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Russia’s exercise of power

A comparative case study of Russia’s use of

command power, soft power and smart power in

Georgia and Ukraine

C-thesis

Author: Linnea Nilsson

Supervisor: Manuela Nilsson

Examiner: Heiko Fritz

Term: VT19

Subject: Peace and Development Studies

Level: Bachelor

Course code: 2FU33E

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Abstract

Despite a vast research of Russia’s means of power, including its military

interventions in Georgia and Ukraine, no comprehensive comparison of

Russia’s exercise of power in Georgia and Ukraine has been accomplished,

even though they are the most prominent cases of post-Soviet states that have

been subjects for Russian military aggression. This study compares the forms

of power Russia has been using to implement its foreign policy objectives in

Ukraine and Georgia, in order to identify Russia’s power-related behavior

and strategies, through an abductive qualitative approach with a comparative

method. Russia’s means of power are analyzed through the glasses of the

analytical framework of Joseph Nye’s concepts of command power, soft

power and smart power. The findings suggest that Russia’s main foreign

policy objectives, related to the post-Soviet space, are to prevent the

establishment of a pro-Western orientation in the region, make its

neighboring countries dependent on Russia, establish closer ties with its

neighbors and incorporate them in the Eurasian Customs Union (ECU), but

also to achieve military supremacy in the region. It is further apparent that

Russia uses similar strategies and means of power in Georgia and Ukraine,

both through military actions and economic pressures, that can be

categorized under command power, but also through diplomatic means, other

economic means, informational tools and co-optation. However, in order to

achieve its foreign policy objectives most efficiently, Russia combines

command power and soft power. This study can contribute to the research of

other dominant countries and unequal relationships; and from the learnings

of this study, early warning signs or scenarios with certain foreign policy

moves can be detected in other dominant countries’ exercise of power

towards less powerful states.

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Keywords

Russia, dominant countries, foreign policy, exercise of power, Ukraine,

Georgia, conflict, command power, soft power and smart power

Acknowledgements

I want to thank my research supervisor Manuela Nilsson for her dedicated

involvement, assistance and support through every step in the process of the

thesis. I am very grateful for her support and understanding during these

weeks.

List of abbreviations

ECU - Eurasian Customs Union

EU - European Union

NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization

USSR - Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

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Table of Content

1. Introduction ............................................................................................................ 7

1.1 Background ...................................................................................................... 7

1 1.2 Literature review, research problem and research relevance ................. 8

2 1.3 Research objective and framing of questions ......................................... 11

3 1.4 Analytical framework ............................................................................. 12

4 1.5 Methodological framework .................................................................... 12

5 1.6 Disposition of the thesis ......................................................................... 13

6 2. Analytical framework ................................................................................... 13

7 2.1 Soft power and command power ............................................................ 13

8 2.2 Smart power ........................................................................................... 14

9 2.3 Alternative concepts of power ................................................................ 15

10 3. Methodological framework .......................................................................... 18

11 3.1 Qualitative method ............................................................................. 18

12 3.2 Comparative method .......................................................................... 19

13 3.3 Abductive approach ............................................................................ 20

14 3.4 Sources ............................................................................................... 21

15 3.5 Limitations .......................................................................................... 22

16 3.6 Delimitations ...................................................................................... 23

17 3.7 Ethical considerations ........................................................................ 24

18 4. Empirical results ........................................................................................... 24

19 4.1 A short review of the conflicts in Georgia and Ukraine ..................... 24

20 4.1.1 Georgia ........................................................................................ 24

21 4.1.2 Ukraine ........................................................................................ 26

22 4.2 Russia’s main foreign policy objectives in the post-Soviet space ...... 28

23 4.3 Russia’s exercise of power in Georgia ............................................... 30

24 4.3.1 Military tools ............................................................................... 30

25 4.3.2 Diplomatic tools .......................................................................... 32

26 4.3.3 Economic tools ............................................................................ 34

27 4.3.4 Propaganda, informational tools and co-optation ........................ 36

28 4.4 Russia in Ukraine ............................................................................... 38

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29 4.4.1 Military tools ............................................................................... 38

30 4.4.2 Diplomatic tools .......................................................................... 39

31 4.4.3 Economic tools ............................................................................ 40

32 4.4.4 Propaganda, informational tools and co-optation ........................ 41

33 5. Analysis ........................................................................................................ 43

34 5.1 Russia’s use of command power in Georgia and Ukraine ................. 43

35 5.2 Russia’s use of soft power in Georgia and Ukraine ........................... 45

36 5.3 Russia’s use of smart power in Georgia and Ukraine ....................... 48

37 6. Conclusions .................................................................................................. 51

38 7. Bibliography ................................................................................................. 53

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1. Introduction

1.1 Background

In 2019, the United States, Russia, China, Germany, United Kingdom,

France, Japan, Israel, Saudi Arabia and South Korea were ranked as the ten

most powerful and influential countries in the world, based on five state

attributes related to power: military strength, the characteristics of the leader,

political influence, economic influence, and the international alliances a

country has (US News World Report, 2019). These dominant countries have

a great ability to achieve their foreign policy objectives, compared to other

states on the international arena, through their exercise of power towards less

powerful countries. The United States has over many years been considered

as the sole dominating superpower in the global world order (Foot, R.,

2006:77), but it has also been argued that the US hegemony is in decline and

challenged by other powerful countries (Roberts, J. T., 2011:776). Another

dominant country that has received much attention in its exercise of power

towards less powerful countries is Russia. By investigating the case of

Russia, conclusions may be drawn on how other dominant countries may use

their power strategies, as well as which consequences their great power status

and exercise of power can get.

After the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the USSR, there

has been a widespread concern of a possible Russian invasion, among

inhabitants in several post-Soviet states (Lanoszka, A., 2016:175). Since

1991, when fifteen new states became independent after the dissolution of

the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Michalopoulos, C., 1993:2), Russia

has made military interventions in two of these post-Soviet states, namely in

Georgia in 2008 (Cheterian, V., 2008:155) and Ukraine in 2014 (Grant, T.

D., 2015:68). In 2008, Moscow recognized the Georgian territories of South

Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states and Russian troops moved into

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these areas, which ended up in a war between Georgia and Russia (Cheterian,

V., 2008:156). Six years later, Russia commenced the annexation of Crimea,

which officially was a part of Ukraine (Grant, T. D., 2015:68). The country

also supported pro-Russian rebels in Eastern Ukraine, who were inspired by

Russia’s annexation of Crimea, which led to a conflict with the Ukrainian

army and paramilitary nationalists. Russian soldiers were also involved in

Eastern Ukraine (Sutyagin, I., 2015:1). In parallel, Russia has by various

means of power attempted to influence both countries, which also occurs in

other post-Soviet states. There is also a discussion of Russia’s underlying

aims behind these interventions and endeavor to influence its neighboring

countries (Lanoszka, A., 2016:176).

1.2 Literature review, research problem and research relevance

As a dominant country with a great power status, Russia has a great ability to

achieve its foreign policy objectives, through its exercise of power over less

powerful states, such as Georgia and Ukraine. The available literature

provides much information about Russia’s power and foreign policy

behavior. For instance, Professor Charles E. Ziegler, states that the

emergence of post-modern global norms, dominated by the West, are

strongly linked to the persisting tensions between Western states and Russia

(Ziegler, E., C., 2012:400). Many researchers, such as Laure Delcour and

Kataryna Wolczuk (2015:473), seem to agree that Russia’s main foreign

policy objective, related to other post-Soviet states, is to tie these countries

closer to Russia and to prevent them from being more integrated with the

West, but also from joining the European Union or NATO.

Much has been written about Russia’s behavior and foreign policy

strategies in other post-Soviet states, including its exercise of power in

Ukraine and Georgia - and there is high emphasis on Russia’s military

actions in Georgia and Ukraine. The sequence of events before the war in

Georgia is also well documented, including of how the internal clashes

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between different ethnic groups started after the nationalist president Zviad

Gamsakhurdia came into office after the first elections and the emergence of

pro-Russian separatist groups, as well as the breakaway regions’ fight for

independence (Oskanian, K., 2013:6-7). Research also has focused on

Russia’s military actions towards Georgia and the Russian-Georgian Five-

Days War. The Russian occupations of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, as well

as the Russian troops’ direct military confrontation with the national

Georgian army, are further well documented (Lanskoy, M., Areshidze, G.,

2008:156-157). The available literature also describes the sequence of events

before the conflict in Ukraine broke out, including how the choice of a closer

economic cooperation with Russia led to grievance among EU-supporters

(Nilsson, M., Silander, D., 2015), which turned into demonstrations in Kiev

and the deposition of President Viktor Janukovytj, which was replaced by a

more EU-friendly leadership (Tolstrup, J., 2015). After this deposition,

Russia annexed Crimea with its military forces. In parallel, a conflict broke

out in Eastern Ukraine, in the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, with direct

confrontations between pro-Russian separatists and Russian troops on one

side and paramilitary Ukrainian nationalists and Ukrainian army forces on

the other side (Sutyagin, I., 2015:1). These military actions, performed by

Russia, have got much attention in the international society and they are well

documented in the available literature.

Russia’s non-military exercise of power in the post-Soviet space has

also been increasingly emphasized in the literature - and this is also the case

in Georgia and Ukraine. For instance, there are material that presents how

Russia is using diplomacy, economic tools, informational tools in Georgia

(Nilsson, N., 2018:5), but also how the country supports separatists and pro-

Russian groups in Georgia, in order to get increased influence over the

country (Ibid.:37). This is also the case in Ukraine, where one of Russia’s

foreign policy priorities is to tie Ukraine closer to Russia, by pointing out the

two countries’ cultural similarities and communal heritage (Bogomolov, A.,

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Lytvynenko, O., 2012:1-2, 5). The available literature further provides

information about Russia’s support of pro-Russian groups in Ukraine,

including NGOs and political parties (Pelnēns, G., 2010:253, 264), as well as

its information warfare in the media space (Polyakov, L., 2015:127, 129) and

its use of economic tools (MacFarlane, N., Menon, A., 2014:97-98). Even

though there are material available in the existing literature that presents

these alternative, non-traditional means of power, the largest emphasis within

the literature written about Russia’s foreign policy behavior in Georgia and

Ukraine, is on Russia’s military actions.

Thus, as seen in the literature review above, the available literature

provides plenty of material about Russia’s exercise of power in both

countries separately. However, the literature mainly focuses on obvious types

of power, such as military or economic power. It does not compare Russia’s

use of different forms of power in Ukraine and Georgia, nor does it

investigate patterns in Russia’s foreign policy behavior and strategies, in

relation to these two countries. Concerning the cases of Georgia and Ukraine,

there is much focus in the literature on Russia’s military presence in its

neighboring countries, while the other means of power gets less attention in

Georgia and Ukraine. The predominant focus on military means is, however,

not remarkable, since the use of military power may frighten people to a

larger extent, since it threatens their physical security.

Since Ukraine and Georgia are the eminent post-Soviet states that

have been subjects to Russian military interventions, an investigation,

identification and comparison of Russia’s behavior and exercise of power in

these two countries is of great importance and has a lot of relevance for the

understanding of military intervention and the use of power in conflict, since

it can indicate patterns in Russia’s foreign policy, as a prominent example of

a great power, in relation to its neighbors. It is important to see which power

strategies Russia has used so far - and to look into more than one case at the

time. If Russia has used the same strategies in both Ukraine and Georgia,

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there is also a chance that similar strategies and means of power are used in

other post-Soviet states, or beyond that, in other countries bordering the

Russian sphere of influence today. Therefore, the identification and

comparison of Russia’s means of power in Georgia and Ukraine can make it

easier to notice warning signals in other post-Soviet states that could be the

next subjects to Russian invasion. It can also contribute with material to an

information base, that may provide states, security organizations, defense

institutions and other international organizations with information about

Russia’s behavior and strategies, related to its exercise of power. This can

facilitate the work to prevent that international law, respect for national

borders and human rights are violated in the future. It may be disputable to

which extent Russia’s foreign policy behavior can be countered, but anyhow,

some scholars underline that Russia has not respected national borders and

human rights - and the country has been breaking the international law

(Sayapin, S., et. al., 2018:4). Therefore, Russia’s aims, behavior and

strategies must be identified, so the international community and nation

states can prepare and develop strategies to prevent these violations.

The investigation of Russia’s foreign policy strategies is also relevant

for studies of other dominant countries. Russia can serve as an example of

other states with high power levels, where learnings can be drawn from

Russia’s role as great power and its foreign policy behavior. From these

learnings, early warning signs or scenarios with certain foreign policy moves

can detected in other dominant countries’ exercise of power towards less

powerful states.

1.3 Research objective and framing of questions

The objective of the study is to compare the forms of power Russia has been

using to implement its foreign policy objectives in Georgia and Ukraine, in

order to identify Russia’s power-related behavior and strategies. In order to

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achieve the research objective, the following research questions have been

formulated:

• Which main objectives in Russian foreign policy, related to its

exercise of power in its neighboring states, are identified in the

current literature?

• Which forms of power is Russia using towards Georgia respectively

Ukraine? How is Russia using these means of power?

• Which main similarities and differences are there, in Russia’s

exercise of power in Georgia and Ukraine?

The second and third research questions are the main questions for this study,

while the first one is relevant for understanding the other questions, since a

country’s foreign policy objectives need to be defined, in order to get a

deeper understanding of its behavior in other states.

1.4 Analytical framework

Joseph Nye’s concepts of soft power, command power and smart power will

be used as the analytical framework for this study, which will examine

Russia’s exercise of power in Georgia and Ukraine. The study will focus on

Nye’s three power concepts; however, it will also be open to detecting other

forms of power, that might not fit into this analytical framework. Nye’s

concepts of power and why this analytical framework was chosen will be

further explained in chapter 2 of this thesis.

1.5 Methodological framework

A qualitative desk study and a text analysis will be done in this paper, with

an abductive approach. A comparative method will be used, by comparing

Russia’s power strategies in Georgia and Ukraine. Chapter 3 will explain the

chosen methodological framework further.

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1.6 Disposition of the thesis

The coming sections of this study will present the analytical framework and

the methodological framework, including the limitations and delimitations of

the study. In the findings section, relevant material and information about

Russia’s exercise of power in Ukraine and Georgia will be presented, as well

as Russia’s foreign policy objectives, related to its post-Soviet neighbors.

These results will later be compared in the analysis, which also will

categorize Russia’s power instruments under Nye’s concepts of command

power, soft power and smart power. The analysis will be followed by the

conclusion of the study, including future research suggestions.

2. Analytical framework

2.1 Soft power and command power

The concept of power is contested and complex - and there is no

encompassing theory, nor one overarching analytical approach that most

researchers agree on (Hurrell, A., 2017:90). Some scholars do the largest

distinction between soft power and command power. According to Joseph S.

Nye, professor at Harvard University, the proof of power has traditionally

been laying in military resources. In more recent times, the concept of power

increasingly emphasizes the ability to affect the behavior of other states, by

attraction (Nye, J. S., 1990:154-155), rather than coercion, which Nye

describes as the concept of soft power, which he developed in 1990 (Nye, J.

S., 1990:166-167). His concept of soft power refers to the ability to shape

another actor’s preferences, decisions and behavior through attraction; by

actions of evoking appreciation or interest for something or someone. A

country can achieve its preferred outcomes in foreign policy, because other

states or actors either are willing to support it, or have allowed situations and

conditions that may produce these outcomes. Instead of ordering other

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countries to behave in a certain manner, the exercise of soft power, or co-

optive power, occurs when a state gets other actors to want and behave in a

similar way as itself. This force of attraction is often associated with

ideological, cultural and institutional influence, but also with policies and

political values, that are considered to be legitimate and have a moral

authority (Nye, J. S., 1990:166-167).

According to Nye, the opposite of soft power is command power,

even called hard power. This is the more traditional form of power, that was

mentioned above. Command power includes economic pressure means,

coercive actions, threats or military means, which is used in order to reach

certain political aims (Nye, J. S., 2008:95). Joseph Nye’s first work on soft

power challenged the assumption that the United States’ power was

declining. Instead, he argued that US’ power was more comprehensive, if

other power resources are examined, besides the traditional power factors

such as economic wealth, military capacity, population and geographic size

of a country (Nye, J. S., 1990:8). Nye claimed that soft power resources are

of greater importance in the US, as well as in other countries, in the new era,

when the world is becoming increasingly interdependent (Nye, J. S.,

1990:32). Some of the most common examples of soft power, is the use of

trade, diplomacy, propaganda, media and co-optation (Nye, J. S., 1990:166-

167). Economic means can, depending on the context, be attributed to either

command power or soft power. Trade and economic cooperation are two

examples of soft power, while economic pressure means, such as sanctions,

would be categorized as hard power (Feklyunina, V., 2015).

2.2 Smart power

The concept of smart power was later developed under the 21st century,

when political scientists realized that the most effective type of power is

when a state combines soft power and command power. Joseph Nye stated

that it is more strategic for countries to use a combination of attraction and

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coercion in their foreign policy, in order to be as powerful as possible.

According to Nye, there are three main ways for an actor to affect and shape

the behavior of others, in order to get it wants, namely payment, coercion and

attraction. Command power is the use of payment and coercion, while soft

power is the use of attraction. By only using either command power or soft

power separately, it is harder for a state to get its desired outcomes. It is,

according to Nye, more effective for a state to use both payment, coercion

and attraction in order to achieve its foreign policy objectives, instead of just

one or two of these (Nye, J. S., 2009:160-162). There are also other scholars

that, more recently, have renewed and supplemented Nye’s material, so it fits

more into the daily context. For instance, the American scholar Ernest J.

Wilson, develops Nye’s ideas and states that both diplomacy advocates and

hard power advocates have a narrow understanding and ignore other essential

means of power. A lacking debate about means of power, leads to poor

decision making, according to Wilson. Therefore, he advocates smart power,

similar to Nye (Wilson, E. J., 2008:110-111).

2.3 Alternative concepts of power

There are, however, other definitions of power, as well as other theorists and

political scientists that writes about concepts of power, that is related to the

exercise of power in international politics, which partly would fit as

analytical frameworks for this study, in order to answer the research

questions. Some political scientists, such as Michael Barnett and Raymond

Duvall, use to differ between various levels of power. These include

compulsory power, which refers to the relation where one actor has direct

control over another actor, institutional power, where an actor has indirect

control over others, for instance, by controlling an agenda, exclude issues

that may threaten certain interests and determine the decisions and structural

power, which refers to the constitution of an actors’ capacities in a direct

structural relation to another actor (Barnett, M., Duvall, R., 2005:43). Others

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do the largest distinction between constructive power and destructive power,

where the former is related to that kind of constructive influence with a

positive intention, that appears when actors are cooperating and working

together, while the latter; the destructive power, is the exercise of power with

a negative attention, that is related to intimidation, fear and coercion (Baker,

G., 2008), which are similar to the concepts of command power and soft

power.

The political scientist Robert Dahl attempts to define power based on

the concept of influence. Influence is related to relationships and to what

extent an actor can influence another actor's behavior and actions. He

considers the state as an important and powerful actor, both nationally and in

the international system. Dahl means that other actors often try to win the

state's favor, since they often can enforce their agenda with the help of the

government. Dahl has a positivist attitude to how power can be understood

and means that it is possible to determine, through empirical investigations,

which actor, among others, that possesses the greatest power (Dahl, 1961,

102-104, 164). Steven Lukes is another political scientist that has been doing

research about different concepts of power. He goes in a similar direction as

both Dahl and Nye, but Lukes divides exercise of power in three various

dimensions. In short, his One-Dimensional Power means that A is directly

exercising power over B (Lukes, S., 2005:17), where he draws much of this

dimension on Robert Dahl’s work on “The Concept of Power”, where Dahl

states that one kind of power relation is when “A has power over B to the

extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do”

(Dahl, R., 1957:80). Lukes’ Two-Dimensional Power is more subtle and

means that exercise of power can be noticed in existing values, structures and

institutional practices, which can inhibit one group and be in favor of another

(Lukes, S., 2005:17:20-21). The Third-Dimensional Power is when someone

exercise power through authority, as well as manipulation (Ibid.:27). Lukes

dimensions do, to a larger extent, focus on intra-state relations, while Nye’s

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concepts of power are fitting better on inter-state relations, which are

examined in this study. Lukes dimensions can also be considered as different

combinations of soft and command power and thereby be based on Nye.

Joseph Nye is the one that first defined the concept of soft power.

Even though there are many other ideas and concepts of power, the others

that would have been relevant for answering the research questions of this

study, are often either based on Nye or they do not provide with anything

better than Nye, in order to form an analytical framework that better would

help to answer the research questions of this study. Nye’s concepts are

preferred as analytical frameworks in this paper, since they may contribute to

more precise answers of the research questions. Further, Nye wrote his first

material at the end of the Cold War - and takes the division and the tensions

between the West and East into account, which also is relevant for this thesis,

since both Georgia and Ukraine has been torn between the West and the East,

since the end of the Cold War.

Therefore, Joseph Nye’s concepts of soft power, command power and

smart power will be used as the analytical frameworks for this study, in order

to identify, compare and analyze Russia’s exercise of power in these two

post-Soviet states. This paper will investigate the different forms of power

Russia has been using towards Georgia and Ukraine, in order to pursue its

foreign policy objectives. According to Jakob Gustavsson (Gustavsson, J.,

2018), foreign policy has generally three primary goals, namely to ensure a

country’s ideology, welfare and national security. Some of the most common

methods that are used to achieve these goals are the practice of diplomacy,

propaganda, economic means and military means (Gustavsson, J. et al.,

2014:259). These means can also be categorized under Nye’s concepts of

soft power and command power. They will be used in the investigation of

Russia’s exercise of power in this study, under the four categories of: 1)

military tools, 2) economic tools, 3) diplomacy tools and 4) propaganda,

informational tools and co-optation, based on the methods Jakob Gustavsson

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presented, which are used in order to categorize the findings of this study.

Military tools and certain economic tools, such as economic sanctions and

pressures, are the most prominent command power means (Nye, J. S.,

2008:95), while diplomacy, propaganda, informational tools, co-optation, as

well as other economic tools, such as trade and economic cooperations,

normally are categorized under soft power (Nye, J. S., 1990:166-167). This

study will also investigate Russia’s use of smart power towards Georgia and

Ukraine, which is the combination of these command and soft power tools

mentioned above.

3. Methodological framework

In this chapter, the methodological framework of the study will be outlined.

In order to achieve the objective of this study, by answering the research

questions, an abductive qualitative desk study with a text analysis will be

done and a comparative method with two case studies will be used in the

paper, which will be explained in the paragraphs below.

3.1 Qualitative method

In contrast to the quantitative method, which put much emphasis on

numerical data (Bryman, A., 2016:375), the qualitative method describes and

explains events, phenomena and actors in detail, in order to provide a deeper

exposition of the context in which individuals’ and actors’ behaviors and

actions take place (Ibid.: 394). This paper will present a qualitative study,

where Russia’s means of power in Georgia and Ukraine will be explained in

detail, in order to provide a deeper account of the context of Russia’s

exercise of power, potential threats and Russia’s underlying aims in foreign

policy. In order to be able to answer the research questions properly, a

qualitative text analysis will be conducted, which aims to sort out the most

essential content in a text, that is relevant for answering the research

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questions, by a careful reading of the text’s sections and entirety, but also of

its context (Esaiasson, P., et. al. 2017:211). Since Russia’s means of power in

Georgia and Ukraine from 1991 are well documented in the available

literature, this paper will present a desk study, where documents and texts

will be collected, interpreted and analyzed (Strang, V., Szabo, V., 1997:377-

379).

3.2 Comparative method

A comparative method will be used in this study, to detect common

strategies in Russia’s exercise of power. The comparative method is a

scientific approach aimed at describing, explaining and analyzing the

empirical differences, as well as the relationships between different entities.

This comparative method can be used to compare different phenomena that

have significant similarities with each other, but also different results. In

contrast to a statistical method, fewer number of cases are examined in the

comparative method (Lijphart, A., 1971:684). The paper will present a

multiple case study, which takes the form when a qualitative method with a

comparative design is applied. A multiple case study occurs when the

investigated case studies are more than one. By comparing various cases, a

researcher can also develop or suggest new concepts, theories or ideas

(Bryman, A., 2016:67-68). In this study, Georgia and Ukraine are the entities

or cases that will be analyzed - and Russia’s exercise of power in these

countries is the phenomenon that will be compared. These two countries are

selected, since the study will compare Russia’s exercise of power in the cases

of sovereign post-Soviet states where Russia has made military interventions,

in order to fulfill the objective of the thesis - and Georgia and Ukraine are the

only countries Russia has invaded. Therefore, more than two different case

studies can not be done within this subject.

However, these two countries are comparable, not only because

they are post-Soviet states and have been subjects for Russia’s military

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interventions, but also because both Georgia and Ukraine have been facing a

dilemma, where they have been forced to choose between either closer ties

with Russia or with the West. Today, they are both searching for a closer

integration with the West. Similar to each other, both Georgia and Ukraine

are also the inferior part in their relationship with Russia - and are in many

respects dependent on the Russian state. Therefore, Russia’s exercise of

power in relation to these countries will investigated and compared - and

thereby, conclusions may be drawn on other unequal state relationships,

where one of the states is far more dominant than the other.

3.3 Abductive approach

By taking an abductive approach, a researcher uses one or several analytical

frameworks in order to describe and explain a certain phenomenon

(Danermark, B., et. al, 2008:90). The researcher’s worldview, in a study with

abductive reasoning, will be based on observed and collected data (Bryman,

A., 2016:401). In this study, an abductive approach will be taken, since the

concepts of soft power, command power and smart power will be used as the

main analytical frameworks, in order to analyze Russia’s behavior and

exercise of power. This lens is, however, not exclusive, but leaves the

investigation open to detect other forms of power that might not fit into the

applied analytical framework. The paper will provide information about how

Russia has been using various forms of power in Georgia and Ukraine, in

order to detect how these strategies may be recognized in other post-Soviet

states the future. This study does not aim to create new theories or concepts,

where the theory is generated from the research, which is the case in an

inductive approach. Neither will it test a theory or a theoretical based

hypothesis, which is the case in a deductive approach (Bryman, A.,

2016:690-691). Unlike the inductive approach, which provides an empirical

generalization, the abductive approach starts to describe general patterns,

which will be done in this study. Abduction also differs from the deductive

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approach, since it is does not provide a rigid logical conclusion (Collins, R.,

1985). It will rather use existing concepts, in order to provide a greater

understanding of Russia’s exercise of power and indicate patterns in Russia’s

relations to its neighbors, by examining the topic through the lens of an

analytical framework.

3.4 Sources

Source criticism is a method for evaluating whether information is credible,

probable and anchored in reality. There are four criteria that often are used

when doing a traditional evaluation of sources, namely: 1) Authenticity; is

the source what it claims to be? 2) Time; when was the source presented? 3)

Dependency; is the source independent or does it belong to or build on other

sources? 4) Tendency; is the information biased (Alexanderson, K., 2012:7,

10-11)? When selecting material for this study, the relevance, reliability and

objectivity of potential sources are examined, by testing them through these

four criteria presented above. This paper is mainly based on scientific articles

and books, in order to present as relevant, objective and reliable information

as possible. There is a great availability of sources that are relevant for

answering the research questions, especially material that concerns Russia’s

use of command power. Instead of reviewing one or a few documents, the

findings are based on several different articles and texts. However, in some

cases, online sources and official statements are also used, in order to provide

additional information that is relevant for the study. For instance, primary

sources of Russian official statements are used, such as the Russian Prime

Minister Dmitrij Medvedev’s direct messages to Ukraine’s former President

Viktoru Yushchenko (Medvedev, D., 2009). Statements like these are

naturally biased, but the use of these sources is not aiming to collect

objective facts or information about an occurrence, but rather to show how

Russia concretely expresses its foreign policy objectives.

22

However, since this paper presents a desk study and implements a

secondary analysis of sources - and mainly uses secondary sources of

information, including the scientific articles and online sources, the material

used in this research may have been generated, biased or conceived in a

certain way. Few texts are completely objective, rather, articles normally

reflect the author’s fundamental worldviews and preconceptions. They often

have something in mind and/or want to prove a statement or phenomena

when they do their research (Strang, V., Szabo, V., 1997:67-69). When

material is collected for this study, this will be kept in mind and efforts will

be taken to select sources with high objectivity and reliability, in order to

provide the reader with such a fair depiction of reality as possible.

3.5 Limitations

One limitation is that Russia’s exercise of power in Georgia and Ukraine

cannot provide a complete template of how Russia is using its power in other

states. The comparison of these case studies and an identification of the

similarities in Russia’s behavior and foreign policy can, however, present

which similar strategies Russia has used so far and indicate which methods

the country may use in other neighboring states. If Russia would have

invaded more neighboring countries, conclusions could have been drawn

with greater accuracy. However, it may be possible to see similar behavior

and strategies in different post-Soviet states, which can identify warning

signals of Russian behavior in other neighboring states. Another limitation is

the lack of language proficiency, since it obstructs the use of additional

sources of information presented in the Russian, Ukrainian and Georgian

languages. This limitation will be certainly apparent in the investigation of

Russia’s foreign policy objectives, when examining foreign policy

statements in Russian media.

23

3.6 Delimitations

The investigation of Russia’s foreign policy manner and exercise of power is

consciously delimited to Russia’s sovereign neighboring countries, that

became independent right after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.

The study will not investigate Russia’s behavior in other regions where the

country has used military means of power, such as in the Middle East, where

Russia rather acts as a intervening great power, instead of having the possible

intention to conquer land areas. The case of Chechnya will neither be deeper

investigated, since it is still a federal subject of Russia - and not an

independent and recognized state (Romaniuk, S., 2008:72). It is the post-

Soviet states that will be examined, whose land areas have been, or may be

subjects for Russian invasion or annexation. Another delimitation that will be

drawn, is that the study will not do a deeper analysis of how Russia has been

using its power in all individual post-Soviet states. It will rather do a deeper

analysis and comparison of Russia’s exercise of power in Georgia and

Ukraine - and with this analysis as a basis, in combination with the

identification of Russia’s foreign policy aims, more generalizing warning

signals for Russian invasion in the other post-Soviet states will be presented.

The study is also delimited to the time period between 1991 and the

present, since there were, obviously, no post-Soviet states before 1991.

Further, it is delimited to the analytical framework of Joseph Nye’s concepts

of soft and smart power, and will not analyze levels of power related to

Russia. The study will rather focus on how Russia uses various means of

power, which can be categorized under soft power and command power, in

order achieve the research objective.

The final delimitation for this study is to neither make a deeper

investigation in Russia’s foreign policy objectives, nor to present and analyze

official statements by Russian politicians, but rather to define its main

objectives, according to the existing English speaking literature, in relation to

24

Georgia and Ukraine, in order to get a clearer understanding of Russia’s

behavior and foreign policy actions in these states.

3.7 Ethical considerations

This paper presents a desk study, based on published literature, which means

there is no ethical considerations that will be taken into account, since it is

dealing with non-sensible information, as there will be no meetings with

organizations or interviewees.

4. Empirical results

4.1 A short review of the conflicts in Georgia and Ukraine

4.1.1 Georgia

Modern Georgia gained its independence in 1991, in connection to the

dissolution of the Soviet Union (Michalopoulos, C., 1993:2). The first

elected president was Zviad Gamsakhurdia, who was a nationalist leader that

spoke for the country’s ethnic Georgians. This resulted in armed clashes and

disputes in South Ossetia between ethnic Georgians and the minority group

Ossetians (Oskanian, K., 2013:6-7). The fighting ended in 1992 with a

ceasefire and the installment of a peacekeeping force. Gamsakhurdia was

replaced by the former foreign minister of the Soviet Union, Eduard

Shevardnadze. That same year, another separatist conflict occurred in the

region of Abkhazia, which is a larger and more strategically significant

autonomous region, located at the coast of the Black Sea, where the

Abkhazians have strived to break free from Georgia (Lanskoy, M.,

Areshidze, G., 2008:156). Georgia has not been able to maintain its territorial

sovereignty, since it lost the political control over South Ossetia and

Abkhazia, which has exacerbated the country’s problems as a weak and

fragile state. The regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia have close ties to

25

Russia and have for a long time attempted to secede from Georgia. South

Ossetia already declared independence in 1990 and sought to break free from

Georgia and join the Russian region of North Ossetia (Phillips, D. L.,

2004:17), while Abkhazia declared its independence in 1992 (Oskanian, K.,

2013:7). During Shevardnadze’s rule, the population suffered from

corruption, poverty and criminality, which resulted in peaceful mass

demonstrations, called the “Rose Revolution”, which led to a new election in

2004, where president Mikheil Saakashvili was appointed (Mitchell, L. A.,

2004:343-345). His main objectives were to unite Georgia and recapture

Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which provoked the South Ossetians and

increased the tensions (Ibid.:348). In 2008, the Georgian authorities

attempted to retake South Ossetia, while Russian troops backed the

separatists and occupied Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well as other areas

in Georgia - and in August 2008, a five days long war broke out, with direct

military confrontations. Both Georgia and Russia signed a peace agreement

after five days, but Russia recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia as

independent states after the war (Lanskoy, M., Areshidze, G., 2008:156-157)

and turned them effectively into Russian protectorates. Therefore, the

territorial and ethnic issues are still not solved - and Russia continues to

control Abkhazia and South Ossetia and has kept its military bases in the

regions. The deep economic, social and intergovernmental linkages between

the two regions and Russia undermines the regions’ autonomy (Bader, M.,

Gerrits, A., 2016:297).

Figure 1:1

26

(U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 2013)

4.1.2 Ukraine

Similar to Georgia, Ukraine was a part of the Soviet Union from 1922 to

1991, when it was proclaimed as an independent state (Michalopoulos, C.,

1993:2). Until 1954, Crimea belonged to the Russian part of the Soviet

Union, but was then moved to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic; the

Ukrainian part of the Soviet Union (Duke, D. F., Marples, D. R., 2007:261).

After the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Crimea was

recognized as a part of the new Ukrainian state, even though the majority of

the Crimean citizens were ethnic Russians (Bebler, A., 2015:197-198).

Today, Ukraine borders both to the European Union and to Russia - and has

interests of having good relations with both parts. However, various groups

prefer a closer cooperation with either EU or Russia. It was the choice

between a closer relation to either the West or to Russia that was the starting

point of the conflict in Ukraine. The European Union offered an association

agreement with Ukraine, which would draw Ukraine closer to the EU.

However, this agreement would prevent Ukraine from joining an economic

union led by Russia in the future. This proposal forced President Viktor

Janukovytj to choose sides. Initially, he was positive to a closer cooperation

27

with EU. At the same time, he did not want to distance the nation from

Russia. Therefore, he signed a trade agreement with Russia instead, which

aroused grievance among EU-supporters in Ukraine (Nilsson, M., Silander,

D., 2015).

In November 2013, large demonstrations took place on Maidan

Square in Kiev, which were motivated by discontentment around the new

agreement with Russia, corruption and poor governance of the country. The

government’s brutal confrontation led to an escalation of the clashes in the

Ukrainian capital - and Janukovytj was deposed by the parliament, in

February 2014. He was replaced by the temporary president Oleksandr

Turtjynov - and in June, Petro Poroshenko was elected as president

(Tolstrup, J., 2015).

Janukovytj was replaced by a Western-oriented government, which

was a major defeat for the Russian state (Johansson, G. B., 2016:101). Russia

strongly reacted on the deposition and took control over Crimea with its

military forces. Russia already had a military base on the peninsula, so the

operation was rapidly accomplished. However, most states do not recognize

Crimea as a part of Russia (Grant, T. D., 2015:68). Russia’s behavior and

actions on the Crimean Peninsula was partly motivated by the fear that the

new Ukrainian regime would use Crimea as a NATO-base. Russia did also

support pro-Russian rebels in the eastern parts of Ukraine, who were inspired

of the annexation of Crimea. This led to clashes between the Ukrainian army

and paramilitary nationalists on one side and pro-Russian separatists on the

other side. The battles mainly occurred in the regions of Luhansk and

Donetsk. Russian soldiers were also involved in these battles (Sutyagin, I.,

2015:1). In September 2014, the Organization for Security and Co-operation

in Europe (OSSE) arranged a peace agreement, that was signed by Russia,

Ukraine and the pro-Russian separatists. However, the peace agreement has

been violated several times - and the conflict escalated further in 2015

(Pettersson, T., Wallensteen, P., 2015:542).

28

Figure 1.2

(U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 2016)

4.2 Russia’s main foreign policy objectives in the post-Soviet space

Regarding Russia’s foreign policy objectives in relation to other post-Soviet

states, the political elite in Russia has not expressed a concrete wish to

restore the Soviet Union. The Russian administration realizes that it would be

impossible, however, there is no agreement of what would replace the USSR

(Bogomolov, A., Lytvynenko, O., 2012:2). Many scholars, including

Kataryna Wolczuk and Laure Delcour, point out that Russia rather searches

to retain its great power status and to make its neighbors dependent on

Russia and well integrated with other post-Soviet states. One of Russia’s

main foreign policy objectives, related to the post-Soviet space, is to prevent

the European Union and the United States from gaining influence in the

region and to prevent the establishment of a pro-Western orientation, as well

as Western norms and values in its neighboring countries. Russia wants to

prevent its neighboring countries from joining EU and NATO and instead

establish closer ties with its neighbors and incorporate them in a Russian-led

custom union (Delcour, L., Wolczuk, K., 2015:473). Russia has been aiming

29

to undermine post-Soviet countries’ relationship to Western actors and to

isolate them from the international system. Another objective in Russia’s

foreign policy in relation to its neighboring states has also been to influence

their security- and foreign policy decisions (Nilsson, N., 2018:26-28, 37).

Russia further attempts to provide an alternative perception of

worldwide events and international politics and aims to influence audiences

abroad, especially its neighboring countries. A priority in Russia’s foreign

policy is to spread its own values, norms and ideology, as well as to achieve

increased military influence and control in the post-Soviet space. However,

some scholars claim that today’s Russia rejects the totalitarian ideology, that

was in place in Soviet Union - and is not aiming to force its own political

model upon its neighboring states. It rather wants to avoid to be surrounded

by pro-Western states and does not want its neighbors to be allied with the

West, since it constitutes a security threat towards Russia. Therefore, Russia

makes strong efforts in order to keep other post-Soviet states friendly

towards Russia, or at least to make them hold a neutral position (Lukin, A.,

2016).

Concerning Russia’s main objectives with its military interventions in

the post-Soviet space, one of Russia’s main objectives with its military

operations in Ukraine, was to prevent Crimea from serving as a NATO-base,

since it would threaten Russia’s national security (Sutyagin, I., 2015:1),

while its main objective with its military intervention in Georgia 2008 was to

gain control over the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, in order to get

an increased strategic position in the Caucasus region, but also to establish

sea and air supremacy. Another main objective Russia had was to prevent

reinforcements of Georgian troops, as well as foreign troops (Pallin, C. V.,

Westerlund, F., 2009:403).

As Jakob Gustavsson claimed, foreign policy generally has three

main goals, namely to ensure a country’s national security, welfare and

ideology (Gustavsson, J., 2018). As seen above, it is apparent that Russia

30

cherish its national security, through its objective to achieve military

supremacy in the post-Soviet states, as well as its welfare, through the

objective to prevent its neighboring states from a closer economic

cooperation with the EU and instead integrate them in a closer cooperation

with Russia, which economically would benefit the Russian states. The

country also cherish its ideology, through its foreign policy objective to

spread its own values and norms, including its anti-Western messages to

other post-Soviet states. In order to achieve these foreign policy objectives,

related to its neighbors in the post-Soviet space, Russia has been using

various means of power, which will be presented in the paragraphs below.

4.3 Russia’s exercise of power in Georgia

4.3.1 Military tools

Georgia is one of the post-Soviet states that has been most harshly and

frequently exposed to Russia’s exercise of power, which gained increased

attention after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Russia has combined several

pressure points, in order to influence the public opinion in Georgia, as well

as the Georgian government’s decision making, especially in its security- and

foreign policy. The pressure points Russia has been using in Georgia include

traditional sources of power, such as coercion, threats and military force -

and the control of the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia

(Nilsson, N., 2018:5). Russia’s military presence within and around Georgian

territory is the most apparent tool the country has been using towards

Georgia. In 2008, Russia deployed a troop of 20 000 men to Georgia and

took control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia within five days - and proved

thereby its ability to quickly achieve military supremacy. This operation was

carefully planned and completed according to the plan, with trained units and

formations that were coordinated together with other means of power, such

31

as a diplomatic offensive and cyber warfare (Pallin, C. V., Westerlund, F.,

2009:400-401), that will be further explained later on.

As seen in paragraph 4.2.1, one of Russia’s main objectives of its

military intervention in Georgia 2008, was to take full control of the

breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The establishment of

military bases in these provinces and the control over mountain crossings

have strengthened Russia’s military position in the Caucasus. Russia also

started to prepare for a naval base for its Black Sea Fleet at the Abkhazian

town of Ochamchire, but also to redevelop a former Soviet airbase, also

located in Abkhazia, in the city of Gudauta. In order to fulfill its military

objectives related to Georgia, the Russian strategy was to combine a support

of naval and air operations with massive deployments on the ground, so the

country could achieve a supremacy in numbers. This kind of military strategy

goes in line with the military thinking in the former Soviet. Russia further

managed to achieve its objective to prevent Georgian troop reinforcements,

by cutting off important roads, ports and railroads in Georgia. Russia also

attempted to debilitate Georgia’s military capability by seizing equipment

and destroying infrastructure. During the Five-Day War in August 2008, the

Russian forces were instructed to focus on military targets. However, some

military commentators argued that Russia’s operation would be more

effective and successful if the troops were allowed to focus on political

targets as well, such as Georgia’s political leadership (Pallin, C. V.,

Westerlund, F., 2009:403).

The Georgian authorities have still not managed to retake the control

over the breakaway regions. In 2014-2015, treaties of an integration with

South Ossetia and Abkhazia were signed by Russia. Georgia has not

developed an anti-annexation strategy and will, similar to Ukraine, continue

to have problems of fighting legitimacy of its annexed territories

(Kapanadze, S., 2015:181).

32

4.3.2 Diplomatic tools

Russia’s pressure points towards Georgia also include the use of diplomatic

tools. As seen in paragraph 4.2.1, one of Russia’s foreign policy objectives,

related to Georgia, has been to isolated Georgia from the international system

and weaken the country’s relation to the West. Russia’s interests in post-

Soviet states differs, to a large extent, from Western interests in same region.

While Western leaders have regarded certain policies in post-Soviet states as

more or less preferable, the same policies have been considered as crucial for

the national security in Russia, by the Russian government (Nilsson, N.,

2016:27). In order to resist and counter the West, Russia has been keen to

establish itself as an indispensable and essential partner in those issues that

Western governments and institutions has considered as critical and

important, such as the unrest in Afghanistan and Syria. Russia also attempts

to deal with post-Soviet states, including Georgia, within the framework of

its relationship to other great powers in the West. Russia has been keen to

have influence over Georgia and prevent the country from establishing closer

relations to the West. However, several Western governments are committed

to Georgia’s sovereign right to formulate and develop its own foreign policy

without interference from Russia, but also to Georgia’s right to

independently pursue membership in EU, NATO and other Western

organizations. When Saakashvili came to power by an election in 2004, the

Bush administration started to showcase Georgia as a success of United

States’ democracy promotion and demonstrated how a Western-inspired

model of governance also was attainable in post-Soviet states, besides the

Baltic countries. The image of Georgia as a relatively democratic state

creates much support and commitment to the country, from the United States

and other Western governments. Therefore, Russia has striven hard to remind

and enlighten the West of the downsides of the domestic development in

Georgia, as seen in paragraph 4.3.4 (Nilsson, N., 2016:27-28).

33

Russia’s primary diplomatic pressure towards Georgia before

the war in 2008, was the support for South Ossetia and Abkhazia, in their

attempts to separate from the Georgian state, but also to make the regions’

leaderships dependent on Russia for their endurance as independent entities.

Since Russia controlled the peacekeeping forces in these breakaway regions,

it were allowed to be military present on the ground - and by maintaining the

conflicts in the regions unresolved, Russia constantly reminded Georgia of

its political vulnerability and its weak territorial integrity. The undetermined

status of the breakaway regions also made it possible for Russia to offer a

potential reward, if Tbilisi decided to return the country’s foreign policy

course to Russia’s fold, but it did not happen. After the Five-Days’ War in

2008, when Russia recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent

states, the potential carrot connected to a possible reunification of Georgia

was removed (Nilsson, N., 2016:28-29).

After 2012, when the Georgian Dream came to power, the

tense relation between Moscow and Tbilisi started to be more relaxed. The

trade increased, the communication improved, visa regimes were removed by

Georgia and the Georgian government did not officially support Ukraine in

the dispute with Russia in 2014. Russia’s use of military tools in Georgia has

decreased since 2012 and it has been replaced by alternative means of power.

Central in Russia’s foreign policy towards the post-Soviet states in recent

years is the lack of tolerance towards its neighbors’ attempts to integrate into

economic, military and political systems, based in the West. This creates a

strategic dilemma for states such as Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia,

especially since a clear guarantee of membership in the EU and NATO is

absent. Should they receive those benefits Russia offers or should they

continue to follow their pro-Western line at all costs (Kapanadze, S.,

2015:162-164)?

Russia also uses its labor market as a means of attraction

towards Georgians. Since 1991, up to one million Georgians have moved to

34

Russia as legal migrant workers. There is also a large number of illegal

Georgian workers in Russia (Human Rights Watch, 2007:23). Around 50

percent of the total value of remittances in Georgia are sent from Russia.

Therefore, the labor market in Russia is attractive for many Georgians and is

important for the Georgian economy. In 2000, visa requirements for

Georgians were introduced by Russia - and they have still not been removed,

even though Georgia removed its visa regime for Russian citizens in 2012.

However, in 2013, Russia gradually eased the visa rules for businessmen,

scientists and journalists. A removal of all visa requirements for Georgians is

a power card and an inducement Russia uses, in order to force the Georgian

government to restore the diplomatic ties and also repeal the “Law on

Occupied Territories”, which criminalized Russian entry to South Ossetia

and Abkhazia (Kapanadze, S., 2015:164-166).

4.3.3 Economic tools

Russia also exercises considerable economic pressure on the Georgian state,

particularly after 2015, when the GDP growth in Georgia slowed down. Even

though Georgia’s economic development was generally positive until its

economic decline in 2015 (Nilsson, N., 2016:30-31), 69.4 percent of the total

population lived in moderate poverty and 32.2 lived in extreme poverty in

2014 (World Bank Group, 2015:4). External economic pressures and

manipulation is threatening Georgia’s vulnerable economy. The country’s

economic links with Russia have recently been reestablished, however, it

gives Russia more occasions to hurt the Georgian economy.

In 2012, when the political party Georgian Dream came to power,

Georgia began to work on normalized economic relation with Russia. The

country wanted Russia to reopen its market for Georgian products, which

gradually occurred in 2013, which benefited Georgia’s economy and the

producers in the country - and Russia became the most important export

destination for the Georgian-produced wines and the fourth largest export

35

destination for Georgian goods in the world (Baranec, T., 2015). Russia

removed bans on tea, potatoes, nuts and other Georgian agricultural products

in 2013 and 2014. This means that Georgia becomes more economically

dependent on its exports to the Russian markets. Whenever Russia decides to

close its market for Georgian goods, the Georgian economy risks to be

seriously damaged (Kapanadze, S., 2015:167-168).

However, Russia has imposed several trade sanctions applied to

Georgian products, legitimized by falsely accusing food products, imported

from Georgia, of having sanitary flaws. Russia has done the same to

Lithuanian, Ukrainian, Polish and Moldovan products. In 2014, Georgia

signed the “Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement” (DCFTA)

with the European Union, in the hope that the agreement would increase its

export to EU and boost the country’s agricultural production, but the

essential consequence was that Russia cancelled its trade agreement with

Georgia and banned several products that earlier was imported from Georgia,

such as wines and brandies (Baranec, T., 2015).

Since 2012, Russian Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) in Georgia has

increased. However, Russia’s investments in Georgia have not represented

more than 10 % of the total FDI in Georgia since 1996, which means that

Moscow does not have serious tools to destroy the Georgian economy by its

companies’ direct investments. Russia and pro-Russian groups are rather

capable to influence Georgia’s investment climate through the Georgian Co-

investment Fund (GCF), which is a vehicle for private investments, which is

aiming to finance projects in cooperation with other private investors. The

energy sector is also a potential area for Russia’s exercise of power, since

Russia has been using energy dependency as a instrument in its neighboring

countries, in order to achieve its political objectives. Georgia is, however, not

heavily dependent on Russian gas, since the country has diversified its

supplies of natural gas. Azerbaijan is the main gas supplier to Georgia - and

only 10 percent of country’s gas is imported from Russia. However, Georgia

36

is increasingly dependent on Russian electricity. In 2014, roughly 80 percent

of Georgia’s electricity imports came from Russia, compared to 45 percent in

2010 (Kapanadze, S., 2015:169-171).

4.3.4 Propaganda, informational tools and co-optation

In order to promote its international objectives, Russia is strategically

presenting narratives that support an alternative perception of international

politics. These narratives are assorted with its already existing anti-Western

and nationalistic discourse - and they are aimed to target and influence

audiences abroad. Currently, there are many domestic actors in Georgia that

supports this political discourse - and these can be found mainly among pro-

Russian NGOs, political parties, groups within the Orthodox church, as well

as in alternative Internet-based media (Nilsson, N., 2016:37). Many of these

pro-Russian and anti-Western actors, in particular the NGOs, more or less

cooperate with Russian organizations, that are supported by the Russian

authorities (Ibid.:41). The Alliance of Patriots and the Democratic Movement

are the largest Georgian political parties that have close connections to

Russia. Representatives from the parties have arranged several meetings with

high officials, including President Vladimir Putin and the Prime Minister

Dmitrij Medvedev. Both parties advocate Orthodox and conservative values -

and they criticize the injustices that were committed by the former

government. Furthermore, both parties have gained more support by the

Georgian population in recent years, especially the Democratic Movement,

which appeared to be increasingly funded after the leader’s meetings with

President Putin, that started in 2010 (Ibid.:37-38).

In order to present its account of different events on the international

arena and leverage the perception of foreign actors, Russia makes strong

efforts to be dominant in the information space. Noticeably, Georgia’s

domestic politics and relation to Western governments and organizations has

been a subject for a narrative contest, particularly between Russia and

37

Georgia. For instance, Georgia depicted the Rose Revolution as the people’s

uprising against the flawed election, while Russia considered it as a coup

towards a legitimate government, instigated by the United States. Further,

Georgia is often described as a liberal and reformist democracy, but Russia

would rather depict it as an unstable and repressive post-Soviet states; and

finally, Russia would describe the war in 2008 as an necessary intervention

in order to prevent a massacre of South Ossetians, rather as a Russian

invasion that violates Georgia’s territorial boundaries (Nilsson, N., 2016:42-

43). Georgia is also differently depicted by representatives of the Russian

government, as well as in Russian media, such as Sputnik and Russia Today,

which are presented in English. Instead of being presented as a democratic

state in the post-Soviet space, Georgia is rather depicted as a hybrid regime

with authoritarian elements, featuring suppression of freedom of speech,

assaults of political opponents and violation of the human rights (Nilsson, N.,

2016:27-28).

Russia also supports anti-Western and pro-Russian media

channels and newspapers in Georgia. Alia, Georgia and the World, Asaval-

Dasavali and Sakinform are some of the most popular pro-Russian news

agencies and newspapers read by the public in Georgia, which often

propagates anti-Western, homophobic, misogynic and xenophobic attitudes

(Kapanadze, S., 2015:174). The Georgian Media Development Foundation

(MDF) lists in its media monitoring report several anti-Western ideas and

statements that often are repeated in the Georgian media, which often is

associated with political parties or NGOs. The most common theme is to

present which negative impact an EU integration would have on the

Georgian society. A frequently used argument is that an integration with the

European Union would threat Georgian values and traditions. For instance,

the liberal view of homosexuality threatens the family traditions in Georgia.

Western countries are also depicted as antagonistic towards the Orthodox

strand of Christianity. Another theme portrays Western involvement in

38

Georgian, as well as in international politics as destructive. For instance, the

crisis in Ukraine is simply explained by Western aggression towards Russia.

Finally, Georgian NGOs that supports openness, liberal reforms and

democratization, that are funded by the West, are portrayed as spies that

serves external forces (Kintsurashvili, T., 2017). A feature of all statements

like these, is that they avoid being openly pro-Russian, since Russia and its

foreign policy continues to be unpopular among a large part of the population

in Georgia. Therefore, anti-Western messages tend to depict the West in an

adverse light - and Georgia’s relation with the West as a threat to the

country’s traditions and values. Russian authorities are supporting and

funding several NGOs, media outlets and political parties in Georgia, even

though they are not openly pro-Russian, in order to influence and spread

anti-Western ideas to the public opinion in Georgia (Nilsson, N., 2016:45-

46).

4.4 Russia in Ukraine

4.4.1 Military tools

Similar to Georgia, Ukraine has also been a subject for Russian military

aggression. As previously mentioned in this study, Russia annexed the

Crimean Peninsula in 2014, which was rapidly accomplished, since Russia

already had a military base on Crimea (Grant, T. D., 2015:68). Most states

and actors in the international community do not recognize or legitimize the

annexation and continue to consider the Crimean Peninsula as a part of

Ukraine. The annexation has also worsened Russia’s relation to the West

(Bebler, A., 2015:196). The annexation of Crimea was partly motivated by

the deposition of the pro-Russian president Janukovytj and the fear that the

new regime would use the Crimean Peninsula as a NATO-base. This

annexation also inspired pro-Russian rebels in eastern Ukraine, which were

supported by Russia. Clashes emerged between pro-Russian separatists and

39

Russian soldiers on one side and Ukrainian paramilitary nationalists and the

national army on the other side. The fights mainly occurred in the Donetsk

and Luhansk regions in eastern Ukraine (Sutyagin, I., 2015:1). In 2014,

Ukraine moved about eleven thousand troops to eastern Ukraine, while

Russia approximately deployed forty thousand troops at the border to eastern

Ukraine, where the battles take place (MacMahon, R., 2014).

The Russian and pro-Russian side has a greater military capacity and

continues to hold the territories of Crimea, Luhansk and Donetsk. The

Ukrainian regime is, similar to Georgia, unable to regain the control of their

territories - and Russia continues to hold them as a strategic card in order to

achieve their foreign policy objectives. However, Moscow is still not able to

achieve a stable and friendly relation with Kiev, since it continues to

maintain control over regions in southern and eastern Ukraine, in a protest

against the current pro-Western regime. Russia also solidifies a dependency

of local pro-Russian regimes on the support from Russia. Russia can thereby

maintain its current position, but also to press Ukraine to allow a re-

integration with Russia, where Russia can achieve a long-term influence over

the foreign and domestic policies in Ukraine (Malyarenko, T., Wolff, S.,

2018:191).

4.4.2 Diplomatic tools

One of the foreign policy priorities for Russia is to maintain influence over

Ukraine - and many political elites consider Ukraine as an important part of

Russia’s own identity. Russia attempts to bind Ukraine into a ‘common

future’ with other post-Soviet countries, by referring to their communal

heritage and cultural similarities. Mikhail Zurabov, the former Russian

ambassador in Kiev, has been stated that Ukrainians and Russians belongs to

the same nation (Bogomolov, A., Lytvynenko, O., 2012:1-2, 5). Further, in

2009, Dmitry Medvedev, the seated Russian president, stated in an official

message to the Ukrainian president Viktor Yushchenko, that “for Russia,

40

Ukrainians since the dawn of the time have been and remain not only

neighbors, but a brotherly people”. Therefore, Medvedev considered it as an

obligation for Ukraine to maintain solidly ties and a close cooperation with

Russia (Medvedev, D., 2009). Simultaneously, Russia attempts to isolate

Ukraine from the West and prevent them from joining EU or NATO. Russia

regards Ukraine’s, as well as Georgia’s membership in NATO as security

threats. The current president Vladimir Putin has aggressively called for

Ukraine’s accession to a Russian-led customs union on his official visits to

Kiev, in order to prevent Ukraine from joining a closer economic cooperation

with the European Union, or apply for a membership in the EU (Bogomolov,

A., Lytvynenko, O., 2012:3-4). Russia’s diplomatic means is closely related

to its economic means of power in relation to Ukraine, which will be deeper

presented in next paragraph.

The Ukrainian leadership has been divided in the clashes between

Russia and EU - and has sought to resolve them by using metaphors, such as

‘creating a bridge between the European Union and Russia, simultaneously

as they integrate with the EU (Janukovytj, V., 2010). However, the Russian

administration would propose the other way around: that Ukraine could

function as Russia’s bridge to the European Union, by a closer integration

with Russia (Bogomolov, A., Lytvynenko, O., 2012:5).

4.4.3 Economic tools

Russia has for a long time been the dominant supplier of natural gas and a

large provider of oil to Europe and post-Soviet states. Many countries,

including Ukraine, are heavily dependent upon Russian gas supplies, which

means that Russia to a large extent can dictate the prices of natural gas. In

2006, Russia cut of its gas supply to Moldova and Ukraine, since they did not

agree on the prices. A large part of Russia’s gas is transported through

Ukraine, in order to be exported to other European countries. When several

European states complained, Russia restored the gas supply (Gelb, B. A.,

41

2007:3-4). In 2012, 29 % of Ukraine’s total external trade was with the

Eurasian Customs Union, which is led by Russia, and 33 % was with the EU

- and Ukraine felt dependent on both EU and Russia. Ukraine has been

facing an economic and political dilemma, since if the country signs an

association agreement offered by the EU, a membership of the Eurasian

Customs Union would be precluded - and crucial trade with Russia will be

lost. Russia was well aware of the dilemma and knew that Ukraine was

internally divided in the question, so Russia offered benefits from a closer

economic relation with the Eurasian Customs Union, but threatened to cut off

the trade if Ukraine chose a closer economic cooperation with EU instead,

which would seriously harm the Ukrainian economy. Ukraine was forced to

choose one side (MacFarlane, N., Menon, A., 2014:97-98). When the pro-

Russian president Viktor Janukovytj signed an agreement with Russia, EU-

supporters started to demonstrate in Kiev. When Janukovytj later was

deposed by the parliament (Nilsson, M., Silander, D., 2015), Russia reacted

by taking control over the Crimean Peninsula (Grant, T. D., 2015:68).

4.4.4 Propaganda, informational tools and co-optation

Some researchers, including Leonid Polyakov, argues states that Russia more

or less has failed to affect the public opinion in Ukraine and to create a viable

alternative towards the democratic European Union, despite its attempts to

illuminate the two countries’ common history and cultural affinity. After the

country’s independence in 1991, support and experiences from the U.S. and

European democracies became available - and soon eminently appreciated in

the Ukrainian civil society. Both EU and Russia attempt to affect Ukraine

through media space and non-governmental activities, but there has been a

growing support for the West and an EU integration in the civil society in

Ukraine. Horizontal contacts have been created between Ukrainians and

Western NGOs, where Ukrainians have learned from the NGOs and applied

the new knowledge on their own needs. With time, Ukrainian NGOs have

42

been growing stronger and activists have had confidence to challenge the

country’s authorities - and criticized them for abusing European values and

norms, corruption and violations of human rights. The civil society in

Ukraine is very strong and vibrant, which has been apparent in the Orange

Revolution in 2004, the Revolution of Dignity in 2013-2014 and in other

activities and protest movements, that have involved millions of Ukrainian

citizens (Polyakov, L., 2015:122-124).

Russia also offers education as a tool to make Ukrainians more

Russian-friendly. Each year, it offers roughly 280 governmental scholarships

for Ukrainians to study in Russia. In 2013, around 7000 Ukrainians studied

in Russia, but most students prefer to study abroad in EU countries instead.

During the same year, 29 000 Ukrainians studied in Europe - and more

students chose both Germany and Poland rather than Russia. Furthermore,

between 2014 and 2020, over 4000 Ukrainians will be able to go abroad to

EU countries through the Erasmus programme - and over 7000 will be

involved in exchange projects (Euukrainecoop, 2014). Russia has made

strong efforts to counter this EU-trend. By using a top-down approach, the

presidential administration in Moscow has created puppet pro-Russian

“NGOs” in Ukraine, as well as programmes such as the “Federal

Programme of Support of Compatriots”, in order to deliver campaigns that

promotes Russian interests and regional policy imperatives (Polyakov, L.,

2015:125-126). There have also been genuine pro-Russian NGOs and

political parties in Ukraine, supported by Russia. However, political forces

often deny their pro-Russian strands, since it can affect the parties’ electoral

ratings negatively, but their rhetoric reflect indirectly Russian interests. The

pro-Russian Rodina Party and the Progressive Socialist Party, have had

small electoral bases. Their strongest support have been in eastern and

southern Ukraine (Pelnēns, G., 2010:253, 264).

The Russian power instruments in relation to Ukraine has,

however, been more aggressive in the media space, than through pro-Russian

43

NGOs. Since 1991, The media space in Ukraine has worked as a battlefield

between imperial/post-Soviet Russian discourses and Western approaches. In

other words, Russia has been active in its information warfare even in

Ukraine. Russian TV outlets, like Russia 24, NTV and Life-News have

focused to influence Ukrainian and Russian audiences with aggressive anti-

Western and pro-Russian messages, including references to the linguistic,

religious and cultural commonalities, which is assumed to have contributed

to anti-Ukrainian and separatist actions in south-eastern Ukraine and Crimea.

Simultaneously, their colleagues at Russian media networks, such as Sputnik,

Russia Today and Voice of Russia have been spreading deceptive

information about Ukraine all around the world (Polyakov, L., 2015:127,

129).

5. Analysis

5.1 Russia’s use of command power in Georgia and Ukraine

As seen in the results of this study, Russia has been using its command

power in both Georgia and Ukraine. One of the main forms of Russian

command power in these two neighboring countries is the use of its military

force. Russia has made military interventions in both countries; in the South

Ossetian and Abkhazian territories in Georgia, as well as on the Crimean

peninsula and the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk in Ukraine. However,

most states on the international arena condemn Russia’s behavior in these

regions and continue to recognize these territories as parts of Georgia,

respectively Ukraine.

Russia’s attempts to strengthen its military bases in both countries

and weaken the enemy’s strategic positions and prevent their troop

reinforcements, in order to achieve military supremacy in the region, over

both land areas and seafaring, are also categorized as command power

moves. In Ukraine, Russia annexed Crimea partly because the country was

44

afraid that the peninsula would serve as a NATO-base in the future, which,

according to Russia, would threaten its own national security. Crimea is also

a strategic position for a military base, since the Russians can get control

over the seafaring to the Sea of Azov, that connects cities in South-Eastern

Ukraine with the Mediterranean Sea. Russia does also have military bases in

Eastern Ukraine, where the fight with the Ukrainian national army and

paramilitary groups is still ongoing. In Georgia, Russia has established

military bases in the breakaway regions, redeveloped an old Soviet airbase

and prepared for a naval base in Abkhazia, at the Black Sea coast. The great

difference is that there is still fights ongoing in Eastern Ukraine, but not in

the Georgian breakaway regions, even though Russia continues to be military

present in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

Another form of command power Russia has been using towards the

two countries is economic pressures. Several trade sanctions have been

imposed by Russia on Georgian and Ukrainian products, which have been

legitimized by false accusations of sanitary flaws on the food products,

imported from Georgia and Ukraine. Russia has also been cutting off the

trade to these two countries, when they not have acted or made decisions in

line with Russia’s interests; however, for different reasons. When Georgia

signed a trade agreement with the EU, Russia banned several products from

Georgia and cancelled their trade agreement. The gas supply to Ukraine was

also cut off by Russia, when Ukraine did not agree on Russia’s proposed gas

price.

Finally, Russia has been using coercion and threats against both

countries, in order to accomplish its foreign policy objectives. Some aspects

of Russia’s attempt to include the two countries in the Eurasian Customs

Union and prevent them from a closer economic integration with the EU can

be categorized under command power, since Russia has been using threats

and forcing them to choose side. If they, according to Russia, prefer ‘wrong’

partner of cooperation, Russia threatens to cut off the trade with Georgia and

45

Ukraine, which seriously would harm their economies, which Russia is well

aware of. An underlying threat of Russian military intervention has also been

apparent. As noted above, Russia has not stayed at empty threats, but has cut

off the trade and used military means in practice in both countries. Based on

these findings, it is apparent that Russia is using both intimidation- and

punishment tactics in Georgia and Ukraine, through its threats, coercion and

punishments, related to its military actions and economic pressures, which

both can be categorized under the exercise of command power.

5.2 Russia’s use of soft power in Georgia and Ukraine

In parallel with Russia’s exercise of command power in Georgia and

Ukraine, it is also using different forms of soft power, that may be not as

visible as command power, but are nonetheless important as means of

influence. Russia’s most apparent soft power means in Georgia and Ukraine

are diplomacy, certain forms of economic strategies, information tools and

co-optation with different pro-Russian actors. These various forms of soft

power are, to a large extent, interrelated to each other, especially the

diplomatic and economic strategies, since a considerable part of the

diplomatic relations regards economic issues.

Concerning Russia’s diplomatic relations with Georgia and Ukraine,

Russia has made great efforts to weaken both states’ relations to the West

and isolate them from the international system. These efforts have been most

apparent in Russia’s attempt to attract them with the benefits from economic

cooperation - and thereby tie them closer to Russia, make them more

dependent on Russia and distance them from the West. A common soft

power strategy for Russia in Ukraine has also been to frequently refer to

Ukraine’s and Russia’s similarities, common heritage and to claim that

Russians consider Ukrainians as brothers, through statements from high

officials, such as Medvedev and Putin, and thereby claim that there is an

46

obligation for Ukraine to maintain close ties with Russia, as they share a

natural bond.

Specific for Georgia, another mean of attraction has been the Russian

labor market and the gradually eased visa rules for Georgian workers. The

Russian government is using a total removal of visa requirements for

Georgian citizens as an incentive under the condition that the Georgian

administration restores full diplomatic ties and stops criminalizing Russian

entry to the breakaway regions. The Russian administration has also

officially supported South Ossetia’s and Abkhazia’s fights for separation

from Georgia and recognized them as independent from Georgia. Similar to

Ukraine, diplomatic dialogue that does not concern economic issues has not

occurred relatively often and the official relations between the governments

have been quite tense, even though they became more relaxed in Georgia

after 2012.

As seen in chapter 5.1, there is one command power aspect of

Russia’s economic tools and attempts to achieve a closer economic

integration of Georgia and Ukraine. However, Russia also uses trade as a soft

power instrument in both countries and emphasizes the economic benefits of

increasing trade. Both countries are already dependent on trade with Russia.

Ukraine is highly dependent on its gas import from Russia, while Georgia is

mainly economically dependent on exports to Russia, certainly on wine and

food products. Georgia is not dependent on Russian gas, but rather on

electricity from Russia. These dependency relations give Russia the power to

set the conditions for trade, which makes it possible for the Russians to

maintain a trade beneficial for themselves, simultaneously as they can tie

Georgia and Ukraine closer to Russia.

As has been shown above, Russia also uses propaganda and

information tools against both Georgia and Ukraine and attempts to be

dominant in the international information space. It strategically presents its

own narratives that are assorted with its anti-Western and nationalistic

47

approach, in order to provide an alternative perception of different

occurrences and international politics. These narratives go in line with its

foreign policy objectives and they are aimed to target both an international

audience and a local public in both countries. Concerning the international

information space, Russia frequently uses media channels such as Russia

Today and Sputnik, presented in the English language, through which the

country spreads deceptive information about Georgia and Ukraine, among

others. In parallel, Russia attempts to impact and influence domestic actors

and civil society in these two post-Soviet states, both through media channels

and co-optation. There are pro-Russian domestic actors in both countries,

including political parties, NGOs and factions within the Orthodox church,

but also separatist movements, which are supported by the Russian

government. Through these actors, Russia can spread its anti-Western and

conservative ideas to civil society and affect public opinion in Georgia and

Ukraine. However, there are considerable regional differences in the attitude

towards Russia in Ukraine, where people who are living in Eastern Ukraine

are generally more positive to Russia than those who are living in the

western parts of the country. Mother tongue and identity play an important

role in the attitude towards Russia - and most Russian-speakers live in

Eastern Ukraine. Except for the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South

Ossetia, regional differences in the perception of Russia are not as clear in

Georgia.

Another soft power strategy are Russia's attempts to attract many

Georgians with work opportunities, which may give them a more positive

attitude towards Russia. More noticeable in the case of Ukraine are the

scholarships offered by Russia, even though most Ukrainian students prefer

to study within the EU instead of Russia. Thus, the offering of both

education and work opportunities are two examples of Russia’s exercise of

soft power in its neighboring countries, in order to make people more

Russian-friendly. However, it seems to be harder for Russia to affect the

48

public opinion in Ukraine than in Georgia, since there is a growing support

for an EU integration and large part of the civil society is very strong and

confident in its pro-Western approach. Western-friendly NGOs in Ukraine

have grown and activists have been criticizing Ukrainian authorities for

abusing European values and norms, which not is as apparent in Georgia as

in Ukraine. Simultaneously, there is still a strong support for Russia in some

parts of Ukraine. There are clear contrasts in the attitudes towards Russia in

Ukraine - and it seems to be hard for Russia to attract new supporters, since

the support for either Russia or the West depends a lot on the individual’s

language and identity.

5.3 Russia’s use of smart power in Georgia and Ukraine

In line with Joseph Nye’s concept of smart power, Russia’s command power

and soft power instruments walks hand in hand and strategically complement

each other, in order to achieve its foreign policy objectives more efficiently.

The country uses means of attraction and offers different benefits to Georgia

and Ukraine, but always attaches those rewards to the condition that the latter

behave or act in a certain manner. In parallel, Russia uses intimidation

methods and punishes these neighboring countries if they do not act in line

with Russian interests and objectives. This stick-and-carrot approach,

combining rewards with punishments in order to induce a certain behavior, is

apparent in Russia’s behavior and smart power strategy towards both

Georgia and Ukraine.

Concerning Russia’s use of attraction, it attempts, among other

things, to attract foreign actors by using diplomacy and put emphasis on the

cultural ties and similarities with the neighboring post-Soviet countries with

the rhetoric ‘you are like us’. It also uses media channels, through which

Russia delivers its anti-Western messages and alternative perceptions of

events and occurrences on the international area, angled to its own advantage

- and supports pro-Russian actors in Georgia and Ukraine. Economic

49

cooperation is also an important mean of attraction. Russia’s offering of

rewards include the benefits from trade, education, working opportunities

and eased visa rules, which are examples of soft power means. All of these

tools are used to improve foreign actors’ perception of Russia and to make

them behave in a pro-Russian manner. Russia wants to tie them closer to the

country and keep them away from Western associations, such as the EU and

NATO, which is an important foreign policy objective for Russia.

In combination with its use of attraction and its reward system,

Russia threatens with, or actually gives punishments to Georgia and Ukraine,

such as economic sanctions, trade cut-offs and military interventions, if they

do not act in a pro-Russian manner. However, Russia does not give

punishments, such as military interventions, solely in order to foster Georgia

and Ukraine in a manner that goes in line with its own interests, but gets

simultaneously the chance to expand its territory and to get increased

regional control, which also is one of its foreign policy objectives in its

neighborhood. Concerning economic issues, Russia can efficiently combine

soft and hard means of power. The country attracts Georgia and Ukraine with

trade benefits and makes them dependent on trade of certain products with

Russia; and can thereby dictate the trade conditions. Whenever Russia

decides to cut off the trade with Georgia and Ukraine, both countries’

economies risk to be seriously harmed.

A disputable question is if Russia’s command power counteracts its

use of soft power. By reviewing the case of Ukraine, Russia’s military

intervention seems to have resulted in that even more Ukrainians are

increasingly positive to an integration with the EU and NATO. Even actors

in other countries condemn Russia’s military behavior. Does this kind of

command power go in line with Russia’s soft power behavior, that attempts

to depict its own country in a favorable light? It depends on how successful

its use of soft power is in comparison to command power. An indication for

this in the findings, is Leonid Polyakov’s claim that Russia partly has failed

50

to attract the public opinion in Ukraine, especially after the military

interventions, since there is an incredibly strong support for an EU

integration in the civil society, which is not as clear in Georgia. However,

even though Russia provides its own narratives of the crisis in Ukraine, as

well as in Georgia, there is a risk that many people see through their

strategies, which can make it hard to attract new actors, except from those

that already are pro-Russian. However, Russia still got the opportunity to

expand its territory, but also, as Russia probably would formulate it; to

ensure its national security and counter the threat from the EU and NATO,

which go in line with its foreign policy objectives.

Finally, Russia’s smart power strategy creates a dilemma for both

Ukraine and Georgia. They can choose to behave in a more pro-Russian

manner and take out their rewards from Russia, but must in that case be

prepared to lose their chances of an integration with the EU or NATO and to

drift further from the West. The alternative is to receive punishments from

Russia, which already have harmed many civilians in Georgia and Ukraine,

both through Russia’s military actions, economic sanctions and trade cut-

offs. Russia ensures that there will only be these two options available for

Georgia and Ukraine and uses all possible means in order to integrate them

with Russia instead of Western actors and associations. Russia seems to be

taken the opportunity to make an offensive, while the Georgian and

Ukrainian states are weak and not yet well-integrated with the West, since it

may be easier to influence and exercise its soft power and command towards

other states when they are weak and fragile, without a sufficient military

support that is strong enough to protect them from Russia. Russia had

probably not dared to enter either Crimea, Eastern Ukraine or the Georgian

breakaway regions with its military, if Ukraine and Georgia were members

of NATO. Both Georgia and Ukraine, with its weak and fragile states, have

been easy prey for Russia’s exercise of power, especially when Russian

influence seems to be prioritized over regional stability.

51

6. Conclusions

Russia’s foreign policy behavior and exercise of power towards Georgia

compared to Ukraine has many similarities, and clear patterns in its strategy

in both countries can be distinguished. Based on Russia’s objectives and

strategies in Georgia and Ukraine, identified in the findings of this study,

possible warning signals for Russian military interventions in other post-

Soviet states can be outlined. As seen in the results, Russia makes strong

efforts to tie its neighboring post-Soviet countries closer to itself and

attempts to prevent them from an EU integration. Warning signals in other

post-Soviet states mainly include Russia’s attempts to affect and attract them

with its soft power instruments, such as economic cooperation, information

dissemination, education, work opportunities and statements that emphasize

the countries’ similarities and common heritage with Russia, which is

implied that they should be a part of, or be closely tied to Russia, instead of

Europe. It is important to keep an eye open after the stick-and-carrot tactics,

when Russia combines attraction and rewards with punishments, such as

economic sanctions and trade cut-offs, when its neighboring states do not act

in line with its interests.

The results of this study indicate that post-Soviet states located near

Europe can expect a strong response from Russia when they clearly are

prioritizing a closer integration and cooperation with the European Union

before Russia. Those post-Soviet states that already are members of the EU

or NATO, such as the Baltic states, are probably no longer at risk for a

military intervention, since Russia seems to target those countries that have a

positive perception of the West and strive for an EU integration, but still are

ambivalent and unstable - and have not been integrated yet with the West,

such as Armenia and Moldova (similar to Georgia and Ukraine). Russia

probably has the greatest chance to exercise its power and achieve its foreign

policy objectives in these countries.

52

However, the results and lessons learned from this investigation are

not limited to Russia and the post-Soviet space, but may also predict the

behavior of other dominant countries on the international area, such as China

and the United States, and contribute to more awareness of common power

strategies, used by strong powers. Similar to Russia, other great powers also

cherish their ideology, welfare and national security - and have a greater

chance to protect these and achieve their foreign policy objectives through

their exercise of power over less dominant countries. Their exercise of power

maintains unequal relationships where less powerful countries become even

more dependent on dominant countries. The great powers can fulfill their

interests and foreign policy objectives at the expense of other states’ welfare,

national security and ideology, which also is the root of suffering among

civilians in many less dominant countries, for instance through economic

pressures and military actions, as seen in the cases of Ukraine and Georgia.

Therefore, it is important that actors in the international community act, in

order to reduce the suffering and violation of human rights, make the world

fairer and to prevent that international law is broken time after time. A

subject for future research is therefore to examine what measures should be

taken, in order to most efficiently counter Russia’s, as well as other great

powers’ violations, through their use of command power.

It would also be relevant for future research to do a closer and more

critical investigation of how soft power versus command power, and the

combination of these, actually affects people. Perhaps, smart power is the

winning concept, as Joseph Nye claimed, or maybe soft power or command

power alone would be better after all. A more in-depth bottom-up field

studies would be desirable, in order to examine how governments are

influenced by these types of power in their decision making and how citizens

respond to these power strategies. Another relevant issue could also be to

examine if Russia’s power strategies really are applicable to other great

powers, or if Russia stands for itself. For instance, Russia does not necessary

53

use same types of attraction instruments as China or the United States.

Therefore, another area for future research is also to compare different great

powers’ power strategies with each other and investigate how far similar

patterns in their strategies and foreign policy behavior might be seen.,

To conclude, this study has identified Russia’s foreign policy

objectives and exercise of soft power, command power and smart power in

Georgia and Ukraine. These findings can neither draw accurate conclusions

about Russia’s exercise of power towards other states, nor about other

dominant countries’ use of power. However, they can indicate which foreign

policy strategies that may be used by other great powers and which possible

warning signals there may be for other military interventions. These

indications can, in turn, facilitate the work towards a more just world and

against violations made by dominant countries.

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