Shamanic journeying imagery, constructivism and the affect bridge …

Anthropology of Consciousness, Vol. 16, Issue 2, pp. 50–71. ISSN1053-4202, © 2005 by the AmericanAnthropological Association. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permissions tophotocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California Press’s Rights andPermissions website, www.ucpress.edu/journals/rights.htm.

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Shamanic Journeying Imagery,Constructivism and the AffectBridge Technique

adam j . rock, ph.d.

Charles Sturt [email protected]

and

peter b. baynes,

ma hons, s .t.l.

Charles Sturt University

abstract

Shamanic journeying imagery arguably occurs across cultures and historicalepochs. However, to what extent is the content of the journeying imagery a con-struction of the shaman’s cultural milieu, belief structures, autobiographical mem-ories, and so forth. The present article finds the literature inconclusive on thisquestion. It is suggested that attempts to answer it face a fundamental methodolog-ical problem: how to detect contextual influences on imagery that the shamancannot report on because they are outside his/her present consciousness andmemory. The authors propose a partial solution: Watkins’ (1971) Affect Bridge, amemory “uncovering” technique used in hypnosis. A non-hypnotic version of thetechnique developed by one of the authors for inquiry into shamanic journeyingimagery is then described.keywords : shamanism, imagery, epistemology, constructivism, Affect Bridge

introduction

In the philosophy of mind there exists long-standing, unresolved problemsregarding the ontology and epistemology of mental images (Heil 1998). Suchproblems have permeated the philosophy of religion, where scholars havedebated the ontological foundations and epistemological structure of visual

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mental imagery associated with mystical experience. Adherents of epistemo-logical constructivism have postulated that such visual mental imagery is“shaped” by a percipient’s religio-cultural milieu, belief structures, and so forth(e.g., Gill 1985; Hick 1989; Katz 1978, 1983; Moore 1978; Owen 1983; Penner1983; Smart 1983). It is arguable that shamanic journeying imagery is a phe-nomenological constituent of shamanic states of consciousness that transcendsgeographical space and historical time (e.g., Eliade 1964). However, to whatextent is the content of shamanic journeying imagery amenable to epistemo-logical constructivism?

The first purpose of this paper is to examine constructivist theories of religionin general, and their application to shamanic journeying imagery in particular.The second purpose of the paper is to propose a method of empirically deter-mining whether the content of shamanic journeying imagery is context-dependent(the constructivist position). This method is designed to facilitate access by theshaman or experimental participant to important contextual influences (e.g.,religio-cultural influences, autobiographical memories) that may otherwise gounreported because they are outside his/her present consciousness and memory.

epistemological constructivism

In 1781, the German philosopher Immanuel Kant argued on a priori groundsthat one’s mind imposes forms or categories (e.g., space, time) upon one’s every-day experience in order to render it intelligible. From this basic premise Kant(1781/1933) postulated that “things-in-themselves” (e.g., the “real” table asopposed to the sense-datum) must be unknowable. In 1909 Rufus M. Jonesapplied this thesis to mystical experience: “Mystical experiences will be, per-force, saturated with the dominant ideas of the group to which the mysticbelongs, and they will reflect the expectations of that group and that period”(Almond 1990:212). In a similar vein, Scholem (1965:15) argues that the “conser-vative character” of mystical experience is due to two variables: the knowledgederived from the mystic’s religious tradition and the mystic’s spiritual teacher.Furthermore, Scholem (1965:16) contends that the reason why, for example,Kabbalists report visions of the prophet Elijah rather than of Buddhist deities orthe Virgin Mary is because “the expression of their experience is immediatelytransposed into symbols from their own world, even if the objects of this experi-ence are essentially the same.” Almond (1990) suggests that similar argumentscan also be found in Eliade (1964).

Katz’s Constructivism Perhaps the most forceful assertion of the so-called “constructivist” positionarrived with the publication of Katz’s (1978) influential article entitled “Language,Epistemology, and Mysticism.” The central thesis of Katz’s essay is that:

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There are NO pure (i.e. unmediated) experiences. Neither mystical experiencenor more ordinary forms of experience give indication, or any grounds forbelieving, that they are unmediated. That is to say, all experience is processedthrough, organized by, and makes itself available to us in extremely complexepistemological ways. The notion of unmediated experience seems, if not self-contradictory, at best empty. This epistemological fact seems to me to be true,because of the sorts of beings we are, even with regard to the experiences ofthose ultimate objects of concern with which mystics have intercourse, e.g.God, Being, nirvana, and so forth.

[Katz 1978:26]

On the basis of this epistemological assumption, Katz (1978:24) argues thatthere can be “no philosophica perennia . . .” because the religious belief-systemthat one derives from his or her religious tradition determines the phenomeno-logical content of the experience of x (be x sunyata or Ein Sof) both conceptuallyand linguistically. This means that the “shaping” process that Katz (1978) is allud-ing to occurs prior, during, and after the actual mystical experience, rather thanmerely in the post-experiential phase of auto-interpretation, as Zaehner (1961)suggests. The preceding argument suggests that a Tibetan Buddhist, for example,is incapable of having an experience of Eckhart’s Godhead or the Advaita Vedan-tist’s Brahman or the Kabbalist’s Ein Sof because the cognitive schemas associ-ated with his or her religious tradition simply preclude the possibility of havingrecourse to such metaphysical entities. Put simply, mystical experience is context-specific. Katz (1978) stresses that this is not an a priori position on his part: it isbased on comparative analysis of a plethora of first-hand accounts by mystics fromdifferent religious traditions. His position has received widespread support (e.g.,Gill 1984, 1985; Gimello 1978, 1983; Hick 1981, 1989; Moore 1978; Owen 1983;Penelhum 1981; Penner 1983; Smart 1978, 1983; Streng 1978).

Many of these themes re-appear in a later essay entitled “The ‘Conservative’Character of Mystical Experience.” Here Katz (1983) further develops the work-ing hypothesis that mystical experiences are predominantly “conservative,” asopposed to heretical. Restated, one’s mystical experiences tend to fall withinthe parameters set by one’s religious tradition. Katz (1983) formulates threeinterrelated arguments to support this thesis. First, the canonical texts that onestudies “shape” and create the transcendental reality that is finally experienced.Second, the “ontological schema” of each religious tradition “directly entersinto the mystical occasion itself” (Katz 1983:40). Katz (1983:40) contends, forinstance, “Buddhists reach their goal, set by their ontology of anitya (imperma-nence) and suffering, of impersonal, stateless, attribute-less, nirvana or satori.”Furthermore, Katz (1983) stresses that the ontological skeleton of each traditionis qualitatively distinct; hence mystical experiences are phenomenologicallyincompatible across traditions. Third, it is contended that “models” play a varietyof roles in the construction of mystical experience. Models refer to individuals

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who are regarded as norms within the context of their respective religioustraditions (e.g., Gautama the Buddha, Mohammed, Jesus the Christ, Krishna,Elijah) (Katz 1982). Functions of a model may include, being “a ‘Founder’ of areligious community,” providing “an authoritative picture of ‘reality,’” and onoccasion providing a new doctrine or a new interpretation of a previously existingdoctrine (Katz 1982:253).

Hick’s Religious Pluralism Hick’s (1989, 1993, 1995, 1997) primary concern is to determine whether all reli-gious traditions worship the same metaphysical entity. Drawing upon Kant’s(1933) noumenal–phenomenal dichotomy, Hick (1989) distinguishes betweenthe Real an sich and its personae and impersonae. The Real an sich refers toReality as it is in itself, the noumenon that is unknowable because it transcendsthe forms or categories created by human cognitions and mental processes(e.g., space, time, causation) (Blackburn 1996). Hick (1993:171) maintains, how-ever, that when the Real is perceived through “one set of religio-cultural‘lenses,’” it appears to human consciousness as a variety of personal deities (e.g.,the Ishwara of Hinduism, the prophet Elijah of Jewish mysticism, the HeavenlyFather of the Holy Trinity). He considers these to be the various personae of theReal. Furthermore, he suggests (1993:71) that when the Real is refractedthrough yet “another set of religio-cultural ‘lenses’” it manifests itself to humanconsciousness as a myriad of “non-personal absolutes” (e.g., the Godhead ofEckhart, the Brahman of Advaita Vedanta). These he considers the impersonaeof the Real. Based on the preceding analysis, he contends (1993:161) that Jews,Christians, Muslims, and so on, are all worshipping different personae andimpersonae of “one ultimate divine Reality.” Hick’s (1993) model of religiouspluralism suggests that a mystical experience, y, consists of metaphysical entity,x, being partially constructed by the mystic’s religious beliefs and values. Thus,Hick (1993) believes that x both exists independently of y, and is qualitativelydifferent from y (x ≠ y); the metaphysical entity or event and the experience arenot identical.

Gimello’s “Hard” Constructivism Like Katz (1978), Gimello (1978, 1983) asserts that mystical experience is inex-tricably bound at a fundamental level with the religious beliefs and values heldby the mystic. However, Gimello’s (1983) point of departure from his construc-tivist colleagues lies in his conviction that mystical experience is one hundredpercent determined by the mystic’s belief system. Gimello (1978, 1983) con-tends that there are no independently existent metaphysical entities, only theprojections of one’s own mind. Thus, for Gimello (1978, 1983) mystical “visions”have the ontological status of hallucinations. Indeed, mystical experience in

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general is “simply the psychosomatic enhancement of religious beliefs and val-ues or of the beliefs and values of other kinds which are held religiously”(Gimello 1983:85). For this reason, Forman (1990:13) has labelled Gimello’sapproach “complete constructivism.”

Shortcomings of the Constructivist ModelThe first and most apparent weakness regarding constructivism is its failure toconsider the possibility of an unmediated form of human experience (Almond1979, 1990; Alston 1991; Bernhardt 1990; Evans 1989; Forman 1989, 1991a, 1991b,1993a, 1993b, 1994, 1996, 1998). Citing evidence from the Upanishadic, Buddhist,Sufi, and Christian mystical traditions, Rothberg (1989, 1990) argues that, in con-trast to Katz’s (1978, 1982, 1983) claim that all experience is mediated, the pri-mary goal of mysticism is to annihilate the discursive intellect (ego-noise) andprovide the adept with a “direct” (i.e., unmediated) experience of Absolute Reality.For example, the Hindu mystic Sri Nisargadatta Maharaj states, “the Jnani’s(knower’s) perception is prior to any interpretation by the sensory faculties”(Balsekar, 1982:19). The Tibetan Buddhist master Lati Rinbochay remarks(1980:16) that there is a type of consciousness (jnana) referred to as the direct per-ceiver (pratyaksha), which may be defined as “knowers which are free from con-ceptuality and non-mistaken.” In a similar vein, the Vietnamese Zen masterThich Nhat Hanh (1995:88) describes “the world of Zen” as “the world of pureexperience without concepts.”

A second shortcoming associated with the constructivist model is that it fails toaccount for the fact that there are “common mystical elements between reli-gious traditions” (Stoeber 1991:112). For example, a number of scholars haveasserted that unio mystica (the mystic’s union with God) occurs in Jewish mysti-cism, Christian mysticism, and Sufism (e.g., Dupre 1996; Idel 1996; McGinn1996; Sells 1996; Merkur 1996). Similarly, decontextualists have argued that astate of consciousness referred to as the “pure consciousness event” occurs in allmystical traditions (e.g., Forman 1986, 1989; Perovich 1990; Woodhouse 1990). Ina more recent paper, Forman (1996) has drawn on the first-hand mysticalaccounts of Teresa of Avila, Eckhart, Plotinus, and Krishnamurti in order todefend his assertion that the dualistic mystical state and the unitive mystical stateare trans-cultural.

Third, the constructivist thesis (i.e., the phenomenological content of mysti-cal experience is “shaped” by one’s religio-cultural milieu) cannot adequatelyaccount for reports of mystic heresy (Stoeber 1991). For example, al-Hallaj, a Sufimystic, was executed in 922 C.E. for the ‘blasphemous’ proclamation, “I am theAbsolute” (Izutsu 1994:54).

Finally, constructivists have never adequately explained how religious beliefs,values, language, and so on, actually create mystical experiences (Forman 1998).For example, as previously stated, Gimello (1983:85) argues that mystical experience

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is “simply the psychosomatic enhancement of religious beliefs and values or ofthe beliefs and values of other kinds which are held religiously.” However,Gimello (1983) fails to explain precisely how religious beliefs and values are psy-chosomatically enhanced and how this psychosomatic enhancement causesmystical experience.

In the next section, the applicability of constructivist theories to shamanic jour-neying imagery will be examined. However, one might argue that it would be effi-cacious to firstly elucidate the definitional problems associated with the concept of“shamanism” in general and “shamanic states of consciousness” in particular.

shamanism

Definitional ProblemsThe key definitional elements of the term “shamanism” have been a subject ofmuch debate amongst scholars (Silverman 1969). In an early attempt at opera-tionalisation, Boyer, Klopfer, Brawer, and Kawai (1964:173) asserted that ashaman “refers only to those individuals who arrogate to themselves supernaturalpower and who are accorded the shamanistic status by their cultural mates.”However, Boyer (Klopfer and Boyer 1961:70) contends that due to variabilityregarding the opinions and values of societal members over time it is often prob-lematic distinguishing between shamans and practitioners who are devoid ofsupernatural abilities yet diagnose and treat illnesses with culturally sanctionedrituals and medicines. In contrast, pseudo-shamans may be defined as “personswho are accorded the status but themselves deny possession of power, or groupmembers who claim to be shamans but who are disbelieved by other membersof their society” (Boyer, Klopfer, Brawer, and Kawai 1964:173).

Dobkin de Rios and Winkelman (1989:2) define shamans as “those practition-ers of ecstasy in hunting and gathering societies of the world who utilize trancestates and engage in healing and divination.” The preceding definition locates theshaman in a specific cultural milieu. Nevertheless, “trance states” may be criti-cised as a general term that fails to denote a precise phenomenological content.

Moreover, the fundamentals of Hultkrantz’s (1973) definition of shamanismhave been clearly demarcated by Wright (1989) as follows:

(1) “The shaman establishes contact with the supernatural world” (Hultkrantz1973:31). In shamanic cosmology, the Upper and Lower Worlds (Heaven or Skyand the Underworld or Land of the Dead, respectively) (Doore 1989) intersectwith the Middle World (Earth) (Harner 1987). The geography of the Upper andLower Worlds consists of anthropomorphic spirits that may be accessed throughshamanic states of consciousness (Wright 1989).

(2) “The shaman is the intermediary between the human group and thesupernaturals” (Hultkrantz 1973:33). The shaman performs a social-role functionby entering a shamanic state on behalf of the social group and subsequently

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interpreting the phenomenological content of shamanic states of consciousnessfor the benefit of the community (Noll 1983; Wright 1989).

(3) “The shaman receives his inspiration from his guardian or helping spirits”(Hultkrantz 1973:38). Shamans possess anthropomorphic and animalistic spiritguides that assist them in successfully traversing the ‘geography’ of the Upperand Lower Worlds (Kalweit 1988; Wright 1989).

(4) “The shaman has ecstatic experiences” (Hultkrantz 1973:41). Shamanicstates of consciousness are often associated with high levels of physiologicalarousal (Walsh 1995).

Eliade (1964:4) asserts that “a first definition of this complex phenomenon,and perhaps the least hazardous, will be: shamanism = ecstasy.” Although Eliade(1964) recognizes that shamanic states of consciousness are ecstatic (rather than,for example, meditative), he fails to consider the “social-role aspect” of theshaman (Noll 1983:444). Peters and Price-Williams (1980:408) have circum-vented this problem by stating that the “only defining attribute is that the spe-cialist enter into a controlled ASC on behalf of his community.” However, Walsh(1989b:3) has criticized this definition as being too broad as it includes any prac-titioners who “enter controlled altered states of consciousness” regardless of whatthe phenomenological content of these particular states may be. Given the pre-ceding discussion, a definition of shamanism is required that encapsulates boththe distinct phenomenological content of shamanic states of consciousnessand the important role the shaman plays in his or her community. Thus, for thepurpose of this paper Walsh’s (1989b:5) definition of shamanism as “a family oftraditions whose practitioners focus on voluntarily entering altered states of con-sciousness in which they experience themselves, or their spirit(s), travelling toother realms at will and interacting with other entities in order to serve theircommunity” will be utilised.

Shamanic States of ConsciousnessDefinition. Harner (1990:21) defines the shamanic state of consciousness as “notonly a “trance” or a transcendental state of awareness, but also a learned awarenessof shamanic methods and assumptions while in such an altered state.” Harner(1990:21) further explains “the learned component of the [shamanic state of con-sciousness] SSC includes information about the cosmic geography of nonordinaryreality, so that one may know where to journey to find the appropriate animal,plant, and other powers.” Noll (1985) submits that shamanic states of consciousnessinvolve the cultivation of mental imagery pertaining to shamanic cosmology.Peters (1989) draws parallels between shamanic states and “lucid” dreaming. Peters(1989) further suggests that shamanic states do not involve a dissociative amnesia orother forms of psychopathology. In fact, the shaman is able to exercise a certaindegree of control with regards to both the content and duration of shamanic states(Noll 1983, 1985; Peters 1989; Peters and Price-Williams 1980; Walsh 1995).

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Harner’s (1990) definition implies that one specific pattern of phenomenalproperties characterize all shamanic states of consciousness (Krippner 2002).Krippner (2002:967), however, has acknowledged the phenomenological diver-sity of the shamanic states of consciousness, suggesting that, “It may be moreappropriate to speak of shamanic modification of attentional states rather than asingle shamanic state of consciousness.” Walsh (1995) has also acknowledged thepossible existence of multiple shamanic states.

Epistemological Structure of Shamanic States of Consciousness. Previouslypublished phenomenological studies provide a variety of “pointers” with regardto the possible epistemological structure of shamanic states of consciousness. Allof these pointers suggest that shamanic states are not “pure,” but are mediated invarious ways.

First, the shaman’s ability to communicate with spectators during theshamanic state (Peters and Price-Williams 1980) suggests: (a) a sense of externality;and (b), the presence of syntactical structures that govern, for instance, gram-matical rules. The fact that the shaman’s linguistic system continues to functionduring a shamanic state arguably supports the constructivist view that the phe-nomenology of the state is linguistically shaped.

Second, the shaman’s ability to recollect the phenomenological content ofthe experience (Peters and Price-Williams 1980) indicates that the long-termmemory system remains functional during a shamanic state. This suggests thatthe shaman is cognitively capable of “remembering and superimposing” previ-ously perceived visual images during a shamanic state.

Third, the finding that the shaman maintains a sense of self (albeit an alteredone) during a shamanic state (Harner 1973; Noll 1983; Walsh 1995) implies areflexive dimension of consciousness that seems inconsistent with a “pure”(i.e., unmediated) state.

Finally, the finding that the shaman experiences complex, integrated mentalimagery during shamanic states of consciousness (Walsh 1995) implies a duality ofsubject and object. This intentional opposition between subject and object Gillargues points to the “vectorial character of consciousness” during a shamanicstate (Forman 1993a:707). In other words, shamanic states of consciousness wouldappear to exhibit the same “from-to” epistemological structure that characterisesnormal waking consciousness. As Gill (Forman 1993a:707) explains: “Mediationalawareness is always of something, through something else, or the prehender canbe said to attend from certain factors to other factors.”

In view of the level and complexity of cognitive functioning present duringshamanic states, it seems reasonable to conclude that shamanic states of con-sciousness are indeed mediated.

Constructivism and Shamanic States of Consciousness. If, as it appears,shamanic states of consciousness are mediated by a variety of psychological

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functions and structures, the question then becomes: to what extent is shamanicjourneying imagery created by belief structures associated with the shaman’scosmology? Walsh poses the question, thus:

Because the shamans alone experience the realms described in tribal myth and cos-mology, the question arises as to whether their journeys and descriptions also shapethese myths and cosmology. To put the question more generally, and make it a veryimportant one, to what extent do spiritual practitioners create their tradition’scosmology from their experience and to what extent is their experience created by,or at least moulded by, their cosmology? To what extent do religious practice andexperience create beliefs and to what extent do beliefs create religious experience?Which is chicken and which is egg, or are they mutually interdependent?

[Walsh 1990:89]

Walsh (1990) argues that a cognitive schema consisting of one’s expectationsand an evolving cosmological framework exists temporally prior to the shaman’spractice. The shaman would not learn to journey to the Upper and LowerWorlds if he or she did not first believe that such worlds existed, maintains Walsh(1990). Furthermore, significant cultural disparities are evident in myths, andshamans tend to report phenomenological effects associated with shamanicstates that are consistent with their specific cultural milieu. Walsh (1990) con-cludes that, for the neophyte in particular, the mental imagery encountered inshamanic states of consciousness is shaped by one’s “cultural cosmology.” Walsh(1990:90) further speculates that, as experiential knowledge is amassed, “thereverse also occurs so that cultural cosmology and personal shamanic experi-ences mould each other through a process of reciprocal determinism.” This sug-gests that phenomenological qualities may shape one’s pre-existing mental setand is thus consistent with Katz’s (1978) “incomplete” constructivism, ratherthan Gimello’s (1978) “hard” constructivism.

Harner (1987:4–5) asserts that “shamanism ultimately is only a method, not areligion with a fixed set of dogmas. Therefore people arrive at their own experience-derived conclusions about what is going on in the universe.” Furthermore,Harner (1987) advocates a realist interpretation of the shaman’s cosmos, arguingthat non-ordinary reality experienced in shamanic states exists independently ofthe percipient’s mind. Thus, whilst Harner’s (1987) conception of shamanism isincompatible with Gimello’s (1978) “hard” constructivism, it neglects to addressthe possibility of: (a) a priori assumptions about shamanic cosmology stemmingfrom the shamanic method; and (b), the aforementioned a priori assumptions“shaping” experience-derived conclusions.

Cases in point are, for example, any variant of the shamanic method thatincorporates Harner’s (1990) shamanic journeying to the Lower World instruc-tions. It is noteworthy that Harner’s (1990) instructions actively encourage par-ticipants to engage in the superimposition of previously formed visual images of

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openings into the earth that they can draw on from long-term memory. Forexample: “Now visualize an opening into the earth that you remember fromsome time in your life” (Harner 1990:33–34).

Forman (1994:45) argues that many religious traditions employ via positivalanguage that serves the “positive performative function” of shaping the phe-nomenological content of mystical experiences. For instance, in the TibetanBuddhist tradition aspirants are first required to understand the empty, selflessnature of all phenomena from an intellectual standpoint before they can realizeit experientially (Klein 1986).

Towards the end of Harner’s (1990:33–34) shamanic journeying to the LowerWorld instructions, one is advised as follows: “At the end of the Tunnel you willemerge out of doors. Examine the landscape in detail, travel through it, andremember its features.” One might argue that terms such as “landscape” fea-tured in Harner’s (1990) instructions serve the “positive performative function”of linguistically conditioning participants to encounter landscape-related visualmental imagery.

In a more recent consideration of constructivism and shamanic journeyingimagery, Hubbard distinguished between the “outward forms” and “coreessence” of entities associated with shamanic states:

The outward forms of gods, spirits, and others encountered during a shamanicjourneying experience may be specified in large measure by the culture of theperson who is having the shamanic experience (e.g., a Native American mayencounter animals, a Christian may encounter saints and martyrs of theChurch, and a Buddhist may encounter buddhas and bodhisattvas), but thecore essence of those landmarks may be specified by unconscious structures orprocesses.

[Hubbard 2003:56]

Drawing on Krippner (2000) and Winkelman (1997), Hubbard (2003:56) hassuggested that such “landmarks (e.g., archetypes) of unconscious or implicitcognitive structures” may function as Jungian archetypes. His distinctionbetween cultural determination of outward forms and the unconscious originsof “core essences” seems consistent with Hick’s (1989, 1993) religious pluralism,which argues that whilst the various personae and impersonae of the Real arereligio-culturally constructed, the fundamental nature of the Real (i.e., Real ansich) is not.

Empirical studies have also aimed to determine whether shamanic journeyingexperiences are amenable to a constructivist interpretation. For example, Harner(1973) surveyed the ethnographic literature and found that the phenomenologicalcontent of South American Indian yage experiences exhibited five reportedthemes: (1) the soul severing its linkage with the physical body and engaging in flight;(2) visions associated with predatory creatures (e.g., jaguars, snakes); (3) a sense of

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encountering the supernatural exemplified as either demons, or in the instance ofmissionized Indians, Christian motifs (e.g., Heaven and Hell); (4) accounts inter-pretable as clairvoyance (e.g., visions of distant “cities,” landscapes, persons); and(5) accounts interpretable as divination (e.g., the ability to “see” a perpetratorcommit a previously unsolved crime). Harner concluded that:

One may note that regularities are found in Banisteriopsis drink experiencesbetween tribes as widespread as the Choco Indians west of the Andes inColombia and the Tacana Indians east of the Andes in Bolivia. However, allof these Banisteriopsis-using peoples occupy a tropical forest environment andtheir cultures often share much in content. Given the relative contiguity aswell as environmental and cultural similarities of these tribes, it seems virtuallyimpossible to isolate the nature of yage-induced experience from its culturalcontext on the basis of the ethnographic data alone.

[Harner 1973:173]

Naranjo (1973:176) administered yage either orally or by intravenous injectionto 35 volunteers from Santiago, Chile for the purpose of addressing the followingquestion: “Would a white man in our culture share what the shamans report ofthemselves or would he experience the drug’s effect according to his own values,expectations and previous life history?” A variety of emergent themes were iden-tified. First, numerous participants reported the experience of a soul separatefrom the physical body. Ten participants reported a sense of flying. Second, nineparticipants reported that their visual imagery contained a “central element”which exhibited a “rotating motion” (e.g., a light source, an eye) (Naranjo1973:182). Third, animalistic entities were encountered by a number of partici-pants. Naranjo (1973:183) states that, “tigers, leopards, or jaguars were seen byseven of the subjects even though big cats are not seen in Chile.” Finally, reli-gious imagery of a Judaeo-Christian nature was also reported. Five participantshad a vision of the Devil or devils, three had visions of angels, three reportedlysaw the Virgin Mary, and two saw Christ. Visual imagery pertaining to Heavenor Paradise, Hell, priestly figures, churches, altars, and crosses were also reportedto a lesser extent. Naranjo (1973:190) also asserts that “Negro people appear veryfrequently, and this research was carried out in Chile where there are noNegroes.” It was concluded that the findings “invite us to regard some shamanis-tic conceptions more as the expression of universal experiences than in terms ofacculturation to local traditions” (Naranjo 1973:190).

A comparative analysis of Harner (1973) and Naranjo’s (1973) research suggeststhat the following themes are present in both the yage-induced experiences oftropical forest Indians and Chileans: the separation of the soul from the physicalbody coupled with subsequent sensations of flight; visions of jaguars; and Christianimagery. It is noteworthy that of the tropical forest Indians, only those who hadbeen missionized reported Christian imagery (Harner 1973). This finding

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would appear to provide preliminary support for Katz’s (1978, 1982, 1983) con-structivist claim that the religious traditions that one is exposed to perform a“shaping” function with regard to the phenomenological content of an experi-ence, X (e.g., a yage experience). Nevertheless, one might tentatively suggestthat soul-flight and visions of jaguars constitute trans-cultural yage-inducedmotifs, given that they appeared in the phenomenological reports of both Indiansand Chileans.

In another study, Houran, Lange and Crist-Houran (1997) analysed 30 narra-tives pertaining to shamanic journeying experiences found in Harner (1990).Analysis was based on a modified version of a “coding scheme for contextualvariables” developed by Lange, Houran, Harte, and Havens (Houran, Lange,and Crist-Houran 1997:63). Demand characteristics and a psychophysical stateoccurred in 100% of experiences. Embedded cues occurred in 40% of experi-ences. In contrast, “belief in the paranormal/supernatural” “occurred least fre-quently” (33.3%) (Houran, Lange, and Crist-Houran 1997:63). “No directcontradictions between the content of the experiences and that of the contextualvariables were found. Of the 30 experiences, 15 (50%) showed complete agree-ment between the experiential content and the content of the contextual vari-ables available to the percipients” (Houran, Lange, and Crist-Houran 1997:63). Itwas concluded that, “the contents of the shamanic experiences are not influ-enced exclusively by beliefs and other cultural factors” (Houran, Lange, andCrist-Houran 1997:63). Houran, Lange and Crist-Houran’s (1997) conclusion isinconsistent with Gimello’s (1978) “hard” constructivism, according to whichmystical experience is held to be 100% determined by the percipient’s belief sys-tem. In contrast, such findings provide support for Katz’s (1978) “incomplete”constructivism in which it is conceded that not all phenomenal qualities are“shaped” by one’s cultural milieu, belief structures, autobiographical memories,and so forth.

false positives, the shaman’s memory, and the affect

bridge technique

The preceding review suggests that the issue of context-dependence with regardto shamanic journeying imagery is far from settled. It is arguable that the incon-clusiveness of results will continue until at least one fundamental methodologi-cal problem is overcome: the false positive conclusion that shamanic journeyingimagery is substantially context-free without excluding the possibility that itderives from the individual’s own pre-existing images and memories. It is notenough to show that journeying imagery is a universal feature of shamanic states,or even that particular “core” journeying images occur universally in thesestates. Journeys and their associated imagery are also a universal part of humanexperience, for non-shaman and shaman alike. It would therefore be important

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to establish that the journeying imagery in shamanic states was significantly dif-ferent from the shaman’s own life experiences, images, memories, and so forth,and could not be traced back to these.

This task is more difficult than it may seem, and presents a considerablemethodological challenge. Empirical studies of shamanic journeying imageryultimately have to depend, directly or indirectly, on the limits of respondents’memories, especially in the ordinary state of consciousness. Absence of evidencedoes not necessarily amount to evidence of absence when it comes to checkingfor non-shamanic sources of the journeying imagery. The respondent (shamanor experimental participant) can only report on what is available to presentawareness and memory. If his or her journeying imagery derives not from theshamanic state but from previous experiences now forgotten, the investigatorusing current methodology will not detect this. The result is likely to be a falsepositive: the conclusion that this journeying imagery is genuinely context-freewhen in fact it is not.

There is currently no methodological protection against such an error, and noobvious way of knowing how widespread it may be. The error is potentially com-pounded by the slippery dynamics of forgetting, which can render some memo-ries at least temporarily inaccessible, and others more accessible in certainaltered states. Some emotionally significant memories appear to be state-dependent (Fischer 1980), and are easiest to access in a state similar to the one inwhich the experience initially occurred, or in a more relaxed, focused, permis-sive state than is normally present in ordinary waking consciousness.

The authors suggest that a partial solution to the problem is to be found in thefield of clinical hypnosis, where “uncovering” techniques are often successfullyused to facilitate access to clinically important memories. One such technique,which the second author has found particularly impressive, is the Affect Bridge(Watkins 1971; Watkins and Watkins 1997). Edelstein (1981) provides a briefdescription of the technique:

When an affect (emotion) of unknown origin is present, either as a major diffi-culty in the patient’s life or as an occurrence during the course of his therapy,he can be hypnotized and told to experience the affect again. He can beinstructed to give some signal when he has the feeling. . .

Next, the patient is told, “We will use the feeling as a bridge to the past. Youwill travel over that bridge to the very first time you ever experienced thefeeling. As I count backward from ten to zero, you will travel backward to anearlier time, to another place . . . until, at the count of zero, you will bereexperiencing the situation that first produced the feeling. Do not try toremember; do not try to do anything. Just let it happen and let yourselfexperience it.

[Edelstein 1981:62–63]

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It will be noted that the Affect Bridge is essentially a time regression tech-nique in which a problematic affect is used as a metaphorical bridge back acrosstime to the original source of the affect in some forgotten event. However, thereis no reason in principle why an image or imagery sequence could not be simi-larly explored, using imagery rather than affect as the “bridge.” Indeed, Watkinsand Watkins (1997:121) have themselves adapted the technique to trace the ori-gins of a problematic bodily sensation rather than an emotion. They call thisadaptation the “somatic bridge.” It may therefore be of interest to describe amodification of their technique by the second author to suit present purposes:that is, to facilitate access in shamanic research to any possibly forgotten personalorigins of ostensibly shamanic journeying imagery.

Since the Affect Bridge technique is essentially an imagery technique that isfacilitated by, but not dependent on hypnosis, it was decided for practical reasonsto dispense with hypnosis. Consequently, the modified Affect Bridge was notdesigned to provide complete access to the unconscious or otherwise elusivememories. Moreover, the second author created instructions that minimized theuse of terms that might function as demand characteristics, and thus increasethe probability of a shaman or experimental participant engaging in false attri-butions (i.e., the mental image is erroneously attributed to a particular memory)or “recalling” false memories (i.e., the mental image is attributed to a memory ofan idea, event, stimulus, and so forth that never occurred).

Brief Relaxation InductionInstead of hypnosis, a brief relaxation induction was chosen to foster the desiredstate of focused, but permissive and non-effortful remembering. There are ofcourse many suitable techniques. For present purposes, it is only important thatthey include suggestions linking the participant’s experience of deepening relax-ation with noticeable increases in clarity of mind, imagination and memory, amore undistracted concentration, and a calm, permissive, non-effortful state ofmind. Particular attention would of course need to be drawn, through mini-imagery exercises, to the growing power of memory recall as the participant’smental relaxation and focus increase.

TV Screen and Affect AttenuationThe relaxation induction is followed by imagery tasks designed both to set thescene for the modified Affect Bridge technique, and to give the participant max-imum control and protection in case of emotional distress. For these purposes,the participant is instructed to imagine all imagery as forming on a TV screenover which he or she has complete control. This control extends to the partici-pant’s distance from the screen, the brightness and size of the images on it,accompanying sounds and music, and even the speed and direction of the action(which can be slowed, stopped, or reversed as needed). These are all quite well

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established affect attenuation techniques. They are valuable safeguards suitablefor imagery work both in hypnosis and in the waking state. Their purpose in thepresent context is to protect the participant against any emotional distress associ-ated with the surfacing of long-forgotten and perhaps painful memories.

Modified Affect BridgeWhen the scene has been satisfactorily set as described, the task becomes to visu-alize on the imaginary TV screen any ostensibly shamanic journeying imagerythe participant(s) have previously reported. Instructions are then given toenhance the brightness, colour, and sharpness of the imagery using an imaginaryremote control device, and signaling (e.g., by raising the right index finger)when the image has become as vivid as possible. The modified Affect Bridge isthen introduced as follows:

You’ve just seen how powerful your imagination can be in this relaxed andfocused state. Now let’s see what your memory can do. I’m going to invite youto have a really close look at that imagery you reported before, because I’minterested in what it means and where it comes from. When you’ve got thatimagery really clear and vivid on your TV screen, I’ll ask you to take an imagi-nary stroll down memory lane to see how far back that particular image goes,and where it might have come from. Maybe you will find it comes from imagesyou encountered when you were younger—perhaps at school or church or themovies or somewhere else. Or maybe you will trace it to inner rather than outerevents—events like dreams, daydreams, fantasies, meditation experiences, orunusual nature experiences. Or maybe your imagery will turn out to have noprevious history as far as you can remember. I don’t know what to expect, sowhatever you find, I’m keen to hear about it, no matter how trivial or odd itmight seem.

At the end of the brief trip down memory lane, we’ll leave the past behind,come back to the present and have a brief discussion about what you experi-enced. Is that OK by you? Good. Are you ready? OK, here we go . . . (PAUSE).

InstructionsOnce the concept of the modified Affect Bridge has been introduced to the par-ticipant, one may commence the induction as follows:

Now, using the heightened powers of your mind in this state of relaxed concen-tration, I wonder whether you can use that image you are looking at on yourTV screen for an interesting experience of time travel. The image itself canbecome a kind of bridge, enabling you to move back from the present over theyears to an earlier time. Back to a time when something was happening thatyou may have forgotten and you had an image just like it? (PAUSE). In a

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moment, I am going to count slowly back from five to one, and as I do so I willbe asking you to keep watching the imaginary TV screen while you let thatimage carry you gently back in time, back to an earlier time when somethinghappened to give you an image just like that image on you TV screen.(PAUSE). Let any past memories that come to you be also images that you arewatching on you TV screen, always under your control, and separated fromyou by a comfortable viewing distance. (PAUSE). If any memory you meetfeels uncomfortable, you can easily move back from it or cut it down to sizewith your TV controls. (PAUSE). You can dim it, take the colour out of it, blurit-even drown it out with some noisily cheerful music. You can even shrink it tothe size of a postage stamp, or just turn the TV off.

Ready to begin a little time travel back over that bridge? O.K., I’ll begin thecount. (PAUSE). Five, beginning to drift gently backwards in time, going atyour own speed, a safe and comfortable rate, never going faster or further backthan feels comfortable. (PAUSE). Drifting back towards a previous time thatfeels safe to remember, when something happened that gave you an image justlike the image you’ve got on your TV screen. Just wait and observe. There is noneed to try to remember, or to make anything happen. (PAUSE). Four, driftingfurther back . . . it might only be months, or it might be years, drifting back toa previous time that feels safe to remember, when something happened thatgave you an image just like the image you’ve got on your TV screen. (PAUSE).Anything that you remember is always at a safe distance from you. (PAUSE).Always under your control as you view it from a safe distance, on the screen ofyour TV. (PAUSE). Three, further back still, watching for something that hap-pened at an earlier time of your life to give you an image just like the imageyou’ve got on your screen. (PAUSE). Allow any images or impressions like it totake shape on your screen, but only if you feel comfortable with them.(PAUSE). Two, your mind calm and easy, just waiting, not trying to makeanything happen or any memories come. (PAUSE). Whatever comes that youfeel comfortable with, stay with that. (PAUSE). And if nothing comes, that’sfine too, just enjoy that sense of easy drifting and relaxation—perhaps there isnothing to remember, nothing like that image that you have ever experiencedbefore. (PAUSE). One, stay quietly for a little while with whatever has comeup, even if it is just a blank screen. (PAUSE). Whatever it is, I’ll be interestedto find out about it later, and just as interested if nothing at all came. So, don’ttry to make anything come, just observe whatever there is to observe—even if itis a blank screen—and enjoy the mental calm and quiet (LONG PAUSE).

Return to Alert StateWhen the modified Affect Bridge induction is complete, the task then becomesone of reorientation. Participants are instructed to shift their attentional focus

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from their visual mental imagery to their physical bodies and other objects in theexternal world. This is coupled with instructions informing the participant thatthe imagery exercise is over:

Now, it’s time to end that little time trip, and gently bring your awareness backto the present and to this room. You can bring with you anything that is com-fortable to remember from that little mental expedition, leaving any memoriesyou don’t want behind. In a little while, we’ll talk about your experiences, butonly about what feels comfortable to you. For now, just look around you, focuson your surroundings, and become aware of where your body is in the room.Feel your body, feel your breathing. You’re back in the present, back in the hereand now, aware of your body, aware of what’s around you. Your little mentalexpedition is over now. The mental expedition is complete. Gently and in yourown time begin to wriggle your fingers and toes. Move your hands and feet.Gently roll your head from side to side and begin to stretch your body. Makeyour body long and move it in whatever way you need to. Stretch the arms uphigh over your head. And then when you’re ready slowly come up into a sittingposition. Our imagery exercise is over.

conclusion

The issue of context-dependence with regard to shamanic journeying imageryremains unresolved. It was argued that the inconclusiveness of results will con-tinue until at least one fundamental methodological problem is overcome: thefalse positive conclusion that shamanic journeying imagery is substantially con-text-free without excluding the possibility that it derives from the individual’sown pre-existing images and memories. The present authors suggested that onepartial solution might be the modification of Watkins’ (1971) Affect Bridge so thatit can be administered in a non-clinical setting for the purpose of facilitating nor-mal remembering in shamans and experimental participants.

Some years ago, Walsh (1989a) lamented the paucity of experimentalresearch pertaining to shamanic states of consciousness. Despite the subsequentpublication of theoretical papers examining the epistemology (e.g., Krippner2000) and ontology (e.g., Walsh 1990) of shamanic states, it is evident that littlehas changed. It is the present authors’ hope that the modification of Watkins’(1971) Affect Bridge contained herein will serve to stimulate experimentalresearch concerning the origin of shamanic journeying imagery.

endnotes

1. The “Return to Alert State” instructions associated with the modified Affect Bridgewere based, in part, on a transcription of an unpublished and untitled audiocassetterecording of a relaxation procedure developed and used by a former colleague SueBauchman.

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