Shi‘i Islamic cosmopolitanism and the transformation of religious authority in Senegal

Shi‘i Islamic cosmopolitanism and the transformationof religious authority in Senegal

Mara A. Leichtman

# Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Abstract Senegalese “conversion” to Shi‘i Islam resulted from cosmopolitan interactionswith West Africa’s resident Lebanese population and Iranian revolutionary ideologies. Shi‘iadvocates spread their religious convictions through teaching, conferences, holiday celebra-tions, and media publicity. Key to their success are libraries full of Arabic and French textsfrom Iran and Lebanon. Inherent in Islamic education is the authority bestowed on thosewho are knowledgeable, and with the spread of religious knowledge through books, media,and the Internet comes a broadening of the scope of religious authority and resulting conflictwith or accommodation of old political communities. Senegalese converts to Shi‘i Islam usetheir literacy in Arabic and individually acquired libraries of Islamic legal books to bypassthe authority of Sufi marabouts. Some keep their feet in both Sunni and Shi‘i worlds, andtheir ability to compare religious texts of both traditions wins them disciples. Shi‘i minoritiesclaim autochthony and authenticity in Senegal through narrating revisionist historicalaccounts of the spread of (Shi‘i) Islam to Africa. Conferences commemorating the martyr-dom of Imam Husayn during the Shi‘i mourning period in the month of Muharram targetSufi Muslims who also love the family of the Prophet. Shi‘i leaders skillfully detach thisforeign religious ideology from Middle Eastern politics and make this branch of Islamrelevant to Senegalese through establishing religious centers as NGOs, which work to bringhealth care and economic development to neighborhoods in the name of Shi‘i Islam.

Keywords Shi‘i Islam . Senegal . Religious authority . Cosmopolitanism . Autochthony

Introduction

Senegalese conversion to Shi‘i Islam is an intellectual endeavor.1 Resulting from theirappreciation of Ayatollah Khomeini, Senegalese Shi‘a embraced scriptural texts thatthey considered to be the absolute textual truth. The Iranian Revolution was thehistorical event that led them to go back further in history to the schism between

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1In contrast see the earlier literature on the spread of Islam to Africa examined in terms of forced conversionthrough conquest or the political economy of conversion for trade alliances (Levtzion 1979).

M. A. Leichtman (*)Department of Anthropology, Michigan State University, 310 Baker Hall, 655 Auditorium Rd., EastLansing, MI 48824, USAe-mail: [email protected]

Sunnis and Shi‘a following the Prophet Muhammad’s death (Leichtman 2009). Thisrethinking of Islamic traditions in West Africa was also reinforced by the expansion ofArab and Iranian proselytizing. Senegalese Shi‘a use their status as Arabisants, thoseliterate in Arabic who often pursued university degrees from Middle Eastern countries,to obtain a following. Yet despite their links to Iran and Lebanon they are hesitant toembrace foreign Shi‘i leadership in Senegal, resistance to which has led to theemergence of various African Shi‘i associations. Shi‘i Islamic authority in Senegal isgrounded in a variety of factors: the socio-religious environment; knowledge forma-tions (within which race, ethnicity, and national origins matter in the Islamic hierarchiesoperated by local Sufi orders); and the cosmopolitan networks of global Islamicorganizations. Senegalese Shi‘a therefore emphatically declare that their articulationand practice of Shi‘i Islam is distinctly African, and that the religion can be separatedfrom its cultural and political manifestations in Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon.

Members of Senegal’s myriad ethnic groups and (initially) various Sufi orderscollaborate in the common goal of propagating their new faith. While inscribing theirintervention in the local religious imaginary through reworking history and tradition,Senegalese Shi‘a are able to go beyond established ties of Senegal’s Sunni reformistmovements with Saudi Arabia and of local Sufi orders with the Senegalese state and(re)negotiate new international linkages with Iran and Lebanon. The result is what I call“conversion” to push theories of religious change to a new level as Senegalesesimultaneously search for their place both outside and inside their traditions. Fluencyin Arabic enables them to access religious texts, interact with other Shi‘a, and be part ofa global Islamic movement, while facilitating scholarships to study in the Middle East.Reformist Islamic schools have been competing with Senegal’s French educationalsystem since independence (Loimeier 2013). Becoming Shi‘a is therefore one waycertain Senegalese attempt to escape the colonial legacy, the failure of the Senegalesestate, and growing structural inequalities in their country (see Leichtman 2009). Theyspread knowledge about Shi‘i Islam in Wolof or other local languages, first to friendsand family, and ultimately to a larger population through teaching, conferences, holidaycelebrations, and media publicity, arguing that the intellectual benefits of Shi‘i Islamcan eventually be transformed into a better material future.

For anthropologists, vernacular cosmopolitanism, an “oxymoron that joins contra-dictory notions of local specificity and universal enlightenment” (Werbner 2006:496),highlights the plurality of practices that constitute and result from regionally diversehistoricities and worldviews. Becoming a “citizen of the world” through travel, migra-tion, religious networks, conversion, and education impacts national culture andnationalism. For Senegalese converts, as Shi‘i Islam travels to Africa it loses the (oftenpolitical) spirit that exemplifies religion in countries of origin: Iran’s revolutionaryundertones or Lebanon’s resistance forces. These processes provide new evidence forreformulating theories of cosmopolitanism to correspond with the complex relationshipbetween religion, migration, conversion, and ethnicity/nationalism. Thus Shi‘i rituals—and the global and local allegiances inherent in their performances—have distinctmeanings for Senegalese converts. Models of cosmopolitanism enable the theorizationof a global religious movement while remaining rooted in local culture and history.Beck argues, “what is distinctive about cosmopolitanization is that it is internal and it isinternalized from within national societies or local cultures” (2006:72-73; see alsoWerbner 2008). In these notions of cosmopolitanism the global remains important,

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but the focus shifts to local contexts that are concurrently shaped by, while alsoinfluencing, the global.

Debates about cosmopolitanism tie into recent discussions in African Studies ofautochthony (Comaroff and Comaroff 2000, 2001; Geschiere 2009; McGovern 2011,2013), cultural politics of indigeneity and commodification of ethnicity (Comaroff andComaroff 2009; Hodgson 2011), and sovereignty (Hansen and Stepputat 2005; Piot2010), which have been dominating questions of citizenship and belonging. Geschiereand Nyamnjoh argue that “cosmopolitanism and autochthony are like conjoined twins:a fascination with globalization’s open horizons is accompanied by determined effortstowards boundary-making and closure, expressed in terms of belonging and exclusion”(2000:425). Mbembe (2002) describes a cosmopolitanism of elites who strive toreconstruct African identity through re-enchanting their customs and traditions in alocal reappropriation of symbolic resources of globalization. The cosmopolitanism ofliterate Arabic-educated Senegalese differs from that of the political elite Mbemberefers to, whose cosmopolitanism is the product of mimicry. Yet both serve as inter-mediaries between localities, the state, and international networks, and can bridge theiraccess to international resources with local sentiments of belonging. Inspired by Iranianand Lebanese influences, Senegalese converts to Shi‘i Islam have vernacularized thisbranch of Islam to become nationally and “authentically” Senegalese. Senegal’s open-ness to religious plurality enables such groups to promote a cosmopolitan religioustolerance of others.

The circulation of religious ideas, Islamic clerics, and commodities across the Saharainto the Sahel and across the Indian Ocean into East Africa has existed historically, longbefore this present moment (Austen 2010; Robinson 2004). Migration, Islamic learning,and new media technologies have further encouraged Muslims to interact with oneanother and to become more aware of their religion’s internal diversity (Mandaville2001; Marsden 2008; Roy 2004). The increasing availability of books and MiddleEastern-style education are essential to challenging existing Islamic authority in Senegal,established through local Sufi Islamic knowledge and Qur’anic schools (Brenner 2001;Ware 2009). Such a focus on Shi‘i Islam as a global religious movement requires theintegration of Middle Eastern Studies with African Studies, examining ties betweenAfrica and the Middle East. How do Senegalese Shi‘a, who have chosen to be areligious minority, construct an Islamic identity separate from that of Senegal’s ubiq-uitous Sufi orders, which are often perceived to be synonymous with Senegalesenational identity? How is Shi‘i Islamic knowledge transmitted in West Africa? Sene-galese followers are convinced of Shi‘i Islam’s authenticity as well as the spiritualadvantages of joining this new movement through the construction of religious schoolsand mosques; the building of NGOs to promote the material benefits of Shi‘i Islam; therevision of Islamic history; the propagation of public conferences and media programs;and the adaptation of Shi‘i beliefs and rituals to the Senegalese context. This articleoffers a survey of all of these themes, limited by space in exploring any one of them indepth. 2 The multiple sections offer an overview of a variety of complementarydiscourses and practices, which employed together form a strategy for transformingreligious authority in Senegal.

2 References to other publications refer the reader elsewhere for greater elaboration, while some topics are tobe further explored in future research.

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In examining genealogy and mobility across the Indian Ocean, Ho coined the term“resolute localism,” which recognizes how designations of “foreign” or “local” arerelativized by history and framed in hierarchy, and can become valorized over timefrom “despised-foreign to valued-local status” (2006:68). Cosmopolitanism creates newreligious traditions, the most successful of which flexibly enable a mix of rituals thatsimultaneously encompasses the reality of a globalMuslim network and the particularityof the Senegalese context. Unlike the more rigid demarcation between Salafi and Sufitraditions of other Islamic reformist movements (for example the 2012 conflict innorthern Mali), Senegalese Shi‘a integrate Sufi Muslims into their institutions.

Whereas national borders and local customs do not circumscribe Senegalese religiouslives, Senegalese do not necessarily envision their new Shi‘i identity as a complete breakwith their Sufi roots. Transnational networks throughout the Muslim world and theability to command repertoires of discourse and ritual are precisely what make themcosmopolitan. I examine the ability of Senegalese converts to transform globalizationfrom unfamiliar foreign practices into local development projects and claims for be-longing. They strategically mold cosmopolitan ethics in ways that uniquely enable theircommunity to assert political autochthony. Devji (2009) examines Osama bin Laden andal-Qa’ida as an example of militancy’s endeavor to found a global politics outside ofinherited forms and institutions. Politics governing citizens of nation-states are replacedwith an ethical form of Muslims as human beings and “contemporary representatives ofhuman suffering” (Devji 2009:7)—no different, Devji declares, from other NGOsdedicated to humanitarian work. Similarly, through education, health care, and econom-ic development, Shi‘i Islam is de-radicalized and familiarized in Senegal as it caters tothe African public good. Religion thus concurrently provides a universalizing whiledifferentiating identity that transforms the conceptual framework of Shi‘i Islam into ahumanitarian and thus (locally) universal one from which everyone can benefit.

Following Devji, the earlier 1979 Iranian Revolution can be compared to al-Qa’ida,not in terms of particular Islamist agendas, but in attempts at universalism and globaldissemination to other Muslim contexts. As Khomeini’s ideologies traveled, the revo-lution’s violence and distinctly Iranian political message likewise transformed intoMuslim pride and Islamic humanitarianism. The revolution’s legacy continued to liveon as Senegalese converts in the 1980s and 1990s sought knowledge about Shi‘ijurisprudence and translated religious proselytizing into Shi‘i Islamic NGOs workingtoward economic development. Cosmopolitanism is, however, a fundamental ethicalconflict for Islam. If cosmopolitanism, according to Appiah (2006), is “universality plusdifference,” can religious minorities such as Shi‘a in Senegal promote a cosmopolitan-ism highlighting difference before universality, or promote a universality that will applyto a particular delineated group? This article will outline such strategies.

An overview of Islam in Senegal

Since the 1980s some Senegalese Sunni Muslims have been “converting” to Shi‘iIslam.3 Opportunity or circumstance led to their exposure to Shi‘i Islam through Islamic

3 I acknowledge that many Muslims may not consider the change in affiliation from one branch of Islam toanother a conversion.

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literature, media representations, or encounters with Lebanese or Iranian Shi‘a, whereasthe sociopolitical context of Senegal and distaste for the dominant maraboutic traditionis what encouraged them to convert. They find that the Shi‘i religious literatureconvincingly answers their questions about Islam that Sufi leaders had been unableto address. Mastering Sunni as well as Shi‘i literature enables them to bypass theauthority of Sufi leaders and establish their own following.

Senegal today is more than 90 % Sunni Muslim, dominated by a tradition of Sufiorders founded by shaykhs, religious clerics who have become saints. The descendents ofthese shaykhs, who inherit the spiritual power or baraka of the founder (Cruise O’Brienand Coulon 1988), continue to lead each order. The oldest Sufi order in Senegal is theQadiriyya, with origins in Baghdad. The largest is the Tijaniyya, an order that began inFez, Morocco. The most well-known order is the Muridiyya, whose founder, AmaduBamba, was Senegalese. Bamba’s Black African origin is important for many followers.4

Referred to as marabouts in Senegal, shaykhs teach and guide the talibe, theirdisciples, who study in Islamic schools called daara where they learn the Qur’an byrote memorization (see Brenner 2001; Ware 2009).5 The marabouts are perceived as all-knowing intermediaries between the talibe and God, and often have the role of“purifying” or “simplifying” the basic teachings of Islam to make them more accessibleto non-literate Muslims. Scholars, such as Cruise O’Brien, have suggested that theSenegalese case is an exception in Africa in that the intermediary auspices of the Sufiorders are institutionalized in the “assertion of an authentic (‘empirical’) statehood overmost of the national territory, involving rural masses as well as elites” (1996:458).Others have argued that Sufism as practiced in Senegal has developed unique variationsto Islam as practiced elsewhere in the Muslim world, and Senegal’s most significantinnovation is that social organization takes preeminence over ideology or theology inIslam (Villalón 1995). Senegalese Sufis are often exemplified by the ritual of njebbel,the vow of obedience pronounced by the talibe to their marabouts: “I place my soul andmy life in your hands. Whatever you order I will do; Whatever you forbid I will refrainfrom” (Villalón 1995:119. See also Cruise O’Brien 1971).

The ultimate social, political, and economic power perceived to be controlled bythese marabouts, and their occasional abuses of this power, leads some Muslimreformists, both Sunni and Shi‘i, to contest the dominance of Sufi orders in Senegal.Disciples displeased with their marabout can leave and pledge their vows to another.Arabic schools are not always directly affiliated to an order. Members of differentreligious groups often pray together in mosque during Friday prayer. Choosing abranch of Islam from outside Senegal enables Senegalese to remain good Muslimswhile escaping and even defying local Senegalese articulations of Islam.

Shi‘i Islam came to Senegal through the migration of people and ideas and bothLebanese and Iranian influences. Lebanese migrants first arrived in West Africa as theresult of a colonial fluke. As early as the 1880s, and especially during the 1920s,emigrants left Lebanon for Marseilles because of economic hardship. They planned to

4 Another Senegalese Sufi order is the Layen, which syncretically incorporates pre-Islamic beliefs associatedwith the sea. Its founder Limamou Laye proclaimed himself to be the Mahdi expected at the end of time, andhis son Insa Laye as a reincarnation of Jesus.5 The French first used the term marabout in West Africa to refer to members of Muslim lineages who werealso clerics, ranging from the obscure to the well-known and including urban and rural imams or prayerleaders, teachers, scholars, preachers, saints and Sufis, amulet confectioners and diviners. See Soares (2005).

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continue on to the United States or South America, where there had been previousLebanese immigration, but their ships docked at Dakar. The French colonial powerconvinced them to stay in West Africa to work as intermediaries in the peanut tradebetween the French in the cities and Senegalese peasants in the rural areas. Religion, inparticular Shi‘i Islam, had not been featured in the Lebanese process of settling andforming a new identity in Senegal until the arrival in 1969 of ‘Abdul Mun‘am al-Zayn,a shaykh from Lebanon who trained in Najaf, Iraq (Leichtman 2008a). Squeezedbetween the Senegalese and the French who displayed racial hostility towards them,Lebanese eventually became an ethnic group, erasing the crucial religious and regionaldifferences that have fueled conflicts back in Lebanon. There was no formal Shi‘ireligious representation in Senegal until the founding of the Lebanese Islamic Institutein 1978. Shaykh al-Zayn came to Dakar shortly before two defining events in themaking of a transnational Shi‘i movement: the Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990) andthe Iranian Revolution (1979).

Concurrent Iranian influences also played a subtle role in encouraging Shi‘i Islam inDakar. Iran has a history of economic cooperation with Senegal from the time ofMuhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, but the embassy was closed in 1984 for spreadingIslamic propaganda. The Iranian embassy reopened in the early 1990s and has beencareful to stress only its economic activities in Senegal.6 However, certain embassyevents continue to promote Shi‘i Islam. Iranians hold an annual reception for prominentLebanese and Senegalese Muslims for the anniversary of the Islamic Revolution.Iranians also finance Senegalese intellectuals to attend Islamic conferences in Tehran.The presence of Iranian Presidents Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad at the Organization ofthe Islamic Conference meetings in Dakar in 1991 and 2008, respectively, was highlypublicized, as was Senegalese President Wade’s numerous visits to Iran (see Leichtman2008b). In addition, an Iranian shaykh built Hawza al-Rasul al-Akram in Dakar in2001.7 The latest twist in political relations was the severing once again of diplomaticties between Senegal and Iran in February 2011. Senegalese authorities accused Iran ofsupplying weapons to anti-government rebels in the southern separatist Casamanceregion, and Iranian bullets were found to be the cause of death of Senegalese soldiers.8

Two years later, Senegalese President Macky Sall reestablished diplomatic ties withIran on 6 February 2013 when he met President Ahmadinejad at the Organization forIslamic Cooperation conference in Cairo. It remains to be seen how newly electedIranian President Rouhani will prioritize relations with Africa.

Competition from Iranian forces resulted in Shaykh al-Zayn’s efforts to be formallyrecognized as the leader of Senegal’s Shi‘a. The title of Caliph continues to be passeddown from father to son in Senegalese maraboutic families, where each caliph haspower over his own followers and disciples. In order to give himself equal status withthe heads of Senegal’s Sufi orders, Shaykh al-Zayn claimed the controversial titleCaliph Ahl al-Bayt, even though the title caliph has been used traditionally for SunniMuslim leaders. He stated publicly that the three caliphs of the Tijani, Murid, and Qadirorders agreed to confer this title upon him; however, one religious scholar in Senegal

6 Religious ties between the two countries were strengthened due to increased relations between Iranianpresident Ahmadinejad and Senegalese president Wade.7 A hawza is a seminary of Shi‘i Islamic training.8 “Senegal–Iran: From Friendship to Diplomatic War,” Afrik-News, 25 February 2011, http://www.afrik-news.com/article19020.html

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confirmed that the Lebanese shaykh created this title himself and asked the Senegalesecaliphs to formalize it. Although his Islamic Institute in Dakar caters primarily toLebanese needs, Shaykh al-Zayn also built mosques and schools throughout Senegalto teach Africans about Shi‘i Islam. He uses the title Caliph Ahl al-Bayt following hissignature in all religious documents and public announcements. Senegalese Shi‘a donot uniformly support the shaykh’s proclaimed status. The desire of some for anindigenous African Shi‘i leader led to divisions among Senegalese Shi‘a who workwith the Lebanese shaykh, those employed by the Iranian embassy, and those whocreated their own independent African Shi‘i organizations.

Literacy and religious authority in Senegal

Although Islam is often envisioned as embodied in women’s clothing, members ofreformist Islamic movements embody Islam in books, symbolic of religious knowl-edge. In Shi‘i Islam, religious education is also embodied in men’s dress, where acertain level of knowledge is indicated in wearing the robes and turban of a Shi‘ishaykh, an honor and status bestowed upon select African Islamic scholars. Someproudly wear this dress, while others choose not to mark themselves publicly in away that will be misunderstood by many Senegalese, following instead the Shi‘iprinciple of taqiyya, or dissimulation. They may also pray in the Sunni manner(without the turba, clay tablet, to which Shi‘a touch their foreheads during prostra-tion) when in Sunni mosques to avoid lengthy explanations to people who areunlearned, who may not have open minds, and who may think that the Shi‘a aremistaken in their practice of Islam.

Reformist movements, either Sunni or Shi‘i, are more likely to spread amongMuslims who are literate in Arabic.9 According to the World Bank, only 39.3 % ofthe Senegalese population (aged 15 and over) was literate in 2002, which increased to49.7 % in 2009 due to literacy programs (http://www.worldbank.org). These statisticsdo not account for Arabic literacy, which would likely increase these percentagesconsiderably. Senegalese literate in Arabic do not always intersect with those literatein French and counted in Western statistical indicators.10 Hastings (1997) has examinedthe vernacular’s transformation from oral to written usage, particularly for translatingthe Bible. Expanding on Anderson’s Imagined Communities (Anderson 2006), heargues that the Bible should be seen as a lens through which the nation is imagined.He uses examples from nineteenth and twentieth century Africa to explore the socialimpact of written literature, which may be greater when most people are illiterate andthe authority of the written text is mediated across certain privileged forms of orality.11

9 Brenner (2001) points out that the rise in Arabic literacy resulting from madrasa education spurred thegrowth of Sunnite sentiment in urban Mali throughout the second half of the twentieth century. Niezen (1990)also finds that the most important criterion for leadership in the rural reform movement among the Songhay ofGao is literacy in Arabic. However, some reformist movements, in Africa and other parts of the world, do notrequire Arabic literacy. See Samson (2009) and Janson (2009).10 See Ka (2002) and Ware (2009) for histories of Islamic schooling in Senegal. A reviewer has referred me tothe Department of Arabic Education of the Ministry of Education of Senegal for statistics on Arabic literacy.11 Jack Goody (1987; 2000), an anthropologist of West Africa, has written several books comparing oral andwritten cultures and exploring the transformative effects of literacy.

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Thus an oral literature, as well as a written literature, can be the medium for a people’sself-imagining and the means by which Islamic authority is bestowed.

Scholars of reformist Islamic movements have likewise examined the process ofauthentication, which is “dependent on textual study and historical inquiry, as well ason a particular notion of rationality” (Deeb 2006:20). Authentication is linked closely toobjectification, where “explicit, widely shared, and ‘objective’ questions are modernqueries that increasingly shape the discourse and practice of Muslims in all socialclasses” (Eickelman and Piscatori 1996:38). These frameworks can be applied to anAfrican context, where literacy in Arabic and knowledge of scriptural sources isunderstood as one way to become a modern Muslim. Eickelman and Piscatori datethe beginning of this process of authentication in the Middle East to events taking placein the 1980s. Other scholars argue that such movements began even earlier in Africa—in the 1930s and 40s in Mali, and as early as 1848 in Senegal (Schulz 2008; Loimeier2003). Senegalese converts, like Sufi marabouts and the Lebanese shaykh, have powerprecisely because they are literate and educated in matters of Islam.

For example, Mamadou was born into a prestigious religious family of the QadiriyyaSufi order.12 His father was an important marabout and gave his children a properreligious education. Mamadou studied Arabic and the Qur’an at an early age. He onlydiscovered Shi‘i Islam by leaving Senegal and the strong religious traditions of hisfamily. He went to Algeria to continue his education and eventually ended up inBurkina Faso as an Arabic teacher. One of his students was reading a book byMuhammad al-Tijani al-Samawi, called Thumma Ihtadaytu (Then I Was Guided), aboutthe Tunisian author’s discovery of Shi‘i Islam. Mamadou told his student, who wasgiven the book by an Iranian school in Ouagadougou, that Shi‘a do not believe inGod—a common stereotype. Nevertheless, he started to read the book and could notstop. Mamadou finished Samawi’s book before the next day, when he shared it with thedirector of the school, who also read and discussed it with him. The most striking partof the book for them was when a group of Africans went before Ayatollah Sayyid Abual-Qasim al-Khu’i—a great Iranian religious scholar who taught in Najaf, Iraq. Aya-tollah al-Khu’i asked the Africans which religious leader they followed, and theirresponse was Malik, the founder of the Malikite school of law during the first centuryof Islam. The Shi‘i leader questioned how they could follow a man who is dead. Al-Khu’i explained that Shi‘a no longer follow Ja‘far, the founder of the Shi‘i branch ofIslamic law, but they follow him.13 Senegalese like Mamadou were convinced by thisargument. After reading the book, Mamadou went to the Shi‘i bookstore in Ouaga-dougou to learn more and converted in 1990.

Books also circulate in Senegal that present the Shi‘a in a negative light. Youssouwas the shaykh of the largest Shi‘i mosque in Senegal, built by a Lebanese business-man but catering to a Senegalese Sufi congregation.14 He described various negativestereotypes about the Shi‘a heard by Senegalese:

They thought [the Shi‘a] were not even Muslims. So, it was a huge surprise toknow that a Muslim scholar championed a revolution, then to know that he

12 Pseudonyms are used to protect the identity of informants who are not public figures in Senegal.13 Ayatollah al-Khu’i was still alive at the time the book was written. He died in 1992.14 He died a few years ago.

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[Khomeini] was a Muslim with such great political and social stands. This made abig difference. People in Senegal heard that Shi‘a were atheists, had a Qur’andifferent from ours, denied Muhammad was the Prophet and viewed Imam ‘Alias the prophet and looked upon companions as atheists. Such misconceptionswere spread due to a lot of inaccurate books.

Youssou had in his possession one of these books, which he gave me because theywere so easily available in Senegal. The book, entitled Al-Khutut al-Arida (The Lines ofLatitude: The Foundation Upon Which the Religion of Twelver Shi‘ism Stands), waswritten by al-Sayyid Muhib al-Din al-Khatib, published in Saudi Arabia in the Islamicyear of 1280 (1902 C.E.). This book, which is still circulating in Senegal today,disseminates such stereotypes about the Shi‘a.

According to Youssou, once Senegalese begin to learn more about Shi‘i Islam, theywill accept its ideas. Nevertheless, he explained that the problem for Senegalese Shi‘a isthe lack of books about their religion. There are some books in the Lebanese IslamicInstitute, and he purchased other books during trips abroad, which he lent to Senegaleseafter Friday prayer.

The embodiment of Islamic authority

In order to read these books, to use arguments in championing Shi‘i Islam or to countermisconceptions of Shi‘a, one must be literate in the Arabic language. Thus, a primarymeans to authenticate Shi‘i Islam in Senegal is to develop educational institutions thatteach Arabic, which is not a native Senegalese language. Many Shi‘i schools andinstitutes were built in the 1990s, hidden in Dakar’s suburbs, the Futa, or in theCasamance region of southern Senegal. Built in the outskirts of villages, or deep insidethe residential maze of suburbs, the almost invisibility of institutes is another form oftaqiyya. Hard to find, and therefore difficult to be targeted by opponents of Shi‘i Islam,institutions cater exclusively to those who are open to learning from them, Shi‘i andSunni Muslim alike. Lebanese Shi‘a finance institutes through khums, the Shi‘i Islamictax of one-fifth of all income, and Senegalese migrants contribute through remittances.Yet Senegalese are critical of both Lebanese and Iranians for not being more generousor more involved in their activities. One convert told me there are myriad institutionsdespite the relatively small number of Senegalese Shi‘a because the founder of eachnew institute hoped for Iranian funding (often to no avail).15

Dakar’s suburbs were chosen as sites for Shi‘i institutes because, one founder toldme, these neighborhoods were full of dance and music, not religion and scholarship. TheAli Yacine Islamic Center for Research and Information was first located in a smallrented building in a popular residential quarter and in 2007 moved to a new largerbuilding purchased by the Islamic center. A library/prayer room is full of Shi‘i booksfrom Iran and Lebanon, and some published by Shaykh al-Zayn in Senegal. Most booksare in Arabic, focusing on philosophy and Islam in general, with a few books in French,

15 Iranian funding also came with conditions that some Senegalese Shi‘i leaders refused to accept.

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especially contributions written by Iranian Ayatollah Musavi Lari.16 When I visited, adozen high school students were being tutored in math outside in the courtyard. TheFranco-Islamic school offers both religious and secular lessons, including Arabic classesfor adults and children, tafsir (Qur’anic commentary) class on Thursday nights, andphilosophy and fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) on Saturdays. The institute hosts celebra-tions for Ramadan and mawlud, the Prophet’s birthday, in addition to celebrating‘Ashura, the tenth day of the month of Muharram, during which Shi‘a commemoratethe Martyrdom of Imam Husayn. Pictures of Mecca and of Ayatollahs Khomeini andKhamenei decorate the walls, along with photographs of the center’s founder withShaykh al-Zayn and various Iranian religious and political dignitaries.

Madrasat Imam al-Baqr is an Arabic-French school for 139 students (in 2003).Books come from a variety of places: the Qur’an from Saudi Arabia, Arabic grammarbooks from Lebanon, Arabic math books from Nigeria, Maliki fiqh books fromTunisia, history books written by Shaykh al-Zayn, and books with French lessons fromSenegal. Although it is common for Islamic schools to acquire books from manyplaces, in Senegal many Islamic schools do not have any books at all. The fact thatShi‘i schools make books available to students attests to the importance educators placeon literacy and a return to the texts. The school is financed through student fees anddonations from the Lebanese community; Senegalese remittances from Gabon, Amer-ica, and France; and Shi‘a in India, Lebanon, and Iran, among other sources.

‘Umar, the director of Madrasat Imam al-Baqr, explained to me that he faced manyproblems in establishing Shi‘i Islam in Senegal. Sufis do not accept new things, even ifthey are not overly hostile against them. When he started the school in 1992 he was justyounger than 40 years old, much younger than the other teachers, who could notrecognize a man of his age in an authoritative position, despite his impressive knowl-edge of Islam obtained through studying under Shaykh al-Zayn in Dakar, followed byfive years of religious training in Iran. Photos in the director’s office of the mosque ofMedina and the Ka‘ba at Mecca are meant to counter stereotypes prevalent amongSenegalese Sufis that Shi‘a do not use minarets in mosques for the call to prayer orperform the Hajj. ‘Umar remarked that Senegalese generally form opinions based onimages, therefore showing them other images enables them to accept differences. Newcosmopolitan forms of religious authority in Senegal, then, are about acquiring Islamicknowledge as well as learning how to apply this knowledge in culturally appropriateways in order to command respect from others.

‘Umar explained that his father was an influential Tijani shaykh. He illustrated hischoice of actions in leaving the ways of his family to become Shi‘i through a number ofanecdotes. He told me there was once a great scholar who managed the legal affairs ofhis community but did not have time to teach his children. When he died thecommunity assumed that his children were educated like their father. The eldest sonwas asked to continue his father’s work in all manners of jurisdiction, a request he wasunable to refuse. He instructed community members to return to his home the followingday with their questions. He immediately left the village and came back 40 years later

16 Sayyid Mujtaba Musavi Lari established the Office for the Diffusion of Islamic Culture Abroad in Qom in1980. This organization dispatches free copies of his translated works throughout the world and has printedQur’ans for free distribution among Muslim individuals, institutions, and religious schools in Africa. For moreinformation see http://www.irib.ir/worldservice/Etrat/English/Nabi/Besat/seal1.htm. Accessed 31 July 2008.

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full of knowledge. When people asked why he left he responded that before he wasunder the shadow of his father but now he has obtained his own knowledge.

A second anecdote was also about the death of a respected shaykh. This time thecommunity approached his older brother, thinking that he was also instructed in themanners of Islam. This man read from an important book of the Tijani tradition. Whenpeople approached him he placed the book behind him and taught them. When theydeparted he put the book back in front of him and became again a student. ‘Umarexplained once more that one must avoid being in the shadow of a great scholar andinheriting the books of another does not automatically make one knowledgeable.Everyone must study for himself and this is why he left the tradition of his father.

However ‘Umar does not renounce Tijani Islam but builds upon the notion ofnjebbel, the vow of obedience to a marabout. Even though ‘Umar is now Shi‘i theTijanis also consider him to be a respectable scholar. Caliph Mansur Sy (Caliph from1997 to 2012) nominated him to serve as his muqaddam (authorized Sufi representa-tive) even though ‘Umar simultaneously serves as a wakil (Shi‘i representative) forIranian Ayatollah Khamenei. His Islamic knowledge enables him to go beyond therequirement within the Tijani order that talibes not follow any other doctrine. Tijanisapproach ‘Umar before going to see the Grand Caliph. ‘Umar stopped wearing the Shi‘iturban when he was made muqaddam.

‘Umar is not the only shaykh who keeps his feet in both Sufi and Shi‘i Islam.Youssou’s mosque association meets on the first Wednesday of each month. BothSunni and Shi‘i members joined the association and represent the mosque at religiousoccasions of other mosques, working to link all Muslims in Senegal. In addition todaily lessons, religious lessons are taught on Fridays and Sundays, when pupilsmemorize the Qur’an and learn its interpretation, Islamic sciences, and Hadith. Shi‘astudy Ja‘fari fiqh on one side of the mosque and Sunnis study Maliki fiqh in theopposite corner. Such strategies of erudition demonstrate how Shi‘i Islam in Senegal isnot intended to be a complete break with Sufi Islam; its authenticity is envisioned in theability to integrate Sufi Muslims into institutions without requiring any formal trans-formation of religious belief or practice, merely the exposure, at times unknowingly, toother Islamic traditions.

These sketches are examples of the formation of new religious leaders whoseauthority lies outside the network of Sufi marabouts, yet they are also embedded inthe Sufi orders. Authenticity is established through building schools and libraries filledwith books obtained from abroad, resources not easily obtainable or affordable in apoor country like Senegal. Authority is achieved through literacy in Arabic and years ofstudy abroad or in foreign-run religious schools in Senegal. ‘Umar describes theindependent search for knowledge through books and other resources as going beyondmerely inheriting one’s family’s tradition by physically leaving villages of origin andstudying elsewhere (in Dakar or the Middle East).

Challenging state authority, establishing religious NGOs

In Senegal spiritual progress is thought to lead to material progress. The Sufi ordersexhibit a version of the Protestant ethic where work, along with prayer and religiousinstruction, are the fundamental Islamic tenets. In rural areas talibe are expected to work

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in the name of their marabout. The spirituality attributed to work historically allowedfor Murid colonization of the Senegalese countryside, enabling Bamba’s followers toovercome the hazards of early settlement and seize the land collectively (see CruiseO’Brien 1971). 17 Senegalese migrants to urban areas—in Senegal and abroad—continue to send a portion of their earnings to religious leaders. In contrast SenegaleseShi‘i spirituality is manifested in religious knowledge over manual labor, whereconverts follow their attraction to Khomeini’s ideals with reading books on Shi‘i Islam.This intellectual spirituality is also expected to lead to material progress and knowledgeis shared through building schools, organizing conferences, publishing books, distrib-uting pamphlets, and debating ideas over the radio and television. Shi‘i converts hopethat education will result in a more sophisticated modernity than that of the workexpected from the masses of Sufi talibes and will contribute to Senegalese economicdevelopment. Yet select Shi‘i leaders continue to follow Sufi tradition and require somemanual labor from their students in return for instruction.

Senegalese Shi‘a are firm advocates of their religious work having concrete secularbenefits for society. This is evident in the work of the various Shi‘i associations. In1999 ten active members created Ansar Muhammad, the most prominent of these earlygroups. Objectives were to bring a cultural revolution and make Islam better known toSenegalese with the motto “courtesy and brotherhood.” Ansar Muhammad organizeddebates on Islam in various locations throughout Senegal and sponsored dinners andcelebrations of major Islamic holidays. Its former president Assan denied the move-ment aimed to proclaim Senegal an Islamic state: “Our community has profound rootsin Senegal and does not engage in political activism . . . because we know that theseissues would only, in the end, divide Senegalese and lead to useless debate. So we workto enlighten people on crucial issues that help develop their spirit and mentality, theirconscience, and then will help develop their country.” Other smaller associations metregularly for prayer and study meetings in various locations in and around Dakar.Individuals also worked to develop Shi‘i institutions in the Futa, Kaolack, andCasamance regions of Senegal.

When I returned to Senegal in 2007, I was surprised to find that many fledglingassociations had disbanded. Some, but not all, involved in earlier organizations joineda well-financed larger institute that seemed to have suddenly emerged on the Senega-lese Shi‘i scene. Press releases, however, stated that the idea for this institute wasinitiated in 2000. Mozdahir International was founded by a Senegalese sharif (whoclaims descent from the Prophet Muhammad and published a book on his succession)of Mauritanian origin from Kolda. First located near the Dakar airport and now morecentrally located in a neighborhood with other NGOs and offices, Mozdahir Interna-tional consists of a main office, a reception area, a library/bookstore, a prayer room andclassrooms. The NGO uses Shi‘i Islam and the teaching of the Prophet Muhammad to“work in this world as if you will live forever and for the next world as if you will dietomorrow” (Tall 2006) to carry out development activities in the name of religion. Theinstitute’s goals are the promotion of education, health, and agro-pastoral development.Although its leaders are intellectuals who debate Shi‘i theology, teach classes, andwrite books, it is no coincidence that the slogan chosen from the Prophet resembles

17 This “work ethic” has most often been attributed to the Murids in the literature even though it is alsoprominent in the Tijani and Qadiri orders.

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that of the Murids. Amadu Bamba’s famous phrase “work as if you would never dieand pray as if you were to die tomorrow” (Creevey 1979:281) allowed agriculturallabor to substitute for religious instruction. Mozdahir International runs agriculturalprojects in the south of Senegal with the aim of teaching workers how to farm marketgardens and banana plantations and share the profits in the hope of keeping youngfarmers rooted in Senegal and helping to prevent illegal immigration, a growingproblem in Africa.

When the Ali Yacine Islamic Center expanded into its new building it also becamean “association for sustainable human development” with plans to apply for NGOstatus for its work focusing on the environment, drugs, malaria, AIDS, and famine. Thisincludes Association Fatima Zahra—a women’s development organization that func-tions as a tontine, a Senegalese rotating credit association.18 It encourages women towork, for example, in selling powdered soap or vegetables in small quantities. AliYacine provides free medical consultations for those in the neighborhood and envisionsitself as working to eradicate poverty. Its director told me that operating merely as anIslamic organization no longer suffices; it must also provide services to the people. Theapplication of religious knowledge and scriptural sources to the modern discourse ofdevelopment is no less authentic an aspect of Islam-as-a-discursive-tradition (Asad1986).

Thus the new face of Islamic reformist movements couples religious education andthe building of mosques and institutions with extra-religious benefits. This is true in theSufi orders as well. Samson (2009) examines how two reformist movements—oneTijani and the other Murid—became micro-societies in which the faithful experience acommunity life governed by Islam and their order’s principles. Dahirat al-Mustarshidin wal-Mustarshidat and Mouvement Mondial pour l’Unicité de Dieu aresecular movements, working for community well-being in response to an ineffectualstate, organizing “citizenship” activities such as cleaning streets, hospitals, and schools.Leaders hope to reform the behavior of city dwellers through Islamic educationspanning proper behavior, speech, and dress, to classes in family planning, cooking,and handcrafts. Through visiting the sick, prisoners, and the marginalized, and offeringcopies of the Qur’an and the writings of the Sufi order, they respond to the state’swithdrawal from its responsibility to educate the youth and protect the poor and theexcluded. They also teach manual trades to youth who cannot be asked to pray if theyare underfed and overwhelmed by problems.

As Karp (2002) has noted, the terms “development” and “modernity” are key wordsthat are intimately related to one another and cannot be exclusively defined. Convertingto Shi‘i Islam, like choosing another reformist Islamic tradition, is therefore seen as aconversion to modernity but, unlike converts to Christianity who wish to become more“Westernized” (van der Veer 1996), choosing Islam may distance converts from themodern European example that is often associated with colonialism and imperialism(Kepel 2002). There has been growing scholarly interest in the work of Islamic NGOs,which have been expanding their activities and outreach across the African continentsince the 1980s and 1990s (Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan 2003; Ghandour 2002; Kaag2007). More than their Sunni counterparts, Shi‘i organizations are dependent on NGO

18 Fatima Zahra is the Prophet’s daughter who is held in esteem by Shi‘a.

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status in order to obtain legitimacy and convince their growing network of followers ofthe wider benefits of adhering to a minority branch of Islam.

The spread of Islam to Africa and other revisionist histories

In addition to Arabic literacy and the building of Islamic schools and NGOs, Islamicauthority can also be negotiated through redrafting the historical narrative of the originand nature of Islam in Senegal. Senegalese converts uphold that Shi‘i Islam hashistorical roots in Senegal with the spread of Islam in the tenth century. This is perhapsan imagined past that contradicts, one could argue, the equally imagined Sunni versionof African Islamic history accepted by historians. Larson (2000) insists upon theinterdependency and complementarity, not oppositionality, of history (as things thathappened in the past) and memory (as representations of those past happenings in thepresent) as ways of apprehending and ascribing meaning to the past. Employingpopular historical memories can shape the course of historical events as history andmemory reproduce one another. This (re)narrated past can be used to convince others ofShi‘i Islam’s authenticity in West Africa.

Senegalese Shi‘a argue that Islam was brought to Senegal by the Almoravids inMorocco who were influenced by the Fatimid Shi‘a. The Almoravids did play animportant role in the development of Islam in the region. West African oral traditionsconnect Wolof history to the Almoravids through the founding King of Jolof, said tohave been a descendant of Abu Bakr b. Umar, an eleventh century Almoravidcommander (Levtzion 2000:78). Western historians, however, depict Almoravids,who did come in contact with Fatimids, as having “finally secured the victory ofSunni-Maliki Islam in the eleventh century” (Levtzion and Pouwels 2000:2). Brettdocuments: “In North Africa it was Berber nomads from the western Sahara who tookup the anti-Fatimid call of the jurists of Qayrawān, to create the militantly Malikiteempire of the Almoravids in Morocco and Muslim Spain” (2001:430). Elsewhere, hewrites “Ibn Yasin [founder of the Almoravid dynasty] followed the Malikite scholars ofQayrawan in their opposition to the Fatimid Mahdi as a usurper of their authority forthe law” (Brett 1999:2). Austen (2010) describes their entrance into North Africathrough fighting against various dissident Kharijite and Shi‘i sects in southern Moroc-co.19 He credits Almoravids for playing a major role in unifying the Islamic identity ofthe western Sahara and Morocco.20 Even though Senegalese Shi‘a depict Almoravidsas sympathetic to Shi‘i Islam from their interaction with Fatimids, western scholars ofthe period clearly state that Almoravids were anti-Fatimid and strongly pro-Maliki.21

19 Austen (2010) does state, however, that prior to the rise of the Almoravids in the mid-eleventh century,Islam had been represented in the desert by small communities of Ibadi Kharijite merchants. The Fatimids putan end to the Ibadi Tahert state in 909 and adopted a doctrine of kitman (concealment of beliefs) in response.He suggests that “there is no direct evidence about whether this practice was followed in the southern Saharaand Sudan, but it would have made good sense in a region where Muslim merchants constituted a very smallminority among populations with whom they wished to maintain peaceful trading relations” (p. 85-86).20 Cornell (1998) describes in more detail than other scholars how Sunni Islam met serious competition inNorth Africa from Shi‘a. He dates the “official”Moroccan state-sponsored turn to Malikism to the Marinids in1286 when Moroccan ‘ulama traded their political support in exchange for institutional religion to combatoutbreaks of Shi‘i messianism in al-Andalus and Morocco (p. 126).21 Michael Bonner helped me clarify the history of this period and pointed me to some of these sources.

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Senegalese Shi‘a also refer to the spread of Shi‘i Islam to Senegal through the Idrisiddynasty of Morocco and evidence of Shi‘i roots in Morocco through ‘Alaouis. 22

Cornell writes that Moulay Idris and his successors, who were descendants of theProphet’s grandson Hasan, brought with them from the Arabian Peninsula to Morocco“a form of archaic Shi‘ism that was similar in many respects to Zaydism” (1998:200).The Idrisids initiated a tradition of independent dynasties justifying their rule inMorocco by claims to descent from the Prophet, beginning in the eighth century andlasting until today. Hourani, however, depicts the Idrisids as being “another challenge,both to ‘Abbasids and Fatimids” (1991:41). Yet Cornell laments that “few modernscholars have taken the Shi‘ism of the Idrisids very seriously” and talks of a “doctrinalwell of Idrisid Shi‘ism” (p. 224). 23 Perhaps an early Shi‘i connection to Senegalthrough either the Almoravids or the Idrisids is a myth. However, Senegalese retellingof the spread of Islam to West Africa to include Shi‘i roots is an important attempt byconverts not only to globalize the (re)emerging reformist movement but also toestablish its legitimacy by demonstrating that Shi‘i Islam has always been Senegalese.The aim of this foundational move is to solidly reconnect to a wider religious world anda deeper past.

Ideas of Shi‘i Islam’s historicity in Senegal were also actively promoted throughIranian efforts. I came across this same notion of African history while meeting withvarious representatives of Shi‘i institutions in London in July 2007. One Iranianeducator, who works with the Islamic College in London following a 12-year stay inWest Africa, informed me that African Sufis are Shi‘a. He explained that Africans thinkthe only difference between Sunnis and Shi‘a is jurisprudence. Yet African Sufis, likeShi‘a, practice tawassul, the act of supplicating to God through a prophet, imam, or Sufisaint. Sufis and Shi‘a both practice ziyara, visits to shrines. They both respect the familyof the Prophet and have the notion of sharifs, those who claim genealogical descentdirectly from the family of the Prophet. According to him the root of Sufism comes fromShi‘i Islam. Because of the oppression of Shi‘a in Mecca, Medina, and Karbala, thehousehold of the Prophet disappeared and went to other countries. This is why Idris, thenephew of ImamHasan (the son of ‘Ali), came to North Africa. The Iranian shaykhwentso far as to claim that in West Africa there is no difference between local Islamic beliefsand Shi‘i ideas and therefore many Africans are unaware that they are Shi‘a.

Are such revisionist historical accounts a matter of “silencing the past” (Trouillot1995), the “invention of tradition” (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1992), or Ranger’s (1993)

22 The ‘Alaouis were an offshoot of the Shi‘i Fatimids who ruled North Africa from Egypt. The term ‘Alaoui(or ‘Alevi in Syria) suggests an adherent of ‘Ali, the son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad, and accentuatesthe religion’s similarities to Shi‘i Islam. The ‘Alaoui dynasty took over rule in Morocco in the mid-seventeenthcentury. I am presenting these historical accounts in reverse chronological order as this is how they werepresented to me, in order of importance.23 Cornell concludes, in discussing the sixteenth-century Moroccan saint al-Ghazwani, that even though heuses terminology that appears to have Shi‘i origins this does not mean that he was a “crypto-Shi‘ite”—butneither was he typically Sunni (p. 223). Austen writes that the Idrisids “never established very firm or wide-ranging political or Shia religious authority, but it did bring Islam to the ‘Far West’ of the Muslim world”(2010:84). He considers the Almohads to be the last rulers to champion any form of Shi‘i Islam in NorthAfrica. He writes that they were successful in bringing the Maghreb along with southern Spain under a singlerule, but their Shi‘i theology proved to be an obstacle in maintaining the loyalty of their subjects who preferredto follow the established beliefs and practices of Sunni Islam (p. 85). I have not heard Senegalese discuss therule of the Almohads in relation to their interpretation of the spread of Shi‘i Islam to West Africa.

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flexibly revised notion of the “imagining” of tradition? It is not my goal to determinehistorical facts but to examine the various reasons for their different narrations. Iranianefforts were strategically aimed at combating Saudi Arabian objectives of spreadingthroughout Africa aWahhabi-influenced Islam.24 Converts deem that the spread of Shi‘iIslam is impeded by criticism from the so-called Wahhabis. Wahhabis are far morenumerous in Senegal and envision their role as restorers of Islam from what theyperceive to be innovations, superstitions, deviances, heresies, and idolatries, especiallyinherent in Sufi and Shi‘i Islam. Hostility comes as well from other foreign Islamicmovements, such as the Jama‘at Ibadu Rahman and other Sunni reformist movementsin Africa, working their way into territories in which they were not historicallyembedded.25 Power, in the form of coercion, discipline, institutions, and knowledge,gives meaning to religious symbols through social and political means (Asad 1993).Struggles for religious power are well addressed in Asad’s definition of orthodoxy:“Wherever Muslims have the power to regulate, uphold, require, or adjust correctpractices, and to condemn, exclude, undermine, or replace incorrect ones, there is thedomain of orthodoxy…Argument and conflict over the form and significance ofpractices are therefore a natural part of any Islamic tradition” (1986:15–16).

Although Iranians may be battling Saudis for influence and authority in West Africa,Senegalese converts to Shi‘i Islam envision these historical narratives along the samelines as a return to the sources of Qur’an and Hadith, popular in other reformistmovements as well. Diouf (2000) argues that Senegalese Murid Sufis represent aunique cosmopolitanism and temporal trajectory not rooted in Western modernity orin global Islam, but in West African history, which has always been global. SenegaleseShi‘a, in their own unique cosmopolitanism, merge North and West African historywith Iranian revisions. Returning to one’s roots—textual and historical—in this case thepre-Sufi origins of Shi‘i Islam in Senegal, offers Shi‘a historical legitimacy over otherreformist traditions, which are newer and more foreign to the region. History can offerShi‘i Islam authenticity if it can be argued that it was initially meant to have been thedominant religious order in West Africa.

‘Ashura or Tamkharit: A day of mourning or celebration?

Like revisionist accounts of the spread of Islam to West Africa, ‘Ashura divides Sunnisand Shi‘a. The tenth day of the Islamic month of Muharram, during which themartyrdom of Imam Husayn, his family, and army is commemorated, is a day ofmourning and sadness for Shi‘a but can also be a day of celebration for Sunni Muslims.In Senegal ‘Ashura overlaps with Tamkharit, a joyful occasion with carnival-likefestivities, resulting in a sort of Muslim Halloween where girls dress as boys and boys

24 The term Wahhabi refers to an Islamic movement that purports to be orthodox, named after the SaudiArabian founder Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1792). This name is rarely used by members of thegroup today and was first designated by their opponents. Also known as Salafism, the movement accepts theQur’an and Hadith as fundamental texts and advocates a puritanical and legalistic theology in matters of faithand religious practice.25 See Augis (2002) for a discussion of the spread of Orthodox Sunni Islam to Dakar’s female students whojoined the Ibadu Rahman movement; Janson (2005) on the Gambian following of the Tabligh Jama‘at; andSchulz (2008) on Islamic moral renewal among Sunni women in Mali.

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as girls, and children go door to door to receive gifts to the rhythm of drums.Senegalese Muslims chant nocturnal evocations on the ninth night of Muharram. Theholiday also evokes the obligation to give charity to help the most deprived. Membersof Sufi orders fast during the day followed by a feast of couscous with beef. Tamkharitis thought to be a syncretism between Islamic rituals and pre-Islamic popular practiceslinked to the Lebu ethnic group’s offerings to pagan divinities.26 The name Tamkharitcomes from two words: tam, to demonize, and kharit, which means friend. Everythingis permitted on this day, even to demonize one’s friend without fear of retribution.Others trace the origin of Tamkharit to the time of the Umayyads, where Yazid the sonof Mu‘awiya promoted a glorification of this day in celebration of his victory overImam Husayn and his companions (Mozdahir 2007:122). Yet others consider its paganrituals very far from Islamic prescriptions.

Over the past decade, Senegalese converts to Shi‘i Islam have begun to commem-orate ‘Ashura in their own way. The practice of self-flagellation has been mostcontroversial in Western media coverage as well as hotly disputed by Shi‘i Muslimclerics. Senegalese Shi‘a insist that such Arab or Iranian practices are not essential toShi‘i Islam, stressing in contrast their Senegalese or African Shi‘i identity.27 Converts inDakar organize public debates that cater to a Senegalese Sunni Muslim audience in amixture of Wolof, Arabic, and French. Conferences, television and radio appearances,and books and pamphlets discuss whether ‘Ashura is a celebration or a day ofmourning and play up the closeness that African Sufis also feel towards the family ofthe Prophet. For example, one flyer created for the 2008–2009 Muharram seasonadvertised: “Be with Husayn or be against Husayn and the family of the Prophet.” Inaddition to educating Senegalese about the history of the battle of Karbala, lectures andwritten publicity also address origins of Tamkharit, whose festivities conflict with thesomber remembrance of the tragic events of Karbala.

Shi‘i converts have begun to introduce themselves into the geographies of religiousceremonies in Senegal—of which they had not previously been a part—by equating theShi‘i day of mourning with the Sufi celebration. Unlike ‘Ashura commemorationselsewhere in the Muslim world, Senegalese focus less on ritual enactments of thetragedies of the battle of Karbala and instead perform ideological and theologicalcomparisons of ‘Ashura and Tamkharit, as if these holidays were the same. MozdahirInternational organized a conference around the theme of “‘Ashura: A Day of Cele-bration or Mourning?,” even publishing a French translation of the 27 January 2007conference proceedings. Speakers from various Sunni and Shi‘i traditions came fromSenegal, Mauritania, France, and other West African countries, and ranged fromreligious clerics, university professors of Islamic studies, high school teachers, convertsto Shi‘i Islam, privately funded researchers, and community practitioners. ManySenegalese maintain that ‘Ashura/Tamkharit celebrates the Muslim New Year, albeit

26 According to Rawan Mbaye, university professor and Tijani Islamic leader. He informed me of a custom topay offerings to the divinities by filling a calabash with food (typically couscous with beef) on the 9th day ofMuharram. If the calabash is empty the next morning the divinity is believed to have taken his share.27 Senegalese converts themselves refer to their practice and application of Shi‘i Islam as being “Senegalese.”I do not use this term to reproduce the Orientalist discourse of Islam noir or “African” Islam, or to enter intothe debate about the existence of a universal Islam versus many local “Islams.”

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on the tenth and not the first of the month of Muharram.28 Conflating Arabic and Wolofnames for the date suggested that Senegalese Sufis were erroneous in their joyfulcommemoration of the Shi‘i day of mourning. Translating ‘Ashura as Tamkharit alsoenabled Shi‘a to claim their belonging to Senegalese religious space.

Speakers recounted the story of the battle of Karbala and also addressed origins ofTamkharit in Senegal. Senegalese Shi‘a insisted that commemorating ‘Ashura as a dayof mourning should not divide the Muslim community; on the contrary it should unitethem. Although there was indeed a division created on that day, this was not betweenSunnis and Shi‘a; the division was instead one of humanity against inhumanity. Theholiday recalls prophets’ victories over trials and sharing Muslim spirituality with otherreligions in a demonstration of Islam’s openness. Indeed, Sharif Muhammad ‘Ali‘Aidara, the head of Mozdahir International, concluded the conference—and thepublished conference proceedings—with the declaration that it is the responsibility ofall Muslims to pass on the message of this debate, as Islam is a religion of peace,dialogue, tolerance, and love. If Muslims accept to come together and sincerely discussthe questions that divide them they will be able to overcome their differences (he iscalling for cosmopolitanism here). Senegalese Shi‘a hope that through educatingSenegalese about ‘Ashura they will sensitize them to the sadness of this date and avoidconflict.

In the past the holiday was known only as Tamkharit, but I noticed in January 2008newspapers began to publish front page announcements for a “bonne fête d’achoura,”evidence of increased awareness in Senegal of the Shi‘i commemoration, even if “happyholidays” is not the appropriate ‘Ashura greeting. 29 Mozdahir International’s 2007conference had become an “annual” conference by 2008 with even more attendees,and their 2009 plans included caravans that would travel to the north and south ofSenegal to distribute flyers to educate Senegalese Sufis about ‘Ashura in an attempt toreach an even larger base than their widely attended and heavily publicized Dakarconference. As documented on their website, their director remarked that “The Prophetsinspired by God’s revelation were chosen by Allah because of their means to educatetheir community and end ignorance and bad morals” thereby linking the work of theprophets to the mandate of this Shi‘i NGO to educate others through such conferences.30

Other Shi‘i organizations convened their own conferences as well, perhaps out ofcompetition, or simply the need to spread ‘Ashura knowledge more broadly.31

Conference leaders reach out to their audience of predominantly Sunni Muslims andthose who are newly discovering Shi‘i traditions by using formats similar to those ofthe Sufi orders, including music, praise singing, and Wolof proverbs and phrases. Eventvenues are decorated with ‘Ashura banners typical of those used elsewhere in the Shi‘iworld, yet instead of the somber black dress of other Shi‘i women, Dakar’s Shi‘iconferences are populated with African women wearing their finest fashion—boubousof pure white or bright cheerful colors, hair nicely coiffed, makeup fully applied, and

28 For additional Qur’anic events and a description of other Tamkharit customs see http://www.au-senegal.com/La-Tamxarit.html?var_recherche=tamkharit. Accessed 17 September 2007.29 The Wolof greeting for Tamkharit is deweneti, which means “may I be in a position to wish you a happynew year next year”.30 http://www.mozdahir.com/interventions-de-cherif/discours-de-cherif-achoura-2008.html. Accessed 1March 2009.31 See Leichtman (2012) for a more complete account of these ‘Ashura conferences.

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flashy gold jewelry on display. As a minority community, Senegalese Shi‘a aim toteach others in order to gain more followers and to avoid conflict. Doing so necessitatesforms of disseminating these new religious ideas in a manner that does not highlightfundamental differences. For that reason the commemoration of ‘Ashura in Dakar doesnot consist of bodily rituals of self-flagellation (matam) demonstrating individual grief,solidarity with ahl al-bayt, and unison with the wider global Shi‘i world. Effortsconcentrate instead to unite as Senegalese Muslims—who also love the family of theProphet—through events that orchestrate a new Shi‘i Islamic message through localSufi Islamic practices. These events are often marked by the presence (and sometimesthe financial assistance) of the Lebanese shaykh or Iranian diplomats.

Conclusion

I have outlined the historical migrations, globalmovements, and religious institutions thathave become a constitutive feature of Senegalese Muslim self-understanding and prac-tice. The search formodern forms of authentic knowledge cannot lead to social change onits own; inherent in Islamic education is the authority bestowed on those who areknowledgeable. With the spread of religious knowledge through books, media, and theInternet comes a broadening of the scope of religious authority and the resulting conflictwith or accommodation of old political communities (Eickelman and Piscatori 1996; Roy2004;Mandaville 2007). Religious scholars whowere once revered for their guidance arelosing their monopoly over religionwith a growing number of educatedMuslims who areliterate in Arabic. Literacy enables them to turn directly to the texts, often to individuallyacquired libraries of Islamic legal books, which they interpret themselves. The conflict isno longer about who can read Islamic texts but who is the best interpreter of these texts.Thus, empowerment is not won through staging a coup d’état against the religious andpolitical status quo and bringing a violent Islamic revolution to Senegal. Empowerment isachieved through inclusion and coexistence, through building Shi‘i institutions that alsocater to Sunni Muslims, and through sharpening one’s juridical expertise to excel in thecomparison between Maliki (Sunni) and Ja‘fari (Shi‘i) law. Converts are won overthrough stressing the complementarities of Sunni and Shi‘i Islam before revealing theperceived superiority of Shi‘i jurisprudence, by not forcing Shi‘i views on others butallowing them to be convinced on their own and at their own pace. In this way conversionto a Shi‘i alternative can bring change peacefully and maybe even promote economicdevelopment in pushing to reform the Sufi orders.

Yet Senegalese Shi‘a do not envision their new religious identity as cutting allties with their Sufi roots. Instead they endeavor to convince their Sufi brothers andsisters of the historical origins, concrete benefits, and authenticity of Shi‘i Islam inSenegal. Cosmopolitan ethics, knowledge, and connections throughout the Muslimworld enable a small but growing minority of Senegalese Shi‘a to contend forreligious authority in Senegal and likewise claim inclusion in the nation. Shi‘iIslam can become an alliance within the larger Sufi orders where an elite group ofeducated Muslims in both Sunni and Shi‘i Islam belong.

There is a struggle for religious authority in Senegal. Reformist Islamic movements,including Senegalese converts to Shi‘i Islam, are able to counter and escape Sufidominance through promoting an alternative—and for them more comprehensive—

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interpretation of Islam. Building schools and libraries ensures them a following throughoffering other Senegalese Muslims access to this same knowledge. Religious scholarsare also adjusting to and responding to the demands of this changing situation byproviding religious education in Arabic. Senegal has therefore seen an increase in new(Shi‘i as well as Sufi) Islamic youth organizations. Lebanese, Iranian, and Africanreligious scholars compete for leadership of Senegal’s Shi‘i communities.32 AlthoughLebanese and Iranians have better financial resources, Senegalese converts insist thatbeing an indigenous African leader is an important component of one’s religiousauthenticity. Through mastering both Sunni and Shi‘i jurisprudence, Senegalese rejectthe authority of local Sufi marabouts and protest Arab and Iranian domination of Islam.In West Africa the authority of the ‘ulama is not disappearing into a Westernized,globalized, Islamic individualism, as Roy (2014) has argued. Religious authority isshifting as scholars and newly emerging leaders develop their own Islamic networkscounter to or concurrent with the status quo. Senegalese are encouraged to join this newcommunity, advertized through conferences and media publicity catering to the generalSenegalese Sufi public, not only because of the more authentic version of Islam itespouses, but also for the concrete modern benefits it offers.

Conversion allows for a breakwith the past in order to create a new present in the hopefor a better future. The reworking of history and tradition enables converts to negotiatenew international linkages whereas revisionist historical narratives of the spread of Islamattempt to locally establish Shi‘i Islamic legitimacy in Senegal. Mourning the martyrdomof Imam Husayn on Senegalese soil ties peripheral West Africa to the Shi‘i core in theMiddle East. Themore Shi‘i leaders can demonstrate that Shi‘i Islam is compatible with aSenegalese lifestyle, the more followers they convert. Shi‘i Islam in Senegal is built uponcosmopolitan convergences of converts’ new religion with the old as well as the ways inwhich Shi‘i Islam diverges from the Sufi orders. The goal is not to assimilate SenegaleseMuslims into a global movement but rather to adapt Shi‘i Islam to a local African context.

Proclaiming Shi‘i Islam to be Senegalese is thus a demonstration of autochthony andbelonging. The actions of Senegalese Shi‘i institutions aim not only to counter foreignShi‘i leadership in Senegal but also the failure of the Senegalese state. Shi‘i NGOs mergeIslamic knowledge with basic services needed by the people—farming, rotating creditassociations, health care—to enable Shi‘i believers to be self-sustaining and lead safer,healthier lives. Such economic development activities discourage the movement’s fol-lowers from illegal migration and teach them to develop the land in order to feed theirfamilies. Adapting cosmopolitan knowledge gained elsewhere to the Senegalese contextis an effort to step in where the state has failed and go beyond the duty of a citizen. ForSenegalese converts there is no greater proof of their loyalty to their country and love fortheir people than to remain in Senegal and work for a better tomorrow.

Acknowledgments Fieldwork in Senegal was funded by the J. William Fulbright Program, PopulationCouncil, the National Science Foundation, and Michigan State University. I would like to thank MichaelleBrowers and Nelly Van Doorn-Harder for organizing theMinorities in Islam/Muslims asMinorities conferenceat Wake Forest University and this resulting special issue. This article benefitted from the careful critique ofMamadou Diouf and two anonymous reviewers. I ammuch obliged to the Senegalese Shi‘a for welcoming meinto their community, sharing their religious experiences with me, and, above all, having faith in my research.

32 See Leichtman, M. A. (forthcoming). Shi‘i cosmopolitanisms in Africa: Lebanese migration and religiousconversion in Senegal. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

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