Cosmopolitanism : Roots and Diversities

Routledge
2021-09-21
Inglis , D 2021 , Cosmopolitanism : Roots and Diversities . in G Delanty & S P Turner (eds) ,
Routledge International Handbook of Contemporary Social and Political Theory . 2 edn , 27 ,
Routledge , Abingdon , pp. 326-336 . https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003111399
http://hdl.handle.net/10138/338906
https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003111399
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Cosmopolitanism: Roots and Diversities
Cosmopolitan matters now constitute central topics for research, debate, and controversy across
the social sciences. Having begun as a sense of non-national affiliation – declaring oneself to
be a ‘citizen of the world’ rather than of any specific polity – it now encompasses a much wider
range of issues, such as the nature of ethics, justice, social responsibility, and cultural
affiliations, considered within conditions of complex globality (Singer 2002, Douzinas 2007).
We will examine the heterogeneous but inter-related literatures about cosmopolitanism in this
chapter. As will become apparent, cosmopolitanism today connotes many things. The word
simultaneously refers to a scholarly field, a set of research agendas, a series of substantive
phenomena, moral and ethical norms, ideals and practices, and ways of thinking, both socially
and politically, as well as in more purely academic terms of analysis and research procedures.
Running through all these is a common theme: the limits of nation-states and national frames
of reference, and the need to think and act beyond these, in ways that can grasp at multiple
levels anti-, non-, post-, trans-, supra-, and beyond- national phenomena and processes (Beck
and Sznaider 2006, Sassen 2006).
There is a widely shared view among otherwise diverse types of scholarship that
cosmopolitanism today should be a field directed towards developing non-Western-centric,
post-universalistic, multi- and inter-disciplinary inquiry (Fine and Boon 2007). There is also a
marked tendency in writings on cosmopolitanism over the last few decades to make the concept
less rigid and ethnocentric than hitherto, more open, flexible, supple, and multiple, especially
as regards becoming more cognisant of forms of difference and plurality in the world (Robbins
and Horta 2017). In other words, the overarching tendency over time has been to
cosmopolitanize cosmopolitanism itself, in the direction of multiplying cosmopolitanisms into
a plural, polyvocal register.
Identifying Cosmopolitanism(s)
The intellectual field of cosmopolitanism has developed greatly over the last several decades,
encompassing a plethora of writings on cosmopolitan thought and practice. These range from
formal political and legal theories, to more empirically informed and grounded accounts of
forms of ‘lived cosmopolitanism’. There are now many synoptic accounts of the genealogy of
cosmopolitanism as a topic in the social sciences and humanities (e.g. Toulmin 1990, Robbins
1992, Heater 1996, Anderson 1998, Cheah and Robbins 1998, Scheffler 1999, Lu 2000,
Mignolo 2000, Breckenridge 2002, Vertovec and Cohen 2002, Dallmayr 2003, Fine 2003b,
2007, Skribis et al 2004, Cheah 2006, Fine and Boon 2007, Ossewarde, 2007, Delanty 2009,
Holton 2009, Delanty and Inglis 2010, Robbins and Horta 2017, de Wilde 2019, Gupta 2019,
Nussbaum 2019).
Cosmopolitanism is a term that was originally strongly associated with Greco-Roman antiquity
and the subsequent European intellectual tradition(s). A narration of cosmopolitanism’s roots
in that regard could identify the beginnings in the philosophical schools of Cynicism and
Stoicism (Nussbaum 1997); examine the Roman adaptation of these ideas (Pollock 2002); then
jump to the 18th century, where the name of Kant is above all invoked as the greatest of all
Enlightenment philosophers of cosmopolitanism (Schlereth 1977, Kleingeld 1999, Rosenfeld
2002); identify a decline in the 19th century of cosmopolitical concerns, as European thought
succumbs to the siren-songs of nationalism (Meinecke 1970); identify a rejuvenation of
cosmopolitical concerns after World War II, as political theorists and others identify post-war,
putatively ‘global’ institutions like the United Nations as embodiments of Kantian concerns
(Friedrich 1947); with the narrative ending with the remarkable flourishing and diversification
of the cosmopolitan intellectual field in recent times (Delanty and Inglis 2010). We might call
the Cynics/Stoics/Kant/post-Kantian lineage hereby identified as the standard narration of
Western cosmopolitanism.
However, cosmopolitanism as a field of inquiry is today more diverse and open than that
narration may suggest. There is much more to be said about cosmopolitanism’s histories in the
plural, acknowledging forms of thought which exist outside of the canonised lineage. There is
a ‘long, rich, and varied history’ of cosmopolitical ideas from non-Western sources, drawn
from across Eurasia and perhaps other parts of the planet too (Niezen 2004: 11). The
Eurocentric bias of the standard narration is obvious, and has been challenged (Pieterse, 2006,
Benhabib, 2008), with alternative locations and genealogies of cosmopolitical thought and
action being suggested such as south America, North Africa, the Caribbean, the Middle East
and multiple locations across Asia (Zubaida 1999, Diouf 2000, Delanty 2014, Murphy 2015).
Being Cosmopolitan and Doing Cosmopolitanism: An Analytical Sketch
Now we will look at some basic notions of what cosmopolitanism is and entails, as well as
examining problems and dilemmas that go along with such notions. Reference will be made in
parentheses to major authors who have dealt with specific issues and challenges.
A basic understanding of cosmopolitanism, reflecting the concept’s ancient Greek etymology
(Heater 1996) – from ‘cosmos’ (the entire universe) and ‘polis’ (a form of political
organisation) would encompass the following idea. A person is, or chooses to be, not (only)
the citizen of a specific political entity, but (also) the citizen of the entire world. If such
affiliation is by choice, it indicates avowedly non-parochial, and perhaps explicitly anti-
parochial, orientations. Thus Diogenes, founding figure of the Cynic school, ‘declared himself
a-polis (without a city), a-oikos (homeless) and kosmopolites (a citizen of the universe)’
(Goulet-Cazé 2000: 329). The Greek Stoics argued that government (politeia) should be
coextensive with the whole inhabited world (oikoumene) or the whole universe (kosmos), rather
than being limited to a particular city-state (Romm 1992). All people, regardless of race or
religion or place of origin, were to be understood as members of one human brotherhood
(Baldry 1965). Roman Stoics, such as Marcus Aurelius (1995: 19) – who declared ‘there is a
world-law, which in turn means that we are all fellow-citizens and share a common citizenship,
and that the world is a single city’ – further developed these ideas within the multi-ethnic
conditions of the Roman Empire (Revell 2009).
Martha Nussbaum’s (1999, 2002) writings have been particularly influential in bringing
ancient cosmopolitanism into contemporary debates. However, one might object that ancient
cosmopolitanism seems to involve the abstract and utopian schemes of a tiny group of
philosophers, either socially marginal as in the Greek case, or occupying positions of power
but mouthing empty or hypocritical platitudes about universal brotherly love, as in the Roman
context (Nussbaum 2019). But Greco-Roman cosmopolitan thought may be more complex than
that. There were important differences between the more socially critical and activist
cosmopolitanism of the Cynics, and the more quietist, status quo-accepting cosmopolitanism
of the Stoics, especially in their Roman incarnation (Leung 2009). In addition, cosmopolitan
notions were rooted in, and helped to develop, broader visions of the world as a complex,
increasingly interconnected whole that were common in Hellenistic Greece and the Roman
empire, and not just among the philosophical minority but among varied social strata (Inglis
and Robertson 2004).
The basic Greco-Roman ideas point to further notions. In a cosmopolitan mode of being
(Hannerz 1990), the individual feels some sort of affiliation – be it political, moral, ethical, or
some other type of orientation – with all persons in the world, regardless of their group
membership. This suggests a universal humanism, a positive orientation towards all of
humankind. That also implies that being less or more cosmopolitan would entail being less or
more affiliated to people who are in some ways unlike oneself and whom one perceives not to
be in one’s own social or political group (Nussbaum 2002). Cosmopolitanism then may be
understood as being based on the view that all human beings are of equal moral worth, and
cosmopolitan action may be understood as ethically informed agency founded on that
assumption (Benhabib 2006). Cosmopolitanism as a form of socio-political being seems to be
the diametric opposite of chauvinism, ethno-nationalism, fundamentalism, and any kind of
political and politicised essentialism, such as the proclamation of one’s nation or one’s religion
as a homogeneous and exclusivist form of social order.
Furthermore, the state of being cosmopolitan suggests a condition of being in some ways
‘comfortable’ in the world as a whole and in moving among, and dealing with, the diverse
groups which make it up. Cosmopolitanism points to modes of being and practice whereby a
person is able, and perhaps willing and happy, to move efficaciously outside of the comfort
zone of the lifeworld(s) their own group(s), be those based on nationality, ethnicity, religion,
or any other mode of affiliation and membership (Hannerz 1990). Openness to difference of
all sorts would seem to be a central characteristic of the cosmopolitan person or social group.
That idea in turn points to the possibility of cosmopolitanism requiring certain resources –
social, cultural, social-psychological, economic, etc. – to be able to be cosmopolitan, and to
think and be able to do things in characteristically cosmopolitan ways (Kögler 2005).
But all this in turn raises various inter-related sets of problems. In the first instance, is ‘being
cosmopolitan’, in the sense of regarding oneself as primarily a citizen of the world over and
above other affiliations, a sufficient basis for a viable identity and sense of self? Perhaps
regarding oneself as a citizen of the world only provides a thin and meagre sense of belonging.
Perhaps it is too abstract and lacking in experiential and symbolic richness and solidity to yield
a sustainable form of selfhood, unlike ‘thick’ forms of belonging to specific social groups,
including states and (what are imagined to be) nations (Calhoun 2003a, Dobson 2006).
A solution to those dilemmas may be to assert that defining cosmopolitanism and other forms
of belonging as opposites and antagonists is either unproductive or erroneous. One could argue
that a cosmopolitan orientation is no less valid if it is clustered together with, or nested within,
other senses of belonging a person or group may have (Appiah 2006). Relatedly, one might
wish to argue that we should avoid understanding cosmopolitan forms of being and affiliation
as the dyadic opposites of their national counterparts. Perhaps these are theoretically
compatible, and indeed might empirically be so under certain socio-political conditions
(Durkheim 1992). The latter might pertain if national governments are committed to certain
values deemed to be cosmopolitan, such as guaranteeing various rights, regardless of whether
rights-holders are citizens or non-citizens, conforming to international treaties and agreements,
and enacting symbolic and practical forms of hospitality to non-citizens in need (Derrida 2001).
In such conditions, patriotism would be incompatible with narrow nationalism but compatible
with cosmopolitan orientations (Appiah 1996, Varouxakis 2006) In such cases, we may be
dealing with states whose legal and political apparatuses are located within inter- and trans-
national frameworks which demand certain cosmopolitan types of norm-observance, like a
meaningful commitment to international law and human rights protocols. In such national
contexts, persons would not have to choose between (more concrete) national citizenship and
(more ideal) world citizenship, as aspects of the latter would already be located within the
apparatuses of the former (Habermas 2001, 2003).
But perhaps this (re)conciliation of cosmopolitanism and (nation-)state is too neat? Does it
elide the fact that states are both part of, and active contributors to, systems of massive
inequalities across the world (Harvey 2009)? After all, we could say that cosmopolitan ideals
usually outstrip concrete realities, and that cosmopolitanism may refer more to conditions that
are to be hoped-for, rather than those that are actualised (Held 2010).
Conversely, some analysts would argue that focusing on cosmopolitanism as set of desirable
norms to be realised is misleading, for it means overlooking all sorts of cosmopolitanism that
actually already exist in concrete social and political conditions, but which might be overlooked
if we misrepresent cosmopolitan phenomena in too idealistic a manner. Concrete forms of
peaceable and productive forms of cross-cultural interchange between specific groups of
people may be identified throughout much of human history as well as today (Inglis 2021).
These processes are just as much describable under the heading of ‘cosmopolitanism’ as are
more abstract ideals and norms like being a citizen of the world, and the people involved in
them, may be described – at least in part – as ‘cosmopolitans’, even if they do not explicitly
understand themselves in such manners (Lamont and Aksartova 2002). On the other hand, who
is to decide, and who has the right to decide, who are ‘cosmopolitans’ and who are not? And
by which criteria could such assessments be made and justified, give that there is no consensus
amongst scholars as to such matters?
Returning to consideration of persons being cosmopolitan, another set of problems is as
follows. If being cosmopolitan and doing cosmopolitan sorts of things requires certain
resources, what if only those people possessed of large amounts of such resources can indeed
practice cosmopolitan orientations? What if being cosmopolitan requires and entails specific
forms of privilege (Calhoun 2003b)? What if cosmopolitanism is nothing other than disguised
and hypocritical Western or Developed World or Global North forms of privilege, strategic
action, and self-delusion? What if the supposedly universal brotherly (or sisterly) love is a
cover for disguised parochialism or imperialism, whether epistemological (Balibar 2018) or
politico-military – as in the case of cosmopolitan concerns about human rights being used as
cover for Western invasions of other countries (Bartholomew and Breakspear 2004)? What
happens if the putative cosmopolitan comes to see themselves as superior to those they define
as non-cosmopolitan, including through the means of defining people in that manner? For then,
openness to the world would co-exist with, or topple into, a kind of arrogance, with the
cosmopolitan claiming a God’s eye perspective on the world denied to those allegedly mired
in parochial ways (Calhoun 2003b). When this happens, cosmopolitanism becomes self-
contradictory, because the beneficent openness to Otherness exists at the same time as, and is
undermined by, a smug sense of self-superiority, which distinguishes oneself and others like
oneself from supposedly inferior un-cosmopolitan persons (Inglis and Robertson 2006).
A solution to these dilemmas might be to draw a distinction between weak and facile, or
perverted and fake forms of cosmopolitanism on the one side, and genuine forms on the other
(Calhoun 2003b). One way to do this would be to say that the latter encompasses two sets of
dispositions. First, in a more negative register, these would involve facets such as self-criticism,
awareness of one’s own socio-cultural biases and willingness to check them, and vigilance
against falling into the traps described above. Second, and more positively, cosmopolitan being
would encompass such virtues as willingness to learn from others unlike oneself (Bielsa 2014),
to relativize all one’s typical ways of looking at and experiencing the world, to engage in cross-
group dialogue, and to engage in multiple forms of translation, linguistic or otherwise, across
socio-cultural boundaries (Delanty 2014). Such orientations would be describable as ‘critical’
or ‘reflexive’ cosmopolitanism, which claims to have thought through the types of dilemmas
indicated above, which we could ascribe to various degenerate forms of (pseudo-
)cosmopolitanism (Kögler 2005).
Cosmopolitanism Between Theory and Practice
Here we examine the relations and tensions between cosmopolitanism as theory and as
descriptive of forms of real-world practices. The field of cosmopolitanism studies today
encompasses various specific bodies of literature. These are the historical (e.g. Kleingeld 1999,
Rosenfeld 2002), involving the history of cosmopolitan thought; the political-philosophical
(e.g. Brock and Brighouse 2005, Habermas, 2001, Nussbaum, 1997), encompassing normative
claims as to the alleged benefits of cosmopolitan affiliations and forms of citizenship, as
opposed to localist and nationalistic dispositions; the political-scientific (e.g. Archibugi 2008;
Held 2010), concerning the analysis of the nature and emergence of what are understood as
cosmopolitan legal and human rights regimes, and the transnational institutions embodying
these; and the sociological and anthropological, which encompasses writings which analyse
‘really existing’ (Robbins 1992) forms of cosmopolitan orientations and practices among
concrete individuals and groups.
Although the current structure of the cosmopolitanism field is complex, it can for the purposes
of synopsis be further divided into two main domains. First, there are the writings of political
philosophers and political theorists, concerned with issues of global governance and justice
(e.g. Held 2003, 2010, Brock and Brighouse 2005, Delanty 2006, Carenti 2006, Grande 2006,
Eckersley 2007, Ferrara 2007, Rumford 2007, Archibugi 2008). We can call this ‘political-
philosophical cosmopolitanism’. Second, there are the writings of more sociologically- and
anthropologically-oriented scholars interested in what are understood as cosmopolitan forms
of experience and practice (e.g. Hannerz 1990, Lamont and Aksartova 2002, Nava 2002,
Calhoun 2003a, 2003b, Skribis et al 2004, Nowicka and Rovisco 2009). The second set of
writings we will call ‘sociological cosmopolitanism’.
Authors in the sociological wing have had an ambivalent relationship to the political-
philosophical authors and texts. On the one hand, canonised thinkers and texts – pre-eminently
Kant (Papastephanou 2002) – have been understood and deployed as sources of inspiration for,
and legitimation of, empirical analyses of ‘really existing cosmopolitanisms’. Conversely,
political-philosophical writings are often taken to be markedly abstract and lacking grounding
in particular socio-historical conditions, and they have been criticised accordingly. Sometimes
it is claimed that the development of sociological cosmopolitanism depends on its rejection of
political philosophy (Skrbis et al 2004). Alternatively, one might discern in political-
philosophical cosmopolitanism, including its classical and canonical texts, more elements of
implicit sociology than may initially be apparent (Inglis 2018). Even the most apparently
abstract and utopian aspects of ‘classical’ cosmopolitan thought – features which it is today
roundly criticised for (e.g. Breckenridge et al 2002) – are partly rooted in ‘empirical’ concerns,
as to how cosmopolitan norms can be brought into concrete existence.
A guiding thought of the sociological/anthropological literature is that cosmopolitanism in the
singular – the political-theoretical doctrine inherited from Greco-Roman philosophy and
elaborated in the Enlightenment – must give way to the ‘plurality of histories’ that make up
cosmopolitanisms in the plural (Pollock 2002). In the sociological literature, cosmopolitan
dispositions and practices are less normative ideals to be achieved in the future, and more
already-existing, concrete forms of thought and practice which involve multiple, overlapping,
and sometimes contradictory forms of affiliation and attachment (Robbins 1992, Benhabib
2008; Nowicka and Rovisco 2009). These in turn are understood as both products of, and
influences on, a diverse range of empirical phenomena, including transnational migration
(Werbner 1999), cross-border mobility (Szerszynski and Urry 2002), and globalization
processes (Roudometof 2005).
The sociological literature deals with a wide variety of empirical phenomena, including
cosmopolitan dispositions (e.g. being open to ‘otherness’ – Hannerz 1990), and ‘rooted’, rather
than socially-decontextualized, forms of cosmopolitanism (Appiah 1996, Beck 2002; Vertovec
and Cohen 2002). These are described as ‘vernacular’ (Pollock 2002), ‘visceral’ (Nava 2002)
and ‘banal’ (Szerszynski and Urry 2002) cosmopolitanisms. These are ‘thick’ in nature, located
in particular socio-cultural contexts, as opposed to the ‘thin’ conceptions of cosmopolitan
‘world citizens’ offered by political philosophers like Nussbaum (1997) (Calhoun 2003a,
Kendall et al. 2008, Kurasawa, 2004, Roudometof 2005, Skrbis et al. 2004, Turner 2002, 2006).
Political-philosophical cosmopolitanism is said to be wholly antagonistic to specific forms of
affiliation, including nationalism and its institutional structure, the nation-state (Calcutt et al.
2009, Lamont and Aksartova 2002: 2). Political philosophy is seen to be guilty of utopianism,
for it ignores the possibility that the nation-state and patriotism can be compatible with
cosmopolitan orientations among citizens, when states cultivate ‘constitutional patriotism’, that
is, respect for human rights, openness to ‘others’, etc. (Appiah 1996,…