RISK ASSESSMENT RELATED DATA FROM FINAL EIA REPORT · Final EIA & EMP – Expansion of Multiple Grades of NPK Fertilizers at DFPCL Complex, Taloja, Maharashtra 07. Risk Assessment

M/s. DFPCL Final EIA & EMP – Expansion of Multiple Grades of NPK

Fertilizers at DFPCL Complex, Taloja, Maharashtra 07. Risk Assessment

Kadam Environmental Consultants | April, 2017

RISK ASSESSMENT RELATED

DATA FROM FINAL EIA REPORT

M/S. DFPCL FINAL EIA & EMP – EXPANSION OF MULTIPLE GRADES OF NPK

FERTILIZERS AT DFPCL COMPLEX, TALOJA, MAHARASHTRA ADDITIONAL STUDIES

KADAM ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS | APRIL, 2017 157

7.2 RISK ASSESSMENT

The risk assessment process is intended to identify existing and probable hazards in all operations and

work environment, to quantify the hazards and to access the risk levels of those hazards in order to

prioritize those that need an immediate attention.

7.2.1 Scope & Methodology

Scope of the risk assessment covers the storage of all chemicals involved in proposed facilities.

Methodology of Risk Assessment and Hazard Identification is detailed in Annexure 14.

7.2.2 Consequence Analysis for Selected Failure Scenario

The project description, and other project related data have been comprehensively reviewed to

identify the hazardous Chemicals and information on the hazardous Chemical properties (MSDS) of all

the chemicals handled at the site has been reviewed to identify the hazards associated with the same.

Their properties are tabulated in Table 7-4. All the raw material and solvents shall be handled and

stored at ambient temperature and atmospheric pressure.

M/S. DFPCL FINAL EIA & EMP – EXPANSION OF MULTIPLE GRADES OF NPK FERTILIZERS AT DFPCL COMPLEX,

TALOJA, MAHARASHTRA ADDITIONAL STUDIES


Table 7-4: Chemicals Properties of Raw Materials

S. No.

Name of

Raw

Material

State

Boiling

Point

Flash

Point Hazard

Involved

LEL-UEL TLV

LD50mg/kg

LC50mg/m3

Specific

Gravity

(water-

1)

Vapor

Density

(air-1)

Odor

Threshold IDLH

(°C) (°C) (%) ppm (ppm) (ppm)

Raw Material

1 Phosphoric

acid Liquid 158 NA Corrosive NA 1 mg/m3

ORAL (LD50): Acute:

1530 mg/kg [Rat].

DERMAL (LD50): Acute:

2740 mg/kg [Rabbit].

DUST (LC50): Acute: &

gt; 850 mg/m 1 hours

[Rat].

1.685 3.4 NA 1000

2

Potash

(KCl- 60%

K2O)

Solid 1420 NA Corrosive NA NA

ORAL (LD50): Acute:

2500 mg/kg 2600

mg/kg [Rat].

1500 mg/kg [Mouse].

1.987 NA NA NA

3 Ammonia Liquid -33 NA Toxic 16.0 -

25.0 25

LC50: 2000 ppm/4

Hours NA 0.62 NA 300

4 Sulphuric

Acid Liquid 270 NA Corrosive NA 1

ORAL (LD50): Acute:

2140 mg/kg [Rat.].

VAPOR (LC50): Acute:

510 mg/m 2 hours

[Rat].

1.84 3.4 NA 3.75

8 Nitric Acid Liquid 120 NA Corrosive NA 2 LC50 = 2500 ppm.

(Rat) 1hr) 1.41 NA NA 25


FERTILIZERS AT DFPCL COMPLEX, TALOJA, MAHARASHTRA ADDITIONAL STUDIES


7.2.3 Selection of Maximum Credible Loss Scenarios (MCLs’)

Following points are considered while selecting the release scenarios:

Flash point for flammable chemicals

IDLH of Toxic chemicals

Operating Temperature and Pressure of the material

Total inventory of the material

On the basis of Chemical Accident Rule 1996, MSIHC Rule 1989 and Chemical Properties of the

chemicals given in Table 7-4, MCLs’ which may take place for simulation are presented in Table 7-5.

M/S. DFPCL FINAL EIA & EMP – EXPANSION OF MULTIPLE GRADES OF NPK FERTILIZERS AT DFPCL COMPLEX,

TALOJA, MAHARASHTRA ADDITIONAL STUDIES


Table 7-5: Storage Condition and Scenarios Selected for Simulation

S.

No. Full name of the Raw Material

Inventory at

site

Storage Parameters

Scenario Considered Consequence Pressure

(Kg/cm2) Temp. (⁰C)

1 Ammonia 3000 MT

Storage 0.1 -33

2 mm leak Toxic Dispersion

5 mm Leak Toxic Dispersion

10 mm Leak Toxic Dispersion


FERTILIZERS AT DFPCL COMPLEX, TALOJA, MAHARASHTRA PROJECT BENEFITS


7.2.4 Simulation of Release and Development of Contours

As the MCLS’ were developed for the selected set of chemicals, the next step is to carry out the

consequence analysis. The consequence analysis results along with their contours are presented in the

following sections.

Ammonia

Toxic dose level and effect due to the release of Ammonia are presented in Table 7-6.

Table 7-6: Toxic dose level and effect due to the release of Ammonia

Chemical

(Storage Tank) Failure Scenario Met Data

Toxic Dose Effect Distance in meter

ERPG 2

(150 ppm)

ERPG 3

(750 ppm)

IDLH

(300 ppm)

Ammonia

2 mm Leak

3.2/F 132.20 54.40 108.20

3.8/D 27.00 12.20 22.70

4/D 39.10 17.20 32.90

5 mm Leak

3.2/F 346.00 132.80 283.70

3.8/D 60.40 25.30 50.40

4/D 88.40 37.00 73.90

10 mm Leak

3.2/F 672.60 252.10 551.50

3.8/D 109.30 42.60 89.60

4/D 165.10 62.40 134.30

The contours for effect distance generated for the release of Ammonia are presented in Figure 7-1 -

Figure 7-3.

Figure 7-1: Maximum Concentration Effect Distance Contour - Ammonia (2 mm Leak, 3.2/F)




Figure 7-2: Maximum Concentration Effect Distance contour of Ammonia (5 mm Leak, 3.2/F)

Figure 7-3: Maximum Concentration Effect distance Contour - Ammonia (10 mm Leak, 3.2/F)

7.2.5 Conclusion

From the above study, it can be concluded that due to 2 mm (minor) leak in Ammonia storage tank,

maximum distance affected due to toxic dispersion effect at IDLH concentration is within the plant

boundary. Whereas in case of 10 mm (major) leak in Tank, toxic dispersion effect at IDLH

concentration is going outside the plant boundary. Based on the above concluded results, the

maximum Distance affected due to Toxic Dispersion effect is given in Table 7-7.

Table 7-7: Maximum distance affected due to Ammonia Leakage

Chemical Scenarios Effect Distance in Meters in worst case

Consequence Zone At IDLH Concentration

Ammonia

Normal Condition

(2 mm Leak) 132.20 at 3.2/F On-site Potential

worst case scenario

(10 mm Leak) 672.60 at 3.2/F Off-site Potential

NR: Not Reported

Note: At Worst Case scenario of Ammonia Storage Tank Leak, maximum distance affected due to

Toxic Dose effect goes far from the project site. However these areas will be manned every moment.

Hence probability for occurrence of worst case scenarios will be negligible.




7.3 DMP

7.3.1 Major Hazards

Ammonia Plant

Ammonia Storage tank 18000 MT:

In this storage tank, anhydrous ammonia is stored at -33°C and at atmospheric pressure. This is a

double wall single integrity tank with perlite insulation purged with nitrogen. All the pipelines of liquid

ammonia from the tank are of welded construction and there is remote possibility of any leakage in

these joints. However, there is one vulnerable area in the main liquid off take line leading into the

pump suction outside the tank. If the flange at upstream isolation valve fails totally and/or nozzle

collapses, there will be spill of ammonia at a fast rate. Liquid ammonia in this case will flash and

evaporate generating a vapour cloud. The possibility of such total failure is remote.

The total collapse of the inner tank itself is considered to have a generic failure probability of less than

one in a million per year. The tank is guarded against overfilling. There have been so far no such

accidents of the tank collapse while in operation anywhere. Two independent level indicators are

provided with high level alarms which cut off Input at alarm levels and plant operation is stopped.

There is a dependable refrigeration system. In the event of its failure, automatic pressure control

system takes care of any over pressurizing. The tank has two independently mounted pressure safety

valves and release the excess ammonia to the independent flare provided for the purpose.

Ammonia Storage tank 3000 MT:

Ammonia Storage Tank of 3000 MT capacity is a double integrity wall tank and in case of leakage from

Inner wall, outer wall withstands preventing ammonia leak to the atmosphere. All other safety system

to this tank is similar to 18000 MT Storage Tank.

Type of Accidents in NP And AN Plants:

Fire / Decomposition of AN melt and explosion

Heavy leakage of Ammonia

System of Elements or Events that could lead to major accidents:

AN does not burn by itself but its contamination by organic matter can promote decomposition at

temperature of above 198°C, this is an exothermic reaction and can self-sustain. Decomposition

gives off NOx.

Heavy leak of Ammonia from Evaporator due to gasket failure.

Acid spillage form storage tank / tank pump failure.

Hazards:

Decomposition of AN will release NOx and affect the person in that area. Heavy leak of Ammonia will

affect the person present in the area. In case of explosion, casualties may occur.




7.3.2 ENVIRONMENTAL DISASTERS

Flood

Proximity of our plant to the Kasardi River and heavy rains, sometimes coupled with high tide may

cause flooding in our complex during the monsoon. Although it may not be possible to completely

prevent it, its consequences can be greatly reduced by implementing necessary preparatory measures

and by taking timely mitigation measures during such incidents. The objective of this plan is to set

guidelines for effective management of such incident.

Hazard Identification Flooding

Flooding in our complex during monsoon can occur due to -

Accumulation of Rain Water in our complex as a result of

Obstruction in the Storm Water Drain

High Level in the river due to High Tide

Abnormal heavy rainfall

Outside Water entering in to our complex.

Risk prone areas in our Complex

IPA Plant area

CNA PLANT area

Utility cooling tower area

WNA - III area

All areas south side of plant building in case of entry of river water. Through collapse of Boundary

wall.

Preparatory Measures

Essential Preparatory measures required to be undertaken before the onset of monsoon are indicated

below in Table 7-8.

Table 7-8: Essential Preparatory measures

Sr. No. Preparatory Measure Responsibility

1 Internal Storm Water Drains to be checked & cleaned to

ensure that the drains are clear and free from obstruction AVP (HR & IR)

2 External Storm Water Drains to be got cleaned through MIDC

before onset of monsoon. AVP (HRM)

3

Areas adjacent to Storm water drains to be maintained free

from waste materials / garbage which may enter in to drain

resulting In to blockages.

AVP - (Process GR I)

AVP (Process GR 11)

4 Checking the boundary wall around complex and carry out

repairs If any AVP (Maint.)

5 Internal Storm water drain to be cleaned immediately after

the first showers. AVP (HRM)

6 200 No. Sand Bags to kept ready by Civil Department near

Administration building AVP- (Maint.)




Sr. No. Preparatory Measure Responsibility

7 3 No. de watering pumps to be kept ready in Electrical

Workshop exclusively for any flooding AVP (Maint.)

8 05 No. of Search lamps to be kept ready exclusively for use

during flooding. AVP (Maint.)

9 Keeping updated on Weather Forecast Including High Tide

Information etc. to all concerned by e - mail. AVP (EHS & QS)

10

Ensure no Hazardous Chemical is kept loose / In open

container in open areas which may be get washed due to

rains and contaminate the storm water drain.

AVP (Process GR I) AVP

(Process GR II)

11 Monitoring Strom Water level and River level during heavy

rains. Sr. Manager - Fire

12 Cleaning of grill opening kept in boundary wall at various

places. AVP (Maint.)

Mitigation Measures

During heavy Rains depending upon the forecast of Weather and level of Water in the river, AVP (EHS

& QS) will keep additional Managers from EHS, Process & Electrical departments for SILENT HOURS.

From Process Department during normal working hours Plant Manager and during silent hours Process

Shift Engineer / Silent Hour Site Shift Manager will be responsible.

Process departments will monitor the storm water drain level in their areas. They will also ensure

that the water is flowing freely in the storm water drain and there is no obstruction in the drain

that can cause built up of the level in the area. If there is any obstruction it should be get cleared

immediately.

In case of observance of high level of Strom water drain, the arrangement for pumping out the

drain water by using de watering pump to the external drain should be done at three locations.

Discharge of de watering pump should be put towards should be put preferably towards Ammonia

Dispatch gate.

If the situation is under control, normalcy is restored.

In case situation is not under control, process department will initiate shut down of the plant and

arrange electrical isolation of the equipment affected by flooding with the help of electrical

department.

Electrical Department

From Electrical Department during normal working hours GM (Electrical) and during silent hours

Electrical Shift Engineer will be responsible.

Monitor MCC Panels, cable Trenches, and Sub Stations to ensure that these are not affected by

flooding. In case of water logging is observed, arrange for dewatering in these areas till situation

is normal.

If the situation cannot be restored to normal, arrange for isolation of the same consultation with

concerned plant Manager/ Process Shift Engineer.

Arrange for electrical connection for de watering pumps.

Arrange for electrical isolation of equipment in plant as per instructions of Process department.




Effluent Treatment Plant

For Effluent Treatment Plant during normal working hours GM (Acid Plants) and during silent hours

Process Shift Engineer (CNA Plant) will be responsible.

Ensure main storm water drain outlets are clear and free from obstruction.

ETP tanks levels are kept reasonably low.

ETP Sludge is stored in designated pits and no loose sludge is lying in the open area.

In Situation of External water entering in our complex causing severe flopping

In case of External water entering to Complex causing severe flopping, during normal working hours

Respective HODs and during silent hours Site Shift Managers / Security Shift in charge will be

responsible.

(Depending upon the forecast of Weather and level of water in river AVP (EHS & QS) will keep

additional Managers for Silent Hours)

Bring the affected Plants to the shut-down safely.

Isolate the Power supply of affected plants.

Evacuate the employees to the place at higher elevation.

Take Head count of the employees.

Arrange for shifting of Equipment, materials wherever possible

AVP (HR & IR) should organize for food, water etc.

Note: During Heavy Rains, each department will have the details on Number of Company

Employees, Number of Contractor's Employees and Visitors present in the Departments/Area.

Earthquake:

In case of major earthquake all General Managers and Sr. Managers shall rush to factory for stabilizing

any abnormal condition in the plant. Visual inspection of storages, buildings, foundations shall be

carried out in view to identify abnormality if any. Detailed inspection for structural stability shall be

followed after every major earthquake. In case of any collapse or endanger to building or storage

evacuation action, safe shut-down shall be initiated with declaration of emergency depending on the

nature of the damage.

Major Earthquake: - Earthquake of Richter scale 6 or >6.

Consequences of Major Hazards

From Storage:

Localized fires may be the result of leakage of combustible chemicals

Localized vapour clouds of nitrous fumes

Thick vapour clouds of nitrous fumes due to decomposition of AN and NP

Irritating Ammonia smell and cold burns

Acid burns from acid spillages,

BLEVE Propylene and Propane tanker / storage tanks

From flammable storages like Methanol, IPA, Naphtha and LDO fire may take place in storage or in

pool. This will be localized emergency. In case of propane / propylene leak and fire the intensity will

be more and will be requiring higher control measures. In case of Ammonia leak from storage

tank/pipeline/ tankers evacuation in the direction of wind rose will be required depending upon




quantum of leak and wind velocity. In case of Nitric acid leak and pool formation NOx will spread

along with wind rose direction.

From Process:

Liquid ammonia may cause cold burns on contact with skin and vapour ammonia may lead to

irritation of nose and throat, coughing and vomiting.

Acid burns, irritations and coughing may arise due to spillage of acids and its associated gases.

Hot burns may result from fires, explosions associated with flammable gases/ liquids handled.

7.3.3 EMERGENCY FIELD OPERATIONS

Atmospheric Ammonia Storage Tanks

In case of any emergency in storage system, the feed to the storage tank should be stopped at once

by remote and local Isolations.

Storage Tank Failure

Flare should be ignited if it has gone off for required burning of ammonia vapour if situation

demands.

Transfer of ammonia from atmospheric storage tank to new storage tank & vice-versa and

subsequent consumption in plants.

Vapour pipelines failure

In case of ammonia vapour line failure, It should be flared immediately and tank pressure to be

controlled by burning of ammonia vapour.

Any In-flow of ammonia to tank should not be allowed. Inform Ammonia plant Shift In charge and

other Plant In charge.

Ammonia Storage Compressor Failure

De-energize the compressor and isolate inlet/outlet ammonia line.

Stop incoming feed to storage tank and flare ammonia for pressure control if required.

Ammonia storage Tank

Tank Bottom Nozzle Failure

Cut off feed to tank from Ammonia plant. Ammonia plant Shift In charge to inform Shift In charge

of other plant about emergency.

Transfer Ammonia to consuming plants and new storage tank, if required, ammonia plant may be

shut down.

Flare storage tank vapors through remote operated valve

Guide fire hydrant monitors towards escaping ammonia vapour

Alert other plants and Security / Fire Dept.

Transfer Pump / In Plant pipelines failure

Stop transfer pumps

Close storage tank liquid cutlet line isolation valve




Limit storage tank input feed

Failure of Ammonia line from storage tank to plants

In case of failure of transfer line, ensure that transfer pumps have tripped automatically and

supply has immediately stopped.

7.3.4 ENVIRONMENTAL EMERGENCIES

Ammonia

Leakage of Ammonia from Storage Tank / Plant

Release of Ammonia vapors which may contaminate environment. In this case, fire water hydrants

should be used for spraying for escaping vapors which may lead to increase the quantity of

contaminated effluent.

The effluents should not be allowed to enter into storm water drain, if not possible, for this a

bund should be provided to the storm water drain.

Contaminated effluent should transfer to ETP with immediate information to neutralize Ammonia.

Inform to ETP operating staff about the emergency and to take necessary action to hold the total

effluent for treatment.

Depute Laboratory person to monitor the level of Ammonia near Gates.

In case if it is more than the TLV (25 ppm), inform chief emergency controller to inform police

Station to initiate Off-Site Emergency.

If tanker unloading is going on than stop unloading, isolate all associated valves. Stop the pump.

7.3.5 RESOURCES AVAILABLE FOR FIGHTING EMERGENCIES

Communication System

In case of any emergency, communication plays an important role. At DFPCL following communication

system exists.

Fire Alarm System

Presently this system exists in Methanol, IPA and Ammonia plants. The area of these plants is

divided into zones and each zone is provided with a break glass type of fire alarm call point

(MCP), a main panel in plant control rooms and a repeater panel at the Emergency Control

Center.

In case of Fire or other emergencies, the personnel in that area are expected to break the glass of

particular manual call point so that immediate signal will be displayed in the control room and the

Security Office from where the subsequent action will be taken.

EPABX System / Intercom

Complex has EPABX Telephone system by which any emergency can be reported to security and

fire department by dialing Number 100 where round the clock Fire men service is available to take

prompt action.




Land Line System

An abbreviated dialing facility is provided to phones in all control rooms. Land line phone has been

provided in Emergency Control Centre.

Walkie-Talkies

Security / Fire Department, Ammonia, Methanol, IPA plant control room has been provided with

Walkie-Talkies.

Mobile/Cell Phone

(Strictly not to be used in flammable chemical (gas/liquid) Plants, Flammable/explosive storages/

Road & control Rooms) Fast communication is possible by cell phone internal as well as external.

PA system

PA system is provided in each plant for communication between Control room & field operations.

SIREN:

There are two number of emergency sirens fixed at two locations (Specific locations) in the complex.

The sound of the siren can be heard up to 5 km. The siren codes are as follows:

There are three types of sirens, which will be sounded during emergencies.

Alert Siren

This type of siren will be sounded as soon as Security Dept. gets communication on emergency. The "Alert

Siren" will have 02 peaks & will be of around 1/2 a minute as Indicated below:

This siren indicates that an emergency is occurred in the plant premises. All the persons should be ALERT &

REMAIN at their work place.

Evacuation Siren

After assessing the potential of emergency & if Incident Controller decides that evacuation is needed, he will

indicate Security Dept. who will sound the "Evacuation siren" which will be of 08 waves & will be of around

02 minutes as indicated below:




After 2 hours

When this siren is sounded personnel should evacuate & assemble at assembly points as per the "On Site

Emergency Control Flan". The copies of which are distributed to all concerned. If the second siren is not

sounded, evacuation is not required.

All clear siren

Once emergency ceases, the Incident Controller will communicate to the Chief Emergency Controller and in

turn the Chief Emergency Controller will instruct the Security personnel to sound "All Clear Siren" which will

be of continuous nature for 3 Minutes.

Hooters for evacuation

In Admin Bldg., Link Bldg., Div. I Laboratory Bldg., and Plant Bldg., hooters are installed. These will be

sounded In case of emergency requiring evacuation.

Fire Fighting System

DFPCL has a well laid down Fire Hydrant network as per TAC norms. In addition to fire hydrant

network at strategic locations first aid firefighting appliances have been provided to tackle the fire

in incipient stage.

For high rise structures fire risers with arrangement of booster pumps is also provided. In addition

to this water cum foam tender is available to mitigate any emergency.

A team of qualified fire professionals is available round the clock.

Fire Water

We receive water from MIDC, Patalganga and Barvi reservoirs which is received and stored in our

reservoirs in Ammonia plant and Methanol plant respectively.

The Ammonia plant reservoir has a capacity of 5400 M3 out of which 1800 M3 is strictly reserved

for firefighting which caters to the need of Ammonia plant firefighting system.

The Methanol plant reservoir has got total 14400 M3 and 7200 M3 is strictly reserved for

firefighting which caters the need of Methanol, IPA , Acid plants, AN/ NP & bagging area.




Fire Hydrant Network

The fire water is circulated throughout the plant via fire hydrant network. The fire hydrant system

is categorized as low hazard/high hazard depending upon the type of plant.

Methanol, IPA and Ammonia comes under high hazard category whereas Acid plants, AN / NP &

bagging area are categorized as ordinary hazard plants.

In high hazard plants for every 30 running meters we have provided one fire hydrant whereas the

distance changes to 45 meters in case of ordinary hazard plants. In addition to the fire hydrants,

we have got water monitors and foam monitors fixed on fire water system at various locations in

the plant area.

The layout of the fire hydrant system confirms to T. A. C's regulations. (Total 228 hydrants, 12

water monitors and 3 foam monitors).

Fire Pump House

As per T.A.C. regulations, we need to maintain 7.5 Kg/cm2 pressure through the fire hydrant

network. Hence, for this purpose, we have installed high capacity pumps which are located in our

pump house. In all we have got two pump houses.

Ammonia Plant Fire Pump House

It has total four pumps viz. one jockey pump of capacity of 30 M3/hr. which is on auto start and

auto stop basis, it maintains 7.5 Kg/cm2 in the pipeline. As soon as the pressure falls to 9.0

Kg/cm2 the jockey actuates and stops automatically after achieving 10 Kg/cm* pressure.

The main purpose of the pump is to overcome the minor leakages through glands of the valves,

etc. Electrical motor driven pump with capacity of 273 M3/hr is the main pump which starts

automatically as soon as the pressure falls to 8.0 Kg/crn2.

It is a centrifugal pump driven by electrical motor of 132 HP. There are two other pumps with

capacity 410 M3/hr. driven by diesel engines of power 230 HP. These are stand by in case of

power failures. These are centrifugal pumps set at 7.0 Kg/cm2 and 6.0 Kg/cm2 respectively,

which starts automatically but has to be stopped manually.

All the above pumps of ammonia plant pump house draw water from the ammonia plant raw

water tank and cater the need of ammonia plant only.

Methanol Plant Pump House

It has total eight pumps which fulfils the fire water need of Methanol, IPA plants, Acid plants,

Boiler area, AN/ NP & bagging area.

There are three diesel engine driven pumps of capacity 410 M3/hr. and an electrical motor driven

jockey pump with capacity 30 M3/hr. to maintain 10 Kg/cm2 pressure in the line for methanol &

IPA plant system

For Acid plants, Boiler area, AN/ NP & bagging area there is three diesel engine driven pump of

capacity 273 M3/hr., one electrical motor driven pump of capacity 273 M3/hr. and one jockey

pump of capacity 30 M3/hr. to maintain 10 Kg/cm2 pressure in the line.

All the above pumps are drawing water from methanol raw water tank. The above two systems

are Interconnected by means of a valve in the pump house itself.

The fire water system of methanol plant and ammonia plant are interconnected by means of a

valve in front of methanol control room which is normally kept closed and can be opened In case

of failure of any of the systems.




A fire hydrant system has been provided to Pilling Tower also.

Medium Velocity Sprinkler System

Deluge system has been provided for RGP Storage and Tanker Unloading area

Emulsifier System (High Velocity Sprinkler System)

Emulsifier system has been provided for electrical power transformers.

Foam Pourer System

The crude methanol, pure methanol, IPA tank, fossil oil, diesel tank and naphtha tanks in the tank

farm area of methanol plant are provided with this system. Foam being lighter than oil / liquid, it

floats on the surface and extinguishes the fire by smothering.

The system consists of a tapping from the fire hydrant line, a foam generator, a foam tank

connected in assembly and a pourer at the end.

Foam compound in a proportionate ratio is introduced in the water stream resulting into foam

after aeration. A special type of foam compound i.e. Alcohol resistant foam is used to cope up

with the alcohol fires. Whereas for other liquid Fires, AFFF foam is used.

Foam Tender

It is installed on Tata 909 chasis. It consists of 2000 liter capacity water and 500 liter capacity

foam tanks. It has pump having discharge capacity of 1800 LPM at 7 kg / cm2. It has two delivery

outlets and one water cum foam monitor.

Hoses, branches and other accessories are available in the tender. In addition to this two CO2

extinguishers of 22.5 kg capacity and one DCP extinguisher of 50 kg capacity is also available in

the tender.

The D.C.P. Trailer:

It is a trailer mounted unit with a D.C.P tank containing 500 Kgs dry chemical powder. This

powder is expelled out by means of nitrogen gas through the discharge hoses. The D.C.P. so

expelled covers the seat of fire and extinguishes by smothering.

Fire Jeep:

We have a fully equipped jeep containing fire hoses, Hose Branches, B.A. Set, PPE, etc. located

near Emergency Control Room.

Portable Fire Extinguishers

Besides other firefighting equipment for the immediate use i.e. for first aid of fire we have got

different types of portable fire extinguishers placed throughout the plant area depending upon

their utility.

There are total 504 fire extinguishers of ABC, Foam, DCP and C02, DCP type extinguishers are

found versatile and can be used on gas, oil or electrical fires. So, many of the places are acquired

by this type of fire extinguishers.

CO2 type fire extinguishers are very popular because of its versatile use, clean and quick effect

and easier operation. Most of the places in the plant are acquired by these extinguishers. They are

suitable on oil, gas and electrical fire.




Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) sets

We have 25 numbers of SCBA set which are kept in ail the control rooms and in all the hazardous

locations.

Medical Facilities

Manning

Male Nurses to man the Occupational Health Centre /n each shift round the clock.

Two full time Medical Officers working in the General shift and on twenty-four hours call.

Back up team of specialists (secondary care) at Dr. Purohit, Dr. Sahastrabuddhe and Dr. Santosh

Jadhav hospitals at panvel and for tertiary care Hiranandani fortis hospital and MGM Hospital

Vashi.

Equipment

Four Oxygen cylinders in ward, one in Ambulance and One Jumbo Oxygen Cylinder in ward with

facilities for administering Oxygen simultaneously to six casualties and one causality in Ambulance

Plus two Oxygen cylinders in ward as Standby.

Four fowler beds plus three, semi, fowler examination couches con be utilized in emergency to

treat seven casualties, simultaneously in emergency.

Equipment for Resuscitation.

Laryngoscope

Endotracheal tube

Tracheostomy tube

Two Resuscitator bags

One Automated External Defibrillator

Equipment for clearing air passages of unconscious casualties - one portable suction machine in

ward plus one more machine in Ambulance.

Item for giving a stomach wash - Ryles tube

Equipment for detecting heart disease - ECG Machine AT 101 Schiller make.) Instrument and

Suturing material for wound suturing under sterile conditions Autoclave Equipment for sterilizing

(Autoclaving) dressing and surgical items

Instrument for emergency venesections or tracheostomy (ready to use)

Sterile dressing for the treatment of burns of 10% or less. Burns more than 10% needs

hospitalization in burns units such as National Burns Center Airoli / Bhatia Hospital (Tardeo

Mumbai)

Splints of all sizes available for cases of fracture/dislocation.

One folding type stretcher in OHC and a folding type stretcher in ambulance.

Four S/S drums and four aluminum box for storing sterile instruments."

One Ambulance One Shower.

Facilities for

Treatment of all type of wounds

All kinds of dressings

Suturing and suture removal

Treatment of burns, Cool Gel, blankets are available.




Treatment of inhalation of gases as NH3, NOx, Cl2 and prevention of complication of such

exposure.

Antidote for Methaemoglobinemia

Treatment of mild cases of carbon monoxide poisoning, CO poisoning that results in altered

consciousness may need hyperbaric oxygen treatment at Kasturba Hospital

Treatment (initial and mild cases) of methanol poisoning. More severe cases will need dialysis in a

large hospital with AKD unit and blood methanol estimation laboratory equipment.

Automated External Defibrillator - to be used in case of sudden cardiac arrest of any cause like

secondary to coronary artery disease or electrical shock etc.

Schiller ECG Machine - useful in diagnosing chest pain

Fingertip Pulse oximeter - for indirect measurement of Oxygen concentration in arterial blood-

useful in inhalation of toxic gases.

7.3.6 Emergency Control Rooms/Escape Routes/Assembly Points etc

Emergency Control Room (center)

In the event of a major accident the Security Office at the Main gate will function as control room of

Chief Emergency Controller. This control room will maintain an up to date list of telephone numbers of

all key personnel and outside agencies. This control room will be manned round the clock and person

will be available at telephone 100 and MTNL Telephone number 2741 2462 / 6768 4062.

Incident Site Control Room

The control room of the affected plant will function as Incident Site Control Room. In case the plant

control room gets affected, then office of respective General Manager (Process) will be used as

Incident Site Control Room.

Escape Route

In the event of an emergency requiring evacuation of people from affected plant, it would be required

to direct the evacuees to proceed towards Assembly Point depending upon the wind direction.

Wind Cocks installation at different Locations

Wind Cocks installed at different locations are given in Table 7-9.

Table 7-9: Wind cocks installation at different Locations

Sr. No. Wind Cocks Locations

1 Ammonia Flood Light Tower

2 IPA T-1 Column

3 IPA Cooling Tower

4 Utility Cooling Tower

5 Bagging Gantry ( On TT-3 )

6 LDAN Bagging Building

7 Ammonia Storage Tank

8 Methanol. distillation column




Assembly Point

Considering area of the plant, 3 Assembly points are designed to be used as per the nature of

emergency and wind direction.

Lawn in front of main gate.

Gate No.4 (Bagging)

IPA

Area opposite to Security Office located near Main Gate and ANP Bagging Plant located towards Gate

No. 4 and IPA Gate are the areas to be used as Assembly points depending upon the wind directions

and location of the emergency situation. However In case of the evacuation towards assembly point at

Gate No. 4, employees in IPA area will assemble at IPA Dispatch Gate.

Head Counting

Head Counting will be done at all the assembly points by security department:

Take record of total number of employees present at a time for time office.

Take record of total number of contract employees present at a time from security department

Make list of total short fall and give it to rescue team.

Rescue team will be interacting with plant in charges/ area in charges to tally the short fall.

7.3.7 Roles & Responsibilities of various Personnel

In an emergency during day time and silent hours he. from 5.30 p.m. to 9.00 a.m. on working days,

full day on weekly off and holidays, actions are required to be taken by Shift-in-Charges / Shift

Engineers, Operators & Technicians till the senior persons come to the site. During general shift hours

also first few minutes, the same persons will be available immediately. Hence duties of various

personnel listed below under this section are from first level to upper levels.

In an emergency it is important that at incident site one person takes the command of the situation

and leads the team to combat the emergency. Under his guidance all other key persons will carry out

their duties and he will ensure that all related actions are taken simultaneously.

In an emergency, Incident Controller will concentrate at Incident site. At times, he will require the

additional resources in terms of equipment, additional manpower, etc.

At the same time, there may be a need to interact with outside agencies for getting resources,

complying with statutory provisions and interacting with Police, neighboring industries, etc. In

emergency plan this role is allotted to Chief Emergency Controller and he will be the overall controller

of emergency.

Primary Observer

The person who first notices the incidence will inform to concerned Control Room and report as

follows:

Identify himself

Location and type of incidence

Severity of incidence

Wind direction - safe route of approach




If possible, fights the emergency e.g. fight the fire with extinguisher; isolate the system, etc. by

keeping himself safe.

Wait at site if atmosphere is conducive for arrival of Incident Controller or rush to relevant Control

Room to inform.

Chief Emergency Controller

Ex. V.P. (Operations), in his absence Sr. General Manager (Operations) will be the Chief Emergency

Controller.

Beyond General Shift hours and on Holidays Site Shift Manager will act as Chief Emergency Controller

until Sr. V.P. (O) / Sr.GM (O) takes over.

Chief Emergency Controller will be over ail controller of the emergency. On receipt of information, he

will proceed to Emergency Control Room. He will take ultimate decision on the following aspects and

execute the same with the assistance of General Manager (Personnel & Administration) end General

Manager (Maint.) who will also rush to Emergency Control room:

Essential communication.

Firefighting and Rescue work.

Emergency Plant shut-down.

Evacuation actions, if required and Head Count.

Demolition and Repairs. .

Transportation.

Investigation.

Public Relation.

Urgent medical attention and actions.

Assess whether off-site emergency needs to be declared. In case 'yes', inform District Authorities,

Police and Mutual Aid Response Group members.

Evacuation and directive to vicinity community through state Govt. agencies.

The Shift-in-charge of the Plant

The Shift-in-charge of the Plant will function as an Incident Controller until concerned Divisional HOD

arrives at the Site:

Go to the Site and;

Assess the emergency

Instruct Security to sound appropriate Siren

Direct the firefighting and rescue operation

Direct the plant operations / shut-down to control the emergency

Direct the Mechanical / Electrical / Instrument / Civil Managers / Officers for support services.

Ensure constant feedback to C.E.C. (Chief Emergency Controller)

Deploy officers and staff for control room and field for coordinating and directing the work of the

firefighting and rescue operation.

V. P (EHS & QS)

In absence of (EHS & QS.), Dy. General Manager (QA) will take over this role.

Rush to the site of emergency and;




Review the action taken and advice security/ fire executive and incident controller in the area of

firefighting and rescue operations and further steps required for reducing the spread of risk.

Arrange for additional safety equipment.

Provide help to C.E.C to get help from outside agencies like local fire brigade and Mutual Aid

Response Group (MARG).

Decide the method of disposal of hazardous spillage.

Collect information on weather condition, ambient air quality and drain discharge during

emergency.

Collect plant data relevant to the incidents.

With consultation with C.E.C, get help from MARG members.

General Manager (Plant)

General Manager (Plant under Emergency) will rush to emergency site and

He will advise proper rescue and control of operations.

He will be in constant touch with plant control room for necessary plant operations / safe shut

down if required.

He will keep continuous liaison with Emergency Control Centre for appraising situation and

additional help required if any.

Fire Shift In charge

Fire Shift In charge will function as fire / rescue leader until Manager (Fire) arrives at the site in

absence of Fire shift in charge the security shift in charge will take over.

Rush to site of emergency, consult Incident Controller and;

Direct the crew members in carrying out firefighting, rescue operation and control of toxic

chemical release -

Direct the rescue operations in co-ordination with Incident Controller and G.M. (EHS & QS).

Provide stretcher service to ambulance point

Cordon off the affected area if required.

Assess adequacy- of firefighting / rescue equipment and material and request Chief Emergency

Controller to provide any additional requirement.

General Manager (Maint.)

In absence of GM (Maint.), Deputy General Manager (Maint.) will take the role of G.M. Maint.) Rush to

the Emergency Control Room and in consultation with Chief Emergency Controller.

Arrange and provide necessary equipment like cranes, dozers, pay loaders, forklifts, trucks,

welding / cutting sets, jacks, chain pulley blocks, water pumps, etc. and power to operate these

equipment.

Ensure continuous operation of fire water pumps.

Arrange and provide required number of personnel to do civil, mechanical and electrical jobs like

sand bags, bundling, excavation, repairs, structure and debris removal, lighting, etc.

Make arrangement for permanent / temporary lighting / flood lights / emergency lights to the

affected area, shelters and other places

Direct the operation of above equipment and services

Keep constant touch with Chief Emergency Controller.




Shift Maintenance Engineer

Shift Maintenance Engineer will carry out following function until AGM (Mech) takes over;

Rush to the concerned Control Room along with one Technician and one Helper and as & when

required, organize for

Necessary equipment like cranes, dozers, pay loaders, forklifts, welding / cutting sets, jacks, chain

pulley blocks, tools and tackles, etc. to the site of emergency.

Arrange and depute operators, riggers, welders and technician, etc. to operate the above

equipment.

Arrange to cut off / restore power supply as needed in emergency situations.

Provide temporary connection for flood lights, street lights and electrical tools.

Provide power connection for pumps and other equipment

Keep liaison with MSEB / MIDC.

Organize instrumentation jobs such as repairs, adjustment of settings, bypassing, switching over

the mode of control, repairs, calibration and the like, which are needed for effective process

control during emergency.

Restore the functioning of controls, alarms and recorders, indicators, etc. for stabilizing the

operations

Remain in constant touch with Incident Controller

Ensure availability of information and data, pre-disaster time and at the time of disaster and store

it in proper fashion so that as and when required is available.

General Manager (Materials)

AGM (Materials) will take over this role in absence of Dy. G.M. (Materials),

Immediately contact Chief Emergency Controller and ascertain the material Requirements to

control emergency.

Arrange adequate supply of required material and transport for material

Procure or hire material, labour and transport to meet urgent requirement from outside parties /

industries.

General Manager (HR, IR & Admin.)

AGM (Admin) will take over this role in absence of G.M. (HR, IR & Admin.).

Go to Emergency Control Center and

Organize hospitalization, evacuation, head count and relief camps

Maintain law and order in factory premises (with the help of security)

Control entry and exit of personnel ii vehicles with the help of security

Seek assistance from outside agencies such as police, civil defense, CIDCO fire brigade and

mutual aid scheme

Ensure dissemination of authentic information to public and press

Keep relatives/ family members of involved employees informed from time to time

Inform to statutory authorities in consultation with C.E.C. (Chief emergency Controller)

Give constant feedback to C.E.C.




Security Officer

Security Officer will carry out following function until security manager take over.

Reinforce security at gates and vital installations

Depute security personnel to help firefighting, rescue and stretcher service

After instruction of Incident Controller blow of appropriate siren.

Restrict entries of unauthorized persons

Regulate entry and exit of personnel to ensure smooth function of emergency services

Ensure smooth entry and exist of fire brigades, ambulances and service vehicles

Organize transportation for affected / evacuated employees, their families and public.

Keep liaison with police, home guards for additional help to control Law and order, traffic and

evacuation.

Male Nurse

Factory Medical Officer will take over this function after reaching the O.H.C.

Organize ambulance services, treatment and hospitalization of affected persons

If necessary, get help of outside hospitals and medical professionals

Pass on information regarding condition and treatment of patients to General Manager (P&A) from

time to time

Contact Blood Bank and organize blood supply

Get blood donors. Get the help of social service organizations for this purpose

Contact General Manager (P&A) for welfare arrangements cf treated and discharged persons

Give feedback to General Manager (P&A)

Operators / Technicians

Report to Shift Engineer

Take action to stop supply of gas, Ammonia, acid etc. to the point of fire / leakage keeping

yourself safe as directed by Shift-in-charge / Engineer

Standby for instructions from Shift Engineer. Keep ready for evacuation if needed.

Other Control Room Persons

If Control room is not conclusive, bring the plant to safe condition with minimum crew by using

Breathing Apparatus and evacuate.

All Others

In case Evacuation siren is sounded, rush to Assembly Point no (1) [Near Main Gate] or Assembly

Point no. (2) [Near Gate No. 4] or Assembly point no. (3) IPA gate after seeing the wind direction.

Direct and lead Drivers / Contractors / Visitors to Assembly Point.

Do not phone unless it is necessary.

Do not spread any rumors.

Subject to head count at Assembly Point In orderly manner.

Obey the Instruction of Security at Assembly Point.


FERTILIZERS AT DFPCL COMPLEX, TALOJA, MAHARASHTRA ANNEXURE


Annexure 14: Methodology of Risk Assessment and Hazard Identification

Methodology of Risk Assessment

The methodology includes,

1. Hazard identification,

2. Selection of potential loss scenarios,

3. Simulation of release source model on DNV’s PHAST 7.1,

4. Plotting the damage contour on site map.

These steps undertaken to carry out risk assessment for this project are described in following

sections.

Hazard Identification

The project description, and other project related data provided by the client have been

comprehensively reviewed to identify the hazardous operations. Also the information on the hazardous

properties (MSDS) of all the chemicals handled at the site has been reviewed to identify the hazards

associated with the same.

Storage of some of the raw material at the site can lead to uncontrolled release of hazardous material

causing hazard. On the basis of this, the important hazards that can lead to accident in the proposed

expansion project are tabulated below.

Table 1: Important Hazardous Events

Type of Event Explanation

BLEVE

Boiling Liquid Evaporating Vapor Explosion; may happen due to catastrophic failure of

refrigerated or pressurized gases or liquids stored above their boiling points, followed by

early ignition of the same, typically leading to a fire ball

Deflagration Is the same as detonation but with reaction occurring at less than sonic velocity and

initiation of the reaction at lower energy levels

Detonation A propagating chemical reaction of a substance in which the reaction front advances in

the unreacted substance at or greater than sonic velocity in the unreacted material

Explosion A release of large amount of energy that form a blast wave

Fire Fire

Fireball

The burning of a flammable gas cloud on being immediately ignited at the edge before

forming a flammable/explosive mixture.

Flash Fire A flammable gas release gets ignited at the farthest edge resulting in flash-back fire

Jet Fire

A jet fire occurs when flammable gas releases from the pipeline (or hole) and the

released gas ignites immediately. Damage distance depends on the operating pressure

and the diameter of the hole or opening flow rate.

Pool Fire Pool fire is a turbulent diffusion fire burning above a horizontal pool of vaporizing

hydrocarbon fuel, where the fuel has zero or low initial momentum

Spill Release ‘Loss of containment’. Release of fluid or gas to the surroundings from unit’s own

equipment / tanks causing (potential) pollution and / or risk of explosion and / or fire

Structural Damage Breakage or fatigue failures (mostly failures caused by weather but not necessarily) of

structural support and direct structural failures

Vapor Cloud

Explosion

Explosion resulting from vapor clouds formed from flashing liquids or non-flashing liquids

and gases




Hazard and Damage Assessment

Toxic, flammable and explosive substances released from sources of storage as a result of failures or

catastrophes, can cause losses in the surrounding area in the form of:

Toxic gas dispersion, resulting in toxic levels in ambient air,

Fires, fireballs, and flash back fires, resulting in a heat wave (radiation), or

Explosions (Vapours Cloud Explosions) resulting in blast waves (overpressure).

Consequences of Fire/Heat Wave

The effect of thermal radiation on people is mainly a function of intensity of radiation and exposure

time. The effect is expressed in term of the probability of death and different degree of burn. The

consequence effects studied to assess the impact of the events on the receptors tabulated below.

Table 2: Damage due to Radiation Intensity

Radiation (kW/m2) Damage to Equipment Damage to People

4.0 - Causes pain if duration is longer than 20 sec.

But blistering is unlikely.

12.5 Minimum energy to ignite wood

with a flame; melts plastic tubing.

1% lethality in one minute. First degree burns

in 10 sec.

37.5 Severe damage to plant

100% lethality in 1 min.

50% lethality in 20 sec.

1% lethality in 10 sec.

Consequences of Overpressure

The effects of the shock wave vary depending on the characteristics of the material, the quantity

involved and the degree of confinement of the vapor cloud. The pressure of the shock wave decreases

rapidly with the increase in distance from the source of the explosion. The overpressure damage is

tabulated below.

Table 3: Overpressure Damage

Overpressure bar Damage

1 Fatality

0.41 Ear Drum Rupture to humans

0.2 Structural Damage to buildings

0.03 Glass Damage

Reference: World Bank Technical Paper no. 55- Technical Ltd. for assessing hazards- A manual

Consequences of Toxic Release

The effect of exposure to toxic substance depends upon the duration of exposure and the

concentration of the toxic substance.

Short-term exposures to high concentration give Acute Effects while long term exposures to low

concentrations result in Chronic Effects.

Only acute effects are considered under hazard analysis, since they are likely credible scenarios. These

effects are:

Irritation (respiratory system, skin, eyes)




Narcosis (nervous system)

Asphyxiation (oxygen deficiency)

System damage (blood organs)

Following are some of the common terms used to express toxicity of materials.

Threshold Limit Value (TLV): It is the permitted level of exposure for a given period on a weighted

average basis (usually 8 hr./day, 40 hr./week)

Short Time Exposure Limit (STEL): It is the permitted short term exposure limit usually for a 15

minutes exposure.

Immediately Dangerous to life and health (IDLH): It represents the maximum concentration of a

chemical from which, in the event of respiratory failure, one could escape within 30 minutes

without a respirator and without experiencing any escape/impairing (e.g. Severe irritation) or

irreversible health effects.

Lethal Concentration Low (LCLo): It is the lowest concentration of a material in air, other than

LC50, which has been reported to cause a death in human or animals.

Toxic Concentration Low (TCLo): It is the lowest concentration of a material in air, to which

humans or animals have been exposed for any given period of time that has produced a toxic

effects in humans or produced carcinogenic, neoplastigenic or tetratogenic effect in humans or

animals.

Emergency Response Planning Guidelines1 (EPRG1): The maximum airborne concentration below

which it is believed that nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to 1 hour (without a

respirator) without experiencing other than mild transient adverse health effects or without

perceiving a clearly defined objectionable odor.

Emergency Response Planning Guidelines2 (ERPG2): The maximum airborne concentration below

which it is believed that nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to 1 hour without

experiencing or developing irreversible or other serious health effects or symptoms that could

impair their abilities to take protective action.

Emergency Response Planning Guidelines3 (ERPG3): The maximum airborne concentration below

which it is believed that nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to 1 hour without

experiencing or developing life-threatening health effects.

RISK ASSESSMENT RELATED DATA FROM FINAL EIA REPORT · Final EIA & EMP – Expansion of Multiple Grades of NPK Fertilizers at DFPCL Complex, Taloja, Maharashtra 07. Risk Assessment

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