Sir Harold Briggs and the Malayan Emergency by David F. Mitchell

8/11/2019 Sir Harold Briggs and the Malayan Emergency by David F. Mitchell

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A80Vt: British fioops dismounl under fhe olter theirpotrol is ombushed on lhe rood. BEIOW: Ponoromi< viewo{ o tloloyon reseltlemenl conp.

so\.emmenL the sultans, traditionally the admin-srative and spiritual guides within their respec-:rve states, lost much of their authority. This,;oupled with the British proposal to include non-

\lalays in the political process, sparked the for-nation of the Pan-Malayan Congress, which;rer became the-United Malays National Orga-:tzation (UMNO).

The new organization protested the MalayanlL ilon, which resulted in abandonment of the'rst established government inJuIy 1946. AIonstitutional Working Committee wasiormed among UMNO, the government, andi-arious other factions. New proposals weredrafted; however, the new government, whichbecame known as the Federation of Malaya,-,ras not proclaimed until February 1., 1.948.

\{any Malayan Chinese and Malayan Indiansrvere outraged with the decision and subse-quently protested against the formation of theFederation.

Opposition to the Federation mountedfuoughout 1,947 , and many in the Chinese com-muniry began to conclude that the British weresiding with the Malays. This was particularlyinsulting to scores of ethnic Chinese who hadr olunteered to fight with the British against the

Japanese. Many of the M?AJA had been trained

by the British military in guerrilla warfare tacticsand feit betrayed by their former cohorts.

In March 1948, the MCP made the officialdecision to move toward guerrilla warfare as aprimary tactic. Violence soon spread through-out the peninsula, which resulted in the decla-ration of a state of emergency by the British on

June 1 8, following the death of three Europeanplantation managers two days before. TheMCP and any organizations that supportedtheir efforts were declared illegal.

The government began to implement a pol-icy of coercion and enforcement, includingmass arrests and deportations, to address whatthey initially believed to be a criminal uprising.This plan ultimately backfired for multiple rea-sons. For one, the British were applying large-scale conventional tactics that had been suc-cessful during Vorld \flar II to an insurgency.Vhen numerous soldiers were sent into hostile

territory to engage in sweeps, they wereambushed in guerrilla hit-and-run attacks.The short-handed and poorly trained police

force (initially consisting of only 9,000 men ina country of roughly five million) further damp-ened government efforts because they werelargely corrupt. Virtually the entire force con-sisted of ethnic Malays, and many officers,wrongfully perceiving that all Chinese weresupportive of the MCP, in turn treated thempoorly, which resulted in many neutral indi-viduals joining rhe Communists.

Numerous Chinese were driven into the Com-

munist camp following the destruction of sev-eral villages and huts by government authorities.

Security forces, believing a certain individual orcommuniry was assisting the MCP, would burnentire areas to the ground, leaving many peoplehomeless and disgruntled. The MCP spread thenews of these events to rural areas during theirpropaganda campaigns, which helped withrecruitment and drove many Chinese to believethat the British were just as bad-if not worse-than the Japanese had been.

Tensions continued to rise between theMalay-run state governments and the federal

government. The states largely believed thecommunist uprising to be a federal issue andfailed to cooperate with the authorities. Moneywas also becoming an issue, and the Federation

was forced to acquire a loan from London inorder to continue its activities. A further blowcame after news of the communist victory inChina, which the British government subse-quently recognized on January 6,7950.

Perceiving that the communists now had agood chance of succeeding, several Chinese

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Sritish troops lelurn from pofiol wilh the body ol o sloin tommunisl guenillc dropedocross a pole.

camps, 80 percent of which were in weMalaya, by the end o11.951..

Under Briggs's direction, the governmbegan to systematically enforce the resettlepolicy. Following the selection of an adearea of 1and, troops were sent into the iunround up a group of squatters. The meninstructed to be as civil and compassionatpossible, and the troops often would help

the squatters' belongings ontomilitary ve

and transport them to their new homes.ilies lost a1l that they could not take withas everything left behind was destroyed s

it could not be utilized by the MCP.The squatters were moved into settlem

that were strategically placed in flat, open

to deter surprise attacks. The compactments, surrounded by barbed wire andlights and regularly patrolled by police,instituted to diminish the Min Yuen supplyand force the guerrillas out of the jungle

resettlement plan was to be implemented

tially in Johore, thestate with the largest s

ter population, and progressively work inorth in what Briggs described as "rollimap up on the guerrillas from bottom toHowever, due to the overwhelming Mpresence in Johore and the financial sureceived by the guerrillas from Chinese

squatter communities.Briggs believed that if the squatters could be

;ut off from the communist cells, the MRLAn ould not be able to survive for long in the jun-

gle. Although a resettlement policy had been in

place prior to the director's arrival, it waslargely inept and unsuccessful. Briggs central-ized the policy in the federal government on

June 1, 1950, and drastically altered the results,

resettling roughly 385,000 squatters in 480

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munities in Singapore, this approach was larerabandoned.

The squatter population held mixed opinionson resettlement, but there was surprisingly lirtle opposition. In many instanceg theiwereprovided wirh medical care. running warer,elecrriciry. schools. and recreationrf *r,rlr[,for children, such as the Boy Scouts. Xfelfareofficers, many of whom were young voiunteers

in their 20s from Australia and Nelry Zr^,t^"i,were brought in to help with the udrninirt rltion of schools and clinics. Missionaries whohad recently been banned from China also vol_

,

d*t,

a

unteered to help in the villages.Although it varied from settlement ro settle,

ment, the average family received a rwo_weeksubsistence allowance to build irs new home,along wirh 800 square yards of land and anaddirronal two acres of farmland. The viliageswere typically locared two ro six miles frorn ih.squatters' original homes and consisted of anlve,rage

of 1.00 ro 1.000 people, alrhough a fewnad upwards of 10.000.

Gates were established in the resettlementcamps, which later became known as .,NewVillages," and a nightly .urf.* *u, i.pl._mented from 7 pv to 6 AM. The head of .a.hhouse was required to keep , lirt of.u.rv o..u-pant and instructed by law to notifi, the policewirhin 24 hours of any arrival or'a.prr*r..l-ood was conrrolled and monitored cioselr incommunal kirchens to inhibit rransfer ro theguerrillas. Many of rhe guerrilla units began rogo hungry. which led in rurn ro aruacks oi rheirfellow Chinese to obtain food. This g;..dydamaged rhe party's repurarion. Srarvationdrew many MRLA insurgenrs our of the junglern search of food and subsequenrly forced themto engage military and police forces in openwarfare.

selling information to multipl. ugencies simul_taneously and stressed the importance of main-

taining one intelligence r:,i::r:z-:rsingle .direcror. Ourp, ,:., ,,.;--throughour the counr:. ,r-*.-.rgather as much intbrm.:r,,, , ,. ihas possible bv personai .- _:.rJr nlagers. Handsome re\\,:fc: .,i.;ia Sllwho provided the Specr-:, B::r,hmation leading to rhe arr..r :,: deguerrilla members. Thi jr:rlLsc;.was extremel.v successtul. an;

rr1i13

the Special Branch had obr:in.d;hephotographs of vinualh er er-,. nemMRLA,

The start of rhe Korean \far on1950, gave an enormous boost to ,hMalayan econom)-. The peninsula',commodiries. rubber and rrn. terc rlarge quantities and as a result rheshortage of emplolmeni rvirhin rhelages. The Chinere squarrers rrhoresettled were now provided rvith job

For many of the rurai Malayan Chinese. theirexperience in the New Villages was th; firstcontact they had ever had withthe government.The authorities rook advanrag. oIth. oppor-tunity and began to teach the younger.hlldr.nabour rhe go\ ernmenr ln rhe irope"of ;nrriLi,rea sense of narional identificarion. As Brispisrared. ''One of rhe mosr viral aims tnrorghliithe Emergency must be ro commit the Cliineseto our side, partly by making them feei thatMalaya and nor Red China is their home.,,

Resettlement was only one aspect of curtail_ing the uprising. The Briggs plan also resrruc_tured and expanded the Speciai Branch, theintelligence arm of the police rhar *r, ,.rpon_sible for garhering and inrerprering informa_tion. Briggs was concerned about"informers

ABOVI: lieurenont Generol Sir Gerold Terwounded. and bleeding comnrunist insurgen

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i --::r::. \-ages were substantial, and pros-- : - - :r-;rd rvirhin the communitiet.

: r -,r -,ras also responsible for shifting large-'-r : : . r\ entional tactics to small patrols bet--:- :- -:J for counterinsurgency operations.r-:- '.{i1 not initially well received by many ofr:: ::.rss rvho had cut their teeth on conven-.- r., n-arfare during \(orld \Var II, a decen-.:.- :.J. small-unit deep-jungle operational

.-r:trf,Ch ultimately proved successful and:::::1e d intact through the end of the war. At--: lrart of this transformation, Briggs stated:

:,l know, some brigadiers and battalion:.:manders aren't going to like what I'm. .:lg to tell them-that they won't be able to-.. bamalions or companies in sweeping move-1:nts anymore. They'll have to reconcile them-

..i','es to war being fought by junior comman-:.:s down to lance-corporals who will have the,.sronsibility to make decisions on the spot if--.-ressary. \X/e've got to look for the commu-,r is now, send small patrols after them, harass

::rm. Fleribility of operations in the iungle::ist be the keynote.",\lthough his initiatives were largely success-

:.. Briggs ran into several difficulties during.--: tenure as director of operations. Following:re end of his tour, which had been extended to

- months, he openly expressed his concerns'.,, -:h the campaign. Briggs recommended that::e new high commissioner assume the duties. i lhe director of operations in addition to his:r{ecutive responsibilities. This resulted in the:ual appointment of Lt. Gen. Sir Gerald Tem-: :r. a move that would drasticallv change the: -'urse of events in Malaya.

-\ commanding military officer with a no-r lnsense attitude, Templer was personally vet-:.j b,v Prime Minister Winston Churchill prior: hrs arrival in Malaya in February 1952.-- rrke Briggs, who lacked the executive author-.. to implement many of his ideas without

::ior approval and fear of possible appeal,Trmpler had virtually complete control over thes ruation. The high commissioner continued.:nd built upon several of the former directors':riiiatives, which greatly increased the overall-:fectiveness of the campaign.

-\lthough Templer went on to conduct a suc-;essful counterinsurgency campaign that ulti-nately resulted in the defeat of the guerrilla resis-:ance, the {ramework of the plan was initially;stablished by Briggs. The Briggs Plan trans-iormed the Malayan Emergency by placing an:mphasis on small-scale operations, intelligence

gathering, and cross-agency communication. Hisresettlement plan has gone down in history asone of the most effective counterinsurgency ini-

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Sir Harold Briggs and the Malayan Emergency by David F. Mitchell

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