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IRANIAN REVIEW of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 3, Fall 2010, pp. 7-32.
Russian-Iranian Relations in the
Context of the Tehran Declaration
Ghoncheh Tazmini*
Abstract
There has been a marked volte face in Russia’s position toward the IslamicRepublic. This was made clear when at a critical political juncture – namely the
watershed agreement on fuel swapping between Brazil, Turkey and Iran – Russiaexpressed support for the US-led UNSC resolution to impose a fourth round of sanctions against Iran. This paper argues that Russia, a country that has traditionally shielded Iran and weighed down on the US from pressuring her, obstructed theinitiative out of economic and geopolitical considerations. Prompted by the eternalquest to restore Russia’s former status as a great power, the Kremlin has had to re-evaluate its relationship with Tehran. Moscow in is in dire need of foreigninvestment, advanced technology, and even markets, which requires thawedrelations with the US. Moscow is ostensibly dissatisfied with the NATO’s eastwardencroachment and also needs the US to turn a blind eye to it geopolitical aspirationsin the former Soviet space. These considerations require that Russia warm up to the
West in general and the US in particular. Incidentally, Obama is offering Russia a
carrot – a diplomatic reset – and Moscow is biting the bait. Today, it appears thatRussia needs the US more and the Islamic Republic less. However, Russia’s aboutturn suggests that Moscow is conscious that if the nuclear impasse is resolved, Iran
would be on its way to becoming a genuine regional power. Furthermore, the Iran- Turkey cooperation axis could also suggest diversification of energy supply routes,breaking Russia’s monopoly on gas. With geopolitical considerations and energy politics in the balance, the stakes are higher, explaining why Russia has acted in anincreasingly unfriendly manner than Iranians seem to have expected.
Keywords: Russian-Iran Relations, Tehran Declaration, Nuclear FuelSwap, Relations with West/US, Security Council Resolutions, Energy Politics
* Ghoncheh Tazmini, holds a Masters degree in Russian and Post-Soviet Politics (London School of Economics) and a PhD in International Relations (University of Kent at Canterbury). She has worked with research institutes in Iran and Europe. Her major publications include Khatami's Ira n: the Islamic Republic and the Turbulent Path to Reform (2009) and Revolution and Reform in Russia and Iran:Modernisation and Politics in Revolutionary States (January 2011). She is the founder of StellaOrientis: Centre for Inter-civilisational Research and Dialogue, based in Portugal.
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Russian-Irani
8 IRANIAN
Introduction
Historically, relations wavering between c
accurate fix on Russi
and “natural ally” ha
two countries. Perha
relations. However, r
Tehran and Mosco
Security Council san
historians have grap
watershed agreemen
the underlying driver
question: where are
This paper wil
Russian-Iranian rela
Nations Security Co
Iran allows us to
turnabout in Russia’
contention by explor
we will provide a bri
claim that there has
Second, we wi
President Barack
favourably to this in
backing the UNSC r
this apparent thaw in
an Relations in the Context...
REVIEW of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 3, Fall 2010, pp. 7-32.
between Russia and Iran have been multifaceted and collaboration and rivalry. Observers find it difficult to
ia-Iran relations. Terms like “strategic partner”, “healt
e been used by observers to qualify the dynamism bet
s, “ambivalence” is the most suitable term to describe
ecent unexpectedly critical and even harsh exchanges
following the May Tehran Declaration and the sub
ctions resolution cast new light on a question that anal
led with: Is Russia a friend or a foe? Moscow’s reactio
t and full-fledged support for the Council resolution
s that motivate Russia in dealing with Iran. This then
ussia-Iran relations going?
l make the case that there has been a significant down
tions. Moscow’s support for the United States-led
ncil resolution to impose a fourth round of sanctions
lean an important development: there has been a
s position vis-à-vis the Islamic Republic. We will sup
ing factors that have prompted this sharp turn. Howev
ief survey of Russian-Iranian relations in order to sup
een more change than continuity in bilateral relations.(1)
ll examine the implications of the “reset” policy initiate
bama in dealing with Russia. Why has Russia res
itiative? Certainly the Kremlin has warmed up to the
esolution. We will examine the principles and priorities
Russia-US relations.
omplex,get an
y rival”
een the
bilateral
etween
sequent
sts and
to this
ighlight
egs the
rade in
United
against
marked
ort this
er, first,
ort the
by US
ponded
est by
behind
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IRANIAN
Third, we will
The breakthrough re
relations between th
far-reaching implicat
market that supplies
regional energy hub
of energy supply ro
fossil fuels: natural g
this new geopolitic
competition in energ
We will explo
Declaration. By wea
substantive underst
Moscow. The premi
calculations and con
unravel why.
Tehran Declara
The joint declaratio
historic turning poin
Tayyip Erdogan and
transfer to Turkish c
uranium within a mo
Agency (IAEA). Ira
material used in me
myth of an Iranian
control of the master
The response
American Secretary
agreement with the
China, on a draft pr
While sending a mes
a counterproductive
IRANIAN REVIEW of Foreign Affairs
REVIEW of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 3, Fall 2010, pp. 7-32.
consider the implications of an Iran-Turkey cooperati
ached by Turkey, Brazil and Iran suggests paradigmatic
e three countries. The nuclear fuel swap could have
ions, threatening, inter alia , Russia’s dominance in th
Europe. The rapidly shifting landscape suggests tha
could potentially emerge. This would allow for diversi
utes, thereby breaking Russia’s monopoly on the kin
s. Russia’s motives towards Iran are overwhelmingly gu
al calculus, one in which Moscow faces unprec
y politics.
e these themes against the backdrop of the May 2010
ving together these two perspectives we will achieve
nding of why relations have soured between Tehr
se of this argument is based on the assumption that
uct has instigated this downgrade. In this study we att
ion
by Iran, Turkey and Brazil on nuclear fuel swappin
t. The agreement, brokered by Turkish Prime Minister
Brazilian President, Luiz Inacio “Lula” da Silva, would
ustody a large proportion of Iranian stockpile of low e
nth, subject to monitoring by the International Atomic
, in return, would be supplied with the more highly-e
ical isotopes in no more than a year’s time. In this
bomb would be dispensed, and Iran would retain
y of the nuclear fuel cycle.
to the deal by the US was hasty and uncompr
f State, Hilary Clinton, announced that the US had rea
other four permanent UNSC members, including Ru
oposal for the imposition of new, harsher sanctions
sage to Tehran that it cannot escape sanctions, the US a
message to Turkey and Brazil: their independent dipl
9
on axis.
shift in
otential
energy
a new
ification
gpin of
ided by
edented
Tehran
a more
an and
Russia’s
empt to
was a
, Recep
see the
nriched
Energy
nriched
ay, the
its own
mising:
ched an
sia and
n Iran.
lso sent
macy –
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Russian-Irani
10 IRANIAN
even if purportedly
to Lula] – was un
definitely hasty reac
the three Tehran De
US and the 5+1 wou
and see” attitude.
appeared to be a f
Iranian ally (albeit a
quite strong and e
enrichment program
Between friend
When Vladimir Puti
as President in 200
predecessor Boris Y
bilateral relations, fo
Middle East, both u
Iranian nuclear dos
UNSC, Russia active
pressure. For exampl
and 2008, Russia bl
even after the IAE
participate in a 5+1
Iran. Moscow public
helped supply materi
In March 200
cooperate with Oba
discussed negotiatin
nuclear power plant.(
July 2009, arguing t
significantly differen
that Iran’s progra
whereas Iran is com
an Relations in the Context...
REVIEW of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 3, Fall 2010, pp. 7-32.
rodded on if not outright prompted by the US [Obam
elcome interference and would be ignored. Wash
ion to the fuel swap was somewhat unexpected – asi
claration signatories, the general expectation had been
ld give it at least the benefit of doubt and assume a “l
owever an interesting twist occurred in this tale. Aft
reign policy watershed, Russia, traditionally regarde
ercurial one) consented to a UNSC draft resolution ca
xpanded sanctions to force Tehran to halt the
e.
and foe
took office first as Russian Prime Minister in 1999 a
, he inherited a strong Russian-Iranian relationship f
eltsin. While there have been a number of ups and d
Tehran, Moscow has been the closest thing to an “all
der Yeltsin and under Putin. In particular, since 2003
ier became an issue at the IAEA and subsequentl
ly fostered the impression that it would guard Iran ag
e, despite voting in favour of UNSC resolutions in 20
cked further punitive action against Iran in Septemb
alleged that Iran failed to cooperate. Russia also re
eeting in 2008 to discuss levelling additional sanctions
ly supported Tehran’s right to peaceful nuclear technol
als and expertise to build the Bushehr nuclear plant.
9 Russian President, Dmitry Medvedev claimed that h
a on the Iranian nuclear issue, yet a month earlier he
a 10-year fuel supply deal with Iran to fuel the2) Medvedev defended Iran in an interview with Italian
at problems associated with Iran’s nuclear program
from those caused by North Korea’s programme. He
me was less disconcerting than North Korea’s “
unicating with the international community, North K
’s letter
ington’s
e from
that the
t’s wait
er what
as an
lling for
ranium
nd then
rom his
wns in
” in the
hen the
at the
inst US
6, 2007
r 2008,
used to
against
ogy and
would
ad also
ushehr
edia in
e were
asserted
ecause,
rea has
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IRANIAN
now virtually cut all
Echoing Med
in July 2009 that it is
power plants” in or
Shmatko went on to
market” for Russia.(
Russian Foreign Mi
that Russia would co
Clinton argued “we
this time, because
Lavrov responded th
Also in Marc
Russian and Chinese
on uranium enrich
consider supporting
though it is certainl
proliferation but at
explained its reluctan
the two countries; n
neighbours on the C
In late March
Britain, the US, Fra
for a new round of s
US-led push to imp
this.”(10) In April, th
against Iran. Russia
there would be more
agreement regardin
sanctions – endorsed
swap deal with Iran.
Russia turned its bac
Tehran’s rea
Medvedev asserting:
IRANIAN REVIEW of Foreign Affairs
REVIEW of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 3, Fall 2010, pp. 7-32.
f its contacts.”(3)
edev’s views, Russian Energy Minister, Sergei Shmatk
“much better to cooperate with Iran in construction of
der to ensure the transparency of Iran’s nuclear pro
say that Iran’s nuclear energy sector represented a “si4) In March 2010, while Clinton visited Russia, Clin
ister, Sergey Lavrov clashed publicly after Lavrov an
mplete a nuclear power plant in Iran by the summer o
think it would be premature to go forward with any pr
e want to send an unequivocal message to the Ira
at the project would definitely be completed.
h, a top Russian Foreign Ministry official announc
envoys pressed the Iranian government to accept a
ent in Tehran in early March. He added, “Russia
sanctions tailored to prevent the spread of nuclear
against any paralyzing sanctions that are aimed not
unishing Iran or, God forbid, regime change.”(7) Ru
ce to impose sanctions on Iran due to the historic ties
mely that they are “economic and cultural partners, as
spian Sea.”(8)
2010 the climate began to change as senior diploma
ce, Germany, China and Russia agreed that they shou
anctions against Tehran.(9) Medvedev expressed suppor
se sanctions on Iran stating, “We cannot turn a blin
5+1 held a second round of talks concerning new s
and Chinese United Nations ambassadors both no
talks in the near future. Finally in May, the 5+1 reache
sanctions against Iran. Remarkably, the new ro
by Russia – came after Turkey and Brazil brokered the
. Rather than support the nuclear fuel exchange pro
k on Iran.
tion was swift: Mahmoud Ahmadinejad quickly
“Today, explaining the behaviour of Medvedev to
11
o stated
nuclear
ramme.
nificant
on and
ounced
2010.(5)
oject at
ians.”(6)
ed that
N plan
would
eapons,
at non-
sia also
etween
well as
ts from
ld press
for the
eye to
nctions
ed that
d a new
und of
nuclear
osition,
ebuked
ard the
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Russian-Irani
12 IRANIAN
nation of Iran is ve
Russians are our fri
speak with more cau
Iran.” He went on
“historic opportunit
opportunity to begin
and inhumane polici
The comments rapi
International Affairs
said he was “disapp
Mahmud Ahmadine
foreign policy advis
Executive that “politi
Russia’s reacti
director of the Centr
in modern history h
and Iran.”(14)
Russia’s balancSince the end of th
Republic has system
Soviet Russia that ha
“strategic” partnershi
historical baggage
Nevertheless, from
balance to America
strategic consideratio
From a Russia
weaponry and civil n
Russia on regional s
described as “pro-R
days of the post-Col
In addition, R
an Relations in the Context...
REVIEW of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 3, Fall 2010, pp. 7-32.
ry difficult for us... the people of Iran do not kno
ends or are against us.” He advised President Medv
tion and forethought about “such a large and capable n
to warn Obama that the Tehran Declaration repres
for him” should he genuinely want “change” –
respecting the rights of other nations and to abando
es, treating other countries instead with justice and fai
ly generated condemnation from Moscow. Chairman
Committee in the Russian Parliament, Konstantin K
ointed by today’s quite harsh statement by Iranian P
jad about the Russian and US presidents.”(12) Me
or Sergei Prikhodko witheringly scolded the Irania
ical demagoguery” never worked.(13)
ion to the watershed deal was unexpected. Rajab
e for Contemporary Iranian Studies in Moscow argues:
as there been such an aggravation in relations betwee
ng actCold War and the demise of the Soviet Union, the
atically cultivated an increasingly close partnership wi
s been characterized in many quarters, in Iran and else
ip or even alliance. Of course, for many Iranians, there i
ttached to relations with Russia and the Soviet
an Iranian perspective, Russia would provide the
n hegemony in the post-Cold War world – an i
n given ongoing US antagonism toward the Islamic Re
n perspective, Iran has been a market for sales of conv
uclear technology. Iran has also been a constructive par
curity issues in Central and South Asia, taking what c
ssian” stance on a number of regional conflicts since t
War period.
ussia has worked had to present itself as a potential pa
if the
edev to
ation as
ented a
and an
wrong
rness.(11)
of the
sachev,
resident
vedev’s
Chief
afarov,
“Never
Russia
Islamic
h post-
here, as
is heavy
Union.
ounter-
portant
ublic.
entional
tner for
ould be
he early
rtner in
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IRANIAN
the development of
company, Gazprom,
the development of
Petronas). After Vla
2001, Gazprom and
committee to coordi
provided early politi
India, while Gazpro
to help finance the p
Just a few yea
even closer strategic
in 2007 Putin beca
received by the Isla
since Dmitry Medve
2008 (with Putin bec
in strategic partner
apparent.
As we shall e
Moscow’s willingnes
conditioned by Russi
of natural gas – a p
strong interest in
exports to European
foreign gas supplier.
More broadly,
ties to Tehran again
with Washington – h
and economic gains
has been willing on
exchange for conces
Russia stepped bac
uranium enrichment
the June 2009 presi
IRANIAN REVIEW of Foreign Affairs
REVIEW of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 3, Fall 2010, pp. 7-32.
Iran’s energy resources. In 1997, Russia’s state-owne
became one of the first foreign energy companies to i
the South Pars gas field (in a joint venture with T
dimir Putin became President of the Russian Feder
the Islamic Republic’s Ministry of Petroleum formed
nate Iranian gas exports with Russia. The Russian gov
al support for a planned gas pipeline from Iran to Paki
offered technical support and even indicated its wil
roject.
rs ago, Russian-Iranian relations seemed to be headed
cooperation. For instance, in an important symbolic st
e the first non-Muslim head of state or governmen
ic Republic’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khame
dev replaced Putin as President of the Russian Feder
oming Prime Minister), the limits on Russia’s willingne
ship with the Islamic Republic have become incr
plain later in the paper, it has become clear, for exam
s to support Iran’s emergence as a gas exporter is ul
ia’s own position as the world’s leading producer and
osition which, among other things, gives Russia an e
orestalling direct competition with prospective Iran
energy markets, where Gazprom is established as the
Moscow’s still compelling need to balance its interest i
t other important foreign policy interests – including r
as regularly frustrated Iranian efforts to maximize the
from cooperation with Russia. Over the last 20 years
a number of occasions to curtail its arms exports to
ions from the US. Likewise, in response to American p
from commitments to provide the Islamic Republ
and reprocessing technologies. Political developmen
dential elections appear to point in the direction of
13
energy
vest in
tal and
tion in
a joint
rnment
tan and
lingness
toward
tement,
t to be
ei. Yet,
ation in
s to act
easingly
le, that
timately
xporter
pecially
ian gas
leading
n closer
elations
trategic
, Russia
Iran in
ressure,
ic with
ts since
rowing
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Russian-Irani
14 IRANIAN
weariness among var
with Russia’s antics.
popular demonstrati
sentiments in Iran,
Moscow has taken o
in Tehran.
Russia’s toing
nuclear issue. Since
on constraining a uni
the US or Israel. To
nuclear issue in th
considerable influe
independently throu
would almost certai
prepared to use its
sanctions. Instead, o
sanctions on Iran ov
water down the mea
with specific negativ
ensure that nothing
authorizing the use
recent Council reso
diluting sanction me
indicate that Russia
paragraph in the re
military force!
This begs th
resolution to Iran’s
progress is achieved
measure of US-Irani
military strikes aga
Washington to offe
incentives that coul
an Relations in the Context...
REVIEW of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 3, Fall 2010, pp. 7-32.
ious Iranian political currents (including much of the p
The public’s chants of “Death to Russia” in the c
ions during the past year are a clear reflection
which could perhaps explain why – amongst other t
bvious steps to distance itself from the current admini
and froing is most apparent in its approach to the
the invasion of Iraq in 2003, Russian leaders have bee
ilateral resort to military force against Iranian nuclear ta
this end, Moscow has a strong interest in keeping the
e UNSC – where Russia, as a permanent memb
ce – rather than having the US deal with th
gh something like an ad hoc “coalition of the willi
nly not include Russia. Therefore, Moscow has nev
veto to give Iran wholesale protection from Security
n four occasions, Russia has supported resolutions i
er its nuclear programme, while also working diplomat
sures actually authorized – that is, the language and
e repercussions for Russian economy and enterprises
in these resolutions could be construed by Washin
f force. Myriad reports and analyses since the adoptio
lution indicate that the Russians have been quite a
sures affecting them directly. Paradoxically, the same
authorities have been instrumental in crafting a p
olution with dubious implications for possible future
question: does Russia genuinely want to see a di
nuclear issue? Another point to note is that if di
, it would most probably go hand in hand with a su
n rapprochement. While Russia clearly opposes US (or
inst Iranian nuclear targets, Moscow has never
r Tehran substantive security guarantees or other
facilitate productive nuclear discussions. Washington’
pulace)
urse of
f such
hings –
stration
Iranian
intent
rgets by
Iranian
er, has
e issue
g” that
er been
Council
posing
ically to
easures
and to
gton as
of the
ctive in
analyses
reamble
use of
lomatic
lomatic
stantial
Israeli)
pushed
trategic
failure
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IRANIAN
to pursue effective d
Interestingly enough
choosing not to talk
tight corner with lim
exclusively on Mosc
enough to forestall a
to achieve real rap
Moscow’s exclusivit
compete directly wit
To the extent
issue since 2003,
multilateral fuel-cycl
Russia. In October
fuel deal with Iran s
per cent low-enriche
the Tehran Research
it into fuel rods. Th
turn into weapons-
serving: the arrang
simultaneously circu
capabilities. Followin
meeting, headed by
in Iran which ap
considerations and
pronouncements por
sorts failed to receiv
late November 200
reporters that altho
uranium abroad for
there would be a si
soil.(16) Emphasis on
other pronounceme
the deal with Turkey
IRANIAN REVIEW of Foreign Affairs
REVIEW of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 3, Fall 2010, pp. 7-32.
iplomacy with Tehran creates a workable paradigm for
, Tehran’s consistent policy during the past three dec
to – let alone deal – with Washington has in fact put it
ited options and the inevitable, undesirable position o
w, and to a lesser degree, on Beijing. The US may en
destabilizing military confrontation with Iran, but not
rochement – which could, among other things, un
and strategic value to Tehran and unleash Iranian
Russian gas exports.
that Moscow has proposed specific solutions to the
these solutions have emphasized Iranian participa
centres, centres that would be based, conveniently en
009, the US, France and Russia struck a multilateral
tipulating that Iran would export more than 1,200kg o
d uranium to Russia for refining to 20 per cent purit
Reactor that makes medical isotopes. France would t
fissile material would be in a form that would be dif
rade uranium.(15) Russia’s support for the proposal
ment would have given Russia an enhanced rol
mscribing the development of Iran’s indigenous fu
g a general consent by the Iranian team attending the
aeed Jalili, Iran’s Chief Nuclear Negotiator, doubts ab
eared to be mostly emanating from domestic
rivalries, and the deal fell through. Subsequent
tending a softer line with a possible compromising for
any meaningful response from the other side. For exa
9, Foreign Ministry Spokesman Ramin Mehmanpar
ugh Tehran was not opposed to sending its low-e
further enrichment, Iran wanted a 100 percent guaran
ultaneous exchange for fuel for its nuclear reactor on
the “Iranian venue” – even Kish Island, as was indi
ts – seemed to forestall any progress on the original d
and Brazil could be put together in May.
15
Russia.
ades of
self in a
relying
age just
enough
ermine
gas to
nuclear
tion in
ugh, in
nuclear
f its 3.5
to fuel
en turn
ficult to
as self-
while
el-cycle
Geneva
ounded
political
Iranian
mula of
ple, in
st told
nriched
tee that
Iranian
ated in
al, until
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Russian-Irani
16 IRANIAN
The new Russia
Moscow’s willingnes
Islamic Republic eve
in Tehran should pr
understand that the
ever existed as such
past. In the view of
as “conditional”. Rus
dictum goes or as by
pursuing. This cons
defend this claim, w
Russia’s changing b
orientation is very m
Let us glean throu
insights.
Just three yea
“the one single mas
Russia’s borders.” H
glorify the role of St
of the Soviet dictato
April 2010 Putin ad
with Poland’s prime
officers in 1940.
Putin’s softne
to restore Russia’s gr
a decade the world i
to 2008, Putin foug
influence. Poland w
the Ukraine and Ge
Russian troops out o
Now the Ob
defence batteries in
an Relations in the Context...
REVIEW of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 3, Fall 2010, pp. 7-32.
profile
s to move ahead with a fourth round of UN sanctions
after Brazil and Turkey had brokered a similar fuel-s
ompt re-evaluation of Iran’s posture toward Russia. Ir
so-called “strategic partnership” – if as indicated previ
– with Russia is highly constrained, and perhaps a thin
his author, it would best to describe Russia’s allegiance
sia has no friends or enemies, only interests – as the ol
conventional wisdom any state or country would or sh
itutes the foundation of Russia’s foreign policy. In
need to determine the drivers, priorities and incentives
haviour toward the Islamic Republic. Russia’s new
uch dictated by new geopolitical and economic consid
h recent developments in order to draw more sub
rs ago, Putin was warning that the US was trying to
ter” of the world as he blasted NATO for “creepin
e also commissioned a revision of Russia history textb
lin, alarming the world with the suggestion that a rehab
r was imminent. These days, he sings a very different
itted the brutality of Stalin’s regime as he stood side
minister at Katyn, where Soviet troops executed 20, 00
s of tone does not reflect any softening of his overridi
eat power status. What has changed is that for the first
s finally going Putin’s way. In his term as president, fro
ht to defend what he regarded as Russia’s rightful sp
s seeking to become a base for US anti-missile defen
rgia were determined to join NATO. Georgia sought t
f its breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Osseti
ama administration has backed off plans to station
oland and the Czech Republic; NATO membership is
against
ap deal
n must
iously it
of the
to Iran
British
ould be
rder to
behind
political
rations.
stantive
become
up to
ooks to
ilitation
tune: in
by side
Polish
ng goal:
time in
m 2000
here of
ces and
o throw
.
missile-
off the
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IRANIAN
table in Ukraine, ow
effectively annexed
invasion. NATO ha
plans. Only last mon
in Sevastopol, Ukrai
Putin has also str
agreements and deal
to Bulgaria and Cent
Against this
interests. Thus, Put
Obama’s offer to
Rogozin, Russia’s a
worked to defuse Ru
through colour revo
under the bridge.
However, Ru
factor: foreign cash
maintaining power i
closer relations with
accept at least some
Moscow, including
Russia hopes to exte
Igor Sechin,
Rosneft, and a leadi
and intelligence offi
influence during Put
the vulnerabilities of
materials. This cann
boom was founded
cheap capital borro
now dried up. In
calculated that betw
to implement plans
IRANIAN REVIEW of Foreign Affairs
REVIEW of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 3, Fall 2010, pp. 7-32.
ing to the victory of a pro-Moscow president; and Ru
the northern territories of Georgia as a result of i
even offered to include Russia in European missile-
th Putin signed a deal extending Russia’s lease on its na
ne, long the home of Russia’s controversial Black S
engthened Russia’s energy dominance of Europe,
s on the South Stream pipeline, delivering Russian gas
ral Europe.
ackdrop, the US no longer looks so threatening to
in, Medvedev and the Russian elite can afford to
reset” bilateral relations. Obama, in the words of
bassador to NATO, is “a young, modern thinker”
ssian fears that the US wants to lure away Russia’s for
lutions. Thus, the geopolitical tug of war seems to b
ssia’s new friendliness is also driven by another i
. The Russian elite believe that an essential condi
the success of Russia’s economy. Today, this transla
the US and Europe, which encourages Russian le
of the demands that Washington and its allies have
Iran’s nuclear programme. By drawing closer to th
d the country’s economic and strategic reach.
utin’s former right-hand man at the Kremlin, chair
ng figure among the siloviki (former Soviet military,
ers who assumed a dominant role in the reassertion
in’s leadership) explains “the [global economic] crisis
the Russian economy in its dependence on certain type
t help but concern us.”(17) The fact is that Russia’s P
on oil money, but most Russian companies actually
ed from the West amounting to $450 billion. That
early 2010, Russia’s Ministry of Economic Devel
en now and 2013 Russia will require about $1 trillion i
o restore infrastructure (roads, railways, schools and h
17
ssia has
ts 2008
defence
val base
a fleet.
inking
directly
Russian
accept
Dmitry
ho has
er allies
e water
portant
ion for
tes into
ders to
put to
e West,
man of
security
of state
xposed
s of raw
utin-era
rew on
ell has
opment
n order
spitals)
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Russian-Irani
18 IRANIAN
and the budget can
stabilization fund set
the Kremlin has reali
investment.
Let us not for
levels, and the Kre
Moscow Carnegie C
marked the end of t
modernize, you are
your own … then
developed countries
Russia seems
foreign investment.
Putin’s team for mor
is because Russia ca
The other 10 percen
threat of radical Isla
of ongoing insurgen
Asia.(19)
In the wake o
Iran a little bit less.
Russia for psycholog
Russia’s independen
embarrassing failure
demonstrated just h
and the pro-wester
December 2004, indi
underscored the wea
demonstrate Russia’
alliance with Iran w
does not need to pro
However, Ru
Even after supportin
an Relations in the Context...
REVIEW of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 3, Fall 2010, pp. 7-32.
not cover more than a third of that sum. A $150
up during boom years will run out by the end of 2011.
zed that Russia cannot develop and modernise without
et that in 2008 the price of oil hit $146 a barrel, double
mlin was inundated with a windfall. Dmitri Trenin
nter states, “The economic crisis has eliminated the hu
he Putin presidency.” He adds “If you accept that unl
marginalized, and if you accept that you can’t moder
our foreign policy is quite clear. You need to reach
that can become resources for your modernization.”(18)
to be taking this advice, devoting much energy to
ccording to Duma Deputy, Sergei Markov, a close me
e than a decade, “90 percent of Putin’s démarche to t
not modernize without Western specialists and techn
t is driven by the fact that “Putin needs the West to f
that Russia is facing” both inside its own borders in t
cies in the North Caucasus and Islamist radicals in
f these developments, Russia seems to need the US m
In the recent past, collaboration with Iran was impo
ical reasons. Partnership and cooperation with Iran repr
e from the West. Back in 2004, Putin suffered a nu
s, both internally and externally. The debacle in
w far Putin was from neutralising the situation in C
n ‘Orange Revolution’ in the Ukraine in Novem
cating the defection of Russia’s most important CIS nei
knesses of Russian foreign policy. Putin realised that h
continuing importance in world affairs and reinfor
s his version of an ‘I did it my way’ scenario. Today
ve its independent national strategy.
sia does have a significant interest in preserving ties
g the fourth draft resolution, Putin and other Russian
billion
Clearly,
foreign
today’s
of the
ris that
ess you
nize on
out to
rallying
ber of
e West
logies.”
ight the
e form
Central
ore and
rtant to
esented
ber of
Beslan
echnya,
er and
ghbour,
had to
ing his
, Russia
to Iran.
officials
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IRANIAN
publicly reaffirmed
on line. Nevertheless
space” that Russia w
gain opportunities f
obtained had they h
This brings us to an
from US-Iranian hos
Caspian Basin oil an
gas from Iran. As a r
oil and gas flowing
reap transit revenue
Iranian routes been
rapprochement occu
These are the
triumph of the Ma
considered, Russia
substantive reasons
emergence as a regi
Russia identifies the
position. Russia and
not concede their
Beyond this, Russia
becoming the medi
potential Turkish-Ira
Russia’s monopoly
further in the study.
Russian reset o
It has become transp
shift in Russia’s posi
identified above. Th
stance toward Russia
Is this a genuine tre
IRANIAN REVIEW of Foreign Affairs
REVIEW of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 3, Fall 2010, pp. 7-32.
ussia’s commitment to bring the Bushehr nuclear pow
, this has little to do with loyalty. Rather, Iran is an “ec
ants to dominate. Russian business interests have been
r trade with and investment in Iran that they might n
d to compete with the American and other Western b
other important consideration: Russia has gained eno
tility. The US has blocked Iran from serving as a corri
gas, and has discouraged Europe from developing an
esult, Russia has benefited from more Azeri and Centr
through pipelines into Russia (thus allowing Moscow
and exercise political leverage) than would have occur
vailable. These advantages would be lost if an Iranian-
rs.(20)
considerations that motivated Russia to distance itself f
Tehran Declaration. In the view of this author, al
was uncomfortable with the Tehran Declaration
but because Moscow was fundamentally uneasy abou
nal power – on its borders. On the greater internation
new Iran-Turkey-Brazil axis as a potential problem for
China, like the other permanent Security Council memb
onopoly on supervising unconventional weapons s
wants to prevent Turkey from assuming Russia’s r
tor vis-à-vis Iran. In fact, Russia feels highly threat
nian cooperation on energy transport, which would je
on supplying Europe with gas. We shall explore thi
roulette?
arent that during the past few months there has been a
tion toward Iran owing to a series of considerations
is repositioning has a lot to do with Obama’s less
. The question is how real is this thaw in US-Russian r
nd? Will there really be a long-term qualitative shift a
19
er plant
onomic
able to
ot have
usiness.
rmously
idor for
buying
al Asian
to both
red had
merica
rom the
l things
ot for
t Iran’s
al level,
its own
ers, will
easily.
ole and
ned by
pardize
is angle
marked
e have
hawkish
lations?
nd how
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Russian-Irani
20 IRANIAN
does Iran feature i
arguing that Russia’
readiness to work co
willing to support
consent with and ac
of Obama’s reset di
volte-face has little t
experience such dipl
the West. Russia is
cruel imperatives of
By taking a cl
clear that Russia has
did to the administra
fact, Moscow has be
times but the only di
knows, the more
administration has p
of issues and situatio
As we menti
planned missile defe
more, Obama has o
parts of Georgia is
recent deal between
base through 2042
Putin’s suggestions f
undermine Ukrainia
wave of insecurity t
people are starting to
an expansive Russia.
As the story
apparent that the
Washington Post re
key proposals it ha
an Relations in the Context...
REVIEW of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 3, Fall 2010, pp. 7-32.
this equation? Optimists in Washington seem to t
s gesture on the nuclear dossier was evidence of M
nstructively with the US. The Kremlin, they maintain, i
Obama’s administration. Russia’s seemingly not-so-r
ive support of the resolution is being trumpeted as a
lomacy. In the view of this author, the reason behind
o do with patience or support. It is not in Russian char
omatic epiphanies. Russia is neither a friend of the Eas
nly Russia’s friend – as reason, conventional wisdom
ealpolitik would dictate.
oser look at Russia’s behaviour in the recent past it
responded to the Obama administration in the same
tion of George W. Bush. That is, before the so-called
en playing this game for years. It has sold the same ru
fference is the price.(21) As anyone who ever shopped f
ou pay for it, the more valuable it seems. The
id a lot in exchange for Russian cooperation on a wid
s, including the Iranian nuclear dossier.
ned above, Obama has eradicated the Bush adminis
nce installations in Poland and the Czech Republic.
ficially declared that Russia’s continued military occup
no obstacle to US-Russian civilian nuclear cooperati
Russia and Ukraine granting Russia control of a Crime
as shrugged off by Obama officials, as have been
or merging Russian and Ukrainian industries in a blatan
sovereignty. The effect of this reset has been to pr
roughout Eastern and Central Europe and the Baltic
fear they can no longer count on the US to protect the
of Russia’s consent to the draft resolution broke, it
S had thrown in some last-minute deal sweetene
orted: “The Obama administration failed to win appr
sought, including restrictions on Iran’s lucrative oil
ink so,
oscow’s
s finally
eluctant
triumph
Russia’s
acter to
t nor of
, or the
ecomes
ways it
eset . In
g many
or a rug
Obama
e gamut
tration’s
hat is
ation of
n. The
n naval
ladimir
t bid to
duce a
s where
m from
became
rs . The
val for
trade, a
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IRANIAN
comprehensive ban
proposal to halt ne
Obama administrati
involved in weapons
draft included a lo
hundreds of million
systems capable of
particularly valuable i
originally contradic
presented a confusin
defensive system is
resolution, and the
however, while dra
Foreign Minister, Se
system, which tends
has proved reassuri
Russia issued a state
Medvedev’s stateme
June 2010 (from whi
membership because
the substance of the
The list goes
the entities, one of
sanctioned for its d
were also lifted on t
military technology t
of Russia, sanctione
Instrument Design
equipment to Syria.
secured Russian sup
end to the sanctions
This was an e
what? History is b
IRANIAN REVIEW of Foreign Affairs
REVIEW of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 3, Fall 2010, pp. 7-32.
on financial dealings with the Guard Corps and a US
investment in the Iranian energy sector.” (22) In addit
n revealed it had ended sanctions against four Russian
trade with Iran and Syria since 1999. It also emerged
phole that would exempt a 2005 Russian deal, v
s of dollars, to sell Tehran five S300 surface-to-air
intercepting ballistic missiles and aircraft, makin
in the event of an Israeli air attack. Notwithstanding, a
ory pronouncements with regard to the missile
g picture of where Moscow stood on the case. Appare
not included in the list of the sanctions enlisted
early statements by Moscow officials highlighted this
ing attention to this aspect, Russian authorities (incl
gey Lavrov), made it clear that Moscow would not del
to reflect the efficacy of the Israeli lobby with the Russi
g both to Washington and Tel Aviv.(23) In late Sep
ent firmly ruling out the sale of S300’s to Iran. Furth
t at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Su
ch Ahmadinejad shied away) against the Iranian applica
Iran is under Security Council sanctions is clearly refle
Russian volte face .(24)
n. Russian officials had complained about the sanctions
which (Russia’s state arms exporter, Rosoboronexp
alings with the Islamic Republic in 2006 and 2008. S
e Moscow Aviation Institute, sanctioned in 1999 for pr
o Iran; the D. Mendeleyev University of Chemical Tec
d in 1999 for aiding Iran’s missile programme; and t
Bureau, sanctioned the same year for supplying
Though US officials for weeks had confidently said t
ort for action against Iran, Moscow raised its demand
only a few days after agreeing to the draft resolution.(25)
pensive deal for the US, but it begs the question: in re
ound to repeat itself: Moscow’s approach to the
21
-backed
ion, the
entities
that the
lued at
missile
them
eries of
system
ntly the
in the
. Later,
sive of
iver the
ans and
tember,
ermore,
mmit in
tion for
ctive of
against
rt) was
nctions
oviding
hnology
he Tula
antitank
ey had
s for an
turn for
UNSC
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Russian-Irani
22 IRANIAN
resolutions of the p
behaviour. In 2007 a
consent to a resoluti
strong statements a
make. The Russian
enrichment. In the e
this 2007 “breakthro
of negotiations with
Both were fol
administration conv
negotiations. All of
Bush declared that h
in winning genuine
few accomplishment
success in getting Ru
UNSC resolution. It
meaning than the pr
anything in the past
except that they wer
as contrasted with t
Iranians – seem to h
The reality is
of the US. To Russi
facto ally when it c
Middle East and to
united by a shared
Moscow and Tehran
multipolar world. T
relations, regardless
expect only token as
nuclear threat”.(26) A
longue durée : recl
positioning the pawn
an Relations in the Context...
REVIEW of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 3, Fall 2010, pp. 7-32.
ast can shed light on the essence of Russia’s charac
fter months of negotiation, the US finally convinced R
on tightening sanctions on Iran. Senior Russian officia
out Iran’s nuclear programme that they had long re
mbassador to the UN declared that Iran was obliged
yes of the Americans, this was considered a triumph.
ugh” came after a similar ‘breakthrough’ in 2006, when
oscow had produced the first watered-down resolutio
lowed in 2008 by yet another “breakthrough” when t
inced Moscow to agree to a third resolution afte
this vacillation failed to yield substantive results, an
e had seen into Putin’s soul, there was much left to be
ussian support in the UNSC against Iran. Given this
s have been more oversold than the Obama adminis
ssia to agree – for the fourth time in five years – to yet
remains to be seen whether this latest agreement has
vious three. The fact is that the Russians have not said
months that they did not do or say during the Bus
much more circumspect in divulging the essence of th
he recent episode when the Russians – and for that
ve left the gloves off.
that by nature Russian interests will always diverge fro
a, Iran may not be a real “partner”, however it has be
mes to Moscow’s plans to reshape the power balanc
ilute US influence in the region. Russia and Iran will al
national interest - limiting US hegemony in world
share, and will continue to share, the goal of fostering
is objective will always constitute the main pillar of
f diplomatic resets or global economic crises. The US
sistance from Russia in countering what the so-called
gain what is important to note are Russia’s interest
iming Russia’s status in the global strategic calcul
s on the chessboard to that effect.
ter and
ussia to
ls made
used to
o cease
In fact,
months
.
e Bush
r more
whilst
desired
history,
tration’s
another
greater
or done
h years,
e policy
matter,
those
en a de
in the
ways be
affairs.
a more
bilateral
should
Iranian
in the
us and
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IRANIAN
Energy rivalry:
Russia may view Ira
the Kremlin is categ
the gas market. This
fuel swap agreemen
promote Iran’s inter
energy market. The
inherent competitor
both Europe and
assiduously courting
between the two cou
slow. Russia’s ambiti
shown itself to be
fourth draft resoluti
hampering Iran as a r
The China N
South Pars gas fiel
developments. The $
Western energy gia
reveals the main arte
With the inva
others, on gaining c
oil. However, the C
more pivotal to th
westwards and eastw
importance of natur
many years. All ener
natural gas are the M
Information Admini
and seven times tho
world’s top sources f
Within the Mi
IRANIAN REVIEW of Foreign Affairs
REVIEW of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 3, Fall 2010, pp. 7-32.
atural gas
as an ally when it comes to curbing US world domina
orically ill at ease with Iran’s role in the regional dyna
factor can explain why Russia tried to indirectly obst
t. It is not in Russia’s interest to back processes tha
national integration. Russia does not want competitio
fact is that with its vast reserves of natural gas, Ira
to Russia. Arguably less well positioned than Iran to
hina, Russia is nevertheless a major player and h
China with an export deal since 2006. However, neg
ntries have been on and off and pipeline construction
ions to expand its natural gas exports can explain wh
uch a fair-weather friend to Iran. Moscow’s reaction
n suggests all too clearly that Russia has its own age
egional energy rival.
ational Petroleum Company’s (CNPC) involvement i
d can serve as an explanation of much wider geo
5 billion project - signed in 2009 after years of foot dra
ts Total and Shell under the shadow of US-led san
rial system for future world energy supply and demand.
sions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the US had set sights,
ntrol of the Central Asian energy corridor. The focus
PC-Iranian partnership reveals that natural gas will
e world economy: specifically, the dual flow of t
ards from Central Asia to Europe and China. In fact, t
l gas as an energy source has been steady and inexora
gy industry agencies agree that the premier sources o
iddle East and Eurasia, including Russia. The US-based
stration puts the natural gas reserves in these regions
se of North America’s total - the latter itself being on
or that fuel.
ddle East, Iran is one of the main holders of gas rese
23
ce, but
mics of
ruct the
t would
in the
n is an
supply
s been
tiations
as been
y it has
to the
nda for
Iran’s
political
ging by
tions –
among
was on
e even
is fuel
e rising
le over
f future
Energy
as nine
of the
ves. Its
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Russian-Irani
24 IRANIAN
South Pars gas field
Iran’s South Pars wo
The latter is the wo
Ghawar has effectiv
imminent era of nat
world’s nucleus for e
Both Europe
Asian gas generally.
Nabucco pipeline is
and Bulgaria all the
from the US – has
particular has reitera
through the pipelin
monopoly as Europe
In addition, I
Armenia and it is als
including the United
so-called “Peace Pip
its extremely long a
buts, the Peace Pipel
region’s most popul
the area, the pernici
underestimated.
Even more i
natural gas from Tur
to operate in 2012.
south and already h
Pars gas field devel
pipelines, Iran woul
primary energy sour
country that EIA pr
natural gas consump
In this contex
an Relations in the Context...
REVIEW of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 3, Fall 2010, pp. 7-32.
is the world’s largest. If converted to barrel-of-oil equi
uld dwarf the reserves of Saudi Arabia’s giant Ghawar
rld’s largest oilfield and since it came into operation i
ly been the world’s beating heart for raw energy suppl
ral gas dominance over oil, Iran will oust Saudi Arabi
nergy.
and China stand to be arterial routes for Iranian and
he infrastructure reflects this: the 3,300-kilometre (2,0
planned to supply gas from Iran (and Azerbaijan) via
ay to Western Europe. While outside pressure – pre
revented Iran from joining the Nabucco pipeline, T
ted its support for the idea of delivering Iran’s gas to
. Nabucco, once operational, will effectively break
’s sole gas supplier and put an end to Russian dominan
ran also exports gas via pipelines separately to Tur
o following up export deals with other Persian Gulf c
Arab Emirates and Oman. Another major arterial rou
eline” from Iran to Pakistan and on to India. Notwith
d roller-coaster period of gestation and the persisting
ine could give Iran the potentiality to export gas to tw
us countries. However, as in other energy-related pip
ious element of outside politics and pressure can h
portant for Iran is the 1,865-kilometre pipeline that
kmenistan through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan into Ch
Turkmenistan shares a 300-kilometre border with Ira
s a gas export deal with Tehran. If the Iranian-Chines
opment can be incorporated into the above trans-
d become the hub of a world economy in which ga
ce. This is amplified further by China’s rising dem
dicts could be dependent on imports for over one thi
ion by 2030.
t of a major realignment in the world’s energy econo
ivalents,
oilfield.
n 1948,
. In the
a as the
Central
0 mile)
Turkey
umably
rkey in
Europe
Russia’s
e.
ey and
untries,
e is the
tanding
ifs and
of the
lines in
rdly be
supplies
ina, due
n to its
e South
ational
s is the
nd – a
d of its
y there
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IRANIAN
will be a diminished
energy market is co
resolution can be see
in the energy mark
undermine the Tehr
energy arteries of a
longer be able to do
All the evid
initiatives that wou
integration. Howeve
acting as such towar
Washington’s. Russi
Moscow to endear
Europe. Concession
repeated delays in c
fissures in Iran on
systems to Iran – w
has used to capture
political currents –
Bushehr plant will n
in its entirety, a vie
kept announcing kep
latest of which is se
amid much Iranian f
represents part of an
a major turnabout i
that Russia may app
interest is to keep W
more room Russia h
keep Europe’s ener
understanding with
issues in the Islamic
the pressing geopoliti
IRANIAN REVIEW of Foreign Affairs
REVIEW of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 3, Fall 2010, pp. 7-32.
role for the US and also for Russia. In so far as th
cerned, Russia’s ostensible blessing for the US-driven
n as an attempt to conceal its fear of facing greater com
t. Pressuring Iran with further sanctions, and attem
an Declaration are part of a last-minute effort to cut
orld economy that Russia, and for that matter, the US,
inate.
nce suggests that Russia has little interest in su
ld improve Tehran’s international image and sub
r, as we underscored above, it is important to note
d Tehran does not suggest that Moscow is being a fr
a’s love-hate relationship with Iran is convenient: i
erself to Tehran and in the process manipulate the
such as building the Bushehr nuclear power plant
ompletion has irked Iranians and even created open
he matter – or threatening to sell S300 surface-to-air
ich is now practically off the table – have been tactic
Washington’s attention. It may of interest to note tha
mostly of critical/reform tendency – have argued
t be completed until and unless the nuclear dossier is r
strongly challenged by the government authorities w
t announcing specific dates for the plant to come on li
for late summer 2010. Given the recent fuelling of t
anfare, one would wonder whether the promised full o
international [read US-Russian] agreement paving the
the dossier or not. This notwithstanding, there is littl
ar willing to grant small concessions to Iran, but its ov
ashington’s focus on Tehran. The more distracted the
as to cement its dominance in the former Soviet spac
gy needs under its thumb. If the US were to r
ehran and rely more heavily on an ally like Turkey to
world (as it has with Tehran Declaration), then it can
ical issue of how to undermine Russian leverage in Eur
25
future
UNSC
petition
ting to
up the
will no
porting
sequent
that by
iend of
allows
US and
whose
political
missile
Russia
certain
hat the
esolved
o have
e – the
e plant
eration
way for
e doubt
erriding
US, the
and to
ach an
tend to
turn to
sia.
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Russian-Irani
26 IRANIAN
Turkey: rival an
Russia’s reaction to
through support fo
Moscow’s perceptio
apprehension over A
strategy to become
that Turkey is situat
of the total oil and
assume that Turkey
energy strategy. The
affinity, otherwise k
to establish itself as
energy users. There
Iran’s nuclear stan
geopolitical equation.
For one, Tur
domestic demand an
its main energy sup
third of Turkey’s oil
from Russia. The Bl
fastened this link be
Turkey with an annu
exist in Iran, Iraq,
keen to explore the
to accommodate Tu
the existence of the
for the short-term fu
Turkey’s relati
Turkey’s domestic re
needs to ensure no
international level, t
which also becomes
an Relations in the Context...
REVIEW of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 3, Fall 2010, pp. 7-32.
d regional soft-power broker?
the Tehran Declaration and its effort to hamper the i
the US-led draft resolution is very much conditi
ns of Turkey’s objectives in the region. Russia ha
nkara’s role as a broker, which it interprets as Turkey’s
n energy corridor between the East and the West. Th
d at a pivotal geographic intersection possessing three
atural gas reserves in the world. Many Russians are b
has used the Iran deal as a platform for Ankara’s lo
argument is that using geography and non-European/
own as “soft-power”, Turkey has used geostrategic a
the gateway between the energy-rich countries and
may be some truth to this reading of Turkey’s brok
off with the West, but there are other variables
.
key needs to diversify its energy imports in order
d to maximise its energy security. Turkey is reliant on R
lier and constitutes a very lucrative market for Russ
needs and more than 70 per cent of its gas currentl
e Stream project in particular, which runs across the Bl
tween both countries. Completed in 2005, it transport
al capacity of 16 billion cubic metres. Whilst secondary
zerbaijan and Turkmenistan (and the Turkish govern
), it will take a couple of years until they have been de
key’s domestic energy requirements. Marc Herzog arg
ully functional Blue Stream pipeline has allowed Russia,
ture, to corner the Turkish market.(27)
onship with Russia at the international level is conditi
liance on Russian energy exports. Thus, Turkey’s foreig
t to be out of line with Russian interests. Howeve
here is the potential for bilateral competition or div
intertwined with the energy interests of the EU, which
nitiative
ned by
s much
broader
e fact is
-fourths
und to
ng-term
cultural
vantage
primary
rage in
in this
o meet
ussia as
ia. One
y come
ack Sea,
s gas to
sources
ment is
veloped
ues that
at least
ned by
policy
, at an
rgence,
itself, is
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IRANIAN
anxiously attempting
note, Turkey has ma
become a broker be
This was well illust
pipeline connecting
regional energy play
Russia. With the N
desperate to diversi
Russia that has beco
is also one of the
Nabucco project des
Russia, howev
for the near future a
alternative sources.
into Italy and Austr
when Putin met his
projects like the Ba
binding itself solely t
potential for future
could be kept out o
“cheap tactics.” An
plan to source gas fr
“political situation.”
reached this decision
Turkey’s forei
able to juggle and r
actors such as Syria
much demand in or
becoming a major re
flotilla incident clea
Turkey’s involvemen
to ignore Turkey.
On this subje
IRANIAN REVIEW of Foreign Affairs
REVIEW of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 3, Fall 2010, pp. 7-32.
to diversify the sources of its domestic energy. On
e no secret of its ambitions to make the most of its loc
tween the Caspian region and consumer markets in
rated with the completion in 2005 of the Baku-Ce
zerbaijan and Turkey. Turkey’s long-term plans to eme
r are caught between the opposing objectives of the
orth Sea oil and gas deposits in definite decline, th
y its energy sources in an effort to weaken its relian
me increasingly more assertive on the international sta
major motives behind the EU’s determination to b
ite its huge financial cost.
er, is intent on keeping the EU reliant on its energy
nd is betting on rival projects to counter EU attempts
outh Stream, a pipeline project that would bring Rus
ia over Bulgaria, met with Turkish approval in Augu
Turkish counterpart in Ankara on a state visit. Neve
ku-Ceyhan pipeline and Nabucco reveal that Turke
o Russia on the plane of energy politics and that there i
ompetition in this crucial field – if, interestingly enou
f them, for one reason or another and through never
xample would be the decision, in late August 2010, to
om Iran to Europe via the Nabucco gas pipeline give
he European-backed Nabucco consortium cited that t
owing to “international laws and regulations.”(28)
n policy has become increasingly adept in recent years i
econcile relations between seemingly adversarial inter
and Israel or the US and Iran. This new-found skill w
der for Turkey to manage its bigger strategic political
gional player as well as an energy transit hub. The rece
rly underscores Turkey’s effort to assert itself more
t in the affair sent out a clear message: the West canno
t, Con Coughlin writes, “Certainly the West cannot a
27
this last
ation to
urope.
han oil
rge as a
U and
EU is
ce on a
e. This
ild the
reserves
to find
sian gas
st 2010
rtheless,
is not
s ample
h, Iran
-ending
shelve a
n Iran’s
hey had
in being
ational
ill be in
goal of
t Gaza
boldly.
t afford
ford to
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IRANIAN
steps back. What ha
with Iran is based sq
The argumen
the Islamic Republi
paradigmatic or con
Iranian relations. Rat
light on a relationshi
transparent is that th
at the very most, bila
2007 I was of the vi
lucrative dividends o
retrospect, that se
considerations and
substantive downgra
case. The famous 1
wrote: “To Europe
we come as lords an
to deal with Russia
former superpower
including in areas adj
own part, with wide-
policy and bigger m
belong to a distant, b
IRANIAN REVIEW of Foreign Affairs
REVIEW of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 3, Fall 2010, pp. 7-32.
s become patently clear is that Russia’s political man
arely on the former’s self-interest.
here, while openly critical of the Russian behaviour
c as of late, does not, however, intend to suggest
eptual shift of an irreversible nature has occurred in
her, the focus has been on this particular chapter to sh
dynamic that has been difficult to describe. What has
e Moscow has placed a ceiling on relations with Tehra
teral relations can be described as conditional . Back in
ew that “For all intents and purposes, Russia may suc
r benefits in the future, and turn its back on the Iranian
ems to have been corroborated. Now with ec
energy politics in the balance, the stakes are higher
de of relations is much more probable than previously
9th century Russia novelist-poet Fyodor Dostoyevs
e have come as beggars for a slice of bread; to Asia, h
d masters.” The Islamic Republic, which will continue
– a permanent member of the Security Council an
aspiring to regain part of its lost empire and he
acent to and of great bearing for Iran – must work har
open eyes and a much more nuanced and even-handed
anoeuvring space, to prove that the 19th century illusi
ygone past.
29
euvring
towards
that a
ussian-
d more
become
. Thus,
January
umb to
s.”(31) In
onomic
, and a
was the
y once
owever,
to have
also a
gemony
d on its
foreign
ons just
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Russian-Irani
30 IRANIAN
Notes
1. Ghoncheh TazminiPaper , No.1, 20
19,2010).
2. “Russia Denies US ‘
http://www.shan
m>).
3. “Iran, North Korea
4. “Russian Minister: B
July 2009.
5. “Rift on Iran Emer
<http://www.ny
&st=cse>).
6. Ibid.
7. Ellen Barry and An
New York Tim
middleeast/25ira
8. David Greene, “Hist
March 2010, <h
(accessed 17 June
9. Brown Merkel, “B
<http://www.go
rrwCZmRAgD9
10. Ibid.
11. “Ahmadinejad Cen
<http://www.teh
2010).12. Juan Cole, “Ahm
(available at: h
unsc-sanctions-by
13. Kremlin Tells I
<http://www.reu
an Relations in the Context...
REVIEW of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 3, Fall 2010, pp. 7-32.
, “Russian and Iranian Relations in Perspective;”, Ravan07, http://www.ravandinstitute.com/policypapers/ (Access
Trade-Off’ On Iran,” Shanghai Daily , 4 March 2009. (Ava
ghaidaily.com/sp/article/2009/200903/20090304/article_39
wo Different Nuclear Problems - Medvedev,” Interfax, 6 Jul
ushehr Reactor To Go Online By Year-End,” Fars News Ag
ges as Clinton Visits Moscow” BBC , 18 March 2010, (Ava
imes.com/2010/03/19/world/europe/19diplo.html?scp=2&
rew Kramer, “China and Russia Pressed Iran to Accept U.
s , 24 March 2010. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/25
.html?scp=2&sq=iran&st=cse> (accessed 17 June 2010).
ory, Profit Drive Russia, Iran Ties”, National Public Radio(
ttp://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=1251
2010).
ck New Sanctions Against Iran”, Associated Press , 1 Ap
gle.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5hi1UnBNcgFa9lv
QBKD80>, (accessed 21 June 2010).
ures Russia for Opposing Tehran Deal,” Tehran Times, 27 M
rantimes.com/index_View.asp?code=220199>, (accessed
dinejad Blasts Medvedev Over UNSC Sanctions”, May 3
ttp://www.zcommunications.org/ahmadinejad-blasts-medved
-juan-cole).
ran to Stop Political Demagoguery,” Reuters, 26 M
ters.com/article/idUSTRE64P35K20100526> (accessed 1
Policy ed June
ilable at:
036.ht
y 2009.
ency , 23
ilable at:
sq=iran
. Deal,”
/world/
PR) , 25
54888>,
ril 2010,
wL_-
ay 2010,
11 June
0, 2010,
ev-over-
y 2010,
1 June
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IRANIAN
2010).
14. “Russian Academic
June 2010, <http
(accessed 16 June
15. “Iran Demands Ch
30 October 2009
6896257.ece> (ac
16. “Iran Seeks
<http://www1.v
Nuclear-Deal-725
17. Charles Clover,Financial Times ,
a0f5-00144feabdc
18. Owen Mathews a
2010, p. 26.
19. Ibid.
20. Mark N. Katz, “R
No.12, 2010, pp.
21. “Security Council S
Times , 6 June
(accessed 8 June
22. Robert Kagan,“A
http://www.washyn/content/articl
23. “Russia: Sanctio
http://www.jpos
August 2010).
24. Ironically enough,
300 surface-to-air
despite Russia’s d
25. Ibid.
26. Ariel Cohen,“Ru
http://www.herit
Curveball-for-Ob
27. Marc Herzog, “Fro
last Decade”,For
(accessed June 8
28. “Nabucco Group
2010, <http://o
August 2010).
29. Con Coughlin, “Tu
IRANIAN REVIEW of Foreign Affairs
REVIEW of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 3, Fall 2010, pp. 7-32.
Deplores Moscow’s Support for UN Resolution on Iran,” I
://www.irna.ir/View/FullStory/?NewsId=1179973&IdLang
2010).
anges to Deal with the West on Nuclear Ambitions,” Time
, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_ea
cessed 25 June 2010).
uarantees on Nuclear Deal,” VOA, 24 Novembe
anews.com/english/news/middle-east/Iran-Seeks-Guarante
57637.html> (accessed 25 June 2010).
avid Gardner and Catherine Belton, “Russia, the Thir21 June 2010, <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3123c7a4-7d
0.html> (accessed 22 June 2010).
d Anna Nemtsova, “The New Putin Profile,” Newsweek ,
ussian-Iranian Relations in the Obama Era,” Middle Eas
62-3.
anctions on Iran - Russia Making the Best of Both Worlds,”
2010, http://www.geotimes.ge/index.php?m=home&newsi
010).
Hollow Reset with Russia”,Washington Post, 25 M
ingtonpost.com/wp-e/2010/05/24/AR2010052403073.html (accessed 8 June 201
s Ban S-300 Missiles,” Associated Press , 11 June
.com/IranianThreat/News/Article.aspx?id=178178> (acce
ars News Agency announced that Iran had actually obtaine
missiles (two from Belarus and two from another unspecifie
eclared refusal to deliver them. 4 August 2010.
sia’s Iran Policy: A Curveball for Obama,” 15 Janua
age.org/Research/Reports/2010/01/Russias-Iran-Policy-A-
ama> (accessed 8 June 2010).
Foe to Friend, t he Volte-face in Turkish-Russian Relations
eign Policy Centre Briefing ,< http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/11
010).
craps Plan for Iranian Gas Supply,” Wall Street Journal, 2
nline.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20100823-705024.html> (acce
rkey’s Role in the Flotilla Affair Should Worry Us All in th
31
RNA, 15
age=3>
Online,
st/article
r 2009,
s-on-
Man,”68-11df-
21 June
Policy ,
eorgian
=21797
y 2010,
).
010, <
ssed 2
d four S
source)
y 2010,
over the
74.pdf>
August
ssed 27
e West,”
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Russian-Irani
32 IRANIAN
Daily Telegraph,
=3108067> (acce
30. “EU to Reaffirm
<http://europa.e
August 2010)
31. Ghoncheh Tazmi
Paper , No.1, 200
an Relations in the Context...
REVIEW of Foreign Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 3, Fall 2010, pp. 7-32.
3 June 2010, <http://www2.canada.com/topics/news/stor
ssed 2 August 2010).
Commitment to Turkey,” Europa Press Release, 12 M
u/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/10/920> (ac
i, “Russian and Iranian Relations in Perspective;”, Ravan
7, p.19.
.html?id
ay 2010,
essed 2
Policy