SELF-REGULATION - Miami

HANDBOOK OF

SELF-REGULATIONResearch, Theory, and Applications

EDITED BY

Kathleen D. Vohs

Roy FI Baumeister

THE GUILFORD PRESSNew York London

I>l

Setf-ffegulatiog of Action and Affect

Z¸¸ :<

i'iiiiiii,,i!i

'!i

iiiiiii,i! ?ii

CHARLES S. CARVER

MICHAEL E SCHEIER

This chapter outlines the fundamentals,of a viewpoint on self-regulation in whichU behavior is seen as reflecting processes 6f feedback controi. Indeed, we propose thattWO layers of control manage two different aspects of behavior, jointly situating behaviorm time as well as space. We suggest further that this arrangement helps people handlemultiple tasks in their life space. More specifically, it helps transform simultaneous concerns with many different goals into a stream of actions that shifts repeatedly from onegoal to another over time.

The view described here has beeh identified with the term self-regulation for a long(e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1981, 1990, 1998, 1999a, 1999b). This term, however,

means different things to different people. Many authors in this book use this t&m asroughly equivalent to self-control: overriding of one action tendency in order to attainanother goal. We prefer to reserve the term self-control for such cases and use tile termself-regulation more broadly. When we use the term self-regulation, we intend to conveythe sense of purposive processes, the smlse that selgcorrective adjustments are takingplace as needed to stay on track for the purpose being served whether this entails overriding another impulse or simply reacting to perturbations from other sources), and thesense that the corrective adjustments originate within the person. These points convergein the view that behavior is a continual process of moving toward (and sometimes awayfrom) goal representations. We also believe that this process embodies characteristics

; of feedback control. Additional points are made in this chapter, but these ideas lie at itsheart,

The ideas presented in this chapter are broad strokes, as much recta-theory as theory.

We describe a viewpoint on the structure of behavior that accommodates diverse waysof thinking about what qualities of behavior matter and why. For this reason, we believethis viewpoint complements a wide variety of other ideas about what goes on in humanself-regulation.

4 BASIC REGULATORY PROCESSES ' .i

BEHAVIOR AS GOAL DIRECTED AND FEEDBACK CONT

In describing this viewpoint, the easiest place to start is with another concept altogether:goals. The goal construct is quite prominent in today's psychology (Austin &z Vancouver,1996; Eltiott, 2008), under a wide variety of names. The concept is broad enough to coverboth long-term aspirations (e.g., creating and maintaining a good impression among colleagues) and the end points of very short-term acts (e.g., pulling one's car squarely into aparking space). Goals generally can be reached in diverse ways, leading to the potentialfor vast complexity in the organization of action. People who think about behavior interms of goals tend to assume that understanding a person means understanding thatperson's goals--indeed, that the substance of the self consists partly of the person's goalsand the organization among them (eL Mischel & Shoda, 1995}.

i i i Action and Affect 5i

by which the body self-regulates physical parameters such as temperature, blood sugar,and hear t rate, is the prototypic feedback process (Cannon, 1932). The concept has beenuseful enough in diverse fields that sometimes it is even suggested that feedback processes

are some of the fundamental building blocks of all complex systems.We believe there is merit in the recognition of functional similarity between the

systems underlying human behavior and other complex systems (cf. Ford, 1987; yon Bertatanffy, 1968). Nature is a miser and a recycler. It seems likely that an organizationthat works in one complex system recurs over and over in nature. For the sanle reasonit seems likely that principles embodied in physical movement control (which also rely inpart on principles of feedback) have more than just a little in common with principlesembodied in higher mental functions (Rosenbaum, Carlson, &; Gilmore 2001). For these

we have continued to use the principle of feedback control as a conceptual heuyears.

Feedback Loops

We actually are less concerned here with the goals themselves than with the process ofattaining them. We have long subscribed to the view that movement toward a g°al reflectsthe functioning of a negative, or discrepancy-reducing, feedback loop (MacKay, 1966;Miller, Galanter, &: Pribram, 1960; Powers, 1973; Wiener, 1948). Such a loop involves asensing of some present condition, which is compared to a desired or intended condition(as a reference value). If the two are identical, nothing more happens. If there is a discrepancy between the two, the discrepancy is countered by subsequent action to change thesensed condition. The overall effect of such an arrangement is to bring the sensed condition into conformity with the intended condition (Powers, 1973). 'If the intended condition is a goal, the overall effect is to bring the person's behavior into conformity with the

goal--thus, goal attainment.There also are discrepancy-enlarging loops, in which deviations from the compar

ison point are increased rather than decreased. The value in this case is a threat, an"anfi-goal." Effects of discrepancy-enlarglng processes in living systems are typicallyconstrained by discrepancy-reducing processes. Thus, for example, acts of avoidanceoften segue into other acts of approach. Put differently, sometimes people are able toavoid something they find aversive by the very act of approaching something else. Suchdualinfluence occurs in instances of what is called actiue auoidance: An organism fleeinga threat spots a relatively safe location and approaches it.

Given the preceding description, people sometimes infer that feedback loops act onlyto create and maintain steady states, and are therefore irrelevant to behavior. Some refer:ence values (and goals) are static. But others are dynamic (e.g., taking a vacation acrossEurope, raising children to be good citizens). In such cases, the goal is the process oftraversing the changing trajectory of the activity, not just the arrival at the end point. Theprinciple of feedback control applies readily to moving targets (Beer, 1995).

We started here with the goal construct. Many people write about goal-directedbehavior. What we have brought to the conversation about goals (and though we werenot the first, we are probably the most persistent) is the notion that goal seeking (humanbehavior) involves feedback control. Why feedback control? Why not just goals and goal

attainment? Good question.Many people view the feedback loop as an engineering concept (and engineers do use

it), but the concept has roots in physiology and other fields. Homeostasis, the I

:xist at many levels of abstraction. One can have the goal of being a good citizen,c : can also have the goal of conserving resources--a narrower goat that contributes to

to conserve resources is recycling. Recycling entails other,

goals: placing newspapers and empty bottles into containers and movingpickup location. All of these are goals, values to be approached, but at varying

It is often said that people's goals form a hierarchy (Powers, 1973; Vallacher &1987), in which abstract goals are attained by attaining the concrete goals that

define them. Lower-level goals)are attained by briefer sequences of action (formedof motor control; e.g., Rosenbaum, Meulenbroek, Vaughan, &

of action have a self-contained quality, in that they runfairly autonomously once triggered.

other direction, sequences cab_ he organized into programs of action

planful than sequences and require choices at varlare sometimes (though not ahvays) enacted in the service

provide a basis for making decisions withinor refraining from certain programs. What Powers

aivalent to values (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1990; SchwartzEven that is not the end'of potential complexity. Patterns of values can

abstract sense of desired (and undesired) self, or a sense of desired

community.All these classes of goals, from very concrete to very abstract, can be reference points

ulation. When self-regulation is undertaken regarding a goal at one level, prey being invoked at all levels of abstraction below

Lt one. We return to this diversity among potential superordinate goals later in the

and Feedback Control

goal concept, in its various forms, is one place in which the constructs of personalityaocial psychology intersect with the logic of the feedback loop. Before moving on,

6 BASIC REGULATORY PROCESSES iiI

we note briefly that the intersection is actually broader. The noti i of reducing senseddiscrepancies has a long history in social psychology, in topics such as behavioral conformity to norms (Asch, 1955) and cognitive consistency (Festinger, 1957; Herder, 1946;Lecky, 1945). The self-regulatory feedback loop, in effect, constitutes a recta-theory forsuch effects.

Action and Affect 7

What determines the criterion for this loop? The criterion is probably quite flexibleis unfamiliar. If the activity is familiar, the criterion is likely to reflect

'the person's accumulated experience, in the form of an expected rate (the more experience you have, the more you know what is reasonable to expect). Whether "desired" or

Jected" or "needed" most accurately depicts the criterion may depend greatly on the

FEEDBACK PROCESSES AND AFFECT

Thus far we have considered behavior--getting from here to there. Another importantpart of experience is feelings, or affect. Two fundamental questions about affect are whatit consists of and where it comes from. Affect pertains to one's desires and whether theyare being met (e.g., Clore, 1994; Frijda, 1986, 1988; Or tony, Clore, & Collins, 1988). Butwhat exactly is the internal mechanism by which it arises?

The answer we posed to this question (Carver &Scheier, 1990, 1998, 1999a, 1999b)• focuses on some of the functional properties that affect seems to display in the behaving

person. We used feedback control again as an organizing principle. We suggested thatfeelings are a consequence of a feedback process that runs automatically, simultaneouslywith and in parallel to the behavior-guldlng process. Perhaps the easiest way to conveywhat this second process is doing is to say that it is checking on how well the first process (the behavior loop) is doing at reducing its discrepancies (we focus first on approachloops). Thus, the input for this second loop is some representation of the rate of discrepancy reduction in the action system over time.

An analogy may be useful• Action implies change between states• Thus, behavior isanalogous to distance. If the action loop controls distance, and if the affect loop assessesthe progress of the action loop, then the affect loop is dealing with the psychological analogue of velocity, the first derivative of distance over time. To the extent that this analogyis meaningful, the perceptual input to the affect loop should be the first derivative overtime of the input used by the action loop.

Input per se does not create affect (a given rate of progress has different affectiveimplications in different circumstances). We believe that, as in any feedback system, thisinput is compared to a reference value (cf. Frijda, 1986, 1988). In this case, the referenceis an acceptable or desired rate of behavioral discrepancy reduction. As in other feedbackloops, the comparison checks for deviation from the standard. If there is one, the outputfunction changes.

We suggest that the error signal from the comparison in this loop (the representation of a discrepancy) is manifest subjectively as affect, positive or negative valence. Ifthe rate of progress is below the criterion, negative affect arises. If the rate is high enoughto exceed the criterion, positive affect arises• If the rate is not distinguishable from thecriterion, no affect arises.

In essence, the argument is that feelings with a positive valence mean you are doingbetter at something than you need to, and that feelings with a negative valence mean youare doing worse than you need to (for more detail, see Carver & Scheier, 1998, chaps.8 and 9). One implication of this line of thought is that, for any given action domain,affective valence should potentially form a bipolar dimension; that is, for a given action,affect can be positive, neutral, or negative, depending on how well or poorly the actionis going.

The criterion can also change. The less experience the person has in a domain, theaore fluid the criterion; in a familiar domain, change is slower. Still, repeated overshoot

of the criterion automatically yields an upward drift of the criterion (e.g., Eidelman &Biernat, 2007); repeated undershoots yield a downward drift. Thus, the system recall

[ brates over repeated experience in such a way that the criterion stays within the range ofthose experiences (Carver &Scheier, 2000). An ironic effect of recalibration would be tokeep the balance of a person's affective experience (positive to negative) relatively similar,even when the rate criterion changes considerably.

Two Kinds of Behavioral Loops, Two Dimensions of Affect

Now consider discrepancy-enlarging loops. The view just outlined rests on the idea thatpositive feeling results when a behavioral system is making rapid progress in doing whatit is orga Ezed to do. The systems considered thus far are organized to reduce discrepancies. There is no obvious reason, though, why the principle should not apply as well tosystems organized to enlarge discrepancies. If that kind of a system is making rapid progress doing what it is organized to do, there should be positive affect. If it is doing poorly,tbere should be negative affect.

The idea that affects of both valences can occur would seem comparable across bothapproach and avoidance systems; that is, both approach and avoidance have the potentialto induce positive feelings (by doing well), and both have the potential to induce negativefeelings (by doing poorly). But doing well at moving toward an incentive is not quite thesame as doing welt at moving away'from a threat. Thus, the two positives may not bequite the same, nor may the two negatives.

Based on this line of thought, and drawing on insights from Higgins (e.g.,' 1987,1996) and his collaborators (see Scholer & Higgins, Chapter 8, this volume), we assumetwo sets of affects, one relating to approach, the other to avoidance (Carver & Soberer,1998). Approach activities lead to such positive affects as elation, eagerness, and excitement, and such negative affects as frustration, anger, and sadness (Carver, 2004; Carver& Harmon-Jones, 2009b). Avoidance activities lead to such positive affects as relief andcontentment (Carver, 2009), and such negative affects as fear, guilt, and anxiety.

Merging Affect and Action

The two-layered viewpoint described in the preceding sections implies a natural linkbetween affect and action. If the input function of the affect loop is a sensed rate of progress in action, the output function must be a change in rate of that action. Thus, the affectloop has a direct influence on what occurs in the action loop.

Some changes in rate output are straightforward. If you are lagging behind, you pushharder• Sometimes the changes are less straightforward. The rates of many "behaviors"are defined not by a pace of physical action but by choices among actions or entire pro

8 BASIC REGULATORY PROCESSES I'f

grams of action. For example, increasing your rate of progress oI °#:.project at work maymean choosing to spend a weekend working rather than skiing, l, ffcreasing your rate ofbeing kind means choosing to do an action that reflects that value when an opportunityarises. Thus, adjustment in rate must often be translated into other terms, such as concentration, or reallocation of time and effort.

The idea of two feedback systems functioning in concert with one another is something we more or less stumbled into. It turns out, however, that such an arrangement isquite common in control engineering (e.g., Clark, 1996). Engineers have long recognizedthat having two feedback systems functioning together--one controlling position, tileother controlling velocity--permits the device in which they are embedded to respond ina way that is both quick and stable, without overshoots and oscillations.

The combination of quickness and stability is valuable in the kinds of electromechanical devices with which engineers deal, but its value is not limited to such devices. Aperson with strongly reactive emotions is prone to overreact and to oscillate behaviorally.A person who is emotionally nonreactive is slow to respond, even to urgent events. A person whose reactions are between the two extremes responds quickly but without undueoverreaction and oscillation.

For biological entities, being able to respond quickly yet accurately confers a clearadaptive advantage. We believe this combination of quick and stable responding is a consequence of having both behavior-managing and affect-managing control systems. Affectcauses people's responses to be quicker (because this control system is time-sensitive) and,

provided that the affective system is not overresponsive, the responses are also stable.Our focus here is on how affects influence behavior, emphasizing the extent to which

they are interwoven. Note, however, that the behavioral responses related to the affectsalso lead to reduction of the affects. Thus, in a very basic sense, the affect system is selfregulating. Certainly people also make voluntary efforts to regulate emotions (Gross,2007), but the affect system does a good deal of that self-regulation on its own. Indeed, ifthe system is optimally responsive, then affective arousal is generally minimized over the10ng term because the relevant deviations are countered before they become intense (cf.Baumelster, Vohs, DeWall & Zhang, 2007).

AFFECTISSUES

This theoretical model differs from others in several ways. At least two of the differencesappear to have interesting and bnportant implications.

Divergent Views of Dimensionality Underlying Affect

One difference concerns bow affects are organized. A number of theories conceptualize affects as aligned along dimensions (though not alt theories do so). Our view fitsthis picture, in holding that affects related to approach and to avoidance both have thepotential to be either positive or negative, thus forming a bipolarity for each motivationaltendency.

Most dimensional models of affect, however, take a different form. For example,Gray (1990, 1994} held that one system is engaged by cues of punishment and cues offrustrative nonreward. It thus is responsible for negative feelings, whether those feelings

[ Action and Affect 9

relate to approacb or to avoidance. Similarly, he held that another system is engaged byboth cues of reward and cues of escape or avoidance of punishment. It thus is responsiblefor positive feelings, whether the feelings relate to avoidance or to approach.

In this view each system is responsible for affect of one valence. This yields two unipolar dimensions, each linked to the functioning of a behavioral system. A similar position has been taken by Lang and colleagues (e.g. Lang 1995 Lang Bradley &::Cuthbert1990) Cacioppo and colleagues (e.g., Cacioppo & Berntson 1994; Cacioppo Gardner& Berntson, 1999), and Watson, Wiese, Vaidya and Tellegen (1999).

What does the evidence say? There is not a wealth of information from studies targeting the issue, but there is some. Least studied is "doing well" in threat avoidance.Higgins, Shah, and Friedman (1997, Study 4) found that having an avoidance orientation to a task (instructions to avoid failing) plus a good outcome led to elevations inreports of calmness. Calmness was not affected, however with an approach orientation(instructions to succeed). Thus, calmness was linked to doing well at avoidance, not todoing well at approach. Other research asked people to respond to hypothetical scenariosintroducing, then removing, a threat (Carver, 2009). Reports of relief related principallyto ihdividual differences in threat sensitivity.

A larger accumulation of evidence links certain negative affects to "doing poorly" inapproaching incentives; just a few are noted here (see Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009bfor details). In the study by Higgins and colleagues {1997) we just described, people withan approach orientation who experienced failure reported elevated sadness. This did not

; occur with an avoidance orientation. This suggests a link between sadness and doing[ poorly at approach.

The broader literature of self*discrepancy theory also makes a similar point. Many] studies have shown that sadness relates uniquely (controlling for anxiety) to discrepancies

"| between actual selves and ideal selves (for reviews, see Higgins, 1987, 1996). Ideals arequalities the person intrinsically desires: aspirations, hopes, positive images for the self.There is evidence that pursuing an ideal is an approach process (Higgins, 1996). Thus,this literature also suggests that sadness stems fr6ma fa ure of approach.' Another study examined the situation of frustrative nonreward. Participants wereled to believe they could obtain a reward if they per formed well on a task (Carver,'2004).All were told they had done poorly, however, and got no reward. Sadness and discouragement at that point related to sensitivity of the approach system, but not sensitivity of theavoidance system.

There is also a good deal of evidence linking the approach system to anger ie.g.,• Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009b). As one example, Harmon-Jones and Sigelman (2001)induced anger in some persons but not others, then examined cortical activity. They foundelevated left anterior activity, which previous research (e.g., Davidson, 1992) had linked

[ [o activation of the approach system. In other studies (Carver 2004), people reportedI the feelings they experienced in response to hypothetical events (Study 2) and after the

destruction of the World Trade Center (Study 3). Reports of anger related to sensitivity ofthe approach system, wbereas reports of anxiety related to the avoidance system.

There is also, however, an accumulation of evidence that contradicts this position,instead placing all negative affects on one dimension and all positive affects on anotherdimension. This evidence, briefly summarized by Watson (2009), consists primarily ofa large number of studies hr which people reported their moods at a particular time oracross a particular span of time. As Carver and Harmon-Jones (2009a) pointed out, how

10 BASIC REGULATORY PROCESSES "i'

ever, an affective response to a particular event differs in importai] . vays from a mood,

which may aggregate experiences over multiple events. It seems likely that different setso influences come into play in the creation or maintenance of moods than underlie specific, focused affective responses to events.

We have devoted a good deal of space to this issue. Why? It is an important issuebecause it has implications in the search for a conceptual mechanism underlying affect.Theories postulating two unipolar dimensions appear to equate greater activation of asystem to more intense affect of that valence. If the approach system actually relates tofeelings of both valences, such a mechanism is not tenable. A conceptual mechanism isneeded that addresses both positive and negative feelings within the approach function(and, separately, the avoidance function). The mechanism described here does so.

One more word about dimensionality. Our viewpoint is dimensional in the sensethat it is predicated on a dimension of system functioning (from very well to very poorly).However, the affects that fall on that dimension do not themselves form a dimension,apart from the fact that they represent both valences. For example, depression (whenthings are going extremely poorly) is not simply a more intense state of frustration (whenthings are going less poorly). The affects themselves appear to be nonlinear consequencesof linear variation in system functioning. Anger and depression are both potential consequences of approach going poorly; which one emerges appears m depend on whether thegoal seems lost or not (see also Rolls, 1999, 2005).

Action and Affect 11

Coasting

Another potentially important issue also differentiates this model from most other viewpoints on the meaning and consequences of affect (Carver, 2003). Return to the argument that affect reflects the error signal in a feedback loop. Affect thus would be a signalto adjust progress--whether rate is above the criterion or below it. This is intuitive fornegative feelings, but not positive feelings.

Here theory becomes counterintuitive. In this model, positive feelings arise whenthings are going better than they need to. But the feelings still reflect a discrepancy, andthe function of a negative feedback loop is to minimize discrepancies. Such a systenr"wants" to see neither negative nor positive affect. Either one would represent an "error"

and lead to changes in output that eventually would reduce it (see also Izard, 1977).This model argues that people who exceed the criterion rate of progress (and who

thus have positive feelings) automatically tend to reduce effort in this domain. They"coast" a little--don't stop, but ease back, such that subsequent rate of progress returns

to the criterion. The impact on affect would be that the pogtive feeling itself is not sustained for very long. k begins to fade.

Expending effort to catch up when behind and coasting when ahead are both presumed to be specific to the goal to which the affect is linked. Usually (though not ahvays)this is the goal from which the affect arises in the first place. We should also be clearabout time frames. This view pertains to the current, ongoing episode. This is not anargument that positive affect makes people less likely to do the behavior again later on.

A system of this sort would operate in the same way as a car's cruise control. If progress is too slow, negative affect arises. The person responds by increasing effort, trying tospeed up. If progress is better than needed, positive affect arises, leading to coasting. Acar's cruise control is similar. A hill slows you down; the cruise control feeds the engine

more fuel, speeding back up. If you come across the crest of a hill and roll downward toothe system cuts back on fuel and the speed drags back down.The analogy is intriguing partly because both sides are asymmetrical in the conse

quences of deviation from the criterion. In both cases, addressing the problem of goingtoo slow requires adding resources. Addressing the problem of going too fast entails onlycutting back. The cruise control does not apply the brakes, but only reduces fuel. Thecar coasts back to the velocity set point. The effect of the cruise control on a high rateof speed thus depends partly on external circumstances. If the hill is steep, the car mayexceed the cruise control's set point all the way to the valley below. In the same fashion,people usually do not respond to positive affect by trying to dampen the feeling. They0nly ease back a little on resources devoted to the domain in which the affect lias arisen.The feelings may be sustained for a long time (depending on circumstances) as the personcoasts down the subjective hilt. Eventually, though, the reduced resources would causethe positive affect to fade. Generally, then, the system would act to prevent great amounts:of pleasure, as well as great amounts of pain (Carver, 2003; Carver N; Scheier, 1998).

Does positive affect (or making greater than expected progress) lead to coasting? Totest this idea, a study must assess coasting with respect to the goal underlying the affect(or the unexpectedly high progress). Many studies have created positive affect in one

context and assessed its influence elsewhere (e.g., Isen, 1987, 2000; Schwarz Bohner,1996), but that does not test this question.

A few studies have satisfied these criteria. Mizruchi (1991) found that professionalbasketball teams in playoffs tend to lose after winning. It is unclear, however, whether the

[ prior winner slacked off, the loser tried harder, or both. Louro, Pieters and Zeelenberg] (2007 explicitly examined the role of positive feelings from surging ahead in the contextI of multiple-goal pursuit. In three studies they found that when people were relatively

close to a goal positive feelings prompted decrease in effort toward that goal and a shiftI of effort to an alternate goal. They also found a boundary on this effect (it occurred

0nly when people were relatively close to their goal). Another, more recent study usingan intensive experience sampling pr(cedure across a 2-week period similarly found thatgreater than expected progress toward a goal was followed by reduction in effort towardthat goaI (Fulford, Johnson, Llabre, & Carver, in press).

i

Coasting and Multiple Concerns

i The idea that positive affect leads to coagting, which would eventually result in reductionof the positive affect, strikes sonic people as unlikely. On the surface it is hard to see whya process could possibly be built in that limits positive feelings--indeed, that reducesthem. After all, a truism of life is that people supposedly are organized to seek pleasureand avoid pain.

There are at least two potential bases for this tendency. One is that it is adaptivefor organisms not to spend energy needlessly. Coasting prevents that. A second stemsfrom the fact that people have multiple simultaneous concerns (Atkinson & Birch, 1970;Carver, 2003; Carver & Scheier, t998; Frijda, 1994). Given multiple concerns, people donot optimize performance on any one of them but rather satisfice (Simon, 1953)--do agood-enough job to deal with each concern satisfactorily. This permits handling of manyconcerns adequately, rather than just one (see also Fitzsimons, Eriesen, Orehek, & Kruglanski, 2009).

[iiii/i

12 BAS,CREGOLATO PROCESSES Ii i

A tendency to coast would virtually define satisficing regardin,

hat particular goal;that is, reducing effort would prevent attainment of the best possible outcome. A tendency to coast would also promote satisflcing regarding a broader array of goals; that is,if progress toward goal attainment in one domain exceeds current needs, then a tendencyto coast in that particular domain (satisficing) would make it easy to devote energy toanother domain. This would help to ensure satisfactory goal attainment in the otherdomain and, ultimately, across multiple domains.

Action and Affect 13

PRIORITY MANAGEMENI AS A CORE ISSUE IN SELF-REGULATION

Feelings and Reprioritization

Simon (1967) reasoned that emotions are calls for reprioritization. He suggested thatemotion arising with respect to a goal that is outside awareness eventually induces peopleto interrupt what they are doing and give that goal a higher priority than it had. Thestronger the emotion, the stronger is the claim being made that the unattended goalshould have higher priority than the current focal goal. Simon did not address negativeaffect that arises with respect to a currently focal goal, but the same principle seems toapply. In that case, negative affect seems to be a call for an even greater investment ofresources and effort in that focal goal than is now being made.

Simon's analysis applies easily to negative feelings, cases in which a nonfocal goaldemands a higher priority and intrudes on awareness. However, there is another way inwhich priority ordering can shift: The currently focal goal can relinquish its place. Simonacknowledged this possibility obliquely, noting that goal completion terminates pursuitof that goal. However, he did not address the possibility that an as-yet-unattained goalmight also yield its place in line.

Carver (2003) expanded on that possibility, suggesting that positive feelings area cue to reduce the priority of the goal to which the feeling pertains. This possibility

The line of argument just outlined begins to implicate positive feelings in a broad functionwithin the organism that deserves much further consideration. This function is the shifting from one goal to another as focal in behavior (Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004; Shallice,1978; Shin & Rosenbaum, 2002). This basic and very important function is often overlooked. Let's consider it more closely. Humans usually pursue many goals simultaneously,but only one can have top priority at a given moment. People manage their many goals byshifting among them. This means there are changes over time in which goal has the toppriority. How are those changes managed?

One view of priority management among goals was proposed many years ago bySimon (1967). He noted that although goals with less than top priority are largely outof awareness, ongoing events still can be relevant to them. Sometimes events that occur

during the pursuit of the top-priority goal create problems for a goal with a lower priority. Indeed, the mere passing of time can sometimes create a problem for the secondgoal because passing of time may make its attainment less likely. If the second goat isalso important, an emerging problem for its attainment needs to be taken into account.If there arises a serious threat to the second goal, a mechanism is needed for changingpriorities, so that the second goal replaces the first one as focal•

appears consistent with the sense of Simon's analysis, but suggests that the prioritizingfunction of affect pertains to affects of both valences. Positive affect regarding an avoidance act (relief or tranquility) indicates that a threat has dissipated, no longer requires asmuch attention as it did, and can now assume a lower priority. Positive affect regardingapproach (happiness, joy) indicates that an incentive is being attained. Even if it is not yetattained, the affect is a signal that you could temporarily put this goal aside because youare doing so well.

If a focal goal diminishes in priority, what follows? In principle, this situation is lessdirective than when a nonfocal goal demands higher priority. What happens next in thiscase depends partly on what else is waiting in line and whether the context has changedin important ways wbile you were busy with the focal goal. Opportunities to attain incentives sometimes appear unexpectedly, and people put aside their plans to take advantageof such unanticipated opportunities (Hayes-Roth &: Hayes-Roth, 1979; Pay'ton, 1990).It seems reasonable that people experiencing positive affect should be most prone to shiftgoals at this point if something else needs fixing or doing (regarding a next-in-line goal ora newly emergent goal), or if an unanticipated 9pportunity for gain has appeared.

On the other hand, sometimes neither of these conditions exists. In such a case, nochange in goal would occur because the downgrade in priority of the now-focal goaldoes not render it lower in priority than the alternatives. Thus, positive feeling does notrequire that there be a change in direction. It simply sets the stage for such a change tobe more likely.

Apart from evidence of coasting per se, there is also evidence consistent with theidea that positive affect tends to promote shifting of focus to other things that need attention (for broader discussion, see Carver, 2003). As an example Trope and Neter (1994)induced a positive mood in some people but not others, gave them all a social sensitivitytest, then told them that they had performed well on two parts of the test but poorly ona third. Subjects then indicated their interest in reading more about their performanceson the various parts of the test. Positive mood participants showed more interest in thepart they had failed than did controls', suggesting that they were inclined to shift focus toan area that needed their attention. This effect has been conceptually replicated by Tropeand Pomerantz (1998) and Reed and Aspimvall (1998).

Phenomena such as these have contributed to the emergence of the view that positivefeelings represent psychological resources (see also Aspinwall, 1998; Fredrickson, 1998;Isen, 2000; Tesser, Crepaz, Collins, Cornell, &z Beach, 2000). The idea that positiveaffect serves as a resource for exploration resembles the idea that positive feelings openpeople up to noticing and turning to emergent opportunities, to being distracted intoenticing alternatives--to opportunistic behavior. Some evidence also fits this idea (Kahn&; Isen, t993).

Priority Management and Depressed Affect

One more aspect of priority management should be addressed here concerning the ideathat, in some circumstances, goals are not attainable and are better abandoned. Sufficientdoubt about goal attainment results in an impetus to disengage from efforts to reach thegoal, and even to abandon the goal itself (Carver &: Scheier, 1998, 1999a, 1999b). Abandonment is clearly a decrease in priority for that goal. How does this sort of reprioritization fit into the picture sketched earlier?

14 BAS]C REGULATORY PROCESSES i,i

At first glance, this seems to contradict Simon's (1967) positi that negative affectis a call for higher priority. However, there is an important distinction between twoapproach-related negative affects, which elaborates on Simon's thinking. Some negativeaffects pertaining to approach coalesce around frustration and anger. Others coalescearound sadness, depression, and dejection. The former demand increase in priority, thelatter promote decrease in priority.

As noted earlier, our view on affect rests on a dimension from doing wefl to doingpoorly, but the affects themselves do not simply flow in a continuum (Figure 1.1). Intheory, inadequate movement forward (or no movement, or loss of ground) gives rise atfirst to frustration, irritation, and anger• These feelings (or the mechanism that underliesthem) engage effort more completely, to overcome obstacles and enhance current progress. This case fits the priority management model of Simon (I967).

Sometimes, however, continued efforts do not produce adequate movement forward.Indeed, if the situation involves loss, movement forward is precluded because the incentive is gone. When failure seems (or is) assured, the feelings are sadness, depression,despondency, grief, and hopelessness (cf. Finlay-Jones & Brown, 1981). Behaviorally,the person tends to disengage from--give up oi1 further effort toward the incentive(Kfinger, 1975; Lewis, Sullivan, Ramsay, & Allessandri, 1992; Mikulincer, 1988; Wortman & Brehm, 1975).

As noted, negative feelings in these two kinds of situations parallel two divergenteffects on action. Both effects have adaptive properties. In the first situation, when theperson falls behind but the goal is not seen as lost, feelings of frustration and angeraccompany increase in effort, a struggle to gain the incentive despite setbacks (Figure1.1). This struggle is adaptive (thus, the affect is adaptive) because the struggle fostersgoal attainment.

In the second situation, when effort appears futile, feelings of sadness and depression accompany reduction of effort (Figure 1.1). Sadness and despondency imply thatthings cannot be set right, that effort is pointless. Reducing effort in this circumstance

Action and Affect 15

Affect= B]issful Happy Frustrated DeiectedOelighted Eager Angry Sad Despondent

Extent of

engagement

oreffort

can also be adaptive (Carver & Scheier, 2003; Wrosch, Scheier, Carver, & Schulz, 2003;Scheier, Miller, Schulz, & Carver, 2003). It conserves energy rather than waste

pursuit of the unattainable (Nesse, 2000). If reducing effort also helps to diminishcommitment to the goal (Klinger, 1975), then it eventually readies the person to take upother incentives in place of this one.

TWO-MODE MODELS OF FUNCTIONING

One more topic that we would like to mention briefly is the idea that human behaviorreflects two modes of functioning, an idea that has acquired a good deal of popularityover the past decade or so. Epstein (1985, 1990, 1994) has advocated this view for quitea long time. What he called the rational system operates mostly consciously, uses logicalrules, is verbal and deliberative, and thus is fairly slow. What he called the experientialsystem is intuitive and associative. It relies on salient information and uses shortcuts andheuristics. It functions automatically, nonverhally, and quickly, even impulsively. Bothsystems are always at work. What behavior occurs depends on which system is presentlydominant, which can be influenced by both situational constraints and individual differeilces,

A great many others have since made arguments that resemble these in broad strokes(see Carver, 2005; Carver, Johnson, & Joormann, 2008; Hofmann, Friese, & Strack,2009). Perhaps most widely noted in socialpsychology is that of Strack and Deutsch(2004}. What they called a reflective system anticipates future conditions, makes decisions from those anticipations, and forms intentions. It is planfid and wide-ranging in itssearch for information. What they called an impulsive system acts spontaneously whenits schemas or production systems are sufficiently activated, without consideration forbroader consequences of the action.

Dual-process thinking has also been influential in developmental psychology. Rothbart and others (e.g., Rothbar t, Ahadi, & Evans; 2000; Rothbart, Ellis, Rueda, & Posher, 2003; see also Kochanska & Knaack, 2003; Nigg, 2000) propose three temperamentsystems: approach, avoidance, and effortfid control. Effortful control is superordinate toapproach and avoidance temperaments (e.g., Ahadi & Rothbart 1994). It concerns attentional managemem and inhibitory control (the ability to suppress an approach behaviorwhen it is situationally inappropriate). The label e[fortfid conveys the sense that this is anexecutive, planful activity, resembling d/pictions of the deliberative mode of the modelsjust outlined.

Above Criterion -- - Below

FIGURE 1.1. Hypothesizedapproach-relatedaffects asa functiorlofdoingwellversusdoingpoorlycompared to a criterion velocity. A second (vertical) dimension indicates the degree of behavioralengagement posited to be associated with affects at different degrees of departure from neutralFrom Carver (2004}. Copyright 2004 by the American Psychological Association. Adapted bypermission.

!¸?i

Various theorists' depictions of the characteristics of these two modes of functioninghave some resemblance to depictions made earlier in the chapter between two levels ofabstraction in action control. Specifically, the deliberative mode of functioning has somesimilarity to what was earlier described as program control, and the impulsive mode offunctioning has some similarity to what was earlier described as sequence control.

We said earlier that programs require decisions and reflect intentions. They seemto be managed top-down, using effortful processing. Flanfulness, characteristic of programs, is also characteristic of behavior managed by a deliberative system. In contrast,

16 BASIC REGULATORY PROCESSES !'(

sequences occur in a relatively automatic stream once triggered, d they may be triggered simply by associations in memory. This resembles the more bfibSc mode of functioning in the dual-process view.

Also of interest is evidence that different brain areas manage effortful and automaticversions of the same behavior (Casey, Tottenham, & Fossella, 2002; Lieberman, Gaunt,Gilbert, & Trope, 2002; Posner & DiGirolamo, 2000). This in itself hints that theremay be an important boundary between action control that is deliberative versus actionsequences that are organized enough to be spontaneous once cued. Other evidence alsosupports the idea that intention-based and stimulus-based actions involve different process of action initiation (Keller et ah, 2006).

In previous discussions (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1998, 1999a) we frequently notedthat what level of control is functionally superordinate can vary with the situation (andacross persons); that is, a person can presently be behaving according to a principle (e.g.,a moral or ethical value) and the same person may be behaving according to a moreconcrete program. One can also imagine cases, though, in which the person is behavingimpulsively and spontaneously, without regard to either principle or plan. In the past, wenoted this point and how different the behaviors are. Now we find ourselves wonderingwhether this division maps onto the two modes of processing that have been postulatedby others.

Acgon and Affect 17

REFERENCES

Self-Con#oh Impulse and Constraint

Finally, we come to self-control per se. The idea that both spontaneous and planful goalscan come into conflict with each other is also part of the literature on self-control andself-control failure (Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996; Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice,1994). This literature focuses on cases in which a person is both motivated to act in someparticular way and also motivated to restrain that action.

Literature on self-control failure tends to portray these cases as involving a relativelyautomatic tendency to act in one way, opposed by a planful and effortfnl tendency torestrain that act. The action that is being inhibited is often characterized as an impulse,a desire that will automatically be translated into action unless it is controlled (perhapsin part because this action is habitual, perhaps in part because it is more primal). Therestraint is typically presumed to be effortful and to depend on limited resources. If theplanful part of the mind is able to attend to the conflict, the person may be able to resistthe impulse. If not, the impulse is more likely to be expressed.

This portrayal seems consonant with two-mode models of functioning (Hofmann etal., 2009). This raises an interesting question. Do all cases of self-control map onto thetwo-mode view? If we understand better what makes the two modes of functioning distinct from each other, will we have gained an important key to understanding self-controland self-control failure? This seems a particularly interesting question for further explo-.ration. We look forward to seeing what these explorations reveal in the years to come.

ACSROWLEDGMEHT

Preparation of this chapter was facilitated by support from the National Cancer Institute (GrantNo. CA64710) and the National Science Foundation (Grant No. BCS0544617).

Ahadi, S. A., & Rothbart, M. K. (1994). Temperament, development and the Big Five. In C.F. Halverson, Jr., G. A. Kohnstamm, & R. P. Martin (Eds.}, The developing structure oftemperament and personality from infancy to adulthood (pp. 189-207). Higsdale, NJ: Erl

• baum.

Asch, S. E. (1955). Opinions and social pressure. Scientific American, 193, 31-35.Aspinwall L.G. 1998 . Rethinking the role of positive affect in self-regulation. Motivation and

Emotion, 22, 1-32.

Atkinson, J. W., & Birch, D. (1970). Tbe dynamics of action. New York: Wiley.Austin, J. T., & Vancouver, J. B. (1996). Goal constructs in psychology: Structure, process, and

content. Psychological Bulletin, 120, 338-375.Baumeister, R. P., & Heather ton, T. F. (1996). Self-regulation failure: An overview. Psychological

..... Inquiry, 7,1-15.

Baumeister, R. F., Heatherton, T. F., & Tice, D. M. (1994). Losing control: Why people fail atself-regulation. San Diego, CA: Academic Press.

Baumeister, R. F., Vohs, K. D., DeWall, C. N., 8¢ Zhang L. 2007 . How emotion shapes behavior:

Feedback anticipation and reflection rather'than direct causation. Personality and SocialPsychology Review, 11, 167-203.

Beer, R. D. (1995). A dynamical systems perspective on agent-environment interaction• Artificial? Intelligence 72 173-215.

Cacioppo, J. T., & Berntson, G. G. (1994). Relationshlp between attitudes and evahmtive space: Acritical review, with emphasis on the separability of positive and negative substrates. Psychologieal Bulletin, 115, 40t-423.

Cacioppo, J. T., Gardner, W. L., & Berntson, G. G. (1999). The affect system has paralleI andintegrative processing components: Form follows function. Journal of Personality and SocialPsychology, 76, 839-855.

, W. B. (1932). The wisdom of the body. New York: Norton.Carver, C. S. (2003). Pleasure as a sign you can attend to something else: Placing positive feelings

within a general model of affect. Cognition and Emotion, 17, 241-261.Carver, C. S. (2004); Negative affects deriving from the behavioral approach system• Emotion, 4,

3-22.

Carver, C. S. {2005). Impulse and constraint: Perspectives from personality psychology, convergence with theory in other areas, and potential for integration. Personality and Social Paycbolggy Review, 9, 312-333.

Carver, C. S. (2009). Threat sensitivity, incentive sensitivity, and the experience of relief. Journalof Personality, 77, 125-138.

Carver, C. S., & Harmon-Jones, E. (2009a): Anger and approach: Reply to Watson (2009) andTomarken and Zald (2009). Psychological Bulletin, 135, 215-2tZ

Carver, C. S., & Harmon-Jones, E. (2009b). Anger is an approach-related affect: Evidence andimplications• Psychological Bulletin, 135, 183-204.

Carver, C. S., Johnson, S. L., & Joormann, J. (2008). Serotonergic function, two-mode models of

self-regulation, and vulnerability to depression: What depression has in common with impulsive aggression• Psychological Bulletin, 134, 912-943.

Carver, C. S., & Scheier, M. P. (1981). Attention and self-regulation: A control-theory approachto human behavior. New York: Springer-Verlag.

Carver, C. S., & Scheier, M. F. (1990). Origins and functions of positive and negative affect: Acontrol-process view• Psychological Review, 97, 19-35.

Carver, C. S., & Scheier, M. F. (1998). On the serf-regulation of behavior. New York: CambridgeUniversity Press.

Carver, C. S., & Scheier, M. F. (1999a). Several nmre themes, a lot more issues: Commentary on

18 .ASlC REaULATO.V PROCESSES !';::

the commentaries. In R. S. Wyer, Jr. (Ed.), Advances in social cog '!ion (Voh 12, pp. 261302). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. ."

Carver, C. S, & Scheier, M. P. (1999b). Themes and issues in the self-regulation of behavior. InR. S. Wyer, Jr. (Ed.), Advances in social cognition (VoL 12, pp. 1-105). Mahwah NJ: ErlbauIil.

Carver, C. S., & Scheier, M. F. (2000). Scaling back goals and recalibration of the affect systemare processes in normal adaptive self-regulation: Understanding "response shift" phenomena.Social Science and Medicine, 50, 1715-1722.

Carver, C. S., & Scheler, M. E (2003). Three human strengths. In L. G. Aspinwall & U. M.8taudinger (Eds.) A psychology of human strengths: Fundamental questions and futuredirections for a positive psychology (pp. 87-102). Washington, DC: American PsychologicalAssociation.

Casey, B. J, Tottenham, N., & Fossella, J. (2002). ClinieaI, imaging, lesion and genetic approachestoward a model of cognitive control• Developmental Psychobiology, 40, 237-224.

Clark, R. N. (1996). Control system dynamics, New York: Cambridge University Press.Clore, G. C. (1994). Why emotions are felt. In P. Ekman & K. J. Davidson (Eds.), The nature of

emotion: Fundamental questions (pp. 103-111). New York: Oxford University Press•Davidson, R. J. (1992). Anterior cerebral asymmetry and the nature of emotion. Brain and CognL

tion, 20, 125-151.Dreisbaeh, G., & Goschke, T. (2004). How positive affect modulates cognitive control: Reduced

perseveration at the cost of increased distractibility. Jour ml o[ Experimental Psychology:Learning, Memory, and Cognition. 30, 343-353.

Eidelman, 8., & Biernat, M. (2007). Getting more from success: Standard raising as esteem maintenance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 92,759-774.

Elliot, A. J. (Ed.). (2008). Handbook of approach and avoidance motivation. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbailiff,

Epstein, S. (1985). The implications of cognitive-experlential self theory for research in socialpsychology and personality. Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior, I5, 283-310.

Epstein, S. (1990). Cognitive-experiential self theory. In L. Pervln (Ed.), Handbook of personality: Theory and research (pp. 165-192). New York: Guilford Press.

Epstein, S. (1994). Integration of the cognitive and the psychodynamic unconscious, AmericanPsychologist, 49, 709-724.

Pestinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Evanston, IL: Row Peterson.

Finlay-Jones, R., & Brown, G. W. (1981). Types of stressful life event and the onset of anxiety anddepressive disorders. Psychological Medicine, 11,803-815.

Fitzsimons, G. M., Fdesen, J., Orehek, E., & Kruglanski, A. W. (2009). Progress-induced goalshifting as a self-regulatory strategy. In J. P. Forgas, R. E Baumeister, & D. Tire (Eds.), Thepsychology ofselfiregulation (pp. 109-126). New York: Psychology Press.

Ford, D. H. (1987). Humans as sel constructing living systems: A developmental perspective onbehavior and personality. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Fredrickson, B. L. (1998). What good are positive emotions? Review of General Psychology, 2,300-319.

Frijda, N. H. (1986). The emotions. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.Frijda, N. H. (1988). The laws of emotion. American Psychologist, 43, 349-328.Frijda, N. H. 0994). Emotions are functional, most of the time. In P. Ekman & R. J. Davidson

(Eds.), The nature of emotion: Fundamental questions (pp. 112-126). New York: OxfordUniversity Press.

Pulford, D., Johnson, J. L., Llabre, M. M., & Carver, C. S. (in press). Pushing and coasting indynamic goal pursuit: Coasting is attenuated in bipolar disorder. Psychological Science.

Gray, J. A. (1990). Brain systems that mediate both emotion and cognition. Cognition and Emotion, 4, 269-288.

Action and Affect 19

r, J. A. (1994). Three fundamental emotion systems. In E Ekman & R. J. Davidson (Eds.), Thenature of emotion: Fundamental questions (pp. 243-247). New York: Oxford UniversityPress.

Gross, J. J. (Ed.). (2007). Handbook of emotion regulation. New York: Guilford Press.• brain activity: Evidence

that insult-related relative left-prefrontal activation is associated with experienced anger andaggression. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 80, 797-803.

Hayes-Roth, B,, & Hayes-Roth P. (1979). A cognitive model of planning• Cognitive Science, 3,275-310.

Heider E (1946). Attitudes and gnitive rganizati n. J urna Psych l gy, 2 7- 12"

Higgins, E. T. (1987). Self-discrepancy: A theory relating self and affect. Psychological Review,94, 319-340.

Higgins, E. T. (1996). Ideals, oughts, and regulatory focus: Affect and motivation from distinctpains and pleasures. In P. M. Gollwitzer & J. A. Bargh (Eds.), Tbe psychology of action:Linking cognition and motivation to behavior (pp. 91-114). New York: Guilford Press.

Higgins, E. T., Shah, J., & Friedman, R. (1997). Emotional responses to goal attainment: Strengthof regulatory focus as moderator. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 72, 515525.

Hofmann, W., Priese, M., & Strack, F. (2009). Impulse and sell: control from a dual-systems perspective. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 4, 162-176.

lsen, A. M. (1987). Positive affect, cognitive processes, and social behavior. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.),Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 20, pp. 203-252). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.

Isen, A. M. (2000). Positive affect and decision making. In M. Lewis & J. M. Havila ad-Jones

(Eds.), Handbook of emotions (2nd ed., pp. 417-435). New York: Guilford Press.tzard, C. E. (1977). Human emotions. New York: Plenum Press.Kahn, B. E., & Isen, A. M. (1993). The influence of positive affect on variety-seeking among safe,

enjoyable products. Journal of Consumer Research, 20, 257-270.Keller, P. E., Wascher, E., Prinz, W., Waszak, F., Koch, I., & Rosenbaum, D. A. (2006). Differ

ences between intentiort-based and stimulus-based actions. Journal of Psychophysiology, 20,9-20.

Klinger, E. (1975). Consequences of commitment to and disengagement from incentives. Psychological Review, 82, 1-25.

Kochanska, G,, & Knaack, A. {2003). Effortful control as a personality characteristic of young. children: Antecedents, correlates, and consequences• Journal of Personality. 71, 1087-1112.

(1995). The emotion probe: Studies of motivation and attention. American Psychologist. SO, 372-385.

Lang, E J., Bradley, M. M., & Cuthbert, B. N. (1990). Emotion, attention, and the startle reflex•377-395.

, New York: Island Press•

Lewis, M., Sullivan, M. W., Ramsay, D. S., & A flessandri, S. M. (1992). Individual differences inextinction: Antecedents and consequences. Infant Behavior

and Development, 15, 443-452., M. D, Gaunt, R., Gilbert, D. T., & Trope, Y. (2002). Reflection and reflexion: A social

cognitive neuroscience approach to attributlonal inference. In M. Zanna (Ed.), Advances inexperimental social psychology (Vol. 34, pp. 199-249). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.

Louro, M. J., Pieters, R., & Zeelenberg, M. (2007). Dynamics of multiple-goal pursuit. Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology, 93, 174-193.

MacKay, D. M. (1966). Cerebral organization and the conscious control of action. In J. C. Eccles(Ed.), Brain and conscious experience (pp. 422-445). Berlin: Springer-Verlag.

Mikulincer, M. (1988). Reactance and helplessness following exposure to learned helplessness

20 BASl0REGOLATORYP 00EsgEsh"

following exposure to unsolvable problems The effects of attr butic ia4l style Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 54, 679-686. !

"

Miller, G. A., Galanter, E., & Pribram, K. H. (1960). Plans and the structure of behavior. NewYork: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.

Mischel, W., & Shoda, Y. (1995). A cognitive-affective system theory of personality: Reconceptuafizing the invariances in personality and the role of situations. Psychological Review, 102,246-268.

Mizruchi, M. S. (1991). Urgency, motivation, and group performance: The effect of prior successon current success among professional basketball teams. Social Psychology Quarterly, 54,181-189.

Hesse, R. M. (2000). Is depression an adaptation? Archives of General Psychiatry, 57, 14-20.Nigg, J. T. (2000). On inhibition/disinbibition in developmental psychopathology: Views from

cognitive and personality psychology as a working inhibition taxonomy. Psychological Bulletin, 126, 220-246.

Ortony, A., Clore, G. L., & Collins, A. (1988). Tbe cognitive structure of emotions. New York:Cambridge University Press.

Payton, D. W. (1990). Internalized plans: A representation for action resources. In P. Maes (Ed.),Designing autonomous agents: Theory and practice from biology to engineering and back(pp. 89-103). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Posner, M. L, & DiGirolamo, G. J. (2000). Cognitive neuroscience: Origins and promise. Psychological Bulletin, 126, 873-889.

Powers, W. T. (1973). Behavior: The control of perception. Chicago: Aldine.Reed, M. B., & Aspinwall, L. G. (1998). Self-affirmation reduces biased processing of health-risk

information. Motivation and Emotion, 22, 99-132.Rolls, E. T. (1999). The brain and emotion. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.Rolls, E. T. (2005). Emotion explained. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.Rosenbaum, D. A., Carlson, R. A., & Gilmore, R. O. (2001). Acquisition of intellectual and

perceptual-motor skills. Annual Review of Psychology, 52,453-470.Rosenbaum, D. A., Meulenbroek, R. G. J., Vaugban, J., &Jansen, C. (2001). Posture-based motion

planning: Applications to grasping. Psychological Review, 108, 709-734.Rothbar t, M. K., Ahadi, S. A., & Evans, D. E. (2000). Temperament and personality: Origins and

outcomes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 78, 122-135.Rothbart, M. K., EJfis, L. K., Rueda M. R., & Posner, M. I. (2003). Developing mechanisms of

temperamental effortful control. Journal of Personality, 71, 1113-1143.Schwartz S. H., & Bilsky, W. (1990). Toward a theory of the universal content and structure of

values: Extensions and cross-cu[tu ra[ replications. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 58, 878-891.

Schwartz, S. H., & Rubel, T. (2005). Sex differences in value priorities: Cross-cultural and multimethod studies. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 89, 1010-1028.

Schwarz, N., & Bohner, G. (1996). Feelings and their motivational implications: Moods and theaction sequence. In P. M. Gollwitzer & J. A. Ba rgh (Eds.), The psychology of action: Linkingcognition and motivation to behavior (pp. t19-145). New York: Guilford Press.

Shafice, T. (1978). The dominant action system: An information-processing approach to consciousness. In K. S. Pope & J. L. Singer (Eds.), The stream of consciousness: Scientific inves

tigations into the flow of human experience (pp. 117-157). New York: Wiley.Shin, J. C., & Rosenbaum, D. A. (2002). Reaching while calculating: Scheduling of cognitive and

perceptual-motor processes. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 131, 206-219.Simon, H. A. (1953). Models of man. New York: Wiley.Simon, H. A. (1967). Motivational and emotional controls of cognition. Psychology Review, 74,

29-39.

Action and Affect 21

Strack, F., & Deutsch, R. (2fl04). Reflective and impulsive determinants of social behavior. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 8, 220-24Z

Tesser, A., Crepaz, N., Collins, J. C., Cornell, D., & Beach, S. R. H. (2000). Confluence of selfesteem regulation mechanisms: On integrating the self-zoo. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 26, 1476-1489.

Trope, Y., & Neter, E. (1994). Reconciling competing motives in self-evaluation: The role of selfcontrol in feedback seeking. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 66, 646-65Z

Trope, Y., & Pomerantz, E. M. (1998). Resolving conficts among self-evaluative motives: Positire experiences as a resource for overcoming defensiveness. Motivation and Emotion, 22,

53-72.

Vallacher, R. R., & Wegner, D. M. (1987). What do people think they're doing?: Action identification and human behavior. Psychological Review, 94, 3-15.

yon Bertalanffy, L. (1968). General systems theory. New York: Brazifler.t, D. (2009). Locating anger in the hierarchical structure of affect: Comment on Carver and

Harmon Jones (2009). Psychological Bulletin, 135, 205-208.| Watson, D., Wiese, D., Vaidya, J., & Teflegen, A. (1999). The two general activation systems of

affect: Structural findings evolutionary considerations and psychobiological evidence.Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76, 820-838.

Wiener, N. (1948). Cybernetics: Control and communication in the animal and the machine.Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Wortman, C. B., & Brehm, J. W. (1975). Responses to uncontrollable outcomes: An integrationof reactance theory and the learned helplessness model. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances inexperimental social psychology (Vo]. 8, pp. 277-33 fl). New York: Academic Press.

, C., Scheier, M. F., Carver, C. S., & Schulz, R. (2003). The importance of goal disengagement in adaptive self-regulation: When giving up is beneficial. Self and Identity, 2, 1-20.

Wrosch, C., Scheier, M. E, Miller, G. E., Schulz, R., & Carver, C. S. (2003). Adaptive selfregulation of unattainable goals: Goal disengagement, goal re-engagement, and subjectivewell-being. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 29, 1494-1508.