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IndexIndex .............. .............. .............. .............. ............... .............. .............. .............. .............. ............... .............. .............. ............ ...... ...... ..... ..... 1Aerospace frontline ............ ............... .............. .............. .............. .............. ............... .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. ........ ..... . 2Aerospace frontline ............ ............... .............. .............. .............. .............. ............... .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. ........ ..... . 3Aerospace ext 1 ITAR .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. ............... .............. .............. .............. .............. ............... ........... ..... 4

Aerospace ext 2 EU subsidies .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. ............... .............. .............. .............. ............. ..... . 5Aerospace ext 3 workforce crisis .............. .............. .............. .............. ............... .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. ........ ..... . 6Aerospace ext 5 trade barriers .............. ............... .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. ............... .............. .............. .............. .... 7Hegemony doesnt stop war ............. .............. ............... .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. ............... .............. .............. ............ .. 8China frontline .............. .............. .............. .............. ............... .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. ............... .............. ...... ..... ..... ... 9China frontline .............. .............. .............. .............. ............... .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. ............... .............. ...... ..... ..... . 10China frontline .............. .............. .............. .............. ............... .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. ............... ........... ..... ..... ...... .... 11China ext 2 wont happen .............. .............. .............. .............. ............... .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. ........ ...... ...... ... 12China ext 3 military would survive .............. .............. .............. .............. ............... .............. .............. .............. .............. ............... ........ 13Solvency frontline .............. ............... .............. .............. .............. .............. ............... .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. ....... ..... 14Solvency frontline .............. ............... .............. .............. .............. .............. ............... .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. ....... ..... 15Solvency ext 1 lack of launch ............. .............. .............. .............. .............. ............... .............. .............. .............. .............. ........ ...... .... 16Solvency ext 2 backlash ............. .............. .............. ............... .............. .............. .............. .............. ............... .............. .............. ......... ... 17

Solvency ext 2 backlash ............. .............. .............. ............... .............. .............. .............. .............. ............... .............. .............. ......... ... 18Solvency ext 3 tech barriers ............ ............... .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. ............... .............. .............. ............ ...... ... 19Solvency ext 3 tech barriers ............ ............... .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. ............... .............. .............. ............ ...... ... 20Solvency ext 3 years away .............. ............... .............. .............. .............. .............. .............. ............... .............. .............. ............. ..... ... 21

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Aerospace frontline1. ITAR blocks U.S. space competitiveness and SSP development

NSSO, 7 (National Security Space Office, Report to the Director, Space-Based Solar Power As an Opportunity for StrategicSecurity; Phase 0 Architecture Feasibility Study October 10, 2007, http://www.nss.org/settlement/ssp/library/final-sbsp-interim-assessment-release-01.pdf)

FINDING : The SBSP Study Group found in order to successfully address major world problems in energy,environmental and national security, the U.S. needs to identify and then reduce or eliminate allunnecessary barriers to effective international cooperation on, and private industry investment in, the development of SBSP. Regardless of the form of international cooperation, Space Based Solar Power will require modification or special treatment under International Trafficking in Arms Regulations (ITAR). Partnerships between U.S. and foreign corporations are often much easier to create andimplement than government to government level partnerships, and more effective when the

purpose is fostering economically affordable goods and services. Application of the International Traffic Arms Regulations (ITAR) may constitute a major barrier to effective partnerships in SBSP and negatively impact national security. Right now ITAR greatly restricts and complicates all space related business, as it treats all launch and satellitetechnologies as arms. This has had the effect of causing Americas competitors to develop

ITAR free products, and had a negative impact on our domestic space industries, which can nolonger compete on level ground . Many participants in the feasibility study were very vocal that

including satellite and launch technology in ITAR has had a counterproductive and detrimentaleffect on the U.S.s national security and competitivenesslosing control and market share, and closing our eyes and ears to the innovations of the competition while selling ourselves on anational illusion of unassailable space superiority . Effective collaboration, even with allies onsomething of this level, could not take place effectively without some special consideration or modification.o Recommendation: The SBSP Study Group recommends the early inclusion of global corporations from Americas allies as partners in the development of this new strategicenergy resource. U.S. corporations should be encouraged to develop partnerships with

foreign owned corporations of Americas closest and most trusted allies. In order toachieve this objective, U.S. industry should be exempt from ITAR when working with our closest and most trusted allies on SBSP systems. U.S. government funded SBSP technology maturation efforts should not include buy America clauses prohibiting

participation of foreign companies as suppliers to U.S. bidders.

2. European subsidies kill U.S. aerospace competitivenessWalker et al, 02 - Chair of the Commission on the Futureof the United States Aerospace Industry Commissioners (Robert, FinalReport of the Commission on the Futureof the United States Aerospace Industry Commissioners, November,http://www.trade.gov/td/aerospace/aerospacecommission/AeroCommissionFinalReport.pdf )

Foreign government subsidies directly affect the competitiveness of our companies. Subsidized primemanufacturers as well assuppliers are able to under- cut prices offered by their U.S. competitors, and are better able to weather market downturns.Subsidized companies are able to secure cheaper commercial financing since their governments share the risk asso- ciated with

bringing new products to market. Subsidized production skews the market itself by flooding it with products that are notcommercially viable . Governments providing the subsidies also apply political pressure on customers in an effort to facilitate a

positive return on the governments investments. In many cases, these government sub- sidies stifle competition and often slowthe introduc- tion of new technology into the market.European funding has had the most dramatic impact on U.S. competitiveness because European products directly compete withU.S. products in most sectors. This problem will be compounded as other govern- ments fund new competitors that will seek toenter an already saturated market . If we maintain the sta- tus quo, U.S. industry will be left to compete against companies thatdont play by the same rules.

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Aerospace frontline3. Workforce crisis will destroy aerospace

Walker et al, 02 - Chair of the Commission on the Futureof the United States Aerospace Industry Commissioners (Robert, FinalReport of the Commission on the Futureof the United States Aerospace Industry Commissioners, November,http://www.trade.gov/td/aerospace/aerospacecommission/AeroCommissionFinalReport.pdf )

Clearly, there is a major workforce crisis in the aero-space industry. Our nation has lost over 600,000 sci- entific and technicalaerospace jobs in the past 13 years. These layoffs initially began as a result of reduced defense spending following the conclusionof the Cold War. This led to an industry shift from reliance on defense sales to one dependent upon commercial markets.Increasing foreign competition in the commercial aerospace market has led to con- tractions in the industry, resulting in mergersand acquisitions. Job losses from this consolidation have been compounded by the cyclical nature of the industry.Due to these uncertainties, most of the workers who have lost their jobs are unlikely to return to the industry. These losses, coupledwith pending retire- ments, represent a devastating loss of skill, experi- ence, and intellectual capital to the industry .

4. Agency confusion prevents federal aerospace leadershipWalker et al, 02 - Chair of the Commission on the Futureof the United States Aerospace Industry Commissioners (Robert, FinalReport of the Commission on the Futureof the United States Aerospace Industry Commissioners, November,http://www.trade.gov/td/aerospace/aerospacecommission/AeroCommissionFinalReport.pdf )

The government is not organized to define national aerospace priorities, develop federal aerospace sector plans and budgets, manage programs that cross mul- tiple departments and agencies, or foster a healthy aerospace sector in a global economy. Asdescribed earlier, no single federal organization is responsible for identifying the appropriate role of aerospace in the context of thenations transportation system and other national needs , including homeland and inter- national security, air transporta- tion, andspace exploitation and exploration. No organization is responsible for defining national aerospace priorities or address- ing all of the factors that will influence national aerospace policy across all stake- holders and all dimensionsinternational, national andgovernmental.The federal government is organized vertically while national aerospace challenges are becoming more horizontal in nature.Legacy structures and processes, which were effective in the past, are fundamentally incapable of addressing the system-of-systems level challenges facing the nation today. These structures and processes simply must be modified and/or replaced byintegrated, crosscutting structures to achieve our goals.The ability of the United States to compete both militarily and economically requires a government that speaks coherently , canfocus its collective capa- bilities on national issues, such as terrorism and air transportation, and can respond quickly and flexiblyto rapidly changing global trends. It requires a government that is structured and has the appropri- ate incentives to providesystem-of-systems solutions to problems that transcend all levels of government, industry, labor and academia and national andinter- national boundaries.

5. Trade barriers will cripple aerospaceWalker et al, 02 - Chair of the Commission on the Futureof the United States Aerospace Industry Commissioners (Robert, FinalReport of the Commission on the Futureof the United States Aerospace Industry Commissioners, November,http://www.trade.gov/td/aerospace/aerospacecommission/AeroCommissionFinalReport.pdf )

Open global markets are critical to the continued economic health of U.S. aerospace companies and to U.S. national security .International markets help U.S. companies to grow by providing a broad cus- tomer base . The 2001 U.S. aerospace trade surpluswas nearly $32 billion, the largest surplus of any U.S. manufac- turing sector. Over half of all U.S.-manufactured large civil

aircraft are sold to non-U.S. customers, and foreign airlines represent the largestmarket growth prospects for the next 20 years.1Twenty-five percent of general aviation airplanesproduced in the United States are sold to overseascustomers.2 Overall, exportsconsistently account foraround one third of total U.S. aerospace production.

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Aerospace ext 1 ITAR ITAR restrictions kill aerospace

Sadeh, 08 - an Associate Director for the Center for Space and Defense Studies at the United States Air Force Academy (Eligar,The Space Review, Space policy questions and decisions facing a new administration, 6/9,http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1146/1)

The United States governments approach to export control of commercial space technologies places political, legal, and bureaucratic restrictions on the aerospace industry in the United States. These restrictions posit a cost to the United States satelliteindustry and the space industrial base.DiscussionExport controls of commercial space technologies are governed through the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR),which is administered by the Department of State. These Regulations prevent international partnerships in commercial space bymaking it more difficult and bureaucratic to implement.As a result of ITAR, domestic manufacturing capabilities for vital space-related hardware and components are reduced. Theregulations, in contrast to the intended goal of retaining preeminence for the United States in the aerospace and defense fields,

brings about the opposite effect.The United States has fallen behind and has lost leadership status in global space commerce competition due to its export controlregime.

Export controls are an impediment to United States competition in the international marketplace. International competition inspace commerce is stiff and growing, and ITAR harms United States industry and limit the ability to access and make use of the best capabilities. Globalization of space is desirable and ITAR is a barrier.ITAR damages national security by placing legal and bureaucratic restrictions on the United States military use of commercialspace assets that rely on a robust satellite industry and space industrial base. The fact is that the United States military is dependenton commercial space services.ITAR directly impacts approaches to national security space whereby the United States is denying allies access to warfighting andspace protection capabilities.

U.S. export controls block aerospace competitivenessWalker et al, 02 - Chair of the Commission on the Futureof the United States Aerospace Industry Commissioners (Robert, FinalReport of the Commission on the Futureof the United States Aerospace Industry Commissioners, November,http://www.trade.gov/td/aerospace/aerospacecommission/AeroCommissionFinalReport.pdf )

Restrictive Export Controls. One of the primary obstacles to the health and competitiveness of the U.S. aerospace industry is our own export control regime . Export controls have been and should be an important component of Americas national security. We

believe, however, current export controls are increas- ingly counterproductive to our national security inter- ests in their currentform and under current practices of implementation. In our judgment, export control reform is crucial to provide better security inthe future and to insure the health and vitality of our aerospace industry .

Export controls undermine U.S. aerospace joint venturesWalker et al, 02 - Chair of the Commission on the Futureof the United States Aerospace Industry Commissioners (Robert, FinalReport of the Commission on the Futureof the United States Aerospace Industry Commissioners, November,http://www.trade.gov/td/aerospace/aerospacecommission/AeroCommissionFinalReport.pdf )

More importantly, U.S. export controls are under- mining one of the central goals of military planning during the past 30 years

alliance interoperability. We actively try to get allies to buy American military equipment to improve our ability to fight as analliance, yet we bog down that process through net- tlesome export controls. For example, during the Kosovo air war, allies were petitioning the DoD to intercede with the State Department to expedite license approval of weapon systems needed to arm combataircraft flying side-by-side with American pilots.Export controls are undermin- ing the collaboration between companies in alliance countries on new system developments. Foreign companies have actually instructed design engineers to avoid American components because of the difficulty of acquiringlicense approval from the United States government .The current approach to export controls is increasingly isolating the American aerospace industry from the commercial sector in anunproductive cocoon of regula- tion. The defense industrial base is falling farther and farther behind the commercial market place

because it has to cope with excessive regulation .

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Aerospace ext 3 workforce crisisCant solve competitiveness- bad science education undermines the US

Colwell, 8 - President of the University of Maryland Biotechnology Institute, Professor of Microbiology and Biotechnology at theUniversity Maryland(Rita, Bioscience Silent Sputnik January 2008, pg. 3, Proquest)

A glance at statistics from the Council on Competitiveness is disconcerting: the United States is 20th in the world in broadbandInternet penetration, just after Luxembourg; and whereas Nintendo invested more than $140 million in research and developmentin 2002, the US federal government spent less than half that sum on research and innovation in education. With the amount of newtechnical information doubling every two years, students in college today will find that much of what they are taught will beoutdated by the time they graduate. Moreover, according to former secretary of Education Richard Riley, the top 10 jobs indemand in 2010 will not have existed in 2004. So not only are our students falling behind in science and technology, as measured

by standard tests globally, but the training they are getting will be insufficient for survival in the global economy.

There will be a brain drain in the aerospace industry due to Cold War scientists retireTessler, 8 (Joelle, Air Force News, US aerospace and defense sector braces for potential brain drain as Cold War workers retireMarch 4, 2008, http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2008/03/ap_braindr Ain_030408/)

The aerospace and defense sector is bracing for a potential brain drain over the next decade as a generation of Cold War scientistsand engineers hits retirement age and not enough qualified young Americans seek to take their place.The problem almost 60 percent of U.S. aerospace workers in 2007 were 45 or older could affect national security and evenclose the door on commercial products that start out as military technology, industry officials said.While U.S. universities are awarding two-and-a-half times more engineering, math and computer science degrees than they did 40years ago, defense companies must compete with the likes of Google, Microsoft and Verizon for the best and the brightest.

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Aerospace ext 5 trade barriersGlobal trade barriers in aerospace are increasing

Walker et al, 02 - Chair of the Commission on the Futureof the United States Aerospace Industry Commissioners (Robert, FinalReport of the Commission on the Futureof the United States Aerospace Industry Commissioners, November,http://www.trade.gov/td/aerospace/aerospacecommission/AeroCommissionFinalReport.pdf )

We are greatly concerned, however, where the rise inforeign competition has been aided by persistentgovernment intervention. Wesee concerted strate-gies by other governmentsto unseat U.S. companiesfrom their position of world leadership.Interventionist

policies are being used as tools toestablish and support national champions protect-ing them from market forces at the expenseof U.S.industry. These policies are described in the International Playing Field section later in this chapter.

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Hegemony doesnt stop war

Heg doesnt solve major warsEland 02 Director of defense policy studies at the Cato Institute

(Ivan,, The Empire Strikes Out The New Imperialism and Its Fatal Flaws, Cato policy analysis no 459, nov 26)

Some advocates of an expansive U.S. foreign policy have argued that actual expenditures on a worldwide U.S. military presenceare less than the potential costs to the United States of future wars resulting from the absence of such U.S. global policing . Twoacademics, Eugene Gholz and Daryl G . Press, debunk this myth by using empirical data from major wars World War I and the Iran- Iraq War todemonstrate that neutral countries incur only small costs, or actually profit, from even large conflicts. Because the world economy

especially in an age of globalization of trade and investmentis flexible and resilient, neutral countries can profit from war byselling to belligerents, by taking over markets that warring nations have previously served, by lending money at high rates of return to the fighting countries, and by buying up assets cheaply that have been liquidated by belligerents to fight the war. In addition,Gholz and Press found that the United States pays much more attempting to ensure global security than it would lose frominstability and war ( and that even with the generous implicit assumption that all U.S. military interventions promote rather than detract from global stability). In short,Gholz and Press demonstrate that the current U.S. policy of being the worlds policeman does not pass the cost/benefit test. 84 Suchempirical data confirm the conclusions of the much earlier intuitive cost/benefit analysis done by Earl Ravenal, a former distinguished research professor of international affairs atGeorgetown University.85

Heg doesnt prevent war, no risk of disaster without hegConry 97 foreign policy analyst at the Cato Institute

(Barbara, U.S. "Global Leadership": A Euphemism for World Policeman, Cato Policy Analysis No. 267, February 5, 1997)

Other proponents of U.S. political and military leadership do not point to particular benefits; instead, they warn of near-certaindisaster if the United States relinquishes its leadership role. Christopher paints a bleak picture: Just consider what the world would be like without Americanleadership in the last two years alone. We would have four nuclear states in the former Soviet Union, instead of one, with Russian missiles still targeted at our homes. We would have afull-throttled nuclear program in North Korea; n o GATT agreement and no NAFTA; brutal dictators still terrorizing Haiti; very likely, Iraqi troops back in Kuwait; and an unresolvedMexican economic crisis, which would threaten stability at our border. [55] Gingrich has pronounced a future without American leadership "a big mess." [56]And former British primeminister Margaret Thatcher has warned, What we are possibly looking at in 2095 [absent U.S. leadership] is an unstable world in which there are more than half a dozen "great

powers," each with its own clients, all vulnerable if they stand alone, all capable of increasing their power and influence if they form the right kind of alliance, and all engaged willy-nillyin perpetual diplomatic maneuvers to ensure that their relative positions improve rather than deteriorate. In other words, 2095 might look like 1914 played on a somewhat larger stage. [57]

In other words, if America abdicates its role as world leader, we are condemned to repeat the biggest mistakes of the 20th century--or perhaps do something even worse. Such thinking is seriously flawed, however. First, to assert that U.S. leadership can stave off

otherwise inevitable global chaos vastly overestimates the power of any single country to influence world events. The UnitedStates is powerful, but it still can claim only 5 percent of the world's population and 20 percent of world economic output.Moreover, regardless of the resources Americans might be willing to devote to leading the world, today's problems often do notlend themselves well to external solutions. As Maynes has pointed out, Today, the greatest fear of most states is not externalaggression but internal disorder. The United States can do little about the latter, whereas it used to be able to do a great deal aboutthe former. In other words, the coinage of U.S. power in the world has been devalued by the change in the international agenda. [ 58Indeed, many of the foreign policy problems that have confounded Washington since the demise of the Soviet Union are the kinds of problems that are likely to trouble the world well into

the next century . "Failed states," such as Somalia, may not be uncommon. But, as the ill-fated U.S. and UN operations in that countryshowed, there is very little that outside powers can do about such problems. External powers usually lack the means to prevent or end civil wars, such as those in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, unless they are willing to make a tremendous effort to do so.Yet those types of internecine conflicts are likely to be one of the primary sources of international disorder for the foreseeablefuture. Despite the doomsayers who prophesy global chaos in the absence of U.S. leadership, however, Washington's limitedability to dampen such conflicts is not cause for panic. Instability is a normal feature of an international system of sovereign states,which the United States can tolerate and has tolerated for more than two centuries. If vital American interests are not at stake,instability itself becomes a serious problem only if the United States blunders into it, as it did in Somalia and Bosnia. [59]

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China frontline1. Any Chinese attack has to happen in broad daylight and is easily defendable by the USForden, 8An M.I.T. research associate and a former UN weapons inspector and strategic weapons analystCongressional Budget Office

(Geoffrey, PhD, How China Loses the Coming Space War, 1-10-08, http://blog.wired.com/defense/2008/01/inside-the-chin.html#more)

Finally, the interceptor needed to track its target, so that it could determine where it should move to place itself in front of theobsolete weather satellite; we have a good sense of how that was done, too. The most likely method it employed to track theoncoming satellite was an on-board telescope using visible light. Locking onto a target this way -- as opposed to focusing on theinfrared light emitted by the heat of the target, the way the US missile defense interceptor does -- imposes significant limitationson the system. I n particular, until it develops a far-infrared capability, which is probably decades away, its ASAT will be forced to attack satelliteswhile they are in bright sunlight. Indeed, even though the site from which the interceptor was launched was cloaked in darkness,the target satellite was high enough to be brightly illuminated by the sun. Until China does develop better sensors, this imposes avery severe constraint on how and when it could attack other satellites: it must wait to attack low Earth orbit satellites when theyare in bright sunshine. Attacks against satellites in significantly higher orbits, such as GPS or geostationary satellites, are less constrained by this requirementsince they are almost always in direct sunlight.

2. Many things prevent a Chinese attack on US satellites: targets deep in space, hitting many targetssimultaneously, keeping the whole thing secret, and a US preemption.Forden, 8An M.I.T. research associate and a former UN weapons inspector and strategic weapons analystCongressional Budget Office

(Geoffrey, PhD, How China Loses the Coming Space War, 1-10-08, http://blog.wired.com/defense/2008/01/inside-the-chin.html#more)

But China could not launch the massive attack required to have anything like a significant effect on US ability to utilize spacewithout months of careful planning and pre-positioning of special, ASAT carrying missiles around the country. It would also haveto utilize its satellite launch facilities to attack any US assets in deep space: the GPS navigation satellites and communicationssatellites in geostationary orbit. Most importantly, it would have to time the attack so as to hit as many US satellites assimultaneously as possible. And, despite all that movement, Beijing would somehow have to keep the whole thing secret. Failureto do so would undoubtedly result in the US attacking the large, fixed facilities China needs to wage this kind of war before the full

blow had been struck. Even if the United States failed to do so, China would undoubtedly plan for that contingency.Based on the orbits of US military satellites determined by the worldwide network of amateur observers, there appears to be a large number of low Earth orbit military satellites over China several times each week. Tohit them, China would have to preposition its ASAT-tipped missiles and their mobile launchers in remote areas of China, one position for each satellite. (If reports of low reliabilities for these missiles are correct, two or more missiles might be assigned to each satellite.) Furthermore, these positions are really only suitable for a particular day. If Chinas political and military planners have any uncertainty at all about which day tolaunch their space war, they would need to pre -position additional launchers around the country. Thus, attacking nine low Earth orbit satellites could require as many as 36 mobile launchersenough for twointerceptors fired at each satellite with a contingency day if plans changemoved to remote areas of China; areas determined more by the satellite orbits than Chinas network of road. (As will be discussed below, nineis about the maximum they could reasonably expect to hit on the first day of the space war.) Xslc_launch_pads At the same time that China would be trying to covertly move its mobile missile launchers around the

country, it would also have to assemble a fleet of large rockets -- ones normally used for launching satellites. The more large rockets China uses for this task, the more deep-space satellites it can destroy. At present, however, China only has the facilities for assembling and launching a total for four suchrockets nearly simultaneously. Two would have to be assembled out in the open where they could be observed by US spy satellitesand two could be assembled inside a vertical assembly building during the 18 days it takes to stack and fuel the Long March rockets stages while preparing to launch. [See right.] Even the two assembled indoors wouldneed to arrive by train and eventually would have to be moved, one after the other, to the launch pad. Each of these rockets, usually reserved for launching satellites into geostationary orbits, could carry three to four interceptors and their special orbital maneuver motors to attack either US navigation satellites, at about 12,000 miles altitude, or communications satellites at about 22,000 miles. Four days prior to the attack, Chinawould launch the first of its Long March rockets carrying deep-space attack ASATs; the same launch pad would have to be used for the second rocket stacked inside the vertical assembly building. As the techniciansrenovated that pad, the first rockets payload would circle the Earth in a parking orbit at about 200 miles altitude waiting to be joined by the other deep-space ASATs. This would appear to be a tell-tale sign of animpending strike. But China could explain the delay to the international community by claiming that the third stage, intended to take the payload it its final altitude, had failed to fire and that they were working on it.Roughly six hours before the first the attack on the USs low Earth orbit military satellites, the other three Long March rockets would have to be fired since it takes roughly that long to get their payloads up to their targets orbits. Delays or failures to launch any of these rockets would strand their interceptors on the launch pad and subject them to possible retaliatory bombing by the US.

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China frontline3. Even if China successfully took out all of the US military satellites, the military could still survive on civilianones

Forden, 8 An M.I.T. research associate and a former UN weapons inspector and strategic weapons analyst Congressional BudgetOffice

(Geoffrey, PhD, How China Loses the Coming Space War, 1-10-08, http://blog.wired.com/defense/2008/01/inside-the-chin.html#more)

While it is possible for China to eliminate the eight US military communications satellites in geostationary orbits that can broadcast to the Taiwan Straits, Beijingdoes not have enough the lauch capacity for as many ASATs as it would take to eliminate all 22 civilian communications satellitesthat could also be used . However, not all of these satellites have equal capacities for transmitting information; it might be possible for China to destroyenough of that capacity to limit the US military. During the invasion of Iraq in 2003, US armed forces sent and received a tremendous amount of information viasatellite. This included video conferencing between the Pentagon and the commanders in the field, satellite photographs downloaded to operations planners, ordersdirecting jets where to drop their bombs, and soldiers emailing their families back home. At its peak, all of this added up to about three billion bits per second, atremendous amount of information. Bandwidth was and continues to be a premium on the battlfield, particularly at the tactical level. And the appetite for information is only increasing. But the total amount of information transmitted over satellites is certain to increase by the next time we go to war; perhaps it couldtriple or even quadruple to twelve billion bits per second in the next ten years. Assuming that the eight military communications satellites aredestroyed first, that leaves at most eight ASATs to destroy the eight most capable civilian communications satellites. If these eightare removed, then there is still a total capacity of over 14 billion bits per second in US owned and operated civilian

communications satellites. Thus, there should be enough transmission capacity for our military -- even if the demand for satellitecommunications increases by a factor of four. And the US military is used to using civilian satellites, as the 2003 invasion of Iraqshowed. The vast majority (84%) of all military communications into and out of the theater of operations went through civilian satellites.

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China frontline4. Globalization prevents Chinese aggression and balancing- they dont want to fightGarret, 2006; director of the Asia Program at the Atlantic Counci and former DOD consultant

Journal of Contemporary China , Volume 15, Issue 48 August

This analysis is cautiously optimistic that the first path - that toward building more robust Sino-American ties - is possible and that appropriate US and Chinese policies can encourage the development of a long-term, stable relationship as well as a US-China strategic partnership on a broadrange of issues of strategic importance to the United States. Such a relationship will not be conflict-free or without competitiveaspects, es pecially in the political and economic realms. And a robust US presence in East Asia, including strong alliance relationships withJapan and other traditional US allies, will continue to be important to maintain regional stability, provide reassurance to regionalstates during this period of 'China's rise', and to 'hedge' against the possible emergence of a more conflictual relationship withChina as well as possible conflict over Taiwan . But the United States is not likely to conclude that a strategy of containment towardChina is either necessary or feasible. Similarly, China will likely continue to pursue a strategy of seeking close ties with the UnitedStates rather than adopting an anti-hegemonist coalition strategy to counter American power and influence .1 At the same time, theChinese will likely seek to develop closer ties and cooperation with the European Union and other powers to bolster China's

bargaining position vis--vis the United States and hedge against the possibility of a sharp deterioration in Sino-Americanrelations . A key factor underlying my optimism is the assessment, argued in this paper, that 'globalization' is reshaping the global strategicenvironment. In this new strategic situation, the interests of the United States and China will limit strategic competition betweenthem and compel closer cooperation to respond to shared strategic threats and challenges. Globalization has led to converging -though by no means identical - national interests in many critical areas and a common interest in maintaining the overall global system of regimes, treaties and organizations governing international economic, political and security relations to the benefit of bothcountries. This high-level common interest does not preclude sharp differences over specific issues, but it is likely to create

pressure on the United States and China to cooperate in many areas in order to defend , maintain and strengthen the system and torestrain them from pursuing containment or confrontational strategies toward each other. Globalization has led to what could be called the'five Cs': i ncreasing constraints on US and Chinese strategic options vis--vis each other created by growing strategicinterdependence; expanding common interests on an increasingly wide array of international and global issues ; increasing need for

bilateral and multilateral strategic cooperation to meet the twin challenges presented by the globalizing and non-globalized worlds and transnational threats;inherent contradictions in globalization leading to conflicts over a myriad of issues that are often created by or exacerbated by globalization and the growingintegration, interdependence and mutual vulnerability of globalizing states; and on-going competition for political and economic advantagebetween nation-states in the global arena, although not zero-sum strategic competition for overall dominance. 1. Constraints onUS and Chinese strategic options Globalization has created a new 'strategic interdependence' among globalizing states as these states' economic power has becomeincreasingly dependent on maintaining, deepening and broadening economic ties with other globalizing states and the international system of peace and stability inwhich those economic ties thrive. Jockeying among states for political influence and economic advantage will continue, but this is likely to occur almostexclusively within the parameters of the international system that the major powers, now including China, recognize must be respected and jointly defended to

preserve their own national interests. Thus, a lthough successfully globalizing states may be economic and political competitors in thefuture, they are not likely to be strategic competitors in a zero-sum contest in which gains for one power, including economic, arenecessarily a loss for the other, and in which their long-term strategic goal is to weaken if not defeat the other power as was thecase in the US-Soviet strategic competition of the Cold War . Rather, these states will find the growth, prosperity and security of other powersessential to their own security and economic well-being. This view contradicts the views of prominent Realists, who see a clash between theestablished dominant power and a rising power, specifically China, as virtually inevitable, and call for efforts to slow and containthe growth of Chinese power. 2 In my view, however, the use of force or threat of force to gain strategic advantage or to settle disputesamong the globalizing states is likely to be viewed by leaders as potentially high cost/high risk without comparable, if any,

benefits, and thus not likely to be pursued as deliberate policy - although miscalculation can never be ruled out entirely, and in the case of China andthe United States, the Taiwan issue, which is left over from the pre-globalization era, holds the potential for direct military conflict between the two globalizing

powers.

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China ext 2 wont happenCommercial space users and Chinese caution prevent a U.S.-Sino space race

Saunders, 7 - Senior Research Professor at the National Defense Universitys Institute for National Strategic Studies(Dr. Phillip C., Chinas Future In Space: Implications for U.S. Security, 2007,http://www.space.com/adastra/china_implications_0505.html?submit.x=94&submit.y=10&submit=submit)

There are some incentives to avoid confrontation. Proliferation of space weapons would inhibit scientific cooperation and raisecosts of commercial satellites. (The global trend in both sectors is towards international collaboration to reduce costs.) Actual useof anti-satellite weapons could create space debris that might damage expensive commercial satellites. Commercial users of spaceare therefore likely to resist efforts to deploy counter-space capabilities. Beijing's strategic incentives may also change over time.Mindful of the Soviet Union's demise due to excessive military spending, Chinese leaders are wary of entering into an open-endedspace race with the United States. Moreover, as Chinese military space capabilities improve and are integrated into PLAoperations, the negative impact of losing Chinese space assets may eventually outweigh the potential advantages of attacking U.S.space capabilities.

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China ext 3 military would surviveChina could not even successfully take out all of the US Navigation satellites

Forden, 8 An M.I.T. research associate and a former UN weapons inspector and strategic weapons analyst Congressional BudgetOffice(Geoffrey, PhD, How China Loses the Coming Space War, 1-10-08, http://blog.wired.com/defense/2008/01/inside-the-

chin.html#more)

You need a launch pad to attack a target in deep space, like an American GPS satellite. China has just three of these pads. Thisreally restricts Chinas offensive capabilities in space. Assuming that China devotes all its deep-space ASATs on GPS satellites, itcould destroy at most 16 satellites. At the current time, with 32 functioning navigation satellites, that would still leave 16 satellitesstill working. Over a period of years, the debris from those collisions would represent a significant threat to more than thosesatellites immediately attacked. They would pass, time and time again, through the belts of debris that resulted from theinterceptions. However, it would probably take longer than the military conflict China initiated with these attacks beforeadditional satellites were destroyed by subsequent collisions. Usually, there are about nine GPS satellites over China at any giventime. If China somehow managed to destroy all of these, it could eliminate America's use of precision-guided munitionsfor afew hours, until the orbits of other GPS satellites take them over the Taiwan Straits. Quite quickly, the constellations other 23satellites would fill in the gap due to their normal orbital movement. Even if it destroyed 16 satellites, China could still onlyinterrupt GPS over the Straits for about eight hours. During the other 16 hours there would be the four or more satellites present

over the target area for bombing runs, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flights, and ship tracking. This pattern of eight hours off followed by 16 hours when GPS could be used would be repeated every day until new satellites are launched. This outage wouldcertainly cause difficulties; GPS not only guides American precision bombs it helps pilot UAV spy planes, and monitor ships. UScasualties might increase , with air crews forced to fly missions during daylight hours and conduct some of the "dull, dirty, anddangerous" missions now flown by robotic planes. It's a situation no American commander would want to face. But it would not

be a catastrophic one. And it would not eliminate precision weaponry, UAVs, or any other American activity that depends on GPS.Keep in mind, this is the worst of the worst-case scenarios. It is highly unlikely that China could remove all the satellites over theconflict area at the same time. After all, attacking 16 satellites, all in different orbits with ASATs launched on just four differentrockets involves some fairly complex orbital maneuvers. A much more likely scenario is that, at best, China could destroy four GPS satellites in the initial wave followed roughly seven hours later by four more, a third wave at roughly 45 minutes after that,and the final wave two hours later. Thus, the GPS attack is spread over ten hours and never eliminates all the satellites visible over the area of conflict at the same time. This Chinese attack on US navigation satellites would not eliminate or even significantlydegrade the USs ability use precision-guided munitions..

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Solvency frontline3. Technology fails its 40 years away

Day, 08 (Dwayne, Knights in shining armor, The Space Review, 6/9,http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1147/1 )

The NSSO study is remarkably sensible and even-handed and states that we are nowhere near developing practical SSP and that itis not a viable solution for even the militarys limited requirements. It states that the technology to implement space solar power does not currently exist and is unlikely to exist for the next forty years. Substantial technology development must occur before itis even feasible. Furthermore, the report makes clear that the key technology requirement is cheap access to space, which no longer seems as achievable as it did three decades ago (perhaps why SSP advocates tend to skip this part of the discussion and hope otherssolve it for them). The activists have ignored the message and fallen in love with the messenger.

4. UV rays will destroy satellitesTaylor, 7 Chief of the Space and International Law Division at Headquarters United States Air Force Space Command; B.A,Berry College; J.D. University of Georgia; LL.M. (Air and Space Law), McGill University (Michael W. Trashing the Solar System One Planet at a Time: Earths Orbital Debris Problem, Georgetown International Environmental Law Review, Fall, 2007,Gale) // DCM

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Solvency ext 1 lack of launchLack of space launch services inhibit space solar power

Mankins, 8 - president of the Space Power Association, and former Manager, Advanced Concepts Studies, Office of Space Flightat NASA (John, Ad Astra, Inexhaustible Energy from Orbit Spring 2008, pg. 20, http://www.nss.org/adastra/AdAstra-SBSP-2008.pdf)

A major barrier to all space endeavors also applies to space solar power, and that is affordable access to space. This barrier is oneof compelling importance. The problem of space access includes both low-cost and highly-reliable Earth-to-orbit transportation,and in-space transporta- tion. (Fortunately, one of the key ingredients in overcoming this barrier is having a market that requiresmany flights. Its hard to imagine how air travel between continents would be affordable if the aircraft were used once or twice per year rather than once or twice per day!)Advances that drive down the cost of space operations present signifi- cant hurdles, too. These hurdles involve a range of capabilities, most of which have never been demonstrated in spacebut all of which are entirely taken for granted here on Earth.The kinds of capabilities in question include the highly-autonomous assembly of large structures, the deployment and integrationof modular electronic systems, refu-eling, and repair and maintenance. (The key ingredient is to perform such operations withoutlarge numbers of operators and sustaining engineers on Earthwhich drive the high cost of contemporary space operations.)

Lack of low-cost space access blocks SSPMankins, 8 - president of the Space Power Association, and former Manager, Advanced Concepts Studies, Office of Space Flightat NASA (John, Ad Astra, Inexhaustible Energy from Orbit Spring 2008, pg. 20, http://www.nss.org/adastra/AdAstra-SBSP-2008.pdf)

Lower-Cost Space Access. Space launch is a well-known and clas- sic case of the chicken-and-egg problem, and one that has provenextremely hard to overcome. For many concepts, very low recurring costs per pound of payload can be achieved only withhigh launch rates (so that the cost of fixed initial investments and annual overhead costs can be spread across many launches).Achieving high launch rates depends upon the actual revenue-generating traffic to be carried, which depends significantly onearlier investments in space-utilizing enterprises (for example, investments related to in-space manufacturing capacity). And, as aresult, increased investments in space-utilizing enterprises (government or commercial) will depend upon the prior existence of assured availability of reliable launch services at the lower prices.So, in order to make space solar power possible, what has to be done about space transportation? In the case of conventional

transportation infrastructures, low cost has always been achieved through reuse of vehicles and the deployment of general-purposeinfrastructures that can be used many times by multiple customers, such as canals, rail- ways, roads, and airports. It is hard toimagine how automobiles, air- craft, ships, or any other modern transportation system might somehow be produced so cheaply thatthe transport could somehow be dispos- able after each use. In order for space solar power systems to be eco- nomically viable,reusable Earth-to-orbit launchers will be essential. In-space transportation advances are also needed. In-space trans- portationsystems must be very fuel-efficient. Also, transport hardware costs must be dramatically reduced through the development of reus-able, rather than expendable, systems. Finally, the personnel costs for the transport infrastructure must be drastically reduced: thesystem must be largely autonomous, involving neither marching armies of operators or maintenance engineers.

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Solvency ext 2 backlashUnilateral U.S. action in space undermines soft power and international cooperation

Sadeh, 08 - an Associate Director for the Center for Space and Defense Studies at the United States Air Force Academy (Eligar,The Space Review, Space policy questions and decisions facing a new administration, 6/9,http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1146/1)

IssueUnited States government leadership in space is not seen as productive by others. The United States government cannot be a leader if no one will follow. Today, the United States is not seen as a good partner in space.DiscussionThe position of the United States in world affairs is influenced by leadership in space. Given the many issues and challenges thespace community faces, leadership is by no means assured.In order to identify and meet the challenges in security, commercial, and civil space productive United States government spaceleadership is indispensable.Leadership requires that the United States develop a strategic vision for space to guide space policy decisions, which is supported

by strong executive leadership, and effective interagency and government-industry partnerships.International participation in security space is important. There is a need for the United States to think more about internationalengagement in the strategic response to the domain of space. It is not a go-it-alone problem. The United States government has

not given sufficient indication that the strategy is to include allies in national space policy.Space represents a soft power foreign policy tool. Space is an international drawing card that engenders national prestige, prevents conflict, and is a domain for international cooperation.

Cooperation is key to make SPS cost effectiveScientific American 8 , (Tim Hornyak Farming Solar Energy in Space: Shrugging off massive costs, Japan pursues space-basedsolar arrays July 2008, http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?id=farming-solar-energy-in-space) // CCH The total project cost would be enormousperhaps in the tens of billions of dollarsbut Suzuki and his colleagues say they arenot considering the price tag. We cant know whether this is feasible or not if we dont have the basic technology first, he says.Were aiming to produce stable, cheap power and hydrogen at a target price of 6.5 cents per kilowatt-hour. That would be in linewith conventional power generation costs of today and might make it more economically attractive. Given current technology,transporting large-scale structures into space may be feasible only through the cooperation of space agencies on different

continents. Suzuki, though, says countries in the space race are trying to develop their technologies independently while the potential militarization of space grows. If JAXA, NASA and the European Space Agency can work together, it would be best, headds.

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Solvency ext 2 backlash

SPS unilateral development risks international conflictNansen 2000 - President Solar Space Industries, (Ralph, Statement to the United States Congress Subcommittee on Space ScienceThe Technical Feasibility of Space Solar Power Before the Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, United States House of

Representatives Committee on Science September 7, 2000, http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewpr.html?pid=2571 ) // CCH

An inherent feature of solar power satellites is their location in space outside the borders of any individual nation with their energydelivered to the earth by way of some form of wireless power transmission that must be compatible with other uses of the radiofrequency spectrum. They must also be transported to space. Government involvement to coordinate international agreementscovering frequency assignments, satellite locations, space traffic control and many other features of space operations is mandatoryin order to prevent international conflicts. Solar power satellites will ultimately become part of the commercial electric utilityindustry and as such, that industry could be expected to shoulder the majority of the burden of development. However, the utilityindustry is not the only one that will benefit from the development of solar power satellites. All of the people of the world willeventually be the benefactors, through reduced atmospheric pollution and the availability of ample energy in the future. As a resultit makes sense that the development of solar power satellites be accomplished through a partnership of industries and governmentsof all the nations that wish to participate.

SPS development violates the Outer Space Treaty it will be treated as a weapon of mass destructionPop, 2k PhD Student, University of Glasgow Law School (Virgiliu, SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF NON-TERRESTRIALRESOURCE EXPLOITATION, http://www.geocities.com/virgiliu_pop/publications/security.pdf )

2.1. Mass Destruction Capabilities

Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty outlaws placement in orbit around the Earth of any (...) kinds of weapons of mass destruction (...). Weapons of mass destruction were defined in 1948 by the UN Commission for Conventional Armaments as those which include atomic explosive weapons, radioactive material weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons, and any weapons developed in the futurewhich have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned above [UN document S/C.3/32/Rev.1, August1948].

Given the evolution of the means of warfare since 1948, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 51/37 of 7 January 1997 [A/RES/51/37] in which itexpresses its determination

to prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction that have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of weapons of massdestruction identified in the definition of weapons of mass destruction adopted by the United Nations in 1948 and it

[r]eaffirms that effective measures should be taken to prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass

destruction.

As seen from above, there is no exclusive definition of weapons of mass destruction; in 1996, the US Secretary of State Warren Christopher classified the landminesas weapons of mass destruction in slow motion5.

Given the lack of a precise definition, the

Office of Technology Assessment of the United States Congress considers that it is unclear [w]hether an SPSs microwave orlaser capabilities would class it as a weapon of mass destruction and hence make it illegal under the 1967 treaty, but it is very likely that such charges would be made in theevent of SPS deployment 6. In order to analyse their (dis)qualification as weapons of mass destruction, one must examine thepossible destructive effects of the SPS technology.

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Solvency ext 3 tech barriersPrior space solar projects prove the technology will fail

Spencer, 08 (Roy, Reality Deniers, National Review, 1/15, lexis)

And now the space-based solar power crowd has returned. These "experts" point to the increase in efficiency that could be

achieved by putting solar collectors in Earth's orbit and beaming the energy down to the ground.And indeed you probably could get several times the amount of energy from a solar collector in space versus on the ground. Too

bad it would be insanely expensive.You might have heard of the problems NASA has had with relatively tiny solar collectors attached to the Space Station and SpaceTelescope. Now imagine putting a one-square mile collector in space. Even if we could get such a thing designed, built, launched,and working, it would replace only 1 of the 1,000 one-gigawatt plants I mentioned earlier that the U.S. alone needs.

Incentives for SSP dont make sense other technologies have to be developed prior to its competitivenessMacauley, 2k - analyst with Resources for the Future (Molly, Can power from space compete?, Space Policy, November,science direct)

Our second set of observations pertains specifically to challenges facing SSP:

The relative immaturity of the technologies required for SSP makes it difficult to assess the validity of estimated costs and thelikely competitiveness of SSP. For this reason, as in many space development initiatives, orders-of-magnitude reductions in thecosts of space launch and deployment and other key technologies are critical. As these reductions occur, the economic viability of SSP may become more promising. Until then, it is premature for the US government to make commitments such as loanguarantees or tax incentives specifically for SSP.

Solar power satellites will be impossible in the near future: 10 to 1 technology improvements are needed in severalareas.

Mankins 98 manager at NASA (John C. Mankins, The Space Solar Power Option, Ad Astra Vol 10 No 1 January/February1008)

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Solvency ext 3 tech barriersSPS is not cost effective or technologically feasible

David 2000 , (Leonard, Senior Science Writer, Space-Based Power System Needed to Solve Earths Energy Woeshttp://www.space.com/businesstechnology/technology/solar_power_satellite_000421.html , 4-21-00) // CCH

WASHINGTON -- Solar power satellites beaming energy to Earth could present daunting technological challenges and offer questionable economic potential, a NASA-funded study has found. But, the report also recommended that the federal governmentshould continue to study the concept and put more emphasis on creating a power plant in space that might support Earth-orbitingspacecraft and deep-space missions. Those are the key points from a study on 21st-century power-beaming satellites releasedFriday by a Washington think tank called Resources for the Future. Satellite solar power has been suggested as an alternative toterrestrial energy resources for electrical generation. The nine-month-long study looked at the market for electricity from the

present to the year 2020, roughly the year when many experts believe satellite solar power actually could be possible. Includedwere comments from the Electric Power Research Institute and Texaco.Among the findings: Conventional electricity generation in both developed and developing countries may be more than adequate in terms of cost,supply and environmental factors.Satellite solar power is relatively immature technology. That makes it difficult to estimate costs and the likely competitiveness of such an idea measured against other energy systems.

Lower launch costs could help make satellite solar power more promising. But until those costs go down, it is too early for theU.S. government to commit to related loan guarantees or tax incentives.Health risks associated with exposure to electric and magnetic fields generated by satellite solar power are likely to be of significant public concern.Such power may be useful for the International Space Station, moon bases or other space missions.However, Molly Macauley, an economist who led the study, said the findings should not preclude NASA working on such aconcept."But it's going to be very difficult to make it competitive with terrestrial power," she told SPACE.com. "It's a very hard sell.""My concern with satellite-solar-power advocates is that they aren't looking over their shoulders to realize that technologicalchange and innovation in markets is happening within conventional approaches."

SSP technology doesnt work it would require major breakthroughs

Day, 08 (Dwayne, Knights in shining armor, The Space Review, 6/9,http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1147/1 )

You may not have noticed, but the space activist community is all worked up about space solar power (see A renaissance for space solar power? , The Space Review, August 13, 2007). It is now the topic of much conversation whenever a group of spaceenthusiasts get together. It was recently on the cover of the National Space Societys magazine Ad Astra. The upcoming NewSpace2008 conference will feature a panel on it. The International Space Development Conference in Washington, DC featured no lessthan threeyes, threesessions on space solar power, or SSP, to use the shorthand term, plus a dinner speaker who addressed thesame subject. With all of this attention, one would suspect that there has been a fundamental technological breakthrough that nowmakes SSP possible, or a major private or government initiative to begin at least preliminary work on a demonstration project. Butthere has been none of this. In fact, from a technological standpoint, we are not much closer to space solar power today than wewere when NASA conducted a big study of it in the 1970s.

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Solvency ext 3 years awaySSP is decades away

Foust, 08 - editor of the Space Review (Jeff, Energy vs. space, The Space Review, 7/14,http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1169/1 )

Another common response, of course, is to cite the promise of space solar power (SSP). And, indeed, SSP could go a long waytowards solving the nations energy woesin theory. The problem is that even supporters of SSP acknowledge turning that theoryinto reality is still decades away, assuming that technological and financial obstacles can be overcome: little comfort for thosefeeling pain at the pump today. Moreover, others are less sanguine about SSPs prospects (see Knights in shining armor , TheSpace Review, June 9, 2008).