubberstamping his proposal. Hedrafted a letter in the name of the Regency Council to Giridhar, asking him to acquiesceto the darbar. While Giridhar initially promised to recognize the darbar’s authority,six months later he reneged on his promise.

When Herbert’s successor as Political Agent, Major Gunning, took over the chair-manship of the Council, he began to encourage this body to increase its pressure onGiridhar. After much effort, Gunning finally induced the Council to agree to send amilitary force consisting of darbar and British troops, which would surround the





Nathdvara temple and force Giridhar to surrender. On 8 May 1876, under Gunning’swatchful eye, the troops attacked Giridhar’s residence. Giridhar attempted to leave ina palanquin with Govardhanlal and then threatened to kill his son in front of thedarbar’s troops. Giridhar declared that his son’s death would be better than having toendure the disgrace of watching the boy installed on the throne of Nathdvara whilehe, the father, was still alive.7 The forces, convinced that Giridhar would carry out histhreat, quickly surrounded the palanquin and snatched the boy. With Govardhanlal’srelease, both father and son were now under the complete control of the darbar’s forcesand were escorted back to Udaypur. Giridhar’s reign over Nathdvara had ended with-out loss of life or damage to the temple. In correspondence written in the aftermathof the mission, British officials let out a heavy sigh of relief that the dispute was overand patted themselves on the back for helping to engineer the ouster of the Nathdvaratilkayat through a bloodless coup.8

The Exile of Giridhar

Govardhanlal was brought to the darbar and made to sign a document stating he ac-knowledged the suzerainty of the maharan.a and would make regular visits to Udaypurto pay the maharan.a his respects. The administrative and judicial authority given tothe tilkayat was revoked and since Govardhanlal was still a minor with no next of kin,the darbar appointed a manager to supervise the temple’s affairs and revenues. Further-more, Govardhanlal would be provided a tutor from the darbar to act as his guardianwhile the civil and judicial administration of Nathdvara and its estates would besupervised directly by the darbar. The performance of seva to Sr nathj and any otherreligious duties, however, would be completely supervised by the young Govardhanlal,because of his position as the spiritual leader of an eminent Vais.n.avite community.

Giridhar, meanwhile, was exiled to Braj with the order that he should never causetrouble for the darbar nor even think of entering Mevad. ever again. In order to makelife in exile more bearable, the darbar would provide Giridhar with a monthly allow-ance to meet his living expenses in Braj. Giridhar was finally permitted to leave Udaypurfor Braj on 21 May 1876 and was given Rs 2,000 by the darbar for travelling expensesalong with 14 loading camels, five tents, 10 servants, and a small convoy of 40 armedguards to escort him all the way to Braj.9

Giridhar, however, would not let matters rest. In 1877, a year after his exile, hebegan to encourage Pus.t.i Marga devotees to support his bid to regain the Nathdvarathrone by travelling to major Pus.t.i Marga shrines throughout India to press his case.He was quite successful. The ruler of Kot.a was persuaded to withhold his annualdonation of Rs 60,000 to the Nathdvara shrine while the British were flooded withpetitions from Pus.t.i Marga devotees.10 For colonial authorities, these were the latestin a round of petitions they had been receiving from Pus.t.i Marga devotees since1876, when the darbar had resumed some of Nathdvara’s villages. The 1876 petitionsargued that the granting of civil and judicial administrative rights to the tilkayat by






Bh m Sim. h in 1809 actually meant that Nathdvara had been given the right to pro-claim itself a sovereign state. Consequently, the darbar’s actions were a violation ofGiridhar’s rights to rule as an independent sovereign. The petitions issued between1877 and 1878 were much the same in nature. They argued that Giridhar’s ouster wasillegal and an affront to a respected religious leader who was invested with a ‘spiritualoffice of divine origin’.11 The British were unmoved by these petitions. The officials inMevad. who reviewed the 1877–78 petitions maintained that the ouster was thoroughlylegal and that reinstating Giridhar would only serve to strain the steadily improvingrelations between Sajjan Sim. h and Govardhanlal. The Political Agent for Mevad.,Col. Impey, further maintained that the petitions were not even representative of theentire Pus.t.i Marga community. The whole affair concerning Giridhar, Impey stated,split the Pus.t.i Marga into three groups: one who claimed that Giridhar was infallible,another group who accorded their reverence only to Pus.t.i Marga images, and a thirdfaction that seemed to be entirely disaffected with the Pus.t.i Marga and were savingtheir reverence for what Impey called the ‘unseen deity’. What Impey meant by thiswas not clear and one can only presume that it was a reference to the supreme formlessbrahman of San.kara’s Advaita Vedanta philosophical system. The British thus dis-missed the petitions on the grounds that Giridhar’s return would cause further in-stability to Mevad. and that those who supported Giridhar’s claims were a group ofwhat Impey termed ‘bigoted adherents’ within a fragmented Pus.t.i Marga.12

The Legal Struggle for the Nathdvara Throne

The so-called ‘bigoted adherents’ who made up Giridhar’s supporters may indeed havebeen, as Impey claimed, one small group of devotees within the Pus.t.i Marga. Butthey were a vocal and influential segment, residing primarily in India’s central com-mercial centre of Bombay, which was populated by a high concentration of wealthyHindu and Jain mercantile communities from Gujarat who owned some of the mostimportant banking firms in India. Almost all the members of the Hindu mercantilefamilies in Bombay were confirmed devotees of the Pus.t.i Marga and regularly visitedand financially supported the city’s Pus.t.i Marga shrine. They were also known forbeing actively involved in the affairs associated with the Nathdvara temple. Vais.n.avamerchants from Bombay regularly donated money to Nathdvara, and it was the pro-minent banking firm of Navanita Purushotamdas that managed the temple’s propertiesin Bombay as well as all the donations made in Bombay to the Nathdvara shrine.

It was this banking firm that, in 1878, extended an invitation to Giridhar on be-half of Bombay’s Pus.t.i Marga community to reside permanently in the city. Giridharaccepted the offer, arrived in Bombay in 1878, and was pleasantly surprised by anotheroffering made to him by his new patron. The firm’s managers all supported Giridhar’sclaims to be the only rightful head of the Nathdvara temple. Consequently, theyoffered the ex-tilkayat complete control over the administration of Nathdvara’s accountbooks. Giridhar naturally accepted. He made his residence in the property owned by





the Nathdvara temple and began to intercept and keep all the offerings made toNathdvara through the firm. It seemed the natural thing to do. Giridhar still consideredhimself the only rightful tilkayat of Nathdvara and believed the offerings made to theshrine should be in his custody.13

Giridhar’s actions in Bombay soon proved to be a major problem for Govardhanlaland Sajjan Sim. h. The latter, having meanwhile assumed full control of the Mevad.throne, was beginning to work together with Govardhanlal to improve the temple’sadministration and finances. Sajjan Sim. h was very aware that he had alienated agood section of the Vais.n.ava community with the expulsion of Giridhar which meantfor Govardhanlal a loss of temple revenue due to the decline in pilgrimage traffic.The difficulty, however, was the vulnerability of Govardhanlal. Barely 17, he was notin a position of strength to stop his father on his own. Sajjan Sim. h thus came to hisaid. The maharan.a made it very clear to British authorities that under no circumstanceswould he allow Giridhar back into Mevad. , and then hired a group of lawyers to filea lawsuit against Giridhar in the Bombay High Court. The suit was filed in the nameof Govardhanlal, who claimed that the property taken by his father belonged to himand the Nathdvara temple. Court proceedings ensued between December 1878 andFebruary 1879 in Bombay and revolved around the terms of Giridhar’s expulsion.The court had to determine whether Giridhar’s forfeiture of his control over theNathdvara estates applied to the property the temple held in Bombay.14

The whole case revolved around the thorny issue of judicial jurisdiction as definedby the paramountcy treaty of 1818 that had brought Mevad. under the protection ofthe British after the Mevad. civil war. This paramountcy treaty forced the darbar toacknowledge the suzerainty of the British in matters of foreign policy, but the internalaffairs of Mevad. were completely under the administrative and judicial control ofthe maharan.a. Hence Mevad. was still considered to be a sovereign territory underthe protection of the British, and could not be considered to be a British territorylike Bombay, which was subject to the colonial law enforced by the High Court. Theplaintiff, Govardhanlal, was to argue that the expulsion was carried out under the dir-ect sanction of the British Government of India, thus making it an Act of State thatwould make the terms of the expulsion subject to colonial law and hence applicableto Bombay. The defence also sought to prove that the expulsion was an Act of Statebut, consequently, it was an illegal act of a foreign power that nullified the whole termsof the expulsion.

This would become problematic for the colonial authorities in Calcutta who weremonitoring the case. British Political Agents involved in the case were hardly neutraland were pressuring the Regency Council into making decisions in agreement withthe Government’s orders to its political agents to end the affair and bring order backto Mevad.. Colonial authorities repeatedly maintained that the Political Agent actedpurely as an advising member of the Council and in no way represented any interestin or commitment to the affair on the part of colonial authorities. Privately, however,officials in Calcutta were worrying that supporting the darbar in the lawsuit would






mean giving up their authority to the legal scrutiny of the High Court and possiblybeing compelled to explain the actions of their representatives whose actions in theindependent territory of Mevad. might have violated British law.15 Officials in Calcuttathus told the darbar that they were going to refuse its request because they had nodirect interest in the suit. The suit was solely between Giridhar and the darbar overproperty and income alienated from the temple. The Government of India insteadoffered to defray the legal costs incurred by the darbar for the entire legal proceedings.16

The darbar was thus on shaky ground when it came to present its case. It had ex-pected that the British would support its argument that Giridhar’s removal was accom-plished with the sanction of the Government of India and was, consequently, a politicalAct of State taken against a recusant jag rdar. In making this argument, the plaintiff ’scounsel provided a certificate from the Political Agent testifying to the fact that Giridharhad been removed from the throne of Nathdvara in May 1876. Govardhanlal’s counselthus argued the certificate was proof that Giridhar’s removal in Udaypur was a legiti-mate act sanctioned in the name of the Government of India, making it fall underthe purview of colonial law. It thus followed that Giridhar’s actions in Bombay wereillegal, for it meant that, under the agreement with the darbar, Giridhar had to giveup all claims to the property and offerings in Bombay because they now belonged toGovardhanlal as the head of the Nathdvara temple.17

Giridhar’s lawyers, on the other hand, put up an impressive defence. They outlinedhow the Sr nathj image, along with the other seven images distributed by Vit.t.halnathto his seven sons, was subject to the rule of primogeniture within the Pus.t.i Marga,and they then produced affidavits from the Bombay maharajas of the Pus.t.i Marga toattest to the fact that Giridhar was a lineal descendant of Vallabha who had legitimatecustody of the Sr nathj image. Thus, in accordance with the rules of successionwithin the Pus.t.i Marga, Giridhar was the rightful head of the Nathdvara house andshould remain so until his death. The deposition of Giridhar by the darbar, the de-fendant’s counsel claimed, was thus illegitimate. It violated longstanding customswithin the Pus.t.i Marga about leadership succession within the community and wasalso a violation of the 1809 royal edict that categorically stated that the maharan.awould not interfere in the civil and administrative decisions exercised by the Nathdvaratilkayats over their lands.

Giridhar’s actions in Bombay, the defense continued, were hardly irregular, for hewas merely collecting property and income that was rightly his as the tilkayat ofNathdvara. There were, therefore, no grounds upon which to sue Giridhar. Giridhar’sexpulsion itself was illegal, because his legal rights had been violated by the Britishand the darbar had no legal authority in Bombay. Udaypur was under the legal juris-diction of the maharan.a, while Bombay was British territory and subject to the rulesof colonial law. The terms of Giridhar’s agreement with the darbar to forfeit templeproperty only applied to property within the territory of Mevad. .18

The judges ultimately ruled in favor of Giridhar. They felt that neither the defencenor the plaintiff had proven the direct involvement of the British in the affair, but





they did accept Giridhar’s claim that the ouster was illegal, because it infringed onBh m Sim. h’s edict of 1809. The judges stated that the terms of this 1809 edict wereplain and clear about the temporal powers to be exercised by Giridhar and could notbe taken away simply because the darbar had decided one day that it did not likeGiridhar’s use of his rightful powers. The judges thus stated that Giridhar had successfullyproved that he was entitled to the throne of Nathdvara. The difference in legal jurisdic-tions between Bombay and Mevad. meant that the High Court could not legally re-instate Giridhar on the throne of Nathdvara, but he did not have to forfeit the Bombayincome and property that he had alienated from the Nathdvara temple.19 Understand-ably, the darbar was not happy with the decision. It appealed the court’s ruling inAugust of 1879, but was ultimately turned down.20 It would seem that Giridhar hadmanaged to get the better of the darbar yet again, this time by using the protectionafforded to him by the colonial legal system.

The Post-Legal Struggle for Nathdvara

One would have thought that the appeal put an end to the whole affair once and forall, but Giridhar still could not let matters go. He refused to accept that he was notreinstated as the maharaja of Nathdvara. Two years after the appellate court had madeits final decision, he began to petition the British authorities in 1881 to reverse hisexpulsion, so that he might return to Nathdvara. If he could not return to Nathdvara,he would request the aid of the British in moving what he claimed was his privateproperty from the Nathdvara temple to another location of his choice. Two monthsafter this petition was submitted to the British, Giridhar told authorities the locationto where he would like to move all his ancestral property. He wanted to take everythinginto British territory, where he could be protected by British law and be safely out ofthe darbar’s reach.21

Between 1882 and 1889, Giridhar continued to issue petitions to the Foreign De-partment in Delhi and to the Viceroy of India reiterating that the Sr nathj imageand all the wealth attached to the Nathdvara temple was his personal property. AfterMay 1889, Giridhar turned away from petitions and went back to the Bombay HighCourt with the purpose of recovering the three lakh rupees that he claimed was thetotal value of his property in Nathdvara. The time for the filing of the suit was notchosen randomly. Govardhanlal had begun a tour of Western India in February 1889and had arrived in Bombay on 2 April, where he was greeted by supporters whohonoured him with gifts as the tilkayat of Nathdvara. Four days later, he was servedwith a legal notice from his father that accused the son of illegally wearing symbolsand insignia associated with the position of tilkayat.

On 4 May 1889, Govardhanlal was served with Giridhar’s lawsuit and hauled offto jail that same evening. The fact that the arrest took place precisely on the day thatthe Bombay High Court closed down for its summer recess seemed hardly coincidental.






The arrest was timed to ensure that Govardhanlal would not only endure the humili-ation of being jailed by his own father, but also have to face the indignity of beingconfined to his cell until the Court came back into session.22 Govardhanlal was eventu-ally released after five hours. A group of his supporters within the Pus.t.i Marga com-munity put up the bail, Rs 31 lakh, and then persuaded the Chief Justice to holdcourt in his own bungalow. The matter was declared to be beyond the jurisdiction ofcolonial law and the judge released a very upset Govardhanlal, who sent a telegramto colonial authorities protesting his treatment at the hands of his father as a personalvendetta carried out through the manipulation of the colonial legal system.23

British officials were by now frustrated with the whole affair. They repeatedlyrejected Giridhar’s petitions for years on the grounds that the expulsion was legallyordered by the darbar and that he would receive no assistance from the Governmentof India whatsoever in his quest to regain Nathdvara. In 1889, the British now had tohear about Giridhar’s attempt to jail his son through the manipulation of the coloniallegal system and then endure another five years of Giridhar’s incessant lobbying ofthe colonial administration. These actions were followed in 1894 by Giridhar’s attemptto fully disown his son by making a failed attempt to adopt a child from another Pus.t.iMarga house to serve as his successor.24

This attempt definitely put pressure upon colonial authorities to find some sort ofresolution to their problems with Giridhar. The darbar sent a letter to colonial author-ities in 1894 stating that Giridhar was not welcome in Mevad. and that the Sr nathjimage and the wealth used for its worship could not be termed as Giridhar’s privateproperty under any circumstances. Giridhar, like all the tilkayats of Nathdvara, wasto be regarded as the hereditary custodian of the Sr nathj image and the wealth thatcame with it. The only donations that a tilkayat could keep were those made specificallyin his name, which he could then use as he pleased. Giridhar, however, was flagrantlyviolating this long established tradition. He was illegitimately collecting donationsmeant for the temple and was even beginning to sell the temple’s property in Bombay,though the deeds were not in his name. Giridhar’s actions, the Udaypur darbar argued,needed to be curtailed before the temple went into financial ruin. Govardhanlal echoedthis same sentiment in a petition he submitted in 1894 to the Viceroy, pleading withhim for assistance in controlling his father.25

British officials in Calcutta and Rajasthan were not exactly sure what to do. Theyhad been suggesting to Giridhar for years that he should make an effort to compromiseso matters would come to an end, but it was clear now that he would never agree tosuch a solution. The authorities, of course, were not about to let Giridhar walk offwith the Sr nathj image and plant it in British territory. An action like that wouldmake for a very tense relationship between colonial authorities and the Mevad. darbar,which since the late seventeenth century had sheltered the image and been its greatestpatron. The darbar would never allow the Sr nathj image to be removed, for thiswould mean a severe loss of prestige for Mevad. ’s ruling dynasty. Thus, the British





were left with either taking Giridhar to Mevad. and leaving him at the mercy of thedarbar or putting him under surveillance in Bombay or in Braj.26

Giridhar himself made the decision. For unknown reasons, he finally admitteddefeat in his battle with the darbar and his son and moved back to Braj. He resided inthe town of Jat pura near the original home of the Sr nathj image and built himselfa new royal residence similar to the palace that he had constructed within the confinesof the Nathdvara temple. One can only speculate that, by building a replica of his oldresidence in Nathdvara, Giridhar was making a final attempt to assert the authorityand prestige to which he believed he was entitled. Whatever the reason for the construc-tion of his residence in Jat pura, Giridhar lived there until his death in 1902.

The drama involving Giridhar, Govardhanlal, the Mevad. darbar and the Govern-ment of India had thus finally ended. But what about the property and wealth inBombay that had brought the darbar and Govardhanlal into conflict with Giridharafter his expulsion? One year after his father’s death, in 1903, Govardhanlal attemptedonce more in the Bombay High Court to retrieve everything that Giridhar had alien-ated from the Nathdvara temple. This time Govardhanlal won a very easy victory.His main opposition—the father who tried to kill, jail, sue, and disown him—wasnow no longer alive.

Conclusion

Previous studies on Indian religious history have all noted the presence of militarizedHindu Saivite and Vais.n.avite orders which, in the seventeenth and eighteenth cen-turies, wielded considerable social and political power in North India and, in the caseof the influential Ramanand community, would become the vehicle of expressionfor marginalized peasantry seeking to improve their social standing in North Indiansociety (Cohn, 1964: 175–82; Kolff, 1971: 213–20; Pinch, 1996). The Pus.t.i Marga,however, provides a rather striking contrast to orders like the Ramanand s. The patron-age structure of the Pus.t.i Marga consisted primarily of the conservative royalty andmercantile communities of Western India who found the emphasis of the Pus.t.i Marga’steachings on the pursuit of devotion within the context of a householder life rathercompatible with their own worldly pursuits of power and wealth. The result was aclose relationship between the Pus.t.i Marga and the economic and political elites ofWestern India which, Edwin Richardson (1979: 19–30) argues, created a rather stablealliance that allowed the maharajas and their patrons to wield power over a largebody of the faithful who did nothing but acquiesce to the power of their religiousand political masters.

This, however, is not quite true. Maharajas were not above using the prestige oftheir sacred images as leverage in their relationships with their royal patrons. Tod(1914, 1.1: 436–7) noted that there was considerable anxiety among Rajput rulersover the possibility that the prestige and economies of their kingdoms would be






damaged if the maharajas took their images and decided to leave for a rival kingdomthat could grant them more generous offers of religious patronage.

This is confirmed by Peabody (1991) in his analysis of the relationship betweenthe Pus.t.i Marga and their patrons in Kot.a. Peabody notes that the patronage of thePus.t.i Marga meant increased political prestige for Kot.a’s rulers and substantial eco-nomic benefits through the creation of a booming pilgrimage economy, generatedlargely by the Pus.t.i Marga’s Gujarati mercantile patrons. This, in turn, assured thecontinued material and physical well-being of the maharajas, but the relationshipbetween Kot.a’s rulers and the maharajas was far from stable. No matter how much aruler sought to ensure control over the maharajas and their divine images, their effortswere undermined by the maharajas. They circumvented the control of the Kot.a rulerseither by drawing upon the financial resources of estates they held outside the bound-aries of the kingdom or by using the prestige of their divine images as bargaining chipsin the relationship with their patrons, threatening to remove them to another kingdom(Peabody, 1991: 743–5, 750–52).

The affair between Giridhar and the darbar conforms to this general pattern ofpatron-client relations. The patronage of the Pus.t.i Marga had ensured a very closerelationship between the Nathdvara temple and the Mevad. darbar right from thetime of Raj Sim. h’s reign, but the elevation of the Nathdvara tilkayats to the level ofhigh-ranking Mevad. noblemen completely changed the guru-king relationship be-tween the two parties. Giridhar effectively exploited his dual status as a guru andjag rdar to act independently of the darbar without any fear of punishment, for themaharan.as had no effective control over the administration of a jag rdar’s estates.This began a long drawn-out conflict between the darbar and Giridhar, in which itbecame almost impossible to tell who exactly had the upper hand. Giridhar repeatedlybested a weakened darbar until colonial authorities ultimately brought an end to thematter by quietly engineering Giridhar’s ouster.

Giridhar, however, continued to manipulate colonial law for his own interests bymobilizing devotees within the community to act as pressure groups who wouldadvance his cause before colonial authorities. Was there, then, a clear winner in theconflict? Govardhanlal and the darbar ultimately managed to depose Giridhar andrebuild their relationship in order to save Nathdvara from its financial woes, butGiridhar seems to have lived rather comfortably in Jat pura drawing upon the resourcesthat the Nathdvara temple held in Bombay. Thus there was no clear victor. Bothsides seemed to have won only partial victories, which however served to tarnishtheir reputations in the eyes of Pus.t.i Marga devotees and the general public.

The relationship between the maharajas of the Pus.t.i Marga and their devoteeswere already strained due to a highly publicized court case in 1861, known as theMaharaja Libel Case, which revolved around allegations of sexual misconduct bymaharajas living in Bombay. The Giridhar affair only served to further strain relationsbetween the two sides. The authority of the tilkayat and his fellow maharajas restedon the assertion made by Vallabha that there was no distinction between individual





souls (j vas) and Kr.s.n.a, the supreme manifestation of divinity. The Lord and his j vaswere really one and the same entity in the same way that sparks were to a fire. Thus,for devotees, the maharaja—like all j vas—was a manifestation of Kr.s.n.a, but occupieda very special status because he also acted as the mediating figure that made Kr.s.n.a’sgrace accessible to the devotee. Devotees, consequently, made a very subtle distinctionbetween the maharajas and Kr.s.n.a. The maharajas were not a full manifestation ofdivinity, but devotees accorded them a type of devotion and reverence that was almost,if not equivalent, to what Kr. s.n.a himself would receive since they made the divine graceand presence of Kr. s.n.a more immediate for the devotee (Bennett, 1993: 58–63).

The Giridhar affair, along with the Maharaja Libel Case, now served to remindthe entire Pus.t.i Marga community of the very human frailties of their spiritual leaders,causing a divisive spiritual crisis that affected all members of the community includingthose associated with the darbar. The darbar, throughout its years of conflict withGiridhar, had always maintained to colonial officials that the Mevad. darbar had ac-cepted the spiritual authority of the Nathdvara maharajas for centuries and wouldalways honour it. Thus their actions against Giridhar were not directed at the spiritualhead of the Pus.t.i Marga, but were, rather, directed at the temporal ruler of the Nathdvarajag r. Consequently, matters of politics dictated that the maharaja, like all jag rdars,had to be brought into line to preserve the political stability of the state.27 The difficultyfor the darbar, however, was that he was the guru for the majority of the nobles onthe Regency Council who dutifully wore their rosary (kan.t.hi) as a sign of respecttowards the Nathdvara tilkayat. It was for that reason, Gunning would later explainin his correspondence, that the majority of the members on the Regency Council werevacillating in taking definitive action against Giridhar. The vast majority of themsimply could not bring themselves to take military action against their own guru.28

The depth of this spiritual crisis, however, was never fully understood by Britishofficials. They were rather shocked at the royal treatment Giridhar was receiving forhis deportation and even two years after Giridhar’s exile, they still could not understandwhy the darbar would be so generous to a person whose behaviour smacked of nothingbut insolence. If Giridhar had committed such actions on British-controlled territory,he would have been served immediately with an arrest warrant under colonial law.29

Giridhar instead was ‘punished’ for his political insubordination with a generousfinancial settlement and a royal send-off to Braj.

One is indeed left with the impression in the correspondence kept by colonialofficials surrounding the affair that the darbar showed far too much restraint in theirdealings with Giridhar, but for the darbar it seemed quite the opposite. From theperspective of the darbar, the decision to exile Giridhar was punishment enough forpolitical insubordination, while the financial aid extended to Giridhar seemed toreflect the belief of the darbar that it had to continue its centuries-long religiouscommitment to honour the spiritual authority of the Nathdvara tilkayats. What forthe British was nothing more than a show of poor political judgment was, for the






darbar, the best way to resolve its own conflicted feelings towards Giridhar and therather ambiguous status he held in their eyes.

How is one, then, to finally interpret the events surrounding Giridhar, the Udaypurdarbar and the British? Peabody (1991: 746–8) notes that the dynamics of patronagebetween the rulers of Kot.a and the Pus.t.i Marga tend to indicate the problems associatedwith arguments in scholarly literature about Indian society that attempt to establisheither kings or brahman. s as the dominant social group in Indian society to whom allother groups are subordinated.30 Peabody stresses that the relationship between themaharajas and their royal patrons was in a state of constant flux and the relationshipbetween the Mevad. darbar and the Pus.t.i Marga tends to confirm Peabody’s argument.Giridhar’s enmeshment in both the realms of the worldly and the sacred sparked atype of see-saw battle between the maharaja and his patrons over the question of au-thority within the Pus.t.i Marga, which produced no real winner and, instead, frag-mented the community and loosened the ties between the devotees and their spiritualleaders.

The conflict between Giridhar and the darbar was thus also indicative of how Indianspiritual leaders far from conformed to the stereotypical image of socially aloof indi-viduals who concerned themselves purely with the non-worldly pursuit of single-mindeddevotion. They were, on the contrary, individuals whose active pursuit of power andwealth could have a profound impact on existing political structures as well as theformation of regional social and religious identities. The Giridhar affair, with all itspersonal idiosyncrasies, serves as a rather fascinating example of the dynamics of re-gional religious politics in India and demonstrates how easily the line between thesacred and secular could become blurred in Indian society thus causing competinginterests from both realms to clash with each other in their desire for greater politicaland social influence.

Notes

1. For a translation of Vallabha’s important Sanskrit work that outlines the core of his phil-osophy, see Vallabhacarya (2000).

2. The third house of the Pus.t.i Marga also settled in Mevad. in the village of Kam. karol justa few years prior to the arrival of the first house in what would become Nathdvara. TheKam. karol branch of the Pus.t.i Marga would also be granted jag rdar status in 1839 underthe reign of maharan.a Javan Sim. h (r. 1828–38). For a history of the Kam. karol branch,see Sastr (1939).

3. Giridhar’s reign was so controversial that very little has been mentioned in Pus.t.i Margaliterature about his tenure as the tilkayat of Nathdvara outside the fact that he was adedicated devotee of Kr. s.n.a who experienced tensions with the darbar. See Vairag (1995:22–3) and the small details mentioned in Ambalal (1995: 69–70).

4. The account that follows is based on correspondence kept by colonial administrators inRajasthan and consists of material that includes memos, handwritten documents, andpublished reports issued by the Agents to the Governor General and the local Mevad.





Political Agents. The collection is found in the National Archives of India in New Delhias part of correspondence of the colonial administrators associated with the Governmentof India’s Foreign Department.

5. Colonel J.A. Wright’s correspondence to A.C. Lyall, Officiating Agent, Governor-General,Rajpootana dated 2 November 1874, in ‘Conduct of the Gosain of Nathdvara, Meywar,Nos. 647–50’. Government of India Foreign Department (1875).

6. Lyall’s correspondence to Wright, dated 2 December 1874, ‘Conduct of the Gosain ofNathdvara, Meywar, Nos. 647–50’. Later government correspondence would term theaction as being a matter of political necessity. See ‘The Gosain of Nathdvara, Nos. 103–07’in Government of India Foreign Department Records, Political-A (1876). The officialgovernment summary of the correspondence that is generally included at the beginningof a new file of correspondence stated in this context that the decision to take actionagainst Giridhar was in the interests of the ‘good government of Meywar’ and that whatevermeasures were to be taken had to be ‘be approved by the Agent to the Governor-Generaland would not be initiative or direct’.

7. For the description of Giridhar’s capture, see the correspondence between Gunning andLyall dated 12 May 1876 in ‘The Gosain of Nathdvara, Nos. 103–07’.

8. Id. The correspondence from government officials in Rajasthan to authorities in Calcuttawent as follows:

‘The policy of Bismarck has succeeded at any rate in Rajpootana.

The Meywar Darbar, with the support and advice of Major Gunning, the OfficiatingPolitical Agent and President of the Council has successfully asserted its authorityover its recusant spiritual vassal, the Gosain of Nathdvara.

The Gosain has been deposed and removed and his son appointed in his stead afterformally acknowledging the territorial sovereignty of the Durbar.

The result has been attained without bloodshed, or other contretemps; and theproceedings appear to have been characterised throughout by firmness, judgment,and moderation. Satisfaction might be expressed at the result, and Major Gunning’sproceedings approved’.

9. Id. Gunning’s correspondence with Lyall dated 20 May 1876.10. See Impey’s correspondence with Lyall dated 7 March 1878 in ‘Affairs of the Nathdvara

Shrine in Meywar, Nos. 196–214’.11. The 1876 petitions can be found in ‘Attitude Assumed by the Gosain of the Nathdvara

Shrine Towards the Meywar Darbar’, in Government of India Foreign Department Records,Political-B (1876). The 1877 and 1878 petitions are found in ‘Affairs of the NathdvaraShrine in Meywar, Nos. 196–214’.

12. For details of this split, see Impey’s correspondence of 7 March 1878 to Lyall in ‘Affairsof the Nathdwara Shrine in Meywar, Nos. 196–214’. In Government of India ForeignDepartment Records, Political-A (1878).

13. See Government of India, ‘The Nathdwara Shrine in Meywar, Nos. 47–48’. In Govern-ment of India Foreign Department Records (1879). The exact chronology is detailed in sec-tion 48.






14. Id. contains the copy of the civil suit filed in the Bombay High Court for the details ofGiridhar’s actions in Bombay and what were the issues to be decided by the judges. Thedetails would again be summarized in correspondence about the Giridhar affair writtenin 1882. See ‘Case of the Gosain of Nathdwara, Nos. 217–228’. In Government of IndiaForeign Department Records, Political-A (1882).

15. This was the concern revealed by colonial authorities in the abstract of the correspondencewritten in 1882 for ‘Case of the Gosain of Nathdvara, Nos. 217–228’.

16. See the correspondence from the Government solicitor, Risley V. Hearn, to C. Gonne,the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, dated 14 January 1879 in ‘The NathdvaraShrine in Meywar, Nos. 47–48’.

17. Id. The court transcript for Suit no. 218 of 1878 from the High Court of Judicature atBombay.

18. Id.19. The judgement is published in The Times of India dated 20 June 1879, and included in

Government of India, ‘Judgement of Bombay High Court in the Nathdwara Case, Nos.168–172’. In Government of India Foreign Department Records (1879).

20. Id. The document contains the publication of the appeal.21. The entire memorial issued by Giridhar with his subsequent request for the removal of

Sr nathj is found in the abstract of correspondence in ‘Case of the Gosain of Nathdvara,Nos. 217–228’. In Government of India Foreign Department Records (1882).

22. For details of the incident, see the correspondence between the Mewar political agent,S.B. Miles, to the First Assistant Agent to the Governor-General in Rajputana dated6 June 1889. Also see the letter sent from the darbar to Miles bearing the date of 18 May1889. Both are found in ‘Complaints against the Meywar Darbar Addressed to the Secre-tary of State by the Gosain of Nathdwara’. In Government of India Foreign DepartmentRecords (1889).

23. Id.24. See the correspondence between the Political Agent, G.H. Trevor, and the Secretary to

the Government of India, Foreign Department dated to 23 July 1894 in Government ofIndia Foreign Department Records, Nos. 139–148 (1894).

25. Id. The petition is dated 14 May 1894, while the letter is dated 24 May 1894.26. Id. See the correspondence from the Mewar Political Agent, Lt. Colonel W.H.C. Wylie,

to the First Assistant to the Agent to the Governor-General, Rajputana, dated 18 July1894.

27. See on this Wright’s comments to Lyall dated 14 October 1875 in The Government ofIndia Foreign Department Records (1875).

28. See Gunning’s comments in his correspondence to Lyall dated 12 May 1876 in ‘TheGosain of Nathdwara, Nos. 103–107’. In Government of India Foreign Department Records,Political-A (1876).

29. This was clearly expressed by Gunning’s successor, E.C. Impey two years later in cor-respondence written to Lyall dated 7 March 1878. See ‘Affairs of the Nathdvara Shrinein Meywar, Nos. 196–214’. In Government of India Foreign Department Records, Political-A(1878).

30. Peabody refers to the scholarship of Nicholas Dirks (1987) and Louis Dumont (1980[1967]).





References

A. Unpublished Primary Sources from the National Archives of India, New Delhi

Government of India. Government of India Foreign Department Records, Nos. 139–48, 1894.Government of India. ‘Affairs of the Nathdwara Shrine in Meywar, Nos. 196–214’. In Govern-

ment of India Foreign Department Records, Political-A, 1878.Government of India. ‘Attitude Assumed by the Gosain of Nathdwara Shrine Towards the

Meywar Darbar, Nos. 54–84’. In Government of India Foreign Department Records, 1876.Government of India. ‘Attitude Assumed by the Gosain of the Nathdwara Shrine Towards

the Meywar Darbar’. In Government of India Foreign Department Records, Political -B, 1876.Government of India. ‘Case of the Gosain of Nathdwara, Nos. 217–28’. In Government of

India Foreign Department Records, Political-A, 1882.Government of India. ‘Complaints Against the Meywar Darbar Addressed to the Secretary of

State by the Gosain of Nathdwara’. In Government of India Foreign Department Records,1889.

Government of India. ‘Conduct of the Gosain of Nathdwara, Meywar, Nos. 647–50’. InGovernment of India Foreign Department, 1875.

Government of India. ‘The Gosain of Nathdwara, Nos. 103–07’. In Government of IndiaForeign Department Records, Political-A, 1876.

Government of India. ‘Judgement of Bombay High Court in the Nathdwara Case, Nos.168–72’. In Government of India Foreign Department Records, 1879.

Government of India. ‘The Nathdwara Shrine in Meywar, Nos. 47–48’. In Government ofIndia Foreign Department Records, 1879.

B. Secondary Sources in Hindi and English

Ambalal, Amit (1995) Krishna as Shrinathji. Allahabad: Mapin.Barz, Richard (1992) The Bhakti Sect of Vallabhacarya. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal.Bennett, Peter (1993) The Path of Grace: Social Organisation and Temple Worship in a Vaishnava

Sect. New Delhi: Hindustan Publishing Corporation.Cohn, Bernard (1964) ‘The Role of the Gosains in the Economy of Eighteenth and Nineteenth-

Century India’. Indian Economic and Social History Review, 1: 213–20.Dirks, Nicholas (1987) The Hollow Crown: Ethnohistory of an Indian Kingdom. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press.Dumont, Louis (1980 [1967]) Homo Hierarchicus: The Caste System and Its Implications.

Chicago: Chicago University Press.Kolff, Dirk H.A. (1971) ‘Sanyasi Trader-Soldiers’. Indian Economic and Social History Review,

8(1): 213–20.Peabody, Norbert (1991) ‘In Whose Turban Does the Lord Lie? The Objectification of

Charisma and the Objectification of Fetishism in the Hindu Kingdom of Kot.a’. ComparativeStudy of History and Society, 33(4): 726–54.

Pinch, William R. (1996) Peasants and Monks in British India. Berkeley: University of CaliforniaPress.

Ray, Rajat (1978) ‘Mewar: The Breakdown of a Public Order’. In R. Jeffrey (ed.) People, Princes,and Paramount Power (pp. 205–39). Delhi: Oxford University Press.






Richardson, Edwin Allen (1979) Mughal and Rajput Patronage of the Bhakti Sect of Maharajas.The Vallabha Sampradaya, 1640–1760. PhD Dissertation, Department of Oriental Studies,University of Arizona.

Sastr , Kan. t.hman. i (1939) Kam. karol ka Itihas. Kam. karol : Kam. karol Vidya Vibhag.Somani, Rama Vallabha (1985) Later Mewar. Jaipur: Shantidevi Somani.Tod, James (1914) Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan, or, the Central and Western Rajpoot

States of India, 2 vols. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.Vairag , Prabhudas (1995) Sr Nathdvara Samskr. tik Itihas. Aligarh: Bharat Prakashan

Mandir.Vallabhacarya (2000) The Grace of Lord Krishna: The Sixteen Verse-Treatises (S.od. asagranthah.)

of Vallabhacharya. Translated by J.L. Redington. Delhi: Sri Satguru Press.

Dr Shandip Saha is an Assistant Professor in Religious Studies at Athabasca Universityin Athabasca, Canada. His broad research interests lie in the history of North IndianHindu and Muslim devotional communities with particular emphasis on the dynamicsbetween religion and state in Medieval India. His other research interests revolvearound the relationship between religion and second-generation Hindu, Buddhist,Sikh and Muslim youth in Canada.Address: Department of Religious Studies, Athabasca University, 1 University Drive,Athabasca, Alberta, Canada T9S 3A3. [e-mail: [email protected]]




South Asia Research - CiteSeerX

Documents